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Preface
The 44th Annual Conference of the Association for Consumer Research (ACR) was held at the Palmer House Hilton, Chi-
cago, Illinois, October 3-6, 2013. This volume reports the presentations made in special sessions, competitive paper sessions, 
working paper session, roundtables and film festival. 
The conference theme was “Making a Difference” and was inspired by Chicago, a bold city that is constantly reinventing 
itself through its architecture, restaurants, arts, nightlife, and music. Our hope was to channel this vibrancy into the conference 
in order to allow participants to discover, or re-discover, the joy of research that makes a difference. The conference attracted 
over 1230 participants, 104 special session proposals (51% accepted), 484 competitive papers (43% accepted), 254 working 
papers (64% accepted), 7 roundtables (100% accepted) and 13 films (81% accepted). 
In keeping with the spirit of the conference, we introduced several inaugural events and innovations to further enhance the 
academic content of our program. These included:
• The keynote address, “David & Goliath” by Malcolm Gladwell. Over 1200 members attended and everyone received 
a complimentary copy of his newly released book 
• The Mid-Career Mentorship Program, to connect mid-career faculty with senior mentors
• Perspectives Sessions, to integrate knowledge in specific research areas
• Workshops, to provide hands-on skills in research tools and methods
• Thematic organization of working papers into mini-sessions
All the academic and entertainment events made up for an energising experience.
We thank our generous donors, especially our schools, the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 
USA, the London Business School, UK, and the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada. Roger Mar-
tin, former Dean of Rotman, introduced us to Malcolm Gladwell and then flew in to open Malcom’s keynote speech. Thank 
you so much. Also supporting us was the American Marketing Association, the Journal of Consumer Psychology, the Journal 
of Marketing Research, the Journal of Consumer Research, and the Marketing Science Institute, and, from industry, Qualtrics, 
CBSIG, Fizz, and BrandOpus.  
Many wonderful people worked tirelessly to help us. We thank our Program Committee, Competitive Paper Review Board 
Members, Competitive Paper Reviewers, Working Paper Reviewers, and Film Reviewers. Special thanks to Leonard Lee and 
Wendy Liu (Working Paper Chairs), Anirban Mukhopadhyay and David Wooten (Forums Chairs), Marylouise Caldwell and 
Paul Henry (Film Festival Chairs), Derek Rucker and Jaideep Sengupta (Doctoral Symposium Chairs), Nidhi Agrawal and 
Jonathan Levav (Mid-Career Mentorship Program Chairs), and Kelly Goldsmith, Tom Meyvis, Leif Nelson, Joachim Vosge-
rau (Entertainment Committee). David Bell, Robert Meyer, Keith Niedermeier, and Americus Reed II (Brand Inequity band 
members) and Ashesh Mukherjee (DJ Ash) rocked our closing gala at House of Blues. Special thanks also to ACR Executive 
Director Rajiv Vaidyanathan, Conference Manager Paula Rigling, website guru Aleksey Cherfas, Membership Executive Man-
ager Praveen Aggarwal, Communication Executive Ekant Veer, administrative assistants Elisabeth Hajicek, Laura Nagle, Shira 
Conradi, Eliza Badoi, and Aaron Christen.
Our final thank you to colleagues who advised us throughout the year and helped in countless ways, to everyone who made 
our program stellar by submitting their best research, and to Angela Y. Lee, President ACR 2013, for this wonderful opportunity 
to organize the ACR conference.
Simona Botti, London Business School, UK
Aparna Labroo, Northwestern University, USA
ACR 2013 Conference Co-Chairs
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Making a Difference
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This year we come together to Chicago for ACR 2013.  The 
theme of this year’s conference is “Making a Difference.”  
The vision of the co-chairs when they were planning this con-
ference was that we would be coming together to make a difference. 
But what does that mean? I think we all know what difference means. 
But it is one thing to know what it stands for, and another to try to 
explain it.  So like what everyone does these days, I went online and 
looked up the word “difference” and found multiple definitions: 
• The quality that makes one person or thing unlike another 
• Something that people do not agree about – a disagree-
ment, quarrel, dispute or controversy
• A point or way in which people or things are not the same
• A noticeable change or effect 
Most of you would agree that “a noticeable change or effect” is 
what the co-chairs have in mind.  But I also think that we could make 
a bigger difference as a field by leveraging our differences. Diversity 
is a good thing. 
But is diversity really a good thing?  Or is it just a politically 
correct stance to take? We all know the saying – birds of a feather 
flock together.  Similar words of wisdom have been expressed by an-
cient philosophers starting with Aristotle (1934): “people love those 
who are like themselves” and Plato (1968) “similarity begets friend-
ship;” as well as in Chinese proverbs: “the same kind gathers (物以
類聚).” 
Research as early as almost 100 years ago showed that school 
children who shared similar demographic characteristics such as age, 
sex, race or ethnicity were more likely to form playgroups or become 
good friends. We all know intuitively, as well as from research, that 
similarity attracts.  People or things that are similar to us are aestheti-
cally more pleasing. Similarity helps reduce uncertainty; and that is 
another reason why we like things that are familiar – as demonstrated 
by the robust mere exposure effect.  Similarity facilitates communi-
cation; we can more easily communicate with others who share a 
common knowledge base, similar beliefs, or tastes. Similarity also 
engenders social cohesiveness. We can achieve greater consensus 
with people who are similar to us, and that makes us like them even 
more. It’s an upward spiral.  
Is similarity favored in academia?  Does similarity work the 
same way in academia with finding co-authors?  I did a mini survey 
with a small group of people from my cohort who were AMA Doc-
toral Consortium Fellows or MSI Young Scholars. I asked them to 
describe their most favorite co-author, what they thought of their co-
author when they first met, and now. Not surprisingly, their attitude 
toward their favorite co-author grew over time. But the impression 
that they think alike and are not very different remained stable (Fig-
ure 1). 
I also asked them to tell me where they met. The data suggest 
that favorite co-authors are likely ones who have the same training or 
share the same workplace culture (Figure 2).
In 1845, Samuel Morse sent the first electronic message “What 
had God wrought” from Washington DC to Baltimore, and declared 
putting an end to what he refers to as the “tyranny of distance.”  But 
it seems that even with the internet, email, and the dropbox that many 
of us use, the tyranny of distance still rules. And the conclusion one 
might draw from this very biased sample that “similarity attracts” 
provides more evidence to the “30-foot rule” phenomenon which 
says that people are most likely to work with others whose offices 
are within 30 feet of their own. 
But while homophily is evident, there is also a need for het-
erophily – “love of the different.” A co-author who is identical to us 
offers zero complementarity.  There are good reasons that we like 
differences. Putting two different things together gives special ad-
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vantage – a term known as hybrid vigor (heterosis). We see this ad-
vantage in the plant kingdom, such as the tea rose, or the rutabaga; 
we also see this advantage in the animal kingdom, like the Savannah 
cat. And amongst people, working with someone who is different 
from us sparks creativity, even when what makes them different is 
that they are wrong! 
I would like to describe a free association study that researchers 
from Berkeley conducted. They asked subjects to freely associate 
with the word “blue” – and the most common answer is “sky”.  But 
in another condition, they added another task before this free asso-
ciation task.  They showed subjects and a confederate color patches 
and asked them to name the color.  When the confederate sees the 
blue color patch and calls out “blue,” the free association is still 
“sky”.  But when the confederate sees the blue color patch and says 
“green,” the free association became more interesting; participants 
might say blue jazz, or blueberry pie.  
So just being different could lead to good outcomes.  But what 
about difference as in “something that people do not agree about – a 
disagreement, quarrel, dispute or controversy?” How can disagree-
ment or quarrel lead to something good?  
Let me tell you something about Alex Osborn. He is the founder 
of BBDO, one of the major ad agencies with offices in many cities 
around the world, including Chicago.  He is also the author of “Your 
Creative Power” published in 1948. What made this book so special 
was Chapter 33 – “How to organize a squad to create ideas.”  Ac-
cording to Osborn, people should get together and use the brain to 
storm a creative problem; that is, they come together and engage in 
a “brainstorm”. And brainstorming was central to BBDO’s success. 
At one of these brainstorming sessions, ten advertising executives 
were reported to have generated a total of 87 ideas for a new drug-
store in 90 minutes, at the rate of almost one idea per minute. The 
most important rule that they had to follow, one that distinguishes 
brainstorming from other types of group activity, was there should be 
NO criticism, and NO negative comments. The idea is that if people 
are worried that their ideas might be ridiculed, the whole process 
would fall apart. So the gist of the instruction was - “Forget qual-
ity. Aim for quantity.” Brainstorming was an instant hit and Osborn 
became an influential business guru. 
Now business guru may know how to make money, but most 
of them don’t know how to do good research. More than 50 years 
later, in 2004, the same researchers from Berkeley conducted another 
study that took place in two countries – US and France.  Fifty-two 
teams of 5 female undergrads each were given 20 minutes to come 
up with as many solutions as possible to reduce traffic congestion 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. At the same time, six teams of male 
undergrads and 15 teams of female undergrads were tasked with 
solving a similar traffic congestion problem in Paris. The teams in 
each country were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. All 
participants were told: “most research and advice suggest that the 
best way to come up with good solutions is to come up with many 
solutions. Freewheeling is welcome; don’t be afraid to say anything 
that comes to mind.” Then participants in the brainstorming condi-
tion were given the standard brainstorming instruction: “However, in 
addition, most studies suggest that you should rule out criticism. You 
should NOT criticize anyone else’s ideas.” And those in the debate 
condition were told: “However, in addition, most studies suggest that 
you should debate and even criticize each other’s ideas.” And partic-
ipants in the control condition were not given any further instruction. 
The results were quite surprising. The brainstorming group 
performed only slightly better than the no instructions control 
group. The debate group was by far the most creative, generating 
20% more ideas than the other two groups. This study shows that 
ideas are not inhibited by debates and criticisms; but are instead 
stimulated by them. 
Other evidence also suggests when people who think differently 
come together, good things happen. A study examining what makes 
Broadway musicals successful shows that the best teams were those 
with a mix of old and new talents and relationships. West Side Story 
is a good example.  It had really famous producers and directors 
and choreographers like Jerome Robbins, Leonard Bernstein, Arthur 
Laurents. It also had a 25-year old lyricist who had never worked on 
broadway musical before – his name? Stephen Sondheim. 
What I would like to advocate is that different ways of thinking 
can enrich research – there is a yin-yang complementarity.  Let’s 
consider promotion and prevention focus. Both are essential for sur-
vival, and yet seldom can we adopt both orientations at the same 
time.  Wouldn’t it be nice if someone has what we lack watching our 
back?  It’s the same with abstract/concrete thinking, or analytical/
holistic thinking. I’m sure you could come up with more examples. 
So having a diverse team of researchers does have distinct pros 
and cons – while the team may lose out on social cohesiveness, they 
win big on creativity, innovativeness, and impact! Let me share with 
you the results of a paper published in Science a few years ago on 
research productivity and impact (Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi 2007). The 
authors examined web of science data on 19.9 million papers and 2.1 
million worldwide patents published between 1945 and 2006 and 
found that teams increasingly dominate solo authors in the produc-
tion of knowledge. Team efforts in research are on the rise across vir-
tually all fields—science and engineering, social sciences, patents, 
except in arts and humanities where it is fairly stable. Teams also 
produce more highly cited research than individuals, with this team 
advantage increasing over time. The most frequently cited studies 
used to be the product of a lone genius, like Einstein, or Darwin. This 
is no longer the case. Today, papers by multiple authors receive more 
than twice as many citations as single-authored papers. And within 
teams, the diversity advantage continues: between-school collabora-
tions have a significant advantage over within-school collaborations 
in terms of high impact papers.  That is, UBC-Duke collaboration 
trumps UBC-UBC collaboration or Duke-Duke collaboration. And it 
is not just cross-school collaborations getting more citations, cross-
border or international collaborations also receive more citations 
than within-nation collaborations.  
What we are observing with these cross-school or international 
collaborations may be similar to what happens to a particular plant 
species - cucurbita pepo. The scallop squash, pumpkin, zucchini, 
these are all different varieties of the same species.  Different farm-
ers grow it for different characteristics they value – so after 7000 
years, we have many different varieties from the same species.  By 
the same token, we may start with one idea, and different researchers 
with different interests will take that idea into different directions, 
and we end up having a much richer set of findings for that construct, 
each with its unique contributions. 
You may ask: where do ideas come from? Maybe we could take 
a lesson from Steve Jobs. When he was running Pixar, he thought 
the headquarters must have an airy atrium. But an airy atrium is not 
enough.  He also thought “everyone has to run into each other.”  So 
he needed to force people to go to the atrium. He started with mail-
boxes, then meeting rooms, cafeteria, coffee bar, gift shop… they 
were all in the atrium. He also had the only set of bathrooms in the 
entire building there, although he was later forced to compromise 
and had a second set of bathrooms elsewhere. 
By now, we know all the ingredients for high impact work…
different people, from different schools, preferably from different 
countries, a space for people to run into each other, time and venue 
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to listen, chat, debate, and to share personal experience. And when 
we put all the ingredients together, that’s ACR2013 in Chicago!
Let’s take a look at the membership of ACR. In 1973, ACR had 
411 members from 8 different countries (Canada 25, Denmark 1, 
Finland 1, France 2, Germany 1, Japan 1, Norway 3, USA 3). Then 
membership went up to 789 members from 19 countries in 1983 
(Australia 8, Brazil 2, Canada 53, Denmark 3, Finland 3, France 6, 
Germany 15, Greece 1, Japan 4, Netherlands 7, Norway 3, Saudi 
Arabia 1, Spain 2, Sweden 2, Switzerland 3, United Kingdom 3, 
USA 672, Yugoslavia 1), 1549 members from 33 countries in 1994 
(Australia 28, Austria 3, Bahrain 1, Belgium 3, Brazil 3, Canada 78, 
Denmark 8, Finland 11, France 15, Germany 21, Hong Kong 3, India 
1, Israel 3, Italy 2, Japan 16, Korea 11, Netherlands 22, New Zealand 
2, N Ireland 1, Norway 2, Poland 1, Portugal 1, Saudi Arabia 2, Scot-
land 1, Singapore 8, South Africa 1, Spain 5, Sweden 4, Taiwan 3, 
Thailand 1, Turkey 4, UK 17, USA 1278). And this year in 2013, we 
have 1668 members from 51 countries (Table 1)—a diverse group of 
individuals, all with a shared goal.   
I am proud to say that the profile of my co-authors looks some-
what like the ACR membership profile: 31 from North America, 10 
from Asia, 2 from Australia, 2 from Europe, and 4 from the Middle 
East. They are the people who have taught me how to think differ-
ently to make a difference.  I am thankful to every one of them.
Here’s what I would like all of you to do.  Before Saturday is 
over, talk to at least 3 people whom you did not know prior to this 
conference. You may find a collaborator for some exciting new re-
search that you could submit to a new outlet.  
Speaking of new outlet, let me take this opportunity to make 
an exciting announcement:  The ACR Board has voted yesterday to 
launch a new journal.  It is official.  This decision was based on the 
findings and recommendations of three taskforces and many meet-
ings and deliberate discussions. The focus of the ACR journal (name 
to be determined) is on substantive contributions.  The issues will be 
themed – like special issues.  Some of them will include commentar-
ies.  There are a lot of details that need to be ironed out, but please 
stay tuned for further announcements.  
Before I leave this podium, I would like to acknowledge and 
express my gratitude to three special people who have made a differ-
ence in my life.  In their different ways, they have guided me, sup-
ported me, and inspired me.  Without them, I would not have been 
here today speaking to you.  They are Andy Mitchell, my advisor, 
and Brian Sternthal and Alice Tybout, my colleagues at Northwest-
ern.  I thank them. 
And I thank all of you. Have a great conference!
Table 1: ACR Membership in 2013
North America Europe Asia-Pacific
Canada 121 Norway 10 Astralia 36
Mexico 9 Poland 3 China 15
United States 968 Portugal 2 Hong Kong (China) 31
Romania 1 India 6
Europe Spain 9 Indonesia 4
Austria 14 Sweden 12 Japan 35
Belgium 24 Switzerland 17 Kazakhstan 1
Croatia 1 Turkey 15 Macao (China) 4
Denmark 6 United Kingdom 71 Malaysia 3
European Union 1 New Zealand 14
Finland 5 Middle East Pakistan 1
France 49 Israel 10 Singapore 16
Germany 28 UAE 3 South Korea 15
Greece 2 Saudi Arabia 1 Taiwan 14
Ireland 4 Thailand 3
Italy 9 South America
Lithuania 1 Brazil 8 Africa
Monaco 1 Argentina 2 Morocco 1
Netherlands 34 Colombia 2 South Africa 6
Netherlands Antilles 1 Chile 1
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Consumer Research
The dictionary definition of a fellow includes:   “a member of 
a learned society.”   Well, wow, what a learned society that I am 
joining.   It has a history dating to the first large scale models of 
the field, in John Howard, distinguished colleagues like Paul Green, 
Peter Wright, Russ Belk, Sid Levy, Joe Alba and others, and includes 
friends like Jim Bettman, Hal Kassarjian, John Lynch and now Ita-
mar Simonson.   I am deeply and truly honored to join this company.
I am also the fourth fellow from Columbia.  This is neat, not 
only because we have twice as many as any other school, but also 
because it reflects a central merit of the school: a culture where doing 
research is valued above other things, something strongly advocated 
by my predecessors, like John Howard, and by my good friends and 
role models, Morris Holbrooke and Don Lehman.  
I thought I would spend my time today looking backwards 
briefly, but as anyone who knows me well, I am more motivated by 
looking forward.  I will divide this talk into two sections, the first I’ll 
call an “an unabashedly sentimental 5 minutes of thanks”, and in the 
remainder of the talk I will address something more forward looking, 
talking about how Choice Architecture can make consumer research 
more relevant.
For purposes of publication in the Proceedings, I’ve moved the 
gratitude section to an appendix, not because saying thank you is 
unimportant, but to let readers more interested in the future – as op-
posed to my idiosyncratic past – an easy entrance.
Consumer Research Should Matter More
As the economist David Laibson has observed, there is a coun-
cil of economic advisors, but no Council of Psychological or Con-
sumer Advisors.    Yet if you study consumption you are obviously 
studying an important part of the economy:
●	 Consumers’ decisions about mortgages helped lead to the 
worldwide 2008 financial crisis, yet their decisions were 
only of interest to consumer researchers in retrospect. 
Very little work looks at one of the most important choices 
that consumers make.
●	 Every day consumers make decisions about consumption 
that will exacerbate or mitigate climate change, including 
purchasing cars, houses, and appliances which, in the ag-
gregate, will determine the amount of greenhouse gases 
released.  Influencing these choices could have a major 
impact upon the future.
●	 While the information technology issues surrounding the 
launch of the health exchange may dominate short-term 
headlines, there is a more lasting and important question 
about the ability of people to select the right policy.  Ex-
plicit in using a market to facilitate choice is the idea that 
people will be able to choose the health insurance protec-
tion that will best fit their needs.  People with interests in 
consumer behavior should be integral players in the design 
of the new marketplaces that are part of the Affordable 
Care Act, but so far have had very limited roles.   Simi-
lar questions surround any government intervention that 
utilizes consumer choice, like Medicare Part D, a multi-
billion dollar program providing subsidized prescription 
drug coverage to seniors.
Yet these topics are not prominent in the consumer research lit-
erature, and the voice of consumer researchers is not a major part of 
the discussion for any of these important debates.  One could say that 
we are at best on the sidelines, or perhaps, to use an analogy, sitting 
at the kid’s table at the public policy family gathering.
There are many diagnoses and potential cures.   In this short 
talk, I will concentrate on one route to having influence on these 
important issues:  Thinking hard and in a non-superficial way about 
how the options presented to people affect their choices.   The phrase 
commonly used, and it’s a brilliant coining by Dick Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein, is choice architecture.
Choice architecture is ubiquitous and inevitable: Either by ac-
cident or design every choice situation is presented in such a way 
that can influence choice.   For example, I noticed that the confer-
ence organizers knew this and preselected the vegetarian option for 
us during this conference.  And Sunstein and Thaler make this point 
in Nudge, using their ‘Cafeteria’ example: There is no neutral choice 
architecture.   So, simply put, choice architecture is the set of deci-
sions we make about what, how, and when options are presented to 
the decision-maker. It is important to realize that everyone, from a 
parent asking a child to go to bed, to a government presenting op-
tions to its citizens, is a choice architect.   Remember, whenever you 
draft choice stimuli for an experiment, you are a practicing choice 
architecture.
Let me describe some of the goals of choice architecture.   These 
are ideas generated by a wonderful collections of colleagues at the 
8th Invitational Choice Symposium published in a piece in Market-
ing Letters (Johnson et al., 2012). Choice architecture can:
●	 Make decisions easier.
●	 Make decisions more accurate reflections of consumers’ 
preferences. 
●	 Help consumers construct preferences to make more ac-
curate hedonic forecasts.
●	 Make better tradeoffs between individual and societal 
goals.
●	 By improving consumers’ decisions, make markets more 
competitive and efficient.
Now notice that only the fourth goal – that is making better 
tradeoffs between individual and societal goals – has anything to do 
with nudging.  The simple fact of the matter is that there are no No-
Choice architecture options.  Just as every building has a design, 
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even a haphazard one, every choice has its own design.   And just 
as the goal of architecture is not to control people’s behavior, but to 
produce a functional and aesthetically pleasant building, the goal of 
choice architecture is, for the most part, these first three goals.
Now that we have clarified that, let me suggest the challenges 
and benefits of incorporating choice architecture into the mainstream 
of consumer research.   
These issues help address one critique, one our reviewers often 
raise: 
What is new about this?  After all, don’t most choice studies in 
consumer research try to change choices?  What’s so special about 
that?
I would argue that choice architecture represents a fascinating 
blend of theoretical and applied issues, and that application helps 
focus theory on places it might have the most impact, which is in the 
world and not in our journals.  
Let me illustrate the relationship between application and theo-
ry with three examples of important questions that central to choice 
architecture and that raise important and interesting theoretical con-
nections.
What are the dynamics of Choice Architecture?
If choice architecture can change preferences, even in direc-
tions that are desired by the decision-maker, how long do those 
changes last?   This is fundamental both theoretically and practically. 
It speaks to the enduring nature of value change and the relationship 
between preferences and behavior.   Itamar Simonson, Jonathan Le-
vav, and On Amir have explored this question and have different per-
spectives on this issue and obviously more work is being done in this 
area. However, early work on mere-measurement with Vicki Mor-
witz (Morwitz, Johnson, & Schmittlein, 1993) showed that measur-
ing intentions changed behavior over a period of 6 months,   Other 
work by Imai, Goldstein, Gürwitz and Gollwitzer (Imai, Goldstein, 
& Göritz, 2007) looks at changes in voting intentions and its effect 
on voting, and shows a wear out of a few weeks.   Understanding 
when and why such effects decay will shed light on the fundamental 
nature of preferences.
Practically, if an intervention just has a short-term effect, and 
the decision is made often, then the intervention might wear out. 
Domains with this property include food consumption and saving 
decisions. Brian Wansink claims we make over a hundred decisions 
about food a day (Wansink, Just, & Payne, 2009) and we make de-
cisions between tradeoffs between consumption and savings every 
time we pull out our wallet.   I do worry that some interventions, like 
mindsets and priming, have strong effects, but are unlikely to be last-
ing.  To the extent we want to influence reality, we need to consider 
these dynamics.
I think that in some cases we have been lucky: We have looked 
at areas where  decision is made once, and tends to stick.   This seems 
to be the case where the consideration of the decision is not particu-
larly pleasant, for example Organ Donation, or retirement savings. 
But the relationship between the temporal nature of interventions, 
their effects on preferences and subsequent choice deserves much 
more  theoretical consideration.
Are people aware of the effects of choice architecture?
There is a really theoretically important issue here about meta-
cognition: Do people realize the effects of choice architecture?   Do 
they attribute the effects of an intervention, such as a default, cor-
rectly, to the presence of the default, or do they attribute the choice 
they made to their own preferences?  How much do they know about 
how well they have made choices in the absence of an intervention? 
Do they believe that the choice environment improved or worsened 
their choices?    Theoretically, we don’t know much about this, but it 
is worrisome.   We do know that people are likely to adapt to what-
ever they chose and that suggests they are unlikely to learn.   
Let me give you a brief example from some work we have done 
looking at how well people can make choices on the health exchang-
es generated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
This work (Johnson, Hassin, Baker, Bajger, & Treur, 2013) 
shows that people have great difficulty choosing a cost effective 
health plan.    Figure 1 shows the results of later experiments.   The 
first bar, labeled Ex. 5, shows the performance of a set of Columbia 
MBA students.   They do relatively well, choosing the most cost 
effective plan about 75% of the time (as shown by the ascending 
blue bar) and making an average mistake of about a $100 dollars (as 
shown by the descending blue bar).   However, even when we teach 
people the meaning of arcane terms like deductible and co-payment, 
ordinary people do not do well.    As you can see in the next bar, they 
are making serious mistakes, choosing the most cost effective policy 
less than half the time, and making mistakes that average over $500. 
Now we have tried several things to help people make better choices 
and have succeeded in doing so:  The subsequent bars correspond 
to treatments in the study: providing significant incentives (which 
help very little), providing a summary of costs (termed a calculator), 
preselecting the best option as the default, or combining defaults and 
calculators.   Obviously, these help, and in the paper, we explain how 
these savings can amount to billions of dollars.
But how well do people appreciate the effects of these choice 
architecture interventions?   If they understood that calculators and 
defaults improved their choice, this would be very good news for 
choice architects: People would be drawn to web sites and vendors 
that helped them make better choices and avoid those that used un-
helpful choice architecture. Public policies that improved their de-
cisions would be supported.   We have only started examining the 
question, but the results are discouraging.  When given an incentive, 
which they should have in reality as these health plan decisions have 
real consequences, people worked harder and were more confident 
of their choices than in the default condition, but the reality, as can 
be seen in incentive bar in the figure, is that they did not do better. 
Providing defaults and calculators did not improve confidence even 
though the combination makes them as effective decision-makers as 
the Columbia MBA’s, as can be seen if you compare the first and last 
bars in figure 1.
Figure 1
 
 
Figure 2.  
 
  From a practical perspective this has implications that are mor-
al, ethical, and political.   If people are unaware of the effects of a 
default, should they be warned of these effects?   Who is responsible 
if a decision maker makes a wrong choice?   These questions, focus-
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ing on the relationship between choice architecture and awareness 
of choice quality seems a conceptually interesting and practically 
important question for future research. 
Who is helped and is anyone hurt?
The concept of nudging seems seductive, but it hides the value 
of the first three functions of choice architecture that we have dis-
cussed, and raises important questions.   We have been lucky that 
most of the ‘winning’ examples of choice architecture are in cases 
where the intervention helps almost everyone.   Most people want 
to increase their savings rate but don’t, most want to become organ 
donors, but can’t bring themselves to think about their demise.    
But people differ along two important dimensions:  They have 
differing tastes and beliefs, and different sets of cognitive skills.   Not 
everyone wants the same health insurance policy, not everyone wants 
the same kind of retirement plan.    One concept that Dan Goldstein 
and I have talked about is that of ‘smart’ defaults (Goldstein, John-
son, Herrmann, & Heitmann, 2008).  Instead of assigning people into 
a one-size-fits-all default, with a little bit of intelligence, you can 
default people into what you think is the best choice for them. They 
are still free to choose something different, but you have gotten them 
closer to an answer that should be right.   Yet, again, questions about 
awareness of these effects come to mind.
Also, how do we identify these individual differences in cogni-
tive ability or other determinants of the way we make decisions? 
This is not just as simple as incorporating individual difference vari-
ables to show moderation. I’m thinking of identifying the big effects 
in the real world, and looking at how different people are helped or 
hurt by different choice designs.   
I’ll illustrate with an example from our lab’s current research. 
We are all getting older: a depressing consequence is that this means 
we lose our ability to process information quickly, an effect that has 
been termed by Salthouse and colleagues  ‘cognitive collapse’ (Sal-
thouse, 2010). The youngsters in this room have almost a full stan-
dard deviation of advantage on fluid intelligence, commonly mea-
sured by tasks like Ravens Progressive Matrices and the like.  (Don’t 
get too smug; this is going to happen to you.  Fluid intelligence peaks 
at 20).   The good news for older people like myself is that we are im-
proving in what is called crystallized intelligence, knowledge about 
the world.  60 year olds are much better crossword puzzle solvers 
than 20 year olds.   Ye Li, Elke Weber and colleagues (Li, Baldassi, 
Johnson, & Weber, 2013) have been examining these effects on fi-
nancial decisions across the life span.  The basic result is that old-
er people made decisions that are often better than those made by 
younger people, but they make them in different ways, relying on 
their knowledge of the world and not their brilliantly speedy ability 
to process new information.   This suggests something very impor-
tant: That the young and old have very different needs when it comes 
to providing information:  That providing fewer alternatives might 
be more beneficial to elders than to the young, because it reduces the 
load on their fluid intelligence. In contrast, the young might benefit 
more from ‘just-in-time’ education about financial facts.    
This suggests a different view of the role of individual differ-
ences in research; that we should not be concerned with those vari-
ables that are ‘theoretically’ interesting, but those that account for 
great variance in the real world.
How to be relevant
What are the benefits of consumer research?   Why should we 
try to share what we know? I am absolutely convinced that we have 
quite a bit to offer, and despite the growth of the field and its great 
promise, it is underappreciated in many ways, not least of which is 
its influence on public policy.   To illustrate in an area of significant 
concern for me, look at consumer finance.    The nascent Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau has an Office of Research whose mis-
sion is to understand consumer behavior in the service of evidence-
based regulation.  You might ask how many consumer behavior re-
searchers or psychologists work for the office.   The answer is one, 
and she started last week.   
I’ll modestly suggest focusing on some of the issues I have dis-
cussed, so focusing on choice architecture in general might bridge 
the gap between policy and our research. Finally, to increase impact, 
let me suggest three things:
A focus on the field
Field experiments are undervalued.    A couple of years ago, at 
a preconference panel on having research with impact, I asked the 
panel about field research.  The response was, to be polite, mixed, 
with many people saying things like:  “there are always confounds in 
field research.”   Well the simple reality is that there are always what 
John Lynch (Lynch, 1982) has called ‘background variables’ and that 
these confounds and background variables are a big part of reality.   
Choice architecture research, more than others, needs to be 
done in the field, with the relevant population, with dependent vari-
ables that look like the actual choice, what Harrison and List (Har-
rison & List, 2004) call ‘framed field studies’.   
This may sound like an impossible task, and I can imagine ju-
nior investigators, worried about tenure, asking ‘Who is that crazy 
man up there?’
Consider, however, that:
●	 Many real decisions are made on-line, that websites are 
used for many important policy decisions, like deciding 
when to collect social security, which health plan to pick, 
or what funds to select for a retirement portfolio.   
●	 On-line participants, particularly if they come from the 
appropriate population can lend credibility to the research 
that will increase its impact.  
●	 Field experimentation doesn’t mean field, it can mean on-
line environments, and the world, more generally, is start-
ing to look a lot like the lab.  
●	 And by the way, if you are clever, you can establish causal-
ity in the field, even without controlling the manipulation, 
through instrumental variable regression.
One more observation: companies are running experiments 
now; it is part of what might be called making business more evi-
dence-based, much like Moneyball made baseball more evidence-
based.  They get it.  So we should take advantage of it too. The op-
portunities for field experimentation are many.
Worry about the size of the effect, the importance of the 
effect and not the elegance of the interaction
Often, we are satisfied with the fact that our results are statis-
tically significant, and less sensitive to the effects of sample size. 
These effects tend to be less replicable and less likely to have impact, 
since, by definition, they suggest that applying the findings is tricky 
business.   Contrast this to results that have several mediators, all of 
which pull in the same direction, making the results robust.  A good 
example of this might be no-action defaults, which have at least three 
causes (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011).
Translate the results into numbers
It’s one thing to report a difference in means, it’s quite another 
to talk about dollars.  In our work on the health exchanges, we could, 
and do, present the results as a percentage increase in performance. 
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But there is another measure.   We can look at the size of the error in 
dollars represented by each decision, the descending bars in the fig-
ure.  This dollar number, put in context, can be very persuasive.  To 
say that choice architecture can reduce the errors made by consum-
ers from $533 dollars to $77 is more concrete and vivid.   Note that 
this simply applies principles that are part of the accepted wisdom in 
other fields about concreteness and vividness.  But there is another 
trick: You can look at how those errors might scale up.  Under the 
assumption that 20 million people will be buying insurance on the 
exchanges, that mistake multiplies, becoming, in the aggregate 9.12 
billion dollars a year.   Now that might get a policy maker’s attention. 
Incidentally, some of the state exchanges are including calculators 
and other decision aids.
Conclusion
In closing, let me say that I am profoundly optimistic about the 
field.   
●	 First, we are larger, more diverse and if the Flynn ef-
fect (Flynn, 1998) means anything the next generation is 
brighter (by several IQ points) than the preceding one.
●	 Second, the world is more interested and accepting of the 
social sciences and particularly input from decision re-
search.   This is true in both policy and business as wit-
nessed by the Behavioral Insights team in Britain and its 
nascent equivalent in the US.  The idea of a randomized 
control trial is rapidly gaining acceptance in business 
worldwide, and we can encourage that trend by incorpo-
rating a concern for experimentation into our teaching. 
Moreover, doing this will create research opportunities.
●	 Finally, the set of tools and toys you have is astounding. 
For those of us who started when surveys and punch-
cards were mainstays, the alternatives are now staggering: 
Ubiquitous computing, eye-tracking in the supermarket – 
in fact, the super market is now your computer.  It’s time 
to abandon the survey: The lab is becoming reality.  I envy 
the possibilities that you face.   
Thanks for listening.
Appendix: The Unabashedly Sentimental 5 Minutes .
Now as I said, anyone who knows me well, knows that I don’t 
look backwards a lot.  To quote research terms invented by a friend 
who is a social psychologist, I am a promotion focus, high locomo-
tion type.    This can be a fault.  I have forgotten old results from 
papers, and I’m much more likely to want to work on a new project 
than do the heavy lifting of getting an old one revised.   But looking 
backwards is important.
There are many people to thank who have helped create the 
researcher who humbly talks to you today.   Current and past gradu-
ate students, a particularly wonderful set of postdoctoral fellows, and 
some really superb research assistants and lab managers, particularly 
those involved in the Preferences as Memories Laboratory, or PAM-
LAB, that I have been running jointly with Elke Weber for the last 
10 years.   It excites me to see them move up each rung on the ladder 
from RA to graduate student or postdoc to faculty member.
But I want to extend my particular thanks to people who made 
a difference early on, as a young working class kid from New Jersey 
came to realize the he could, perhaps, follow his crazy interests, first 
in science, and then in something he vaguely knew was something 
more relevant and interesting, social science and consumer decision-
making.   Excuse me if I tell you a little about my parents’ back-
ground.   My father grew up on a homestead in eastern Colorado, the 
first generation son of Swedish immigrants, and occasionally, but not 
often, he would tell tales of burning corn cobs for fuel, and using the 
car battery to power the house’s only radio, since electricity had not 
yet reached them.  My mom was one of nine children born in Scran-
ton, and my grandfather counted himself fortunate to be a supervisor 
in silk mills.   While wonderfully encouraging, there were not a lot 
of role models for going to college or graduate school.
 I’d like to focus on those most responsible for me choosing 
the career and research questions that I have.  The tale starts with a 
couple of junior faculty, who were never tenured, in Human Com-
munication at Rutgers, David ‘Louie’ Bender and David Davidson 
who gave a young RA something more to do than fetch coffee and 
who did me the great favor of giving me some things to read.  Now 
I am sure you are thinking that Human Communication majors all 
were scholarship athletes or good-looking people who wanted to be 
news anchors, and I clearly fit neither role.  I majored in this mostly 
because it had the least required courses, had something to do with 
social science and I really did not know what I wanted to do.   The 
most important things given to me to read were work in attitude 
theory and Herb Simon’s Science of the Artificial, a wonderful little 
book laying out the human information processing perspective.   I 
applied to the Psychology PhD program at Carnegie-Mellon, which 
was pretty stupid.  I had taken only taken two advanced psychology 
courses, and didn’t get into some other programs because of this.  I 
remember telling one of my letter writers in psychology thank you 
for his letter and that I had gotten into Carnegie-Mellon, to which he 
responded disbelievingly,  “In Psychology?”
By an astounding accident, Jay Russo spent one year at CMU, 
making the transition from Psychology to Marketing.   During this 
year I took a 6-week course called Buyer Behavior that used as a 
text Jim Bettman’s An Information Processing Theory of Consumer 
Choice (a preprint in mimeo) and I was hooked.  I then spent a year 
and a half at Chicago.   There I admired and argued with Hilly Ein-
horn who offered great encouragement and was a great alto saxo-
phonist.  Playing bass for Hilly, Morris Holbrook and Paul Green 
was a ton of fun, but as they say, outside the scope of this talk. 
Back to Jay who provided the right mix of encouragement and 
challenge. He also went way beyond what was necessary.  I had 
written a paper and submitted to a conference in Sweden, and never 
heard back.  When two weeks before the conference, Robin Hogarth 
told Jay I was on the program, he encouraged me to go, and lent me 
the money so I could make the trip.     While I paid him back finan-
cially long ago, I really cannot pay Jay back for all the advice and 
encouragement he gave, but I can say thank you.
I should also mention Sarah Lichtenstein, who provided me 
with lots of encouragement, and was a huge role model for many 
people in the field.
 I was then fortunate that Amos Tversky agreed to host me as 
a post-doctoral fellow on a National Science Foundation fellowship 
at Stanford.   What followed was an enthralling, challenging, and 
intimidating intellectual experience.  Oh, by the way, it was pretty 
productive.   At this point, I was totally hooked on decision research, 
did two early papers on affect and risk with Amos, and was pretty 
schizophrenic:  Enthralled by two very different styles of research: 
The grand and clever demonstration experiment, a technique pio-
neered by Kahnemann and Tversky, and the careful and narrow in-
formation processing style of research, representing my Carnegie 
roots.  I think I’ve never really reconciled the two.
About this time, I started to talk to John Payne.   It would appear 
that I had chased John out of some of the best universities:  He was 
a post-doc at Carnegie who had just left when I arrived, a faculty 
member at Chicago, who left when I got there, and when I received a 
job offer from Duke, I’m sure there was a sigh of relief when I didn’t 
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take it:  John was simply too valuable to them.   Not long afterwards, 
John and I were developing production systems of strategies. Soon 
Jim Bettman joined us on this project.   I felt a little like a rookie on 
the all-star team, but I was nonetheless amazingly comfortable:  Our 
interaction was about the ideas, not egos.   As a last bit of nostalgia, 
I remember that Jim and John would walk through the Fuqua School 
running our computer simulations on the administrator’s IBM PCs 
inserting floppy disks at night and retrieving them in the morning. 
Little did they know they were inventing clustered computing.    
In German you refer to your dissertation advisor as your doctor 
vater or doctor father, so while Jay played that role for me, Jim and 
John were my uncles, or since I’m from New Jersey, and have spent 
a lot of time in places used to film episodes of “The Sopranos”, per-
haps they were my godfathers.
Along the way, each of these folks saw something and said 
something that was encouraging, that made me feel that I could do 
something useful, that I had an interesting idea.  This is in strong 
contrast to the kind of feedback we get so often from reviewers, or 
that we give each other in questions at conferences.   Writing this, I 
come to feel that I’ve fallen short on this dimension, and hope we all 
realize how valuable this kind of encouragement can be.    As Don 
Lehman said in his fellows address, it is important.  Pass it on….
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Paper #2: Consumer JDM Research in Search of 
Direction: What’s Next for Consumer JDM-BDT 
Researchers?  (My Take)
A primary goal of “Behavioral Decision Theory” (BDT), in-
cluding the significant part of BDT research published in marketing 
journals, has been to introduce an alternative to economic, norma-
tive decision theory.  More precisely, while not offering a compre-
hensive alternative decision theory, much of BDT has been devoted 
to showing that key assumptions underlying economic theory are 
violated and are inconsistent with the way decisions are actually 
made.  BDT research consisted largely of “effects,” many of which 
involved demonstrations of preference reversals.  BDT research 
tended to have certain unique characteristics, including (a) avoiding 
“grand theories,” such as those characterized by boxes and arrows; 
instead, BDT research led to some general conclusions such as the 
notion of the construction of preferences; (b) minimal, as required 
use of mediation analyses; (c) a preference for choice and behavior 
as dependent measures as opposed to ratings; (d) the introduction of 
various distinct effects, which are then appropriately named.  Re-
searchers have also tried to understand what underlies these effects 
and their moderators/boundaries.  The consumer BDT community 
has been particularly diverse in terms of the educational background 
of researchers, many of whom have also been important contributors 
to the broader Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) field. 
Consumers’ BDT researchers have made important contribu-
tions to the consumer behavior literature and the broader JDM field. 
Although I have not conducted a systematic analysis, compared to 
other consumer research topics, it appears that BDT research pub-
lished in marketing journals has had large impact on research in non-
marketing fields as well as on quantitative researchers in marketing. 
The primary objective of BDT has been largely accomplished 
– BDT research has persuasively demonstrated that the assumption 
of value maximization and, more broadly, assumptions underlying 
normative theories of decision making, are violated in systematic 
ways (such as various context and task effects).  Accordingly, this is 
a good time to reevaluate possible directions for “ex-BDT” consum-
er researchers.  Although each person will make his/her own choices, 
having a discussion about areas that present promising opportunities 
and might benefit from the skills and tendencies of consumer BDT 
researchers may help shape the direction of this large community.
A default option is to just let the chips fall where they may.  As 
further demonstrations of violations of the assumptions economics 
are becoming less significant as contributions to the literature, vari-
ous other topics have emerged.  Though lacking one common pur-
pose, they address a variety of interesting questions.  In general, con-
sumer JDM researchers have paid greater attention in recent years 
to topics that have particular implications for society, such as deci-
sions concerning health, the environment, financial matters, and eth-
ics.  Consumer JDM researchers have also studied currently popular 
topics in psychology, such as embodiment.  And long-standing top-
ics such as intertemporal preferences and moderators of previously 
demonstrated effects have continued to be examined.
An important, emerging area for consumer JDM researchers is 
consumer decision making as a reflection and driver of the evolving 
information environment (Internet, etc.).  The current information-
rich, socially intensive environment can potentially fundamentally 
change many aspects of consumer behavior and marketing.  Si-
monson and Rosen (2014) discuss the broad implications of a shift 
from relative evaluations to absolute evaluations of product quality. 
Briefly, in an age when consumers can readily obtain rather accurate 
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information (based on reviews, demonstrations, and other informa-
tion services) that allows them to predict experience quality, they are 
less dependent on relative comparisons.  For example, consumers’ 
product quality predictions are less likely to be driven by comparing 
the options in front of them (i.e., the local context), by prior brand 
evaluations, or based on prices and countries-of-origin.  The current 
information environment might also change other aspects of con-
sumer behavior such as basic purchase processes, adoption of in-
novation, and customer satisfaction.
Compared to the previous BDT field, this emerging area of re-
search is less focused on anomalies and preference reversals.  It calls 
for greater emphasis on external validity.  Moreover, in addition to 
controlled experiments, studying consumer decision making in the 
new environment will involve greater reliance on secondary data. 
This may require researchers to improve their econometrics skills 
and/or collaborate to a greater extent with empirical quantitative re-
searchers in marketing.
Such a shift of focus raises other challenges.  Because it is more 
marketing-focused than the previous more general purpose BDT/
JDM field, it will require a greater commitment to marketing and 
consumer-specific research than the consumer BDT community has 
been accustomed to.  Moreover, the general JDM community may 
find consumer-focused work of less interest.  Considering that many 
researchers in the consumer BDT have strong ties to the psychology 
and general JDM field, it is unclear if they will be receptive to this 
direction. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The field of consumer behavior has a lengthy history of exami-
nation of the processes and nuances associated with the acquisition, 
consumption, and dispossession of goods and services. From its very 
inception as an academic field, substantive domains and methodolo-
gies have been explicitly interdisciplinary and include economics, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, as well as other fields. How-
ever, despite this broad reach, most investigations have concentrated 
their attention on a rather small percentage of the entire world popu-
lation and geographic locations (Martin and Hill 2012), emphasizing 
relatively elite portions of the economically developed west. Yet we 
assume our research is generalizable to the entirety of humankind. 
This situation raises several distinct possibilities that have im-
plications for consumer theory development. First, the 85 percent 
of the human population that has received only limited attention by 
scholars has the same needs and wants as the predominantly western 
elite consumers because of widespread exposure to media and other 
sources of information associated with the larger consumer culture 
(Alden et al. 1999). If this proposition is true, differences are a matter 
of scale rather than perspective or process. Such worthy research has 
influenced the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid movement in business that a 
multi-billion persons market exists, which requires similar products 
in smaller, more affordable portions and sizes (Prahalad and Hart 
2002).
A second possibility is that the majority of consumers on our 
planet is truly distinct and demands all new ways of conceptualizing 
how they navigate their material world (Hill and Gaines 2007). Un-
der this paradigmatic approach, cultural distinctions and individual 
differences may be so influential that a failure to take them into ac-
count leads to inappropriate theory and practice (for a fuller discus-
sion see Okazaki and Taylor 2010). A third approach that is adopted 
in this session proposal suggests that restriction associated with im-
poverishment supersedes most other factors and has a diverse impact 
upon consumer behavior. For instance, Hill, Martin, and Chaplin 
(2012) looked at consumption restriction, social comparison, and 
life satisfaction, finding that social comparisons are more powerful 
determinants of life satisfaction for people in poorer, developing so-
cieties than for people in affluent societies. Specifically, compared 
to their affluent counterparts, impoverished consumers experience 
greater decreases in life satisfaction when their access to goods and 
services is lower than others within their societies.
As a consequence of these and other results (Martin and Hill 
2012), we propose a special session that presents four novel contexts 
where findings compare more affluent with more impoverished con-
sumption environments and reveal the importance of poverty in our 
understanding of consumer behavior. The first examines how mate-
rialism manifests among poor children; the second looks at saving 
behavior in developing nations; the third studies consumer negotia-
tion and acquisition processes in subsistence marketplaces, and the 
fourth presents working class consumer behavior in mobile-home 
parks. The central question asked in each of these new data sets is: 
Do impoverished consumers behave differently or the same when 
compared to more affluent counterparts?
Poverty and Materialism: Are Impoverished Children 
More Materialistic Than Affluent Children?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Our research is the first to examine consumer values for chil-
dren and adolescents from impoverished backgrounds. In study 1, 
we found that older adolescents (ages 16-17) from impoverished 
families are more materialistic than adolescents from affluent back-
grounds. In study 2, we found that differences in materialism among 
income groups emerge at the onset of early adolescence (ages 12-
13). Prior to this stage, younger children (ages 8-11) from impov-
erished families exhibit a similar level of materialism as younger 
children from more affluent families. Across both studies, higher 
levels of materialism among impoverished adolescents is associated 
with low self-esteem, which has been identified as one of the nega-
tive impacts on youngsters living in families experiencing economic 
hardship. Below, we discuss the implications and contributions of 
these findings for consumer research on (1) poverty and materialism, 
and (2) young consumers and materialism.
The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in issues re-
lated to consumers living in poverty as well as bottom-of-the-pyra-
mid consumers in less developed countries (Martin and Hill 2012; 
Prahalad 2005; Viswanathan, Rosa, and Ruth 2010). However, even 
with this renewed interest, little is known about the role that material 
goods, consumption values, and desires for material wealth play in 
the lives of those living in poverty. 
A naïve assumption would be that consumers living in poverty 
are focused on obtaining the bare necessities, leaving little room for 
strivings for material wealth and status. However, a recent study by 
Hill, Martin, and Chaplin (2012) questions this assumption. Using 
data across 38 countries, they show that social comparisons of mate-
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rial wealth are more important for life satisfaction of consumers liv-
ing in poorer developing nations versus consumers living in affluent 
Western nations. This work reveals that access to goods and services 
in the marketplace plays an even more important role in poverty-
stricken societies. Our results show the same patterns for young con-
sumers (adolescents) living in poverty within an affluent Western 
nation. Further research comparing these levels of analysis—poor 
versus affluent nations and poor versus affluent consumers within 
nations—may provide additional insights into the role of poverty in 
aspirations for material wealth.
The connection between poverty and materialism opens up 
several new areas for study. One topic of great importance is the 
effects of materialism on the well-being of consumers living in pov-
erty. Higher levels of materialism are associated with a variety of 
negative consequences, such as lower life satisfaction, less success-
ful interpersonal relationships, and less generosity toward others 
(Kasser 2002, 2005). Could higher levels of materialism exact an 
even greater toll on poor consumers? Believing that happiness and a 
more satisfying life depends on accumulating material wealth, which 
is beyond their grasp, individuals living in poverty may experience 
much greater negative consequences of materialism than the general 
population. 
Preliminary data gathered during the course of our research 
lends credence to this view. In each of our two studies, we asked 
participants how happy they were on a scale from 1 to 5. Younger 
children from impoverished and more affluent families had similar 
levels of happiness (8-9 year-olds: 4.08 vs. 4.10; 10-11 year-olds: 
4.07 vs. 4.22; all p > .50). Note that these children also had simi-
lar levels of materialism. However, adolescents from impoverished 
families were less happy than adolescents from more affluent fami-
lies (12-13 year-olds: M = 3.21 vs. 3.64, t(1, 44) = 2.24, p = .01; 
16-17 year-olds: M = 2.90 vs. 3.91, t(1, 48) = 4.57, p < .01). Recall 
that for both age groups, impoverished adolescents were also more 
materialistic than their affluent peers. 
Another important consequence of materialism among impov-
erished adolescents may be a connection between materialism and 
juvenile delinquency. Our research shows that adolescents from im-
poverished families are more materialistic, yet they have fewer re-
sources to fulfill their strivings for money and material goods. Crime 
provides one of few paths to material wealth. The link between ma-
terialism and crime among adolescents from poor neighborhoods is 
suggested by Ozanne, Hill, and Wright (1998) in their study of ju-
venile delinquents (ages 12-18) incarcerated for robbery, auto theft, 
and selling illegal drugs. These juveniles placed a high degree of 
importance on possessions and money as a way to obtain a sense 
of power and status among their peers. Possessions—such as cars, 
clothes, and guns—were seen as important to having the right image 
when “hanging out with friends” and competing for the attention of 
young women. Although crimes were sometimes committed for fun 
and excitement, many were committed to obtain money to spend on 
items to impress others and provide status among their peers. 
Profiles of Consumer Saving: 
Societal Conditions and Individual Aspirations
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We were interested in capturing the nuances of consumer saving 
behavior worldwide, among individuals in nations across a range of 
poverty and restriction. To do so we conducted two research inves-
tigations examining different facets of the poverty-saving relation-
ship. Given the nascent stage of research in these areas, we proposed 
two different research questions to look at societal and individual 
influences on consumer saving. In our first investigation, we used 
multilevel methods and analyses to understand how conditions of 
poverty and inequality at the societal level influenced individual sav-
ing likelihood. Using a broad worldwide sample and controlling for 
additional national and personal factors previously linked to saving, 
we found that societal poverty significantly influenced individual 
saving occurrence. Echoing research that highlights the resourceful-
ness and determination of the world’s poorest citizens (Collins et al. 
2009), we found that in conditions of greater poverty, saving likeli-
hood also was greater. We were unable to confirm the impact of in-
equality on saving (versus spending), as inequality had no significant 
effect on these behaviors among consumers in our sample. 
In our second investigation, we extracted two more narrow and 
focused samples of consumers in nations with the highest poverty 
and in nations with the lowest poverty, according to United Nations 
classifications. In each, we applied latent class nominal binary re-
gression analysis to distinguish consumer profiles and understand 
the manner in which aspirations influence saving. As described 
above, we found differences among the consumers within each 
sample, as well as across the two samples. Specifically, theoretical 
perspectives of goal contents theory and the role of aspirations fit the 
high poverty sample well, demonstrating how both intrinsic and ex-
trinsic aspirations influence saving for different profiles of consum-
ers. The findings for the low poverty/ high affluence sample were 
in stark contrast, where a large number of consumers were not at 
all influenced by aspirations. When intrinsic or extrinsic aspirations 
were influential, they acted to promote spending rather than saving 
among these consumers.
Our findings challenge conventional wisdom about saving, and 
extend marketing and economics scholarship. Research involving 
materialism or conspicuous consumption accurately portrays the 
angst of consumers living in post-modern societies where identi-
ties are dependent on what we have and how it is displayed socially 
(Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Wong 2007). Nonetheless, seven bil-
lion inhabitants live in diverse material environments characterized 
by varying levels of poverty, affluence, and equality. To suggest that 
these contexts may lead to similar beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors 
is fraught with difficulties, especially if investigations concentrate 
attention on the most impoverished people in the poorest develop-
ing nations (Hill, Felice, and Ainscough 2007). Our findings echo 
limited but emerging scholarship that examines large-scale samples 
of such populations and finds significant disparities in individual 
psychological interpretations as a result of societal poverty (Martin 
and Hill 2012).
The idea that consumers with less material access and goods 
might get caught up in the same needs and desires as their more 
affluent counterparts is a valid assumption as long as the context is 
a material world where the basic necessities of life are widely avail-
able (Martin and Hill 2012). When or if they are not, such as in sub-
sistence marketplaces, heuristics employed in consumption versus 
saving may vary greatly, resulting in radically different behaviors 
for (potentially) radically different reasons. Consider our finding that 
greater poverty in the least developed parts of the world leads to 
increased saving. This outcome is not consistent with what happens 
in Western countries with more abundant marketplaces (Berger and 
Ward 2010), or in experimental settings with consumers who face 
restrictions for short time periods (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011). 
Yet an alternative logic is revealed that suggests the poorest citizens 
may recognize their lives are in greatest jeopardy in times of low 
to no resources, and saving during more abundant times could be 
viewed as necessary for basic survival (Collins et al. 2009).
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Yet even these relationships are not so simple. As shown re-
cently by Martin and Hill (2012), self-determination influences indi-
vidual life satisfaction of BOP consumers. The present study moves 
significantly beyond their basic conceptualization of psychological 
need fulfillment to investigate nuances that enhance this theoretical 
paradigm; namely goal contents theory. Examination of consumer 
goals and aspirations is not new, as evidenced by the stream of work 
described in the paper’s conceptual development. Although the find-
ings of past research on goals are significant, we do see substantial 
value for life goals and aspirations as a differentiator of saving be-
havior between citizens in poor versus affluent nations. In particular, 
our finding that different forms of aspirations lead to greater sav-
ing in impoverished societies—but may have the opposite effect in 
wealthy countries—is theoretically compelling. Collectively, results 
suggest unique ways of understanding what it means to seek per-
sonal fulfillment and social status via consumer behavior if poverty 
abounds or if affluence abounds. Likewise, our results highlight the 
extent of these disparities and their relative importance across na-
tions. 
Expectations derived from goal contents theory are that in-
trinsic (Kasser and Ryan 1996) and extrinsic (Deci and Ryan 1985) 
aspirations help explain saving behavior. Yet again, we find impor-
tant differences between the developed and developing worlds. For 
example, in the most impoverished societies, the vast majority of 
consumers experience one or the other form of aspirations, leading 
to increased saving. For individuals whose aspirations or goals are 
intrinsic in nature, greater numbers of children imply that they may 
be responding to desires to support their families’ growing needs 
and promote their safety, security, and well-being. Such broader life 
goals also may be self-actualizing. For individuals whose aspirations 
are extrinsic in nature, low education and income levels may make 
them susceptible to negative social comparisons (Hill, Martin, and 
Chaplin 2012). Accordingly, financial, material, and success oriented 
goals may promote saving behaviors as a means to a desired end of 
status and other recognition. Future research could probe the charac-
teristics and goal contents of high poverty consumers to understand 
how aspirations influence other important outcomes and aspects of 
their lives. 
Consumer Negotiation and Acquisition at the Bottom-of-
the-Pyramid: The Case of Women Market Traders
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Fresh food markets, whether centrally organized by govern-
ments or ad hoc in nature, provide the world’s market traders, the 
vast majority of whom are women, with a critical source of income. 
Simultaneously, these markets serve a critical social function by 
making possible the efficient aggregation and redistribution of foods 
to needy populations, and providing economically and ecologically 
sustainable alternatives to imported foods that have higher economic 
and environmental costs. Women market traders play a critical role 
in consumer access to fresh and low cost agricultural products. In ad-
dition, in some countries their market entrance fees serve as a signifi-
cant source of local government revenue. Throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Australasia, however, women trad-
ers are frequently dismissed as marginal, unskilled, and unimportant. 
Women market traders make substantial contributions to local and 
national economies by connecting consumers with agricultural pro-
ducers, adding to local government funding, and sustaining count-
less households and communities. Their importance and contribu-
tions must be understood and acknowledged.
Women market traders in subsistence economies work in fragile 
socioeconomic and political environments. In some countries (e.g., 
Fiji), repeated military coups have led to policy instability that places 
additional pressure on market systems and social networks to pre-
serve order and process, even when the rule of law is absent or un-
predictable. In other countries (e.g.,  Tanzania), it has been economic 
shocks due to political upheaval in neighboring states that have in-
troduced uncertainty into the market, and it has once again fallen to 
market traders to adjust and endure. In addition, markets are com-
plicated by religious and ethnic diversity that constrains interaction 
between social groups, and by persistent pressure from civic leader 
to foster a sense of national identity that neutralizes such barriers. In 
environments made unpredictable by conflicting agendas at multiple 
levels, we study how women market traders create sustainable, mul-
tiethnic distribution networks that make markets possible and feed 
urban and rural residents while financing town and city operations.
In many emerging economies, residents engage in semi-subsis-
tence agriculture to meet household food needs, but those who live 
in towns or urban areas rely upon fresh produce markets. Due to 
their popularity, and patronage by most urban residents, municipal 
markets are some of the few places where social interaction between 
individuals from different ethnic groups is normal and expected, and 
among traders such interethnic alliances constitute a critical aspect 
of their work. Key topics in this research are how capitalist mar-
kets create, reinforce, and subvert ethnic differences in a politically 
fraught environment, and the role of feminized market trade labor in 
these processes.  
The research also explores how social justice and sustainable 
business practices come together in subsistence markets through 
women traders. It explores at a micro-level, for example, women’s 
critical roles in creating and maintaining food security in the midst of 
climate change. Food security, broadly defined as people’s abilities 
to access affordable and nutritious products, is a concern throughout 
the world. In Fiji, for example, climate change is a clear and present 
danger to sustainable livelihoods. Soil salinization caused by rising 
ocean levels is having widespread impact on crop production, and 
its influence is palpable in market trading activity. In Tanzania, it 
is record high temperatures and extreme weather events that are af-
fecting growing seasons and food availability, with similar effects in 
local produce markets. 
At the level of women traders, our research shows that they 
negotiate difficult circumstances and emerging problems created by 
climate change to make trade possible in spite of increasingly vola-
tile supply and quality. The research further documents some of the 
labor environment challenges faced by women market traders and 
their innovative solutions to such challenges. Women market traders 
work long hours in conditions commonly seen as inadequate, un-
sanitary, and hazardous. They battle second-class status, pricing and 
access inequities, and the persistent threat of assault in order to fulfill 
market duties, and through impressive and creative management of 
their meager resources and distribution networks they preserve suf-
ficient dignity to function. Their innovativeness and persistence are 
impressive, and worthy of being understood and emulated.
Moral Identity and Competition in a Working Class 
Neighborhood
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
An enduring finding in consumption communities and socio-
logical research is that consumers socially stratify themselves (Ve-
blen 1994/1899). Bourdieu (1977, 1984) theorizes society as made 
up of overlapping social fields where people compete for social dis-
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tinction by employing economic, cultural, and social resources. In 
particular, the cultural capital of the working classes is conceptu-
alized as subordinate to the cultural capital of higher classes. The 
working classes lack resources so they create a culture of necessity 
where they develop a taste for the practical, passively accept popular 
culture, and are united in their conformity. Recent empirical work 
using survey data similarly portrays working class culture as deficit 
where poor consumers have little education, do not read books or 
attend cultural events, and have few preferences beyond consum-
ing commercialized popular culture and visiting fast food restaurants 
(Bennett et al. 2009). Consumer researchers have extended this work 
on status consumption, challenging some of the initial assumptions 
and stressing the importance of consumption practices (Holt 1998; 
Ustuner and Holt 2007, 2010).
But the cultural capital prized within different social groups 
may be more nuanced and localized particularly when consumers 
have few resources. In a study of rural firefighters, they value their 
country competence, which is an embodied skill set that allows them 
to face life-and-death decisions; as members of the pickup-truck 
crowd, they see themselves as superior to the pretentious suburban 
Buick crowd (Desmond 2006). Consistent with other researchers 
who question the centrality of taste in status competition (Lamont 
2000), we examine how moral dispositions guide the consumption 
practices of the working poor. Based on an ethnographic study and 
forty interviews in a mobile home park, we examine the home con-
sumption practices of consumers in this marginalized and resource 
constrained environment. 
Our research finds that different visions of morality lie at the 
heart of status negotiation for the working poor. Specifically, the 
trailer park residents’ moral habitus shapes their evaluations of them-
selves and their neighbors, as well as their preferences, perceived 
capacities, hopes, and dreams. Habitus is a set of unconscious and 
enduring dispositions that are acquired in childhood and provide an 
implicit sense of how the world works and one’s place in this world 
(Bourdieu 1984). Habitus is a forgotten history that is transferred 
to new contexts and helps explain why people reproduce existing 
social structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This study extends 
this notion of habitus empirically to explore the moral habituses or 
dispositions that guide a working class neighborhood.
Five groups emerged in our study—Nesters, Reluctant Emi-
grants, Community Builders, Homesteaders, and Outcasts. Nesters 
enact a disciplined moral self that is based on hard work; they are 
critical of their neighbors who they see as lazy and instead align with 
middle class consumers. Reluctant Emigrants enact a caring moral 
self where family is privileged; yet they view the park as a hostile 
and chaotic place from which to escape. Community Builders affirm 
a communal self and work on projects to enhance the well-being of 
their neighborhood. Homesteaders are resigned to life in the park, 
which they see as a good place for poor people to live because they 
can leverage social support; their moral identity is fatalistic and they 
adopt a live-and-let-live approach. Finally, the Outsiders perform a 
spectacular self that is characterized by practices that are defiant and 
rule breaking.
The diversity of class habituses guided by different moral dis-
positions can explain the levels and intensity of class consciousness 
and agency within a social class. Why is class structure stable? Why 
do few working-class protests occur despite growing social inequali-
ties? Part of this answer may lie in the co-existence of competing 
moral habituses within the same social class. For example, the Com-
munity Builders criticize the structural disadvantages facing the poor 
yet mobilize to take constructive actions. However, the Homestead-
ers are more passive and fatalistic. Within the trailer park, these two 
groups interact socially more than any other groups. Yet given their 
differing moral dispositions, they do not work together in solidarity. 
Given the even greater differences among the other groups, class 
solidarity is unlikely. Nesters gain status by distancing themselves 
from the other trailer park residents, and consume symbolically to 
enact a middle class lifestyle. The Reluctant Emigrants see trailer 
life as a negative symbol of poverty and thus invest little energy in 
their home practices and seek to escape the community. All of these 
groups differ from the Outcasts for whom the home has little mean-
ing except as a safe place to enact subcultural capital.
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How Audience Factors Influence Word-of-Mouth
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Discrepancies and Knowledge Signaling in Word-of-Mouth
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Paper  #3: Using Incentives to Encourage Word-of-Mouth 
Transmissions That Lead To Fast Information Diffusion
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA
Paper  #4: Answering Why: Action and Reaction Explanations 
in Word of Mouth
Sarah G. Moore, University of Alberta, Canada
SESSION OVERVIEW
How does the audience shape word of mouth? What audience 
characteristics influence what and how people communicate? Most 
research on word-of-mouth has focused on its consequences, or how 
it influences choice, diffusion, and sales (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 
2004; Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman 2010). There has 
been less attention, however, to the processes underlying interper-
sonal communication, particularly how the recipient impacts what 
people talk about and share. The four papers in this session illustrate 
how various aspects of the audience might motivate the speaker to 
share different type of content, use different linguistic styles, or pass 
on product information in the face of incentives or knowledge dis-
crepancies. All four presentations are working papers with at least 
four studies completed.
Barasch and Berger investigate how the mere number of peo-
ple with whom consumers communicate impacts what people share 
through shifting sharer focus. They find that talking to a group leads 
people to focus on the self and share self-presentational content, 
while talking to one person leads people to focus on the audience and 
share useful content. Packard and Wooten examine how consumers 
compensate for knowledge deficiencies by sharing product informa-
tion with psychologically close (but not distant) audiences. That is, 
people engage in compensatory self-enhancement with audiences 
that have self-concept relevance (i.e., friends) by sending close oth-
ers positive signals of their consumer knowledge. 
Stephen and Lehmann examine the use of incentives to en-
courage transmission of product information to higher-connectivi-
ty friends (i.e., social hubs). Moreover, the authors show that this 
mechanism of incentives based on positive externalities (increasing 
value with more audience members) can lead to faster information 
diffusion. Finally, Moore shows that the use of different explanations 
in WOM is determined by what speakers think would be most useful 
or helpful for their audience, such that they use more action explana-
tions for utilitarian experiences and more reaction explanations for 
hedonic experiences. 
Communication requires more than one party; indeed, people 
cannot share things without an audience. Together, these papers 
highlight the diverse ways in which the audience shapes what and 
how people communicate. Given the widespread applicability of the 
issues discussed, the session should attract researchers interested not 
only in word-of-mouth, communication, and persuasion, but also 
self-presentation, utilitarian vs. hedonic experiences, and self-other 
trade-offs. In the spirit of the conference theme of “Making a Differ-
ence,” we hope that the practical implications of each presentation 
(how to improve social interactions, share more valuable content, or 
design effective WOM campaigns), and the diverse approaches to 
studying the audience’s influence on word-of-mouth, will generate a 
lively and fruitful discussion.
Broadcasting and Narrowcasting: How Audience Size 
Impacts What People Share
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Does the mere number of people with whom consumers com-
municate impact what they talk about and share? Some conversa-
tions involve communicating with just one person (narrowcasting), 
whereas others involve communicating with many people (broad-
casting). We suggest that audience size will impact communication 
by shifting the relative influence of two fundamental word-of-mouth 
drivers: self-presentation and helping others. 
People disproportionately attend to their own opinions and in-
terests (Kruger 1999), and it is intrinsically rewarding to talk about 
the self (Tamir and Mitchell 2012). Indeed, self-disclosure is the 
most common topic in human conversation (Emler 1990). Given 
that considering others requires time, effort, and motivation (Epley 
et al. 2004), broadcasting should do little to move people from their 
natural tendency for self-focus, which should boost self-presentation 
because people automatically associate themselves with favorable at-
tributes (Paulhus and Levitt 1987).
Narrowcasting, however, should mitigate egocentrism and en-
courage people to focus on others. Thinking about a specific other 
makes others more concrete and promotes recognition of a person’s 
distinct identity (Alicke and Govorun 2005). Sharing with just one 
other person should make the audience more vivid, increasing the at-
tention he or she receives. By increasing other-focus, narrowcasting 
should facilitate consideration of the audience member’s perspec-
tive, which should in turn encourage people to “tune” their messages 
(Higgins 1999) and share useful content.
Thus, we suggest that broadcasting will lead people to share 
more self-presenting content (because of increased self-focus), while 
narrowcasting will lead people to share content that is more useful 
(because of increased other-focus).  The current research tests the 
causal impact of audience size by manipulating it directly across four 
experiments.
In Study 1, we gave participants a list of imaginary events and 
asked them to write a short description of their day for one person 
(narrowcasting) or a group of people (broadcasting). Since people 
often self-present through distancing the self from negative personal 
experiences (Sedikides 1993), we predicted and found that broad-
casting led people to share fewer negative events (t(90)=2.50, p=.01) 
and reframe the negative events they mentioned in a positive light 
(t(90)=-2.16, p<.04). 
In Study 2, we controlled for audience closeness by asking par-
ticipants to have short, real conversations with other students in the 
lab, either a single partner (narrowcasting) or a small group (broad-
casting). Then, we had 2 coders rate the conversations for negativ-
ity (r=.9). Building on Study 1, we found that broadcasting reduced 
negativity (t(179)=-2.73, p<.01). Further, as a preliminary test of 
self-focus and other-focus, we found that broadcasting increased the 
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usage of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, t(179)=-2.14, 
p=.03), while narrowcasting increased the usage of second-person 
pronouns (e.g., you, t(179)=3.38, p<.01). 
Study 3 tested the underlying mechanism behind these effects. 
In addition to manipulating audience size, we asked half the par-
ticipants to list the name(s) of the people with whom they are shar-
ing, which should have a similar effect as narrowcasting by boosting 
other-focus and moderating the effect of audience size. Respondents 
were asked how likely they would be to share 8 useful items (e.g., “A 
coupon for a discount”), or 15 self-presentation items that were ei-
ther acquisitive or protective (“Just got a good/bad grade on a test”). 
Because people are more motivated to avoid bad impressions than to 
pursue good ones (Baumeister et al. 2001), we expect the impact on 
self-presentation to reveal itself primarily in the avoidance of look-
ing bad (protective self-presentation) rather than the approach of 
looking good (acquisitive self-presentation). 
An ANOVA revealed a significant Audience Size x Other-focus 
interaction on usefulness (F(1,138)=5.65,p<.03), as well as an Audi-
ence Size x Other-focus x Self-presentation interaction, such that the 
effect on protective self-presentation was significant (F(1,78)=6.90, 
p=.01), but the effect on acquisitive self-presentation was not (F<.1, 
p>0.9). As predicted, when participants did not list others’ names, 
narrowcasting boosted the sharing of useful content and broadcast-
ing decreased willingness to share things that would make partici-
pants look bad. When participants listed names of the people with 
whom they were sharing, however, these differences disappeared. 
Making the audience more concrete had an analogous effect to nar-
rowcasting, supporting the notion that audience size effects are driv-
en by changes in sharer focus.
Study 4 tested this mechanism more directly. Respondents 
were randomly assigned according to a 2 (Audience size: narrow 
vs. broad) x 4 (Content type) between-within-subjects design. We si-
multaneously manipulated the usefulness and self-presenting nature 
of the content, asking participants how likely they would be to share 
each type of content and how much they were thinking about the self 
versus the audience (sharer focus).
As expected, people were always more willing to share useful 
content, but this tendency was stronger when people were narrow-
casting (F(1,141)=6.94, p<.01). Similarly, people were always more 
willing to share content that made them look good rather than bad, 
but this tendency was stronger when broadcasting (F(1,141)=23.97, 
p<.001). Consistent with our previous results, while audience size 
did not impact participants willingness to share content that made 
them look good, broadcasting did reduce participants willingness to 
share content that made them look bad.  The effects of audience size 
on self-presentation and usefulness were both mediated by sharer 
focus (95% CI[.03, .65]; 95% CI[-.39,-.03]). 
By demonstrating the impact of audience size on communica-
tion and by articulating the underlying role of sender vs. receiver 
focus, this research integrates work on the drivers of word-of-mouth 
with work on self-other trade-offs to deepen our understanding of 
what people share and why. This work contributes to work on the 
behavioral drivers of word-of-mouth, interpersonal communication, 
and the role of sharer focus.
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Compensatory Communication: Consumer Knowledge 
Discrepancies and Knowledge Signaling in Word-of-
Mouth
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People who believe they are knowledgeable about products 
tend to share this knowledge more with others. This tenet is central 
to research on word-of-mouth motivation (e.g. Engel et al. 1969; Fe-
ick and Price 1987; Wojnicki and Godes 2012) and consistent with 
Gricean maxims—those who believe they are more knowledgeable 
should make an appropriately weighted ‘conversational contribu-
tion’ by sharing their knowledge more with others (Grice 1991). A 
prediction that follows from this research is that a perceived short-
coming in consumer knowledge should constrain a person’s motiva-
tion to share product information.
While recognizing this possibility, we predict that perceived 
deficiencies in consumer knowledge sometimes lead to an increase 
rather than a decrease in word-of-mouth transmission. Why might 
this occur? Subjective consumer knowledge has been defined as 
what or how much a person thinks she presently knows about prod-
ucts (Park et al. 1994). Extending this definition, we propose that 
consumer knowledge consequences may be linked not only to a per-
son’s beliefs about their present-state attributes or “actual self,” but 
also the “ideal self” they desire to be in the same domain (Markus 
and Wurf 1987). 
A discrepancy between a person’s perception of their actual 
and ideal consumer knowledge (a knowledge discrepancy) may have 
significant behavioral consequences (Baumeister 1982). A common 
response to self-discrepancies is compensatory self-enhancement, 
whereby people work to promote more favorable impressions of 
themselves with self-concept relevant audiences (e.g. Swann et al. 
1989). Building on prior research on compensatory self-enhance-
ment (e.g. Rucker and Galinsky 2008) and self-concept motivation 
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in word-of-mouth (e.g. Berger and Schwartz 2011), we predict that 
the desire to produce compensatory signals of higher consumer 
knowledge sometimes leads knowledge discrepant individuals to 
share more (rather than less) product information. Four studies test 
our compensatory communication hypothesis. 
Study 1 examined how a measured knowledge discrepancy im-
pacts consumers’ motivations to share product opinions with audi-
ences that differ in self-concept relevance. The relevance of social 
relations with psychologically close individuals (i.e. friends) make 
them a primary target of self-enhancement, while distant (i.e. anony-
mous) others are likely to hold less self-concept relevance (Baumeis-
ter 1982; Tesser and Campbell 1982). Participants in this study (and 
all that follow) were told they would be testing the “Share” button 
feature of an online retailer, through which product reviews can be 
transmitted to either known or anonymous others. Our analysis re-
vealed that given a psychologically close (but not distant) audience, 
a knowledge discrepancy increases the number of product reviews 
people intend to write and how many people they wished to share 
their reviews with during the study.
Study 2 explored the core effect using a manipulated rather than 
measured knowledge discrepancy, and tested for moderation by lay 
beliefs in the self-enhancement benefit of sharing word-of-mouth in-
formation (Hennig-Thurau et al 2004). A knowledge discrepancy in 
music was manipulated adapting an existing method (e.g. Higgins et 
al 1986). Three items captured lay beliefs in the self-enhancement 
benefit of sharing product knowledge. Analysis revealed that the ef-
fect of a knowledge discrepancy on the intention to write and share 
music reviews was greater for participants with higher beliefs in the 
self-enhancing benefits of sharing word-of-mouth.
Study 3 examined the effect in a different product category 
(movies) and with different dependent variables. Specifically, we 
analyzed the content of participant-written reviews using measures 
consistent with attempted audience impression management. We 
predicted that review content shared by participants with high (vs. 
low) knowledge discrepancies would indicate greater effort to write 
the review, include more self-centered content, utilize more complex 
language, and be more positive about the product (Schlenker 1980; 
Walther 2007). After the discrepancy manipulation, participants 
were to share their opinion about the last movie they had seen via 
email with a self-concept relevant audience. Multivariate ANOVA 
using 11 content-based measures supported all four predictions link-
ing the compensatory communication effect to self-presentation in 
general or social displays of knowledge in particular.
In Study 4, we tested whether the compensatory communica-
tion effect was mediated by the negative emotion (dejection) found 
in prior examinations of actual:ideal self-discrepancies (e.g. Higgins 
1987; Higgins et al. 1986). This study also provided an additional 
robustness test by examining discrepancies in consumer knowledge 
at a general as opposed to a category-specific level. A discrepancy in 
generalized consumer knowledge was manipulated using the same 
method as Studies 2-3 (except for dropping the product category 
name). Participants were then invited to share their knowledge about 
books, music or movies with a self-concept relevant audience in a 
manner identical to Study 2. The core compensatory communication 
effect was again replicated for both the number of reviews written 
and review sharing. Bootstrap analysis confirmed that the specific 
emotion linked by prior research to actual:ideal self-discrepancies 
mediated the effect of a knowledge discrepancy on intentions to 
transmit word-of-mouth. 
Conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between word-
of-mouth and consumer knowledge is that the people who talk more 
about products do so because they think they know more about them. 
By identifying the motivational power of knowledge discrepancies, 
this research contributes a more nuanced understanding of how 
knowledge beliefs and audience factors motivate word-of-mouth 
transmission. We hope this research stimulates new inquiries lever-
aging a more dynamic conception of consumer knowledge, shedding 
new light on the link between these beliefs and consumer attitudes 
and behaviors.
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Using Incentives to Encourage Word-of-Mouth 
Transmissions That Lead To Fast Information Diffusion
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Unlike traditional advertising campaigns or sales promotions, 
word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing relies on consumer-to-consumer 
interactions to spread awareness, generate interest, and drive sales. 
Importantly, not only do marketers hope for positive WOM, they 
hope it spreads rapidly. Fast information diffusion is important in 
many marketing situations, particularly in competitive environments 
and when firms have limited timeframes in which to achieve objec-
tives.
According to prior research, the best way to speed up WOM-
based information diffusion is for firms to target consumers who are 
highly connected (i.e., social hubs). Extant research shows that once 
information (or a product) is passed on by a social hub diffusion 
speeds up because these WOM transmitters have access to more 
people than “normal” consumers (Goldenberg et al. 2009; Hinz et al. 
2011). However, directly targeting social hubs is not always possible 
because they are, by definition, relatively limited in number. Further, 
outside of public online social networks such as Twitter, it is difficult 
to identify these types of consumers. In light of these problems, it 
may often infeasible for marketers to base WOM marketing cam-
paigns on directly targeting hubs. 
The current research investigates an approach to WOM market-
ing that circumvents these concerns by not directly targeting higher-
connectivity consumers. Instead, the proposed approach is based 
on targeting “normal” consumers who do not have abnormally high 
levels of connectivity and finding ways to encourage them to share 
the information with their high-connectivity “hub” friends. Five 
studies show that this can be achieved through the use of incentive 
mechanisms that increase the probability that a targeted consumer 
will transmit relevant information via WOM to a receiver friend who 
has a higher degree of social connectivity. We show that this leads 
to faster information diffusion. Our central hypothesis is that incen-
tives based on positive externalities will increase the likelihood that 
a WOM-transmitting consumer will select a receiver with higher 
connectivity. When a piece of information has a positive external-
ity, the value of the information to those who possess it increases 
with the number of others who possess it. For example, a positive-
externality incentive would increase the amount of discount a trans-
mitter received on a purchase if they spread WOM to more people. 
Conversely, a no-externality incentive would be fixed and not vary 
with the number of people who received WOM. Transmitting to 
more socially connected friends makes sense to a consumer who is 
presented with a positive-externality-based incentive because if their 
well-connected friend passes on the information more people will 
hear about it.
Study 1 tested this hypothesis by examining whether a positive-
externality-based incentive increases the connectivity of a selected 
WOM receiver compared to a no-externality incentive in the context 
of a discount coupon for Amazon.com. In the positive-externality 
condition participants would receive a 50% discount only if the cou-
pon was shared and redeemed by at least 7,500 people over three 
days. In the no-externality condition this requirement was removed. 
We found that participants were significantly more likely to transmit 
the offer information to a high-connectivity friend in the positive-
externality condition than in the no-externality condition (p < .001).
Study 2 considered WOM transmissions in an online review 
advice-giving context. Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) “workers” 
who wrote reviews of AMT were asked to nominate a person with 
whom these reviews would be shared, and indicate how socially con-
nected their chosen receivers were. In the positive-externality condi-
tion a bonus payment was given if their reviews were shared over 
100 times over a week. In addition to externality (positive vs. none) 
we manipulated how much effort participants put into the review-
writing task (higher/longer task vs. lower/shorter task). We found 
that nominated receivers had higher connectivity ratings when a 
positive-externality incentive was used, but only when participants 
put in higher effort (i.e., were more intrinsically motivated). Thus, 
positive-externality incentives only work when transmitters are also 
sufficiently intrinsically motivated to see information spread among 
others.
Studies 3 and 4 were field experiments designed to replicate 
results from studies 1 and 2 in different contexts and with actual 
WOM transmissions. Study 3 used a context where transmitters did 
not stand to personally benefit from information diffusion. Instead, 
a third-party charitable organization stood to benefit by receiving a 
sizeable donation if participants’ actual WOM transmissions gener-
ated a large enough number of visits to the charity’s website in a 
specified period of time. Study 4 involved a social media startup that 
tried to recruit new users with messages designed to elicit a positive-
externality or not. Both field experiments replicated the results from 
studies 1 and 2.
Study 5 sought to identify the macro-level outcomes of posi-
tive- versus no-externality incentives for WOM transmissions on in-
formation diffusion speed in a social network using simulations. The 
simulation experiment demonstrated that, as theorized, as the prob-
ability of transmitting to a higher-connectivity receiver increases, 
diffusion speed also increases.
Overall, these five studies demonstrate that positive informa-
tion externalities can be successfully used to increase the likelihood 
that regular WOM-transmitting consumers will select their higher-
connectivity friends as receivers and that this does indeed lead to 
faster diffusion processes at the macro level.
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Answering Why: Action and Reaction Explanations in 
Word of Mouth
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Word of mouth (WOM), where consumers share information 
about experiences with others, is an everyday occurrence that strong-
ly influences consumers (Arndt 1967) and firms (Chevalier and May-
zlin 2006). However, prior work has overlooked a key component 
of WOM: its content. While prior work has focused on valence 
(Richins 1983), content is key to understanding the impact of WOM 
(Godes et al. 2005), as demonstrated in recent work (Schellekens et 
al. 2009; Moore 2012). The current paper focuses on when and why 
individuals use particular WOM content. We investigate explaining 
language as one important type of content; individuals often explain 
events and experiences, to reduce uncertainty and manage future 
utility (Gilbert, Wilson, and Centerbar 2003). 
Prior work shows that the act of explaining influences consum-
ers’ evaluations of their experiences. Due to their primarily emotion-
al nature, explaining dampens evaluations of hedonic experiences, 
but, due to their primarily cognitive nature, explaining polarizes 
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evaluations of utilitarian experiences (Moore 2012). We extend this 
work by examining the role of two types of explanations—action 
and reaction explanations (Malle 2006)—in WOM. Action explana-
tions outline why consumers chose experiences or behaved in certain 
ways (e.g., I bought the cookies for a friend). Reaction explanations 
outline why consumers felt the way a certain way about experienc-
es (e.g., I liked the cookies because they were chewy). While prior 
work has identified actor/observer differences in using these types 
of explanations (Malle 2004), we focus on explanations in a WOM 
context. 
We posit that explanation type in WOM may not be predicted 
by actor/observer differences—since the audience is salient, the use 
of different explanations may instead be determined by what speak-
ers think would be most helpful for their audience (Grice 1957). 
This, in turn, may be determined by product type. For utilitarian ex-
periences, which are instrumental and goal-oriented (cognitive), ac-
tion explanations might be more useful and therefore more common; 
for hedonic experiences, which are affective and sensory (emotional; 
Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000), reaction explanations might be more 
useful and therefore more common. Further, we posit that providing 
these explanations will impact speakers (Moore 2012), such that for 
utilitarian experiences, only action explanations will polarize evalu-
ations, but for hedonic experiences, only reaction explanations will 
dampen evaluations. We examine these predictions in seven studies.
In study 1, we tested audience preferences for different types 
of explanations. We provided individuals with constructed reviews 
that varied in valence (positive or negative), product type (pretested 
as hedonic or utilitarian), and explanation type (action, reaction, or 
none). Participants rated reaction explanations as more helpful for 
hedonic (restaurant) reviews and action explanations as more helpful 
for utilitarian (USB stick) reviews. 
We next examined whether speakers (reviewers) were sensitive 
to these preferences. In study 2, we collected 200 Amazon.com re-
views. We collected fiction and non-fiction book reviews to repre-
sent hedonic and utilitarian products (confirmed in a pre-test), and 
coded each review for its proportion of reaction and action explana-
tions. More action than reaction explanations were provided for non-
fiction (utilitarian) books (e.g., I bought this because it was a best 
seller), while more reaction than action explanations were provided 
for fiction (hedonic) books (e.g., I loved this book because it was 
well-written). 
In study 3, we replicated this finding in the lab. Individuals re-
called a recent utilitarian or hedonic purchase that was positive or 
negative. They imagined writing an online review or a diary entry, 
and rated how likely they were to include sentences that provided 
either no explanations, action explanations, or reaction explanations. 
Corroborating the Amazon data, regardless of valence, and only in 
the public (online review) conditions, individuals were more likely 
to include action (reaction) explanations for utilitarian (hedonic) 
products. 
In studies 4 and 5, we examined how different types of expla-
nations influence speakers. Individuals recalled and wrote about a 
recent purchase that varied by valence (positive or negative), product 
type (hedonic or utilitarian), and explanation type (action, reaction, 
or none). To manipulate explanation type, individuals completed fill 
in the blank sentences that varied in terms of the explanation re-
quested. In studies 4a and 4b, individuals wrote about dining out at a 
restaurant (hedonic) or purchasing a technology product (utilitarian). 
In studies 5a and 5b, to control for product tangibility, all individuals 
wrote about a technology product that was either hedonic or utili-
tarian. For positive and negative purchases across all three studies, 
compared to not explaining, action explanations polarized individu-
als’ evaluations of utilitarian products, and reaction explanations 
dampened individuals’ evaluations of hedonic products. 
In sum, we examine WOM content, a critical but understudied 
issue in WOM. We focus on explanation type in WOM about hedon-
ic and utilitarian products. We examine when action versus reaction 
explanations are preferred by audiences, and show that speakers are 
sensitive to these preferences—but sometimes to their detriment, as 
providing certain types of explanations can impact speakers’ evalua-
tions of their own purchases. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW 
Much research has investigated how consumers make dif-
ficult choices (Luce 1998, Nowlis, Dhar and Simonson 2010).  To 
date, choice difficulty is generally considered a fixed property of 
the choice set, determined by the configuration of alternatives and 
attribute values. Choices with many alternatives, for instance, are 
considered more difficult than those with less alternatives (Iyengar 
and Lepper 2000), and choices between alignable attributes are con-
sidered easier than choices between non-alignable attributes (Zhang 
and Markman 2001). More recent research has begun to explore the 
notion that choosing from the same choice set can be perceived as 
more or less difficult based on consumer or situation-specific char-
acteristics (Schrift et al. 2011; Sela and Berger 2012). The papers in 
this session further this line of inquiry by examining incidental fac-
tors that affect choice difficulty and consequently choice incidence. 
Paper 1 (Etkin and Pocheptsova) will open the discussion by ex-
ploring effects incidental positive mood on choice difficulty. While 
prior research has emphasized the benefits of positive mood for a 
wide range of outcomes, this research shows positive mood can actu-
ally make choice seem more difficult. The authors demonstrate that 
when choice evokes tradeoffs, positive mood increases perceived 
differences between choice options, which increases choice diffi-
culty and the incidence of deferral.  
Consumers’ experience of choice difficulty also depends on 
the amount of cognitive effort expended prior to choice. Paper 2 
(Goldsmith and Hamilton) shows that evaluating low (vs. high) fit 
brand extensions prior to choice actually decreases the incidence of 
deferral. The authors argue that reconciling low (vs. high) fit brand 
extensions requires more cognitive resources and promotes a more 
abstract style of thinking, thereby decreasing decision difficulty. To-
gether with the results from paper 1, these findings expand under-
standing of how factors incidental to choice can nevertheless impact 
experiences of difficulty.
Papers 3 and 4 further enrich our understanding of how inciden-
tal factors influence choice difficulty by exploring novel pathways 
through which such difficulty may be resolved. Paper 3 (Cho et al.) 
explores the impact of distractions on choice difficulty. The authors 
show being distracted while making a choice increases the likeli-
hood that consumers choose consistently with their conscious focal 
goal. Distractions bolster the importance of the focal goal, thereby 
increasing adherence. Paper 4 (Danilowitz et al.) illustrates a final 
counter-intuitive relationship between incidental states and difficult 
decisions. Whereas previous literature has largely argued that feel-
ings of conflict are associated with increased choice difficulty and 
greater choice deferral, this paper suggests that priming incidental 
conflict instead decreases choice deferral. The authors show priming 
conflict increases the systematic processing of choice information, 
which allows people to directly confront conflict and results in in-
creased choice. 
Together, four papers offer novel and surprising insights into 
how incidental factors influence consumers’ experience of choice 
difficulty and choice deferral. In doing so, these papers demonstrate 
a series of important effects that will be of interest to a wide range of 
ACR attendees, including those interested in choice, mood, resource 
depletion, brands, and goals. 
When Being Happy Makes Choice Harder
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Being in a positive mood confers a wide range of benefits on 
consumers. Positive affect enhances creativity (Isen et al. 1985), pro-
motes self-control (Aspinwall 1998; Ragunathan and Trope 2002), 
and generally leads to successful outcomes (Lyubomirsky et al. 
2005). Based on these findings, one might expect positive mood to 
have beneficial impact on choice processes. In contrast, we propose 
that positive mood will at times make choice more difficult, increas-
ing the incidence of choice deferral. 
We base our propositions on prior work showing that positive 
mood increases context dependence, or adoption of situation-specific 
processing cues (Murray et al. 1990; Hunsinger, et al. 2011; Show-
ers and Canter 1985). Although positive mood has been primarily 
shown to enhance focus on inter-item similarities (Isen and Daubman 
1984; Isen et al. 1985; Lee and Sternthal 1999), in situations that cue 
consumers to focus on differences, positive mood instead increases 
perceived inter-item differences (Murray et al. 1999; Showers and 
Canter 1985). For example, Murray et al. (1990) demonstrated that 
participants in a positive mood identified more similarities between 
items when prompted to focus on similarities, but also identified 
more differences when prompted to focus on differences. 
We posit that when choice involves tradeoffs, positive mood 
will spontaneously lead consumers to focus on differences between 
choice options. When consumers are faced with tradeoffs, they 
engage in comparison processes aimed at resolving this conflict 
(Brenner et al. 1999; Gilbert et al. 1995; Tversky 1977). Though 
choice options may be compared in terms of similarity or dissimilar-
ity (Gati and Tversky 1984; Medin et al. 1993; Tversky 1977), an 
emphasis on unique or different features is the norm (Brenner et al. 
1999; Dhar and Sherman 1996). We thus expect a differences cue 
to be salient when consumers make choices that involve tradeoffs. 
Positive mood, then, should lead consumers to more readily adopt 
this differences focus, increasing their perceptions of differences be-
tween choice options. Perceiving more differences between choice 
options, in turn, increases choice difficulty by making inter-item 
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comparisons more difficult (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). As a result, 
we expect positive mood will increase consumers’ perceptions of 
choice difficulty for choices with tradeoffs, making them more likely 
to defer choice entirely. 
We test our propositions in four studies. In a pilot study, we 
used a word-prime task to manipulate positive vs. neutral mood 
(adapted from Pyon and Isen 2011) and presented participants with 
a set of three physician options, designed in such a way as to require 
tradeoffs when making a choice (adapted from Schrift, et al. 2011). 
Half of participants chose a physician option while the remaining 
half rated the attractiveness of each physician option. Next, we asked 
all participants to rate their perceptions of differences between the 
three physician options [1-7].  As we predicted, positive mood in-
creased perceived differences between the physician options when 
participants were confronted with tradeoffs (i.e., they had to make 
a choice; Mpos = 4.89, Mneg = 4.26; F(1, 78) = 3.31, p = .07), but not 
when they merely rated the options (Mpos = 4.48, Mneg = 4.75; F < 1). 
Consistent with prior findings, this reversal suggests in the absence 
of a cue to focus on differences, positive mood spontaneously leads 
individuals to focus on similarities.
Study 1 uses a different tradeoff manipulation to provide fur-
ther support for our propositions. We manipulated positive vs. nega-
tive mood using pre-tested video clips and then asked participants 
to imagine they were taking a trip for work or for pleasure. We con-
structed a set of flight options such that choosing required tradeoffs 
when the trip was for pleasure but not for work. As expected, be-
ing in a positive mood increased perceived differences between the 
flight options when choosing required tradeoffs (i.e., when the trip 
was for fun; Mpos = 4.80, Mneg = 4.26; F(1, 156) = 4.70, p < .05), but 
decreased perceived differences when choosing did not require trad-
eoffs (i.e., the trip was for work; Mpos = 4.33, Mneg = 4.88; F(1, 156) 
= 5.04, p < .05).
Studies 2 and 3 extend our investigation by considering conse-
quences of focusing on differences between choice options. In study 
2 we manipulated mood as in the pilot study and asked participants 
to choose a task they would like to complete for pay. In one set (no 
tradeoffs), there was an asymmetrically dominating task option, 
whereas in the other set (tradeoffs required), there was not (adapted 
from Sela and Berger 2012). We measured participants’ interest in 
deferring on a 7-point scale. As predicted, being in a positive mood 
increased interest in deferral when choosing required tradeoffs (Mpos 
= 5.02, Mneg = 4.20; F(1, 180) = 3.87, p = .05). The opposite occurred 
when participants chose from the set that did not require tradeoffs 
(Mpos = 3.73, Mneg = 4.54; F(1, 180) = 4.02, p < .05). 
Study 3 replicated our findings in a field study. We intercepted 
students at a University food court, administered a word-prime mood 
manipulation (the alleged main study) and then in thanks, asked 
them to choose a $10 gift-card to one of four local restaurants. This 
choice required participants to make tradeoffs among seven attri-
butes (e.g., distance from campus, wait time for food, size of menu, 
etc.). We gave participants the option to defer immediate choice in 
favor of choosing later online. Results show being in a positive mood 
increased participants’ propensity to defer choice (Mpos = 11.54%, 
Mneg = 0%; χ
2 = 3.89, p < .05). That no participants in the negative 
mood condition chose to defer choice makes the higher incidence in 
the positive mood condition all the more remarkable.
In sum, we demonstrate positive mood can negatively influence 
choice, exacerbating consumers’ perceptions of differences between 
choice options and increasing deferral. Our findings contribute to 
extant research on positive mood as well as choice difficulty, demon-
strating mood is an important factor to consider when investigating 
choice processes.
The Cognitive and Behavioral Consequences of 
Considering Low-Fit Brand Extensions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Launching new products is a risky and expensive endeavor. Ac-
cordingly, many firms attempt to mitigate this risk by introducing 
new offerings under existing brand names. A great deal of academic 
research has explored the factors that affect consumers’ likelihood 
of accepting these brand extensions, finding that the perceived “fit” 
between the extension and the brand is a critical factor in predict-
ing consumer interest (Aaker and Keller 1990). However, in today’s 
uncertain economy, many firms seek to maximize leverage from suc-
cessful brands by broadening the scope of their product lines beyond 
exclusively high-fit extensions. This raises the question: How does 
having low-fit extensions in the marketplace affect consumers?
While recent research has begun to explore the factors that in-
crease acceptance of low-fit extensions (e.g., Meyvis, Goldsmith and 
Dhar 2012), little work to date has explored the consequences that 
such brand extensions might have for consumers. For example, if 
Crest, an oral care brand, were to introduce a line of facial products 
(e.g., moisturizer), how might consumers’ experience of evaluating 
such products differ as compared to evaluating products that were 
higher in fit (e.g., Crest gum)? Although one could argue that of-
fering a wider array of brand extensions only benefits consumers 
by way of increasing variety (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997), 
we propose that the presence of low-fit brand extensions may lead 
to unique consequences. Specifically, we predict that when the fit 
between the brand and the extension is low, evaluating such products 
will result in regulatory depletion as well as a shift towards more ab-
stract processing. Further, we argue that these cognitive shifts have 
downstream implications for choice confidence, choice difficulty 
and choice deferral.
We draw from the literature on brand extensions (e.g., Perac-
chio and Tybout 1996) to propose that when the there is a poor fit 
between a brand and an extension, evaluating such products requires 
expending more effort and can deplete consumers of the executive 
resources necessary for successful self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister 
et al. 1998). We test this prediction across a series of experiments. 
For example, in Experiment 1 all participants evaluated a series of 
brand extensions, which were either high in fit (e.g., McDonald’s 
BBQ sauce) or low in fit (e.g., Mrs. Field’s BBQ sauce) with the 
parent brand. Next all participants were given an unsolvable puzzle, 
as persistence on impossible tasks has previously been used to test 
depletion effects (Wan and Sternthal 2008). In line with our pre-
dictions, participants exerted less effort on the task (showing more 
depletion) after evaluating the low-fit brand extensions. Those in the 
low-fit condition spent less time on the task than those in the high-
fit condition (M
low fit
=174 seconds vs. M
high fit
=376 seconds; p<.05). 
In subsequent experiments, we demonstrate boundary conditions 
for this effect that provide support for our process. Specifically, we 
show that when consumers are not motivated to reconcile the brand 
and the extension, these effects do not occur. We provide convergent 
evidence for the observed depletion effect by showing that decision 
confidence also erodes after consumers evaluate low-fit brand exten-
sions (Hamilton et al. 2010; scale: 1-not at all confident to 9-ex-
tremely confident; M
low fit
=5.9 vs. M
high fit
=6.5; p<.05). 
Having demonstrated that evaluating low-fit extensions leads 
to self-regulatory depletion across a series of experiments with con-
vergent dependent measures, we argue that what makes the effect of 
evaluating low-fit brand extensions on self-regulatory depletion par-
ticularly interesting is that the same manipulation can also promote 
more abstract processing, a factor often shown to counteracts deple-
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tion effects (e.g., Wan and Agrawal 2011). We base this prediction on 
findings from construal level theory, which demonstrate that higher-
level, more abstract construals allow consumers to find connections 
between disparate stimuli (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003). We add 
to this work by testing if this effect is bi-directional. Specifically, 
in Experiment 5 we explore if prompting consumers to find con-
nections between disparate stimuli (e.g., by evaluating low-fit brand 
extensions) promotes more abstract construals. We have participants 
evaluate a series of extensions that are either high or low in fit, then 
having them complete a task traditionally used to assess differenc-
es in levels of construal (a modified behavioral identification task; 
Meyvis, Goldsmith and Dhar 2012).  We find that those who first 
evaluated low-fit brand extensions were significantly more likely to 
identify behaviors in abstract terms than those who first evaluated 
high-fit extensions (M
low fit
=5.6 vs. M
high fit
=4.8; p<.05).
Having shown that evaluating low-fit brand extensions can 
promote more abstract processing, our final experiment tests for im-
plications this might have on consumer choice.  Prior work has sug-
gested, although never directly demonstrated, that abstract process-
ing should reduce choice deferral by decreasing decision difficulty 
(Kim and Dhar 2007).  We test this by manipulating if consumers 
first evaluate high vs. low fit brand extensions then presenting them 
with an unrelated choice task that includes the option to defer choice 
(Dhar 1997). In line with our prediction, participants in the low-fit 
condition were significantly more likely to make a choice (less likely 
to defer choice) than those in the high-fit condition (choice deferral: 
P
low fit
=32% vs. P
high fit
=48 %, p<.05). In support of our process, we 
find this effect does not occur when consumers are not motivated to 
reconcile the brand with the extension.
Taken together, these results suggest that evaluating low fit 
brand extensions can have cognitive consequences for consumers 
both in terms of self-regulatory depletion (Experiments 1 – 4) and 
level of processing (Experiments 5 and 6). We discuss how these 
results extend the research on schema congruity, self-regulatory 
depletion and construal level theory. Because most if not all prior 
brand extension research has been from the perspective of the firm, 
we believe our findings offer novel insights into the effects that vary-
ing brand extension fit can have on consumers. We conclude with a 
discussion of the practical implications for these findings.
Distractions: Friend or Foe in the Pursuit of Conscious 
and Nonconscious Goals?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We have all had the experience of going to a coffee shop with 
the intent of working, but becoming distracted: the loud conversa-
tion at the next table, the music, the sunny weather outside, or even 
the desire to buy and eat a red velvet cupcake.  How might these 
different types of distractions affect your goal to work?  Will the 
consequences differ depending on whether your goal is conscious 
or nonconscious? 
Conscious and nonconscious goals are generally believed 
to lead to similar processes and outcomes (e.g. Bargh et al. 2001; 
Chartrand and Bargh 1996).  More recently, however, research is 
examining how the two types of goals may differ (Gollwitzer, Parks-
Stamm, and Oettingen 2009).  Our research posits that the pursuit of 
conscious and nonconscious goals diverges when faced with distrac-
tions.  Consistent with the view that there is a limited pool of cogni-
tive resources (Kruglanski et al. 2002), when a focal goal is faced 
with a distraction, the motivated response can be to protect the goal 
and protect the cognitive resources.  We propose that because the 
activation and pursuit of conscious goals require cognitive resources 
(Kruglanski et al. 2002), introducing a distraction that threatens to 
compete for those resources will increase the importance of the goal 
and as a result, increase goal adherence.  The activation and pursuit of 
nonconscious goals, however, require very few cognitive resources 
(Bargh and Barndollar 1996), such that distractions are not perceived 
as a threat that requires a response.  We hypothesize, therefore, that 
distractions will enhance the accessibility and pursuit of a conscious 
goal, but have no effect on a nonconscious goal.  Furthermore, we 
examine the effect that different types of distractions will have on the 
pursuit of conscious and nonconscious goals.  As a key component 
of our theorizing involves the consumption of cognitive resources 
by a goal, and the subsequent threat posed to those resources by a 
distraction, we expect that the increase in goal pursuit will be further 
moderated by the extent to which the distractions consume cognitive 
resources.  More specifically, we hypothesize that the nature of the 
distraction will moderate the effect of distractions on goal pursuit. 
We test these hypotheses in a series of three experiments. 
In Study 1, we demonstrate our main proposition that distrac-
tions can increase adherence to a conscious focal goal, but not to a 
nonconscious focal goal.  The study was a 2 (Focal goal: conscious 
health goal vs. nonconscious health goal) X 2 (Distraction: travel 
goal prime vs. none) between-participants design.  Participants first 
completed the focal goal prime task, then were presented with a 
distraction task or not.  Next, they chose between two magazines: 
healthy living versus desserts.  As expected, we find that among par-
ticipants primed with the conscious health goal, those who faced a 
distraction were more likely to choose the healthy living magazine 
compared to those who did not (83% vs. 69%; p = .05).  Choice share 
of the healthy living magazine did not differ among those primed 
with a nonconscious health goal (73% vs. 72%).
Study 2 measures the influence that distractions have on the 
accessibility of focal goals.  Study 2 was a 2 (Focal goal: conscious 
academic goal vs. nonconscious academic goal) X 2 (Distraction: 
environment goal vs. filler task) between-participants design.  As in 
Study 1, participants first completed the goal prime and then com-
pleted the distraction or filler task.  Participants were then given a 
word search task and instructed to find 9 hidden words.  Ten of the 
hidden words were academic goal-related words, while the other 10 
were neutral words.  The notion here is that the more (less) acces-
sible the focal academic goal is, participants would find more (fewer) 
academic goal-related words.  Consistent with our prediction, par-
ticipants with the conscious academic goal found more goal-related 
words in the presence of a distraction (i.e. environment goal) than 
not (i.e. filler task; M distraction = 5.03 vs. M filler = 4.46, p = .05).  There 
was no difference among the participants with the nonconscious aca-
demic goal (M distraction = 4.85 vs. M filler = 4.69).  Taken together, these 
findings suggest that 1) conscious and nonconscious goals differ 
when faced with distractions such as alternative goals and 2) distrac-
tions not only activate shielding mechanisms of inhibition, which 
decrease the accessibility of alternative goals (Goschke and Dreis-
bach 2008; Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski 2002), but also actually 
increase the pursuit and accessibility of conscious focal goals.  
Study 3 tests the underlying process that distractions increase 
conscious focal goal pursuit by increasing goal importance.  It also 
specifies the type of distraction that will produce this effect.  In par-
ticular, we compare the effect that a resource consuming distrac-
tion—a conscious competing goal—would have against a distraction 
that is less resource consuming—a nonconscious competing goal on 
focal goal importance.  We expect that a conscious competing goal 
will be perceived as a resource threatening distracter that will elicit a 
bolstering of the importance of the focal goal, while a nonconscious 
competing goal will not. As predicted, participants in the conscious 
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academic goal conditions reported higher importance of the goal to 
study when there was a threatening distracter (i.e. a conscious goal 
distracter) compared to when there was a non-threatening distracter 
(i.e. nonconscious goal distracter; M threat = 8.60 vs. M non-threat = 7.60, p 
< .05).  There were no differences across the nonconscious academic 
goal conditions on importance of the goal to study (M threat = 7.22 vs. 
M non-threat = 7.40).
These findings contribute to the existing literature on goal pur-
suit by demonstrating that the pursuit of conscious and nonconscious 
goals diverge in the presence of distractions.  Furthermore, our find-
ings suggest that distractions can have the ironic effect of facilitating 
the pursuit of conscious goals.  
The Positive Consequences of Conflict: When a Conflict 
Mindset Facilitates Choice
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Conflict is generally thought of as aversive, associated with 
depression, neuroticism and illness (Emmons & King, 1988), de-
creased task performance (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002), and impaired 
decision making. In contrast to this modal and intuitive view, we 
propose that conflict can also be beneficial. We test our proposal by 
examining the effects of incidental conflict on people’s willingness 
to make a decision. Extensive research on decision-making suggests 
that integral choice conflict increases deferral (Anderson, 2003; Iy-
engar & Lepper, 2000; Luce, 1998).  In contrast we argue that inci-
dental exposure to conflict activates a mindset that in turn facilitates 
decision making and increases choice likelihood. A conflict mindset 
brings with it the procedural benefits of coping with conflict without 
the associated costs such as negative affect (Luce, Bettman & Payne, 
1999) or stress (Lazarus, 1993).
In the current paper we activate conflict outside of awareness by 
priming conflicting goals, and look for increased choice in domains 
unrelated to the primed conflict. Our main proposition is that expo-
sure to conflict activates a conflict mindset, which leads to more sys-
tematic processing of subsequent, difficult choices. This assumption 
is in line with prior research indicating people who proactively work 
to resolve choice conflict systematically consider more available 
information (Janis & Mann, 1977) and take longer to decide (Bett-
man, Johnson, Luce & Payne, 1993). We propose that as a result of 
this systematic processing of choice information, people in a conflict 
mindset are more likely to resolve conflict and make choices. This 
is consistent with the notion that people choose more often when 
preference uncertainty is reduced (Dhar and Simonson 2003). Four 
experiments test our propositions.
In experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions: Healthy/Indulge Conflict; Career/Socialize 
Conflict, or Control (no conflict). Our priming manipulation was a 
lexical decision task where participants indicated if the letters on 
the screen formed a word (21 trials) or a non-word (14 trials). In 
each of the Conflict conditions, 7 of the words related to one goal 
(e.g., fitness), 7 related to the conflicting goal (e.g., chocolate). Par-
ticipants then made two choices (apartments, cell phones), which 
included a standard deferral option (Dhar 1997). Finally, participants 
were probed for awareness. As predicted, participants in the Conflict 
conditions were more likely to make a choice than those in Control 
(M
conflict
 = 73% vs. Mcontrol = 62%, p < .04). There were no differences 
between condition on any awareness measure, for any study reported 
here (all ps>.1). 
In experiment 2 we test our proposed process using two mark-
ers of systematic processing: longer decision times, and consider-
ation of more information (Bettman et. al., 1993; Janis and Mann 
1977). We capture these process measures using a program similar 
to Mouselab (Johnson et al., 1991) and test if systematic informa-
tion processing mediates the effect of conflict on choice likelihood. 
Student participants were brought into the lab and primed with either 
a Study/Party Conflict or Control (no conflict) using the same lexi-
cal decision task as Experiment 1. They then made choices, which 
included a deferral option. The computer recorded the time spent 
on each choice and the amount of information viewed. Participants 
in the Conflict condition were more likely to choose one of the op-
tions than those in Control, M
conflict
=82% vs. Mcontrol = 71%, p < .05. 
Conflict primed participants tended to take more time to make their 
decision F(1,78) =3.4, p = .06, and viewed more information F(1, 
394) = 4.5, p < .05. To test our proposed process, decision time and 
information viewed were entered into a serial bootstrap model for 
multiple mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). There was a signifi-
cant and positive path indicating that conflict increases the amount 
of information searched, which increases decision time and results in 
greater choice (95%CI=.001, .088) .
Experiment 3 tested a boundary condition and rules out an al-
ternative explanation. Our mindset theory predicts that the conflict 
prime should facilitate resolution of subsequent difficult choices, but 
should not increase persistence on a non-choice task. In addition, we 
have proposed that it is the conflict mindset, and not the activation 
of a single goal, that brings about our effects. Using the same lexi-
cal decision task describe above, participants completed a Control, 
Conflict (career vs. socialize), or Single Goal (career only) priming 
manipulation. Half the participants made 2 choices identical to those 
in Experiment 2 (Album, Theater), while the other half completed a 
non-choice, persistence task in which they rated as many pictures as 
they liked before choosing to stop (adapted from Vohs & Heather-
ton, 2000). As before Conflict participants were more likely to make 
choices than Control participants, M
conflict
 =86%, Mcontrol =75%, p<.04. 
However, as predicted, Conflict and Control participants persisted at 
a similar rate on a filler task, completing the same number of items, 
M
conflict
=14.1, Mcontrol =12.8, p>.61, interaction: F(1, 200)=4.3, p<.04. 
Finally we do not find evidence to support a single goal priming 
explanation for the increase in choice resolution, as Conflict partici-
pants were more likely to make a choice than participants in Control 
and the participants who were primed with just a Single Goal, M
conflict
 
=86%, ,Mcontrol=75%, Msinglegoal =76%, p <.05. 
In Experiment 4 we sought to conceptually replicate our find-
ings using another common choice scenario: preference for an ex-
treme option in a three item compromise choice set. We hypothesize 
people will be more likely to choose an extreme option after being 
primed with conflicting goals. As predicted, Conflict (vs. Control) 
participants were more likely to resolve the choice by selecting an 
extreme option, M
conflict
=55.1%, Mcontrol=41.1%, p<.02.
The negative consequences of choice conflict are well docu-
mented (Emmons and King 1988, Riediger and Freund 2004). This 
research examines whether a conflict mindset can have positive con-
sequences, and suggests that the traditional view of conflict as caus-
ing a paralytic flight from difficult choices may not tell the whole 
story.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Anthropomorphism occurs when people imbue nonhuman 
agents (e.g. their pets) with humanlike characteristics, motivations, 
intentions, or emotions. In marketing, companies often aid this 
process of anthropomorphism by creating human-like representations 
of their brands (e.g., the Michelin Man). Consumers are also known 
to anthropomorphize brands (Delbaere, McQuarrie, and Phillips 
2011; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2012). However, the unique 
effect of each of these is unknown as is the interaction of the two. 
This special session attempts to answer this question. In doing so, it 
advances our understanding of anthropomorphism in the marketing 
context. The four papers offer new insights on the antecedents 
and consequences of product anthropomorphism, document novel 
effects of anthropomorphizing a product on consumer behavior, and 
examine the mechanisms underlying these effects. This session has 
implications for brand positioning, advertising, consumer well-being 
and self-control.
The four papers focus on how anthropomorphism influences 
consumer behavior and contribute to the literature from different 
perspectives. First, Chen, Sengupta and Adaval use a motivation-based 
framework to examine the antecedents of brand anthropomorphism. 
They show that sociality and effectance motivation prompt 
consumers to humanize brands and endow them with different 
personalities. The personality traits that brands are endowed with are 
often those that alleviate the underlying motivational needs. They 
also provide implications for brand positioning by showing that 
consumers with salient sociality (effectance) motivations indicate 
higher willingness to pay when a brand emphasizes a sociality 
(functionality) positioning. While the first paper documents the novel 
antecedents of brand anthropomorphism, the next two papers stress 
the consequences of anthropomorphizing products on consumer 
preference. Chen, Wan and Levy examine how consumers respond to 
products communicated in an anthropomorphic manner as a function 
of their psychological state of being socially excluded or included. 
They show that experiencing social exclusion increases consumers’ 
preference for anthropomorphized products, because these products 
are perceived to provide an opportunity for social re-affiliation. Their 
studies further demonstrate that this effect is diminished when the 
brand exhibits a tough personality, which signals higher chance of 
future rejection. Hsieh et al. take a different perspective to examine 
different types of anthropomorphism in marketing communication 
and their impact on consumer decision. Their studies reveal that 
consumers with an interdependent self-construal are more likely to 
purchase a brand that is anthropomorphized as a partner (vs. servant). 
This effect occurs because partner brands exhibit an intention to 
cooperate, which is consistent with the goals of the interdependent 
self. Finally, Hur, Koo and Hofmann document negative effects of 
anthropomorphizing products. They find that anthropomorphizing 
tempting products hampers consumer self-control, because 
consumers are less likely to identify self-control conflicts, leading to 
higher chance to indulge in temptations. 
Despite the fact that anthropomorphism is pervasive in marketing 
communication, scholarly research about how anthropomorphism 
influences consumer behavior is still at an early stage. The proposed 
session will advance our understanding of the antecedents and 
consequences of product and brand anthropomorphism and the 
process by which consumers anthropomorphize products. By 
offering new insights and implications, we believe that the special 
session will stimulate discussion and future research on how to better 
understand the motivations underlying anthropomorphism and its 
consequences. 
The Effects of Anthropomorphization on Brand 
Personality Perceptions: A Motivational Account
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Anthropomorphism refers to the tendency that people have to 
imbue nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motiva-
tions, intentions, or emotions (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). 
Past research suggests that consumers humanize objects such as 
brands when they have access to human-like knowledge structures 
while making brand judgments (Aggarwal and McGill 2007; Kim 
and McGill 2011). In contrast to the cognitive perspective (i.e., the 
influence of salient knowledge structures) that informs most of the 
extant consumer literature in this area, the present research draws 
on recent findings in psychology (Epley et al. 2007) to provide a 
motivational account of anthropomorphism. This perspective argues 
that the salience of certain motivations (e.g., a need for sociality and 
a need for control or effectance over one’s environment) facilitates 
the process of anthropomorphism. We apply Epley et al.’s framework 
to a marketing context and, more importantly, advance the original 
conceptualization by merging it with relevant insights from the brand 
personality literature (e.g., Aaker 1997; Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 
2010). Specifically, we argue that while sociality and effectance mo-
tives both lead consumers to humanize a brand, they differ in the type 
of human-like traits that the brand is endowed with. We further posit 
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that these different antecedents of brand humanizing have distinct 
consequences on the effectiveness of brand positioning strategies.
Our conceptualization is based on the idea that different under-
lying motivations (such as the desire for sociality arising out of feel-
ings of loneliness or the desire for effectance arising out feelings of 
not being in control) should yield different brand personality percep-
tions. Based on the idea of motivated perception (Balcetis and Dun-
ning 2006; Changizi and Hall 2001), we hypothesize that the specific 
motivation that causes consumers to humanize a brand should lead 
them to endow the brand with the particular human-like trait that 
can alleviate the underlying need. According to Aaker (1997; Aaker 
et al. 2010) consumers humanize brands along distinct personality 
dimensions, such as excitement, competence, sincerity, etc. Con-
sider, for instance, two such brand personality traits: “warmth” and 
“dependability”. Our theorizing predicts that consumers for whom 
a sociality motivation has been made salient – e.g., via chronic or 
momentarily induced loneliness –will think of the brand as a “warm” 
person because doing so will help to alleviate loneliness. Therefore, 
when compared to a baseline condition in which no such motiva-
tion has been made salient, those with a sociality motivation should 
rate the brand higher on warmth but should show no difference in 
dependability perceptions. The reverse should be true for consumers 
with an effectance motivation, made salient either through chronic 
or momentarily induced need for control. By thinking of the brand 
as a “dependable” person, such consumers will be able to satisfy 
their need for control. Accordingly, compared to a baseline condition 
where no such motivation is salient, consumers with an effectance 
motivation should rate the target brand higher on dependability – but 
not on warmth.
Results from four studies provide convergent support for these 
arguments, and their implications. Study 1 examined the basic prop-
osition that high sociality or effectance motivation can increase a 
person’s tendency to humanize a brand. Participants first recalled a 
personal experience that made them feel lonely (inducing a sociality 
motive) or helpless (inducing an effectance motive). A third, base-
line condition, did not induce any such motive. Then, all participants 
were asked to draw a picture of an unknown brand. The brand was 
endowed with more human-like features given a salient sociality or 
effectance motivation relative to the baseline condition. 
In Study 2, participants first went through the same motivation 
manipulation as in study 1. Next, they were exposed to an unknown 
brand and were asked to indicate their perception of brand personal-
ity along three dimensions – warmth, dependability, and outdoorsy 
(which was assessed as a control dimension). As predicted, lonely 
(helpless) participants perceived the unknown brand to be warmer 
(more dependable) than those in the baseline condition. No differ-
ences were obtained for the control “outdoorsy” dimension. Study 
3 was identical to study 2 but replicated the above findings using 
an open-ended measure in which participants spontaneously listed 
human-like adjectives that best described the brand. 
 Finally, Study 4 both reinforced and built on our conceptu-
alization to examine a key consequence of anthropomorphization, 
relating to the effectiveness of brand positioning. If an underlying 
motivational need is met by a brand humanizing exercise, it should 
remove the need to humanize a subsequent brand, rendering moti-
vational appeals for that brand ineffective. To test this, participants’ 
salient motivation (sociality/effectance/baseline) was manipulated 
as before. Next, they were exposed to either a brand humanizing 
task, or a geography task. The former task offered an opportunity 
for participants to satisfy their salient motivational need through the 
brand humanization, but the latter task did not. For the latter partici-
pants therefore, the initial motivation should remain salient. Next, 
all participants were asked to evaluate a different product from the 
one that they had previously humanized – a smart phone calendar 
application called MyCalendar. This was described either as a great 
social (functional) app that facilitates the user’s social (work). The 
key dependent variable was willingness-to-pay (WTP) for this ap-
plication. Results revealed a three-way interaction involving motiva-
tion, opportunity to humanize, and brand positioning on WTP. As 
expected, when participants had completed a brand humanization 
task prior to the calendar evaluation task, their sociality/effectance 
motivations were satisfied. Consequently, participants’ WTP esti-
mates for MyCalendar were not influenced by brand positioning. In 
contrast, the geography task had presumably left participants’ so-
ciality/ effectance motivations unfulfilled and these should remain 
salient while performing the calendar evaluation task. In accord, 
lonely participants indicated higher WTP when the ad for MyCal-
endar emphasized a sociality vs. a functionality positioning, with a 
reverse pattern obtaining for helpless participants. All effects were 
significant at p < .05.
In sum, this research uses a motivational-based framework to 
provide a new look at both the antecedents and consequences of 
brand anthropomorphism. In doing so, we advance basic theoretical 
knowledge regarding the processes underlying brand anthropomor-
phism and offer insights into the brand personality literature.
Is She My New Friend? The Effect of Social Exclusion on 
Consumer Preference for Anthropomorphized Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Anthropomorphism, defined as the tendency of seeing human 
characteristics in non-human agents (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 
2007), is often used in marketing communications. For example, 
marketers might create a human representation for its brand (e.g., 
the Energizer Man), or use human terms to describe products’ 
features in advertising. Past research has suggested that one major 
motivation for people to anthropomorphize is the desire for social 
affiliation (Epley et al. 2007). For instance, Epley et al. (2008) 
found that participants who were primed to feel lonely, compared 
with those in fear or control conditions, were more likely to describe 
their pets using supportive anthropomorphic traits. However, it is not 
clear how experiencing social exclusion, the state of being cut off, 
ignored, or isolated by other individuals or social groups (Baumeister 
et al. 2005; Williams 2007), will influence consumers’ preference for 
products communicated in an anthropomorphic manner. The current 
research examines this question.
Research in branding has suggested that people can form 
relationships with products in a similar way to how they form 
relationships with other people (Fournier 1998). Thus, when 
socially excluded consumers see human characteristics in the 
product, they may show more interest because connecting with the 
anthropomorphized product represents an opportunity for social 
affiliation. One’s interest in connecting with the product should 
be exhibited in their product attitudes. Therefore, we predict that 
socially excluded consumers, compared with socially included 
consumers, will exhibit greater preferences for anthropomorphized 
products, but not for non-anthropomorphized products.
However, excluded persons are needy but vulnerable (Maner 
et al. 2007). They desire new social affiliation, but also want to 
protect themselves from being rejected again. Downey and Feldman 
(1996) found that people highly sensitive to rejection tended to 
avoid social interactions and had more hostile intentions towards 
others who they believe might reject them. These findings suggest 
that excluded consumers may not exhibit greater preference for the 
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anthropomorphized products if the product is imbued with human 
characteristics that imply the possibility of rejection. Some brand 
personalities (Aaker 1997) may represent good opportunities for 
social affiliation while others may not. For example, a friendly 
personality depicts a kind and approachable image, whereas tough 
personality describes a less approachable image. Since excluded 
consumers would be reluctant to approach people with a tough 
personality due to the fear of being rejected again, we expect 
that these consumers would have similar reaction towards tough 
anthropomorphized products. Seeing the product with tough brand 
personality is expected to reduce their interest in having a relationship 
with the product. This prediction is consistent with Epley et al.’s 
(2008) finding that excluded participants did not describe their 
pets using non-supportive anthropomorphic traits (e.g., devious) 
more than participants in fear or control conditions. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that social exclusion will increase preferences for 
anthropomorphized brands that represent a friendly personality, but 
not a tough personality.
Empirical results from three studies support our hypotheses. 
Study 1 employs a 3 (social exclusion vs. social inclusion vs. control) 
x 2 (anthropomorphism: human vs. object) between-subjects design. 
Participants first recalled a recent experience in which they felt social 
excluded, socially included, or a control condition in which they 
were shopping in the supermarket. Then they were instructed to do 
an ostensibly unrelated product survey in which an energizer battery 
was presented for evaluation. The battery was communicated either 
in human form (i.e., the energizer man image with a first person 
introduction) or in object form (i.e., the pure object image with a 
third person introduction). As predicted, excluded participants, 
compared with those in inclusion and control conditions, provided 
more favorable evaluations of an anthropomorphized battery, but not 
a non-anthropomorphized battery.
Study 2 tested the moderating effect of brand personality on 
excluded consumers’ attitude towards anthropomorphized products. A 
2 (social exclusion: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (anthropomorphism: 
human vs. object) x 2 (brand personality: friendly vs. tough) 
between-subjects design was employed. Participants first performed 
a ball-tossing game online (Williams, Cheung and Choi 2000) that 
manipulated social exclusion. Exclusion participants received far 
less ball tosses from their partners than included participants did. 
After completing the game, participants completed an ostensibly 
irrelevant product survey in which they were asked to evaluate a 
clock, which was presented either in first person with human facial 
features, or in third person without human facial features. The clock 
was described visually and verbally as either friendly or tough in its 
personality. As expected, results in friendly conditions replicate the 
finding in study 1, and this effect is diminished in tough conditions, 
supporting the moderating role of brand personality. 
Study 3 examined the underlying mechanism in a 2 (social 
exclusion: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (anthropomorphism: 
human vs. object) between-subjects design. The brand personality 
is manipulated within-subject in the choice task. Following 
manipulation of social exclusion (rejection or acceptance of a friend 
request in a social network website), participants provided thoughts 
about two sub-brands of Walker mint candy: bright princess and 
dark queen. The two sub-brands represent different personalities: 
friendly and easy to approach versus cold and difficult to approach. 
Participants were asked to describe what kind of person versus what 
kind of product the brands are (Aggarwal and McGill 2012), which 
manipulates anthropomorphism. Then participants were instructed 
to choose one between the two candies. To test the underlying 
mechanism, participants responded to a series of items including the 
extent to which the candy can become their new friend. As expected, 
the choice share of friendly candy is significantly higher among 
excluded participants who humanized the candy, compared to all 
other three conditions. Results of mediation analysis supports that 
the perceived social re-affiliation opportunity drives this effect.
In sum, this research demonstrates novel effects of using 
anthropomorphism in marketing by showing when and what types of 
anthropomorphism are effective in influencing consumer response. 
We also identify new behavioral consequences of social exclusion, 
and contribute to the branding literature by documenting new 
antecedents of relationship building between consumers and brands.
When Consumers Meet Humanized Brands: Effect of 
Self-construal on Brand Anthropomorphism
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike 
characteristics, motivations, intentions, and emotions to nonhuman 
objects (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). It enables a brand to 
assume a social role as a relationship partner (Fournier 1998), as in a 
partnership, a fling (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004), an exchange, 
a communality (Aggarwal 2004), etc. Our research investigates how 
consumers with different self-construals exhibit differential purchase 
intentions towards brands that assume different social roles.
Further, we attempt to understand the underlying process 
by examining the different intentions underlying each social role 
brands assume. Some consumers feel entitled to their needs being 
met by brands and even demand special treatment thereof while 
others display flexibility and accommodation in dealing with brands 
when problems arise (Fournier 2009). In accord, we posit that 
anthropomorphized brands aim/intend to satisfy consumers’ internal 
needs and/or cooperate with consumers. In particular, we further 
argue that a partner brand intends to cooperate with consumers as 
well as satisfy their internal needs, while a servant brand’s intentions 
are geared more towards satisfying consumers’ internal needs (Aaker 
et al. 2004; Braun and Zaltman 2000; Aggarwal and McGill 2012).
Self-construal literature offers insight on how consumers with 
different self-construals value different brand intentions. Self-
construal has been viewed as the extent to which an individual 
perceives himself or herself as autonomous and independent of 
others or as embedded within a broader social network comprising 
of connection with others (Markus and Kitayama 1991). These 
different self-construals are labeled independent and interdependent 
respectively. Cooperating with others is an expression of and 
enhancing the interdependent self, as doing so is conducive to 
achieving the goal of fitting in. In contrast, expressing one’s inner 
attributes and focusing on one’s needs is conforming with the 
independent self, as doing so enables individuals to feel unique 
and autonomous (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Consequently, 
we predict that interdependents will prefer brands that exhibit a 
cooperation intention and independents will prefer brands that intend 
to satisfy consumers’ internal needs. Since partner brands exhibit 
both intentions and servant brands intend to satisfy consumers’ 
internal needs, we expect that consumers with an interdependent 
self-construal will express greater purchase intention for a partner 
than for a servant brand, while independent consumers’ purchase 
intention will be similar for the two.
Study 1 which tested this prediction was 2 (brand 
anthropomorphism: servant vs. partner) x 2 (self-construal: 
independent vs. interdependent). 104 undergraduate participants 
(49 women, Mage = 21) from a US public university were randomly 
assigned them to one of two anthropomorphism conditions. In the 
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servant (vs. partner) condition, participants read that the HTC T5 
brand (i.e. a fictitious brand under HTC) works for (vs. with) them 
and helps them perform many tasks (e.g. navigate the road; adapted 
from Aggarwal and McGill 2012). Purchase intention, the key 
dependent variable, was elicited using 3 items (“I would like to buy 
HTC T5,” “I would like to recommend HTC T5 to other people,”  “I 
would like to switch to HTC T5 from other smartphones”; α =.88). 
Covariates and control variables included affect. Self-construal was 
measured using the scale developed by Singelis (1994) towards the 
end of the questionnaire. We found a significant two-way interaction 
between anthropomorphized social role and self-construal (β = .55, 
t = 2.11, p < .05). Consumers with an interdependent self-construal 
(one standard deviation above the mean) were more likely to 
purchase the brand when the brand was described as a partner than 
when it was described as a servant (Mpartner = 3.87 vs. Mservant = 3.21; 
t = 2.06, p < .05); independents (one standard deviation below the 
mean) were indifferent between a partner and a servant brand (Mpartner 
= 3.34 vs. Mservant = 3.68; t = –1.03, p > .30).
We also investigate a boundary condition of the above effect. 
Self–brand connection refers to the extent to which individuals have 
incorporated a brand into their self-concept (Escalas 2003). Aaker 
et al. (2004) have documented that partner quality is associated 
with high self-connection. Thus, we theorize that when consumers 
strongly identify with a brand (i.e., their self-brand connection is 
high), the consumer-brand relationship resembles a partnership, 
regardless of the brand’s perceived intention. Under such 
circumstances, independents and interdependents will not display 
differential preferences toward a brand. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that the two-way interaction between self-construal and type of 
brand anthropomorphism observed in study 1 will be restricted to 
settings involving low, and not high, self-brand connection.
Study 2 tested this prediction and was a 2 (brand 
anthropomorphism: partner vs. servant) x 2 (self-construal: 
independent vs. interdependent) x 2 (self-brand connection: low vs. 
high) design. 142 participants recruited from an online panel (68 
women, Mage = 34) were randomly assigned to an independent or 
interdependent self-construal condition (Trafimow et al. 1991), and 
one of two manipulations of anthropomorphized brand roles (partner 
vs. servant) based on participants’ a) listing a laptop brand that is 
like their partner (vs. servant), and b) explaining the partnership (vs. 
service; adapted from Aggarwal and McGill 2012). Subsequently, 
respondents indicated their purchase intention as earlier (α =.80), 
responded to control and confounding measures, and finally to the 
self-brand connection items (Escalas and Bettman 2005). We found 
a three-way interaction between self-construal, anthropomorphized 
brand roles, and self–brand connection (β = –.64, t = –2.93, p < 
.01). Contrast analysis revealed that among consumers with a low 
self–brand connection, those with an interdependent self-construal 
were more likely to purchase the partner than the servant brand 
(Mpartner = 5.80 vs. Mservant = 4.60; t = 4.20, p < .001), while those 
with an independent self-construal were equally likely to purchase 
the servant and the partner brands (Mpartner = 5.25 vs. Mservant = 5.68; 
t = –1.48, p > .13); consumers with a high self–brand connection 
were equally likely to purchase the partner and the servant brands, 
regardless of self-construal (ps > .3).
When Temptations Come Alive:  
How Anthropomorphization Undermines Consumer  
Self-Control
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Anthropomorphism is defined as imbuing the behavior of 
nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, 
intentions, or emotions (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). A major 
conclusion from the extant research on anthropomorphism is that 
anthropomorphizing non-human agents leads to more favorable 
attitudes toward those agents (Epley et al. 2008; Gong 2008). 
Moreover, previous consumer research has shown positive effects 
of anthropomorphism in consumer contexts (Delbaere, McQuarrie, 
and Phillips 2011); for example, consumers are less willing to 
replace a product when they think about it in anthropomorphic terms 
(Chandler and Schwarz 2010). 
However, what if an anthropomorphized product is one’s 
temptation? None of the prior research has specifically looked 
at consumer self-control settings, that is, situations in which the 
anthropomorphized object may be both desirable and at the same 
time detrimental with regard to consumers’ self-control goals. For 
instance, how would dieters respond to anthropomorphized high-
caloric cookies that hurt their long-term weight-loss goals?
We propose that anthropomorphization of temptation products 
hampers consumer self-control by decreasing identification of a self-
control conflict. According to a number of formulations (Myrseth 
and Fishbach 2009; Hofmann et al. 2012), successful self-control 
rests on the concerted interplay of at least two internal processes: 
the detection of conflict and the recruitment of control to adjust 
thought, emotion, or behavior in accordance with one’s higher order 
goals. Consequently, there are two main reasons for self-control 
failure: a failure to detect motivational conflict in the first place; 
and, once conflict is detected, a failure to muster up enough control 
resources to resolve such motivational conflict. The focus of this 
work is on the primary problem of conflict identification, and we 
predict that anthropomorphizing temptation decreases the likelihood 
of conflict identification. Anthropomorphized temptation could 
be seen as having intentions to tempt people and as having more 
control over people’s decisions (Waytz et al. 2010). When faced with 
an anthropomorphized temptation, people may therefore undergo 
a certain shift in their attributional focus away from an internal 
attribution of responsibility towards an external attribution on the 
tempting product itself. As a consequence of losing an internal focus, 
people may become less likely to detect a self-control conflict and, 
consequently, less likely to engage in consumer self-control. 
Four studies tested our predictions with diverse 
anthropomorphism manipulations and goal-contexts. Study 1 
employed a 2 (temptation product: anthropomorphized (AM) versus 
control) between-subject design. Participants evaluated high-caloric 
cookies (tempting product) that were either in a humanlike shape 
(AM) or in a round shape (control) and reported the extent to 
which they identify self-control conflicts in consuming the cookies. 
As predicted, participants in the AM condition felt less conflicted 
toward eating cookies than those in the control condition. 
Study 2 was designed to examine the effect of 
anthropomorphizing a tempting product on conflict identification 
and subsequent self-control behavior. The study employed a 2 
(temptation product: AM versus control) between-subject design and 
we used a similar manipulation of anthropomorphism to Study 1. 
Participants were presented with photographs of the cookie products 
that were either anthropomorphized or not, and rated how conflicted 
they were about consuming the products. Upon completion of the 
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study, participants were offered to take candies (small chocolate 
bars) as many as they wanted, serving as a measure of self-control. 
As predicted, participants in the AM condition felt less conflicted 
toward consuming the products, and took more candies than those in 
the control condition. 
As our theory assumes that the conflict people experience 
toward consuming the product is part of the self-control process, 
we predicted that anthropomorphism would not disrupt conflict 
identification if people do not hold a higher-order goal that conflicts 
with a target product. In Study 3, therefore, we manipulated the 
salience of a higher-order goal, and tested whether this goal salience 
moderates our effects. We employed a 2 (goal prime: focal versus 
control) × 2 (temptation product: AM versus control) between-
subject design. To gain more confidence in our effects, we also moved 
to a different goal context (academic goals for college students) and 
employed a different manipulation of anthropomorphism by naming 
the product and having it talk like a person. Participants were primed 
with either a focal (academic) or a control goal (health/diet). They 
then evaluated a temptation product (TV gadget) that was either 
anthropomorphized or not, and reported self-control conflicts and 
willingness to pay for the product. As predicted, when participants 
were primed with the focal goal, those in the AM condition identified 
less conflict and were willing to pay more for the product than those 
in the control condition. In contrast, when participants were primed 
with the control, unrelated goal, anthropomorphizing the product did 
not yield any effect on self-control conflicts or willingness to pay. 
Study 4 tested the underlying mechanism of our effects: people 
make less internal attribution of their own possible behavior as they 
shift responsibility to the temptation agent. In addition, we accessed 
participants’ chronic dieting goal strength and tested whether 
individual differences in goal strength would moderate the effect. 
Thus, the study employed a 2 (temptation product: AM versus control) 
between-subject design, with one self-report variable (dieting goal 
strength). Participants reported self-control conflicts and degrees of 
internal attribution toward consuming the cookie product, which was 
either anthropomorphized or not. Lastly, they reported how often 
they were on a diet. As predicted, we found a two-way interaction 
on both conflict and internal attribution: the stronger participants’ 
dieting goals were, the less conflict they felt toward consuming 
the cookie, and the less internal attribution they made about their 
possible consumption, when the cookie was anthropomorphized 
versus not. The decrease in internal attribution also mediated the 
effect of anthropomorphism on conflict identification. 
Taken together, four studies demonstrate that 
anthropomorphizing a tempting product decreases the likelihood of 
identifying the product as temptation, which conflicts with a goal that 
offers long-run benefits. Then, the decrease in conflict identification 
leads to more indulgence in temptations and greater willingness to 
purchase the product. So, what happens when your temptations come 
alive? It could significantly harm your self-control. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
This session presents new research examining how people use 
and respond to word-of-mouth (WOM) in order to achieve their so-
cial goals.  With the rise of written, online recommendations that 
function as word-of-mouth, we have the opportunity as a field to 
analyze massive amounts of word-of-mouth data.  The data present 
exciting possibilities for new discoveries, but without a theoretical 
framework or understanding of the goals that motivate people to pro-
duce WOM and those that influence their responses to it, we are more 
likely to be overwhelmed than enlightened by such data.  This ses-
sion presents four papers, each of which looks at how people produce 
and respond to word-of-mouth to achieve their social goals.  
The first paper, by Dr. Jonah Berger, presents a new goal di-
rected theoretical framework for understanding WOM, and the three 
other papers each examine a different goal that can be achieved by 
either the speaker or listener in a conversation about a particular 
product or experience.  By first presenting a theoretical framework 
in the same session as three empirical papers, we are able to immedi-
ately address some of the questions and gaps in the literature that the 
framework raises. In particular, Berger finds that there is a relative 
lack of research on the causes of WOM and why people talk about 
certain things rather than others.  
Two of the three other papers examine the social goals of the 
speaker and the third examines the social goals of the receiver.  Ku-
mar and Gilovich and Wiener, Bettman, and Luce explicitly exam-
ine new motives for engaging in particular types of word-of-mouth 
behavior.  Kumar and Gilovich find that talking about experiences 
fulfills the speaker’s goal for happiness better than does talking about 
products, and so people talk about experiences more frequently than 
they talk about products. Wiener, Bettman, and Luce examine con-
versation pieces, or products that produce questions and interest 
from others, and find that people use unique, identity relevant and 
publically displayed products to encourage conversations that enable 
them to learn about their conversational partners, perhaps ultimately 
enabling them to find like-minded friends or partners.  Presented 
together these papers suggest that conversation pieces blur the line 
between product and experience and suggest that a social goals ap-
proach has much to tell us about this distinction. 
Of course not only do speakers have social goals, but recipi-
ents of word-of-mouth have social goals as well.  Alexander and 
Moore examine how listeners may interpret word-of-mouth as social 
pressure and how word-of-mouth may activate their goal to appear 
competent to others.  This goal may negatively influences how they 
interact with a product and undermine new product usage.  
Together these four papers suggest that the production of and 
responses to word-of-mouth are quite strategic in pursuit of their so-
cial objectives.  Given the apparently utility of word-of-mouth for 
achieving social goals, is it possible that the desire to produce or have 
a good response to another’s word-of-mouth may actually drive con-
sumption behavior so that a consumer might have the “right” thing 
to say. 
Word-of-Mouth and Interpersonal Communication: 
An Organizing Framework and Directions for Future 
Research
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There is currently huge popular interest in word-of-mouth and 
social media more broadly (e.g., Facebook and Twitter). But while 
quantitative research has demonstrated the causal impact of word-of-
mouth on diffusion and sales, less is known about what drives word-
of-mouth and why people talk about certain things rather than others. 
Why do certain products get more word-of-mouth? Why do cer-
tain rumors spread faster than others? And why does certain online 
content go viral? Further, how does the audience people are com-
municating with, as well as the channel they are communicating 
through, impact what gets shared?  
This talk addresses these, and related questions, as it integrates 
various research perspectives to shed light on the behavioral drivers 
of word-of-mouth.  It provides an integrative framework to organize 
research on the causes and consequences of word-of-mouth and out-
lines additional questions that deserve further study.
In particular, I argue that interpersonal communication is goal 
driven and serves five key functions.  These include:
1. Self-Presentation, 
2. Emotion Regulation
3. Information Acquisition
4. Social Bonding
5. Persuading Others  
Self-presentation refers to the fact that people often share word 
of mouth to shape how others see them.  This occurs through sharing 
self-enhancing things, things that signal desired identities, or even 
engaging in small talk to avoid sitting there in silence.  Emotion 
regulation refers to the fact that people often share word of mouth 
to help manage or regulate their emotions. This includes venting, 
seeking social support, reducing dissonance, facilitating sense mak-
ing, or encouraging rehearsal. Another important function of word 
of mouth is information acquisition.  Talking and sharing to seek 
advice or figure out how to resolve problems.  Word of mouth also 
serves a social bonding function, allowing people to connect or bond 
with others.  Sharing can reduce feelings of loneliness and reinforce 
shared view. Finally, people use word of mouth to persuade others to 
their point of view.
It is worth noting that these goals are predominantly self-serv-
ing in nature.  While communication almost always involves a re-
cipient, I will argue that word of mouth is mostly self-serving rather 
other-serving.  Though people certainly tune their message to their 
audience, and some acts of transmission can be interpreted as altru-
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ism, these same behaviors can also be explained by self-serving mo-
tives (e.g., self-presentation or social bonding).
Finally, I will discuss how contextual factors, such as who peo-
ple are talking to and what channel they are talking across, moder-
ate these various motives.  Talking to weak rather than strong ties, 
for example, should lead self-presentation motives to have a greater 
impact on transmission.  But it is not only audience type that mat-
ters.  Audience size may also play a role.  Talking to larger audi-
ences boosts self-presentation by encouraging people to focus on the 
self, while talking to smaller audiences may encourage sharing use-
ful information by encouraging people to focus on others.  Different 
channels should also play a role.  Compared to oral communication 
(e.g., face-to-face discussion), for example, written communication 
(e.g., email or text) provides more time to construct and refine com-
munication, and, as a result, leads self-presentation motives to play a 
greater role in transmission.
In sum, what we know about word of mouth is clearly dwarfed 
by what we don’t know. That said, this talk will attempt to review 
what we do know, provide a framework to organize this existing re-
search, and outline potential directions for future work in the area.
Talking About What You Did and What You Have: The 
Differential Story Utility of Experiential and Material 
Purchases
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine you just returned from a week in the Caribbean or sam-
pling the restaurants in New York City.  How likely would you be to 
tell others about your trip? Would the telling enhance your experi-
ence?  Now imagine you spent a similar sum of money on a home 
theater or some new living room furniture you’ve been eyeing. How 
likely would you be to tell others about these purchases, and would 
the telling increase how much enjoyment you get from them?
The research presented in this paper investigates one explana-
tion for the fact that experiential purchases bring us more happiness 
than material purchases (Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003): consumers 
talk more about their experiences than their possessions and derive 
more value from doing so. Such conversations facilitate the re-living 
of the experience in question, they encourage embellishment, and 
they foster social connection—all of which serve to enhance enjoy-
ment of the original event. Seven studies demonstrate that people 
are more inclined to talk about their experiences than their material 
purchases and they derive more happiness from doing so; that taking 
away the ability to talk about experiences (but not material goods) 
would diminish the enjoyment they bring; and that being given the 
opportunity to talk about experiences (but not material goods) in-
creases the satisfaction they bring.
In Study 1a, we examined whether consumers tend to talk more 
about experiential purchases than material purchases. Ninety-six 
participants were given a definition of either experiential or mate-
rial purchases, and then asked to list their most significant purchase 
over the past five years in the category in question. Participants in-
dicated that they had talked more about experiential purchases, F(1, 
94) = 12.54, p < 0.0001, and also indicated that they would be more 
likely to talk about experiential purchases in a hypothetical situation 
in which they had to make small talk, F(1, 94) = 15.46, p < 0.0001. 
In Study 1b, we explored whether this difference could explain dif-
ferences in purchase satisfaction. Accordingly, 102 participants an-
swered the same questions as those in Study 1a, and also indicated 
how much happiness they derived from their purchase. After rep-
licating our finding from Experiment 1a, t(100) = 2.78, p < 0.01, 
and replicating the satisfaction findings from Van Boven & Gilovich 
(2003), t(100) = 1.99, p = 0.05, purchase satisfaction was regressed 
onto purchase condition and the talking composite. We found a sig-
nificant meditational relationship, Sobel Z = 2.42, p < 0.02, suggest-
ing that experiential purchases make consumers happier than mate-
rial purchases, but this difference can be explained by the fact that 
experiential purchases are more likely to be talked about.
In Studies 2a and 2b, we looked into whether talking about ex-
periential purchases boosts the teller’s happiness more than talking 
about material purchases. One hundred four participants in Study 2a 
were given a list of material and experiential purchases and asked 
what portion of the happiness derived from each purchase came from 
being able to talk about it. Participants reported that talking was a 
more important element of the enjoyment of experiential purchases, 
matched pairs t(103) = 4.80, p < 0.001. Experiment 2b was a close 
replication of 2a, but instead of asking about the percentage of hap-
piness that came from talking about each purchase, 109 participants 
rated on a Likert scale how much talking about the purchase added to 
their overall enjoyment. As predicted, participants reported that talk-
ing about purchases with others added more to their enjoyment of 
experiential purchases than material purchases, matched pairs t(108) 
= 6.18, p < 0.0001.
One way to gauge the importance consumers attach to talking 
about their purchases is to examine what happens when they don’t 
have the opportunity to do so. That is, how much would not being 
able to talk about a purchase diminish the enjoyment of it, and is this 
amount different for experiential and material purchases? In Stud-
ies 3a and 3b, we hypothesized that consumers would be willing to 
accept a lesser experience rather than have a more enjoyable experi-
ence they couldn’t talk about—but that they would be disinclined to 
accept such a trade-off when it comes to material goods. In Study 3a, 
98 participants provided the two purchases they would most want to 
make within the categories of beach vacations (experiential) or elec-
tronic goods (material) and were then presented with a hypothetical 
choice dilemma: they could either have their first choice, but without 
being allowed to talk about it, or they could have their second choice 
and be free to tell others about their purchase. Participants were more 
likely to report wanting to switch to a lesser alternative that they 
could talk about in the experiential condition than in the material 
condition, χ2 (1, N=98), = 19.96, p < 0.001. In Study 3b, we repli-
cated this result, but instead of being restricted to the categories of 
vacation destinations and gadgets, 98 participants made judgments 
about purchases from their own lives, χ2 (1, N=98), = 3.86, p < 0.05. 
Consumers seem willing to take a hedonic hit on the purchase itself 
in order to be able to enjoy talking about experiences, something 
they are less willing to do for material purchases.
In Study 4, we tested whether having participants talk about 
their experiential purchases would increase their remembered enjoy-
ment of the purchases in question—but that talking about a material 
purchase would not have a similar benefit. We asked 204 partici-
pants to recall the most recent vacation they had taken or the most 
recent item of clothing or jewelry they had purchased. They spent 
five minutes simply thinking about their purchase, or five minutes 
talking to another participant about it. When then asked to rate how 
much they liked their purchase, we found a significant purchase type 
x type of activity interaction, F(1, 97) = 5.37, p < 0.03, that indicated 
that participants given an opportunity to talk about their vacations 
reported higher levels of enjoyment than those who simply thought 
about them, while no such beneficial effect of storytelling was pres-
ent for material purchases.
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Conversation Pieces
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People need people:  they need people to talk to just for a 
moment—on a coffee break at work or at a party—and they need 
friends, people with whom they connect with more deeply (Bau-
meister & Leary, 1995).  People invest time and effort in trying to 
create these short and long term relationships, but previous research 
has not examined how they may strategically enlist products to help 
them to create new social connections.  This paper attempts to exam-
ine this behavior through examining conversation pieces, or products 
that produce questions and interest from others, literally ones that 
start conversations.
Previous research has found indirect ways that products can be 
used to achieve social goals.  For example, excluded individuals may 
substitute products for people (Mead, et al., 2011) or use products to 
signal social status (Holt, 1998) or identity (Berger and Heath, 2007) 
to others.  However, these articles have only looked at people using 
products for one-way communication rather than how products may 
facilitate interaction with another person.  Given that conversation is 
a key way that people connect with each other, to study relationship 
development it is necessary to examine people talking about prod-
ucts, not just displaying them.  
The word-of-mouth literature studies these conversations but 
focuses on their consequences for product liking or adoption rather 
than for social relationships.  What research there is on the social 
motives for word-of-mouth suggests that it may not be motivated by 
social goals, but merely by what is accessible in the speaker’s envi-
ronment (Berger and Schwartz, 2011).  Other research has suggested 
that they talk positively about products to self-enhance, to help oth-
ers, or to create feelings of excitement (Sundaram, Mitra, and Web-
ster, 1998).  These goals may be rooted in a desire to have positive 
social interactions with people, but the ability of word-of-mouth to 
directly build relationships has not been studied.  In this paper we 
examine how people use conversation pieces to create conversations 
and thus to facilitate the development of relationships. 
Given the lack of previous research on conversation pieces, 
study 1 examines their basic characteristics and the characteristics 
of the people who frequently use them.  In this study, participants 
were asked to describe a wearable conversation piece that they had 
and to rate it on a variety of different characteristics.  This study and 
the subsequent ones asked about wearable conversation pieces (as 
opposed to furniture or art at a person’s home) because the user has 
a choice of when to and when not to display the item, enabling us to 
understand the user’s display motives. 
In this study several common characteristics of conversation 
pieces emerged.  Qualitative analysis revealed that conversation 
pieces tended to be souvenirs (a shirt from Cambodia), items relat-
ed to media (a Super Mario leather jacket), or simply “interesting” 
pieces of clothing (a necklace mad out of zippers).  Almost all of 
the conversation pieces described were considered by their owners 
to be noticeable, unusual, identity relevant, and well liked.  Since 
conversation pieces only inspire conversation if others notice them 
and think that they are worth commenting on, it is not surprising that 
they are noticeable and unusual.  
Study 1 also examined the personality characteristics of people 
who frequently use conversation pieces.  We find that conversation 
piece usage was relatively across all participants, but people who 
are higher in extroversion, possession-self connection, and need for 
uniqueness were more likely to use conversation pieces than those 
lower in these characteristics.  Despite the fact that almost all of the 
conversation pieces described were clothing, jewelry or accessories, 
there were no differences in conversation piece usage between men 
and women.  
In study 2A we investigated the motives behind displaying a 
conversation piece.  In this study, participants answered open-ended 
questions about why they wore their conversation pieces.  Partici-
pants identified both long and short term goals that they felt their 
conversation pieces helped them to achieve.  Some conversation 
pieces make the wearer an easier target for another person to ap-
proach and initiate a conversation with—“I like your dress” is a very 
easy conversation starter.  This enables the wearer to achieve a short 
term goal of not being ignored at a party.  
Other participants described using their conversation pieces to 
achieve longer term goals, such as identifying which people they 
meet might be good friends.  As found in study 1, conversation piec-
es frequently are identity-relevant and communicate a person’s in-
terests or values.  Therefore wearers can use them to identify which 
other people share or approve of those interests and thus might be 
potential friends.  Approximately one third of participants reported 
using their conversation pieces as a mechanism for deciding which 
individuals they were interested in getting to know better.  This is 
exemplified by a quote from a 27 year old male who wears a Ninja 
Turtles t-shirt and says, “If someone says that a Ninja Turtle shirt is 
childish or stupid or lame I know that they don’t have the same kind 
of sense of humor I do and we likely won’t get along.”  
Study 2B followed up on the social motives behind conversa-
tion piece usage using an experimental design.  Participants were 
first asked to think of a conversation piece they had and then were 
randomly assigned to have a goal to get to know new people or with 
a goal to talk to their friends.  People were significantly more likely 
to wear their conversation piece when they had a relationship initia-
tion goal than when they did not, suggesting that people may use 
conversation pieces to help them to cultivate relationships with new 
people.  This study provides evidence that part of the function of 
conversation pieces is to create new social connections, and that 
when this motive is not active they are less useful and so less likely 
to be worn. In sum, in three studies we find evidence that people use 
products, specifically conversation pieces, to help them achieve both 
short and long term goals relevant to social connections.  
You Gotta Try It! The Negative Side of Positive Word of 
Mouth
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Word of mouth (WOM) is a fundamental process in the mar-
ketplace (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Positive WOM can increase 
consumer attitudes (Bone 1995), switching behavior (Wangenheim 
and Bayon 2004), and trial and adoption of products (Arndt 1967); 
negative WOM does the opposite, with attendant consequences 
for firms (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). However, recent work 
has demonstrated that sharing positive WOM can have unintended 
negative consequences for the storyteller (Moore 2012). Building 
on this work, we examine the potential downside of positive WOM 
(PWOM) from the perspective of the receiver.
We ask whether receiving PWOM can ever be “bad” for con-
sumers, and examine when and why this might be the case. We focus 
on the context of new products, where WOM is a key driver of dif-
fusion (Arndt 1967; Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990), and where 
consumers might be particularly susceptible to the negative conse-
quences of positive recommendations, given the risk and uncertainty 
surrounding new products (Taylor 1974; Herzenstein, Posavac, and 
Brokus 2007; Hirunyawipada and Paswan 2006). 
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Prior research shows that PWOM can elicit positive emotion by 
providing useful information and reducing risk (Arndt, 1967; Mol-
dovan, Goldenberg, & Chattopadhyay, 2011; Murray, 1991; Söder-
lund & Rosengren, 2007). We make the novel prediction that PWOM 
might also be perceived as social pressure to use the adopted prod-
uct competently and successfully, or else risk negative judgments 
from the recommender (Berger & Heath, 2008; Cialdini, Kallgren, & 
Reno, 1991; Schultz et al., 2007). Imagine a consumer who hears that 
the latest smartphone is the best yet. While this information should 
elicit positive emotion, we ask whether PWOM might also create so-
cial pressure for the consumer to have as positive an experience with 
the phone as the recommender. This PWOM-induced social pressure 
might elicit negative emotion such as worry or anxiety (Baumeister 
& Tice, 1990; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002), with poten-
tial consequences for the consumer’s intentions toward the recom-
mended product (Alexander, 2013; Wood & Moreau, 2006).
We explore when PWOM might elicit both positive and nega-
tive emotions in adopters and investigate the consequences of these 
emotions for usage intentions. Since prior work suggests that PWOM 
should consistently elicit positive emotion, we focus on identifying 
conditions under which PWOM also elicits negative emotion. To do 
so, we examine four moderating variables that should increase the 
social pressure exerted by PWOM and thereby elicit negative emo-
tion in adopters.
Across three studies, we examine 1) volume of PWOM re-
ceived (study 1); 2) type of PWOM: whether PWOM is liking-based 
or performance-based (studies 2 and 3); 3) social distance: whether 
the recommender is close to or distant from the receiver (study 2); 
4) product difficulty: whether the product is easy- or difficult-to-
use (study 3). We predict that when these moderators exert social 
pressure to competently use a new product—when volume is high, 
PWOM is performance-based, the recommender is close, and prod-
ucts are difficult-to-use—adopters receiving PWOM will feel nega-
tive as well as positive emotion.
In study 1, we examined how PWOM influenced emotions in a 
sample of real consumers (N = 299) adopting one of 21 new techno-
logical products. We surveyed consumers within one week of acquir-
ing the new product and measured their receipt of PWOM and their 
positive and negative emotions. We found that the more PWOM con-
sumers received about the product they adopted, the more positive 
and the more negative emotions they felt about this newly acquired 
product. However, study 1 is correlational, and consumers do not 
always receive WOM in such quantities. Thus, our next two stud-
ies use a controlled lab setting to explore additional moderators that 
might elicit negative emotion in single episodes of PWOM.
In study 2, we examined how social pressure affects negative 
emotion after receiving PWOM from a single consumer. We held 
product difficulty constant and manipulated type of PWOM and 
social distance. Undergraduates imagined receiving liking-based 
(participants were told their friends were “addicted” to the product) 
or performance-based PWOM (participants were told their friends 
were “masters” at using the product) from a close or distant social 
other (a friend or an exchange student). To ensure that our results 
were due to the social pressure exerted by PWOM, rather than to re-
ceipt of new information, we also manipulated whether participants 
adopted the app because of the PWOM or on their own initiative. 
This resulted in a 2 (type of PWOM: liking or performance) by 2 
(social distance: close or distant) by 2 (adoption influence: own or 
other) design. We predicted that only in the other-adoption condi-
tion would performance-based PWOM from close others exert social 
pressure and therefore elicit negative. As expected, there were no 
significant effects on negative emotion in the own-adoption or in the 
liking-based PWOM conditions. However, as predicted, in the other-
adoption conditions, participants who received performance-based 
PWOM felt more negative emotion when this recommendation came 
from a close compared to a distant other. 
In study 3, undergraduate participants were informed that their 
school was adopting video editing software for use in class proj-
ects, and that the software was generally regarded as either easy- or 
difficult-to-use. They then imagined receiving PWOM from a close 
friend, who said the software was “incredibly cool”, and that they 
were either addicted to (liking-based PWOM) or masters at us-
ing it (performance-based PWOM). Thus, study 3 was a 2 (type of 
PWOM: liking or performance) by 2 (difficulty: easy or difficult) be-
tween-subjects design. We predicted that negative emotion would be 
elicited only when performance-based WOM was received about a 
difficult-to-use product. Consistent with this prediction, positive and 
negative emotions were simultaneously elicited only in the difficult-
to-use conditions when participants received a performance-based 
WOM recommendation; type of PWOM did not influence emotions 
in the easy-to-use conditions. In this study, we also measured usage 
intentions. We found that positive emotion increased, while negative 
emotion decreased, usage intentions. We also found that negative 
emotion mediated the relationship between our social pressure vari-
ables (type of PWOM and difficulty) and usage intentions.
In sum, in one field survey and two lab studies, we find evi-
dence of a downside of PWOM; PWOM can elicit negative as well 
as positive emotions in new product adopters, and negative emotions 
undermine adopters’ usage intentions.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers and firms communicate their intentions through a 
variety of language uses. Instances of such language uses may be 
pronoun use (‘I/we will consider your complaint’), negation (‘It 
wasn’t expensive’), figurative language (‘It’s the Ferrari of vacuum 
cleaners’), or language abstraction (‘That perfume smells fresh/is 
nice’). Recently emerging work on linguistic behavior in marketing 
(Kronrod, Grinstein and Wathieu 2012a, 2012b; Moore 2012; Patrick 
and Hagvedt, 2010; Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts 2010) has di-
rected a spotlight to questions of language use and its effect in mar-
keting communication. 
The current session is, figuratively speaking, a ray of this spot-
light. In this session we intend to make a difference, bringing a new 
breeze of research to the attention of our research community. We 
will present works, all of which investigate phenomena in market-
ing linguistics, hoping the session will stimulate wide discussion of 
consumers’ and firms’ talk and what effects it has. The papers in this 
session are all closely tied around language use of consumers and 
firms. All four deal with the question: how do variations in language 
use affect consumers?  
Verlegh and Beukeboom investigate the effect of negation in 
WOM and find that consumers use negation (e.g. ‘it didn’t take long’) 
when they describe experiences inconsistent with their expectations; 
receivers of negation interpret this as a signal of unexpected product 
performance. Kronrod and Danziger examine the use of figurative 
language in communication originating from users (WOM) or firms 
(ads) and show how the source (WOM or ads) moderates the effect 
of figurative language on product evaluations and choice, for hedonic 
and utilitarian options. Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts also com-
pare WOM to firm communication and demonstrate that the use of 
abstract (vs. concrete) language in product referrals from sales agents 
activates more persuasion knowledge than when it comes from other 
consumers. Finally, Packard, Moore and McFerran find that when 
firm service agents use “I” rather than “you” or “we”  in responding 
to customer inquiries and complaints, customer purchases increase 
up to one year after the interaction, due to elevated perceptions of the 
employee’s agency and empathy. 
Together, the works in this session represent the growing inter-
est in linguistic behavior of firms and consumers. The issues inves-
tigated in each of the papers have clear implications for consumers 
and marketers, as language is a natural component of almost any 
communication in marketing. Although these papers are tightly con-
nected in their focus on language use in marketplace communication, 
they display variety of approaches and topics that will  stimulate ad-
ditional research into the role of language in marketing and consumer 
behavior. The combination of novel concept and a strongly increas-
ing interest in linguistic issues in consumer behavior should warrant 
a wide interest for this session at ACR 2013. 
A Negation Bias in Word of Mouth: How Negations 
Reveal and Maintain Expectancies about Brands and 
Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers like to talk about their product experiences with oth-
ers. This word of mouth (WOM) can have a strong impact on product 
evaluations and sales (e.g., Chevalier & Mayzlin 2006), both prac-
titioners and academics have great interest in understanding its ef-
fects and underlying mechanisms. Although research on WOM has a 
long history, dating back to the seminal work of Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955), academics have only recently begun to examine language use 
(Moore 2012; Schellekens, Verlegh & Smidts, 2010). Findings sug-
gest that consumers implicitly reveal much information “in between 
the lines” of their WOM messages. Such formulation differences 
may for instance reveal speakers’ a priori brand expectations when 
they describe a product experience. Of particular interest is the use of 
negations. The Negation Bias (Beukeboom, Finkenauer & Wigbol-
dus, 2010) demonstrates that negations usage (e.g., not stupid, rather 
than smart) is more pronounced when (stereotypic) expectancies 
are violated, compared to when expectancies are confirmed For in-
stance, garbage men performing poorly on IQ-tests is stereotypically 
expected and likely described as “stupid”, for professors this would 
be unexpected and described as “not smart”. Importantly, negations 
lead message recipients to infer that the described experience was an 
exception, caused by situational circumstances (Beukeboom et al., 
2010). 
In two experiments, we examined the existence of a negation 
bias in WOM.  We expect that negations are used more often in de-
scriptions of expectancy inconsistent than consistent product expe-
riences. We also expect that receivers can “decode” these implicit 
communications: a speaker’s use of negations leads the receiver to 
infer that the described experience is an exception to the rule. The 
use of negations in inconsistent situations will dampen the impact of 
WOM on receivers, serving to maintain a brand’s positive or nega-
tive reputation, even in the face of WOM disconfirming that reputa-
tion. 
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Experiment 1 examined whether people are more likely to use 
negations when they describe product experiences that are inconsis-
tent (versus consistent) with their a priori brand expectations. Partici-
pants were presented with WOM vignettes that varied according to a 
mixed 2 (positive/negative brand expectation) x 2 (positive/negative 
experience) x 5 (vignettes) design. To manipulate expectations, we 
used pretested brands scoring either high or low on a focal attribute. 
For example, a customer received slow (versus fast) service in a Hil-
ton (versus Ibis) Hotel. We created five vignettes for each condition. 
Each participant saw all five different vignettes within one condition. 
This was analyzed as a within-subjects factor.
Following Beukeboom et al. (2010), participants rated how 
well each experience was described by a negation or an affirmation 
(e.g., “the service was not fast/ slow”). After rating all five experi-
ences, they were again presented on a separate page, and participants 
rated the expectedness of each experience.
A mixed model ANOVA revealed the predicted expectation 
x valence interaction, for both dependent variables (F(1,115)>9; 
p<.01): for positive experiences, negations were rated more appli-
cable when participants held low (versus high) expectations, and 
for negative experiences, negations were rated less applicable when 
participants held low expectations. Effects were mediated (Hayes, 
2012) by perceived expectedness: the less expected an experience, 
the more applicable participants rated the negations, and the less ap-
plicable they rated affirmations.  
Experiment 2 examined whether a speaker’s use of negations 
indeed leads receivers to infer that the experience was unexpected. 
Participants (N=123) read a scenario in which a friend commented 
on his suitcase. This comment was varied in a 2 (valence: positive/
negative) x 2 (description: negation/affirmation) between-subjects 
design. We measured participants’ inferences about (1) the expected-
ness of the experience, (2) the speaker’s surprise with the experience 
(3) the speaker’s expectations before the experience, and (4) speaker 
evaluation of the experience.
As predicted, participants inferred that the experience was 
less expected and more surprising when the speaker used negations 
versus affirmations (both F(1,119)> 4, p<.05). Interactions with 
valence were non-significant. For inferences about the speaker’s a 
priori expectations we do predict an interaction: negations in de-
scriptions of negative experiences (“not fast”) signal a positive a 
priori expectation, but the opposite is true for positive experiences 
(“not slow”). Indeed, we found a (marginally) significant  interac-
tion (F(1,119)=3.55, p=.06): the effect was significant (p<.05) for 
negative experiences, and directionally consistent for positive ex-
periences. 
Importantly, we found no significant effects of negations on 
inferences about the speaker’s evaluations. After all, negations do 
not communicate whether an experience was positive or negative. 
They do, however, communicate whether it was (un)expected, and 
whether it confirmed the speaker’s expectations. In this manner, ne-
gations provide a subtle mechanism for communicating and main-
taining brand reputations. 
Wii Will Rock You! The Role of Figurative Language in 
Word of Mouth
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Research in advertising has studied the persuasive effect of 
figurative language. Figurative language is the use of words and ex-
pressions to convey an additional connotation beyond that of their 
lexical meaning (Fogelin 1988). Instances of figurative language 
may be, among others, metaphor (The Ferrari of vacuum cleaners), 
word play (Don’t leave without a good buy), idiomatic expressions 
(My car’s a lemon), hyperbole (the service person was a cell phone 
professor) or imitating sounds (This teacher is wrrrufff, meaning a 
tough teacher, or ouch!, meaning I was offended). 
The common finding and general conviction is that figurative 
language evokes positive affect and attitudes across contexts (Mc-
Quarrie and Mick 1999, 2003; McQuarrie and Phillips 2005; Phillips 
and McQuarrie 2009). In contrast, we suggest that figurative lan-
guage in user generated content is effective only in certain contexts. 
We propose that this context sensitivity results from a difference in 
the conversational norms regarding advertising and consumer gener-
ated content. For example, consumers often perceive ads to be bi-
ased, persuasive attempts (Sweldens, Van Osselaer, and Janiszewski, 
2010). By contrast, user-generated content is generally perceived 
as an objective sharing of opinions (Moore 2012; Schellekens, Ver-
legh, and Smidts 2010; Sen and Lerman 2007). Thus, conversational 
norms regarding persuasive text may include expectations for lin-
guistic tactics and artful word play. Conversely, the norms of using 
figures of speech in user generated content may not be governed by 
a general expectation of the text to be persuasive, but rather of it to 
reflect a sincere opinion. 
Because of these differences we suggest consumers have a dif-
ferent set of conversational norms and expectations regarding ad-
vertising and user generated content. Namely, it is typical for, and 
expected of, advertising communication to be exaggerated and 
emotionally intensified. Therefore, figurative language is gener-
ally normative for advertising (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Rot-
feld and Torzoll 1980; Simonson and Holbrook 1993; Toncar and 
Fetscherin 2012; Xu and Wyer 2010). But user generated content is 
a form of natural language in interpersonal communication.  There-
fore language perception and language choice may be governed by 
considerations that differ from those in advertising, particularly in 
their crucial dependence on the context of conversation (Grice 1975; 
Schwarz 1996; Sperber and Wilson 1995).
We base our reasoning on psycholinguistic literature that dem-
onstrates a positive link between emotional intensity and use of figu-
rative language (Bryant and Gibbs 2002; Caillies and Butcher 2007; 
Fussell and Moss 1998; Zemanova 2007). We then suggest hedonic 
and utilitarian consumption as contexts commonly associated with 
emotional and rational attitudes, respectively (e.g. Alba and Williams 
2013; Chaudhuri and Ligas 2006; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). 
Building on these literatures, we propose figurative language is more 
conversationally normative, and therefore more effective, in hedonic 
consumption than in utilitarian consumption. Following the reason-
ing whereby communication norms govern not only perception, but 
also language choice, we then test and find support for the prediction 
that consumers also use figurative language more in descriptions of 
hedonic consumption rather than utilitarian consumption. 
In our studies we focus on the conditions that invoke the use of 
figurative language in consumption context and the conditions that 
increase the effectiveness of figurative language in WOM. In study 1 
we contrast the effectiveness of figurative language in ads versus in 
WOM. Participants read a description of a hotel for either a business 
or a vacation purpose, which was presented as if taken from an ad or 
from a consumer review. The description was either figurative (e.g. 
The service is like on a king’s reception) or literal (e.g. The service 
is very professional). Results comparing ads to reviews suggest it 
is conversationally normative for figurative language to be used in 
advertisements for both hedonic and utilitarian product descriptions, 
and therefore the effectiveness of figurative language is similar for 
both types of product. However, figurative language is less norma-
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tive, and therefore less effective, in utilitarian product descriptions 
provided by consumers (F(1,334) = 4.2, p < .05).
In study 2 we examined the effects of figurative language on 
real consequential consumer decisions. After reading figurative or 
literal reviews of the same store, which contained both hedonic and 
utilitarian products, participants were asked to choose hedonic or 
utilitarian products as a reward for participation in the experiment. 
Participants who read reviews containing figurative language chose 
more hedonic products as prizes than participants who read reviews 
that did not contain figurative language (t = 5.0, p< .001).
Study 3 involves natural data analysis. We analyzed product re-
view headlines from www.Amazon.com. We find higher frequency 
of figurative language in hedonic product reviews, compared with 
utilitarian product reviews (F(1,21) = 15.8, p < .05). Our analysis 
also shows that in reviews of hedonic products more extreme prod-
uct evaluations employ more figurative language, while in reviews 
of utilitarian products review extremity does not moderate use of 
figurative language (F2,42=18.4,p <.001).
 Finally, in study 4 participants use liquid soap for either a util-
itarian purpose (washing a spoon) or a hedonic purpose (blowing 
bubbles) and compose reviews of the products. Linguistic analysis 
of the reviews shows higher figurativeness of reviews for the soap 
when used to blow bubbles (t(1,88) = 2.12, p < .05).
This work contributes to consumer research by exploring an un-
derrepresented aspect of online consumer communication – use and 
effects of language. This work also contributes to research of com-
munication and psycholinguistics by being the first to investigate the 
effect of figurative language in natural communication. Finally, we 
propose a new theoretical explanation for the link between figura-
tiveness and emotion, introducing conversational norms.
How Language Signals Persuasion: Concrete and 
Abstract Language in Product Referrals from 
Consumers and Firms
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Nowadays it’s becoming more difficult to detect if a product 
review or referral is made by another customer (without self-interest 
in advertising a product), or by someone with a commercial interest 
(advertisement, word-of-mouth marketing). Consider raving prod-
uct reviews on Amazon.com or emails with product offerings from 
Facebook friends. What could be sincere word of mouth could also 
be a marketing scheme. One way to figure out the sincerity of the 
communication situation is to examine the language use in product 
referrals.  
While psycholinguistics in marketing communication has re-
ceived much attention from academics (for overview see Lowrey, 
2007), language use in word of mouth only recently gained popular-
ity (e.g., Moore 2012). Building on the linguistic category model 
(Semin & Fiedler 1988), Schellekens et al. (2010) have studied 
the use and effects of abstract versus concrete language in word of 
mouth. According to this model, an event can be described at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. For example, the low fuel consump-
tion of the Toyota Prius may be described as “the Prius use little 
gas” (concrete)  or “the Prius is eco-friendly” (abstract). The use 
of abstract language describes the information as general and stable 
(“traitlike”), while concrete descriptions contain verifiable informa-
tion on product functioning. Schellekens et al. (2010) showed that 
receivers of word of mouth are receptive to the use of abstract versus 
concrete language. They found that senders of positive (negative) 
word of mouth were perceived to be more positive (negative) about 
a brand if they use more abstract language, and that consumers who 
receive word of mouth are persuaded more when the sender uses 
more abstract language. The current studies extend prior research 
on language abstraction and examine the role of communication set-
ting (commercial vs. non commercial). The studies suggest that com-
munication setting moderates the impact of language abstraction on 
consumers through the activation of persuasion knowledge. Persua-
sion knowledge refers to consumers’ assumptions and beliefs about 
persuasion and marketers’ motives, strategies, and tactics (Campbell 
& Kirmani, 2000; Friestad & Wright, 1994). 
We argue that environmental cues in a communication set-
ting can moderate the effect of language abstraction on persuasion 
knowledge of consumers, which in turn could affect product attitude 
and buying intention. More specifically, an environmental cue (e.g., 
advice giver has a sales motivation) could trigger consumers to be 
suspicious and attentive to persuasion cues. Since language can be 
used as a subtle mechanism to signal more information than the lit-
eral meaning of a message, suspicious consumers could scrutinize 
language use. Previous research showed that abstract (vs. concrete) 
descriptions are used more when trying to be persuasive (Schelle-
kens, Verlegh & Smidts, 2012). Sales personnel is expected to try 
to convince customers to buy products and therefore might be ex-
pected to use more abstract (vs. concrete) language when describ-
ing products. Thus, positive product referrals framed abstractly (vs. 
concretely) from a sender with a commercial motive may be seen 
as more manipulative and incite more persuasion knowledge. On 
the contrary, without environmental cues indicating a commercial 
motive (i.e., word-of-mouth communication) we have no reason to 
expect a difference is the activated persuasion knowledge between 
abstract and concrete language use in referrals. 
In Study 1, we manipulated the communication context (source 
of referral: commercial vs. non-commercial) and language abstrac-
tion of referral (concrete vs. abstract) between subject design. Partic-
ipants read a scenario in which a person (‘Sandra’) was shopping in a 
perfumery when she heard a referral about a new perfume (‘Spring’). 
Half of the participants were told that this referral was given by a 
sales person, while the other half were told it was given by another 
customer. The product referral was either described concretely as 
‘Spring smells fresh’ or abstractly as ‘Spring is a nice perfume’. The 
participants rated the goal of the communication from trying to (1) 
inform me about ‘Spring’ perfume to (9) persuade me into buying, 
and the interest of the speaker from (1) help Sandra to (9) own inter-
est (Campbell, 1999; 2007). Next, participants indicated the speak-
ers persuasion motives on four nine-point items (α=.816): not ma-
nipulative/manipulative, sincere/insincere, honest/dishonest, and not 
pushy/pushy (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000).  
As predicted, when a sales agents describes a product referral 
abstractly (vs. concretely), this leads to inferring the speaker as try-
ing to sell a product (7.34 vs. 6.23, t(130)=6.04, p=.015), serving his 
own interest (6.66 vs. 5.94, t(130)=2.86, p=.10), and having persua-
sion motives (i.e., being seen as more manipulative and pushy and 
less sincere and honest) (5.61 vs. 4.89, t(130)=5.34, p=.022). On the 
contrary, in line with our expectations the language abstraction of 
referrals from another customer has no effect on persuasion knowl-
edge (all t’s<1).  
In study 2, we focused on the intervening construct, suspicious-
ness, which we activated by informing all participants that some 
of the product referrals of the study were written with a motive to 
be persuasive. We thus examined whether consumers who have a 
reason to be suspicious about the source of a referral associate the 
use of abstract (vs. concrete) language with a persuasion motive. We 
presented participants with five different product descriptions which 
were either abstract or concrete. For each description they were 
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asked to indicate on a nine-point scale whether they thought that 
the referral was given by (1) a friend or (9) a company agent. The 
concrete description of the household appliance was for example 
“this appliance works good” and the abstract version was “this appli-
ance is good”. As expected, abstract (vs. concrete) statements were 
more strongly linked to salespersons than to friends (5.03 vs. 4.09, 
F(1,46)=10.77, p<.01). 
The present studies extend the prior work by Schellekens and 
colleagues (2010), and show that the use of abstract language does 
not necessarily lead to more persuasive referrals. The two stud-
ies show that the use of abstract language may trigger persuasion 
knowledge, especially in commercial contexts. The findings add to 
the growing body of knowledge on the impact of language on per-
suasion, and help us understand how language abstraction affects 
consumers differently in different contexts. They also add the use 
of (abstract) language to the list of factors that are known to activate 
persuasion knowledge, which may provide fertile ground for future 
research in this area.
Putting the Customer Second: Pronouns in Customer-
Firm Interactions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Recent work has demonstrated the importance of specific word 
use in influencing consumer behavior. This emerging body of work 
has examined the impact of language use on consumer senders and 
receivers of word of mouth (Moore 2012; Patrick and Hagvedt, 
2010; Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts 2010) and advertising (Sela, 
Wheeler and Sarial-Abi 2012). Yet there is little work examining the 
impact of firm employee language on consumers, particularly in the 
context of service interactions.
Firms, however, are starting to pay attention to interaction con-
tent, particularly when it comes to training and evaluating front-line 
employees. For example, Apple has “stop words” that employees are 
prohibited from saying to customers (Chen 2011). In contrast, online 
retailer Zappos does not have scripts for its agents, allowing each 
to create a “personal emotional connection” with customers (Hsieh 
2010). Despite their different philosophies on language use, both 
Apple and Zappos recognize the importance of measuring and man-
aging what is said between customers and employees. In this vein, 
we offer an empirical examination of the behavioral consequences 
of language use in service interactions. While prior research on ser-
vice interactions often examines how actions taken by firm agents 
(e.g. apologies, compensation; e.g. DeMatos et al. 2007; Rust and 
Chung 2006) influence customer attitudes and/or behaviors, we are 
unaware of research assessing how their words might affect the same 
outcomes.
Our conceptual focus is on pronoun use, as pronouns are an 
important psychological indicator (Pennebaker 2011) and have been 
found to impact brand information processing (Bitner 1990; Sela et 
al. 2010). Further, it is not clear which pronouns firm agents should 
use in their interactions with customers. Managerial theory suggests 
that firm agents should talk about “you” (the customer) in interac-
tions, thereby “putting the customer first” (Basch 2003, Evenson 
2011). This tenet is corroborated by findings from linguistic psychol-
ogy that demonstrate “you” pronouns can convey a focus on and 
desire to satisfy an interaction partner (e.g., Ickes, Reidhead and Pat-
terson 1986). 
In contrast, we predict that more self-centered firm agent lan-
guage—represented by heavier use of “I” pronouns—may be par-
ticularly effective. Some support for this prediction comes from re-
search suggesting that “I” pronouns indicate agency (e.g., Ahearn 
2001; Pennebaker 2011) and socially-shared concerns (i.e., empathy; 
Campbell and Pennebaker 2003). Our research thus examines the 
impact of firm-agent use of “I” (vs. “you”) pronouns on customer 
attitudes and behaviors, with perceived firm-agent agency and em-
pathy as potential mediators of this relationship. We leverage a lin-
guistic analysis package (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis 
2007) that identifies the proportion of words used in 70 linguistic 
and psychological categories, including pronoun sub-groups (e.g., 
the “I” sub-group includes “I’m”, “me”, “my”).
Study 1 examined which pronouns firms prioritize in practice. 
We constructed two emails—a customer question and a complaint—
and sent these to a random sample (N = 20) of the top 100 Internet 
retailers (https://www.internetretailer.com/top500). Consistent with 
the tenet of “putting the customer first” we found, for example, that 
while “you” pronouns appeared in 100% of firm responses, “I” pro-
nouns were present in only a minority (27%). It appears that firm 
agents indeed focus on the customer (vs. themselves) in these inter-
actions. But is this necessarily ideal?
In Study 2, a controlled experiment examined the impact of 
firm agent pronoun use on customer satisfaction, with perceptions 
of firm agent agency and empathy as mediators. Participants (N = 
376) imagined they had engaged in one of eight versions of a cus-
tomer-firm interaction in a 2 (customer inquiry: complaint, question) 
x 4 (firm response: I, we1, you, control) between-subjects design. 
Versions of the firm response varied the preponderance of pronoun 
use only, with no change in meaning. After reading the interaction, 
participants reported their satisfaction with the interaction and their 
perceptions of firm agent agency and empathy. Regardless of inter-
action type (question or complaint), the “I” condition resulted in 
higher customer satisfaction than the “you”, “we”, or control condi-
tions. Bootstrap tests confirmed parallel mediation of the “I” effect 
by participant perceptions of firm-agent agency and empathy.
In our third study, we leveraged a unique dataset from a large 
online retailer to examine whether firm agent pronoun use has real 
behavioral consequences. The data is comprised of over 1,100 unique 
interactions (6,500 emails) between customers and firm agents over 
a one-year period and includes each customer’s purchase data for a 
one year period pre/post their interactions. Similar to our Study 1 
findings, firm agent use of “you” pronouns was higher than the use 
of “I” pronouns (91% vs. 28% of emails). More importantly, control-
ling for a large number of alternative explanations and covariates 
(e.g., customer pronoun use, pre-interaction purchases, complaint 
dummy, compensation dummy, # of emails in interaction, customer 
anger, demographics), we found that firm agent use of “I” pronouns 
(but not “you” or “we”) was linked to a significant increase in post-
interaction purchases at one-year and shorter time intervals.
This research opens the door to further examinations of lan-
guage use in customer-firm interactions. We show that while firms 
appear to prioritize the customer through the use of “you” pronouns, 
the use of “I” pronouns have a greater positive impact on customer 
satisfaction and purchase behavior. Our analysis sheds light on how 
firms might leverage the linguistic content of customer-firm commu-
nications (e.g. email, blogs, social networks, etc.) to improve their 
use of language in these interactions, thereby enhancing customer 
relationships. 
1 We also assessed “we” pronouns as a third relevant pronoun group, 
but refrain from extensive discussion of “we” here for brevity. Judge coding 
found that over 98% of firm agent use of “we” referred to “firm + agent”, not 
“firm + customer” or “agent + customer.” “We” was thus the primary non-
customer pronoun used by firm agents. “We” pronouns were ineffective in 
relation to customer satisfaction (negative impact of “we” vs. “I”, null “we” 
vs. control) and purchases (null or negative impact for “we”).
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The purpose of this session is to integrate investigations on con-
sumer neuroscience and neuromarketing—that is, the study of brain 
function associated with consumers’ judgments and choices—(e.g., 
Plassmann, Yoon, Feinberg, & Shiv, 2011; Reimann, Schilke, Weber, 
Neuhaus, & Zaichkowsky, 2011; Smidts, 2002) with transformative 
consumer research—that is, research on how to increase consumers’ 
welfare and quality of life (Ozanne, 2013). This session will high-
light contemporary research in this new domain of transformative 
consumer neuroscience—which we define as “utilizing neuroscien-
tific insights and methodologies to improve consumers’ judgments, 
choices, and overall well-being”—and stimulate discussion on future 
research. The four papers in this session make important contribu-
tions in areas such as aging and decision making (Koestner, Hedg-
cock, Halfmann, & Denburg), craving and snacking behavior (Lu 
& Dubé), encoding of intangible characteristics of rewards (Chen, 
Hsu, & Nelson), and incentivizing consumers to choose less food 
(Reimann, MacInnis, & Bechara). In Paper 1, Koestner, Hedgcock, 
Halfmann, and Denburg study the neurobiology behind consumer 
vulnerability, particularly the brain activation patterns of older adults 
viewing deceptive and non-deceptive advertisements. The authors 
found that decreased activation in a region of the prefrontal cortex 
critical for complex decision making was associated with greater 
vulnerability. In Paper 2, Lu and Dubé link a lab measurement of 
neurocognition components involved in motivated behaviors with 
large-scale field observations of eating behavior. The authors found 
that snacking and the predictive power of craving on snacking vary 
between restrained and unrestrained eaters under the operation of 
different motivational and executive control processes. In Paper 3, 
Chen, Hsu, and Nelson advance current understanding of value rep-
resentation by studying how the brain represents the intangible char-
acteristics of goods, specifically branding. The authors found that by 
using machine learning techniques together with Aaker’s brand per-
sonality scale, they can predict, from brain activity, pairs of previous-
ly unseen brands with accuracies significantly above chance. Finally, 
in Paper 4, Reimann, MacInnis, and Bechara establish that offering 
non-food rewards (lottery tickets, toys) bundled with smaller food por-
tions as an alternative to full-portion meals can substantially decrease 
chosen portion sizes. The authors explain this effect by a “common 
reward currency” at the brain level. All four papers incorporate dif-
ferent neuroimaging and neuropsychological measurements to study 
imperative questions on consumers’ decision making and well-being.
Scamming Depression Era Elders: Neuroanatomical 
Basis for Poor Decision Making Among Older Adults
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Deceiving the elderly is not a new problem, but it is one that has 
been growing in prevalence. To illustrate, financial abuse of elders 
aged 65 and older has risen from a low of 8% in 1950 to an as-
tounding 20% in 2010 (Infogroup / ORC, 2010; Kemp, 2005). These 
recent statistics may even underestimate the extent of the problem, 
with only 1 in 25 cases being reported (Wasik, 2000). Financial loss-
es due to elder fraud are considerable. Estimates have placed losses 
at $2.6 billion in 2008, rising to $2.9 billion in 2011 (MetLife, 2011). 
Sadly, these numbers do not take into account the devastation fraud 
can have on the elderly and their families, often wiping out entire 
savings and years of work in a single action, not to mention the nega-
tive psychological effects.
The neurobiology behind elder fraud has received very little at-
tention from researchers, but there is a sizeable literature in cognitive 
neuroscience that can be used to generate hypotheses. To illustrate, 
multiple studies have lent support to the idea of the “frontal aging 
hypothesis”, which states that the frontal lobe of the brain undergoes 
the greatest amount of age-related decline in the context of healthy 
aging (West, 1996). Also, lesion studies have demonstrated that the 
prefrontal cortex, and specifically the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex, is crucial to real-world decision making (Bechara et al., 2000). 
Most directly, a recent study conducted by our research group dem-
onstrated that patients with acquired ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
lesions displayed greater vulnerability to advertisements with mis-
leading and deceptive content than both normal comparison and pa-
tients with brain damage outside the prefrontal sector (Asp, Manzel, 
Koestner, Denburg, & Tranel, 2012). Combined, these studies led us 
to hypothesize that older adults who were vulnerable to consumer 
fraud would have abnormal brain activation in ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex and insular cortex while viewing advertisements.
The older adult participants were recruited from a registry com-
piled in the Department of Neurology, University of Iowa College of 
Medicine. Thirty-two participants, age 62 to 88 years, participated; 
however, the data from one participant was excluded secondary to 
malfunction during the functional magnetic resonance imaging ses-
sion, resulting in 31 final participants (52% female; Mage = 76.8, SD 
= 7.0 years). Participants were scanned using a Siemens 3T magnetic 
resonance imaging scanner with 12-channel head coil. Data analy-
sis was completed using the Brain Voyager QX software package. 
Stimuli were created based on six advertisements deemed deceptive 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 1998). We created decep-
tive and non-deceptive versions of each advertisement. While in the 
scanner, participants were shown three deceptive and three non-
deceptive advertisements. Outside of the scanner, each participant 
completed a questionnaire that assessed their comprehension of the 
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advertisement’s content as well as their purchase intentions for each 
of the advertised products. During an earlier testing session, all par-
ticipants completed a battery of neurocognitive evaluations and the 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2007), a laboratory measure of 
decision making under uncertainty. 
From the questionnaire data, we utilized participants’ compre-
hension ratings of the three deceptive advertisements to create two 
groups based on their susceptibility to being deceived: “vulnerable” 
(n = 16) and “non-vulnerable” (n = 15). These two groups did not dif-
fer with regard to demographic variables (age, education, sex distri-
bution) or cognitive variables (intellect, attention/working memory, 
language, visuospatial, anterograde memory, executive functioning) 
(all ps > .05). Vulnerable participants had less activation in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex when viewing both deceptive and non-
deceptive advertisements than non-vulnerable participants (p < .05). 
We also observed that brain activation in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex was inversely correlated with personality trait Trustworthi-
ness (a measure of “gullibility” from the NEO Five-Factor Inven-
tory) (p < .05). Finally, brain activation in insular cortex correlated 
with Iowa Gambling Task performance such that laboratory decision 
making was positively associated with insular activation (p < .01). 
Interestingly, poorer laboratory decision making performance was 
predictive of greater activation for deceptive advertisements con-
trasted against non-deceptive advertisements (p < .05).
These findings provide some of the first evidence for differen-
tial neural patterns of brain activation to deceptive advertisements 
among older adults in relation to consumer vulnerability, personal-
ity traits, and decision making performance. Overall, older partici-
pants demonstrating greater susceptibility to deceptive advertising, 
higher gullibility, or lower financial decision making performance 
displayed less activation in brain regions crucial to decision making 
and emotional processing, suggesting that prefrontal brain regions, 
such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insular cortex, may be 
integral to the protection of the older consumer from fraud.
Linking Individual Differences in Motivational and 
Executive Control Neurocognition to Real World Craving 
and Snacking Behavior: The Case of Restrained and 
Unrestrained Eaters
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Background
Recent neuroscience research has generated detailed models of 
brain circuits involved in reward processing, decision-making, and 
self-control to understand may motivated behaviors, including eating 
(Dagher, 2012). However, research thus far has typically considered 
neurocognition components, one at a time (Vainik, Dagher, Dubé, & 
Fellows, 2013), divorced from the complexity of brain and real-life 
environment (Hammond et al., 2012). Thus, it is important to bridge 
the current knowledge of brain from neuroscience lab to real-world 
eating, sparking the transformation in individual behaviors, market-
ing practices, and public health policy (Dubé et al., 2008); Lab mea-
surements of individual neurocognition should be empirically linked 
with field observations of eating to explore: which neurocognitive 
components are engaged in real-life eating; and how individual dif-
ferences in neurocognition are related to eating as responses to inter-
nal (e.g., hunger or craving) and external cues (food cues).
Research Aims and Hypotheses
At any given point of time, eating is jointly determined by 
neurocognition components that combine homeostatic (e.g., hun-
ger), motivational (e.g., attentional bias to food cues and incentive 
salience in working memory) and executive control (e.g., inhibitory 
control and mental flexibility) processes (Dagher, 2012). Many but 
not all food consumptions result from yielding to craving, which has 
been attributed to a combination of inhibition over responses to re-
warding cue, poor mental flexibility, and resulting incentive salience 
in working memory (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005). Individual 
differences in these motivational and executive control processes can 
be traced both at neurocognitive (Affective Shifting Task, AST; Mur-
phy et al., 1999) and behavioral levels (restrained and unrestrained 
eating; Herman & Polivy, 1984). 
Presuming individuals are constantly being exposed to high-
caloric highly-rewarding food (HRF) cues, this study aims to exam-
ine the expectation that a person’s likelihood of having HRF snacks, 
after hunger being controlled, will be predicted by the presence of 
craving. At individual level, we further expect that both snacking and 
the predictive power of craving on snacking vary between restrained 
and unrestrained eaters under the operation of different motivational 
and executive control processes. Restrained eaters are self-trained to 
heavily rely on their inhibitory control to regulate eating (Stroebe, 
Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008). As their goal is to re-
sist the temptation of HRF, its related information persists and is 
elaborated in working memory resulting heightened craving (Polivy, 
Coleman, & Herman, 2005). Therefore, we expect restrained eaters 
with relatively better inhibitory control would be more vulnerable to 
HRF eating. Mental flexibility is the cognitive ability of intentionally 
directing attention to facilitate the switch between tasks with differ-
ent cognitive rules (Cserjési, Molnár, Luminet, & Lénárd, 2007), and 
is one of the critical neurocognition components to resist the tempta-
tion of rewarding cues (Mobbs, Iglesias, Golay, & Van der Linden, 
2011). Unrestrained eaters do not particularly intend to regulate eat-
ing beyond homeostatic processes (LeBel, Lu, & Dubé, 2008); while 
HRF cues catch their attention, they may or may not want to shift 
attention away depending on their contextual goal (e.g. whether they 
are hungry). But if they do, we expect that a stronger mental flex-
ibility would contribute to resist HRF eating. 
Method
In laboratory, 109 non-obese adult women performed AST. 
Restrained and unrestrained eaters were identified by restraint-scale 
(Polivy, Herman, & Warsh, 1978). They subsequently participated in 
an experience-sampling study (Reis & Gable, 2000) reporting their 
hunger feeling, HRF craving and snacking 6times/day in a ten-day 
period. 
In AST, English words were presented, one for each trial, on a 
computer screen. In half of trials, participants were asked to quick-
ly respond to positive English words (rewarding cues) and ignore 
neutral words; in the other half of trials, the rule was reversed. The 
rule-switches were structurally arranged. For each participant, AST 
indicators were obtained to assess her neurocognition components: 
Attentional bias was reflected in one’s superior responsiveness to re-
warding cues than to neutral stimuli. Inhibitory control was assessed 
by performance in the trials that responses to rewarding cues have to 
be stopped. And mental flexibility was assessed by the magnitude of 
decrement in task performance due to rule-switching. 
To link individual AST indicators with HRF snacking reported 
in the experience-sampling study, data was analyzed by a general-
ized hierarchical linear model with two-level specification (see Ap-
pendix). At episode-level, HRF snacking (Yes/No) was explained by 
context variables (hunger and time) and HRF craving (Yes/No). At 
individual-level, the individual differences in HRF snacking likeli-
hood and the predictive power of craving were further explained by 
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AST indicators, restraint-group (Restrained/Unrestrained eaters), 
and their interactions.
Major Findings
Consistent with our expectations, at episode-level, after con-
trolling for hunger (p < .001), HRF craving was positively associ-
ated with snacking (p = .04). At individual level, both restrained and 
unrestrained eaters’ HRF snacking likelihood was positively related 
to their AST indicator of attentional bias to rewarding stimuli (ps < 
.02). 
Differences in both snacking likelihood and the predictive 
power of craving emerged in the neurocognitive processes that were 
expected to vary between restrained and unrestrained eaters. Spe-
cifically for unrestrained eaters, better mental flexibility was directly 
associated with lower HRF snacking likelihood (p = .001). In terms 
of the predictive power of craving, stronger attentional bias was as-
sociated with higher likelihood that snacking had been triggered by 
craving (p = .03), while better mental flexibility was associated with 
lower triggering power of craving (p < .001). These results suggest 
that unrestrained eaters’ ability of directing attention helped them to 
attend to activities other than eating. As of restrained eaters, neither 
inhibitory control nor mental flexibility could directly account for 
HRF snacking likelihood. But the better restrained eaters were at 
inhibitory control, the more likely was it that snacking was triggered 
by craving. Neither difference in their attentional bias nor mental 
flexibility affected the triggering power of craving on eating. 
The pattern of results suggests that it is possible to examine 
the pathways by which neurocognition components impact real-life 
motivated behavior. Results also highlight that mental flexibility is 
a natural contributor to healthier food choices for a large segment of 
population. Future research should not only bring these results back 
to neuro-imagery labs but also examine the possibility that restrained 
eaters could be trained to foster mental flexibility. 
Appendix
Episode Level Model
Snack (Y/N) = P0 + P1*(Craving) + P2*(Hunger t-1) + 
P3*(weekend) + Pj*(Tj)
Where, Craving and Snack are dummy variables with HRF 
craving or snacking being denoted as 1, otherwise 0. Hunger (t-1) is 
a continues variable (0-150), which is group centered. Weekend is a 
dummy variable indicating weekend and holidays as 1. Tj (j=2-6) are 
dummy variables indicating the time of the day.
Individual Level Model
P0 = B00(Unrestrained) + B01(Restrained) + B0m(Unrestrained * 
AST indicators) + B0n(Restrained * AST indicators) + u0
P1 = B10(Unrestrained) + B11(Restrained) + B1m(Unrestrained * 
AST indicators) + B1n(Restrained * AST indicators)
P2 = B20(Unrestrained) + B21(Restrained) 
P3 = B30
Where, P0 is the coefficient indicating an individual overall 
HRF snacking, that is, the probability to take HRF snack without 
craving being reported on the same episode. P0 is further explained 
by Restrained (a dummy variable: restrained eater as 1, otherwise 0), 
a set of AST indicators, and the interaction between Restrained and 
AST indicators.
P1 is the coefficient indicating how likely a participant followed 
her craving to take snack (the predictive power of HRF craving), 
which is further explained by Restrained, a set of AST indicators, 
and the interaction between Restrained and AST indicators.
Identifying Symbols of the Consumer Marketplace from 
Human Brain Activity
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer neuroscience seeks to understand how consumer de-
cisions are shaped by marketing actions. Recent research, guided by 
formal economic models, has made rapid progress in understand-
ing the neural basis of value representation. These idealized mod-
els, however, rely on well-defined and stable preferences in a human 
population that is famously fickle, and prone to influence from subtle 
signals like brands, which may be unrelated to intrinsic value. An 
understanding of these influences is therefore critical for both our 
understanding of consumer decision-making, as well as potential 
real-world applications.
The twin challenges in this work are the need to (1) capture, in 
controlled laboratory conditions, some tractable set of stimuli from 
consumer daily life, and (2) to characterize, using quantitative, theo-
retically-grounded measures, the underlying mental representations. 
Here we bring together research in consumer behavior and decision 
neuroscience to understand how these intangible characteristics are 
represented in the brain. Specifically, we investigated the neural ba-
sis of brand perception by building on the well established semantic 
associations related to brands, widely known as “brand personality.” 
Brands are tractable and nearly inexhaustible. Frequently they are 
instantly recognizable, and emotionally and behaviorally evocative. 
Perhaps most importantly, brands have been nearly exhaustively 
studied. Research in consumer behavior in particular, has developed 
a rich framework for characterizing consumers’ perceptions and atti-
tudes toward brands, how they are formed, and factors that influence 
them (American Marketing Association 2012). 
Historically, neuroimaging studies systematically map brain 
regions to experimental manipulations of cognitive states and/or be-
havior. In consumer neuroscience, for example, there have been sev-
eral studies that have investigated brain regions that respond differ-
entially to branded vs. unbranded items, or when making inferences 
about brands vs. about people (Yoon, Gutchess, Feinberg, & Polk 
2006; Schaefer & Rotte 2007). Our experiment, in contrast, asks the 
question, “What type of information about brands (or other aspects 
of the consumer experience) is contained in the brain regions that 
respond to brands?” We do so by studying the neural responses to 
brands by combining functional neuroimaging of brand perception 
with a quantitative model of an important aspect of brand percep-
tion—the brand’s personality. 
A total of 18 participants underwent functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) while being shown a set of 45 of logos of 
well-known brands in a passive viewing task. Prior to the experi-
ment, they were instructed to think about the characteristics and 
personalities of the brands. To access the latent perceptions of our 
participants, we used a measure of brand personality developed in 
Aaker (1997). Following the experiment, participants were asked 
to complete, for each brand, the 42 item brand personality scale, as 
well as familiarity and preference, for a total of 1,980 ratings per 
participant. The total time for completion of the experiment was ap-
proximately 3 hours, and they were paid $70 upon completion of the 
experiment. 
This widely used and validated factor analytic system, which 
has been cited more than 2,000 times, posits that brand personality 
can be described as a set of five orthogonal personality dimensions: 
sincerity, excitement, competence, sophistication and ruggedness. 
With the dimensions of brand personality, we decompose each brand 
as the composition of these factors, using them as the measure of the 
mental contents of brands. 
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We first found that activity in the striatum is correlated with 
brand preference ratings. This is a region of the brain known to re-
spond to primary and secondary rewards, and is consistent with the 
idea that our brains respond to preferences of abstract objects such 
as brands. Then, we found that activity in the temporal-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) is correlated with the brand personality index. This brain 
region has been hypothesized to be a general brain region of think-
ing about people and intentions (Saxe, 2006). This provides the first 
evidence that a significant proportion of variance in brain responses 
to brands can be captured by the brand personality construct.
Next, we used multi-voxel pattern analysis to predict the cog-
nitive states of the participant using their neural responses to the 
brands and their latent associations (Haxby & Gobbini 2011; Nas-
elaris, Pregner, Kay, Oliver, & Gallant 2009). To train the model, 
we reconstruct the relationship between the personality dimensions 
and the brain activation. With those we were able to predict the brain 
activations associated with the brands outside the training set. Once 
trained, we evaluated our model by comparing the predicted fMRI 
images and the actual data. Our model successfully distinguished 
pairs of previously unseen brands with accuracies significantly high-
er than chance. Similarly, we are able to test whether we can recon-
struct which brands participants are viewing by using the physical 
feature of the logos, such as shape, color, and text, as well as using 
the brand personality model. This can be interpreted as a more strin-
gent test of whether neural representation of brands is sufficiently 
captured by the brand personality construct. 
Understanding the neural basis of consumer psychology and 
behavior has important managerial, financial, and ethical implica-
tions. Here we investigate whether and how the brain represents a 
specific construct—brand personality—that has excellent psycho-
metric properties and is widely studied in consumer behavior. Be-
yond branding, this research represents a novel attempt to overcome 
the conceptual and technical challenges in bridging the mind and 
the brain, and how our brains deal with the astonishing diversity of 
goods and services afforded by the modern economy.
Reward Substitution: Incentivizing Consumers to Choose 
Smaller Portion Sizes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In many societies, food has become abundant and calorie-rich. 
A pandemic of obesity has ensued, with high costs to governments, 
businesses, and consumers. The medical sciences’ remedy to this is-
sue seems deceptively simple: Consumers should eat less (Lamberg, 
2006). However, this advice is easier to give than to follow or en-
force in societies that value having freedom and a variety of avail-
able options. One stream of research shows that—without altering 
satiation—smaller portion sizes can drastically decrease the overall 
quantity of food consumed (e.g., Geier, Rozin, & Doros, 2006; Rolls, 
Roe, & Meengs, 2006; Rozin, Kabnick, Pete, Fischler, & Shields, 
2003). This notion of decreasing food intake by altering portion sizes 
has been investigated in several different yet related variants such as 
smaller assortment sizes (Kahn & Wansink, 2004; Redden & Hoch, 
2009; Rolls et al., 1981), smaller package sizes (Scott, Nowlis, Man-
del, & Morales, 2008; Wansink, 1996; Wansink & Kim, 2005; Wan-
sink & Park, 2001), taller and more slender food containers (Wansink 
& Van Ittersum, 2003), and smaller bowls and plates (Van Ittersum & 
Wansink, 2012; Wansink & Cheney, 2005; Wansink, Van Ittersum, & 
Painter, 2006).
However, extant research has largely missed addressing the is-
sue of how consumers can be incentivized to choose such smaller 
portions—a highly relevant question in a world of “family-sized” 
cereal cartons (Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2007), all-you-can-eat buf-
fets (Wansink & Payne, 2008), and restaurants where tempting “su-
per-sized” meals are offered ubiquitously (e.g., Hill & Peters, 1998; 
Nestle, 2003; Nielsen & Popkin, 2003). Moreover, from a business 
perspective, recent marketing research has shown that some profit-
maximizing firms have dropped smaller portion sizes from their port-
folios and menus because of decreased demand (Sharpe, Staelin, & 
Huber, 2008) and that introducing smaller food packages to the mar-
ketplace may only be profitable for firms under specific circumstances 
(Jain, 2012). This raises the question whether firms should actively 
offer such smaller packages and risk loosing profitability.
In order to answer these important questions and fill this unfore-
seen gap in the extant literature on food choice and consumption, the 
present research introduces a novel food offering that promotes eating 
less, possibly without hurting food manufacturers’ and restaurants’ 
profitability. This food offering entails half-sized meals paired with 
non-food rewards such as a lottery ticket or a small toy (at the same 
price than a full-sized meal). Four studies establish and validate a 
novel food choice effect, which we termed “reward substitution.” For 
the purpose of this research, we define reward substitution as the ex-
change of parts of a (food) reward with another (non-food) reward. As 
such, we follow the established definition of rewards being positive 
reinforcers, which are sometimes also referred to as incentive stimuli 
(Schultz, 2000).
In Study 1 of the present research, initial evidence for the re-
ward substitution effect is provided in a children population. Study 
2 replicated the effect among an adult sample and further shows that 
the effect does not wear-off over time, even as consumers became 
familiar with the product. Because self-reported satiety/hunger did 
not moderate the reward substitution effect in Studies 1 and 2, we 
manipulated consumers’ satiety levels in Study 3 and found mod-
eration of the reward substitution effect by manipulated satiety. In 
Study 4, we investigated the underlying neurophysiological process 
associated with choosing the half-sized meal with the non-food re-
ward compared to choosing regular full-sized meals without such 
non-food rewards. Recent neuroimaging research has independently 
shown brain activation in the same brain system—the striatum—for 
distinct rewards such as food (Berridge, 1996), money (Knutson, 
Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001), beautiful faces (Aharon et al., 
2001), and aesthetic packages (Reimann, Zaichkowsky, Neuhaus, 
Bender, & Weber, 2010). Our research builds on the idea of a com-
mon neural currency (Montague & Berns, 2002; Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997; Wise, 1978) to see whether the combination of a 
small food portion and a non-food reward would attract activation in 
the striatum as does a large food portion alone.
Taken together, the findings from these four studies present a 
comprehensive examination of the reward substitution effect that 
contributes to the extant literature on consumer food choice by show-
ing that attempts of promoting the choice of smaller food portions (1) 
can be behaviorally effective, (2) is moderated and even intensified 
by manipulated but not self-reported satiety, and thus, may be par-
ticularly effective in food-abundant societies in which consumers are 
generally satiated, and (3) attracts the same neurophysiological pro-
cess, if non-food rewards are offered as partial substitutes for food.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
In what ways are a consumer’s day to day emotional experi-
ences and self-control dilemmas related to each other? Research 
has established that when consumers succeed (fail) at self-control, 
positive (negative) emotion is experienced in response (Carver and 
Scheier 1998). However, an overview of the literature shows that it is 
less clear when emotion will work to facilitate versus impede a con-
sumer’s willingness to overcome a self-control dilemma (Winterich 
and Haws 2011). Understanding how emotion influences self-control 
requires focusing on the specific emotion experienced, as each dis-
crete emotion activates unique cognitive and motivational proper-
ties that can change depending on the context (Tamir, Mitchell, and 
Gross 2008). In this session, we will focus specifically on how vari-
ous discrete emotions influence aspects of the self, to then influence 
a consumer’s self-control. 
The first paper, (Han, Agrawal, Poor, and Duhachek), shows how 
emotions create “situational selves” that shift preferences for certain 
types of information as a means of affirming one’s self.  Specifically, 
they find that angry (versus shameful) people become more likely to 
exhibit increased counter-argumentation to inconsistent (consistent) 
information which affirms one’s self and leads to subsequent boosts 
in self-control. The second paper, (Allard and White), demonstrates 
that guilt (relative to sadness) leads to increased self-control by in-
creasing the desire to engage in self-improvement rather than mood 
repair. This increased desire to self-improve is hypothesized to oc-
cur because guilt is experienced in response to violations of self-
standards. The third paper, (Garg and Nenkov), suggests that sadness 
(relative to anger) leads to greater self-focus which decreases self-
control efforts via indulgent consumption. In addition, they explore 
whether the increased indulgent consumption brought on by sadness 
attenuates if people are encouraged to shift their focus away from 
the self and towards others.  The fourth and final paper, (Salerno, 
Laran, and Janiszewski), explores how certain experiences of pride 
are more likely to be perceived as a reliable experience which then 
influences self-control. Specifically, they find that in the absence of 
an active goal, pride that emerges from a stable behavioral pattern or 
success at a high effort task is interpreted as diagnostic of a person’s 
self-concept and leads to increased self-control efforts. 
Thus, the objective of this session is to address two key ques-
tions: (1) what are the ways in which various specific emotions effect 
aspects of the self and (2) what are the downstream consequences for 
a consumer’s ability to exert self-control? This research is important 
as it comes at a time in which the costs of self-control failure are 
higher than ever before, reflected in consumer overspending (Bau-
meister 2002), weight gain and obesity (Sharpe, Staelin, and Huber 
2008), and addiction (Grant et al. 2010). We expect ACR attendees 
interested in the topics of emotion, the self, and self-control to be 
our primary audience with the session also being of general interest 
given the scope of theoretical constructs covered. 
The Downstream Consequences of Incidental Emotions 
and Preference Inconsistent Information
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers are constantly exposed to information, which some-
times conflicts with current preferences. Research has shown that 
consumers typically resist preference-inconsistent information (e.g., 
Kunda 1990; Chen and Chaiken 1999) by discounting, ignoring, or 
selectively processing it in a way that reinforces pre-existing beliefs 
(e.g., Jain and Maheswaran 2000). Recent research has also high-
lighted the importance of consumers’ affective state, showing that 
emotions with differing valence and agency can influence decision-
making after exposure to preference consistent versus inconsistent 
information (Agrawal, Han, and Duhachek 2012). The purpose of 
the present research is to tie together research on preference inconsis-
tent information and emotional appraisals to explore the downstream 
consequences of emotions and appraisal (in)consistent messaging, 
specifically in terms of self-control. We employ the appraisal-tenden-
cy framework (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001; Lerner and Tie-
dens 2006) and self-affirmation theory (Sherman and Cohen 2006) to 
show that emotions of the same valence (e.g., shame and anger) can 
have different effects on self-control following confrontation with 
either preference consistent or inconsistent information. 
According to self-affirmation theory, people are motivated to 
maintain the integrity of the self, where integrity is defined as a 
sense that one is a good and appropriate person (Sherman and Cohen 
2006). We argue that incidental emotions create a situational self, 
such that the appraisal tendencies associated with an emotion can in-
fluence perceived “appropriateness” when presented with preference 
consistent or inconsistent information and this can activate the need 
to self-affirm. The appraisal tendency for shameful individuals is that 
they have transgressed an aspiration or ideal (Tangney 1991). Thus, 
to the extent that preference consistent information is considered a 
threat to this situational self (I’m wrong but you’re telling me I’m 
right), the individual will try to affirm the self by counter-arguing the 
message. The appraisal tendency for angry individuals is an offense 
against the self (Lazarus 1991); to the extent that preference incon-
sistent information is perceived as a threat to this situational self (I’m 
right, but you’re telling me I’m wrong), the individual will try to af-
firm the self by counter-arguing the message. Altogether, we predict 
that preference inconsistent (consistent) information is perceived as a 
threat to the situational self-identity of angry (shameful) individuals 
because it is at odds with the emotion’s respective appraisal. In an 
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act of self-affirmation, angry (shameful) individuals will exhibit in-
creased counter-argumentation toward this inconsistent (consistent) 
information. Such self-affirmation should boost subsequent self-con-
trol (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009). We tested these predictions across 
three studies. 
In study one, we tested the predicted interaction using a 2 (emo-
tion: anger, shame) x 2 (preference consistency: consistent, incon-
sistent) between subjects design (N = 118). First, the target emo-
tions were primed using an emotional recall task that induced either 
anger or shame (cf., Robinson and Clore 2001). Next, preference 
consistency was manipulated using a two-part procedure adapted 
from previous research (Jain and Maheswaran 2000). In part one, 
subjects read a description of two different products. To form a 
moderately strong preference for Product A, subjects were told that 
scientific testing showed that Product A was superior to Product B 
on five out of eight product attributes. In part two, subjects were 
shown evaluations from actual users of both products and randomly 
assigned to either a preference consistent or inconsistent condition. 
In the consistent (inconsistent) condition, subjects were told that the 
percentage of respondents who felt Product A (B) performed better 
than Product B (A) was much higher than those who felt Product B 
(A) performed better. Self-control was measured by asking subjects’ 
snack preference on a seven-point scale anchored by: 1 = chocolate 
cake, 7 = apple. As predicted, the results revealed that in the prefer-
ence consistent condition, subjects exhibited more self-control when 
they felt shame versus anger (p < .05). In contrast, subjects in the 
preference inconsistent condition exhibited more self-control when 
they felt anger versus shame (p < .05).
In study two, we sought to replicate these results and also pro-
vide process evidence (N = 167). The design and procedure mir-
rored that of study one, except that subjects were asked to provide 
cognitive responses after exposure to the product evaluations in 
part two of the preference consistency manipulation.  These cog-
nitive responses were then coded to reflect the proposed mediator, 
counter-argumentation. The results replicated those found in study 
one: subjects in the preference consistent condition exhibited more 
self-control when they felt shame versus anger (p < .05), but subjects 
in the preference inconsistent condition exhibited more self-control 
when they felt anger versus shame (p < .05). Further, counter-argu-
mentation was shown to mediate this relationship, such that angry 
(shameful) subjects expressed more counter-argumentation toward 
inconsistent (consistent) information, which in turn boosted subse-
quent self-control. 
In study three, we sought converging evidence for our theory by 
including a trait measure of self-control. The design and procedure 
mirrored that of study one, with two exceptions. First, situational 
self-control was captured using a behavioral measure in which sub-
jects were allowed to eat freely from a bowl of chocolates. Fewer 
chocolates consumed indicated greater self-control. Second, trait 
self-control was measured using Puri’s (1996) Consumer Impulsive-
ness Scale (CIS). Subjects that scored above (below) the median on 
the reverse-scored prudence subscale and on the hedonic subscale of 
the CIS were classified as prudents (hedonics) (N = 152). According 
to our theoretical model, we would expect that the effects found in 
studies one and two would be amplified (attenuated) among hedon-
ics (prudents) because these individuals are chronically low (high) 
in self-control. The results were consistent with these predictions, 
revealing the predicted three-way interaction between emotion, 
preference consistency, and trait self-control (p < .05). Specifically, 
hedonics exposed to preference inconsistent information exhibited 
more self-control when they were angry versus shameful (p < .05), 
while hedonics exposed to preference consistent information exhib-
ited more self-control when they were shameful versus angry (p < 
.05). This pattern was attenuated among prudents.
Taken together, this research shows that emotions of the same 
valence (e.g., shame and anger) can have different effects on self-
control following confrontation with preference consistent/inconsis-
tent information. These results have implications for marketers and 
consumers alike. 
Failing to Meet the Standards: How Guilt Triggers 
Preferences for Unrelated Self-Improvement Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Guilt has traditionally been described as a self-conscious emo-
tion stemming from some violation of normatively held standard of 
behavior (Basil, Ridgeway, and Basil 2006; Heidenreich 1968) and is 
often viewed as an interpersonal emotion arising from concerns over 
a transgression against others (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 
1994). This research examines a novel downstream consequence of 
guilt, namely, preferences for self-improvement products in domains 
unrelated to the source of the guilt.
Previous work on the downstream consequences of guilt has 
largely examined two types of outcomes. First, the experience of 
guilt leads individuals to engage in actions allowing for direct repa-
ration of the wrong-doing (e.g., Dahl, Honea, and Manchanda 2005; 
Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). Second, guilt can lead to out-
of-domain downstream consequences wherein the activation of guilt 
in one context can lead to prosocial behaviors in a second context 
(Konecni 1972; Regan et al. 1972). In other words, research suggests 
that people can take direct or indirect means of resolving guilt. Such 
behaviors have been attributed to resolving the negative emotions as-
sociated with guilt by repairing the mood or engaging in impression 
management (Cialdini et al. 1987). 
We alternatively suggest that guilt can activate a desire for self-
improvement. Drawing on past work suggesting that falling short of 
one’s own personal standards can activate guilt (Higgins 1987; Pelo-
za, White, and Shang 2013), we propose that guilt activation make 
salient one’s failure to meet important self-standards. As a result, 
consumers will exhibit self-improvement strivings. When options to 
engage in moral actions to directly or indirectly alleviate guilt in the 
prosocial domain are not available, we predict that activating guilt in 
one domain leads to increased preferences for consumption choices 
geared toward general self-improvement in subsequent unrelated 
domains.
Our approach draws from a recent body of literature focus-
ing on improving our understanding of the distinct motivational 
outcomes of specific emotions (Griskevicius, Shiota, and Nowlis 
2010; Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011; Winterich and Haws 2011) to 
compare the effects of guilt with those of sadness – an emotion of 
similar valence, intensity, and certainty about its source – and of neu-
tral emotional states on consumption preferences. More specifically, 
we compare two strategies for regulating negative emotional states, 
preferences for self-improvement and mood-management options. 
We thus compare the typically more effortful and future oriented 
process of making changes to the self with the process of regulating 
one’s mood. We present four experiments investigating this spillover 
effect.
Study 1 uses a 3(emotion: guilt vs. sadness vs. neutral) be-
tween x 2(goal type: self-improvement vs. mood-management vs. 
control) within, mixed-model design. Participants recalled an event 
that either made them feel particularly guilty, sad, or recalled a neu-
tral event. In an ostensibly separate study, they were asked to help 
evaluating upcoming book titles in the “100 Tips to…” series. Par-
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ticipants evaluated the titles “Becoming Your Best Self” as the self-
improvement option, “Improving Your Mood” as the mood-manage-
ment option, and other control titles (e.g., “Exploring Italy”). Results 
support the predicted interaction between the emotion recalled and 
the goal associated with each title. Participants in the guilt condi-
tion rated the self-improvement title higher than participants in the 
sadness or control condition. No significant difference was observed 
for the other titles. Study 2 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) be-
tween x 2(social-comparison Type: upward vs. downward) within, 
mixed-model design. It provides additional support for the effect by 
testing how participants’ affective state influences agreement with 
alternative measures of self-improvement and mood-management 
desires. After performing a recall procedure similar to study 1, par-
ticipants rated their agreement with both upward (self-improvement) 
and downward (mood-management) social-comparison behaviors. 
Participants in the guilt condition agreed more with upward social-
comparison behaviors than those in the sadness condition. No differ-
ence was observed for downward social-comparison.
Study 3 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) between x 2(goal 
type: self-improvement vs. mood-management) within, mixed-mod-
el design. This study provides support for our theoretical framework 
by examining the mediating role of self-improvement motives. Af-
ter engaging in a recall procedure similar to study 1, participants 
evaluated two functional music album titles. Participants in the guilt 
condition evaluated more positively than the ones in the sadness con-
dition the self-improvement choice titled “Music to Improve Your 
Self,” which was recommended to “create the optimal environment 
for mastering new skills.” Ratings were not significantly different 
between conditions for the mood-management title “Music to Im-
prove Your Mood,” which was recommended to “lift up mind, body, 
and spirit.” A difference score comparing participants’ ratings of 
each title also supported the notion of a relative preference for self-
improvement over mood-management consumption. This relation-
ship was mediated by participants’ self-improvement motivations.
Study 4 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) x 2(self-theory: 
incremental vs. entity) between-subjects design. It extends our un-
derstanding of the phenomenon by highlighting the importance of 
believing in one’s ability to change. We posit that individuals who 
view their self as being malleable and improvable will be particular-
ly likely to pursue self-improvement products in another domain af-
ter experiencing guilt. We examined the impact of self-theory (Chiu, 
Hong, and Dweck 1997) or the extent to which participants believed 
the self to be stable (i.e., entity theory) or malleable (i.e., incremental 
theory) on subsequent product choices. Participants were asked to 
select three samples from two functional teas: the self-improvement 
“Get Smart” tea or the mood-management “Get Happy” tea. Results 
support the predicted interaction between emotion and self-theory 
on consumers’ choices of self-improvement over mood-management 
products. Among participants in the guilt condition, incremental the-
orists made more self-improvement choices than entity theorists. No 
such difference was observed in the sadness condition. 
Taken together, the results of the four studies provide con-
verging evidence that activation of guilt can subsequently lead to 
preferences for self-improvement consumption choices in unrelated 
domains. This relationship is driven by the activation of a general 
desire for self-improvement and  contingent upon people’s belief that 
the self can be improved over time.
‘I’ versus ‘You’: Self-focus as a Mediator of Emotion 
Effects on Self-control
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Anecdotal evidence has suggested that behavior and consump-
tion are related with the emotion that a person is experiencing.  In-
deed, research on incidental or ambient emotions has discovered the 
pervasive tendency of emotions to carry over from one situation to 
another, coloring behavior in unrelated tasks (e.g., Keltner and Le-
rner 2010; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). Among emotions, sadness 
is unique because of two important reasons. First, although nega-
tive, sadness does not conform to the standard predictions based on 
its emotional valence.  Based on a valence-based model, one would 
predict that negative emotions, including sadness, will trigger gen-
eralized negative assessments of the environment and lead one to 
perceive the world in negative ways.  In contrast, sadness actually 
triggers positive valuation of new products, as measured by willing-
ness to pay (Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004).  Second, the 
carryover effect of sadness drives consumption behavior across di-
verse domains. In the domain of eating, for example, sadness (rela-
tive to happiness) leads to increased consumption of tasty, fattening 
food products, such as buttered popcorn and M&M candies (Garg, 
Wansink, and Inman 2007; Garg and Lerner 2013). In the domain of 
consumer transactions, sadness (relative to a neutral state) increases 
the amount people spend to purchase items (Lerner et al. 2004). 
One of the factors implicated in the sadness-consumption rela-
tionship is the enhanced self-focus that sadness engenders. Cryder 
et al. (2008) found that this increased self-focus was tied to higher 
willingness to pay for a new product (water bottle). However, these 
authors focused on just acquisition of a new product rather than gen-
eralized indulgent (hedonic) consumption across domains. 
In the present research, we hypothesize that the self- versus 
other-focus associated with emotions and its effect on consumption 
might hold more generally across emotions. In our studies we exam-
ine two specific, negative emotions – anger and sadness. We focus 
on the ‘self’ because based on the appraisal tendency framework it 
connects with one of the key dimensions - self-responsibility - differ-
entiating emotions and their subsequent effects (Lerner and Keltner 
2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Self-responsibility refers to the 
degree to which one feels responsible for what is happening in the 
situation. 
Understanding the differences in the effects of anger and sad-
ness is important as they are two of the most common negative emo-
tions associated with consumption experiences (Garg, Inman, and 
Mittal 2005). From a theoretical perspective as well, anger and sad-
ness are very interesting, because even though both have a nega-
tive valence, they arise from different appraisal tendencies that lead 
to differential impact on a subject’s degree of self-responsibility 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Whereas, a heightened sense of self-
responsibility characterizes sadness, anger is associated with others 
being responsible for the situation (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985). Thus, whether anger and sadness lead to sys-
tematic differences in self-control relevant consumption becomes an 
important question to examine. The answers will broaden our un-
derstanding of the relationships between emotions and consumption 
in general; well beyond our current knowledge that is limited to the 
sadness-consumption links. 
The current research also examines whether outcome elabora-
tion moderates the emotion-consumption link. Extant research has 
established the beneficial effects of considering the potential future 
outcomes for effective self-control in the present (e.g., Baumeister 
and Heatherton 1996; Nenkov, Inman, and Hulland 2008). Prior re-
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search, however, has not differentiated between different outcome 
elaboration approaches. We argue that elaborating on the potential 
outcomes of a behavior for the self versus others would moderate 
the relationship between emotions and consumption. We predict that 
since the self-focus associated with sadness drives its detrimental 
effects on self-control, switching the focus on others, rather than the 
self (e.g., by reminding participants about the potential effects of 
their behavior on others) could attenuate these effects.  
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a series of three studies 
to examine whether anger and sadness are associated with varying 
levels of self-focus and whether this differential self-focus results 
in systematic shifts in preferences for hedonic options (Study 1); 
whether manipulating the focus of outcome elaboration (to empha-
size the self vs. others) can alter the extent to which sad and angry 
individuals opt for hedonic options (Study 2); and finally whether 
self-focus and outcome elaboration can influence the amount of he-
donic food product (M&Ms) consumed rather than simply shifting 
preferences for hedonic options, as in Studies 1 and 2 (Study 3). 
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that sadness leads to a higher self-
focus as compared to anger, and that this enhanced self-focus medi-
ates the link between emotion and preference for hedonic options. 
We examined two consumer domains – preference for healthy versus 
hedonic food and preference for time spent on a utilitarian versus 
hedonic task. A 2 (emotion: sad, angry) x 2 (preference: food, time 
spent) between-subjects design was implemented to test the hypoth-
eses of the study. Results find that sad individuals are significantly 
more self-focused than angry individuals and tend to prefer hedonic 
options across both domains. Also as predicted, this differential self-
focus mediates the relationship between emotion and preference for 
hedonic options. 
Study 2 aims to show that the focus of outcome elaboration - 
self vs. others – moderates the influence of emotions on preference 
for hedonic options. Study 2 uses a 3 (emotion: sad, angry, neutral) 
x 2 (outcome elaboration: self, others) between-subjects design. We 
expect that outcome elaboration would succeed in overriding the ef-
fect of sadness on preference for hedonic consumption only when it 
is focused on others (rather than self). 
The final study seeks to replicate and extend the results of Stud-
ies 1 and 2 in the domain of actual food consumption (Garg et al. 
2007; Garg and Lerner 2013). This study would test our predictions 
in a well-tested domain to bolster the reliability of our results and 
would move from examining simple preferences to actual behavior. 
Overall, this research aims to provide critical insight into the 
theoretical moderators and mediators underlying the emotion-hedon-
ic consumption relationship. This will have important implications 
for the strategies employed to attenuate the influence of contextual 
factors such as emotions because of the negative consequences of 
unbidden consumption.
The Influence of Pride Diagnosticity on Self-Control
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Pride is a self-conscious emotion shown to generate apprais-
als of increased self-worth, which can have a diametric influence on 
self-control efforts. In some instances, pride’s increased self-worth 
can encourage people to exert self-control (Patrick, Chun, and Ma-
cInnis 2009; Williams and DeSteno 2008). In other instances, this 
same sense of self-worth can foster a “license to sin” and lead to 
self-control lapses (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011; Winterich and 
Haws 2011). Thus, understanding when pride assists versus impedes 
self-control may depend on the consideration of other moderating 
factors. 
This research proposes that the influence of incidental pride on 
self-control is a function of (1) whether the experienced pride is per-
ceived to provide diagnostic information about how to behave and, 
(2) a person’s present goal state. We find that two antecedents (i.e., 
the circumstances that were responsible for the pride) determine 
when pride is diagnostic: stability and effort. Stability is pride expe-
rienced as a function of how frequently an accomplishment is made 
within a domain. Effort is pride experienced as a function of the dif-
ficulty level of an accomplishment within a domain. When pride is 
high (versus low) in stability or effort in one domain, it should be 
perceived as diagnostic for what to do in other domains. This is be-
cause pride high in stability (effort) pertains to an accomplishment 
requiring persistence (overcoming difficulty). Such an accomplish-
ment should be more trustworthy for what to do in other domains 
because persistence (overcoming difficulty) is applicable to attaining 
self-control success across all domains (Freund and Riediger 2006; 
Williams and DeSteno 2008). 
We predicted that the effect diagnostic pride has on self-control 
will depend on one’s current goal state. When no regulatory goal 
is active, diagnostic pride should be used to make inferences about 
one’s self-concept (i.e., “The event that made me proud is part of 
who I am”). To the extent that opportunities (i.e., means) are avail-
able to pursue in other self-control domains important to an indi-
vidual, diagnostic pride should increase self-control. However, when 
a regulatory goal is active, pride should become diagnostic to goal 
pursuit and supersede adjustments to the self-concept (Wheeler, De-
Marree, and Petty 2007). Goal-pursuit relies on feedback for control; 
such that when progress is insufficient (sufficient), goal pursuit is in-
creased (decreased) (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Since the experience 
of diagnostic pride occurs in response to success in one’s long-term 
goals, pride should signal that the person is effective at regulatory 
behavior and to deemphasize the importance of the goal. Thus, di-
agnostic pride should lead to an inference that enough progress has 
been made toward the active goal (i.e., “The event that made me 
proud is enough of an accomplishment for now”) and decrease self-
control.
We tested our hypotheses in three studies. Studies 1A and 1B 
used a two (regulatory goal: inactive vs. active) x two (pride expe-
rience: nondiagnostic vs. diagnostic) between-subjects design. The 
studies were identical in design and procedure except that each study 
manipulated one pride antecedent. Study 1A (1B) manipulated pride 
diagnosticity using the stability (effort) pride antecedent, where pride 
high in stability (effort) was diagnostic while pride low in stability 
(effort) was nondiagnostic. Participants first completed a lexical de-
cision task that either primed the regulatory goal of being virtuous 
or no goal. Then participants responded to a hypothetical scenario 
that either evoked diagnostic or nondiagnostic pride. In study 1A 
(stability), participants in the nondiagnostic (diagnostic) pride condi-
tion were told to think about a single past experience (common past 
experiences) in which they were proud of eating healthy. In study 1B 
(effort), participants in the nondiagnostic (diagnostic) pride condi-
tion were told to think about a time in which they were proud of 
an A they received with very little effort (a great deal of effort) on 
their part. Lastly, participants completed a task purportedly related to 
everyday decisions but was actually our dependent measure for self-
control. Participants made 15 total decisions, where each decision 
had two possible options, and one option was always more virtuous 
than the other. Results showed that when no regulatory goal was ac-
tive, diagnostic pride led to a greater number of virtuous decisions 
made compared to nondiagnostic pride. However, when a regulatory 
goal was active, diagnostic pride led to a lower number of virtuous 
decisions made compared to nondiagnostic pride. 
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Study 2 builds upon studies 1A and 1B, showing that the per-
ceived diagnosticity of pride is critical to predicting how pride will 
influence self-control. The study’s design was modified to include 
a manipulation which made the concept of nondiagnosticity either 
salient or non-salient, using a two (nondiagnosticity salience: low 
vs. high) x two (regulatory goal: inactive vs. active) x two (pride 
experience: nondiagnostic vs. diagnostic) between-subjects design. 
First, participants completed the priming task from study 1, with the 
regulatory goal changed to savings. Next, participants completed the 
pride manipulation from study 1A. Then, participants completed a 
task supposedly related to reading comprehension but in truth ma-
nipulated nondiagnosticity salience. In the low salience condition, 
participants read about a new bird exhibit at the local zoo. In the high 
salience condition, participants read about a new book that highlight-
ed the importance of “not using success in one area of their lives to 
infer what they should do in other areas.” Lastly, participants com-
pleted a budgeting task and indicated how much they would save for 
the upcoming month, which served as our dependent measure for 
self-control. When nondiagnosticity salience was low, the pattern of 
saving intent replicated study 1. However, when nondiagnosticity 
salience was high, differences in pride experience attenuated, where 
only participants in the active regulatory goal condition exhibited 
greater saving intentions than those in the inactive regulatory goal 
condition.  
Collectively, these studies show that the effect of pride on self-
control is jointly determined by the diagnosticity of the pride experi-
ence and the presence (versus absence) of regulatory goals. As such, 
the findings contribute to our understanding of how emotions influ-
ence self-control, with important implications for consumer motiva-
tion and wellbeing.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The literature on judgment and decision making has long fo-
cused on the disutility of uncertainty. The certainty effect for exam-
ple, first evidenced in the Allais paradox (Allias 1953), suggests that 
people overweight certain outcomes relative to probable outcomes 
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000). In general, people are risk averse 
in gains—they prefer a sure gain to a lottery of gains with the same 
expected value (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In an extreme dem-
onstration of risk aversion, Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) showed that 
risky prospects are valued less than their worst outcome. Recently, 
however, researchers have begun to explore conditions under which 
consumers embrace uncertainty. For example, Goldsmith and Amir 
(2010) found that in the absence of thoughtful consideration, innate 
optimism drives consumers to respond to uncertain promotions and 
certain promotions with the best outcomes equally favorably, al-
though the expected benefits of uncertain promotions are lower.   
The current session brings together three papers each exploring 
a way to maximize the utility of uncertainty or minimize its disutility. 
Across the three papers, we discuss (a) how to frame risky prospects 
to increase willingness-to-pay; (b) which information processing 
strategy to use to decrease uncertainty aversion; and (c) how con-
sumers aggregate promotion and product risk to minimize overall 
risk aversion.
The first paper by Yang, Vosgerau, and Loewenstein explores 
the influence of framing on consumers’ valuation of a risky prospect. 
In particular, framing a risky prospect as “uncertain gift” compared 
to “lottery” substantially increases consumers’ willingness to pay for 
the prospect. Although framing does not change consumers’ subjec-
tive value of the risky prospect, the “uncertain gift” frame evokes a 
higher reference price than “lottery” frame which increases WTP. 
The second paper by Goldsmith and Amir compares effects of intui-
tive processing versus deliberative processing on people’s tendency 
to avoid uncertainty. The results suggest that intuitive processing 
actually decreases uncertainty aversion, and thus increases one’s 
likelihood of making a rational choice in contexts where uncertainty 
aversion usually biases choices. The first three papers focus on peo-
ple’s reactions to a single source risk. The final paper by Shi and Xu 
extends the scope of investigation by looking into how consumers 
make decisions when companies market products of uncertain quali-
ties with probabilistic promotions. In this case, consumers aggregate 
two independent sources of risks (product and promotion risks) and 
evaluate them jointly. The results show that product risk and promo-
tion risk interact in determining joint risk evaluation – it is amplified 
when consumers perceive salient contrasts between the sizes of two 
risks. 
Introductory remarks will briefly review the previous research 
on risk aversion and uncertainty aversion and emphasis will be 
placed on recent discoveries on the positive influence of uncertainty. 
Each speaker will discuss the theoretical perspective from which the 
findings are grounded. The last 10 minutes of the session will be 
devoted to summarizing the factors that have been examined in ex-
ploring the upside of uncertainty and encouraging the speakers and 
the audience to generate new theoretical perspectives that may high-
light avenues for future research. In line with the theme of ACR of 
“making a difference,” this session will aim to provide an overview 
of emerging findings that are built on previous work on risk aversion 
and uncertainty aversion but also make a difference by exploring the 
promises of uncertain environment.  
We expect this session will be of interest to a broad audience at 
ACR. Given that risk aversion is one of the most prominent finding 
in consumer judgment and decision making, insights into when con-
sumers embrace risk and uncertainty provides new opportunities for 
consumers, retailers, and manufacturers.
The Influence of Framing on Willingness to Pay as an 
Explanation of the Uncertainty Effect
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) documented the intriguing uncer-
tainty effect (UE) where risky prospects are valued less than their 
worst outcome. For example, people are willing to pay an average 
of $26 for a $50 gift certificate, but only $16 for a lottery that would 
pay either a $50 or a $100 gift certificate with equal probability. The 
psychological mechanism underlying this effect is still unknown. 
Keren and Willemsen (2009) claimed that participants simply misun-
derstood the instructions in the lottery condition. Simonsohn (2009) 
carefully ensured participants’ correct understanding and reliably 
replicated the effect, proposing that the uncertainty effect denotes a 
direct form of risk aversion.
This extreme form of risk aversion appears even more peculiar 
given that in the marketing domain researchers have documented 
the opposite. Goldsmith and Amir (2010) examined the effect of un-
certainty on promotions and found that risky prospects framed as a 
free gift could be more attractive than their expected value. Why do 
people exhibit extreme risk-aversion in the situations examined in 
the research documenting the UE, but extreme risk-seeking for seem-
ingly closely equivalent risky choices in the domain of consumer 
research? In a series of 9 studies, we show that framing a risky pros-
pect as a “lottery ticket” as opposed to an “uncertain gift certificate” 
substantially reduces WTP, because the lottery frame evokes a lower 
reference price, but people value the risky prospect equally under 
both frames.
In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that when a risky prospect 
is described as a “lottery” as opposed to an “uncertain gift”, WTP 
is substantially reduced causing the UE. In Experiment 2, for ex-
ample, we orthogonally manipulated framing (a lottery ticket vs. a 
gift certificate) and uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain). Framing a 
risky prospect as a lottery ticket−no matter whether it was certain or 
uncertain−substantially decreased WTP. Thus, the uncertainty effect 
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only occurred when the uncertain item was framed as a lottery ticket 
and the certain item was framed as a gift certificate. 
In Experiments 3A and 3B we replicated the framing effect, and 
tested four possible explanations - subjective uncertainty, processing 
fluency, negative attitudes toward lottery tickets, and anchoring. The 
procedure in these studies was identical to that in the previous stud-
ies; additionally, participants also indicated how much uncertainty 
they felt in this offer (subjective uncertainty), how difficult the of-
fer was to understand (fluency), and their attitude toward lotteries. 
Finally, we also asked participants to indicate the typical price of a 
lottery ticket either before or after they indicated their WTP to test 
whether WTP is anchored on typical lottery ticket prices. Neither 
subjective uncertainty, fluency, attitudes towards lotteries nor an-
choring were related to WTP. 
In Experiments 4-6 we manipulated aleatory uncertainty, men-
tal representations of uncertainty, and anticipated disappointment. 
While we replicated the previously found framing effect in all three 
studies, none of the uncertainty and disappointment manipulations 
had an effect on WTP.
Experiments 7 and 8 test a reference price account of the UE 
that was inspired by Weaver and Frederick’s (2012) reference price 
theory of the endowment effect. According to this account, the lot-
tery frame may evoke a lower reference price than the gift certificate 
frame. 
One prediction that follows from this account is that if the lot-
tery ticket frame evokes a lower reference price than the uncertain 
gift certificate frame, setting an explicit reference price under both 
frames should lead to an assimilation of WTP to that reference price. 
In Experiment 7, we manipulated the presence of a reference price 
by telling half of the participants that the majority of participants in 
previous studies had been willing to pay $35 for the risky prospect 
($35 is the median WTP across framing conditions in our experi-
ments). In the control conditions no reference price was mentioned. 
As predicted, we found that the differences in willingness to pay 
(WTP) disappeared when the same reference price was set for both 
frames.
The reference price account also allows for another elegant pre-
diction. According to Weaver and Frederick (2012), people are not 
willing to pay more than the reference price (r, i.e., the market value) 
even when they subjectively value (v) the good more, because this 
would constitute a bad deal. Formally, WTP = min (r, v). WTA, how-
ever, is equal to the maximum of the reference price and valuations, 
and should not thus be affected by the low reference price under the 
lottery frame. Formally, WTA = max (r, v). This suggests: WTA, in 
contrast to WTP, should not be affected by the framing manipulation. 
In Experiment 8, we test this prediction by manipulating the frame 
(lottery vs. gift certificate) and endowment status buyer vs. seller. 
Consistent with the reference price account, results show that lottery 
framing reduces WTP but not WTA. 
Experiment 9 and 10 examine whether our finding can be gen-
eralized to other frames, such as “raffle”, “gamble”, “coin flip” and 
“voucher”. Consistent with the reference price account, we found 
that “raffle”, “gamble”, “coin flip” frames significantly reduced WTP 
compared to “voucher” frame. No UE effect was observed when the 
frame of the risky prospect and its worst outcome matched. We also 
found that framing had a greater impact on WTP than on WTA. 
Concluding, in a series of 11 studies we demonstrate that fram-
ing influences WTP and thus explains the UE. We rule out a host of 
possible explanations for the framing effect on WTP, and find evi-
dence consistent with a reference price account.
The Role of Cognition in Uncertainty Aversion:  When 
Less Thought Leads to More Rational Choices
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Human beings often strive to be rational and consistent in their 
decision making. As a result, a great deal of academic research has 
been devoted to understanding the decision strategies that promote 
rational choices across different contexts. Prior work has identified 
two distinct processing styles used in decision resolution: conscious 
deliberation, which draws attention to the decision, and intuitive re-
sponding, which relies more on “gut” responses. The belief that care-
fully considering one’s decision should improve decision-outcomes 
has been advocated for centuries and some academic research sup-
ports the merits of such behavior; however, to our knowledge, no 
work to date has tested the implications that promoting (versus in-
hibiting) consideration of one’s decision has for one’s likelihood of 
making rational choices in contexts involving uncertainty. 
A large body of academic work demonstrates that people pre-
fer certain over uncertain benefits, even showing that a preference 
for certainty can lead to violations of expected utility theory. The 
seminal demonstration of such a violation is the Allais Paradox (Al-
lais 1953). This paradox reveals that when individuals are presented 
with sequential choices between gambles, the majority violates the 
independence axiom, failing to treat the potential outcomes within 
the gambles as independent in part because uncertain gains are less 
tolerable when certain gains are available. We build on this work by 
testing the effect of processing style on this paradigm.  In so doing, 
we are able to test if and how directing resources (e.g., cognitive fo-
cus) towards decisions involving uncertainty affects one’s likelihood 
of making a rational choice.
Recent research suggests that careful consideration of one’s 
decision may increase uncertainty aversion (Goldsmith and Amir 
2010). If this is the case, manipulations that inhibit such consider-
ations (e.g., by directing cognitive resources away from the decision) 
may increase rationality in contexts where uncertainty aversion has 
been shown to bias outcomes (e.g., the Allais Paradox). Experiment 
1 tested this directly by manipulating cognitive load and testing indi-
viduals’ likelihood of demonstrating the Allais Paradox and revealed 
that participants were less likely to demonstrate the Allais Paradox 
when under cognitive load (Pno-load=37%; Pload=27%; p<.05). If the 
Allais Paradox occurs in part because of uncertainty aversion, these 
results imply that under cognitive load, uncertainty aversion decreas-
es, thus resulting in more rational choices in this context. If true, 
then when the decision context promotes consideration, participants 
should be more likely to demonstrate the paradox, as compared to 
when it does not. Prior research suggests that individuals naturally 
consider gambles with higher-stakes outcomes (e.g., higher in mon-
etary value) more than those offering low-stakes rewards (Goldsmith 
and Amir 2010).  We utilized this value manipulation in order to test 
for a conceptual replication of our effect and observed that partici-
pants were significantly less likely to demonstrate the Allais Paradox 
when the gambles were of low-value (21%) as compared to high-
value (38%; p<.001). Experiment 3 replicates this pattern of results 
in a different domain by manipulating if participants were asked to 
“think carefully” about uncertain rewards prior to rating their attrac-
tiveness. In line with our predictions, we observe that directing atten-
tion towards the uncertain rewards made them less attractive (p<.05).
Decision making under risk and uncertainty has been at the 
forefront of social scientific investigation for five decades. We build 
on this work by shedding light on the relationship between process-
ing style and uncertainty aversion. Our experiments offer conver-
gent evidence demonstrating that consideration increases uncertainty 
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aversion, relative to more intuitive processing, which can decrease 
one’s likelihood of making a rational choice in contexts where uncer-
tainty aversion commonly biases choices (e.g., the Allais Paradox). 
We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical impli-
cations for these findings.
Psychological Risk Aggregation: Selling Products of 
Uncertain Qualities with Probabilistic Promotions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Companies often market products of uncertain qualities with 
probabilistic promotions (e.g., 50% chance of getting 15% off; 50% 
chance of getting 45% off). A product provides uncertain qualities 
to consumers either because it is new to the market or because the 
product is inherently risky (e.g., investment products). When such 
products with uncertain qualities are promoted with probabilistic re-
wards, consumers need to aggregate two sources of risks (product 
and promotion risks) and evaluate them jointly to decide the attrac-
tiveness of the deal package. This paper studies consumers’ psycho-
logical reactions to aggregated risks from independent sources. Our 
paper extends the existing literature on probabilistic promotions that 
has focused on consumer responses to the uncertain nature of the 
probabilistic promotions, comparing their performance relative to 
fixed promotions (Goldsmith and Amir 2010, Mazar, Shampanier, 
and Ariely 2012) or exploring the optimal design of reward structure 
(Kalra and Shi 2010). Most of the existing studies, by examining 
either established brands such as Nike athletic shoes, Amazon gift 
cards, and M&M’s or hypothetical ones, have neglected the potential 
performance uncertainty in the products being promoted.
We develop a theoretical framework for joint risk evaluation 
that incorporates three factors: risk aversion, probability weight-
ing, and contrast effects.  First, risk aversion is the core concept in 
normative economics theory, which suggests that decision makers 
evaluate a two-risk prospect by computing the expected value of its 
outcomes. Assuming that people are risk aversive, this model pre-
dicts that people should prefer fixed promotion over probabilistic 
promotions, and for any given product promoted by a probabilis-
tic promotion, the joint evaluation of the two-risk prospect should 
monotonically decrease as the risk of the probabilistic promotion 
increases. Second, prospect theory assumes that people may over-
weigh favorable outcomes and they are risk-aversive. When proba-
bilistic promotion involves low risk, since people may overweigh 
the more favorable outcome in the reward package, the joint evalu-
ation of the two-risk prospect can be greater than a fixed promotion 
with no risk. However, as promotion risk continues to increase, risk-
aversion will overshadow positive-outcome-overweighting and lead 
to decrease in joint evaluation. Note that both frameworks assume 
that promotion risk and product risk independently influence joint 
evaluation. No direct interactive effect between two sources of risks 
is predicted. Finally, we extend above two frameworks with a joint-
risk evaluation model to accommodate the contrast effect that may 
occur when aggregating two independent sources of risks (a promo-
tion risk and a product risk).  Specifically, when people perceive a 
large and a small risk prospect simultaneously, the larger risk is more 
salient and becomes the focus of attention. The smaller risk serves 
as the reference of comparison. Contrasting the large risk against the 
small risk amplifies the perceived size of the large risk. As a result, 
perception of joint risks is higher and joint evaluation is lower when 
the differences between the two risk prospects are sufficiently large 
to produce a contrast effect.
In two experiments, we manipulate the size of product risk (be-
tween-subject) as well as the size of promotion risk (within-subject) 
and investigate how consumers make joint evaluations of the two-
risk prospect in two diverse contexts.  In the first experiment, product 
risk was manipulated by the variance of mutual funds’ annual returns 
in the past (high vs. low). The size of promotion risk was manipulated 
through the spread between large and small rewards (7 levels from 
low to high): the larger the spread, the higher the promotion risk. 
The probability of getting either reward is 50%.  Joint evaluation of 
this two-risk prospect was measured by the likelihood of choosing 
the mutual fund over a fixed-income fund with no promotion. The 
results revealed an interactive effect of product risk and promotion 
risk. First, inconsistent with the predictions of normative economic 
theory, the joint evaluation of the two-risk prospect did not decrease 
with reward spread monotonically. When the product risk was high, 
the joint evaluation dropped sharply when a low risk promotion was 
introduced, but then bounced as promotion risk increased to a higher 
level. Monotonic decreasing trend was observed when the promotion 
risk increased from the medium to high levels. This drop-bounce-
drop trend was also in contradiction to the bounce-drop-drop trend 
predicted by single risk Prospect Theory. Second, when the product 
had low risks, introducing a small promotion risk had little impact 
on the joint evaluation. However, as the promotion risk increased 
from the medium level to high level, joint evaluation dropped dra-
matically. 
The second experiment manipulated product risk by using three 
types – radically-new, incrementally-new, and established – of prod-
ucts in the airline industry (high vs. low vs. no risk; between-sub-
ject). The quality of a flight service would be uncertain when it is a 
new flight route offered by an established airline; and the uncertainty 
would be even higher when the new service route was offered by a 
newly founded airline. In contrast, the established product involves 
minimal quality uncertainty. Again, the size of promotion risk was 
manipulated through the spread between large and small rewards (7 
levels from low to high). Joint evaluation of the target product was 
measured by indicating the matching price for a competing product 
that make the target and the competing products equally attractive. 
Again, the interactive effect of product risk and promotion risk sup-
ported the joint evaluation model. 
Our results suggest that we should extend the commonly ap-
plied single-risk prospect theory models by explicitly accounting for 
psychological interactions between two sources of risks when they 
are evaluated jointly. The joint risk evaluation model developed in 
this paper offers one approach to incorporate such contrast effects 
between two risks.    
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Creativity has been defined as the generation of ideas, insights 
or problem solutions that are both new and useful (Amabile 1983; 
Sternberg and Lubart 1999). Consumers themselves engage in vari-
ous problem solving activities and enjoy creative outputs in a wide 
range of contexts. In today’s society, perhaps more than ever, cre-
ativity prevails as part of our everyday consumption environment. 
Whether sharing an idea in an online community, engaging in a craft 
project or creating a customized product, consumers value creative 
outcomes. It is no surprise then that over the past several decades, re-
searchers have delved in understanding the antecedents and effects of 
consumer creativity. Recently however, most research in consumer 
creativity has focused on studying the effects of situational variables, 
such as external constraints (Moreau and Dahl 2005), involvement 
(Burroughs and Mick 2004), noise (Mehta et al. 2012), spaciousness 
(Meyers-Levy and Zhu 2007) on creativity. 
The proposed session aims to diverge from this trend. This ses-
sion brings together four papers that examine a more human side 
of creativity. First paper (Herd and Mehta) furthers current under-
standing of empathic design and teases apart the differential effects 
of empathy and perspective taking on creativity. Specifically, this 
paper demonstrates that empathy leads to higher levels of shared 
identity which then leads to more creative product outcomes. The 
second paper (Sellier and Dahl) examines the role of ethics in con-
sumer creativity. Building upon recent research which demonstrates 
that higher creativity can lead to more unethical behavior, this work 
shows that an ethical (or a moral) mindset can lead to higher creativ-
ity. Hence, looking at things from a positive perspective this paper 
suggests that “good”, can also boost creativity. The third paper in the 
session (Yang and Chattopadhyay) recognizes mortality salience and 
its influence on creativity. This research considers dire situations that 
can make death salient. The authors find that such thought processes 
can hamper divergent thinking, resulting in lower creativity of the 
generated ideas. Finally, the fourth paper (Tu and Argo) investigates 
the effect of consumers’ social comparisons and evaluation expecta-
tions on creative outcomes. This paper shows that when consumers’ 
creative outcomes are expected to be compared based on an indi-
vidual’s own ability level, it’ll lead to higher level of creativity as it’ll 
enhance competition and involvement in the given creativity task. 
However, when the social comparison is based on the creativity out-
come itself, it will negatively affect creative performance.
In sum, this proposed session examines a wide range of theoret-
ical constructs (empathy, social comparison, morality, mortality) and 
their distinct influences on creative performance. All four paper pa-
pers in the session enhance current understanding of consumer cre-
ativity and provide cutting edge insights into how consumers’ subtle 
psychological variables can either enhance or inhibit creativity. 
Thus, we believe that this session in itself presents a coherent theme 
that will appeal to a wide range of consumer behavior researchers.
Heart Versus Head: Examining Differential Effects of 
Empathy Versus Perspective Taking on Creative Product 
Design
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The extant literature in product innovation and creativity has 
treated the constructs of empathy and perspective taking interchange-
ably (e.g., Dahl et al. 1999). Yet, recent literature suggests they are 
theoretically different processes (e.g., Davis et al. 1987; Galinsky et 
al. 2008). 
Perspective taking is a cognitive process by which one imagines 
how another person thinks (Batson et al. 2007; Dahl et al. 1999). By 
taking another’s perspective, consumers are able to “put themselves 
in the shoes” of a target. This process allows them to better anticipate 
the behavior and reactions of others (e.g., Davis 1983). Empathy, on 
the other hand, is an affective process that involves the adoption of 
another’s feelings (e.g., Batson et al. 2007; Escalas and Stern 2003). 
Importantly, perspective taking and empathy have been shown to in-
duce differences in the way the self is construed. Perspective taking 
involves taking another’s perspective, but allows one to maintain an 
individual self-identity (e.g., Simon et al. 1997). An empathic con-
nection on the other hand enhances shared identity, a redefinition in 
terms of others (e.g., Brewer et al. 1993; Simon et al. 1997). 
This adaptation of shared identity as compared to maintain-
ing one’s self identity allows individuals to retrieve unconventional 
knowledge about others which then leads to enhanced creativity 
(e.g., Maddux and Galinsky 2009). We thus propose that in a product 
design context an affective process of empathic concern as compared 
to the cognitive process of perspective taking will lead to higher lev-
els of shared identity, which in turn will lead to product designs that 
are more creative in nature. We test our hypothesis across three stud-
ies involving real design tasks and consistently find that empathy 
(vs. perspective taking) leads to more creative product designs. To 
pinpoint shared identity as the underlying process, we both measure 
and manipulate it across studies.   
In study 1, all participants (N = 80) were prompted with either 
perspective taking or empathy strategy (manipulation adapted from 
Batson et al. 2007). In the perspective taking condition, participants 
were told to visualize a target consumer interacting with the product. 
In the empathy condition, participants are told to imagine how a target 
consumer would feel while using the product. Following the manipu-
lation, all participants were directed to provide new creative ideas for 
a laptop that is specifically designed for consumers age 65+. Follow-
ing the study, independent raters blind to condition evaluated each 
participant’s ideas on the following dimensions: creativity, novelty, 
originality. These measures were averaged to create a mean objective 
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creativity score (α = .91). Results revealed a main effect of empathy 
vs. perspective taking (MPT = 3.45 vs. MEmp = 3.56; F(1, 79) = 4.65, 
p < .04).
In the next study, all participants (N = 45) were again prompted 
with either a perspective taking or empathy strategy. Following the 
manipulation, each participant provided as many creative ideas as 
they could for a grocery cart for the elderly. Again, we found a main 
effect of strategy on objective creativity such that those prompted 
with empathy were more creative (MPT = 3.50 vs. MEmp = 3.84; F(1, 
44) = 4.12, p < .05). In order to better understand the underlying 
process, we also captured shared identity measures of how similar 
they imagined themselves being to the elderly and how much they 
imagined themselves as a unique individual (reverse-coded). Media-
tion analysis using bootstrap approach showed a significant indirect 
effect of shared identity through which empathy (vs. perspective tak-
ing) influenced creativity (95% CI: .0455, 4.336).    
Finally, in study 3, we manipulated shared identity to provide 
further evidence that this change in how participants identify with 
consumers influences creative output. All participants (N = 180) 
were provided with Lego-like toy pieces called Krinkles and were 
instructed to create a toy prototype for a 4-6 year old child. Strat-
egy (empathy vs. perspective taking) was manipulated as in previous 
studies. Shared Identity was manipulated by asking participants to 
“imagine, as a product designer, if you were a 4-6 year old child how 
you would interact (how you would feel) while playing with the toy.” 
In Self Identity condition the participants were asked to “imagine, as 
a product designer, how this segment of 4-6 year old children will 
interact (feel) while playing with the toy.” Following the study, we 
took pictures of each design and asked moms of 4-6 year old children 
to evaluate each design’s creativity (creativity, novelty, originality). 
A significant two way interaction was observed (F(1, 179) = 7.78, p 
< .01) such that when the participants were primed with self identity 
empathy lead to lower creativity of the prototypes.  However, when 
shared identity was primed no difference was observed between em-
pathy and perspective taking conditions.
Taken together, these studies reconfirm that perspective taking 
and empathy are distinct constructs which differentially influence 
identification with consumers, driving differences in consumers’ 
abilities to develop new and creative ideas and designs. 
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The Light Side of Creativity: An Honesty Mindset Can 
Boost Creativity
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Considerable consumer research has established that a critical 
area of study is the investigation of contextual factors that enable 
consumers to be creative (e.g., Moreau and Dahl 2005). Alarming-
ly, recent research documented that creativity can negatively affect 
ethical behavior (e.g., Gino and Ariely, 2012). The present research 
flips this perspective to show that creators with an ethical mindset 
can enjoy greater creativity (study 1). We further show that a moral 
mindset can similarly serve as a creative boost (study 2). In sum, the 
activation of “good” can increase creativity.
What is a mindset? Engaging in certain tasks is known to acti-
vate a set of cognitive operations, which remain activated beyond the 
initial task, thereby influencing subsequent and unrelated tasks – the 
term “mindset” is used to refer to this global readiness (e.g., Gollwit-
zer, 1990). Following this research, we define an ethical mindset as 
a global readiness to have appropriate feelings in distinguishing be-
tween what is morally acceptable versus not (Crisp 2000). As such, 
an ethical mindset involves one’s justification of one’s actions as be-
ing appropriate (Gino & Ariely, 2012); it implies moral flexibility. A 
moral mindset is different in that it represents a global readiness to 
abide by an absolute set of rules allowing no internal justification – 
whether actions are appropriate is externally dictated.
We examine how an ethical mindset versus a moral mindset 
shapes subsequent creative cognitive processing. Prior research pin-
pointed constraints as a critical antecedent of creativity (e.g., Dahl 
& Moreau, 2007). Both an ethical and a moral mindset constrain the 
creative process in that they focus creators on ethical/moral creative 
solutions. Further, an ethical mindset provides autonomy, because it 
allows internal justification of one’s actions, whereas a moral mind-
set stifles autonomy. For these reasons, we expect that an ethical 
mindset will foster individual creativity more than a moral mindset 
and than a non-constraining, neutral mindset. 
We tested this prediction in a first study in which 92 students 
(45 men, age = 20.1 years) completed creative tasks after having 
been primed with ethics-related, morals-related, or neutral words. 
They were told that they would take part in two studies. The first 
study was a word search task. Participants had to circle words hidden 
in a grid, from a list appearing below the grid. We varied the list of 
words, so that most of the words either related to ethics (e.g.,  “al-
truistic,” “generous”), morals (e.g., “abiding,” “imperative”) or were 
neutral (e.g., “armchair,” “telephone.”). Participants subsequently 
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reported how creative, original, novel, inspired, artistic, and innova-
tive they perceived their alien to be (1-7; not at all/very), their mood, 
and other measures.
Next, participants participated in an ostensibly unrelated cre-
ativity study. They were instructed to imagine visiting a different 
planet, and encountering an alien there. Their task was to be as cre-
ative as possible in drawing this alien (Ward, 1994). Next, they were 
given a creative problem-solving task, the Duncker candle task, for 
which only one solution exists. 
Once all data from creators were collected, 16 peers indepen-
dently rated each alien’s creativity, indicating how creative, original, 
novel, inspired, artistic, innovative (1-7; not at all/very; α for the 
averaged creativity score across peers = .99) the aliens were. Subse-
quently, they rated each alien’s attractiveness (6 items, all α’s > .85).
Seven participants did not follow the study instructions, and 
were therefore excluded from the sample. We report our analyses 
for the remaining 85 participants. We computed a self-perceived cre-
ativity index by averaging creators’ creativity ratings (α = .91), and 
subjected this index to an ANOVA. We found a significant impact of 
Mindset, F(1, 85) = 3.15, p < .05, r2 = .04,  such that creators with 
an ethical mindset perceived their aliens to be significantly more cre-
ative than creators with a moral mindset (Methical = 4.10 vs. Mmoral= 
3.44, t(82) = 1.94, p = .05, r2 = .04); and than creators with a neutral 
mindset (Mneutral = 3.28, t(82) = 2.34, p < .03, r
2 = .06). Moral and 
neutral creators rated themselves as equally creative, t < 1.
Next, we computed an objective creativity index by averaging 
peers’ creativity ratings (all αs > .85). An ANOVA using this index as 
the dependent variable showed a significant impact of Mindset, F(1, 
85) = 3.16, p < .05, r2 = .04, such that the ethical aliens were judged 
more creative than the moral aliens, Methical = 4.34 vs. Mmoral= 3.77, 
t(82) = 2.27, p < .03, r2 = .06; and than the neutral aliens, Mneutral = 
3.81, t(82) = 1.94, p = .05, r2 = .04. Moral and neutral aliens were 
rated equally creative, t <1. 
Focusing on the Duncker candle problem, we found that 54% of 
ethical participants found the correct answer, a greater performance 
than moral participants (29% solved correctly, χ2 = 3.62, one-tail p < 
.03), and than neutral participants (30 %, χ2 = 3.24, one-tail p < .04). 
We found no influence of mood or peers’ alien attractiveness ratings 
on our results, all p’s > .08. 
A second study examines when a moral mindset can boost cre-
ativity above and beyond an ethical mindset. Following research in 
moral psychology (Haidt 2007), we suggest that a moral mindset 
(vs. an ethical mindset) will foster greater creativity when creators 
work in groups, because it activates group cohesion and facilitation 
processes during the creative process. In contrast, because it boosts 
autonomy, an ethical mindset compromises group cohesion.
We primed 90 participants with an ethical or a moral mindset 
as in study 1, before they worked on designing a toy for people eat-
ing behind the wheel, in groups of 3 or 4. Subsequently, they rated 
their creative process experience, in particular the extent to which 
they felt the group worked well and enjoyed cohesion. We found 
that moral groups produced more creative toys than ethical groups 
primed, p < .05. Further, we found that groups’ ratings of how well 
they worked together mediated this effect. 
Together, our results suggest that, if creativity can lead to dis-
honesty, honesty can also produce a creative advantage. 
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Towards Understanding Creative Ingenuity in Dire 
Situations
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
From deadly natural disasters to terrorism and wars to violent 
crimes, today’s 24/7 media constantly exposes us to information that 
makes our own mortality salient. At times, we may even be quite 
close to such misfortunes (e.g., living in the areas ravaged by Su-
perstorm Sandy or Hurricane Katrina). This research explores how 
mortality salience affects people’s creative ability and what type of 
individuals are more sensitive to this effect. 
Prior research suggests that mortality salience elicits existential 
anxiety and, to buffer against this paralyzing anxiety, people deploy 
terror management strategies to create a sense of meaning and or-
der that can transcend death (e.g., Solomon et al.1991; Greenberg 
et al. 1997). Because cultural values provide meaning and structure 
to one’s world and represent permanence beyond an individual’s de-
mise, mortality salience intensifies people’s adherence to their cul-
tural values and worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1990; Rosenblatt 
et al. 1989). Supporting this theorization, a large number of studies 
show that the onset of mortality salience can alter evaluations of self 
and others (Burke et al. 2010). These effects have also been shown to 
be non-consciousness and unique to mortality salience (as opposed 
other aversive situations; Greenberg et al. 1994).
Nonetheless, how mortality salience impacts creativity is not 
well understood. The current research proposes that mortality sa-
lience inhibits access to information outside of one’s core conven-
tional knowledge, as a means to protect the coherence and stability 
of one’s core cultural values and worldviews. This inhibition occurs 
because access to peripheral information that may conflict or cast 
doubt on one’s cultural values and worldviews, can make adherence 
to them more difficult, reducing the usefulness of this terror manage-
ment strategy. Thus, mortality salience is likely to hamper assess to 
divergent information in memory, impairing creative ingenuity. 
Moreover, because death represents the ultimate form of loss 
of control (Becker 1973), mortality salience may impact people with 
different control beliefs differently. While individuals with high 
internal locus-of-control believe that event outcomes are primarily 
controlled by their own efforts and actions, those with moderate in-
ternal locus-of-control believe that they have control over only some 
events (Rotter 1966). The first group’s beliefs are irreconcilable with 
the notion of death, which should lead to the elicitation of stronger 
terror-management behaviors under mortality salience. This, in turn, 
impairs their creative ability more. Consequently, while individuals 
with high internal locus-of-control can be more creative problem 
solvers in many situations (e.g., Burroughs and Mick 2004), their 
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creativity ability is likely to be inferior to those with moderate level 
of internal locus-of-control under mortality salience. 
Our propositions were tested in the field and the lab. In study 
1, we obtained consumers’ new product suggestions (n=44,864) sub-
mitted to a major beverage company over a period of 174 weeks. 
Each of these ideas was evaluated by the firm’s customers and the 
average quality of the ideas submitted was calculated for each of 
the weeks. We also obtained empirical data on the extent to which 
death was reported in the media during the same period. We ran a 
regression with the quality of the new product ideas as the dependent 
measure, the extent to which death was reported in the media as the 
independent measure, as well as variables controlling for consumer 
participation level and seasonality effects. Consistent with our prop-
osition, the level of death reporting in the media had a significant 
negative effect on the quality of new product ideas (beta=-3.23, t=-
2.18, p<.03).
Study 2 examined whether mortality salience (MS) inhibits as-
sess to divergent knowledge. Participants (n=221) first responded 
to a locus-of-control scale (Rotter 1966). Following a most com-
monly used TMT paradigm (Burke et al. 2010), participants were 
then asked to write down thoughts regarding either their own death 
(MS condition) or viewing TV programs (control condition). Next, 
they completed the PANAS (Watson et al. 1988) that captured par-
ticipants’ affective states and served as a delay task (cf. Pyszczynski 
et al.1999). Thereafter, participants in both conditions were asked to 
write down all the place names they could think of with “A” as the 
first letter. Consistent with the hypothesis that mortality salience in-
hibits access to divergent information in memory, participants in the 
MS condition wrote down significantly fewer foreign place names 
(e.g., Algeria, Aruba, Azerbaijan) than those who in the control con-
dition (Mcontrol=3.98, MMS=5.09, t=2.50, p=.01). Further, a significant 
interaction effect between the locus of control measure and mortal-
ity salience manipulation was found (beta=-.86, t=2.95, p<.005). To 
probe the interaction, we trichotomized participants based on their 
locus-of-control. Contrast analyses revealed that, in the MS condi-
tion, participants with high internal locus-of-control wrote down 
significantly fewer foreign place names than those with moderate 
internal locus-of-control (Mmoderate=4.96, Mhigh=3.56, F=4.96, p<.03); 
however, the opposite was true in the control condition (Mmoder-
ate=5.02, Mhigh=7.25, F=8.27, p<.005). 
In study 3, participants (n=247) were given a business decision 
making task—deciding what new business should go into a com-
mercial property where a restaurant went bankrupt (adapted from 
Goncalo and Staw 2006); Whether participants followed the prece-
dence—using the space for a restaurant again served the DV. The 
experimental procedure was similar to that of study 2. As expected, 
the same pattern of interaction effect and contrast comparison re-
sults emerged (p’s<.04). Finally, inconsistent with an affect-based 
account, including PANAS scores in the analyses did not affect the 
findings of study 2 and 3. 
Overall, these results shed light on how mortality salience af-
fects information accessibility and creative problem solving, add to 
the literature non-conscious processes underlying creativity (e.g., 
Yang et al. 2012; Zhong et al. 2008), and illuminate the role of con-
trol beliefs in terror management theories. Moreover, our findings 
contradict lay intuitions: A survey of mid to senior level executives 
(n=30) at one of the largest logistics firm in the world revealed that 
the majority (67%, χ2 =15.2, p<.01) would put high locus-of-control 
managers in charge of problem solving, in crisis scenarios (e.g., nat-
ural disasters or terrorist attack that resulted in a major loss of life). 
Our results, however, suggest that those with moderate locus-of-con-
trol may be more creative problem solvers in those dire scenarios.
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64 / It’s Not Just About You: Social Influences on Creative Outcomes
The Impact of Comparisons with Others on Creativity 
Outcomes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
From scrapbooking to gift designing, from online co-creation 
(e.g., “My Starbucks Idea”) to customization (e.g., NikeID custom-
ization service), people often undertake the role of designer. The 
success of these activities requires participants to be creative. Also, 
these situations often entail a social environment where participants 
may interact with, and expect evaluation from similar others. While 
past research has investigated the impact of evaluation expectation 
from experts (people who are experienced in the domain under in-
vestigation) on creativity (for a review, see Amabile 1996), little re-
search has examined the situation where evaluations are expected 
from similar others who are involved in either the same or a different 
creativity task. The present research attempts to fill this gap. 
Building upon social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), we 
propose that in a creativity task (e.g., making a card), in order to 
assess their own abilities, people are likely to compare with others 
when they can easily see others’ creations, especially when evalua-
tion is expected from others. Further, we hypothesize that compari-
sons with others occur at different levels depending on the type of 
creativity task in which others are involved. First, when people are 
involved in the same creativity task (i.e. people making scrapbook 
pages in a scrapbooking class), comparisons are likely to occur based 
on the creativity outcomes, focusing on the dimensions under evalu-
ation (e.g., the theme of the creation and the materials used; Wood 
and Taylor 1990). We refer to such comparisons as outcome-oriented 
comparisons. Second, when people are involved in different creativ-
ity tasks (i.e. people working under different categories of the same 
co-creation platform) comparisons are expected to occur based on an 
individual’s own ability level, focusing on dimensions related to cre-
ativity ability (e.g., one’s occupation and experiences in the creativ-
ity task). We refer to such comparisons as individual ability-oriented 
comparisons. We propose a focus on outcome-oriented comparisons 
is detrimental to creativity because it constrains choice of what and 
how to create, while a focus on ability-oriented comparisons could 
leverage creativity because it enhances competition and involve-
ment in the creativity task. Of note, while several early studies have 
found that constraints enhance creativity in a variety of creativity 
tasks (e.g., Costello and Keane 2000; Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992; 
Stokes 2001; Moreau and Dahl 2005), we argue it is unlikely the case 
in our context since people participating in the creativity task are not 
explicitly required to follow the creations of others. This argument 
is supported by Moreau and Dahl’s (2005) finding that only when 
constraints are both restricted and required, constraints enhance cre-
ativity.
Study 1 used a 2 (task type: same vs. different) x 2 (expected 
evaluation: yes vs. no) between-subjects design. A total of 65 females 
were run individually with one trained female confederate who was 
attending as another participant and did either the same creativity 
task (making a card) as the participants or a different task (sentence 
scrambling). To assess the creativity of the participants’ card designs, 
three experts with abundant experience in card-making who were 
blind to the study hypothesis and treatment evaluated the pictures of 
the participants’ card designs on six items, including “the card design 
is creative, distinct, unique, complex, neat, and the materials used 
are novel” (1 = not at all, 7 = to an extremely extent; items adapted 
from Amabile 1979). A creativity index was created by averaging the 
scores of these six items of the three coders (α = .92). The results re-
vealed a significant interaction of task type and expected evaluation 
(F(1, 61) = 5.13, p < .05), while both main effects were not signifi-
cant (p’s > .05). Planned contrasts indicated that participants were 
more creative when an evaluation was expected from a person who 
was doing a different task versus doing the same task (t(57) = 2.23, p 
< .05). No other contrasts were significant (all t’s < 1.6). 
Study 2 seeks to obtain evidence that comparison levels drive 
the interactive effect of comparisons and evaluation expectation on 
creativity. We will adopt the same procedure of study 1 except: 1) 
evaluation expectation will always be present and 2) comparison 
necessity will be manipulated, yielding a 2 (task type: same vs. dif-
ferent) x 2 (comparison necessity: yes vs. no) between-subjects de-
sign. We expect that when comparison is necessary, participants will 
compare with the confederate intensively at the creativity outcome 
level/individual ability level in the same/different task condition, and 
hence, participants in the same task condition will be less creative 
than those in the different task condition. However, when compari-
son is unnecessary, there will be no comparison at either level, and 
hence, task type will not influence creativity differently. 
Study 3 seeks to obtain support from a real-existing co-creation 
platform of a company. We will adopt a 2 (task type: same vs. dif-
ferent) x 2 (type of information available: creativity outcome vs. 
personal ability-related) between-subjects design. Specifically, par-
ticipants will see creations (vs. personal ability related information) 
of others from the same (vs. different) contest. The personal ability-
related information will include participants’ age, gender, occupation 
and experiences in the co-creation platform. We expect an interactive 
effect of the task type and information available on the participants’ 
creations. 
Overall, the proposed research will make a number of contri-
butions. Foremost, this research will add to work on creativity by 
investigating the impact of similar others on one’s creativity. Second, 
this research will extend social comparison theory by demonstrating 
that within the domain of creativity, people can make social compari-
sons at different levels (i.e. outcome vs. individual ability), and that 
the outcome of creativity depends on the level of such comparisons. 
Third, while traditionally, creativity research has focused on the im-
portance of experts when studying expected evaluations, the present 
research found preliminary evidence that expectation of evaluation 
from similar others also has a significant influence on creativity. Fi-
nally, the expected findings will provide insights into the impact of 
others consumers on the outcome of creativity in co-creation com-
munity.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
It appears obvious that marketers create associations between 
brands and attributes in consumers’ minds. However, practitioners’ 
knowledge of how to best do this does not seem to go beyond “pair 
the brand with an attribute and consumers will learn the association”, 
even if they do not pay much attention (i.e., learning of associations 
flies under their radar). Not surprisingly, that simple rule does not do 
well at predicting when which associations will actually be learned. 
On the other hand, associative learning has not been a mainstream 
area in academic consumer behavior research. We hope that this ses-
sion will contribute to increasing interest in this area. 
The session addresses two main issues. First, when presenting 
a brand in conjunction with other stimuli (e.g., images within an ad, 
another brand, a design element, a product attribute) there are ac-
tually many different associations that could be learned, not just a 
single brand-stimulus association. Thus, we need theory about what 
the relevant types of associations are and which conditions favor or 
hinder their learning. Second, the question whether learning of asso-
ciations does fly under the radar has proven to be difficult to answer. 
Two papers directly address this issue and all papers provide some 
perspective on it. 
The first two papers ask whether associative learning occurs 
automatically. The first paper argues that in a conditioning context 
consumers do have to pay attention in order to learn, but that learning 
of the association kicks off two separate processes, one requiring at-
tention, the other running off spontaneously without such attentional 
demands. So it argues that associative learning involves a delibera-
tive stage (i.e., non-automatic) in the sense of requiring attention. 
The second paper argues that even at an early learning stage, as-
sociations can be learned against the will of consumers, that is, the 
learning is automatic in a sense of it being uncontrollable.  These 
papers raise the question whether these positions are contradictory 
or complementary. 
In the lab, learning is typically studied with brands that are ar-
tificially created to have minimal prior associations. However, in the 
real world, prior associations typically exist. The next two papers 
study systematic influences of pre-existing associations. Like the 
first paper, the third paper assumes that consumers draw spontaneous 
inferences during associative learning. This is studied in the context 
of co-branding an unknown brand with a known brand (the pre-exist-
ing associations). This paper argues that consumers learn more than 
a simple association between the two brands. Instead, they also infer 
associations between each brand and the benefits of these brands. 
The paper shows that when an unknown brand pairs up with a known 
one, the unknown brand could benefit or suffer, depending on how 
the brand-benefit associations are affected.  
The fourth paper studies the real-world problem of a brand hav-
ing pre-existing negative emotional associations. The paper assumes 
that learning positive emotional associations could work as anti-dote, 
but asks which type of positive emotions would be the most effective 
anti-dote.  
Investigating Deliberative and Spontaneous Inferences as 
Outcomes of Associative Learning with High versus Low 
Contingency Awareness
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In his insightful theoretical critique, De Houwer (2007) advo-
cates an effects-based perspective regarding the meaning of evalu-
ative conditioning (EC): evaluative conditioning can be defined as 
an observed change in liking that is due to the pairing of stimuli (p. 
233). Embracing this effects-based perspective is stimulating a host 
of new research questions about associative learning. This perspec-
tive motivates competing theorizing about what causes the transfer 
of liking that takes place when stimuli co-occur (cf. De Houwer 
2007; Jones, Olson & Fazio 2010). Additionally, recent studies fea-
turing “non-evaluative” US’s as part of a conditioning procedure are 
beginning to show effects more diverse than a simple transfer of lik-
ing (e.g., Forderer & Unkelbach 2011; Galli & Gorn 2011; Glaser & 
Walther 2013; Meersmans et al. 2005; Miller & Allen 2012). Said 
another way, conventional EC methods and procedures are now be-
ing utilized to examine a wide array of questions about associative 
learning beyond simple, direct affect transfer from US to CS.
Our research approaches associative learning as a formidable 
process that can include the spontaneous inferences people draw 
from co-occurring stimuli. Referring to the process as “formidable” 
reflects the theorizing of Kardes, Posavac & Cronley (2004), who 
assert that spontaneous inferences will have a significant impact on 
other judgments, yielding attitudes characteristic of the central/sys-
tematic route to persuasion rather than the peripheral/ heuristic route. 
This challenges the longstanding view (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo 1981) 
that conditioning mechanisms only apply in the peripheral route to 
persuasion.
In the experiment described here we investigated the effects 
caused with conventional EC procedures on deliberative and spon-
taneous inferences and implicit and explicit attitudes. To probe sub-
jects’ self-generated inferences this experiment included several 
innovative features: 1) the US’s used in this study were selected 
through extensive pre-testing to possess inference-provoking poten-
tial in one specific product domain; 2) spontaneous inferences are 
assessed through a unique Implicit Association Test (IAT); 3) con-
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tingency awareness is treated as an experimental manipulation rather 
than being assessed post hoc.
The experiment was presented to subjects as a study in how 
they process visual information as consumers. The EC procedures 
follow Olson & Fazio (2001) with several alterations. Target stimuli 
(the CS’s) were real but unfamiliar bottled water brands (not Poke-
mon characters). The US’s were visual images of natural scenery 
chosen through pre-testing to evoke inferences of purity and fresh-
ness, rather than general positive words and pleasant pictures. The 
conditioning procedure had 5 blocks of trials with 86 images pre-
sented per block. Numerous filler images appeared in each block. 
In the conditioning treatment, the brand Isbre was paired with the 
natural images 8 times per block, for a total of 40 pairings across the 
5 blocks. In the control group, Isbre bottled water was paired with 
neutral images 40 times across the 5 blocks. Contingency awareness 
(CA) was manipulated through instructions to subjects. For the high 
CA condition, subjects were told to identify any reoccurring patterns 
in the images presented and to press the spacebar when a red dot ap-
peared on the screen. In the low CA condition, subjects were told to 
count backward by 3’s from 300 and press the spacebar when a red 
dot appeared on the screen. The common spacebar task ensures con-
sistent attentiveness in the two conditions (Gibson 2008). Follow-
ing the conditioning procedure subjects completed separate IAT’s to 
assess implicit beliefs and attitudes; and then measures for explicit 
beliefs and brand attitudes. A “strong measure” of CA (adapted from 
Field & Moore 2005) taken at the end of the study was used to vali-
date a successful manipulation.
This experiment provides a test of a key assertion from Kardes 
et al. (2004) that spontaneous inference formation is more likely 
when one’s motivation and ability to deliberate are high. Subjects’ 
motivation and especially their ability to deliberate are influenced 
as a result of the contingency awareness manipulation. Moreover, 
deliberative and spontaneous inferences are tracked via measure-
ment of explicit and implicit beliefs. The data show that with high 
CA, both deliberative and spontaneous inferences are present in the 
treatment versus the control group, but they are largely unrelated 
and each has unique downstream effects on explicit versus implicit 
attitudes, respectively. Simply stated, deliberative and spontaneous 
inferences appear to operate in separate systems. In the low CA con-
dition no treatment effects were observed on any of the dependent 
measures. These findings regarding the necessity of contingency 
awareness to the observed outcomes are consistent with research on 
what has recently been labeled “non-evaluative” conditioning ((For-
derer & Unkelbach 2011; Kim, Allen & Kardes 1996; Meersmans 
et al. 2005). 
On the Automatic Effects of Advertising: The 
Uncontrollability of Evaluative Conditioning Effects
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Changing brand attitudes by pairing brands with affective 
stimuli is called evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is defined as the 
change in liking of conditioned stimuli or brands (CS) caused by 
their pairing with valenced, unconditioned stimuli (US). This basic 
procedure of pairing brands with positive stimuli lies at the heart of 
branding and advertising strategies and is therefore of central im-
portance to consumer research (Shimp, Stuart, & Engle, 1991; Stu-
art, Shimp, & Engle, 1987; Sweldens, van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 
2010). Whereas there is no doubt that EC effects can be established 
through conscious propositional reasoning, a long-standing disagree-
ment in the literature concerns whether there can also be a contribu-
tion of an unconsciously operating automatic process in the attitude 
acquisition (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010; Sweldens, et al., 2010). A process is defined as automatic if 
it occurs in the absence of awareness, is uncontrollable and is not 
influenced by intentionality or processing resources (Bargh, 1994).
In a recent contribution (Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, 
& Klauer, 2012) we showed that previous methods were biased to-
wards the conclusion that EC effects require conscious awareness of 
the CS – US pairings. We developed a new method based on the pro-
cess dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), providing evidence that 
EC can, in fact, establish attitudinal effects without explicit memory 
for the pairings. In the current research, we present a new method to 
assess the automaticity of the learning process by focusing on the 
controllability of the EC effect. Specifically, we developed a process 
dissociation procedure that allows dissociating the effects of con-
trolled processes from uncontrolled processes during the condition-
ing phase. In the standard condition, participants are informed that 
the USs are informative about the CSs. Participants thus believe that 
the valence of the USs can be trusted to form an attitude about the 
CSs. In order to separate controllable from uncontrollable processes 
involved in this task, a reversal condition was designed. The reversal 
instructions still stated that the valence of the USs is informative 
for the CS, but that it should actually be opposite in valence from 
what is presented. Participants thus believe that the valence of the 
US needs to be reversed to form accurate attitudes about the CS. To 
the extent that the valence transfer in an EC procedure is control-
lable, participants should be able to reverse the US valence in the 
generation of their CS attitudes. To the extent that the valence trans-
fer is automatic and uncontrollable, participants will not be able to 
execute this reversal. Hence, the reversal condition is implemented 
so that controllable and uncontrollable processes lead to differential 
evaluations of the CSs. 
We first conducted two experiments which implemented the 
standard and reversal conditions in a between-subjects (Experi-
ment 1) and a within-subject (Experiment 2) design. A multinomial 
processing tree model was then applied to distinguish the relative 
contributions of controllable valence transfer (estimated by the c-pa-
rameter) from automatic uncontrollable valence transfer (estimated 
by the u-parameter). We used both types of designs as an opportunity 
for parameter validation. In Experiment 3, we increased participants’ 
motivation to control the effects of affective stimuli on brand atti-
tudes by offering financial rewards for complying with task instruc-
tions (i.e., successfully applying the valence of the affective stimuli 
in the standard condition and reversing it in the reversal condition). 
Experiment 4 features a cognitive load manipulation to validate the 
parameter estimates. A controllable process is hypothesized to be 
susceptible to cognitive load. An automatic, uncontrollable process 
on the other hand should not be affected by reductions in cognitive 
processing capacity.
In all experiments we found a significant u-parameter, which 
specifies an automatic uncontrollable EC effect on attitudes. More-
over, the u-parameter estimates did not differ between experiments, 
increasing confidence in their robustness. While the controllable 
(c) component was sensitive to the complexity of the conditioning 
phase, task experience, and the availability of cognitive resources, 
the automatic uncontrolled (u) component was insensitive to any of 
these procedural factors as well as participants’ motivation to exert 
control over the acquisition process. Interestingly, the explicit evalu-
ative ratings of the CSs do indicate a reversed EC effect in the rever-
sal condition (albeit smaller in size than the normal EC effect in the 
standard condition). A researcher looking only at these evaluative 
ratings would have no means to distinguish the controllable from the 
uncontrollable components in the emergence of the total EC effect. 
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As these explicit evaluative ratings do indicate a reversed EC effect 
in the reversal condition, the researcher would probably – errone-
ously – conclude that EC effects are under conscious control. 
Our demonstration of uncontrollable learning in EC has impor-
tant implications for the study of branding and advertising in general, 
and for ethicality questions in marketing in particular. Our experi-
ments show that even when consumers believe that a particular ad-
vertisement is misleading, they cannot help but be influenced by the 
affective stimuli included in the commercial. This raises a serious 
problem for the protection of consumers from unwanted influence. 
In addition, our research has important implications for dual pro-
cess theories of learning, suggesting that associative and proposi-
tional processes are qualitatively distinct despite recent claims to the 
contrary (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). 
Riding Coattails: When Co-branding Helps versus Hurts 
Less-known Brands
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
New brands often partner with established brands to leverage 
existing associations. Conventional wisdom holds that such partner-
ships disproportionately benefit the less-known (Aaker and Keller 
1990; Boush and Loken 1991; Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Levin 
and Levin 2000). A popular account for this is the Human Associa-
tive Memory (HAM) model, according to which an unknown brand 
is relatively devoid of associational content and is therefore a blank 
slate ready to receive the presumably positive associations from an 
established brand. Although there is intuitive appeal to this account, 
the HAM model presumes a static association between entities in 
which the consumer need only learn that the two brands are partner-
ing together. Most consumer exposures to co-branding, however, are 
much more dynamic since the consumer learns not only of the ex-
istence of a partnership, but also of expected product benefits stem-
ming from the partnership. When these dynamic effects are incor-
porated, research on consumer associative learning has found that 
the transfer of associations can deviate from the predictions of the 
HAM model. 
Associative learning models predict that consumers will not 
simply strengthen the association between the component co-brands, 
but each component co-brand may also interact when forming as-
sociations with the outcome (e.g., the benefit the new co-branded 
product delivers). This cue interaction may lead the two brands to 
become asymmetrically associated with the benefit. Competitive cue 
interaction effects can bias consumers’ predictions of which product 
features predict product performance for a given brand (e.g., Cunha, 
Janiszewski, and Laran 2008; Cunha and Laran 2009; van Osselaer 
and Alba 2000). In co-branding arrangements, competitive cue in-
teraction could ironically cause the established brand to dominate 
associations with the benefit, thus undermining the advantage of co-
branding for the less-known brand. 
We draw upon the animal learning literature to propose that fa-
cilitative cue interaction effects are also possible (Urcelay and Miller 
2009). In contrast with cue competition effects, facilitative effects 
would actually enhance the strength of association between a less-
known brand and the outcome and thereby benefit the less-known 
brand. We propose that time delay between the presentation of cues 
(brands) and outcomes (product features) influences the breadth of 
stimulus generalization such that narrower (broader) generalization 
operates when time intervals are shorter (longer) time delays. When 
generalization is narrower, effects consistent with cue competition 
are predicted because little is generalized about the less-known 
brand when it co-brands with a well-known brand. When generaliza-
tion is broader, effects consistent with cue facilitation are expected 
because more is generalized about the less-known brand when it co-
brands with a well-known brand. 
In Experiment 1 participants were presented with a series of 
three learning trials.  In the compound condition, an unknown break-
fast cereal brand was paired with a well-known cereal brand (Kel-
logg’s) as stimuli for the launch of three new co-branded cereals (one 
per learning trial), with each cereal delivering a different level of di-
etary fiber content per serving.The elemental condition replicated the 
compound condition with the key difference that the unknown cereal 
brand was presented alone in each of the three learning trials (i.e., no 
co-branding).  In each trial, following presentation of the brand(s), 
subjects were given feedback about the amount dietary fiber each ce-
real delivered.  In the control condition, no dietary fiber information 
was presented.  Subjects were then asked to indicate the likelihood 
they would try a new cereal offered by the unknown brand.  In the 
control condition, no differences in willingness to try the new brand 
were observed as a function of whether the new brand was presented 
in a co-branded format versus presented by itself.  After receiving 
feedback about the cereals, however, subjects were less likely to try 
the new brand when it was presented in a co-branded format than 
when it was presented by itself, a cue competition effect.
Experiment 2 used time-delay as a moderator of stimulus gen-
eralization to demonstrate both cue competition and cue facilitation. 
When there was no delay between presentation of brand and out-
come information, cue competition and its negative effects for the 
less-known brand were replicated. With a 5-second delay, however, 
participants reported greater willingness to try the less-known brand 
when it was partnered with the well-known brand, a facilitative 
cue interaction. Furthermore, this result suggests a single process 
account that can explain when co-branding helps versus hurts less 
known brands.
In Experiment 3, we verify that a focus on learning co-branding 
outcomes produces benefits for less-known brands owing to facilita-
tive cue interaction effects and not to a HAM process. Experiment 
3 manipulated whether the well-known brand has expertise in the 
product category, and the critical dependent measure was willing-
ness to try a new product offered in a different category, a learn-
ing transfer task.  Subjects learned information about the quality 
chocolate produced by an unknown and a well-known brand.  They 
were then asked their willingness to try a sugar cookie produced by 
the less-known brand (a transfer task requiring stimulus generaliza-
tion).  In the no-delay condition, the negative effect of cobranding 
was again replicated.  In the delay condition, however, the effect 
of co-branding was positive further supporting an underlying cue-
interaction process.
From a theoretical standpoint, identifying the conditions under 
which cue interaction is competitive versus facilitative allows us to 
unify the diverging findings from the co-branding literature under a 
single theoretical model, rather than a dual-process account. From 
a practical standpoint, a better understanding of cue interaction ef-
fects will help marketers learn when to expect a less known-brand 
to strengthen (vs. weaken) its position after co-branding with a well-
known brand.
Emotional Counter-Conditioning of Brand Attitudes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We investigate a situation when a brands’ image suffers from 
negative emotional associations, such as for the Škoda car brand 
in the UK, which presumably was associated with embarrassment 
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(Srivastava & Malaviya 2003), or McDonald’s, which might have 
been associated with disgust after a rumor that its hamburgers con-
tained worm meat. How can such a brand improve its image? Fix-
ing the deficiencies that initially gave rise to the negative emotional 
associations and communicating these objective improvements is 
often insufficient (Tybout, Calder, and Sternthal 1981), presumably 
because the emotional associations linger. Changing the brand name 
may at times solve the problem, but is often not feasible. From a 
psychological perspective, is there an alternative? 
Building on psychotherapy, we propose emotional counter-con-
ditioning as a “therapy” to improve brand image. Intuitively speak-
ing, if a brand elicits negative feelings, eliciting positive feelings in 
the presence of the brand may result in “re-associating” the brand 
with these positive feelings, and that may be an effective way to 
improve attitudes toward the brand. Surprisingly, the experimental 
evidence that emotional meaning beyond valence can be conditioned 
focuses on just two negative emotions, fear and disgust (see Maren 
2001; Mason and Richardson 2010; Mineka and Oehlberg 2008). 
Thus it is not clear whether emotional meaning in general can be 
transferred by means of conditioning, and for counter-conditioning 
there is even less evidence. Even more importantly, we are not aware 
of any research that develops a general theoretical position as to the 
type of emotion that would be most effective for counter-condition-
ing. Building on appraisal theories of emotions (cf. Clore, Schwarz, 
and Conway 1994), we develop such position. We introduce the con-
cept of specific counter-emotions, emotions that differ in valence but 
share a similar appraisal structure. For example, the pleasure from 
eating food, i.e., sensory pleasure, shares a similar appraisal struc-
ture with the disgust one feels from tasting a spoiled food item. For 
instance, both attribute the negative feeling to a sensory event, here 
the taste of food. The joy one feels when experiencing a pleasurable 
event with friends, i.e., (social) joy, shares a similar appraisal struc-
ture with the sadness one feels when loosing a friend. According to 
our main hypothesis, tainted brand attitudes can be more effectively 
improved through conditioning by pairing the brand with specific 
counter-emotions (specific counter-conditioning) rather than with 
other positive emotions (nonspecific counter-conditioning). 
In a conditioning experiment we manipulated attitudes toward 
spring water bottles labeled with different brand names. In a first 
stage we initially paired these brands with images eliciting negative 
emotions (disgust, sadness). In a second stage, we counter-condi-
tioned these brands with positive emotions (sensory pleasure, joy) 
and measured brand attitudes one week later. As predicted, specific 
counter-emotions were most effective at improving brand attitudes. 
That is, attitudes toward a “disgust brand” were improved more 
when counter-conditioned with sensory pleasure than with joy. Con-
trary, attitudes toward a “sadness brand” were improved more when 
counter-conditioned with joy than with sensory pleasure. Thus, the 
concept of specific counter-emotions provides a guideline managers 
can use to select a positive emotion as “anti-dote”. They can then 
use specific counter-conditioning to complement objective improve-
ments of deficiencies. 
As an additional finding, the superiority of specific counter-
conditioning replicated when we attempted to deteriorate positive 
brand attitudes with negative emotions (e.g., as in anti-smoking ads). 
If smoking is motivated by seeking a feeling of confidence or pride 
by associating with a respected group who smokes (e.g., peers, cool 
cowboys, actors), the common strategy of eliciting disgust or fear 
of disease is unlikely to counter feelings of pride. Our theorizing 
indicates that ads provoking embarrassment and shame may be more 
effective in undermining the motives behind teen smoking.
Emotions are multi-dimensional constructs, but respondents 
have difficulty articulating these dimensions. They also have diffi-
culty articulating the extent to which they associate specific emotions 
with a brand. We addressed this difficulty by having our respondents 
provide similarity judgments of brands (counter)conditioned with 
different negative and positive emotions, which is easier for them. 
From these similarity judgments we derived perceptual maps and 
uncovered emotional dimensions, including brand attitude. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The objective of this session is to increase our understanding 
of prosocial behavior. About two thirds of all Americans engaged in 
prosocial behavior in 2012 by either giving money or volunteering 
their time to help others. However, this number might be a conserva-
tive estimate because a substantial number of prosocial behaviors are 
undocumented, such as giving money to homeless people or buying 
a particular brand from a company that donates some of the proceeds 
versus a company that does not. Opportunities to engage in prosocial 
behavior are ample but for most people resources are limited. In this 
session, the papers seek to address the following question: How do 
people choose among prosocial opportunities and how do they feel 
after the behavior was carried out?
Understanding prosocial behaviors and their consequences is 
important and can benefit both organizations and individuals in mak-
ing better decisions. In a world where hunger, disease, and impover-
ishment are still prevalent, charities and other organizations should 
weave prosocial activities into their functioning and increase public 
appeal. Individuals, on the other hand, can engage in prosocial be-
havior with many charities and organizations, and therefore should 
learn how to best choose among these opportunities.
With four papers, this session addresses these issues as it inte-
grates various research perspectives to identify factors affecting the 
entire decision making process, starting with how consumers choose 
where to give, through how consumers feel after they give, to how 
others perceive those who give. The papers complement each other 
in that they examine different aspect of prosocial behavior using dif-
ferent methodologies including analysis of archival data and labora-
tory studies with some innovative procedures.
Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia show that social ven-
tures posted on Kickstarter.com increase their likelihood of getting 
funded if they offer consumers very few or many donation choices, 
thus providing an alternative perspective to the “choice overload hy-
pothesis”. The authors show that backers of those ventures engage 
in intuitive, rather than rational, decision making. Cryder, Botti, 
and Simonyan further examine donation choices and show that de-
spite believing a cause to be low priority people prefer to give to 
that cause, over a more pressing cause, because the former is more 
appealing and personally satisfying to them. While the extent of a 
cause’s neediness is valued as more important, actual donations re-
veal that the cause’s attractiveness is actually more important. Rudd, 
Aaker, and Norton ask: How can we maximize the happiness experi-
enced by people who engage in prosocial behaviors? These authors 
show that framing the goal of a prosocial act concretely rather than 
abstractly increases the giver’s happiness because the giver focuses 
on the logistics of achieving the act versus the broader meaning of 
the act itself. Finally, Berman, Levine, Barasch, and Small show that 
when people engage in a prosocial behavior privately but then brag 
about it publicly (on Facebook), they are considered more generous, 
compared with those who do not brag. However when people engage 
in a prosocial behavior publicly and also brag about it, they are con-
sidered less generous, compared with those who do not brag.
Crowdfunding to Make a Difference: The Role of Choice 
in Funding Social Ventures 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Internet has allowed individuals across 
the globe to contribute to and even actively participate in ventures 
influencing pressing social issues. The growing prevalence of 
online venues that support social issues is due in part to so-called 
crowdfunding organizations that use the Internet to bring together 
geographically dispersed individuals to make small contributions 
to ventures. By widening the pool of potential contributors and 
matching entrepreneurs with potential backers across the globe with 
minimal transaction costs, crowdfunding has altered the process of 
obtaining resources. But this model of resource acquisition comes 
with some significant challenges. For example, ventures must 
compete with numerous others from all over the world for attention. 
There is also greater potential for fraud because of limited regulation, 
a fact that makes the decision making process more difficult for 
potential contributors (Herzenstein, Sonenshein, and Dholakia 2011; 
Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia 2011). 
Given limited regulation but wider participation, a key question 
is how potential contributors decide which ventures to support, 
especially when most are developed and pitched by unknown and 
unproven organizers. Early analyses of this question (Edwards 1954; 
Harbaugh 1998) applied a rational utility maximizing framework 
supporting more choices ad infinitum, but research over the past 
decade has convincingly placed boundary conditions on this 
economic argument. Based on individuals’ limited cognitive abilities, 
this growing body of research has found that an overload of choices 
can lead to diminishing returns (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Schwartz 
2005). Scholars embracing this “choice overload hypothesis” 
(Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010) have found that 
decision making tends to follow an inverted U-shaped relationship 
such that initially more choices lead to favorable processes and 
outcomes up to an inflection point beyond which additional options 
lead to diminished outcomes for the decision maker. 
Although the choice overload perspective offers an important 
qualification to the economic decision making paradigm, both 
perspectives assume that individuals rationally process information, 
and differ only on the role of cognitive limitations in decision making. 
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But for social ventures, it is not clear whether economic assumptions 
about rational decision making best explain how contributors 
allocate financial resources. Indeed, some research suggests that 
individuals are less prone to follow a calculative, rational mindset 
when considering support for social issues (Ashford and Barton 
2007; Sonenshein 2007, 2011). Individuals may instead adopt a 
prosocial motivation in which they desire to have a positive impact 
on other people, groups, or organizations (Grant 2007). We argue 
that this focus on “the other” fundamentally alters how contributors 
make decisions about funding social ventures, thereby requiring new 
theory development beyond economic models of choice and the 
choice overload hypothesis. 
To that end we develop and test theory we label “the intuitive 
leader impact hypothesis”. This hypothesis posits that individuals 
abandon the deliberate information processing approach, instead 
relying on intuitive judgments about a venture’s leader. We suggest 
that contributors focus less on maximizing their own utility and more 
on making a difference for others. Since most people who wish to 
help others do it through donations to organizations, charities, or 
ventures, the competency of the organization and its leaders is of 
utmost important. We hypothesize that organizers of social ventures 
offering potential donors few or too many donation choices will be 
viewed as more competent because they either carefully designed 
the collection of choices they offer or they exerted significant effort 
to offer something for everyone, respectively. As a result, these 
ventures are more likely to get funded and be successful in the longer 
term when compared to those offering a medium number of choices. 
This pattern represents a flipping of the choice overload hypothesis. 
We test these predictions in three studies.
In study 1, we used data scraped from Kickstarter.com, currently 
the largest online crowdfunding organization. Our dataset includes 
over a thousand ventures posted on kickstarter.com during July and 
August 2011 that were coded by trained RAs for whether they have 
a social mission or not. Controlling for the funding goal and other 
financial measures we show that ventures with a social mission are 
more likely to fund when they offer few or many funding choices—a 
U-shaped relationship between the number of choices and decision 
making outcomes—thus reversing the choice overload hypothesis. 
Projects that do not have a social mission follow the choice overload 
hypothesis—an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number 
of choices and the likelihood of funding. In study 2, we replicated 
and extended our field-based findings using a controlled laboratory 
experiment. Building on a real venture from kickstarter.com we 
described a band that wishes to raise money to record a new album. 
We manipulated whether the venture has a social mission (donating 
some of the proceeds to poor children) or not and the number of 
donation choices it offers (2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 choices), and asked 
participants to split $500 between this venture and future ventures. 
We further asked participants a series of measures aiming to assess 
the competency of the venture’s leader. We replicate the results 
from study 1 and show that participants made more intuitive (faster) 
decisions for the social venture, and that perceptions of the venture 
leader’s competency mediate the effect of the number of donation 
choices on funding. Finally, in study 3, we surveyed Kickstarter 
venture leaders whose ventures have a social mission to examine the 
relationship between the number of choices leaders offered potential 
contributors and the venture’s success one year after launch. We find 
that leaders of ventures with few or many donation choices described 
the status of their ventures as being more successful than leaders of 
ventures with average number of choices.
To summarize, our mixed methods approach helps ground a new 
perspective on choice theory by showing how intuitive processes 
prompted by concerns for others challenge traditional economic 
theory and invert the choice overload hypothesis. 
Giving to What We Want Instead of to What We Should
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There is a puzzling phenomenon in charitable giving that people 
give a lot of money to seemingly low-priority causes (e.g., sports 
fundraisers) while other highly pressing causes remain severely 
underfunded (e.g., water sanitation in destitute countries). In this 
project, we hypothesize that a fundamental reason why needy causes 
are ignored is because of a need to self-enhance via others’ positive 
attributes. Therefore, despite a strong and widespread belief that the 
neediest causes should receive priority, causes that are attractive or 
appealing can triumph over more needy alternatives.
Study 1 investigated people’s explicit preferences about the 
importance of neediness in resource allocation decisions. Two-
hundred and twenty-eight participants generated an open-ended 
answer to the question: “If multiple individuals needed help and you 
were deciding which one to donate to, what would be the single most 
important thing you would consider when deciding which person 
to donate to?” Forty-six percent of participants spontaneously 
answered that neediness was the most important criterion. The next 
most popular criterion was the impact of the donation, receiving 
only 8% of responses; all other possible answers received a lower 
percentage of endorsement.
Study 2 investigated preferences for needy versus attractive 
alternatives in real allocation decisions. Participants viewed pictures 
of four girls who had received successful cleft palate surgery from 
the charity Smile Train. A pre-test verified that one of the girls, 
Angelica, was judged to be significantly more attractive or “cute” 
(p < .0001) and significantly less needy (p < .0005) than the other 
three girls.
In the experiment, participants were informed that each of the 
girls needed financial support to move on with their lives post-surgery. 
Participants selected one of the girls to support and were told that the 
researchers would send $1 on their behalf to support the girl that the 
participant chose. The experiment included 3 conditions: 1) a control 
condition in which participants were simply asked to choose a girl 
to support, 2) an “Attractiveness” condition in which participants 
were asked to explicitly rate the cuteness of each girl before making 
their allocation decision, and 3) a “Neediness” condition in which 
participants were asked to explicitly rate the perceived neediness of 
each girl before making the allocation decision.
Participants exhibited a significant preference for allocating to 
Angelica, the cutest and least needy girl, over all other girls in the 
Control condition (p < .05) and the Attractiveness condition (p < 
.01). Results were significantly different, however, in the Neediness 
condition; in this condition, participants chose Angelica at a rate 
equal to that at which the other girls were chosen (p = .30) and 
were significantly less likely to choose Angelica than in the Control 
condition (p < .05).
Study 3 tested how self-involvement influences preferences 
for appealing options. Participants either indicated which child they 
would choose to sponsor themselves (self condition) or indicated 
which child they would advise an anonymous donor to sponsor 
(advisor condition). When participants chose for themselves, they 
exhibited a significantly greater preference for Angelica than when 
they advised others (p < 0.01). 
Study 4 manipulated the presence of choice to further investigate 
the idea that self-enhancement underlies the preference for appealing 
options. Research has shown that choice is often used as a means to 
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express one’s own self (Iyengar 2010) and, at least in the Western 
world, can be seen as a way to define oneself as an individual (Markus 
and Schwartz 2010). In a 2x2 experimental design, participants 
viewed either post-surgery (attractive) or pre-surgery (unattractive) 
photos of a mixed-gender group of Smile Train children. Participants 
then chose to allocate to a particular child (choice condition) or 
were randomly assigned to allocate to a particular child (no-choice 
condition). Subsequently, participants were asked how much they 
would donate to Smile Train. We observed an interaction such that 
participants in the no-choice condition reported giving equivalent 
amounts to Smile Train regardless of whether the children they 
allocated to were attractive or unattractive. However, participants in 
the choice condition, who had an opportunity to boost positive self 
associations via their choices, gave more when the children were 
attractive compared to unattractive.
Finally, because choices based on neediness may not satisfy 
donors’ need for self-enhancement from their generous acts, we 
hypothesized in Study 5 that explicit reminders of neediness 
may have perverse consequences on generosity in the long run. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Control and Neediness 
conditions from Study 2, and also completed a follow-up measure 
that asked participants how likely they would be to donate to the 
charity Smile Train in one year. We once again observed that while 
Angelica was preferred in the Control condition (p < .0001), this 
preference disappeared once participants explicitly considered 
neediness before the resource allocation choice (p = .55). When 
asked about donations in one year, however, participants indicated 
that they would donate significantly less if they had been in the 
Neediness condition compared to if they had been in the Control 
condition (p < .05). Considerations of neediness therefore appear to 
be a double edged sword—they increase evenhanded allocations in 
the short term but decrease overall kindness in response to future 
requests. 
One of the most intense debates in the history of Social 
Psychology centered around the question of whether human 
generosity was altruistic or egoistic at its core (Batson, 1991; 
Cialdini et al., 1987). The current project sheds light on this issue. 
Although people carry with them an explicit belief that neediness 
should triumph all in resource allocation, actual judgments of 
resource allocation often are based on what we want to give to--
appealing and attractive options. Although people can behave in a 
truly altruistic fashion, such as when focusing on others’ neediness, 
doing so appears to squelch future generosity because it does not 
satisfy a primary motivation to self-enhance via appealing causes.
Leave Them Smiling: How Concretely Framing a 
Prosocial Goal Creates More Happiness
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A growing body of research has demonstrated that behaving 
prosocially creates a “helper’s high” (Luks, 1988) and increases 
subjective well-being (Anik et al., 2009; Lyubomirsky et al., 2004; 
Post, 2005; Thoits & Hewitt, 2001). But, do certain prosocial pursuits 
more effectively increase personal happiness? We explore this 
question, examining one factor linking prosocial acts and happiness: 
How the goal of the act is framed. 
Goals can be framed at various abstraction levels (Emmons 
& Kaiser, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001), and striving for 
concrete (versus abstract) goals has been correlated with less 
psychological distress and greater well-being (Carver et al., 1988; 
Carver & Scheier, 1990; Emmons, 1992). Building upon these results, 
we hypothesize that prosocial acts lead to greater giver happiness 
when the act’s goal is framed concretely (e.g., make someone smile) 
versus abstractly (e.g., make someone happy).
Why might a prosocial goal’s abstraction level influence personal 
happiness? When a goal is concretely-framed (versus abstractly-
framed), one’s expectations of achieving the goal may be better 
calibrated (due to greater focus on the “how” and logistics versus 
the “why” and broader meaning of goal-directed actions; Torelli 
& Kaikati, 2009; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989). Moreover, the 
outcome of goal-directed actions may be perceived more favorably 
(due to concrete goals having clearer standards of success; Emmons, 
1992; Locke & Latham, 1990). Importantly, these characteristics 
should enable concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) 
prosocial goals to shrink the gaps between people’s expectations 
of success and reality (Kopalle & Lehmann, 2001; Ojasalo, 2001; 
Schwartz, 2005; Walker & Baker, 2000)—and smaller expectation-
reality gaps are associated with greater satisfaction and well-being 
(Davis, 1981; Michalos, 1985; Schwartz, 2005; Thomas, 1981; 
Vermunt et al., 1989). Therefore, we predicted that concretely (versus 
abstractly) framing a prosocial goal increases personal happiness by 
reducing the gap between givers’ expectations of accomplishing the 
goal and the actual outcome of their goal-directed acts. Because 
people routinely incorrectly predict how much happiness things in 
life will bring (Aknin et al., 2009; Brickman et al., 1978; Buehler 
& McFarland, 2001), including the hedonic benefits of performing 
prosocial acts (Dunn et al., 2008), we also predicted that people 
would not recognize that concretely-framed (versus abstractly-
framed) prosocial goals cultivate more personal happiness. 
Experiment 1 instructed participants to perform an act of 
kindness within 24 hours. Manipulating the abstraction of the 
prosocial goal of the act, participants randomly assigned to the 
concrete [abstract] condition were asked to do something to 
make someone else smile [happy]. Twenty-four hours later, in a 
follow-up survey, participants reported the extent their act created 
happiness in their own life, how well the outcome of their act met 
their expectations for accomplishing their assigned goal (i.e., their 
expectation-reality gap), and the specificity of the goal they had in 
mind when performing their act.
Manipulation checks confirmed concrete (versus abstract) 
condition participants had a more specific goal in mind when 
performing their act. Two ANOVAs then revealed concrete (versus 
abstract) condition participants felt the outcome of their act better 
met their goal achievement expectations and felt their act created 
more personal happiness. Importantly, a mediation analysis 
demonstrated that these shrunken expectation-reality gaps are what 
increased the personal happiness of those in the concrete (versus 
abstract) condition.
Experiment 2 ruled out several alternative accounts and began 
investigating the accuracy of people’s prosocial goal predictions. 
Participants were pairs of friends—one friend served as the “giver,” 
the other the “receiver.” Placed in separate rooms, the friends 
answered questions about their friendship and were then told they 
would get a three-minute-long break (in a room with their friend) 
before completing another survey (in separate rooms). At this time, 
givers randomly assigned to the concrete [abstract] condition were 
asked to do something to make their friend (i.e., the receiver) smile 
[happy] during this break. After the break, the givers reported their 
current happiness, their beliefs (before the break) about their assigned 
(i.e., how challenging it would be, their ability to accomplish it, and 
their expectations for succeeding at it), how well their act actually 
met their expectations for accomplishing their assigned goal, and 
their perceptions of the size and concreteness of their act. The 
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receivers reported their current happiness and their happiness (and 
smiling) during the break.
Manipulation checks confirmed givers in the concrete (versus 
abstract) condition viewed their prosocial goal as more concrete 
(versus abstract). ANOVAs then revealed concrete (versus abstract) 
condition givers felt happier after performing their act and that the 
outcome of their act better met their expectations. As in Experiment 
1, a mediation analysis demonstrated that their increased personal 
happiness was driven by these smaller expectation-reality gaps. 
Additional ANOVAs showed these effects could not be explained 
by differences in the type of receiver (e.g., a friend), closeness of 
the giver-receiver relationships, givers’ perceptions of their act’s 
size, or receivers’ actual happiness (or smiling) during and after the 
break—as these factors did not differ across conditions. Three final 
ANOVAs revealed givers in both conditions had (before the break) 
viewed their goal as equally challenging, their ability to accomplish 
it equally great, and their expectations for success equally high—
initial indications that people would not recognize the hedonic 
advantage of pursuing concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) 
prosocial goals.
Experiment 3 directly tested whether people would correctly 
predict which prosocial goal was better for personal happiness. 
Participants, assigned to the concrete or abstract condition, imagined 
taking part in Experiment 1 and predicted their responses to the 
follow-up survey. Subsequently, the two prosocial goals from 
Experiment 1 were described, and participants rated each goal (from 
1-100) on how much personal happiness it would create.
An ANOVA revealed concrete (versus abstract) condition 
participants did not correctly predict their act would create more 
personal happiness. Furthermore, repeated measures ANOVAs, with 
the goal ratings as the within-subjects factor, revealed participants 
(within and across conditions) incorrectly rated the goal of making 
someone happy (versus smile) as able to create more personal 
happiness.
Conclusion. We extend the prosociality literature, showing that, 
contrary to people’s intuitions, an act of kindness with a concretely-
framed (versus abstractly-framed) goal leads to greater personal 
happiness—an effect driven by shrunken expectation-reality gaps. 
The Braggart’s Dilemma: On the Social Rewards and 
Penalties of Advertising Prosocial Behavior
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Public displays of generosity are ubiquitous. People often 
signal their generosity to others by wearing t-shirts or announcing 
their good deeds to wide audiences on social networking sites. One 
reason it is surprising to see so many people advertise their good 
deeds is that there exists a strong norm to be modest about prosocial 
behavior. Further, individuals go to great lengths to communicate 
to that their good deeds are not motivated by self-interest (Ariely, 
Bracha & Meier, 2009). However, successfully demonstrating 
generosity has positive returns on reputation (Flynn, 2003), making 
it appealing to publicize one’s good deeds to others.
We examine the role of bragging about prosocial behavior on 
attributions of generosity. We expect that bragging communicates 
that an actor has done a good deed, but also signals that the actor 
was motivated by selfish desires. Thus, an individual whose good 
deeds are unknown to others will be seen as more generous when he 
brags, because it informs others of his prosocial behavior. However, 
an individual whose good deeds are already known to others will be 
seen as less generous when he brags, because bragging no longer 
provides new information about his behavior, and instead signals 
that his actions were motivated by reputation concerns. 
In Study 1a, participants (N = 201) were asked to imagine 
running into a coworker named Jeff around town. During their walk, 
they passed by a group taking donations for a local children’s hospital. 
We then manipulated (a) whether the participant saw Jeff donate 
to the charity and (a) whether Jeff later publicized his donation on 
Facebook. Participants then rated Jeff on a 12-item charitable credit 
measure, which included items such as how moral, nice, and altruistic 
is Jeff. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Donation Visibility 
X Facebook Post crossover interaction (p < .001). Participants in 
the Unknown condition gave Jeff more charitable credit when he 
bragged (M = 5.38) than when he did not brag (M = 4.63, t(99) = 
4.65, p < .001). However, when the donation was Known to others, 
participants gave Jeff less credit when he bragged (M = 5.24) versus 
when he did not brag (M = 5.72, t(98) = -2.66, p = .009). 
Study 1b tests the robustness of these results using a more subtle 
form of bragging. Specifically, we manipulated whether Jeff wore a 
button that advertised his donation to charity or one that supported 
his college basketball team. We replicate all results. 
Studies 2 and 3 show why bragging about prosocial behavior is 
different from other forms of bragging. When prosocial behavior is 
already known, bragging becomes self-defeating: by telling others of 
their good deeds, a braggart is seen as having selfish motives which 
undermines the perception that he is generous. However, bragging 
about personal achievements and gains for the self do not undermine 
perceptions of motivation; for self-interested pursuits, image concerns 
are not directly at odds with perceptions about personal qualities. 
Thus, we expect that—unlike prosocial behavior—bragging about 
self-interested pursuits will have no effect on perceptions of the trait 
conveyed in a brag. 
In Study 2, participants (N = 203) imagined running into a 
colleague named Jeff. We manipulated (a) whether Jeff just finished 
volunteering for charity or running a 10k race and (b) whether he 
bragged about his achievement on Facebook. Participants then rated 
(a) Jeff’s intrinsic motivation for helping others [running in the race] 
and (b) how much charitable [athletic] credit Jeff deserved for his 
accomplishment. In order to compare credit across conditions, we 
first standardized our credit measure across the two activity types. A 
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Activity Type X Facebook 
Post interaction, p = .011. In the Prosocial condition participants rated 
Jeff as being less charitable when he bragged (M = -0.31) than when 
he did not brag (M = 0.33), t(100) = -3.38, p = .001. However, in 
the Athletic condition, participants did not evaluate Jeff’s athleticism 
differently when he bragged (M = 0.04) versus when he did not brag 
(M = -0.04), t(96) = 0.72, p = .72. 
We also ran a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrap 
procedure to test the process by which bragging affects credit. We 
predicted that in the Prosocial condition, a braggart will be seen as 
less intrinsically motivated to help which will reduce the credit he 
receives. However, in the Athletic condition, there will be no such 
mediation. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant 
indirect effect for the Prosocial condition (Indirect Effect = -0.66, SE 
= 0.15; 95% C.I. = [-0.97, -0.39]), but not for the Athletic condition 
(Indirect Effect = 0.00, SE = 0.14; 95% C.I. = [-0.26, 0.27]).  
It is possible that participants felt that running a 10k required 
more effort than volunteering, and bragging is more acceptable 
for high effort behaviors. In Study 3, (N = 203) we hold effort 
constant by comparing bragging about spending money on oneself 
versus bragging about spending money on the self. Specifically, we 
manipulated (a) whether Jeff donated $60 to charity or purchased a 
$60 tennis racket and (b) whether he bragged about it on Facebook. 
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We then proceeded in the same manner as in Study 2, and replicate 
our previous findings. Specifically, a two-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant Expenditure x Facebook Post interaction, p = .041. In 
the Spending on Others condition, participants rated Jeff as being 
less charitable when he bragged (M = -0.23) than when he did not 
brag (M = 0.23), t(99) = -2.37, p = .02. However, in the Spending 
on Self condition, participants did not evaluate Jeff’s athleticism 
differently when he bragged (M = 0.05) versus when he did not brag 
(M = -0.05), t(101) = 0.55, p = .59. Additionally, we replicate the 
moderated mediation results from Study 2. 
In sum, bragging communicates that an individual has acted 
generously, but also signals that the braggart was not motivated 
by pure intentions. For any prosocial behavior, this illuminates the 
fundamental tension between doing good and appearing good.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers’ lives are increasingly intertwined with technology 
(Evans 2003).  As smartphones, tablet computers, and access to mo-
bile broadband continue to diffuse throughout the population, con-
stant connectivity has become a way of life.  
The title of this session suggests that, as consumers spend 
more and more time with various forms of media, and as those me-
dia become more encompassing, interactive, and immersive, con-
sumers’ lives have an ever-greater virtual component.  Consumers 
spend hours in massively multiplayer online games, sleep with their 
iPhones so as not to miss a single text, constantly manage their online 
identities via Facebook posts, and create avatars in online worlds like 
Second Life.
Clearly, consumers perceive multiple beneficial outcomes ema-
nating from their virtual lives, or their participation would not be so 
intense.  However, it is also apparent that the consumption of vari-
ous forms of entertainment media that can nurture consumers’ “vir-
tual lives” also can sometimes have negative consequences in “real 
life”. The mental health community, for example, is increasingly 
concerned with consumer addictions to videogames, devices such as 
smartphones, and social networking sites like Facebook.    
The purpose of the session is to explore several instances of 
consumers’ virtual lives broadly construed in order to gain more in-
sights into the positive and negative consequences of this phenom-
enon.  First, Russell and McQuarrie present the results of a series 
of experimental studies funded by NIAAA to investigate the role of 
narrative transportation (i.e., immersion into the story) in teens’ reac-
tions to TV programming featuring underage alcohol use.  They find 
that narrative transportation is a powerful mediator of participants’ 
attitudes toward drinking, beyond mere emotional reactions and 
identification with characters. Kuo reports the results of a qualitative 
depth interview study of escapism in the context of video games.  He 
finds positive short-term consequences such as stress relief and self-
esteem repair but also hints of long-term negative consequences of 
excessive and prolonged participation in escapist activities. Nardini, 
LeBoeuf & Lutz introduce the concept of “implicit distraction” to 
explain the deleterious effect of excessive picture taking on enjoy-
ment of an experience. Two experiments show that picture taking 
damages enjoyment, yet is not perceived by participants as a distrac-
tion.  Finally, Schau, Gilly & Celsi use archival analysis and depth 
interviews to illuminate how consumers use brands as virtual con-
nections during times of separation.  Working with military families, 
they develop a typology of roles that brands can fulfill when serving 
as virtual proxies for safety and home.
Taken together, the papers in the session address the questions: 
How do consumers create and nurture their virtual lives?  What are 
the tradeoffs between positive and negative outcomes of virtual 
lives?  How can consumers manage their virtual lives more judi-
ciously to enhance their “real life” wellbeing?
Virtual Learning about Alcohol through Narrative 
Transportation into Television Episodes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research focuses on the health implications of immersing 
oneself into a virtual story, in our case, a fictional television episode. 
We pursue this research question in the context of a major public 
health problem: under-age drinking. Social policy research has estab-
lished that depictions of alcohol and storylines that revolve around 
drinking are common in popular culture forms directed at a youth-
ful audience.  Alcohol consumption shows up in music lyrics and 
in music videos, and across a wide variety of movie and television 
genres (Dal Cin et al. 2008; Gunasekera, Chapman and Campbell 
2005; Gruber et al. 2005; Russell and Russell 2009; Sargent et al. 
2005; Sargent, Tanski, and Gibson 2007). In turn, exposure to media 
programming that features alcohol has been implicated as a causal 
factor in alcohol use and abuse by teens. The presentation reports the 
findings of an experimental program funded by the National Institute 
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) concerning the impact 
on teens of alcohol-related narratives. We constructed TV episodes 
to present these narratives.  The episodes feature fictional characters’ 
“virtual lives” whose experiences with alcohol could, based on narra-
tive transportation (NT) theory, alter teen viewers’ own beliefs about 
real life drinking and its consequences (Green and Brock 2000). The 
premise of NT theory is that transportation into the virtual world of 
the story causes dispositions to shift in a direction consistent with 
the story world (Gerrig 1993).  So, if the story shows teenagers 
having fun drinking alcohol, and the teenage viewer is transported 
into that story, then that viewer’s beliefs about the consequences of 
consuming alcohol should shift in the direction of perceiving more 
positive outcomes.  Conversely, if the story shows realistic negative 
outcomes of alcohol, then a transported teen’s dispositions toward al-
cohol should accordingly shift in a more negative direction. Because 
transportation into the story is usually induced through identification 
with the virtual characters that populate it, character identification is 
also a likely driver of the persuasiveness of the messages contained 
in the story.
We present a series of experiments to test the theoretical predic-
tion that shifts in real life beliefs about alcohol will be mediated by 
the degree to which the teens immerse themselves into the virtual life 
presented in a TV episode.  In other words, we assess the possibil-
ity that these virtual narratives can indirectly persuade teens through 
narrative transportation (Green and Brock 2000) and character iden-
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tification.  It is not known whether a personally consequential be-
havior, like under-age drinking, can be tacitly shaped by narrative 
exposure.  The initial demonstrations of narrative persuasion focused 
on shifts in distal beliefs about the world, rather than personally con-
sequential behavior.
The experiments were conducted with 14-17 year old teens 
whose parents were members of a nationally representative sample 
of the US population. For the manipulation, we produced original 
television episodes that varied based on the valence of the alcohol 
narrative. The narrative follows a male teenager, ‘Tom’, in a series of 
events leading up to a beach party where he and his friends are seen 
drinking heavily with other teenagers. In line with research about so-
cial marketing messages most likely to affect teenagers (Pechmann 
et al. 2003), both positive and negative versions of the film narrative 
emphasized the social consequences of the behavior. In one, Tom be-
haves charmingly, ‘gets the girl’, and wins entry to a competition: his 
drinking is part of a story that ends on a positive note.  In the negative 
version, Tom behaves loutishly to the female romantic interest, she 
scorns him for his behavior while drinking, and he fails to advance 
to the competition.
 The experiments followed a pre-post design: after obtaining 
parental consent and teen assent, the teen participants completed an 
initial online questionnaire that, amongst a series of lifestyle ques-
tions, included measures of media exposure and of their beliefs 
concerning the personal consequences of alcohol use. These were 
assessed using measures of outcome expectancies developed within 
alcohol research: these included sexual, social, physical, and cogni-
tive outcomes that were either positive or negative (Grube and Agos-
tinelli 1999; Jones, Corbin and Fromme 2001).  Approximately 20 
days later, the teens participated in another study focused on evalu-
ating the pilot of a new TV series. This study began with viewing 
one version of the TV episode.  Measures of narrative transportation 
(Busselle and Bilandzic 2009; de Graaf et al. 2009; Green and Brock 
2000), identification with the characters of the story, positive and 
negative beliefs about alcohol consumption, and the manipulation 
checks were taken in that order.  
The findings are discussed in terms of the mediating role played 
by narrative transportation, as opposed to simple exposure effects 
exerted by the negative (positive) narrative itself.  We consider as 
well alternative formulations of mediators, such as emotional reac-
tions, or identification with the characters in the narrative.  Media-
tion is separately assessed for positive and negative beliefs about 
drinking and drinkers.  
This presentation contributes to the broader discussion in the 
session about how virtual experiences—in this case, transportation 
into a story world presented via television—can be used in an edu-
cation-entertainment fashion.  Is it possible to shape alcohol beliefs 
by constructing a narrative that gives a realistic portrayal of the harm 
that can result?  Or does the desired belief change only occur when 
the narrative is powerfully transporting?  Conversely, how much 
should we worry about the plethora of alcohol narratives, often posi-
tive, to which teens are already exposed?  Does mere exposure have 
an impact, or do these misleadingly positive stories only affect teens 
who are deeply transported into the narrative? In short, how power-
ful is the influence of virtual experience, when the subject matter is 
a personally consequential behavior that has important health and 
policy implications?
Coping with Stress in the Age of Warcraft: A Conceptual 
Framework for Consumer Escapism
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research explores the phenomenon of consumer escapism 
within the context of online gaming. While there exist many strat-
egies for coping that involve the consumption of products, escap-
ism through gaming is unique in its ability to immerse consumers in 
virtual realities where desires, wishes, and fantasies can come true. 
With continuing advances in media technology (e.g., online connec-
tivity, photorealistic CGI, intuitive motion/touch controls), escaping 
into the digital worlds of video games and other such interactive 
platforms has become an increasingly common consumer behavior. 
In the current marketing literature, the escapism construct has been 
invoked in several consumption contexts. In their examination of on-
line search behavior, Mathwick and Rigdon (2004) describe escap-
ism as a state of psychological immersion. Within their framework of 
television connectedness, Russell, Norman, and Heckler (2004) de-
fine escapism as the process by which viewers immerse themselves 
in their favorite shows for the purpose of avoiding reality. These 
same themes are echoed in research examining other consumption 
contexts such as themed restaurants (Kozinets et al. 2002) and his-
torical reenactments (Belk and Costa 1998). This research seeks to 
extend the current literature by examining the motivations and pro-
cesses inherent to escapism through online gaming. 
To accomplish this goal, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with two sets of participants: (1) four individuals who regularly 
participated in online sessions of Warcraft III: Reign of Chaos, and 
(2) four individuals who frequently engaged in non-gaming escape 
behaviors (e.g., watching TV). Following a methodology adapted 
from Mick and Buhl (1992), interviews were conducted over sev-
eral sessions in participants’ homes. The first session of each inter-
view focused on uncovering relevant insights into the life themes 
and histories of each participant, and subsequent interviews obtained 
descriptive first-hand accounts of individual escape experiences. A 
general framework for escape was developed by analyzing the re-
lationship between life themes, the interpretation of stress, and the 
escape behaviors that ensued. 
There were several key findings that emerged from the qualita-
tive analysis. The first stage of the analysis focused on understand-
ing how the different stressors that motivate escape influence the 
gaming experience. Threats against self-esteem, for example, have 
been shown to trigger behaviors such as overeating (Mandel and 
Smeesters 2008) in an effort to cope. Within the context of gam-
ing, threats against self-esteem (e.g., a poor job performance review) 
motivated respondents to adopt online avatars within Warcraft that 
allowed for a strong sense of affirmation. More specifically, such 
players tended to gravitate toward characters that represented ideal 
versions of their real life personas. One informant, for example, 
consistently chose elven characters because of their unique charac-
ter traits (i.e., agile, chivalrous, intelligent). From the perspective 
of self-discrepancy theory (Higgins 1987), these respondents were 
given the opportunity to overcome perceived self-discrepancies by 
assuming the identities of their avatars within the Warcraft universe. 
Consequently, strong emotional attachments were formed with the 
avatars that persisted over long periods of time.     
For other informants, threats against self-control (i.e., the in-
ability to control interactions with the environment and other indi-
viduals) were the primary stressors motivating their gaming behavior. 
When faced with a loss of control in real life (e.g., lack of authority 
at work), such informants used Warcraft as means of re-establishing 
a sense of control within the confines of a virtual world. To achieve 
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maximum control of the in-game environment, these informants 
strategically chose avatars that possessed the power to dominate 
other players. Instead of forming a personal connection with their 
avatar, informants motivated by the need for control sought only the 
feelings of empowerment that come with in-game victory. One infor-
mant, for example, felt no attachment to his chosen avatar; rather, he 
repeatedly chose to use a specific character (i.e., the Death Knight) 
due to its ability to overcome the feelings of powerlessness he often 
experienced in the real world.
In contrast with the active role taken by consumers during a 
session of Warcraft, escapism through other forms of entertainment 
is often more passive in nature. When watching TV, for example, the 
viewer is generally a third-person observer, rather than a first-per-
son participant. Consequently, informants engaging in non-gaming 
forms of escapism did not accrue the same benefits of affirmation 
and empowerment through their escape experiences. Instead, pas-
sive escapism functions as a coping mechanism through distraction 
and mental absorption. For example, one informant frequently used 
televised sporting events as a means of redirecting his thoughts away 
from stressful situations. The effectiveness of escape under such cir-
cumstances is contingent on the degree to which the stimulus can 
hold the attention of the viewer. Other informants reported similar 
experiences with magazines, music, and TV dramas.  
As an emotion-focused style of coping (Lazarus 1999), ac-
tive escapism through video games is particularly potent due to the 
feelings of affirmation and empowerment that emerge during the 
process. Although passive escapism may offer limited amounts of 
affirmation or empowerment through vicarious consumption, the el-
ement of role-play inherent to gaming allows for these feelings to be 
powerfully realized. For this reason, escapism through video games 
can become pathological; several informants, for example, reported 
that their gaming behaviors had negatively impacted their job per-
formance and their relationships with family members. In this way, 
escapism through video games can become a vicious cycle whereby 
gaming leads to an increased amount of stress in the long-term. In 
extreme instances, addiction may occur when individuals see their 
existence in the virtual world of a game as preferable to their exis-
tence in the real world.   
As gaming becomes increasingly prevalent across a broad range 
of consumers, this research contributes to the literature by creating a 
basic framework for understanding escapism in the gaming context. 
The insights gained through this research suggest that the unique 
stressors faced by individuals have a direct impact on the character 
of an escape experience. More specifically, threats against self-es-
teem lead to an escape experience that focuses on the affirmation of 
identity. In contrast, individuals who experience a loss of control in 
reality use the escape experience as a means of reestablishing a sense 
of control within the game.
When a Picture is Worth Less Than a Thousand Words
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The use of technology, and particularly social media, has be-
come exceedingly common, especially among young adult consum-
ers.  Consumers multitask; check Facebook while in meetings, tweet 
while watching TV, and text while partying with friends.  Although 
consumers seemingly assume that these media add to their overall 
enjoyment and wellbeing, we contend that such media multitasking 
can detract from enjoyment in some consumption situations.  Specifi-
cally, a consumer participating in a hedonic consumption experience 
(e.g., a visit to a national park) may inadvertently diminish his/her 
enjoyment of the experience by constantly taking photos intended 
for Facebook.  In essence, the desire to document the experience via 
pictures, tweets, or texts, distracts the consumer from the experience. 
However, because consumers take such activities for granted, they 
do not recognize them as distractions. Hence, we propose that the 
use of technology during a hedonic consumption episode becomes 
an implicit distraction, or a distraction that people fail to recognize. 
These implicit distractions may lead to unique effects not observed 
in response to more explicit distractions that people are aware of.  
Past research on pain tolerance and on the enjoyment of posi-
tive experiences has found that distraction suppresses the effect of 
the informational component associated with an experience, thereby 
increasing dependence on the more automatic affective component 
(Leventhal, Brown, Shacham, and Engquist 1979; Shiv and Nowlis 
2004). However, in this past research, the distraction (e.g., memoriz-
ing a number) was quite explicit to participants. We examine cases 
where the distraction is implicit or embedded within the experience, 
and we propose that the process is somewhat different. We suggest 
that with implicit distractions like taking pictures, the attention de-
voted towards the experience itself must be further divided, from 
simply enjoying the experience to also documenting it. This shift 
may lessen the amount of attention available for enjoying the experi-
ence itself.
We test this theory in two studies. Study 1 examined the effects 
of various types of distractions on the enjoyment and subsequent 
choice of a sampled experience. In the “High Implicit Distraction” 
condition, participants were asked to take as many pictures as pos-
sible during a 1-minute video of a private island in the Virgin Islands. 
In the “Low Implicit Distraction” condition, participants were told 
that they could take pictures if they wished, but that they weren’t 
required to. In the “High Explicit Distraction” condition, participants 
memorized an 8-digit number while watching the video. Finally, in 
the “Low Explicit Distraction” condition, participants memorized a 
2-digit number while watching the video. To gauge participants’ en-
joyment of the video, they were asked whether they would choose 
to watch a 5-minute version of the same video or instead watch an 
alternative (unsampled) 5-minute video, as well as rate their degree 
of enjoyment, involvement, and distraction while viewing the video. 
The type and level of distraction significantly influenced both 
choice and rated enjoyment. Choice of the sampled video was signif-
icantly higher with high explicit distraction (memorizing an 8-digit 
number; 82%) than with high implicit distraction (taking many pic-
tures; 50%; χ2 = 4.77, p = .029). When distraction was low, choice 
of the sampled video was marginally higher in the implicit (71%) 
than explicit condition (46%; χ2= 3.05, p = .081). Planned contrasts 
also revealed that participants taking only a few pictures enjoyed the 
experience (M= 13.42) significantly more than participants taking 
many pictures (M= 12.27, p= .05). However, participants felt sig-
nificantly more distracted in the high explicit condition than in each 
of the other conditions (all p < .05).  Thus, taking many pictures (a 
high implicit distraction) did not feel particularly distracting but did 
reduce enjoyment of the experience.
Study 2 investigated consumers’ lack of awareness of the detri-
mental consequences of taking too many pictures by looking into the 
lay theories people hold. Participants read a scenario about a person 
who vacationed at the Grand Canyon. We manipulated whether the 
vacationer took 10, 50, or 100 pictures during the 1-day trip.
The number of pictures taken significantly influenced predic-
tions of enjoyment. Positive affect was predicted to be significantly 
lower when 10 pictures were taken (M= 11.44) than when 50 or 100 
pictures were taken (M= 13.65 and M= 14.08 respectively, p < .001). 
Further, participants predicted marginally more regret when 10 pic-
tures were taken (M= 2.12) than when 50 or 100 pictures were taken 
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(M= 1.54 and M= 1.44 respectively, p= .09). Finally, participants 
predicted a significantly worse trip when 10 pictures were taken (M= 
1.76) than when 50 or 100 pictures were taken (M= 1.23 and M=1.20, 
p= .03). These results suggest that people believe that others enjoy 
experiences more, not less, when more pictures are taken.  (We also 
found that when participants rated how much they themselves would 
enjoy the trip that they read about, the number of pictures taken by 
the vacationer did not affect the participant’s own predicted enjoy-
ment. Thus, our findings cannot be explained by participants judging 
the trip to be subpar when only a few pictures were taken.) 
Our results thus far indicate that not all distractions have the 
same types of effects. The influence of distraction on the enjoyment 
of experiences depends on the nature of the distraction. While an 
explicit distraction at high levels (i.e. memorizing an 8-digit number) 
led to more enjoyment of an experience, an implicit distraction at 
high levels (i.e. taking many pictures) led to less enjoyment. Further, 
contrary to participants’ lay theories, taking many pictures was sig-
nificantly less enjoyable than taking only a few pictures.
Our findings have implications for consumers’ use of technolo-
gies such as social media while engaged in hedonic experiences. 
Further research is underway to determine if the effects observed 
here hold for other common multitasking activities like texting and 
tweeting.  In addition, we are working to develop a deeper process 
account of the effects.
Somewhere Out There: The Power of Brands to Act as 
Virtual Proxies Signifying Safety and Representing Home 
During Intense Risk-Filled Separations 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There are about 1,400,000 active military personnel across all 
branches: 103,000 are “afloat” and 297,000 are installed in foreign 
countries (US Census 2012, Table 509). All are in a state of risk-
filled separation. All communicate with families and friends. All 
seek to bridge the distance between themselves and loved ones. Dur-
ing separation, co-creating home and signaling proximity can bolster 
both deployed soldiers and family and friends who remain at home. 
Our research focuses on how home is enacted and consumed dur-
ing family separation and how proximity is signaled. Our context 
heightens the importance of maintaining connections to home since 
deployment often involves the risk of bodily injury.
 Fournier (1998) established that consumers create and main-
tain bonds with brands that in many ways resemble interpersonal re-
lationships. Abundant literature has considered the manner in which 
these consumer-brand and consumer-company relationships are 
formed (c.f., Aggarwal 2004; Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), are enact-
ed within specific consumer constituents (c.f., Kates 2000; Luedicke, 
Thompson and Giesler 2009), become intensified as in brand love 
(c.f., Carroll and Ahuvia 2006; Batra Ahuvia and Bagozzi 2012), and 
even eventually end (Fiona, Hall and Meamber 2012). Belk (1988) 
argues that relationships between consumers and objects are never 
truly dyadic (consumer-object), but rather are multi-pronged (con-
sumer-object-consumer). Consumers’ relationships with objects,like 
brands are most often social. Interestingly, Fournier’s (1998) in-
formants revealed that their consumer-brand bonds often originate 
in strong interpersonal relationships (a daughter engages in a rela-
tionship with a cleaning product her mother used). Schau and Gilly 
(2003) detail how consumers post brands in personal webspace as 
shorthand to communicate identity details to website visitors, engag-
ing in conspicuous virtual materialism sharing identity projects with 
known and unknown others. Research on direct transitional objects 
show people actively use mementoes to transition from one identity 
to another as in physical displacement and death (c.f., Gentry, Ken-
nedy, Paul and Hill 1995; Hill 1991; Hill and Stamey 1990; Parkin 
1999). The object sometimes stands in for a loved one or a special 
place. Research has examined how people create home away from 
home (Clapham 2012; Gorman-Murray 2007; Malone and Dooley 
2006; McCracken 1989). While these studies elucidate many com-
plexities surrounding consumers’ relationships with objects and 
brands, they do not yet reveal how consumers use brands within 
their real life, active, interpersonal relationships, or specifically 
how brands connect consumers in virtualities. Our research seeks 
to understand the manner in which consumers undergoing intense 
risk-filled separations from family and friends use brands in their 
communication with distant loved ones. Specifically, we examine 
the manner in which deployed military and their family and friends 
utilize brands in their interpersonal communications. 
Using historical documents (archived military personal cor-
respondence), brand promotions that explicitly call upon patriotic 
military themes (especially separation), 26 interviews with families 
that have experienced a military deployment, and online forums for 
deployed military and their families, we uncover the strategic use 
of brands within personal communications during intense risk-filled 
separations.
We examined outward facing consumer-brand bonds that have 
a communicative function to an external set of constituents (family 
and friends not deployed to the same base). We find two broad cat-
egories: comfort brands and military-endorsed brands. For comfort 
brands and military-endorsed brands there are two consumer-brand 
relationship trajectories: continuing (once begun they are maintained 
in and out of military service) and contextual (only active during ac-
tive military service).
Comfort Brands are consumed explicitly for comfort-oriented 
reasons. For example, brands are used to signify safety and prox-
imity to friends and family in the U.S. or to represent locales like 
home. By function, we identify them as: proxies (brands that com-
municate proximity like being under the same sky as in An Ameri-
can Tail or singing the same song, watching the same show), cozies 
(brands that communicate that military personnel are safe and the 
situation is mundane rather than in peril, such as eating Dunkin Do-
nuts), homies (brands that represent locales specifically home [US or 
regional] like McDonalds, Coca-Cola, or Alejandro tortillas specific 
to Tucson), and techies (brands that literally bring family and friends 
together technologically like Skype, iPhone/iPad, Google Chat, 
Gmail). Within comfort brand relationships we have two distinct 
types: legacy brand relationships, a form of continuing bonds (those 
that continue pre-military or extra-military consumer-brand bonds) 
and emergent brand relationships, a form of contextual bonds (those 
that emerge as comfort brands through military exposure on base).
Military Endorsed Brands are brands that military personnel 
first encountered in the military through defense-based contracts 
(e.g., Oakley) that then come to be trusted as high quality. Insiders 
who know military use of the brands and military grade standards 
come to mark these vetted high-quality brands as safe. In this re-
search, we are specifically looking at family and friends of military. 
Within the military-endorsed brands we have two types: treasures 
and tools. Treasures are a form of continuing bonds where brands 
that are initially used within the confines of the job but then are 
exported or used outside of active military-related uses (e.g., used 
within families and friend sets). Tools are a form of contextual bonds 
where brands are used only within the confines of the job. 
In essence, we find that consumers utilize brands as virtual 
proxies signifying safety and representing home during intense risk-
filled separations. Both consumers at home and those deployed share 
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pictures and stories of shared brands to strengthen bonds and com-
municate shared safety and solidarity.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The idea that “sex sells” is commonplace in the marketing 
world. But, is it possible that sexual motives influence consumer 
choice far beyond the draw of explicit sexual cues? While sexual 
cues are an effective method for attracting consumers’ attention, re-
search has yet to consider how consumers’ sexual and mating con-
cerns influence decisions particularly within consumer domains that, 
on the surface, have little to do with sex. This special session fea-
tures groundbreaking research that combines business science with 
the natural sciences. Each set of findings provide a unique window 
into the mating-related mechanisms that can underlie our consumer 
choices and challenge some existing views of the factors that influ-
ence consumption.
The first two papers offer a fresh take on women’s conspicu-
ous consumption and desire for variety. In the first paper, Wang 
and Griskevicius investigate the role sexual rivals play in driving 
women’s consumption of luxury goods. Four experiments show that 
women’s conspicuous consumption is triggered by a desire to signal 
to other rival women, and that flaunting expensive products is ef-
fective at deterring rivals from stealing a romantic partner. The sec-
ond paper, by Rae and Durante, examines a previously unconsidered 
factor that influences consumer variety seeking: the hormones that 
regulate fertility. Four experiments show that ovulating women de-
sire greater variety in product choice and that this increase in variety 
seeking is driven by an increase in desire for new men. 
The final two papers provide new evidence for how sex and 
power impact economic and consumer choice. The third paper, by 
Torelli, Mittal, and Vohs, focuses on how attractiveness influences 
women’s internalization of a link between sexuality and power. Four 
experiments show that more (vs. less) attractive women endorse 
sexual leveraging for acquiring/restoring power and – subsequently 
– attempt to boost their attractiveness via products that enhance sex 
appeal when feeling powerless. The fourth paper, by Stanton and col-
leagues, switches gears to also shine a light on men. Two studies 
challenge the notion that testosterone – a hormone responsible for 
driving sexual behavior and status striving – is also responsible for 
risky financial decisions. Findings are the first to demonstrate that 
how testosterone influences financial risk depends greatly on whether 
the decision has social implications or only impacts the self.
This session aims to make a difference by introducing research 
lines that open an exciting new frontier for marketing research. Sepa-
rately, each paper in this session provides a different insight into the 
role sex plays in consumer choice. Together, these papers provide an 
additional perspective on the idea that “sex sells” by showing how, 
when, and why the bedroom can often lead to the bank. As such, the 
session would be of interest to a breadth of consumer researchers, 
including those interested in materialism, sexual economics, moti-
vation, social perception, nonconscious processes, romantic rela-
tionships, and biological and evolutionary approaches to consumer 
behavior. 
Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships and Rivals: 
Women’s Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A designer handbag found on the shelves of stores such as Nei-
man Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, or Nordstrom costs anywhere from 
several hundred to several thousand dollars. Yet an average Ameri-
can woman purchases three new handbags each year, prominently 
flaunting designer brands such as Fendi, Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Marc 
Jacobs, Christian Dior, Prada, and Chanel. Spending on luxury goods 
amounts to as much as $525 billion per year in the United States 
alone, with women’s products accounting for over half of this con-
sumption. Given women’s passion for pricey possessions, why do 
they desire luxury goods?
Considerable research has examined why people purchase lux-
ury products. Past work finds that the reasons for why consumers 
seek such possessions include everything from pursuing happiness 
and boosting self-esteem to signaling one’s status and identity (Belk 
1985; Han, Nunes, and Dreze 2010; Richins 1987; Veblen 1899). But 
there is reason to believe that luxury goods play an important role in 
another ubiquitous part of life-relationships. Recent findings suggest 
that men’s conspicuous consumption plays a vital role in relation-
ship by serving as a “sexual signaling system” (Sundie et al. 2011). 
In the current research, we examine whether women’s conspicuous 
consumption might have any function in relationships. 
We propose that women’s conspicuous consumption may func-
tion as a signal to romantic rivals. We hypothesize that a woman 
can use luxury products to signal to other women that her roman-
tic partner is especially devoted to her. In turn, flaunting expensive 
handbags and designer shoes might help women deter romantic ri-
vals from poaching her relationship partner. We investigate the idea 
of whether women’s conspicuous consumption might function as a 
signaling system to guard mates in four studies.
Study 1 examined whether other women infer information 
about a woman’s relationship based on the luxuriousness of her pos-
sessions. Sixty-nine women were randomly assigned to read one of 
the descriptions about a woman either wear designer products or 
non-designer products at a party with her romantic partner. Results 
indicate that a woman was perceived as having a more devoted part-
ner when she had designer compared to non-designer outfit and ac-
cessories (Ms=5.40 vs. 4.82, t=2.01, p=.048). 
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Study 2 examined if experimentally activating a motive to guard 
a mate triggers women’s conspicuous consumption. Using guided 
visualization manipulations from previous research (Griskevicius et 
al. 2007; Maner et al. 2007), we activated either a (1) mate guarding 
motive, (2) mate attraction motive, or (3) control. Because the desire 
for conspicuous goods is related to the size of product brand logos 
(Lee and Shrum 2012; Nunes et al. 2010), women were then given 
the opportunity to draw luxury brand logos on a handbag, shoe, car, 
and T-shirt that they would want to purchase. The dependent mea-
sure was the size of the logo women drew for each product. Findings 
showed that only a mate guarding motive altered the size of logos 
(t(134)=3.21, p = .002), leading women to draw luxury brand logos 
that were about twice the size compared to those in the other condi-
tions.  
Study 3 sought to conceptually replicate and extended the mate 
guarding finding from Study 2 using different dependent measures 
including desire to spend for both conspicuous and non-conspicuous 
consumption products. The results suggest that mate guard motive, 
does not simply lead women to want to spend more on any products, 
but is instead specific to products used for conspicuous consump-
tion. Study 3 also ruled out two possible alternatives, showing that 
this effect is not driven by threat to one’s self-esteem or by the mere 
present of another woman. 
Study 4 examined the intended audience of women’s conspicu-
ous product displays. Because women’s conspicuous consumption is 
hypothesized to ward off female rivals, we predicted that the intend-
ed audience of women’s luxury possessions would specifically be 
women who are potential threats to the relationships. We activated a 
mate guarding motive, but the situation was manipulated so that the 
woman’s conspicuous products could only be seen by either other 
women or men. Thus, the study had three between-subjects condi-
tions: (1) mate guarding – male audience, (2) mate guarding – female 
audience, and (3) control. 
To assess conspicuous consumption, all participants earned 5 
extra dollars in the study, which they could either take home or use 
to purchase raffle tickets to win a $200 gift card for a spending spree 
at a luxury store (e.g., Neiman Marcus, Tiffany & Co., etc.). Partici-
pants could spend as much or as little of the $5, with higher spend-
ing increasing the likelihood of getting the card. Findings showed 
that activating a mate guarding only increased women’s conspicu-
ous consumption when the audience were other women (t(72)=2.90, 
p=.04). 
Additional data suggest that when a woman had luxurious pos-
sessions paid by her partner, other women were less willing to ro-
mantically pursue her relationship partner if the opportunity arose. 
Therefore, women’s luxurious possession is in fact effective signal 
to facilitate mate guarding. 
Overall, this research makes a contribution by identifying a 
novel function of women’s conspicuous consumption, showing the 
workings of how luxury products can function as signaling system to 
ward off romantic rivals, and revealing how products play an impor-
tant and previously unknown role in relationships.
Playing the Field: The Effect of Fertility on Women’s 
Desire for Variety
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
While considerable past research has examined variety seeking 
in consumer choice (e.g., Kahn 1995), the current research is the first 
to examine whether women’s desire for variety is influenced by a 
universal biological factor – the monthly ovulatory cycle.  
The ovulatory cycle spans, on average, 28 days, during which 
a woman can become pregnant on about one week – the ovulatory 
phase of the cycle. Although most women do not know when they 
are ovulating, research has shown that ovulation can non-conscious-
ly alter women’s psychology and decision-making. For example, 
near ovulation women have more fantasies about other men that are 
especially different from their current partner (Sheldon et al. 2006) 
and have more extramarital affairs (Bellis and Baker 1990). Ovulat-
ing women are particularly attracted to men other than their current 
partner who display markers of genetic fitness (e.g., symmetry, mas-
culinity, social dominance; Durante et al. 2012; Garver-Apgar et al. 
2006). These findings suggest that the hormonal fluctuations associ-
ated with ovulation may increase women’s openness to variety – at 
least in men. Here, we explore whether this ovulatory-induced shift 
in preference for different men translates to the marketplace. 
 Study 1 examined whether ovulation increases variety-seeking 
in consumer choice. Women made 15 choices about nail polish color 
(out of 20 colors). Participants were told to select a nail color for 
each day (1 – 15) and were told they could select as many or as few 
nail colors as they preferred. Results showed that women chose a 
greater variety of colors near ovulation compared to when not ovu-
lating (Movulating = 6.73 vs. Mnot-ovulating = 5.46; p = .044). 
Because we propose that women’s desire for variety in product 
choice is a reflection of an ovulatory increase in openness to differ-
ent men, Study 2 examined whether openness to sex with a new man 
mediates women’s variety seeking. Women made 15 choices of nail 
color as in Study 1 and reported the likelihood they would date, have 
sex with, or engage in a brief affair with a man other than their cur-
rent partner. Ovulating women sought greater variety in nail choice 
compared to women who were not ovulating (Movulating = 6.63 vs. Mnot-
ovulating = 5.52; p = .056). Ovulating women also reported higher like-
lihood estimates for having a sexual affair with other men (Movulating 
= .179 vs. Mnot-ovulating = -.076; p = .014). The effect of ovulation on 
women’s variety seeking was mediated by women’s openness to sex 
with other men (.21; SE = .14; 95% BCI .027 – .647).
Given that mating motives appear to underlie the effect of ovu-
lation on women’s variety seeking, Study 3 sought to suppress the 
ovulatory effect on desire for variety by manipulating women’s mat-
ing goals. While ovulation leads women to be open to short-term sex 
with attractive men, an important moderator of this effect is the qual-
ity of a woman’s current romantic partner. Research finds that ovula-
tion does not lead women to be interested in other men when their 
current partner is high in sexual desirability (e.g., Larson et al. 2013). 
This suggests that ovulating women should be motivated to retain a 
current mate if he is someone who is physically attractive. Study 3 
therefore investigated whether a motive to retain an attractive partner 
(vs. a control) would suppress the effect of ovulation on variety seek-
ing. Study 3 also measured variety seeking in four different product 
categories: nails, high heel shoes, candy bars, and restaurants. 
There was no influence of fertility on variety by product type 
so the four product categories were converted into a variety seeking 
composite (α = .77). As predicted, there was no difference in variety 
seeking between ovulating and non-ovulating women in the mate 
retention condition (Movulating = 8.50 vs. Mnot-ovulating = 9.40), p = .13. 
Replicating Studies 1 and 2, ovulating women in the control condi-
tion chose a greater variety of products near ovulation compared to 
when they were not ovulating (Movulating = 10.35 vs. Mnot-ovulating = 8.65; 
p = .016).
To this point, we have examined the effect of ovulation on va-
riety seeking for both single and married women. However, unlike 
single women, married women have made a significant commitment 
to one partner and they may have considerably more to lose from 
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the dissolution of their relationship. Further, married women often 
wear a symbol of their commitment to one man in the form of a wed-
ding ring. Because a wedding ring is considered to be a strong and 
universal symbol of commitment to one’s partner (Chesser 1980), 
we reasoned that the act of removing and putting on one’s wedding 
ring should augment feelings of commitment. Drawing on the idea 
that sensorimotor stimulation translates to cognitions associated with 
that stimulus (Ackerman et al. 2010; Chandler et al. 2012), Study 4 
examined how removing and replacing one’s wedding ring would 
influence the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. We hypothesize 
that removing one’s wedding ring should lead to cognitions associ-
ated with lower commitment (akin to a mate attraction motive) and, 
thus, bolster the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. Conversely, 
the act of putting one’s wedding ring back on (akin to a mate re-
tention motive) should suppress the effect of ovulation on variety 
seeking. There was a significant interaction between fertility and 
condition, p = .03. While there was no difference in variety seeking 
by condition for women who were not ovulating (p = .37), our key 
prediction concerned how removing and replacing a wedding ring 
would affect variety seeking in women who were ovulating. Near 
ovulation, women sought more variety in product choice after they 
removed their wedding ring and less variety when they put their 
wedding ring back on (MRingOff = 10.52 vs. MRingOn = 8.48; p = .035).
Four studies show that the hormones associated with ovulation 
influence women’s desire for variety. This research adds to the litera-
ture on how hormones can influence consumption behavior (Durante 
et al. 2011) and is among the first to demonstrate the mediating role 
mating motives play in consumer choice.
Sex as Power: Attractive Women Link Sexuality and 
Power for Personal Gain
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It is often believed that women and men differ in their ap-
proaches for exercising power, in that women in powerful positions 
seem more likely than men to mentor and coach (Eagly and Johan-
nesen-Schmidt 2001). Although women and men tend to differ in 
their emphasis on the personal versus relational self (Cross and Mad-
son 1997), women nonetheless possess a personal self complete with 
individualized goals, desires, and preferences (Gabriel and Gardner 
1999). Knowing that women generally use power for mutual gain 
while acknowledging that women have inner goals that they seek to 
attain for their own personal gain suggests that there will be circum-
stances in which women seek personal gain through power. When 
and how women seek power for personal gain was the focus on the 
current research. 
Our tack was to study women’s views about the meaning and 
purpose of power, particularly as it relates to the use of sex and at-
tractiveness. Social interactions with men can offer an opportunity 
for some women to gain personal power. Sexual Economics Theory 
(Baumeister and Vohs 2004) proposes that sex is a female resource 
that bestows upon women considerable negotiating power in the 
context of heterosexual relationships. This power enables women to 
be able to request valuable resources (e.g., respect or material gifts) 
in order for the sexual exchange to occur. Women’s negotiating pow-
er is particularly strong in the case of more (versus less) attractive 
women. Because attractive women are more desirable than others, 
they have even more of an upper hand and thusly the power to de-
mand more resources (Baumeister and Vohs 2004). Since men often 
see the world through sexual glasses and interpret their social inter-
actions with women in sexual terms (Shotland and Craig 1988), men 
can become quite concerned about gaining the approval of attrac-
tive women (Van Vugt and Iredale 2012). As a consequence, there 
is spillover from the heterosexual negotiation script into mixed-sex 
social interactions, which also are especially favorable to attractive 
women (Dion and Stein 1978). To the extent that more attractive 
women successfully leverage their physical attractiveness for fulfill-
ing their personal goals, these women could both develop a stronger 
belief that power can be useful for personal gain and that leveraging 
one’s physical attractiveness is an acceptable and effective means for 
doing so (Darley and Fazio 1980). Therefore, we predicted that more 
(versus less) attractive women, who can use their physical attractive-
ness more often and effectively, would have a higher likelihood to 
conceptualize power in personalized terms (i.e., that the purpose of 
power is for personal gain, Winter 1973), as well as to endorse the 
use of sexual leveraging for achieving or restoring power. 
Four studies tested these predictions by comparing the beliefs, 
reactions, choices, and behaviors among women who were (self- 
or other-rated as) more or less attractive. Study 1 used established 
scales to measure different facets of personalized power related to 
one’s ability to control/influence others for personal gain, aspiration 
for gaining social status, and desire to dominate others, as well as 
participants’ physical attractiveness. Findings suggested that more 
(versus less) attractive women expressed aspirations to achieve high 
social status, thought that assertive, forceful, and self-assured behav-
iors are good, and more confidently believed that they can influence 
others and satisfy their own desires. 
Study 2 directly assessed the link between women’s physical 
attractiveness and the use of sexuality to acquire/ restore power. Par-
ticipants first answered questions in response to four interpersonal 
situations including some contexts in which targets were portrayed 
exercising or reacting to power (Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). Two situ-
ations involved leveraging sex appeal for acquiring/restoring power, 
whereas the other two involved forceful, non-sexual actions in re-
sponse to abuses of power. These latter situations were included for 
comparison purposes to explore the possibility that more (versus 
less) attractive women are simply more likely to react to the negative 
feelings triggered by misuses of power. Next, participants answered 
questions that measured their self-reported tendencies to leverage 
their sex appeal for gaining power. Last, we measured attractiveness 
in two ways as a robustness check. The results demonstrated that at-
tractiveness was positively related with women’s approval of the use 
of sexual leveraging for acquiring or restoring power. Furthermore, 
the higher approval of sexual leveraging actions for acquiring power 
among more (versus less) attractive women was mediated by their 
own self-reported tendencies to leverage their sex appeal. Findings 
also show that attractiveness seems to be unrelated with the likeli-
hood that women would react to the negative feelings triggered by 
powerlessness.
Study 3 experimentally manipulated feelings of powerlessness 
in order to directly test the extent to which more (versus less) attrac-
tive women seek to amplify their sex appeal when feeling power-
less. We assessed women’s choices for products that can enhance 
sex appeal after inducing (versus not) a sense of being powerless. 
Results showed that feelings of powerlessness prompted more at-
tractive women to choose products that could boost their sex appeal, 
compared to their choices in a neutral condition and compared to 
less attractive women. Less attractive women in contrast, showed 
no differences as a function of condition. Study 4 directly measured 
women’s attempts to boost their physical attractiveness in response 
to feelings of powerlessness using a behavioral measure, and used 
others’ ratings of participants’ physical attractiveness as the mea-
sure of attractiveness. The findings demonstrated feelings of pow-
erlessness made more attractive women become more interested 
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in products that are instrumental for boosting their attractiveness. 
These effects were specific to such products, and did not emerge for 
products that were described in sexually-appealing terms but were 
not instrumental for boosting attractiveness. This argues against the 
alternative account that power is linked to the general concept of 
sex in more attractive women, suggesting that they do not possess a 
global link between power and sex. 
The combined results of the studies provided converging evi-
dence for the notion that feelings of power and sexuality are linked 
for women high in attractiveness, which therefore make these wom-
en more likely to compensate for a lack of power by attempting to 
boost their sex appeal. 
Sex Hormones & Economic Decisions: The Effect of 
Testosterone on Financial Risk Depends on Social 
Context
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Does testosterone influence risky decisions in economic and 
social domains? There has been recent speculation in the media that 
testosterone drives risky decisions, and that the Great Recession 
started in 2008 because there was “Too Much Testosterone on Wall 
Street” (Hewlett 2009). In spite of those strong claims, there was 
scant empirical research to corroborate them, and generally little was 
known about physiological factors that might account for individual 
differences in our risk preferences. In two studies, the present re-
search explored the extent to which testosterone predicts individuals’ 
willingness to take risks when making economic decisions alone and 
when making socially-interactive economic decisions.
Decades of research have shown that testosterone drives mating 
behavior and is associated with social dominance, the pursuit of sta-
tus, and aggression (Archer 2006; Mazur and Booth 1998; Stanton 
and Schultheiss 2009). For example, individuals with high testoster-
one levels pursue high-status, risk-laden careers (Dabbs et al. 1990; 
1998), and army soldiers with the highest levels of testosterone are 
the most likely to abuse drugs, be violent, and go AWOL (Mazur, 
1995). These behaviors put one’s social relationships as well as one’s 
health and well-being at risk. While testosterone is associated with 
these and other risky social behaviors, it is unclear whether or not 
high levels of testosterone predispose individuals to pursue risk in 
other domains such as economic decision making. The present stud-
ies examine not just how testosterone may relate to risky economic 
decisions, but also the extent to which the social nature of the eco-
nomic decision may influence the relationship between testosterone 
and economic decision-making behavior. 
Across studies, testosterone was collected and measured from 
saliva using standard methods and radioimmunoassay techniques 
(Schultheiss and Stanton 2009). Testosterone levels were z-scored 
within sex and collapsed over gender (Mehta et al. 2008).
Study 1 investigated the relationship between individuals’ 
testosterone levels and their tolerance of unfair offers made in the 
ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is a dyadic social economic 
game that involves the exchange of money between participants 
within a constrained format that allows one to compare how often 
a participant is willing to accept fair versus unfair exchange offers. 
Participants’ (N = 57) testosterone levels were negatively related to 
their acceptance of unfair offers, r(55) = -.27, p = 0.04, meaning that 
high-testosterone individuals’ were less tolerant of unfair offers. The 
relationship persisted when controlling for gender β = -.28, p = 0.04. 
Moreover, there was no relationship between testosterone levels and 
acceptance of fair offers, r(55) = .11, p = 0.43, which demonstrates 
that testosterone selectively predicts behavior when confronted with 
unfairness. Unfairness may be perceived as a challenge to one’s 
dominance. Accordingly, one would predict that testosterone should 
have selective effects on decisions regarding unfair offers as op-
posed to fair offers, which is what the data reflect.
But, does testosterone always lead individuals to make riskier 
decisions? Study 2 investigated the relationship between testoster-
one and aversion to risk in economic decisions that people make 
independently. In addition to interrogating the direct relationship be-
tween economic risk aversion and testosterone, the potential effects 
of participants’ relationship status were also considered. In the do-
main of power and sex hormones, relationship status is a critical fac-
tor, such that positive association between power and sex hormones 
is strongest in those who are single (Stanton and Schultheiss 2007; 
Stanton and Edelstein, 2009). From an evolutionary perspective, tes-
tosterone may more robustly promote behaviors associated with the 
pursuit of power and economic gains in single individuals (Saad and 
Vongas 2009; Stanton and Edelstein 2009). 
Participants’ (N = 390) risk aversion was determined through 
120 trials in which they chose between a certain outcome (a guar-
anteed win) and a risky gamble that could potentially pay more or 
less than the certain outcome. Across the 120 trials, the values of the 
certain outcome, probabilities of winning the gamble, and the ratio 
of the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option 
were varied and randomized. Participants’ payment was dependent 
on their choices, which ensured that their behavior was incentive 
compatible.
Across all subjects, testosterone levels were positively associ-
ated with risk aversion, r(388) = .13, p = 0.01. In other words, low-
testosterone individuals were the most risk seeking, which stands in 
contrast to received wisdom. This effect persists when controlling 
for gender β(387) = .13, p = .01. Further exploration of the effects 
of participants’ relationship status revealed that testosterone and risk 
aversion were particularly strongly correlated amongst those partici-
pants who were single, r(211)= .19, p = 0.005. This effect was then 
tested independently for each gender, and both single men and single 
women showed a similar relationship between testosterone and risk 
aversion, Men: r(80) = .27, p = .02; Women: r(128) = .15, p = .09. 
In contrast, testosterone and risk aversion were not significantly as-
sociated for those who were coupled, r(175)= .04, p = .56, and in-
dependent of testosterone, those in a relationship were not riskier 
than those who were single t(388) = .12, p = .90. It may be that 
low-testosterone individuals desire to pursue risk, but feel inhibited 
in social domains, which leads them to pursue risk in domains that 
are socially isolated such as economic decisions that are made inde-
pendently. The findings suggest that testosterone’s relationship with 
risk aversion may be both counterintuitive as well as more complex 
than previously assumed. 
The present studies demonstrate that testosterone is uniquely 
associated with risky decision making depending on social context 
and social factors. For social decisions, higher levels of testosterone 
predict greater risk and less tolerance of unfairness, whereas for eco-
nomic decisions made alone, higher levels of testosterone predicted 
greater risk aversion.  Interestingly, in both studies, the relationship 
between individuals’ testosterone levels and behavior were the same 
in men and women, which suggests that the putative male-specific 
role of testosterone in promoting riskiness is ill-founded. These stud-
ies suggest that individual differences in testosterone levels are a po-
tential physiological mechanism that accounts for heterogeneity in 
economic risk preferences.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
On its surface, exercising self-control would seem like a fairly 
simple proposition involving the decision to resist fleeting temp-
tation and adhere to more important, long-term goals. In practice, 
however, choosing between indulgence and restraint is a daily con-
volution of emotions, aspirations, appetites, and rationalization, sub-
ject to a wide array of influences. Understanding the precursors and 
processes that lead a consumer to indulge or exercise restraint, and 
understanding the outcomes of these decisions, is of utmost inter-
est to marketers, policy makers, and consumers alike. Consumers 
seem to be adept at generating justifications and excuses for lapses 
in self-control, contributing to a general propensity towards indul-
gence. Although most self-control research emphasizes the benefits 
of choosing virtues over vices (e.g., Wertenbroch 1998), consumers 
can clearly derive benefits from indulgent consumption experiences, 
and continually missing out on indulgence comes at a price (Haws 
and Poynor 2008; Kivetz and Keinan 2006). Still, indulgence as an 
intricate behavioral phenomenon has rarely itself been the focus of 
research.  
The present set of papers offers intriguing and overlapping nov-
el perspectives involving indulgent behaviors. These papers together 
illuminate a set of product- and situation-relevant conditions under 
which consumers become more likely to indulge and even receive 
enhanced benefits from indulgent consumption. For example, creat-
ing cuter versions of both hedonic and utilitarian products (Scott and 
Nenkov), adding functional innovation benefits to products (Garvey 
and Bolton), and sharing hedonic goods with others (Liu, Fitzsi-
mons, and Bettman; Lowe and Haws) all enhance the likelihood of 
indulgence. In addition, sharing or co-indulgence is found to provide 
added benefits of engaging in more indulgent consumption (Lowe 
and Haws). 
Specifically, the papers by Garvey and Bolton and Scott and 
Nenkov emphasize that the nature of the product itself matters— that 
is, the overall framing of the level of hedonic benefit associated with 
a product can be dramatically influenced by fairly simple changes to 
the core product. This may be through adding utilitarian functionality 
that in turn provides a license for indulging, or by priming concepts 
of fun and frivolity through making products “cute”. Next, the papers 
by Liu et al. and Lowe and Haws both explore the social aspects as-
sociated with indulgent experiences. Social interactions and experi-
ences appear to be enhanced with hedonic consumption.
Overall, this session explores influences on indulgent consump-
tion that are novel and not always immediately apparent. The papers 
illuminate previously unexplored product-level and situational fac-
tors, which lead consumers to indulge more readily and/or enhance 
the benefits of the indulgent experience. Important general questions 
emerge from this set of papers including: 1) how do we maximize the 
benefits we receive from choosing to indulge, while also minimizing 
the costs? And, 2) what can we learn by considering both the prod-
uct level and social benefits provided by consuming indulgences? As 
such, this session embodies the “making a difference” theme of ACR 
2013, and it should be of interest to a significant portion of ACR at-
tendees including scholars studying self-control, indulgent consump-
tion, and social interaction.  
“So Cute I Can Eat it Up”: Priming Effects of Cute 
Products on Indulgent Consumption
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research examines exposure to cute products – a previ-
ously unexplored factor that might affect the extent to which con-
sumers engage in indulgent consumption. Companies market cute 
products in various categories not only to children, but also to adult 
consumers. The marketplace is replete with cute clothes, utensils, 
appliances, foods, and even automobiles (e.g., Taylor 2011). Despite 
the abundance of cute products in the marketplace, however, aca-
demic research on their evaluation or their downstream effects on 
consumer decision-making and behavior is limited. This is the first 
research to examine how cute products available in the marketplace 
(e.g., cute cookies or cute ice cream scoops) may influence consum-
ers’ consumption behavior. 
In the current research we explore cuteness, which refers to 
products (and other objects) that are attractive in an adorable or en-
dearing way and have a whimsical nature. Past research had shown 
that exposure to cute human stimuli (e.g., babies, baby-like facial fea-
tures) triggers caretaking behavior and carefulness (Sherman, Haidt, 
and Coan 2009; Sherman et al. 2012), which should lead consum-
ers to engage in more restrained and careful behavior. On the other 
hand, we put forward the possibility that cute products might have 
the opposite effect of triggering indulgent and frivolous behavior. 
We propose that exposure to cute products (i.e., evaluating, using, or 
consuming such products) would increase indulgent consumption, 
because cute products’ whimsical nature would prime mental repre-
sentations of fun and frivolity.
Displaying behaviors of a primed concept or category has been 
replicated in a variety of contexts (e.g., Aggarwal and McGill 2012; 
Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001). The activation of the construct also ac-
tivates all the related features including behavioral tendencies associ-
ated with it, which increases the likelihood that these behavioral ten-
dencies will be acted upon. The activation of a particular construct, 
in this case, fun and frivolity, should thus lead to a greater likelihood 
of nonconscious behavior associated with this construct. We predict 
that exposure to cute products will prime mental representations of 
fun and frivolity, leading consumers to display behaviors consistent 
with these representations, resulting in more indulgent consumption.
In a series of seven experiments we show that exposure to cute 
(vs. non-cute) products primes mental representations of fun and 
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frivolity, which leads to more indulgent consumption choices. Our 
results consistently show that when adult consumers are exposed 
to cute products, they tend to engage in more indulgent consump-
tion. In one study (n = 33) consumers both scooped and ate more 
ice cream when serving with a cute (vs. neutral) ice cream scoop. In 
a series of three studies (total n = 313) when exposed to a cute (vs. 
different types of non-cute) cookie, they indicated a higher likeli-
hood of eating the cookie, a greater desire to indulge in cookies, and 
ordered more cookies. These effects were strong enough to affect 
unrelated downstream consumption decisions as well – participants 
were more likely to choose a gift certificate that could be redeemed 
for indulgent groceries and to indulge in a rich entrée in a subsequent 
scenario. In these studies we also provide evidence of fun/frivolity 
priming by asking participants to list the first words that come to 
mind when seeing the cute (vs. neutral) product. Results across the 
three studies consistently revealed that a significantly greater propor-
tion of participants mention the words fun or frivolous when pre-
sented with a cute versus a neutral product, providing evidence that 
cute products prime mental representations of fun and frivolity.
In two other studies (total n = 174) we tested whether consum-
ers make more indulgent book and movie choices when they are 
shopping with a cute (vs. neutral) Barnes and Noble or Amazon gift 
cards. To assess indulgent choices, in we adapted an approach used 
by Read, Loewenstein, and Kalyanaraman (1999) in which partici-
pants selected among a set of highbrow (less indulgent, more vir-
tuous) or lowbrow (more indulgent, less virtuous) movies. Results 
revealed that when shopping with a cute Barnes & Noble or Amazon 
gift card, participants chose to buy more lowbrow books and rent 
more lowbrow movies, respectively.
Finally, we uncovered an important boundary condition that il-
luminates when and how the effects of cute products on indulgent 
consumption are facilitated or inhibited (n = 77).  We demonstrate 
that reminding consumers of the need to exert personal control may 
limit the ability of cute products to increase indulgent consumption, 
presumably because it primes mental representations of control and 
responsibility, which limits the effects of cute products’ fun/frivolity 
priming.
Findings from this research have important implications for 
consumers, marketers, and policy makers. Based on our findings 
it seems that marketing cute products could not only lead to more 
indulgent choices, as shown in our experiments, but could also en-
courage impulsive buying, increase consumption rates, increase con-
sumer spending, and further decrease the already low savings rates 
in the United States. Adult consumers may be increasingly stressed 
with responsibilities of daily life and may be attracted to cute prod-
ucts that prime mental concepts of fun, because it seems to allow 
them to let go of being restrained and responsible. Findings from the 
current research about the implications of such choices are important 
because consumers are likely unaware that exposure to cute products 
might have inadvertent negative effects on their choices in various 
important consumer domains.  
This work helps scholars and practitioners better understand the 
underlying process and downstream effects of how cute products in-
fluence indulgent consumption.  It also helps consumers make more 
informed decisions about the products they choose, and how these 
products may influence their consumption.
Consuming Functional Innovations: Are Utilitarian 
Behaviors Enhanced or Undermined?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A frequent practice in marketing is the introduction of prod-
ucts with new functionality; that is, a product is modified with attri-
butes that afford consumers with additional opportunities for action 
(Dourish 2001; Ziamou and Ratneshwar 2003).  Examples include 
functional foods (e.g. omega-3 ice cream) and green products (e.g. 
natural detergents) that provide benefits over their traditional coun-
terparts, and which represent substantial portions of their respective 
consumer markets (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009).
The present research examines how functional innovations may 
unexpectedly and ironically undermine the very outcomes their nov-
el functionality is intended to support. Although prior research has 
deeply studied factors which influence preference for (Hirschman 
and Holbrook 1982, Naylor, Droms, and Haws 2009) and categori-
zation of (Moreau, Markman and Lehmann 2001; Moreau, Lehm-
ann, and Markman 2001) functional innovations, research is sparse 
examining the downstream consequences of consuming these prod-
ucts.  Extant research has demonstrated that evaluative processing 
of novel innovations results in a heightened focus upon incremental 
benefits versus traditional products (Alexander, Lynch, and Wang 
2008; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). We propose that this “func-
tional focus” may influence subsequent consumption patterns. Prior 
research has demonstrated that explicit self-perceptions of utilitarian 
behavior have the tendency to subsequently increase hedonic behav-
iors through a variety of mechanisms, including reducing perceived 
risk (Bolton, Cohen, and Bloom 2006), guilt reduction, (Wansink 
and Chandon 2006), executive resource depletion (Vohs and Heath-
erton 2000), and utilitarian goal-release (Laran, Janiszewski, and 
Cunha 2008).  
Our research indicates that consumption of functional inno-
vations subsequently increases hedonic-seeking behaviors which 
undermine utilitarian outcomes. Our results are consistent with a 
process of passive goal-guidance (Laran and Janiszewski 2009), 
in which consumption of a functional innovation releases relevant 
utilitarian goals, followed by involuntary emergence of conflicting 
hedonic desires (Carlson, Meloy, and Miller 2013) that subsequent-
ly guide perception and behavior. The result is a so-called hedonic 
“boomerang” that undermines overall utilitarian outcomes and the 
functional benefits of the innovation. Furthermore, we propose a 
method to interrupt this process and thereby mitigate the “boomer-
ang” by priming a utilitarian goal beforehand—which shields (Char-
trand et al. 2008) against the release of the functional goal.
A series of real behavior and scenario studies supports the pro-
posed model and intervention, while ruling out alternative expla-
nations.  Study 1 examined the impact of consuming a functional 
innovation upon subsequent hedonic-utilitarian behavior. An envi-
ronmental innovation in the technology domain (smartphones) was 
employed.  Following purchase of a functionally innovative (“with 
Eco-Safe battery technology”) or non-innovative smartphone, par-
ticipants indicated choice likelihoods for multiple phone application 
pairs containing one hedonically oriented and one utilitarian oriented 
option.  As predicted, participants purchasing the functional inno-
vation indicated a greater likelihood to purchase hedonic software 
apps.
Studies 2A-B were conducted to i) provide direct process 
evidence for a heightened hedonic and suppressed utilitarian state 
following consumption of a functional innovation distinct from 
conscious choice, and ii) demonstrate that a similar “hedonic boo-
merang” effect does not occur for traditional, non-innovative prod-
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ucts that provide comparable utilitarian benefits, thereby iii) ruling 
out conscious “justification” process explanations such as guilt re-
duction (Wansink and Chandon 2006), or conscious licensing due to 
inferences of goal progress (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Study 2A di-
rectly measured involuntary activation of a heightened hedonic state 
due to functionality without soliciting conscious choice. In study 2A, 
participants first imagined purchasing either an environmentally re-
sponsible (washable cotton towel) or irresponsible (disposable paper 
towels) product that was either functional (“with Eco-Nurture addi-
tives”) or non-functional.  To measure activation of a hedonic state, 
participants were next exposed to a 15x18 letter matrix containing 
an equal number of utilitarian (e.g. “responsible”) and hedonic (e.g. 
“exciting”) words.  As predicted, functionality significantly in-
creased (decreased) the number of hedonic (utilitarian) words found 
in the puzzle, regardless of the base product type or perceived en-
vironmental responsibility of the purchased product. These results 
are consistent with activation of a hedonic state that guides attention 
outside of conscious awareness. Furthermore, these results preclude 
explanations for behavioral shifts due to conscious guilt-reduction 
or “balancing” mechanisms, which propose that conscious justifica-
tion of prior behavior is used as a “license” to engage in hedonic 
behaviors. Study 2B employed the same design and initial stimulus, 
but measured behavioral intentions through choice likelihood ratings 
of environmentally responsible and irresponsible options. Consistent 
with the process findings of 2A, functional innovations (regardless 
of base type) subsequently decreased preference for environmentally 
responsible options. 
Study 3 explored in a real-behavior context whether consump-
tion of a functional innovation undermines utilitarian behavior. As 
part of a “taste test” cover story, participants first consumed a real 
pre-packaged cookie labeled as functional (“with antioxidants”) or 
non-functional, then spent fifteen minutes viewing movie trailers and 
eating actual M&Ms. Consistent with our predictions, individuals 
consuming a functional innovation subsequently ate more grams of 
the candy.  Study 4 replicated this effect with (non-) functional in-
novation versions of a “healthy” base product, yogurt. 
Study 5 provided further evidence for the proposed process by 
demonstrating that prior activation of a utilitarian (vs. hedonic) goal 
mitigates the effect of functionality upon subsequent consumption. 
Thus prior utilitarian goal activation inoculates consumers and intro-
duces a method for “undoing” the functional boomerang.
In summary, this research is, to our knowledge, the first effort to 
understand the downstream consequences of consuming functional 
innovations.  Consumption of a functional innovation intended to 
support utilitarian outcomes is demonstrated to subsequently under-
mine these outcomes. This unintended consequence occurs because 
the functional innovation instigates a hedonic state resulting from the 
release of functionally-related goals. 
Anticipating Sharing and Preference for Hedonic 
Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumption situations in which people share products with 
others are common (Belk 2010). For example, people may share an 
appetizer at dinner with a friend or share household items with a 
roommate. We examine how sharing can alter consumers’ product 
preferences. Specifically, although products can differ along many 
dimensions, we focus on how anticipating sharing products shifts 
consumers’ preference for hedonic versus utilitarian products. Re-
search has shown that there is an important distinction between he-
donic and utilitarian products; hedonic products are desired for their 
greater enjoyment but are more difficult to justify selecting, whereas 
utilitarian products are desired for their functionality and easier to 
justify selecting (Khan and Dhar 2006; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; 
Wertenbroch and Dhar 2000). 
Prior research has shown that a variety of different factors can 
alter preferences for hedonic versus utilitarian products. For ex-
ample, Okada (2005) found that in single evaluation (i.e., products 
presented separately), preference for hedonic products was higher 
than preference for utilitarian products, but that in joint evaluation 
(i.e., products presented together), preference for utilitarian prod-
ucts was higher than preference for hedonic products. Kivetz and 
Simonson (2002) found that expending greater effort in a frequency 
reward program shifted consumers’ preferences away from utilitar-
ian rewards and towards hedonic rewards.
We examine how anticipating sharing versus not sharing a 
product affects hedonic product choice. We predict that anticipating 
sharing a product makes consumers more likely to select hedonic 
(versus utilitarian) products. Results from two studies support our 
hypothesis. 
Study 1 . 
In study 1, we conduct a first test of our hypothesis, examining 
whether people are more likely to choose a hedonic food if they 
anticipate sharing (vs. not sharing) it. In addition, we identify 
shareability as a boundary condition, in that this effect does 
not apply to products that are not as easily shared. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (shared, 
individual) x 2 (high shareability, low shareability) group between-
subjects design. Participants read one of four scenarios, depending 
upon their assigned condition. All participants were told to imagine 
being at dinner with their best friend. Participants in the shared, high 
shareability condition were asked whether they would order twelve 
buffalo wings to share with their friend as an appetizer. Participants 
in the individual, high shareability condition were asked whether 
they would order six buffalo wings for themselves as an appetizer. 
Participants in the shared, low shareability condition were asked 
whether they would order two scoops of ice cream to share with 
their friend. Participants in the individual, low shareability condition 
were asked whether they would order one scoop of ice cream for 
themselves. All responses were on a scale from 1 (definitely not) 
to 5 (definitely yes). Analysis revealed a main effect of the shared/
individual factor, qualified by a significant interaction between 
shared/individual and shareability. In the high shareability condition, 
participants were more likely to order the hedonic food if it was 
to be shared versus not shared. In the low shareability condition, 
participants were equally likely to order the hedonic food regardless 
of whether it was to be shared.
Study 2 . 
A potential alternative explanation for these results is that 
participants inferred that it would be cheaper for them to pay for half 
of a shared product than to pay for an entire non-shared product of 
half the size, thus leading them to be more likely to order the shared 
product than the non-shared product. Another potential alternative 
explanation is that sharing leads people to be more likely to purchase 
all products, not merely hedonic products as we propose. Study 2 
addresses these alternative explanations by asking participants 
to allocate a store credit between hedonic and utilitarian goods. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 
2 (shared, individual) group between-subjects design. Participants 
in both conditions were told that they would divide a store credit 
between digital entertainment (e.g., DVDs, digital music downloads, 
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Internet video streaming credits, movie tickets) and household 
supplies (e.g., floor cleaners, cleaning wipes, detergents, paper 
towels). Participants in the shared condition were told to imagine 
that they planned to spend a $20 store credit on products to share 
with their roommate, and participants in the individual condition 
were told to imagine that they planned to spend the $10 store credit 
on products for themselves. To measure preference for hedonic 
over utilitarian products, we calculated the percentage of total store 
credit allocated to digital entertainment. Thus, high values indicate 
greater preference for hedonic products, and low values indicate 
greater preference for utilitarian products. An analysis conducted on 
percentage allocated to digital entertainment revealed a significant 
main effect of shared/individual, such that participants allocated 
a significantly greater percentage of the store credit to digital 
entertainment in the shared versus the individual condition. 
This research examines the choices that consumers make for 
themselves in situations in which they anticipate sharing versus not 
sharing products. First, we found that consumers are more likely to 
opt for a hedonic product if they anticipate sharing versus not sharing 
it. Second, we found that consumers allocate more money to hedonic 
versus utilitarian products if they anticipate sharing versus not shar-
ing it. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on hedonic versus 
utilitarian choice while answering recent calls to examine how shar-
ing shapes consumption choices (Belk 2010). Process mechanisms 
for this effect are being tested and will be presented and discussed.
Camaraderie in Crime: Shared Self-control Decisions 
and Affiliation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Self-control decisions very often involve an element of both 
social influence and social consequence, and consumers exhibiting 
high levels of self-control experience greater social acceptance for 
a number of reasons. For example, these individuals are more likely 
to display pro-social behavior (DeWall, Baumeister and Vohs 2008), 
appear trustworthy (Righetti and Finkenauer 2011), and self-monitor 
more effectively (Finkel et al. 2006). It has even been suggested that 
self-control exists for the very purpose of facilitating group member-
ship (Baumeister, Schmeichel and Vohs 2007) by ensuring that our 
behavior that is coordinated with that of our peers. 
However, previous research on the social outcomes of self-con-
trol decisions has generally employed actor-observer scenarios or ac-
tor-influencer scenarios (McFerran et al 2010, Ackerman et al. 2009, 
VanDellen and Hoyle 2010) and has very rarely examined shared 
self-control decisions or taken the perspective of a participating peer. 
However, no research that we are aware of has ever examined the 
potential outcomes of shared self-control decisions. As there are two 
key elements of a shared self-control decision – the peer(s) and the 
object of the decision itself – we offer a new conceptual framework 
to examine consumer self-control decisions in social settings and 
explore the outcomes of shared self-control decisions regarding 1) 
affiliation and 2) product experience.
In this paper we pay particular attention to shared self-control 
failure (co-indulgence). While it is true that socially coordinated be-
haviors lead to positive social outcomes, socially coordinated behav-
ior may take various forms. Mutually indulging in a tempting con-
sumption opportunity may offer a unique set of benefits that mutual 
restraint (co-abstinence) does not. Indulgence helps preserve cogni-
tive resources that exercising self-control can deplete (Baumeister 
and Alquist 2009) and prevent feelings of regret associated with 
missing out on enjoyable experiences (Kivetz and Keinan 2006). Of 
most interest to us, however, is that co-indulgence seems to provide 
a valuable bonding experience for those involved which in turn im-
pacts the product experience. We examine the importance of per-
ceived similarity and reduced anxiety in producing these co-indul-
gent effects. In three studies, we demonstrate that co-indulgence and 
co-abstinence both produce significant feelings of affiliation with 
peers with the effect being stronger for co-indulgence. Perceptions 
of similarity and reduced anxiety mediate this relationship. Product 
experience is also enhanced by co-indulgence because of this posi-
tive shared experience and a reduction of guilt.  
In study 1, participants (N=155) imagined a dyadic shared self-
control decision and were randomly assigned a choice condition 
(indulge vs. restrain) and a peer choice condition (peer indulge vs. 
peer restrain). Participants then indicated the impact this scenario 
would have on their feelings of affiliation for their peer, their product 
experience, and several other measures. The analysis resulted in a 
significant interaction between the two conditions such that shared 
indulgence and shared abstinence yielded much higher levels of felt 
affiliation. An increase in perceived similarity mediated this process. 
Contrast analyses also showed that co-indulgence led to higher lev-
els of affiliation than co-abstinence and that this was mediated by re-
duced feelings of social anxiety. Among participants who indulged, 
co-indulgence also greatly enhanced the anticipated consumption 
experience. Co-indulgence led to significantly lower feelings of guilt 
which mediated the improved consumption experience.  
In study 2, participants (N=172) were again asked to imagine 
a shared self-control decision with a peer. In this study, participants 
encountered a tempting purchase opportunity while on a tight bud-
get. Participants imagined either a relatively expensive or inexpen-
sive temptation (high-severity vs. low-severity, counterbalanced) 
and were randomly presented with one of two decision scenarios 
(co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence).An ANOVA was conducted on 
the measure of affiliation using co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence and 
indulgence severity as between-subjects factors. Analysis revealed 
a significant interaction such that co-indulgence resulted in higher 
feelings of affiliation when the indulgence severity was low, while 
the opposite was true when the severity was high. Examining the 
contrasts, the difference between co-indulgence and co-abstinence 
was significant in the low severity condition, while in the high se-
verity (expensive) condition, the difference between co-abstinence 
and co-indulgence was marginally significant. A bootstrap analysis 
reveals that guilt significantly mediates the relationship between the 
interaction variable (co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence and cheap vs. 
expensive) and affiliation. The less guilt a consumer feels, or the 
more guilt a consumer avoids, the more socially beneficial a shared 
experience will be.
Study 3 (N=153) examines a three-way interaction between 
participant choice (indulge vs. restrain), peer choice (indulge vs. re-
strain), and peer familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar). A three-way 
ANOVA on affiliation using familiarity, participant choice and peer 
choice as factors was significant. Co-indulgence resulted in great-
er affiliation than even co-abstinence for familiar peers, whereas 
matched behaviors mattered for unfamiliar individuals, but there was 
no significant difference between co-indulgence and co-abstinence. 
Our research demonstrates the effects of shared self-control de-
cisions on interpersonal affiliation and product experience. We show 
social and experiential benefits to self-control failure and elucidate 
the conditions under which this applies. Self-control is not always a 
social positive. Consumers do at times seek for and appreciate moral 
support, but in the right circumstances they also value camaraderie 
in crime.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumer acculturation is on the rise and of interest to consum-
er researchers (Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; Chytkova 
2011; Dion, Sitz, and Remy 2011; Fernandez, Veer, and Lastovicka 
2011; Oswald 1999; Peñaloza 1994; Vihalemm and Keller 2011). Al-
though this research stream’s overarching goal is “to understand and 
conceptualize the various forces that define, allow, facilitate, or com-
plicate consumer acculturation under specific cultural conditions” 
(Luedicke 2011, 238), prior studies have predominantly focused on 
the micro-processes of individual migrants’ cultural adaptation. A 
few notable exceptions include works on how migrants succumb to 
institutional domination (Üstüner and Holt 2007) or escape from it 
by using the market as a form of empowerment (Üstüner and Thomp-
son 2012). 
Hence, previous research has devoted surprisingly little atten-
tion to the role of macro-institutional variables. In line with this 
year’s conference theme, this session aims to unpack various institu-
tional forces that make a difference in migrants’ market acculturation 
through four mature empirical studies (see Appendix 1 for project 
overview). The papers investigate how different institutional forces 
(market-mediated ethnic myths, market agents’ imagined ethnic com-
munities, political mergers, and multicultural environments) lead to 
different manifestations of nostalgia, commonly defined as “a sen-
timental longing for the past” (Holbrook and Schindler 1991). The 
authors then examine how these forms of context-driven nostalgia 
impact various migrant groups’ market acculturation practices and 
experiences. Collectively, the projects show that different institution-
al conditions of acculturation 1) lead to distinct and previously unex-
plored manifestations of nostalgia, theorized here as performances, 
enchantments and discourses; 2) impact social networks with which 
to share nostalgic consumptions and feelings; and 3) result in unusual 
patterns of acculturation. 
In detail, Veresiu and Giesler first conceptualize ethnic entre-
preneurship as the strategic actions of migrant consumers to enact 
and embody the host culture’s market-mediated images of nostal-
gic otherness in order to ensure a smoother and speedier accultura-
tion process, based on an ethnography of Roma refugees in Toronto, 
Canada. Second, Visconti and Stamboli focus on how institutional 
agents participate in the construction of an ethnic imagined commu-
nity mediated by nostalgic market discourses in France’s Turkish mi-
grant community. Third, Brunk and Hartmann discuss how nostalgic 
enchantment for the former GDR’s consumer culture may actually 
inhibit or even reverse acculturation of East-German consumers who 
have become migrants in their own country following Germany’s po-
litical merger. Fourth, Emontspool and Kjeldgaard show that instead 
of exclusively promoting cosmopolitan detachment from home cul-
ture, multicultural environments, such as the one found in Brussels, 
can encourage displays of national belonging, expressed in nostalgic 
discourses about mundane and global products. 
This session is relevant since it expands the theoretical bound-
aries of consumer acculturation by exploring macro-institutional 
forces and nostalgic sources. Secondly, it involves four empirical 
projects employing diverse data collection methods (depth-inter-
views, ethnography, netnography, and introspection). Thirdly, it has 
the potential to appeal to a broad audience interested in the interac-
tions between macro (institutional variables and ethnicity) and micro 
(identity and personal emotions) dimensions in consumer research.
Fiddler on the Street: How Roma Refugees Enact Host 
Cultural Images of Nostalgic Otherness
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It looks like there are two big reactions: the very exotic re-
action like oh wow the Gypsies make their dreams, it’s like 
the life of freedom and stuff or there is also the thing with us 
being thieves and you know like we take the chickens and 
steal the stuff. So you find the two same stories, but it looks 
like at some point we are accepted here [Toronto, Canada]. 
Here we can make a living, we are not living in extremely 
poor conditions or anything like that, maybe a bit like out 
of the society, but it looks like we have more power and 
we have more space and we don’t have to live in camps. 
(Gabriela, 52, Roma Refugee, Freelance dancer, in Toronto 
for 4 years) 
Gabriela’s reflexive remark illustrates the important institution-
al influence of local stereotypes and attitudes about ethnic minorities 
on the lived experiences of migrant consumers. The Canadian host 
culture commonly defines “Gypsy” as either a lifestyle or a distinct 
nomadic ethnicity existing predominantly in Europe (Lee 1998a). 
More specifically, overview studies (e.g., Csepeli and Simon 2003; 
Liégeois 1994; Rehfisch 1975) consistently distinguish between two 
main market-mediated myths of the Roma ethnicity that dominate 
popular opinion: one characterizing these individuals as passionate, 
mysterious, and talented “Gypsy” artisans and the other typecasting 
them as thieving, lazy, and dirty “Gypsies.” Previous consumer ac-
culturation research has explored in detail the processes and agents 
through which migrant individuals socialized into a different (mi-
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nority) culture adapt to a new (dominant) consumer culture (e.g., 
Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; Chytkova 2011; Dion, 
Sitz, and Remy 2011; Fernandez, Veer, and Lastovicka 2011; Lu-
edicke 2011; Oswald 1999; Peñaloza 1994; Üstüner and Holt 2007; 
Vihalemm and Keller 2011).  
How host cultural images about ethnic populations shape con-
sumer acculturation experiences and practices has received much 
less attention, however. To redress this key theoretical oversight, as 
well as empirically engage Luedicke’s recent (2011, 730) call for 
“consumer researchers to explore the reflexive interactions between 
local and migrant groups that compete for (or share) consumption 
spaces, services, objects, symbols, and natural resources,” we con-
ducted an in-depth ethnographic investigation of the interactions be-
tween Roma refugees (colloquially known as “Gypsies”) and local 
residents in Toronto, Canada. Overall we found that Roma refugees, 
like Gabriela, are not only well aware of the two opposing ethnic 
stereotypes circulating throughout popular culture, but also strategi-
cally employ enactments of the market-mediated nostalgic image of 
the artisan “Gypsy” through everyday consumption-related activities 
in order to actively dispel the negative myth of the thieving “Gypsy.”
To better understand this phenomenon, we draw on perfor-
mance theory (e.g., Schechner 2006). According to performance 
theory scholars, ethnicity can be seen as a performance since it 
involves patterns of behavior that have been socially constructed, 
learned, practiced and revised by a certain group for a particular 
audience, over time. More specifically, this approach “underscores 
ethnicity as behavior, as a social skill of manipulating, masking, 
and assuming various cultural characteristics through innumerable 
symbolic activities. In this sense, one can view ethnicity as perfor-
mance” (Staub 1989). Building on the idea that ethnicity is a type of 
performance, we develop the construct of ethnic entrepreneurship, 
which we define as the strategic actions of migrant consumers to 
enact and embody the positive images of nostalgic otherness from 
the host culture in order to ensure a smoother transition into the new 
consumer cultures. In particular, our findings section unpacks how 
Roma refugees in Toronto strategically employ enactments of the 
market-mediated nostalgic image of the artisan “Gypsy” to 1) dispel 
negative competing images of Roma as lazy, thieving, and dirty, 2) 
ensure ethnic acceptance is increased, 3) enable economic gains, and 
4) allow for a smoother consumer acculturation process by resolving 
tensions between dominant and minority cultures.  
Methodologically we used an ethnographic approach that com-
bines both a discursive level (related historical documents and cul-
tural materials from mass media channels and online), as well as a 
practical level (non-participant observation and in-depth, semi-struc-
tured interviews with 18 Roma refugees, aged 16-75, 56% female, 
16 locals working in the immigration service industry, aged 25-65, 
56% female, and 9 local residents, aged 25-61, 33% female). We an-
alyzed the complete dataset (34 interviews, 1125 pages of historical 
and cultural data) using the hermeneutical analysis mode of tacking 
back and forth between data and theory (Thompson 1997).
This paper anticipates making two contributions. First, we ex-
pand the consumer acculturation literature by unpacking the impor-
tant institutional role of the host culture’s market-mediated ethnic 
stereotypes on migrant consumer acculturation practices and experi-
ences. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on marketplace 
mythologies by exploring the impact of ethnic myths on the identity 
construction projects of migrants. 
Generations at the Mirror: First and Second Generation 
of Turkish Consumers’ Home Country Nostalgia
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Migrants, as well as their children, typically live in a ‘hyper-
ethnicized’ world. Institutional pressures coming from the outside—
the dominant society as well as the ethnic communities (Zouaghi and 
Darpy’s ‘ideal us’; 2006)—and even from internal confrontations 
with family members—for example, across generations (Visconti 
and Napolitano 2009)—constantly reinvigorate the ethnic discourse. 
Hence, migrants are not allowed to overcome their often presumed 
ethnic diversity, and the way they behave and consume is perma-
nently interpreted in the light of such (self)attributed difference. Elif, 
a Turkish second generation living in Lille, voices this institutional 
hurdle: “Look, have you seen how Turkish people are represented by 
French television? Think of what integration means. Are we willing 
to integrate by watching this stuff? No! We do on our own...”
Elaborating upon Benedict Anderson’s (1983) idea of ‘imag-
ined community’, we claim that ethnic discourses produced by insti-
tutional agents represent powerful imagined communities, invisible 
as much as immanent in the life of migrants and indigenous people. 
This idea complies with Jenkins’ (2002) analysis of the ‘imagined’ 
but not the ‘imaginary’ nature of ethnicity. As Jenkins observes, eth-
nicity is constructed within an institutional scenario—thus, it repre-
sents its agents’ ‘imagination’—but its invisibility and immateriality 
do not make it ‘imaginary’, that is, without social consequences for 
the people producing and embodying that imagination. In a nutshell, 
fostered by increased mediatisation and connectivity, imagination 
appears today as a form of ‘organized social practice’ (Appadurai 
1990/2011).
By acknowledging a large array of institutional agents (domi-
nant society, consumer culture, the mediascapes, ethnic communi-
ties, families, groups of peers, and marketers of different ethnicities), 
our paper attacks two main outcomes of these agents’ imaginative 
production: 1) the broad category of ethnicity, here largely meant 
as ‘Turkishness’; and 2) the more specific category of generational 
ethnicity, under the assumption that also different generations might 
constitute different ‘imagined communities’, which often receive 
specific juridical recognition within a nation. More precisely, we ob-
serve how first and second generations of Turkish in France refer to, 
elaborate, and use feelings of ‘home country nostalgia— “the psy-
chic suffering caused by expatriation” (Robert-Demontrond 2001, 
319)—in the market. By home sickness we mean an obsession to be 
(back) to a different physical space, cultural context, social network, 
market, and institutional setting. As our data shows, these nested 
references combine factual as well as imaginary traits, and can be 
addressed specifically to migrants’ country of origin or more broadly 
to a generic ‘elsewhere’. Our aims are threefold. First, we want to 
relate home country nostalgia to institutional agents and unpack 
their interplay. Second, we wish to mark differences across first and 
second generations in terms of institutional forces at play and their 
impact on nostalgic discourses and consumption practices. Third, we 
contextualize former findings on migrants’ acculturation in order to 
inspect the effects of home country nostalgia—as mediated by insti-
tutional agents—for first and second generations’ acculturation.
Empirically, the work relies upon an ethnography on 18 Turkish 
informants (7 first generations and 11 second generations) around 
the city of Lille during a period of 18 months. Methods include depth 
interviews, participant observation and observation of indirect indi-
cators (e.g., indicators of social and economic capital), collection of 
factual data, and photography. Interpretation is granted by iterative 
data analysis and field/theory alternation (Thompson 1997).
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First, we demonstrate that nostalgia is seldom, if at all, possible 
in the absence of institutional pressures. Data reveals that nostalgia 
is often presentable as ‘imposed nostalgia’. Consistently with Emon-
stopool and Kjeldgaard in this session, we also observe that the dom-
inant society expects Turkish people to be homesick (Matt 2007). We 
argue their expectation reflects both imaginative stereotyping about 
‘enduring ethnicity’ and opportunities to consume Turkish difference 
made visible by nostalgic market behaviors in an attempt of ‘cross-
over dreaming’ (Grier, Brumbaugh, and Thornton 2006). Second, we 
show that while the dominant society and the ethnic communities 
exert highest institutional pressures on the first generation, the first 
generation and the group of peers exert substantial pressures on the 
second generation. As such, Turkish parents’ nostalgic consumptions 
are more displayed beyond the family whereas children’s nostalgic 
consumptions are more domestic. Finally, by being institution-
ally stimulated, nostalgia and nostalgic-related consumptions play 
a major role in acculturation. In order to organize different effects 
of imposed home country nostalgia on first and second generations’ 
acculturation, we identify two conceptual dimensions: 1) individual 
versus social nostalgia; and 2) nostalgic consumptions having a de-
fensive versus an offensive function against institutional pressures. 
By crossing these two dimensions, four different ends of nostalgic 
consumptions appear (cfr. Appendix 1).
Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that home 
country nostalgia is not only the consequence of hostile or favor-
ing institutional agents (Stern 1992) that stimulate a ‘myth of return’ 
(Akhtar 1996) but that it can become an additional institutional force 
whenever external agents expect migrants to feel homesick: from an 
institutionally-led to an institutionally-leading nostalgia manifested 
via the market. Second, in its defensive manifestations, home coun-
try nostalgia is not an expression of ‘desire for a place’ (i.e. being 
there) but of ‘desire for a nonplace’ (i.e. being elsewhere) that are 
objectified through material possessions. Ideally, the home coun-
try becomes the context in which migrants are able to forget their 
ethnicity, and thus “subvert the imagined world of the official mind 
and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them” (Appadurai 
1990/2011, 285). Third, we demonstrate that home country nostalgia 
is not only a side effect of acculturation but a force able to orient 
market acculturation effectively.
Locals as Migrants in German Unification and 
Acculturation: How Nostalgia Enchants the Former East 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer acculturation is commonly understood as a process 
of physical movement and the resulting adaptation to the cultural 
environment in one country by persons from another country (Pe-
ñaloza 1994). However, acculturation processes may take place even 
without migration. This project analyses such consumer accultura-
tion instantiated in the specific institutional context of Germany’s 
political unification in 1989. With the fall of the wall, consumers in 
former East-Germany were—metaphorically—‘being crossed by the 
border’ becoming local migrants exposed to Western consumer cul-
ture and an inescapable process of cultural learning and adaptation.
This particular acculturation process is intertwined with a spe-
cific form of nostalgia. Emically glossed by the term ‘Ostalgie’—a 
combination of Ost (east) and Nostalgie (nostalgia); or Eastalgia—
we witness an increasing nostalgic revival of East-German brands 
and consumptionscapes. Although East-Germans considered their 
products of low quality as well as unattractive back then and aspired 
Western brands as the ‘real things’ (Veenis 1999), today, many of 
these previously disliked commodities are cherished.
While public discourse has interpreted Eastalgia primarily as a 
longing for East-German life, anthropological literature suggests that 
the stereotypical image of the eastalgic East-German is an invention 
by West-German media to cope with Germany’s past (Boyer 2001; 
2006). This suggests that Eastalgic consumption exceeds notions of 
being a mere retro phenomenon (Brown 1999; Brown, Sherry, and 
Kozinets 2003). Underneath its retro-coat, Eastalgia represents a re-
source for coping with acculturation processes in the institutional 
context of political re-unification. Given that we know surprisingly 
little about these deeper-routed cultural functions of nostalgia, this 
study explores and illustrates the sources, roles, and underlying func-
tions of Eastalgia as a specific form of nostalgic consumption vis-à-
vis acculturation processes for ‘local migrants’.
The current consumer cultural dynamics are rooted in the past 
and lived today, hence methodologically, the historical and contem-
porary context necessitates various materials. Our research starts 
with seven guided introspections (Wallendorf and Brucks 1993) of 
‘local migrants’ reflecting upon the experienced changes and various 
aspects of their life before, during, and after the unification using 
a written essay format. Introspections were followed by long inter-
views (McCracken 1988) including photo elicitation and review of 
historical materials where possible. Moreover, netnography of face-
book fanpages, blogs and commercial sites relating to Eastalgia, as 
well as newspaper articles and documentaries complement our mate-
rial. This combination of methods allows a deeper understanding of 
the ‘then’ and ‘now’: the symptom, its manifestations, and its roots.
Our theoretical approach is inspired by literature on enchant-
ment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment, discussing how consum-
ers carry the burden of enchanting their lives (Ritzer 2005; Firat and 
Venkatesh 1995) and how they turn towards shelters of collective 
enchantment projects (Arnould, Price, and Otnes 1999). While en-
chantment has previously been portrayed as instantiated in religios-
ity (Muñiz and Schau 2005), magic (Arnould et al. 1999), utopia 
(Kozinets 2001), or pastoral myth (Press and Arnould 2011), there 
are explicit links between nostalgia and enchantment: Brown et al. 
(2003) observe that retro-brand meanings are channeled through 
enchantment as storied forms of nostalgic myths. Building on this, 
we frame nostalgia as a form of (re)enchantment that is collectively 
achieved and utilized by consumers to deal with various aspects of 
the acculturation process, and ultimately with dominated, modern 
cultural conditions in the context of (macro) institutional changes
Our findings contextualize Eastalgia across three cultural-his-
torical phases of the re-unification process: (1) the ‘unification hon-
eymoon phase,’ characterized by euphoria and hyper-consumption of 
Western brands experienced as enchanting, but also by eradication, 
discarding, and de-valuing anything East-German (Berdahl 1999; 
Veenis 1999); (2) the ‘hangover phase’ where Western consumer 
culture is no longer capable of enchanting, a realization facilitated 
by the dominated conditions under which political changes occurred, 
mass unemployment, and shattered dreams of ubiquitous prosper-
ity; and (3) the ‘recovery phase’ during which Eastalgia emerges as 
a symptom of idealization and re-enchantment of the formerly de-
spised products and consumption experiences through storied forms 
of myth about life and consumption in the former GDR. Thus, we re-
veal how Eastalgia mediates re-enchantment in three ways (ideologi-
cal, re-enacted, re-appropriated) and unveil the different functions 
of eastalgic (re-)enchantment in acculturation processes: Eastalgia 
inhibits, reverses, and facilitates acculturation. 
 This paper aims to make the following contributions to existing 
literature. By investigating the novel context of ‘locals as migrants’, 
this study expands our understanding of consumer acculturation, the 
cultural functions of nostalgia in these adaptation processes, as well 
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as conceptually links nostalgia and (re)enchantment. We find that 
Eastalgia is both a symptom and coping strategy for dealing with 
problematic and contested acculturation and thus acts as a media-
tor for re-enchantment in dominated, modern cultural conditions. 
Our findings demonstrate how the sources for the manifestation of 
nostalgic enchantment are multiple, as are the consequences for ac-
culturation. Nostalgic consumer projects can play a central role in 
facilitating, inhibiting or even reversing acculturation processes. By 
offering evidence for reverse acculturation, our study supports Lu-
edicke’s paper (2011) in that acculturation should no longer be seen 
as a progressive, directed process but rather as a complex recursive 
system of adaptation by migrants and local consumers. 
Asserting Integration through Nostalgic Discourses: 
Acculturation to an International Community
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The concept of nostalgia has played an important role in con-
sumer research for the last decades. Its main conceptualization is one 
of “bitter-sweet” feelings of longing for a past considered as better 
than the current situation, which leads consumers to prefer products 
reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; 
Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent re-
search points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ 
adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 
2011), nuancing nostalgia’s initial link to negative experiences of 
homesickness (Matt 2007).
Increased migration around the world due to globalization has 
led to a diversification of migrants’ socio-economic and geographi-
cal profiles, which diversifies the cultural influences during accul-
turation. As a large share of research has however focused mainly on 
permanent, low-skilled labor migration between two cultures, inves-
tigating the role of nostalgia in consumer acculturation of more di-
versified types of migrants is therefore timely. Hence, the aim of this 
paper is to investigate individuals’ recourse to nostalgic consumption 
discourses during multicultural encounters. 
In this context, the discursive side of nostalgia is particularly 
important; migrants resort to different discourses about food con-
sumption as indicator of social identity in one context or the other 
(Luna, Ringberg, and Peracchio 2008; Oswald 1999). In particular, 
cultural reflexivity, that is, conscious reflection on one’s culture, im-
pacts consumption practices (Askegaard, Kjeldgaard, and Arnould 
2009). As Emontspool and Kjeldgaard (2012) indicate, consumption 
discourses in multicultural communities can exacerbate this cultural 
reflexivity, which then becomes a “conscious consideration and en-
actment of a cultural identity in order to comprehensively and ad-
equately represent cultural affiliation” (Emontspool and Kjeldgaard 
2012, 229). The authors show how nostalgic discourses can then il-
lustrate migrants’ cross-cultural consumption experiences. 
What has not been discussed until now, is how institutional dis-
courses may induce this behavior. Indeed, as Luedicke (2011) indi-
cates, more focus is needed on the role of host cultural institutions in 
order to fully investigate migrant consumers’ relationship to markets, 
as well as different outcomes of their adaptation to these new con-
sumption environments (Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; 
Peñaloza 1994). Acculturation is not only an individual, psychologi-
cal change; individuals’ surroundings greatly impact it. In this paper, 
we therefore propose an exploration of nostalgic acculturation dis-
courses, asking how consumers integrate institutional expectations 
in those discourses. 
To address this issue, the paper firstly analyses 17 in-depth 
interviews (McCracken 1988) with migrants of different socioeco-
nomic and ethnic origins, and investigates consumer acculturation 
and nostalgia in this population. Secondly, this study draws on inter-
views undertaken with young migrants living in shared an apartment 
in Brussels, to focus on cross-cultural discourses, as well as on per-
ceptions of institutionalized discourses within these communities. 
The chosen sample is particularly representative of multicultural 
environments of higher cultural capital, as Brussels welcomes large 
numbers of migrants due to the presence of the European institutions, 
which provide strong institutional discourses about cultural identity. 
The findings of this study illustrate the emergence of nostalgic 
discourses that are less due to the acculturation process in itself, but 
rather follow upon migrants’ impression that nostalgic discourses 
are expected from them. The respondents relate that during social 
contact, other migrants express curiosity as to the respondents’ coun-
try of origin. In consequence, they feel required to express national 
pride and longing to their culture of origin, although they don’t nec-
essarily feel nostalgic themselves. Nonetheless, they adopt nostalgic 
discourses about a large range of consumption items. 
In an international community as exists in Brussels, nostalgia 
discourses can thus display integration in multicultural societies 
rather than longing for a lost past. This finding finds an explanation 
in the differentiation make by Cannon and Yaprak (2002) between 
local and global cosmopolitans. While global cosmopolitans, who 
have no attachment to particular places, consider nostalgia a failure 
(Thompson and Tambyah 1999), our findings show the compatibil-
ity of attachment to the country of origin with multiculturalism as 
promoted by supranational organizations such as the EU, influenc-
ing local cosmopolitans’ consumption discourses and encouraging 
nostalgic discourse in multicultural settings.   
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APPENDIX 1
Project overview: forces, contexts and conceptual contributions
Institutional forces
Acculturation 
context Type of Nostalgia 
Manifestations of nostalgia and 
impact on acculturation
Veresiu and 
Giesler
Dominant market-medi-
ated ethnic stereotypes
Strategic Accul-
turation 
Performed Nos-
talgia
Nostalgic performances as a survival 
tactic and type of ethnic entrepre-
neurship
Visconti and 
Stamboli
Pull forces of migration 
(migrants for job or fam-
ily rejoining)
Assimilation, 
acculturation, 
resistance, swap-
ping
(Imposed) home 
country nostalgia
Nostalgia as survival; sewing; con-
testation of the imaginary commu-
nity; and nurturing
Generational forces (first 
vs second generations) Reculturation
Inherited and 
imposed home 
country nostalgia
Nostalgia as sewing; and nurturing
Brunk and 
Hartmann
Political merger (ac-
culturation in absence of 
immigration or displace-
ment)
Non-migratory 
acculturation
Nostalgia as en-
chantment
Ideological, re-enacted and re-
appropriated meanings of enchanted 
nostalgia can facilitate, inhibit or 
even reverse acculturation 
Emontspool 
and 
Kjeldgaard
Multicultural environ-
ment
Reflexive ac-
culturation
Discursive nos-
talgia
Reverse process: Reflexive accultur-
ation leads to developing nostalgic 
discourses (something expected by 
others)
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Mindsets are cognitive schemas (Oyserman et al. 2009), activat-
ed in one situation, which persist and impact subsequent behaviors, 
judgments, and decisions. Despite the pervasive impact of mindsets, 
consumer researchers have only recently started to investigate their 
antecedents and consequences for consumers, integrate new findings 
with existing ones, and explore how mindsets affect the interaction 
among different actors in the marketplace.
How might purchasing different types of products activate dif-
ferent mindsets that impact subsequent decisions? Can activated 
mindsets change managers’ decisions and consumers’ interactions 
with others?  And what is the role of mindsets in people’s percep-
tions of bargains? The current session addresses these and related 
questions, and offers cutting-edge insights into the causes and role of 
mindsets in judgment and decision making. 
The first paper, by Khan et al., makes an important contribu-
tion by identifying a novel mindset that consumers develop while 
making purchases. It compares the cognitive consequences of mak-
ing hedonic versus utilitarian purchases and shows that purchasing 
hedonic products induces a justification mindset, which increases 
choice of easy-to-justify options in a subsequent situation. The sec-
ond paper, by Moorman et al., demonstrates that activating a com-
parative mindset not only increases managers’ likelihood of making 
hypothetical purchases but also elevates their spending levels in real 
business decisions. Thus, it generalizes the comparative mindset ef-
fect to manager decision making and extends the effect from choice 
to spending level. 
The next two papers explore different antecedents of a com-
petitive mindset and show the consequences of such a mindset in 
decision contexts that involve an interaction between consumers or 
between consumers and marketers. The paper by Roux et al. shows 
that a scarcity prime activates a competitive mindset that motivates 
people to pursue self-focused goals when interacting with others. 
The paper by Sela et al. suggests that the interactions between mar-
keters and consumers activate a competitive mindset, which leads 
consumers to attach higher value to offers that seem to fit them by 
coincidence, without the marketer’s intent, than to offers that were 
designed to fit their preferences. 
Considering the fundamental role of mindsets in consumer be-
havior and the variety of topics these talks cover, the session should 
be of interest to a broad set of audiences. Not only should it appeal to 
researchers working on judgment and decision making, choice, and 
cognition, but also to those who study social interactions, goals, and 
motivation more broadly.
Justification Mindset: How Hedonic versus Utilitarian 
Purchase Influences Subsequent Choice
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers make both hedonic and utilitarian choices. Gener-
ally, hedonic choices are guided by pleasure-seeking goals and are 
more pleasurable than utilitarian ones, which are often guided by 
functional needs (Alba and Williams 2013). Most literature in the he-
donic-utilitarian paradigm has focused on the decision processes by 
which consumers choose between such products (Dahl et al. 2003; 
Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Okada 
2005; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). However, whether choosing a 
hedonic or utilitarian item guides consumers’ subsequent preferences 
differently has remained under-studied (Mukhopadhyay and Johar 
2009; Dholakia et al. 2005). The question is important as growing 
research has documented sequential influences in decision-making 
(Novemsky and Dhar 2005; Dhar et al. 2007; Dhar and Simonson 
1999). In the current research, we examine how choosing a hedonic 
versus a utilitarian option affects subsequent choices by changing the 
reasoning process applied to the subsequent decisions.
We propose that buying a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) item induces 
a justification mindset. The proposition rests on findings that hedonic 
items often evoke guilt and are harder to justify (Okada 2005; Khan 
et al. 2005). Once a justification mindset is activated it may shift 
consumers’ focus in subsequent decisions from the attributes of the 
choice alternatives to the reasons that best support each alternative 
thereby encouraging easier-to-justify actions. A carryover effect of 
justification mindset is consistent with findings that when a mindset 
is evoked, it persists, guiding thought and behavior, even in unrelated 
tasks (Gollwitzer & Bayer 1999; Chandran and Morwitz 2005; Dhar 
et al. 2007). The framework of a justification mindset allows us to 
predict how a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) initial purchase (driver) can 
influence subsequent choices (target) in a seemingly diverse set of 
contexts.
We start by examining how hedonic (vs. utilitarian) driver af-
fects WTB (willingness-to-buy) of a target. Past research has shown 
that an initial purchase can increase the purchase likelihood of unre-
lated subsequent items (Dhar et al. 2007). If hedonic purchases in-
duce a justification mindset, then we predict that a hedonic (versus 
utilitarian) driver should attenuate purchase acceleration. Study 1 
tested this prediction by offering participants an opportunity to pur-
chase either a hedonic (potato chips), a utilitarian (notebook), or no 
driver item and noting the differences in WTB of a utilitarian tar-
get (Keychain) across these groups. As predicted, a utilitarian driver 
significantly increased (55.3%utilitarian vs. 35.7%control), and a hedonic 
driver directionally decreased (22.7%hedonic vs. 35.7%control) purchase 
of the target keychain compared to the control. Note that the reduc-
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tion in the subsequent purchases may be even more pronounced 
when the target is hedonic.
Study 2 tested a justification mindset account for the above 
findings by eliciting reasons for purchase of a target. In a justifica-
tion mindset people are likely to focus on the best reasons for their 
choice, hence asking for reasons should have no further effect. Thus, 
while asking for reasons should reduce purchase likelihood of the 
target after a utilitarian driver, it should have no significant impact 
after a hedonic driver, which is predicted to induce a justification 
mindset. As predicted, eliciting reasons had an effect when the driver 
was utilitarian (59%no-reasons vs. 25%reasons) but not when it was he-
donic (20%no-reasons vs. 17%reasons).
Besides WTB, a justification mindset should also affect the rel-
ative attractiveness of hedonic versus utilitarian options: consumers 
in justification mindset should be more likely to choose easier-to-
justify utilitarian items. We first examine this prediction for choice 
of the compromise option. A need to justify a choice should increase 
the share of a compromise option (Simonson 1989). Thus, we pre-
dict that the compromise effect would be more pronounced after a 
hedonic (vs. utilitarian) purchase. Study 3 participants were asked 
to choose between three digital cameras (target choice) involving 
a price-quality tradeoff. Participants either viewed choice-set ABC 
where B was the compromise option or BCD where B was a non-
compromise option. Prior to this choice, participants were either of-
fered to purchase a bag of potato chips (hedonic driver) or a notebook 
(utilitarian driver) or nothing (control). As predicted, compromise 
effect was not significantly different in the control and utilitarian 
driver conditions (32%no-driver vs. 27%utilitarin-driver) but almost doubled 
in the hedonic driver condition (32%no-driver vs. 53%hedonic-driver). 
Study 4 examined implications of a justification-mindset for a 
choice-set that contains only hedonic options. Goldsmith and Dhar 
(2009) show that extreme hedonic options may sometimes be easier 
to justify than moderately indulgent options as they offer a justifica-
tion of maximum goal attainment. Building on this, we predict that 
a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) driver would result in greater share of the 
most indulgent item from an all-hedonic choice-set. To provide fur-
ther support for the justification-mindset account we also examined 
an important individual difference relevant to purchase behavior. Rick 
et al. (2008) have shown that spendthrifts and tightwads differ sig-
nificantly in their experience of pain-of-paying. Differences in pain-
of-paying may partly determine the level of guilt people experience 
from hedonic purchases, such that spendthrifts may experience less 
guilt than tightwads. Hence, we predict that hedonic (vs. utilitarian) 
drivers may affect the subsequent behavior of tightwads more than 
spendthrifts. To test this idea we asked participants to imagine pur-
chasing an expensive pair of shoes either for work-wear (utilitarian 
driver) or for party-wear (hedonic driver). Next, they chose between 
two luxury vacations, one of which was relatively more indulgent. 
Finally, we measured spendthrift vs. tightwad tendencies. In addition 
to a main effect of driver-type (higher purchase of more indulgent 
resort after hedonic driver (50%hedonic-driver vs. 38% utilitarian-driver), and a 
main effect of consumer-type: higher purchase of the more indulgent 
resort by spendthrifts than tightwads (61% spendthrifts vs. 26% tightwads)) an 
interaction between driver-type and consumer-type emerged reveal-
ing higher choice of the more indulgent resort for tightwads after a 
hedonic driver (33%hedonic-driver vs. 15.9%utilitarian-driver) but no significant 
difference for the spendthrifts (62.2%hedonic-driver vs. 58.3%utilitarin-driver).
Our research contributes to hedonic-utilitarian literature and 
to the growing work on mindsets and their influences in sequential 
decision-making and stresses the importance of understanding con-
sumer purchases in the context of their consumption journey rather 
than as isolated decisions. 
The Comparative Mindset and Managerial Decision 
Making: Theory Extensions and Boundary Conditions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Previous research on the comparative mindset effect suggests 
that consumer purchases often involve three sequential steps (Xu and 
Wyer 2007; 2008). First, they decide whether-to-choose, then they 
decide which-to-choose, and finally, they implement the purchase. 
This sequence of steps also occurs in many managerial decisions in-
volving company purchase of products or services as well as in deci-
sions to spend on advertising or strategic initiatives. Extending pre-
vious framework in consumer research, we suggest that after making 
whether-to-choose and which-to-choose decisions, managers often 
need to decide how much money to spend (i.e., deciding spending 
level). Because these steps are often pursued sequentially, activating 
a comparative mindset, which disposes managers to engage in the 
which-to-choose stage without first considering whether-to-choose, 
could not only increase managers’ choice likelihood (H1) but also 
elevate their spending levels (H3). Moreover, this effect is mediated 
by reduced weighting of negative product information at the decision 
stage (H2). 
Study 1 manipulated comparative mindset by asking partici-
pants to state a preference for one animal from twenty pairs of ani-
mals (elephants vs. hippos, kangaroos vs. zebras, etc.). In the con-
trol condition, they solved twenty word-completion problems about 
animal names (e.g., __ u __ __ er __ ly, H __ p __ __, etc.). Then, 
participants were asked to imagine that they were the Vice President 
for a company and were planning to buy computers for their compa-
ny. Based on information about two computers, participants decided 
whether they would “Purchase Computer A,” “Purchase Computer 
B,” or “Defer Choice and Search for Other Models.” As predicted, 
participants in the mindset condition were more likely to purchase 
one of the computers rather than deferring choice than those in the 
control condition.
Study 2 explores the processes through which a comparative 
mind-set influences choice. In the mindset condition, participants 
compared six pairs of ads on a range of criteria (e.g., “Which picture 
is more likely to prompt consumers to click through on a website?”). 
In the control condition, participants rated six ads on the same cri-
teria (e.g., “Is this picture likely to prompt the consumer to click 
through on a website?”). Then, participants made purchase decisions 
about computers as in study 1. In addition, they reported how much 
they thought about the computers’ strengths, weaknesses, pluses, mi-
nuses, strong points, weak points, etc., when making their decisions. 
The results replicated the findings in study 1, and show that reduced 
thinking about the negative aspects, but not increased thinking about 
the positive aspects, mediated the mindset effect. 
Study 3 used the same manipulations as study 2 did. In the 
dependent task, all participants were asked to play the role of Vice 
President of a computer manufacturing company and make next-
year advertising spending decisions for the company. Based on the 
descriptions of two computers that their company was selling, par-
ticipants decided among three options: “Advertise Model A,” “Ad-
vertise Model B,” or “Advertise Neither Model and Save the Bud-
get.” Contingent on their choice, those who chose to advertise either 
Model A or Model B were asked to decide the percentage of budget 
they wanted to spend to advertise the chosen model and the per-
centage that they wanted to save. Results indicated that participants 
in the comparative mind-set condition not only were more likely to 
choose to advertise one of the models, but also committed a greater 
percentage of the budget to spending than their counterparts did in 
the control condition.
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Two quasi-experiments examine the comparative mindset ef-
fect on real business decisions and the moderating conditions sur-
rounding this effect. We select presidential election years as a con-
text that should stimulate a comparative mindset among managers 
because the primaries and general election create an intensive period 
of comparing political candidates. We hypothesize that activating 
a comparative mindset during presidential election years increases 
marketers’ advertising spending levels relative to a control group 
(H4). Moreover, this effect will be weakened when the economy is 
in a recession (H5), and will be amplified when the manager’s com-
pany has higher profits (H6). Both economic recession and company 
profits are operationalizations of decision scrutiny, which defines the 
extent to which people make cost/benefit tradeoffs in decisions.  Fi-
nally, this effect will be amplified when the manager’s company is 
located in a swing state (H7) because political campaigns are more 
intensive in these states, and therefore, should enhance the acces-
sibility of the comparative mindset. 
The first quasi-experiment tests H4 by using a multiple time se-
ries quasi-experimental control group design in which we compare a 
sample of firms headquartered in the U.S. to a control group of firms 
headquartered outside the U.S., assuming that managers of non-U.S. 
firms are influenced less by the comparative mind-set induced by 
the presidential election. The dependent variable is the advertising 
spending data pulled from Compustat during the period 1950-2011. 
The results show that only managers from U.S. firms, but not manag-
ers from international firms, spent more on advertising in presiden-
tial election years.
The second quasi-experiment tests a set of moderating vari-
ables among firms in the U.S. This result indicates a main effect of 
the presidential election effect. Consistent with H5, we observe that 
the interaction of Election*Recession is negative and significant, 
indicating that the comparative mind-set effect associated with the 
presidential election weakens during tough economic times. The in-
teraction of Election*Firm_Profit, on the other hand, is positive and 
significant, indicating that when managers’ companies are more prof-
itable, the effect of the comparative mind-set strengthens. This sup-
ports H6. We also found a two-way interaction of Election*Swing_
State, showing that the effect of the comparative mind-set associated 
with the presidential election strengthens when the state associated 
with the manager’s company headquarter is a swing state. This sup-
ports H7. We exclude the alternative explanation that these effects 
are driven by increased ad price in election years.
In sum, this research extends the influence of comparative 
mindset to spending level decisions among managers, explores the 
underlying mechanism, and identifies the boundary conditions. In 
addition, this study shows that the comparative mindset influences 
not only hypothetical purchase and advertising decisions, but also 
business spending decisions in the real world.
Competitive Mindset: Does Scarcity Call for Selfishness?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Scarcity is a prevalent condition that characterizes human ex-
istence. Mankind has regularly experienced periods of famine and 
draught (Chakravarthy and Booth 2004), modern economies often 
must cope with economic recessions (Griskevicius et al. 2013) and 
even in resource-rich environments it is common to encounter cues 
that emphasize the limited nature of products and resources (Cialdini 
2009; Gitlin 2007). As a consequence, consumers often think about, 
worry about and discuss scarcity-related concerns (Twist and Barker 
2006). However, in spite of the prevalence of cues and cognitions 
related to scarcity, little is known about the psychological processes 
that result when the concept of scarcity is activated in the mind of the 
consumer, and further what implications those processes might have 
for decision making (Shah et al., 2011).
This research investigates how activating the concept of scar-
city affects consumers’ propensity to behave selfishly in subsequent, 
unrelated tasks. We draw from research in social and evolutionary 
psychology (Hill et al. 2012; Griskevicius et al. 2013) to predict that 
when the concept of scarcity is activated, people’s decision mak-
ing will be guided by a focus on advancing their own welfare, rela-
tive to that of others. We argue that this occurs due to an underlying 
shift towards a competitive mindset. Our theoretical framework also 
predicts that activating the concept of scarcity can cause people to 
become more generous with others, but only in settings where the as-
sociated benefits to the self are highlighted (e.g., charitable giving in 
order to gain status, Griskevicius, Tybur, and van den Bergh 2010). 
We test these predictions in five studies. In all studies, par-
ticipants are first randomly assigned to either a scarcity prime or a 
neutral prime condition. We employ three different manipulations 
to prime the concept of scarcity (a listing task, episodic recall and 
a semantic priming task) and find convergent results supporting our 
predictions. Study 1 tested for the proposed main effect of prim-
ing scarcity on selfish behavior. After the priming task, participants 
were asked to evaluate the acceptability of an immoral behavior that 
benefited the self, yet came at a detriment to society (tax fraud). In 
line with our predictions, participants primed with scarcity rated tax 
fraud more acceptable (Mcontrol=3.10 vs. Mscarcity=4.23; F(1, 88)=4.79; 
p=.034). 
Study 2 tested whether a competitive mindset mediates the 
effect of scarcity on selfish behavior. After the priming task, par-
ticipants were given a real donation choice: the option to keep vs. 
donate $1 of their compensation to a charity. Next, among several 
filler scales, participants were given the Hypercompetitive Attitude 
Scale (Ryckmam et al. 1990), which was included as a measure of 
a competitive mindset. In line with our predictions, participants 
primed with scarcity were more likely to keep the money (β=-1.21; 
p=.054). They were also more competitive (β=.58; p=.009) and this 
competitive tendency had a negative effect on donation rate (β=-
1.04; p=.035). Most importantly, the direct effect of scarcity on self-
profitable behavior was not significant when an agentic orientation 
was added to the model (p=.29; 95% CI [-2.03;-.03]; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). 
In order to provide convergent evidence that activating the 
concept of scarcity makes individuals more focused on the self and, 
hence, more selfish, study 3 also tested whether it made them less 
focused on others, and thus reduced their communal orientation 
(Frimer et al., 2011). After the priming task, participants completed 
the Communion Management scale (Paulhus and Trapnell, 2008), 
which assesses dissimulation on communal attributes. In line with 
our prediction, activating the concept of scarcity significantly de-
creased participants’ communal tendencies as compared to the con-
trol (Mcontrol=6.9 vs. Mscarcity=5.6; F(1, 263)=5.11; p=.025).
Studies 4 and 5 tested for boundary conditions to the observed 
effects. Specifically, study 4 tested whether exposure to scarcity-
related cues promotes a strategic response, by increasing selfish be-
havior only when the behavior is directly self-profitable, instead of 
simply leading to a generalized, irrational desire to hoard resources. 
To test this, after the priming task, participants played either a dicta-
tor or an ultimatum game. The interaction between the scarcity and 
the game manipulations was significant (F(1, 187)=6.56; p=.011). 
In the context of the dictator game, wherein retaining more money 
leads to more self-profit, scarcity significantly increased the amount 
of money participants retained for themselves (Mcontrol=$6.17 vs. Ms-
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carcity=$7.06; F(1, 187)=4.78; p=.030). However, in the context of the 
ultimatum game, wherein retaining more money can lead to reduc-
tions in self-profit, scarcity had no effect on the amount of money 
retained (Mcontrol=$5.96 vs. M scarcity=$5.47; F(1, 187)=2.09; p=.150). 
Study 5 tested whether priming scarcity can promote other-
profitable behavior when such behavior is framed as directly ben-
efiting the self. After the priming task, participants indicated their 
gift giving intention and their willingness to pay for a gift designed 
to thank a helpful friend, which were standardized and averaged to 
form a composite measure of generosity. The interaction between 
the scarcity and the self-benefit manipulations was significant (F(1, 
141)=5.55; p=.02). When gift giving was not framed as providing 
any clear benefit to the self, participants’ generosity did not differ 
between the scarcity and the control condition (Mscarcity=-.18; Mneu-
tral=.01; F(1, 138)=.89; p>.3). However, when gift giving was framed 
as providing a clear benefit to the self, scarcity increased partici-
pants’ generosity (Mscaricty=.29; Mneutral=-.15; F(1, 141)=5.87; p=.017).
This paper sheds light on the heretofore unknown consequences 
of priming the concept of scarcity on selfishness. Across five studies, 
we demonstrate that scarcity activates a competitive mindset, which 
in turn motivates people to pursue self-focused goals through selfish 
means. This suggests that desperate times may indeed call for selfish 
measures.
Beating the Market: Competitive Mindset and the Allure 
of Unintended Value
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often encounter marketing offers that can potential-
ly be construed as valuable opportunities, such as products on sale, 
loyalty programs, rebate offers, and various promotions. However, 
the mere fact that an offer is presented or framed as a bargain is often 
not sufficient to generate consumers’ subjective belief that the offer 
actually represents superior value for them. While a great deal of 
research has examined factors that influence value assessment, the 
factors that produce subjective perceptions of bargain have remained 
rather elusive. 
We propose that one important determinant of deal perception is 
the degree to which an offer appears more valuable than presumably 
intended by the marketer. In particular, consumers’ belief that the 
marketer has not fully factored-in their willingness-to-pay or the util-
ity they derive from the promoted product tends to create the (mis)
perception of unintended consumer surplus; this, in turn, enhances 
the likelihood that the offer will be seen as valuable. We further pro-
pose that the tendency to act on such perceived bargains reflects in 
large part a competitive mindset where consumers are driven by a 
desire to outsmart the market and obtain a better value than intended 
by the marketer (Ratner and Miller 2001; Wright 1986). 
Thus, subjective perceptions of bargain and the action ten-
dencies they invoke depend on consumers’ belief that the offer is 
valuable for them without the marketer’s intent. We test these prop-
ositions primarily in the important marketing context of offer cus-
tomization and targeted promotions. Specifically, we contrast cases 
in which a marketing offer appears to fit the consumer’s preferences 
better than presumably intended, thereby providing unintended util-
ity or value, with cases in which the offer is explicitly tailored by the 
marketer to fit the consumer’s preferences. Importantly, we examine 
the effect of incidental versus tailored fit while holding constant both 
the actual and the perceived fit between the offer and the consumer’s 
preferences, and examining both cases of idiosyncratic (Kivetz and 
Simonson 2003) and non-idiosyncratic fit. 
Experiment 1 shows that consumers are more likely to pursue 
a marketing offer when certain cues lead them to believe the offer 
fits them better (and is therefore more valuable for them) than in-
tended, than when such cues are absent or when the offer is explicitly 
designed to fit the consumer. After measuring participants’ idiosyn-
cratic preferences in an unrelated task, we offered participants with 
a special interest in economics and world news to take advantage 
of a special promotion for The Economist magazine – an offer that 
strongly matches their individual preferences. One third of partici-
pants were told that the offer was targeted at the average person, 
thereby providing them with seemingly unintended fit. Another third 
were told that the offer was designed “for the classic reader of The 
Economist”. The last third did not get any information about whom 
the offer was designed for. The offers were otherwise identical. In 
addition to the offer framing manipulation, half of the participants 
were primed with a competitive mindset whereas the others were 
primed with a neutral mindset.  Consistent with our propositions, 
participants interested in economics and world news were more like-
ly to take advantage of the offer when it was framed as designed for 
the average person than when it was designed “for the classic reader” 
or when no targeting information was provided. Moreover, the ten-
dency to take advantage of the offer in the average person framing 
condition increased in the competition mindset priming condition, 
compared to the control prime. 
In Experiment 2, we offered people to take advantage of a Hol-
lywood Hits TV channel for $50 a year instead of a Hollywood Hits 
+ Ballet channel package for $90 per year (almost all our partici-
pants favored Hollywood hits and had no interest in ballet). We told 
half of the participants that the Hollywood Hits offer was available 
instead of the enhanced Hollywood + Ballet package due to a local 
infrastructure capacity constraint. The other half were told that the 
company conducted market research which suggested people were 
not interested in ballet. In addition, half of the participants were 
primed with a competitive mindset whereas the others were primed 
with a neutral mindset. As predicted, people were more likely to take 
advantage of the Hollywood-only (but better value) offer when it 
was due to the company’s infrastructure constraints than to market 
research. Moreover, the tendency to take advantage of the offer in-
creased following the competitive mindset prime, compared to the 
neutral prime.
Experiment 3 extended these findings and provided direct evi-
dence that offers that seem to provide unintended fit are seen as more 
valuable than intended by the marketer, compared to equivalent of-
fers that fit the consumer by design.
Experiment 4 bolsters our proposition that the effect of unin-
tended fit/value reflects consumers’ perception of marketers as coun-
terparts in a competitive, zero-sum game. Specifically, we predicted 
that the competitive motivation to obtain a bargain at the marketer’s 
expense would be attenuated when it comes at the expense of a not-
for-profit entity (McGraw, Schwartz, and Tetlock 2012). Thus, in ad-
dition to varying whether the offer seemed to provide unintended 
versus intended fit/value, we also varied whether the offer was made 
by a for-profit marketer or a not-for-profit entity. Consistent with our 
theory, the tendency to pursue the offer providing seemingly unin-
tended value was pronounced when the seller was framed as a for-
profit marketer, but it was attenuated when the seller was framed as 
a not-for-profit entity. 
Taken together, the findings show that offers are particularly at-
tractive when their value to the consumer (e.g., through fit) appears 
unintended rather than premeditated. The findings provide novel in-
sights into factors that lead consumers to perceive offers as subjec-
tively valuable and underscore the hitherto unexplored role of the 
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adversarial, competitive motivation to outsmart the market by tak-
ing advantage of unintended opportunities. The findings also show 
that explicit offer customization can boomerang by lowering bargain 
perceptions.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Reminders of money are ubiquitous. Every purchase we make, 
bill we pay, and check we receive forces us to think about how much 
money we have. Additionally, we encounter many subtle reminders 
of money in our daily lives, such as passing by a bank, ATM, or bill-
board displaying dollar signs. With this in mind, researchers have ex-
amined how thinking about money affects attitudes and behavior. For 
example, individuals who are primed with money, rather than time, 
feel less connected to products that they have purchased (Mogilner 
and Aaker 2009) and are less willing to donate money to charity (Liu 
and Aaker 2008). However, research in the area of money has largely 
ignored how priming this concept affects goal pursuit. As activating 
the idea of money makes people more self-sufficient (Vohs, Mead 
and Goode 2006), thus changing people’s aspirations, this raises the 
important question: How does the activation of the idea of money in 
people’s minds change goal pursuit?
With four papers, this session addresses this question as it in-
tegrates various ways to activate the concept of money to examine 
how these thoughts affect a host of goal-related behaviors. Garb-
insky, Klesse, and Aaker prime thoughts of money by influencing 
one’s subjective level of wealth, via manipulating scale anchors. The 
authors find that making people feel less wealthy ironically causes 
them to save less money. They attribute these findings to feelings of 
powerlessness that are induced by feeling relatively poor, thus mak-
ing individuals feel like their savings goal cannot be attained. Van 
Kerckhove, Lunardo, and Fitzsimons manipulate thoughts of money 
in an alternative fashion by having participants make lists of things 
they would be unable to do without money or by asking participants 
to indicate the amount of money in their bank account. They find 
that priming money scarcity leads consumers to place greater value 
on option choice as they are willing to invest more resources to keep 
options open. Johnson et al. manipulate monetary thoughts in a more 
generalizable way by providing participants with a cost calculator 
similar to those found on existing websites. They find that these cal-
culation aids, in union with other interventions, cause participants 
to make better health coverage choices that could ultimately save 
10 billion dollars each year. Finally, Sarial-Abi and Vohs show that 
even subtle reminders are sufficient to activate the concept of money 
by having participants sit in front of a computer with a screensaver 
displaying one hundred dollar bills. They find that activating the con-
cept of money enables participants to better achieve a range of goals, 
from financial to health and problem-solving. 
Although this session is designed to be of substantial interest 
to those who study the psychological consequences of money (as all 
four papers share a common focus on deepening a theoretical under-
standing of ways in which thinking about money affects goal pursuit, 
we also expect this session to have broader appeal. For instance, this 
session will focus on various ways to prime the concept of money in 
people’s minds, making it relevant to researchers interested in prim-
ing tactics more generally. Additionally, as three of the four papers 
examine the effects of money on financial decisions (saving, spend-
ing, and choosing health insurance), this session should also attract 
those interested in financial decision making. We hope that attracting 
a diverse audience will help facilitate a lively and fruitful discussion. 
In addition to creating connections between research areas, this ses-
sion should also build connections between academia and industry 
because of its direct managerial implications; not only do the re-
searchers focus on advancing our theoretical understanding of the 
consequences of money, but they also identify techniques that could 
potentially be manipulated by marketers in order to activate thoughts 
about money and thus change how much people ultimately decide to 
save, spend, or invest.
With Great Power Comes Financial Responsibility: The 
Effect of Power on Saving
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The savings rate among the poor is very low. Approximately 
10% of all U.S. households, most of which live in poverty, lack for-
mal saving tools (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir 2006). Without 
banks, they must rely on alternative financial means such as check 
cashers, payday loans, or borrowing from friends, which can have 
serious ramifications for spending and savings issues. With this in 
mind, we sought to investigate why people who feel poor tend not to 
save as well as ways to encourage saving behavior. In doing so, we 
shed light on a new mechanism that explains the link between wealth 
and saving: feeling powerful. 
Experiment 1—Subjective Wealth and Saving
This experiment sought to establish that feelings of power drive 
the relationship between subjective wealth and saving. Subjective 
wealth was manipulated by asking participants to indicate their annu-
al household income on a scale that ranged from $0 – over $420,000 
(low subjective wealth manipulation) or on a scale that ranged from 
$0 – over $44,000 (high subjective wealth manipulation) (Nelson 
and Morrison 2005). Then, participants imagined that they just re-
ceived $100 and indicated how much of this money they would put 
in a savings account. Participants then indicated the extent to which 
they felt powerful (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Results showed that among those willing to save (N = 68), there 
was a significant difference in subjective wealth condition such that 
participants in the high subjective wealth condition (M = $50.86, SD 
= $29.81) were willing to save more money than those in the low 
subjective wealth condition (M = $37.12, SD = $26.16), t(66) = 2.02, 
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p = .05. Additionally, participants in the high subjective wealth con-
dition indicated feeling significantly more powerful (M = 4.40, SD 
= 1.67) than those in the low subjective wealth condition (M = 3.06, 
SD = 1.62), t(66) = 3.36, p < .001. Finally, these feelings of power 
mediated the relationship between subjective wealth condition and 
amount that participants were willing to save (95% CI: .96, 14.00).
Experiment 2—Power Poses and Saving
This experiment sought to manipulate power in a way unrelated 
to money in order to establish that power is indeed driving the ef-
fect on saving. Feelings of power were manipulated by having par-
ticipants imitate poses associated with feelings of high power or low 
power (Carney, Cuddy and Yap 2010). After being shown pictures 
they had to imitate, participants made two high power poses or two 
lower poses for one minute each. Then, they imagined that they just 
received $100 and indicated how much of this money they would 
put in a savings account. Results showed that among those willing 
to save (N = 66), there was a significant difference in power condi-
tion such participants in the high power condition (M = $76.72, SD 
= $20.81) were willing to save more money than those in the low 
power condition (M = $64.26, SD = $22.77), t(64) = 2.32, p = .03.
Experiment 3—Why Power Increases Saving
This experiment sought to establish why feeling powerful in-
creases the amount of money one is willing to save. Because power 
promotes an action orientation (Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee 
2003), we hypothesized that feeling powerful makes people feel like 
their savings goals can indeed be achieved, thereby increasing the 
amount of money one is willing to save. An additional benefit of 
experiment 3 was the inclusion of a control condition, allowing us 
to examine whether differences in saving are driven by feelings of 
high or low power. Feelings of power were manipulated by having 
participants write about a time when they had power over someone 
else (high power condition), a time when someone else had power 
over them (low power condition), or they were not given a writing 
assignment (control condition) (Galinsky et al. 2003). Then, they 
imagined that they just received $100 and indicated how much of 
this money they would put in a savings account. Participants then 
indicated the extent to which they agreed with following two state-
ments: “Right now, I feel like I am able to work effectively toward 
my long-term saving goal,” and “Right now, I feel confident that I 
will be able to achieve my long-term saving goal” (adapted from 
Klesse et al. 2012). 
Results showed that among those willing to save (N = 117), 
there was a significant difference in power condition, F(2, 114) 
3.55, p = .03, such that participants in the high power condition (M 
= $78.15, SD = $23.48) were willing to save more money than those 
in the control condition (M = $65.29, SD = $33.40), t(114) = 1.96, p 
= .05, and low power condition (M = $61.55, SD = $30.16), t(114) = 
2.53, p = .01. Additionally, the aforementioned items were averaged 
to create a goal attainability index (r = .68, p < .001), revealing that 
participants in the high power condition (M = 5.48, SD = 1.13) felt 
significantly more able to work effectively toward their saving goal 
than those in the control condition (M = 4.82, SD = 1.57), t(114) 
= 2.16, p = .03, and low power condition (M = 4.83, SD = 1.35), 
t(114) = 2.11, p = .04. Finally, feeling like one’s saving goal could 
be achieved mediated the relationship between power condition and 
amount that participants were willing to save (95% CI: .37, 5.77).
General Discussion
We suggest that the low savings rate among the poor can be 
attributed to feelings of powerlessness (experiment 1) by showing 
that feelings of power drive increases in saving. This pattern was 
observed by having participants imitate power postures (experiment 
2) or write about a past experience in which they felt powerful (ex-
periment 3). Additionally, these results suggest that power causes 
individuals to save more money by making them feel like their sav-
ings goal can indeed be achieved.   
Enhanced Desire for Product Choice in Response to 
Monetary Scarcity
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
While consumers are well-accustomed to having the freedom 
to choose among alternatives, they often find themselves in situa-
tions in which their choice freedom is restricted. A theory apt to deal 
with people’s reactions to threatened freedoms is ‘reactance theory’ 
(Brehm 1966), which proposes that perceived threats to freedom 
motivate people to reassert that freedom. Though abundant, reac-
tance research has been limited as it has exclusively focused on how 
making a specific option unavailable affects consumers’ behavior 
with respect to that specific object. The current research, however, 
focuses on a situation that people may experience as a generalized 
threat to choice freedom, and as such may have a broader effect on 
consumer behavior.
As money is generally seen as giving people options in life and 
yielding feelings of freedom (Mitchell and Mickel 1999; Vohs and 
Baumeister 2011), we posit that monetary scarcity may be experi-
enced as a general threat to freedom of choice. Hence, monetary 
scarcity may be experienced as a restriction of choice, resulting in an 
increased valuation of option choice. Moreover, as people high (vs. 
low) in trait reactance are more motivated to reestablish threatened 
freedoms, monetary scarcity may lead people higher in reactance to 
value option choice.
To study whether monetary scarcity has a more generalized ef-
fect on the valuation of option choice than the scarcity of specific 
products (especially for those higher in trait reactance), participants 
first completed a reactance questionnaire (Hong and Faedda 1996). 
Next, they were randomly assigned to one of three scarcity condi-
tions. In each condition, scarcity was activated by having partici-
pants list three things they would not be able to do anymore when 
either gasoline, sugar, or money was unavailable to them (Roux, 
Goldsmith and Bonezzi). Finally, participants were presented with 
three pairs of assortments, each comprising a small and a large as-
sortment. Participants indicated from which assortment they would 
be most happy to choose (Inesi et al. 2011). Three products, namely 
water, candy, and detergent, were included in the assortment choice 
task. Results show that while participants in the sugar (vs. gasoline) 
scarcity condition prefer a larger assortment size for candy only,, 
participants in the monetary (vs. gasoline) scarcity condition prefer 
a larger assortment size for all three products. Moreover, we find 
an interaction effect: , The preference for a large assortment in the 
monetary scarcity condition is larger for highly reactant participants.
Experiment 2 replicates this finding by assigning participants 
to a monetary scarcity or monetary abundance condition, rather than 
focusing on different types of scarcity. After completing the reac-
tance scale, participants indicated the amount of money in their bank 
accounts, either on a response scale with large (monetary scarcity) 
or small (monetary abundance) increments. Next, participants chose 
three chocolates out of an assortment of five. Finally, participants 
evaluated the size of the assortment they chose from and indicated 
their satisfaction with their choices. Two regressions both reveal a 
significant interaction: Monetary scarcity (vs. abundance) leads 
to lower assortment size evaluations and lower satisfaction with a 
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choice from a small assortment, especially for people high in trait 
reactance.
Experiment 3 replicates this finding incorporating a clear mea-
sure of people’s striving for option choice. After completing the 
reactance scale, participants were randomly assigned to a money 
condition (monetary scarcity vs. control; Zhou, Vohs and Baumeis-
ter 2009). Next, participants played a ‘door game’ (Shin and Ariely 
2004), in which participants could click on three depicted doors. The 
game was designed as such that switching between doors was costly, 
though necessary to keep doors/options available. People who like 
to keep options open may be inclined to switch more than others. As 
anticipated, an interaction occurred whereby monetary scarcity leads 
people to switch more, especially when their reactance level is high. 
Prior research showed that when a resource becomes scarce, 
people will value it more (Brock and Brannon 1992; Lynn 1991). 
Hence, as money becomes scarce, people should value money more. 
The reported studies indicate that under conditions of monetary scar-
city, people also value option choice more. Using a 2 (money: scar-
city, abundance) × 2 (resource: money, time) mixed-model design 
with resource serving as a within-participants factor, Experiment 
4 focuses on how people trade-off money and option choice under 
conditions of monetary scarcity.
After measuring reactance, monetary scarcity was manipulated 
by an episodic recall task (Roux, Goldsmith and Bonezzi). Next, par-
ticipants were presented with two scenarios; each scenario involved 
deciding whether to make the purchase from a store offering a small 
or a store offering a large assortment. In the first scenario the prices 
of eyeglasses were lower in the small versus large assortment store, 
while in the second scenario, the small-assortment store was open, 
and the large assortment store was closed. Desire for a larger choice 
set was measured, by, respectively, the amount of money participants 
were willing to spend additionally and the number of minutes they 
were willing to wait to access the larger choice set. Results show that 
in the monetary scarcity condition, participants are willing to wait 
longer to choose from a large assortment, especially when reactance 
is high, replicating the findings of the previous studies. However, 
when considering the amount of money people are willing to addi-
tionally spend to choose from a large assortment, we find that there 
is no effect of monetary scarcity, nor an interaction with reactance. 
This finding indicates that, even though lacking money triggers a 
greater desire for choice, people do not value option choice more 
than money. Hence, having choice options cannot substitute for a 
lack of money.
Overall, these studies suggest that monetary scarcity can lead 
people to exhibit reactance and to look for freedom. Whereas finan-
cially threatening situations generally redirect people’s focus on ex-
trinsic goals such as financial success and social popularity (Sheldon 
and Kasser 2008), we show that this may also instigate an increased 
valuation of a ‘higher-order’ goal like freedom of choice. Our re-
search extends the scope of reactance theory, but also sheds new 
light on the desires of people living under conditions of monetary 
scarcity.
Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The 
Value of Choice Architecture 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In less than a year, on January 1, 2014, tens of millions of 
Americans, along with members of Congress, will participate in a 
grand experiment in consumer choice: They will select health insur-
ance using a marketplace or health insurance exchange operated by 
states and federal governments as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care and Act. The success of these exchanges depends 
upon two related premises: First that consumers will be able to select 
the best policy for their needs, and second that price competition, 
driven by effective consumer choice, will lower prices
These premises are critical not only to the new exchanges, but 
also for all government administered health insurance markets and 
for the efficiency of privately provided benefit choices. Yet, a large 
literature in psychology suggests that this may not be the case, since, 
as we shall see, these exchanges may not provide a helpful choice 
architecture to support decision making.  In this paper, we examine 
three related questions:  Can people select the best policies?  Do they 
know how well they are doing?  Does the design of the sites change 
their performance?  
Our results suggest there is significant room to improve these 
decisions. Without any intervention, respondents perform at near 
chance levels and show a significant bias, overweighting out-of-
pocket costs and deductibles. Financial incentives do not improve 
performance, and decision-makers do not realize that they are per-
forming badly.  However, performance can be improved quite mark-
edly by providing calculation aids, and by choosing a “smart” de-
fault, raising the performance of ordinary respondents to that of the 
MBA students.
Experiment 1 provides a baseline, examining the proportion of 
people choosing the most cost-effective policy from 4 or 8 options. 
Fig. 1 shows the outcomes from all experiments. The top half of 
each bar, in blue, represents the proportion of correct choices, and 
the bottom half, in red, plots the average dollar error, across respon-
dents.  The dashed line represents expected choice quality by a ran-
dom chooser.   Panel A of Fig. 1 shows a rather dramatic outcome: 
With 4 choice options, respondents select the best option only 42 
percent of the time, and make an average mistake of over $200 dol-
lars. With eight options, they select the correct option 21 percent of 
the time, a figure not different than chance (p < .05). Experiment 2 
added monetary incentives. As can be seen in the next two bars of 
Fig. 1 (A), incentives did not improve outcomes, and performance 
was close to chance.
One obvious intervention, used in Experiments 3 and 4, pro-
vides a cost-calculator stating the annual total cost. This is done on 
several existing web sites including Medicare.gov. In addition, Ex-
periment 4 also simplified the choice by removing quality informa-
tion for half the respondents.
The results, shown in the third and fourth columns of Fig. 1(A) 
are not markedly different. Again respondents chose the most cost 
effective option less than half the time, and make large financial er-
rors. The unaided decisions makers averaged errors of $611 in Ex-
periment 3 and chose the correct option 32% of the time.  Providing 
the calculators did marginally help but only in Experiment 4: Re-
spondents provided with calculators chose the correct option 10.1% 
more often, and reduced the size of errors by $216, but still were 
only correct 47% of the time and made mean errors of $364. 
Is this task simply impossible? Experiment 5, used a very dif-
ferent population to see how highly trained, financially literate indi-
viduals might do.  We presented MBA students enrolled in a class on 
consumer finance with the same task as in Experiment 4.
As seen in the first column of Fig. 1(B), they perform appre-
ciably better, choosing the right option 73% of the time, and making 
an average mistake of $126. Their self-reports of how they accom-
plished the task are interesting: Forty percent reported using excel. 
This suggests that having both the right mental model and the ability 
to execute these calculations may be a basic requirement to make 
good choices.
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In Experiment 6, we explored the possibility that mental mod-
els plus different possible interventions would produce good perfor-
mance by those who will be using the exchange. We compared a 
control condition to four different manipulations. An incentive group 
received a more extreme and sophisticated incentive regime. We 
contrasted this to three choice architecture interventions. The first 
provided a calculator, explained what the calculator did, and tested 
that understanding. The second provided a smart default that prese-
lected the most cost effective options given that individual’s usage. 
Individuals could, and did, change that selection if they wanted. Fi-
nally, we combined defaults and calculators. The presence of incen-
tives and our choice architecture manipulations allows comparing 
the cost effectiveness of these interventions.
The last four bars in Fig. 2(B) show that the treatments vary 
widely in effectiveness. The controls, despite having received in-
struction and tests of understanding, choose about as well as respon-
dents in prior experiments. The second bar indicates that incentives 
do not have a significant effect on outcomes, even though individuals 
in the incentive condition did take 38% longer to make their deci-
sions, a significant increase relative to controls. Calculators (with 
education), in contrast, produce better decisions, with a significant 
decrease in the size of the loss and an increase in the proportion cor-
rect. The smart default option has a similar effect, reducing losses 
and increasing the percentage correct.  Finally, when combined, the 
defaults and calculators seem to complement each other, leading to 
performance levels that are comparable to those of the highly trained 
MBA students. This last result suggests, perhaps, that the use of cal-
culators justifies the selection of the default, increasing the transpar-
ency of their selection.  It also suggests that providing just-in-time 
education along with calculation and choice aids produces better 
performance.
We close by showing that respondents were overconfident, and 
that these choice architecture interventions could save purchasers 
and taxpayers 10 billion dollars a year.
Mere Exposure to Money Motivates Goal Attainment
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How do people achieve their goals? Goal performance has 
been linked to goal setting, dedication to achieving the goal, self-
perceptions of being able to achieve the goal, and the goal’s value to 
the individual (Heath et al., 1999; Vroom, 1964). Being motivated 
(i.e., feeling energized toward pursuing the goal) helps too (Locke 
& Latham, 1990). The current article offers the idea of money, as a 
simple environmental cue, can aid goal pursuit. 
The use of money is intimately tied to goal pursuit. When 
people use money, they do so to close a gap between a current and 
desired end-point, the definition of goal pursuit (Baumeister, 1998; 
Carver & Scheier, 1990). Money is also linked to goal attainment in 
another manner. The largest source of money gain is earnings, which 
means that people apply persistence, skill, or other behaviors to per-
form jobs that meet an acceptable standard. 
Hence, there are two distinct ways that money and goal pursuit 
are intertwined – through spending and earning it. Due to their fre-
quent pairing, the very concepts of money and a goal might stimu-
late energetic and motivated reactions. We predicted an interaction 
between being reminded of money and the presence of goal in deter-
mining motivated behavior. 
Experiment 1: Finances. Participants in money (vs. nonmoney) 
reminder condition saw 20 images of one hundred dollar bills (vs. 
shells) arranged onscreen randomly and provided a quick and ac-
curate account. Next, participants in the no-goal condition read a 
second-person paragraph that described how they had not been good 
at managing their finances. Participants in the goal condition read 
the same paragraph, but they also read that they had adopted a goal 
of being frugal and not spending much money. The next screen dis-
played and described 11 products (e.g., a CD that includes an ad-
ditional CD as promotion). They reported the likelihood of buying 
each item. Ratings were averaged to form an overall spending likeli-
hood measure. 
An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as predic-
tors of spending intentions revealed the predicted interaction effect, 
F(1, 104) =5.21, p < .03. Participants in the money reminder condi-
tion who were given an explicit goal versus no goal reported lower 
spending intentions, F(1, 104) = 7.17, p < .01. Participants in the no 
money reminder condition, however, did not differ in their spending 
intentions as a function of goal and no goal condition, F < 1. 
Experiment 2: Health. Participants randomly received the 
money versus non-money reminder manipulation as in Experiment 
1. Next, participants read text written in second person to describe a 
person’s realization of eating too much lately and gaining weight. In 
the goal condition participants read, “You tell yourself, I must stop 
eating so much, and this becomes an important goal that you want 
to reach.” Then participants rated a series of words on their aesthet-
ics using three 5-point scales anchored with: unattractive / attrac-
tive, unpleasant / pleasant, and negative / positive. We averaged the 
health-related items (e.g., apple) to create a healthy attitude score.  
An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as pre-
dictors of healthy attitude scores revealed the predicted interaction 
effect, F(1, 86) = 4.68, p < .04. Participants in the money reminder 
condition who were presented with a goal reported more favorable 
attitudes toward the health words than did participants who were not 
reminded of money (F(1, 86) = 13.81, p < .01. In the absence of a 
goal, whether participants earlier had been reminded of money or not 
did not affect their attitudes toward the health words, F < 1.  
Experiment 3: Problem Solving Performance. Participants were 
handed a stack of questionnaires. Computers nearby had a screen-
Figure 1: Performance across experiments
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saver on, which depending on condition, showed either money ver-
sus fish floating underwater. Next, participants in the goal condition 
read they should adopt the goal of completing as many problems as 
they can. In the no goal condition, participants read that they would 
be performing math problems. 
An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as predic-
tors revealed the predicted significant interaction effect on duration, 
F(1, 104) = 18.85, p < .01. When given a goal, participants who 
had been reminded of money, relative to their non-money counter-
parts, spent more time trying to solve the math problems, F(1, 104) = 
17.20, p < .01. Without being given a goal, duration was equivalent 
between participants who were or were not reminded of money, p 
> .05. 
Experiment 4: Having Fun. We last sought to test whether 
money reminders would help people achieve goals that were not ex-
plicitly given to them by us. Participants’ first task was to complete 
paper forms of questionnaires while a nearby computer’s screensav-
er showed either pictures of money or fish underwater. Next, par-
ticipants in the fun (versus no frame) condition were instructed to 
complete four puzzles that were described as “enjoyable games and 
puzzles” versus “verbal tasks.” Four items measured participants’ 
experience: the task was fun/enjoyable; I enjoyed/had fun doing the 
task.” 
An ANOVA on experience of fun during the task revealed the 
predicted significant interaction, F(1, 92) = 4.32, p < .05. When par-
ticipants in the money reminder condition were given a task framed 
as fun, they experienced more fun compared to those who were in 
the nonmoney reminder condition, F(1, 92) = 12.30, p < .01. There 
was no difference between money and nonmoney reminder condi-
tion participants’ experience of fun when the task was not framed as 
fun, p > .57.
General Discussion. Four experiments showed that remind-
ers of money influences goal pursuit. The findings of this research 
contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate 
money as a tool for goal-pursuit. Second, we integrate the literature 
in psychology of money and self-regulation to highlight the under-
lying mechanism under the influence of money on goal-pursuit. In 
sum, our data, for the first time, shows that money can be used as a 
facilitator for goal-pursuit. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Modern life is rife with inconsistencies in product and resource 
availability. Not only does the economy continue to be characterized 
by periods of recessions, but there is considerable inequality among 
people for access to products and resources. Consequently, how do 
consumers perceive and react to cues of scarcity in their everyday 
lives? Despite increasing interest in this research topic, there are still 
many open questions regarding the antecedents and consequences 
of scarcity. For example, it is unclear what environmental cues lead 
consumers to perceive resources as more or less scarce. Moreover, 
the influence scarcity exerts on consumers’ cognition, judgment and 
behavior still remain vastly unexplored. This session provides a step 
forward in this direction by considering various ways in which scar-
city shapes consumer behavior. 
All four papers in this session provide new insights into how 
different cues of scarcity, from store atmospherics to news articles in-
dicative of recession, influence consumers’ cognitions and behaviors. 
Two of the papers also identify important person variables, such as 
childhood environments, that may affect people’s responses to such 
cues.
The first paper, by Sevilla and Townsend, investigates how en-
vironmental cues influence perceptions of scarcity. Specifically, they 
demonstrate how the product-to-space ratio in a retail setting leads 
consumers to perceive products as more or less scarce. Results from 
three experiments suggest that consumers perceive products to be 
scarcer when they are surrounded by more empty space, holding the 
product assortment constant. In turn, scarcity perceptions translate 
into higher purchase intention and increased price estimates. 
The second paper, by Mittal and Griskevicius, draw from Life 
History Theory to explore whether consumers’ response to scarcity 
cues depends on their childhood environments. Specifically, the au-
thors investigate how resource scarcity cues differentially influence 
financial planning. Across three experiments, the authors present evi-
dence suggesting that consumers who grew up with relatively lower 
levels of family support value financial planning more less when ex-
posed to resource scarcity cues. 
The third paper, by Hill, DelPriore, Rodeheffer and Butterfield, 
also draw from Life History Theory to investigate how resource scar-
city influences women’s ideal body sizes. Three experiments demon-
strate that exposure to scarcity cues leads women who experienced 
relatively stressful (benign) childhoods to prefer heavier (thinner) 
body sizes.
 Finally, the fourth paper by Roux and Goldsmith explores how 
being exposed to scarcity-related cues influences people’s level of 
processing. Specifically, they show that activating the concept of 
scarcity induces people to adopt an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset, 
which broadens one’s consideration, thus leading them to categorize 
objects into fewer, more general, superordinate groups and to be 
more likely to include atypical exemplars into a given category.
Taken together, these four papers advance our understanding of 
how scarcity influences consumer behavior. Overall, this session of-
fers a coherent set of innovative perspectives that enhance the breath 
of our knowledge in a growing area of research. We expect this ses-
sion to appeal to a broad audience, including researchers interested 
in resource scarcity, store atmospherics, financial planning, family 
environments, physical appearance, and cognitive processing.
The Product to Space Ratio Effect: How Store Density 
Influences Perceptions of Scarcity and Product 
Preference 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Past research has shown that consumers use cues in the retail 
environment when making inferences about the properties of a prod-
uct (Zeithaml 1988). In this work, we investigate an important aspect 
of a store environment, product density, which is the amount of space 
devoted to a constant number of items. Despite the importance of this 
factor as a potential determinant of store and product perception, this 
component of the retail environment has been widely understudied. 
Unlike past research on store density, which has focused on human or 
overall crowding (e.g. Eroglu and Harrell 1986; Machleit et al. 1994; 
Machleit et al. 2000), the present research considers how varying 
the density of products affects consumer preferences towards them.
In our studies we keep the number and characteristics of a set 
of products constant and manipulate the amount of space devoted to 
their display. Our results systematically show that a lower product-
to-space-ratio (more space per product) has a positive effect on prod-
uct preference, valuation, and likelihood of purchase. These findings 
are consistent with research on the use of white space in advertising 
(Pracejus et al. 2006), which suggests that this visual trope is ef-
fective due to its socio-historical meaning. However in contrast, we 
show that the effect of product to space ratio in the retail environment 
is due to a less deliberative process, that of increased perceptions of 
product scarcity. Past research has shown that scarce products are 
highly desirable (Cialdini 2009; Inman, Peter and Raghubir 1997; 
Verhallen 1982), mostly because people believe that limited oppor-
tunities are more valuable (Cialdini 2009). In this work, we show 
support for this notion and document a new manner of manipulating 
perceptions of product scarcity in a retail place, through varying the 
amount of space surrounding each product. Moreover, we rule out 
alternative explanations for the effect based on perceptions of store 
messiness or consumer difficulty in observing product assortments 
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as well as address the automatic versus deliberative components of 
the phenomenon. 
Study 1 was a field study that established our proposed effect 
revealing that consumers spent more money in the store when a con-
stant product assortment was displayed across a larger rather than 
smaller amount of space (Mlarge space = 6.73 vs. Msmall space = 3.67; t(195) 
= 2.24, p < .04). Moreover, a survey of store visitors revealed more 
favorable evaluations of products in the low product to space ratio 
condition (Mlarge space = 5.27) than in the high product to space ratio 
group (Msmall space = 4.73; t(84) = 2.29, p < .03).
Study 2 used a laboratory controlled environment to provide ev-
idence for the display density effect by asking participants to select 
a choice set from which to make a hypothetical purchase. Specifi-
cally, participants considered two sets of men’s neckties that differed 
on the designs of the ties and on the product-to-space-ratio of the 
display. The display space and product design factors were counter-
balanced and yet significantly more than half of participants selected 
the assortment with more space as the one from which they would 
prefer to purchase (59.1%, χ
2 
= 6.32, p < .02), which they liked more 
(59.1%; χ
2 
= 6.32, p < .02), found more attractive (61.1%; χ
2 
= 8.00, p 
< .01) and more luxurious and exclusive (59.1%; χ
2 
= 6.32, p < .02).
Study 3 considered the underlying mechanism behind this effect 
by examining potential mediators for the phenomenon. In contrast 
to study 1, study 2 used a between- rather within- subject design, 
used estimated price of the featured products rather than choice set 
selection as a dependent measure, and considered a female-centric 
product category, that of women’s shoes, as opposed to men’s neck-
ties. As expected, participants in the larger space condition estimated 
the price of the shoes as higher than did those in the smaller space 
condition (Mlarge = $97.51 vs. Msmall = $70.20; F (1, 97) = 6.61, p < 
.02). Moreover, both perceptions of scarcity associated with the store 
(Mlarge = 3.69 vs. Msmall = 2.98; t (99) = 2.10, p < .04, CI: 16.36 to 
-1.14) and with the product (Mlarge = 3.74 vs. Msmall = 1.22; t (99) = 
9.06, p < .0001, CI: -38.63 to -1.01-) mediated the effect.
In a set-up similar to study 2, study 4 provided further sup-
port for the underlying scarcity mechanism revealing the effect to 
be deactivated when participants’ beliefs about how scarce a product 
is are directly manipulated (χ
2 
= 1.61, p > .20). Additionally, in this 
study we found that the effect held under conditions of cognitive 
load, which suggests predominantly automatic and non-deliberative 
processing. This is a novel finding when we contrast this work to 
past research on scarcity effects, which are usually triggered through 
rational claims or explicit amounts shown (e.g. Fromkin 1970; Ver-
hallen 1982).
We believe this presentation is consistent with the theme of the 
conference and would “make a difference” as this topic has direct 
theoretical consumer behavior and managerial implications. Specifi-
cally, we have shown that the effect of product-to-space-ratio plays a 
positive role in increasing product preference and valuation, and yet 
this finding may be at odds with cost efficiency concerns that sug-
gest a denser store maximizes retail rent utility. The present research 
could encourage researchers from these different fields to work to-
gether to determine the conditions and situations in which the dis-
play density effect can best be employed to maximize profits.   
Planning Under Paucity: Responses to Resource Scarcity 
Threats Depend on Childhood Environments 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
 Financial planning is pervasive in consumers’ lives. Not only 
does it impact how we spend money in our everyday lives, but it 
also has a profound effect on wealth accumulation and retirement 
satisfaction (Ameriks, Caplan, and Leahy 2003; Elder and Rudolph 
1999). Because a principal reason to plan is to have a better and 
more comfortable future, might uncertainties about the future change 
people’s planning psychologies? For example, can cues indicating 
looming resource scarcity such as those related to economic reces-
sions lead people to change their financial planning? Would such 
cues lead them to plan more or plan less? 
Recent work suggests that the answer depends. Research indi-
cates that people respond in divergent ways when faced with threats 
of resource scarcity based on their childhood resource conditions 
(Griskevicius et al., 2013, White et al., 2013). For example, adults 
raised in relatively resource-rich environments took fewer risks and 
became less impulsive under cues of resource scarcity, whereas 
those from relatively resource-deprived backgrounds responded to 
the same cues by taking more risks and becoming more impulsive 
(Griskevicius et al., 2013). In the present work, we draw on the cost-
benefit framework of life history theory to investigate the effects of 
resource scarcity on people’s financial planning behavior. 
In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated resource scarcity 
cues by having people read a news article about the recent economic 
recession or having them read a control article. We then examined 
their beliefs about the importance of financial planning by using an 
adapted version of the propensity to plan scale (Lynch et al., 2009). 
Results revealed that for people growing up with relatively higher 
levels of family resources, the recession news article did not sig-
nificantly affect their valuation of financial planning. However, 
among individuals growing up with relatively lower levels of fam-
ily resources, recession cues decreased their valuation of financial 
planning. 
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the results of Study 1 by using 
a behavioral measure of the value of planning. Resource scarcity was 
manipulated by having participants recall an incident when they felt 
financially deprived compared to their peers (Sharma & Alter, 2012). 
In the neutral condition, people simply responded to the measure of 
financial planning. Then, in an ostensibly unrelated task, respondents 
were informed that the experimenters were interested in knowing the 
kinds of information people are interested in learning in the context 
of retirement planning. They were then provided with a list of top-
ics pertaining to retirement finances that they could choose to learn 
about. Importantly, they were informed that they could read as many 
or as few of the topics they were interested in. The dependent mea-
sure was the amount of time respondents spent on learning about 
retirement planning. Findings conceptually replicated the results of 
Study 1. Specifically, respondents who grew up with relatively high-
er levels of family resources did not differ significantly on learning 
about retirement planning under scarcity manipulation. In contrast, 
among those growing up with relatively lower levels of family re-
sources, scarcity thoughts significantly decreased the amount of time 
they spent on learning about retirement planning. 
Study 3 had two goals. First, to ensure the robustness of the 
experimental findings in Studies 1 and 2, we sought to conceptu-
ally replicate the results using a third methodology to prime resource 
scarcity—a photo slideshow (Griskevicius et al., 2013, Hill et al., 
2012). Second, to tested whether people’s perceptions of personal 
control could be potential mediator of the relationship between re-
source scarcity cues and planning beliefs. Resource scarcity cues 
were manipulated by having participants view a slideshow with visu-
al images suggestive of economic recession or control images. Next, 
participants rated their beliefs about the importance of planning and 
their perceptions of control over their financial behavior. Consistent 
with the results from Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 found that for people 
growing with relatively lower levels of family resources, recession 
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cues significantly decreased their rated importance of financial plan-
ning. Additionally, the changes in the importance of planning were 
found to be mediated by the changes in perceptions of personal con-
trol over financial behaviors. 
These studies provide important new insights into the complex 
relationship between resource scarcity and people’s financial behav-
iors. It draws on life history theory to explore why people from dif-
ferent childhood backgrounds might respond differently to modern 
stressors such as resource scarcity and uncertainty. It also identifies 
perceptions of personal control as an important variable that guides 
people’s subsequent beliefs and behaviors pertaining to financial 
planning. This work has important implications for public policy 
professionals and others who wish to foster better financial planning 
behaviors in people from underprivileged backgrounds. 
The Effects of Resource Scarcity on the Ideal Female 
Body Size 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When it comes to women’s body ideals, is it true that thin is in? 
Or is shapely sexy? The answer to this question varies considerably 
across cultures. Although ultra-thin female models are idealized in 
Western nations like the United States, individuals living in nations 
where resources are scarce, tend to prefer women with a heavier 
body size (see e.g., Swami et al., 2010). This pattern repeats itself 
within nations, communities, and across the sexes. People living in 
relatively safe, affluent regions idealize thinner female bodies than 
those residing in more dangerous, lower SES communities (Swami 
et al., 2010). Resource scarcity and stress also increase the heaviness 
of the body that men most desire in their romantic partners (Swami 
& Tovée, 2012), but not necessarily themselves (Sobal & Stunkard, 
1989).
Why do researchers regularly observe a relationship between 
resource scarcity and preference for a heavier female body ideal? 
Here, we use insights from two theoretical models in evolutionary 
biology – life history theory and the critical fat hypothesis – to ex-
amine whether this relationship might emerge from the different life 
history strategies typically adopted by individuals living in resource 
scarce versus resource plentiful environments. Female body fat plays 
a key role in women’s fertility regulation, with thinness being related 
to suboptimal fertility (Frisch, 1985). Accordingly, we predicted that 
resource scarcity cues– which promote the contingent expression 
of a faster life history strategy and more immediate reproduction – 
would produce a preference shift away from the very thin, sub-fertile 
female ideal typically chosen by Western women toward a heavier, 
more fertile female form.
In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated cues of resource 
scarcity by having men and women read a news article about the 
recent economic recession. We then asked them about their develop-
mental history and measured their perceptions of the ideal body size 
using the contour drawing figure rating scale CDFRS (Swami et al., 
2010). We predicted that women who experienced earlier pubertal 
development – a physiological indicator of sensitization to a faster 
life history strategy – would respond to scarcity cues by shifting 
away from the very thin, sub-fertile body ideal typically favored by 
western women, toward a heavier, more fertile female ideal. Because 
body fat does not influence men’s fertility, we predicted that no such 
effects would be found for men. The results of Study 1 supported 
these predictions. 
In study 2, we used a similar priming methodology to explore 
whether we could conceptually replicate these results using a second 
cue to resource scarcity – cues to heightened environmental stress 
and uncertainty. Participants read a news article about increasing 
stress and unpredictability in the modern world or a control article. 
Next, they reported on their pubertal timing and indicated the ideal 
female body size. As predicted, women who experienced earlier pu-
bertal development chose a heavier female body ideal after readings 
a news article about increasing rates of violent crime compared to 
comparable controls.
Study 3 was designed to extend our findings in two ways. First, 
we sought to examine whether resource scarcity cues have implica-
tions for men’s perceptions of the ideal female body size. Because 
successful enactment of faster life history strategies is critically de-
pendent on female body fat, both men and women sensitized to faster 
reproductive strategies should respond to harshness by idealizing a 
heavier, more fertile female body size. Second, because pubertal tim-
ing is not the only developmental marker of life history strategies, 
Study 3 was also designed to test whether we could conceptually 
replicate the specific pattern of results found in Studies 1–3 using 
a different index of developmental history – childhood SES (see 
e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011). We predicted that resource scarcity 
cues would interact with both men’s and women’s childhood SES, 
such that individuals growing up in lower SES environments would 
idealize a heavier female body size relative to individuals growing 
up in higher SES environments. As predicted, we found that men 
and women growing up in lower SES environments responded to re-
source scarcity cues by favoring a heavier, more fertile female body 
ideal. 
The results of our three studies provide some of the first experi-
mental evidence regarding how and why people living in relatively 
safe, affluent regions prefer a thinner female body ideal than those 
residing in more dangerous, lower SES communities. Specifically, 
the results of our studies lend support for the hypothesis that this 
variability might reflect the different life history strategies adopted 
by those living in resource scarce versus resource plentiful environ-
ments. Although this variability is often attributed to differences in 
exposure to Western media and the thinness of fashion models used 
in magazines and advertisements, the current research provides evi-
dence that these findings may also reflect fundamental differences 
in people’s psychologies based on the level of resources present in 
men’s and women’s childhood and adult environments. This work 
has important implications for researchers interested in various areas 
including physical appearances, food consumption, individual dif-
ferences, and mating behaviors. 
Understanding the Psychology of Scarcity: When 
Limited Resources Prompt Abstract Thinking 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Scarcity is a prevalent condition that characterizes human ex-
istence. Mankind has regularly experienced periods of famine and 
draught (Chakravarthy and Booth 2004), modern economies often 
must cope with economic recessions (Griskevicius et al. 2013), and 
even in resource-rich environments people routinely encounter cues 
that emphasize the limited nature of products and resources (Cialdini 
2009; Gitlin 2007). As a consequence, people often think about, worry 
about, and discuss scarcity-related concerns (Twist and Barker 2006). 
However, in spite of the frequency of cues and cognitions related to 
scarcity, our understanding of the psychological processes that result 
when the concept of scarcity is activated remains limited. In this re-
search, we investigate how activating the concept of scarcity influ-
ences the way people process information. Specifically, we posit that 
scarcity-related cues can affect people’s level of processing through 
the activation of an abstract mindset (Liberman and Trope 2008).
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Construal level theory (CLT; Liberman and Trope 1998) pos-
its that psychological distance affects the way in which individuals 
mentally represent objects or events (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
More specifically, when events are psychologically distant, people 
represent them at a higher level, focusing on their superordinate, 
central, and general features, whereas when events are psychologi-
cally proximal, people represent them at a lower level, focusing on 
their subordinate, peripheral, and concrete features. Research has 
also shown that unrelated cues can promote these more abstract ver-
sus concrete levels of processing (Fujita et al. 2006; Freitas, Goll-
witzer, and Trope 2004; Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004) 
and have carry-over effects on decision processes (Khan, Zhu, and 
Kalra 2011; Kim, Zhang, and Li 2008; Meyvis, Goldsmith, and Dhar 
2012). 
We add to this work by testing how exposure to scarcity-related 
cues affects consumers’ level of construal. Prior work has shown that 
exposure to threat-related cues can narrow one’s scope of attention to 
a more local (vs. global) level (Friedman and Förster 2010). Because 
exposure to scarcity-related cues might trigger cognitions related to 
threat, one thus might expect such cues to promote concrete levels 
of construal (Liberman and Trope 2008; Marguc, Förster, and Van 
Kleef 2011). This prediction is supported by research showing that 
being raised or put in an environment where resources are scarce 
changes how people allocate attention, specifically by shifting focus 
towards the scarcity-related problem and away from other problems 
or future considerations (Griskevivius et al. 2013; Shah, Shafir, and 
Mullainathan 2011).
However, we draw from research on resource constraints and 
goal pursuit to argue that exposure to scarcity-related cues induces 
people to adopt an abstract mindset. Indeed, research has shown that 
interfering forces (Higgins 2006) encountered during goal pursuit 
induce a more global, higher-level perspective in order to improve 
problem solving through the detection of alternative means or strate-
gies, and that this shift in processing can carry over to tasks unrelated 
to one’s goal pursuit (Marguc et al. 2011). Related research has also 
shown that constraints put on a creative process can improve creative 
thinking (Burroughs et al. 2011; Moreau and Dhal 2005). Therefore, 
in resource-rich environments, being exposed to scarcity-related 
cues may not be interpreted as a threat, but instead as an interfer-
ing force that induces taking a step back and processing information 
from a more abstract perspective. We test this prediction in three 
studies and find convergent results supporting our prediction.
First, to test whether activating the concept of scarcity induces 
people to adopt an abstract mindset, study 1 manipulated the activa-
tion of scarcity (episodic recall, adapted from Fischhoff et al. 2003) 
prior to having participants complete the Behavior Identification 
Form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner 1989), which assesses people’s 
level of representation (abstract “why” vs. concrete “how”) of 25 
different activities. In line with our prediction, participants primed 
with scarcity were more likely to select higher-level representations 
of behaviors (M = 17.05) than participants exposed to a neutral prime 
(M = 14.81; p = .054). 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate conceptual support for this effect, 
showing that activating the concept of scarcity broadens one’s con-
siderations. Prior work has shown that when individuals process in-
formation abstractly, they tend to categorize objects into fewer, more 
general, superordinate groups (Liberman and Trope 2008; Marguc et 
al. 2011; Waslak et al. 2006). Study 2 thus manipulated the activa-
tion of scarcity with a listing task (Roux, Goldsmith, and Bonezzi 
2012), where participants had to to list three things they “cannot do” 
(vs. “can do”) when different resources are unavailable (vs. avail-
able). Participants then completed a categorization task (Waslak et 
al. 2006), where they had to categorize three different lists of items 
(camping trip, household, and yard sale items) into groups. In line 
with our prediction, participants primed with scarcity classified the 
items into fewer categories overall (M = 6.12) than those in the neu-
tral prime condition (M = 6.64; p = .057). 
Prior research has also shown that abstract thinking expands 
the boundaries of conceptual categories and increases the inclusion 
of atypical exemplars into a given category (Liberman and Trope 
2008). Study 3 thus manipulated the activation of scarcity (listing 
task) prior to having participants complete a category inclusiveness 
task (Huang and Galinsky 2011, Isen and Daubman 1984), where 
they had to rate the extent to which strong, intermediate, and weak 
exemplars belonged in a given category. In line with our prediction, 
participants primed with scarcity demonstrated greater category 
inclusiveness for medium (M = 8.14) exemplars than participants 
exposed to a neutral prime (M = 7.75; p = .04). A similar pattern 
of results emerged for the weak exemplars (Mscarcity = 5.90; Mneutral = 
5.48; p = .07), but not for the strong exemplars (Mscarcity = 9.87; Mneutral 
= 9.77; p = .13), consistent with prior work (Huang and Galinski 
2010).
In summary, the findings presented here advance our under-
standing of how being exposed to scarcity-related cues affects one’s 
psychological orientation. Across three studies, we demonstrate that 
exposure to scarcity-related cues promotes more abstract constru-
als. Although further research is necessary to fully understand the 
boundaries of these effects, this research provides an important step 
towards a better understanding of the psychology of scarcity.
REFERENCES
Ameriks, J., Andrew C., & Leahy, J. (2003). Wealth accumulation 
and propensity to plan. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 
(3), 1007–47.
Burroughs, James E., Darren W. Dahl, Page Moreau, Amitava 
Chattopadhyay, and Gerald J. Gorn (2011), “Facilitating and 
Rewarding Creativity during New Product Development,” 
Journal of Marketing, 75 (July), 53-67.
Chakravarthy, Manu V. and Frank W. Booth (2004), “Eating, 
Exercise, and “Thrifty” Genotypes: Connecting the Dots 
Toward an Evolutionary Understanding of Modern Chronic 
Diseases,” Journal of Applied Physiology, 96, 3-10.
Cialdini, Robert B. (2009), Influence: Science and Practice, 5th ed., 
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Elder, Harold W., & Rudolph, P. M. (1999). Does retirement 
planning affect the level of retirement satisfaction? Financial 
Services Review, 8 (2), 117–27.
Eroglu, S., & Harrell, G. D. (1986). Retail crowding: Theoretical 
and strategic implications. Journal of Retailing.
Fischhoff, Baruch, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and 
Jennifer S. Lerner (2003), “Judged terror risk and proximity to 
the World Trade Center,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26, 
137-51.
Förster, Jens, Ronald S. Friedman, and Nira Liberman (2004), 
“Temporal Construal Effects on Abstract and Concrete 
Thinking: Consequences for Insight and Creative Cognition,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 177-89.
Freitas, Aantonio L., Peter M. Gollwitzer, and Yaacov Trope 
(2004), “The Influence of Abstract and Concrete Mindsets on 
Anticipating and Guiding Others’ Self-Regulatory Efforts,” 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 739-52.
Friedman, Ronald S. and Jens Förster (2010), “Implicit Affective 
Cues and Attentional Tuning: An Integrative Review,” 
Psychological Bulletin, 136 (5), 875-93.
114 / Understanding Consumers’ Perception of and Responses to Scarcity Cues 
Frisch, R. E. (1985).  Fatness, menarche, and female fertility.  
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 28, 611-633. 
Fujita, Kentaro, Yaacov Trope, Nira Liberman, and Maya Levin-
Sagi (2006), “Construal Levels and Self-Control,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 51-367.
Gitlin, Todd (2007), Media Unlimited: How the Torrent of Images 
and Sounds Overwhelms Our Lives, New York, NY: Henry 
Holt.
Griskevicius, V., Delton, A. W., Robertson, T. E., & Tybur, J. M. 
(2011). Environmental contingency in life history strategies: 
The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status on 
reproductive timing.  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 100, 241-254.  
Griskevicius, Vladas, Joshua M. Ackerman, Stephanie M. Cantu, 
Andrew W. Delton, Theresa E. Robertson, Jeffry A. Simpson, 
Melissa Emery Thomson, and Joshua M.Tybur (2013), “When 
the Economy Falters, Do People Spend or Save? Responses 
to Resource Scarcity Depend on Childhood Environments,” 
Psychological Science, 24 (2), 197-205.
Higgins, E. Tory (2006), “Value From Hedonic Experience and 
Engagement,” Psychological Review, 113, 439-60.
Hill, S. E., Rodeheffer, C. D., Griskevicius, V., Durante, K., 
& White, A. E. (2012). Boosting beauty in an economic 
decline: mating, spending, and the lipstick effect. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 103(2), 275–91.
Huang, Li, & Galinsky, Adam D. (2011), “Mind-Body Dissonance: 
Conflict Between the Senses Expands the Mind’s Horizons,” 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 351-9.
Inman, J. Jeffrey, Anil C. Peter, and Priya Raghubir (1997), 
“Framing the Deal: The Role of Restrictions in Accentuating 
Deal Value,” Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (1), 68-79.
Isen, Alice M. and Kimberly A. Daubman (1984), “The Influence of 
Affect on Categorization,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47, 1206-17.
Khan, Uzma, Meng Zhu, and Ajay Kalra (2011), “When Tradeoffs 
Matter: The Effect of Choice Construal on Context Effects,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 48 (1), 62-71.
Kim, Kyeongheui, Meng Zhang, and Xiuping Li (2008), “Effects 
of Temporal and Social Distance on Consumer Evaluations,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 35 (4), 706-13.
Liberman, Nira and Yaacov Trope (1998), “The Role of Feasibility 
and Desirability Considerations in Near and Distant Future 
Decisions: A Test of Temporal Construal Theory,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology,75, 5-18.
Liberman, Nira and Yaacov Trope (2008), “The Psychology of 
Transcending the Here and Now,” Science, 322, 1201-5.
Lynch, J. G., Netemeyer, R. G., Spiller, S. A., & Zammit, A. (2010). 
A generalizable scale of propensity to plan: The long and the 
short of planning for time and money. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 37, 108-128.
Machleit, K. A., Eroglu, S. A., & Mantel, S. P. (2000). Perceived 
retail crowding and shopping satisfaction: what modifies this 
relationship?. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9(1), 29-42.
Machleit, K. A., Kellaris, J. J., & Eroglu, S. A. (1994). Human 
versus spatial dimensions of crowding perceptions in retail 
environments: A note on their measurement and effect on 
shopper satisfaction. Marketing Letters, 5(2), 183-194.
Marguc, Janina, Jens Förster, and Gerben A. Van Kleef (2011), 
“Stepping Back to See the Big Picture: When Obstacles 
Elicit Global Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 101 (5), 883-901.
Meyvis, Tom, Kelly Goldsmith and Ravi Dhar (2012). “Brand 
Extensions and the Consumer Decision Environment: Pictures 
and Comparisons Shift Consumers’ Emphasis from Fit to 
Quality,” Journal of Marketing Research, 49 (2), 206-17.
Moreau, C. Page and Darren W. Dahl (2005), “Designing 
the Solution: The Impact of Constraints on Consumers’ 
Creativity”, Journal of Consumer Research, 32 (1), 13-22.
Pracejus, J. W., Olsen, G. D., & O’Guinn, T. C. (2006). How 
nothing became something: white space, rhetoric, history, and 
meaning. Journal of Consumer Research, 33(1), 82-90.
Roux, Caroline, Kelly Goldsmith and Andrea Bonezzi (2012), 
“On the Consequences of Scarcity: When Limited Resources 
Promote Agentic Responses,” Manuscript under review.
Shah, Anuj. K., Eldar Shafir, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2011), 
“Some Consequences of Having Too Little,” Science, 338, 
682-5.
Sharma, E., & Alter, A. L. (2012). Financial Deprivation Prompts 
Consumers to Seek Scarce Goods. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 39(3), 545–560. 
Sobal, J., & Stunkard, A. J. (1989).  Socio-economic status and 
obesity:  A review of the literature.  Psychological Bulletin, 
105, 260-275.  
Swami, V., Frederick, D. A., Aavik, T., Alcalay, L., Allik, J., 
Anderson, D., Zivcic-Becirevic, I. (2010).  The attractive 
female body weight and female body dissatisfaction in 26 
countries across 10 world regions:  Results of the International 
Body Project I.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
36, 309-325.
Swami V. & Tovée, M. J. (2012). The impact of psychological 
stress on men’s judgments of female body size. PLoS ONE 
7(8): e42593.
Trope, Yaacov and Nira Liberman (2003), “Temporal Construal,” 
Psychological Review, 110, 403-21.
Twist, Lynne and Teresa Barker (2006), The Soul of Money: 
Reclaiming the Wealth of our Inner Resources, New York, NY: 
W. W. Norton & Company.
Vallacher, Robin R. and Daniel M. Wegner (1989), “Levels 
of Personal Agency: Individual Variation in Action 
Identification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
57 (4), 660-71.
Verhallen, Theo M. M. (1982), “Scarcity and Consumer Choice 
Behavior,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 2 (December), 
299-322.
Wakslak, Cheryl J., Yaacov Trope, Nira Liberman, and Rotem 
Alony (2006), “Seeing the Forest When Entry Is Unlikely: 
Probability and the Mental Representation of Events,” Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 135 (4), 641-53.
White, Andrew E., Yexin Jessica Li, Vladas Griskevicius, Steven 
L. Neuberg, & Douglas T. Kenrick. (in press). Putting all your 
eggs in one basket: Life history strategies, bet-hedging, and 
diversification. Psychological Science.
Zeithaml, V. A. (1988). Consumer perceptions of price, quality, 
and value: a means-end model and synthesis of evidence. The 
Journal of Marketing, 2-22.
115 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Let’s Talk About It: Factors Influencing Word-of-Mouth Content
Chairs: Yu-Jen Chen, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China 
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
Paper  #1: Who’s Driving This Conversation? Systematic Biases 
in the Content of Online Consumer Discussions 
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA 
Ann E. Schlosser, University of Washington, USA
Yu-Jen Chen, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China
Paper  #2: When Do People Talk About and Why?
Evan Weingarten, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Paper  #3: The Content and Impact of Mobile Versus Desktop 
Reviews
Nicholas Lurie, University of Connecticut, USA
Sam Ransbotham, Boston College, USA 
Hongju Liu, University of Connecticut, USA
Paper  #4: Naive or Savvy: How Credible Are Online Reviews 
for Credence Services?
Shannon Lantzy, University of Maryland, USA
Katherine Stewart, University of Maryland, USA 
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers often share information about their consumption 
experiences and discuss products and services with others online 
(e.g., by reviewing a service provider or participating in a discussion 
forum). Although previous research has provided insight about why 
consumers post content (e.g., Schlosser 2005) and how quantitative 
metrics such as review volume and ratings change over time (e.g., 
Moe and Schweidel 2012), we know much less about the factors that 
influence the qualitative content consumers share. An understanding 
of online content is critical because decades of research on social in-
fluence show that what consumers say influences others (e.g., strong 
vs. weak arguments: Petty and Cacioppo 1986; vividness effect: 
Herr, Kardes and Kim 1991). 
The four papers in this session, all at an advanced stage, lever-
age both large datasets from online forums and controlled experi-
ments to examine factors that influence word of mouth (WOM) con-
tent. Specifically, they examine whether what consumers say differs 
when they are: 
• the first to post a response vs. the second or third?  
• posting about the past or future instead of the present?
• posting a review on a mobile device vs. on their desktop 
computer? 
• reviewing a provider whose services are harder vs. easier to 
evaluate? 
Hamilton, Schlosser and Chen show that early responses to a 
post affect later responses to the post, suggesting that the first people 
to respond play a crucial role in driving the content of the discussion. 
Weingarten and Berger demonstrate that there is a strong present 
bias in what people talk about but that people tend to talk about the 
near future and distant past  This suggests that accessibility and emo-
tional intensity affect when people talk about. The next two papers 
examine the effects of sharing devices and the type of experience. 
Lurie, Ransbotham and Liu find that restaurant reviews written on 
mobile devices are more affective and more negative than those writ-
ten by the same reviewer on desktops. Notably, mobile reviews tend 
to be rated by others as less useful, perhaps because they are shorter 
and more emotional. Finally, Lantzy, Stewart and Hamilton also ex-
amine reviews of service providers and find that negative reviews 
contain higher-quality arguments and more information than posi-
tive reviews for the same types of service providers. They show that 
reviews of credence service providers (e.g., doctors, auto mechanics) 
include more claims about easier-to-evaluate experience attributes 
than claims about harder-to-evaluate credence attributes. 
Consumers rely on online content to make important decisions. 
We aim to “Make a Difference” by identifying systematic biases that 
affect the information being shared online. We expect this session to 
generate discussion about the emotional and affective nature of on-
line content, the influence of previous posts (either by the same per-
son or by others) on subsequent posts, and the various methods that 
can be used to study WOM. This session will appeal to researchers 
interested in the antecedents and consequences of WOM and social 
media marketing as well as those interested in social influence and 
communication.
Who’s Driving This Conversation? Systematic Biases in 
the Content of Online Consumer Discussions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers rely on online word of mouth to make consump-
tion decisions partly because they believe the information provided 
helps them make better-informed decisions. However, participants 
in online discussion forums may have multiple goals, only one of 
which is to provide others with accurate information. For example, 
participants may want to signal expertise (Schlosser 2005; Wojnicki 
and Godes 2012), convey uniqueness (Schlosser 2009) or build con-
nections with others (e.g., Hennig- Thurau et. al. 2004; Schlosser 
2009). Because online posting is context-dependent communication 
in which participants read previous posts within a thread before of-
fering their own opinions (Moe and Schweidel 2012), the informa-
tion shared in online forums will be influenced by previous posts. 
Therefore, it’s likely that early responses would drive the discussion 
towards or away from the information requested in the initial post. 
We closely examine the role of early responses on later re-
sponses in online discussion threads in which in which the consumer 
seeking information explicitly tells other participants which decision 
criteria are important. For example, a consumer posting on Tripadvi-
sor.com might describe an upcoming trip and ask for hotel recom-
mendations, noting her preferences for location, price level and other 
services such as parking. Despite the objective value of the informa-
tion that has been requested, we predict that the discussion content 
will show systematic biases. For example, we expect already men-
tioned attributes to be more rather than less likely to be mentioned in 
subsequent responses. Research on social influence has shown that 
group members tend to repeat shared information (Larson, Foster-
Fishman and Keys 1994; Mojzisch et al. 2010; Stewart and Stasser 
1995). Thus, we expect information provided in online discussion fo-
rums to be driven by early responses to the query: instead of equally 
reflecting attributes mentioned in the query, we expect the content 
to focus more on attributes already mentioned. We suggested that 
this is because consumers exhibit conformity to express affiliation 
toward others.
We test our predictions by analyzing public data from online 
discussion forums and conducting controlled experiments. Our anal-
ysis of discussion threads from three online discussion forums (on 
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Tripadvisor.com and DISboards.com) provides empirical evidence 
that early responses to a query drive the subsequent discussion. We 
examined two different consumption categories (hotels and restau-
rants) in three cities (Seattle, Washington DC, and Orlando). Our 
sample included 324 posts from 85 discussion threads with at least 
three participants and the goal of seeking advice about a specific 
decision (e.g., Should I stay at hotel A or B?) between January 2011 
and January 2013. After identifying the attributes most frequently 
mentioned for each product category (e.g., location, price), two rat-
ers coded each response to indicate whether each attribute was men-
tioned. Because each response could mention multiple attributes, we 
used a Generalized Estimating Equations approach (GEE; Liang and 
Zeger 1986) to analyze the data. Controlling for the importance of 
the product attributes, we find that whether previous responses men-
tion an attribute is more predictive of whether subsequent responses 
mention the attribute than whether the initial post mentions the at-
tribute. This finding suggests that previous responses to a post play 
a critical role in influencing the attributes discussed in subsequent 
responses.
In Study 2, participants were given information about the at-
tributes of two restaurants. Using this information, participants were 
asked to respond to a posted question asking about the appropriate-
ness of the two restaurants for an occasion involving a large group of 
friends. The number of previous responses to the question was varied 
so that participants were either providing the first, second or third re-
sponse. The content of the previous responses was also varied so that 
previous posts either mentioned the critical attribute (the suitability 
of the restaurant for groups) or did not (and mentioned the atmo-
sphere of the restaurant instead). Consistent with our manipulation 
of the importance of the critical attribute, when there were no pre-
vious responses, more participants mentioned the restaurants’ suit-
ability for groups (M = 70%) and fewer mentioned atmosphere (M 
= 43%). Importantly, more participants mentioned the restaurants’ 
suitability when all other previous posts mentioned suitability for 
groups (M = 71%) than when no previous posts mentioned suitabil-
ity for groups (M = 48%). Notably, when some responses mentioned 
suitability for groups and others did not, participants were also less 
likely to mention the important attribute (M = 52%). As in the real 
discussion threads we analyzed, participants in this study seem to be 
more strongly influenced by the initial responses to the post than to 
the query.
Study 3 allowed participants to communicate their own knowl-
edge in their response to a post about a real event in which they were 
familiar. All participants read an inquiry post and a first response 
about the event. We manipulated the content of the first response in 
terms of the attribute being mentioned. The results were consistent 
with Study 2 such that participants were more likely to be influenced 
by the first response on attribute that is critical (Mmention = 50% vs. 
Mnot mention = 13%). However, when the attribute is not critical, wheth-
er the first response mentioned did not change participants’ response 
(Mmention = 45% vs. Mnot mention = 49%) 
Study 4 examined whether the perceived expertise of the first 
responder moderates the effect. The procedure was identical to study 
2 except that we manipulated expertise by describing the first re-
sponder as a frequent or first-time traveler to the Boston area. Al-
though we replicated the key finding of our first lab study, show-
ing that whether the first response mentions the key attribute has a 
significant effect on whether the participant mentions it (M = 79% 
vs. 46%), we did not observe an attenuation of the effect when the 
first responder was perceived to be less expert. This suggests that the 
influence of the first responder derives not from his or her expertise 
but from social incentives to focus on shared rather than unshared 
information. 
In our last study, we manipulate the participant’s goals to pro-
vide accurate information in response to the query or form relation-
ships with group members. The procedure was similar to study 2 
except that participants were encouraged to adopt either a group goal 
or an accuracy goal. As predicted, we replicated the early response 
effect only in the group goal condition, suggesting that participants’ 
goals moderate the effect, suggesting that participants are respond-
ing to normative influence within the group setting.
When Do People Talk About and Why?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People talk about things that occur over various time horizons 
into the past, present, and future.  They talk about the television show 
they are currently watching, the groceries they bought yesterday, and 
the restaurant they are going to tomorrow.  
But, when are people more likely to talk about, and why?  That 
is, how does the likelihood people talk about something vary based 
on its temporal position from the present, and how does this pattern 
inform us about the drivers of interpersonal communication?
We suggest two key factors shape when people talk about. 
The first is accessibility.  People are more likely to talk about 
things that are  accessible (Berger and Schwartz 2011).  Tempo-
rally distant events are less accessible than temporally close events 
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004).  In the context of when 
people talk about, that suggests that (1) individuals should share 
more about the present than the past and future, (2) that temporally 
close events should be shared more frequently than temporally dis-
tant events, (3) that people should talk more about the future later in 
the week when they get closer to the weekend, and (4) that people 
should talk more about the past 24 hours later in a given day.  Second, 
arousal impacts sharing (Berger 2011; Berger and Milkman 2012) 
and emotional arousal should also shape when people talk about. 
Past research has found the future to be more emotionally intense 
than the past (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004; Van Boven 
and Ashworth 2007), more positive (Newby-Clark and Ross 2003), 
and less constrained (Van Boven, Kane, and McGraw 2008). Conse-
quently, while people may talk about the near past than near future 
(because it is more accessible), they may talk about the distant future 
rather than distant past (because it is more emotionally intense).
To provide a naturalistic examination of when people talk 
about, we collected a large sample of everyday conversations.  We 
randomly selected about 3,000 tweets posted in the public twitter 
stream, 3,000 Facebook posts taken from an online database of Face-
book data (Kosinski and Stillwell 2011), and hundreds of pages of 
transcribed in-person conversations from a written corpus.  Next, 
two research assistants removed spam posts from the Twitter and 
Facebook data set. Then, three research assistants individually coded 
each message in Excel on a continuous scale in terms of fraction of a 
day from the present (-7 = a week ago, -1/24 = an hour ago, 0 = now, 
1 = a day from now, 365= a year from now), and resolved disputes 
together. The intraclass correlation coefficient for the datasets was 
high (>.95).
Four key results emerged.  First, as predicted, interpersonal 
communication is very focused on the present.  Approximately 43% 
of all rated posts were about exactly now, 29% were about the past, 
and 28% were about the future (χ² (2, N = 3812) = 165.64, p < .001). 
The past and future did not differ significantly overall in their fre-
quencies (χ² (1, N = 2169) = 2.324, p = .13). If the range that counted 
as “present” was expanded (from 0) to include posts within a half 
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hour into the past and future, 60% of posts were about the present. 
This number grows to 64% if broadened to an hour into the past or 
future.  This result shows that many online social media posts, if not 
focused on the very instant of posting, are focused heavily on the 
present, which is the most accessible.
Second, as predicted, time of day affects when people talk 
about. As the day progresses, individuals talk more about what hap-
pened within the previous twenty-four hours (excluding the past 
hour). This result holds in terms of hours (B = .015, Wald = 4.032, 
p = .045) and minutes (B= .000217, Wald = 3.171, p = .075) since 
midnight.  Overall, this result is consistent with the accessibility ex-
planation: individuals have and share more accessible material from 
earlier in the day as it progresses.
Third, as predicted, day of week also affects when people talk 
about.  As people move further into the week (and away from the 
weekend), people talk more about the upcoming twenty-four hours. 
This progression holds for days since Saturday (B = .054, Wald = 
7.131, p = .008) and trends in the right direction for hours since Sat-
urday (B = .00134, Wald = 2.476, p = .12), and holds when reviewing 
days (B = .055, Wald = 7.113, p = .008) and hours (B = .00195, Wald 
= 4.854, p = .028) since Sunday.  This result is also consistent with 
the accessibility mechanism if the future becomes more accessible 
as Friday gets closer.
Fourth, people talk more about the near past and distant future. 
In other words, the relative frequency of past and future fluctuates 
based on temporal distance (χ² (1, N = 2169) = 63.041, p < .001). 
Looking at nearby time periods, people share more about the previ-
ous twenty-four hours than the next twenty-four hours (χ² (1, N = 
1823) = 20.858, p < .001), but for distant time periods (i.e., greater 
than a day away), people talk more about the future than the past (χ² 
(1, N = 346) = 44.439, p < .001).  Whereas people talk more about 
the recent past than near future, they talk more about the distant fu-
ture than the distant past. This latter finding is in line with the emo-
tional intensity explanation inasmuch as the more evocative, distant 
future is shared more than the distant past.
Overall, these results are consistent with our predictions about 
the impact of accessibility and emotional intensity on the sharing 
from temporally close and distant time frames.  People share more 
nearby events, and more distant future than distant past events. We 
are currently conducting various lab studies to further explore and 
provide evidence for our proposed mechanisms as drivers of these 
effects.
The Content and Impact of Mobile Versus Desktop 
Reviews
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Although there is a growing body of research on the content 
and impact of word-of-mouth on consumer behavior, little is known 
about differences between mobile and traditional desktop reviews. 
Recent empirical research shows that desktop reviews are gener-
ally positive (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), that product ratings in 
online reviews increase over time but decline as the number of re-
views increases (Godes and Silva 2012), and that later reviewers are 
influenced by earlier ones (Moe and Trusov 2011). Other research 
shows that the valence, dispersion, and volume of consumer reviews 
predict sales in traditional (i.e., desktop) online environments (Che-
valier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan, Gu, and Whinston 2008; Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004). Other research suggests that the perceived value of 
consumer-created content depends on characteristics such as con-
tribution length, contributors’ prior posting behavior, contributor 
expertise, and the perceived similarity of the creators to the readers 
of this content (Forman, Ghose, and Wiesenfeld 2008; Weiss, Lurie, 
and MacInnis 2008). However little is known about differences in 
the characteristics and relative influence of consumer content created 
in mobile versus traditional settings. In addition, there is substantial 
debate over the pros and cons of allowing consumers to write real 
time reviews with some fearing that mobile reviews will not benefit 
from reflection and that consumers will affectively (and negatively) 
respond to their current experiences. This has led some review sites 
(e.g., Yelp) to allow consumers to start reviews on their mobile de-
vices but require them to use a desktop computer to finish them. 
This research addresses these issues by 1) identifying potential dif-
ferences in content created on mobile versus non-mobile devices and 
2) assessing how these factors affect the relative influence of mobile 
versus desktop reviews.
Given that mobile reviews are more likely to be written during 
or immediately after service experiences, they should be more accu-
rate, and less optimistically biased, than retrospective (i.e., desktop) 
evaluations (e.g., the rosy view; Mitchell et al. 1997; Novemsky and 
Ratner 2003; Wirtz et al. 2003). This means that mobile reviews will 
be more negative than desktop reviews. However, because they are 
likely to be written in real-time, and therefore reflect “hot” reason-
ing (Ariely and Loewenstein 2006), mobile reviews may be more 
emotional and heuristic decreasing their perceived usefulness rela-
tive to desktop reviews. Further, time pressure and tradeoffs between 
physical and cognitive effort on mobile devices (Lurie, Song, and 
Narasimhan 2009) means that mobile reviews should be shorter; po-
tentially also reducing their perceived usefulness (Weiss et al. 2008). 
To gain initial insights into these issues, we collected 299,806 
reviews from 125,147 users on 144,231 restaurants on the website 
Urban Spoon. Of these, 136,306 reviews (45%) were written on mo-
bile devices and 163,500 (55%) were written on non-mobile devices. 
To control for user characteristics that might drive differences be-
tween mobile and non-mobile reviews, we focused on 4,449 users 
who wrote both mobile and non-mobile reviews providing a sample 
of 48,610 (20,616 mobile and 27,994 non-mobile) reviews. Review 
text was analyzed using the LIWC program (Pennebaker, Booth, and 
Francis 2007). To measure influence we examined differences in the 
number of people that “liked” a review. Results show that mobile 
reviews are shorter (as expected), more negative, involve a greater 
percentage of words expressing positive emotion, are less cognitive, 
and more affective. Mobile reviews are also less influential (i.e., few-
er readers “like” these reviews) even after controlling for differences 
between mobile and desktop reviews.
Naive or Savvy: How Credible Are Online Reviews for 
Credence Services?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Online reviews allow consumers to share information about 
their service experiences with other consumers. Theoretically, shar-
ing this information should reduce market information asymmetries 
between potential consumers and service providers  because many 
attributes of a service experience cannot be evaluated prior to con-
sumption (i.e., they are credence or experience attributes rather than 
search attributes; Huang, Lurie, and Mitra 2009). For example, al-
though a consumer might be able to evaluate the prices of entrees (a 
search attribute) prior to eating at a restaurant, it is very difficult to 
evaluate their tastiness (an experience attribute) without having con-
sumed a meal, and even after eating them, a consumer cannot verify 
the claim that they are made with organic ingredients (a credence 
attribute). Because consumers cannot assess the quality of credence 
attributes, consumer reviews of services that are dominated by cre-
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dence attributes (e.g., doctors, auto mechanics) are of dubious cred-
ibility. Indeed, many doctors have strongly resisted the legitimacy of 
consumer reviews (Andrews 2008; Jain 2010), in some cases even 
requiring patients to sign documents promising never to review their 
doctors (ElBoghdady 2012).
Although consumers have numerous forums to review cre-
dence services (e.g., RateMDs.com, Angie’s List, Yelp.com), extant 
research has focused only on reviews of search and experience goods 
(Huang et al. 2009; Mudambi and Schuff 2010; Park, Kim, and Han 
2008). We address this gap by examining the claims typically includ-
ed in reviews of credence service providers and whether consumers 
rationally discount claims about credence attributes within reviews. 
We pose three interrelated research questions: 1) Do the claims made 
in reviews of credence services on forums such as Angie’s List and 
Yelp.com substantively differ from the claims made in reviews of 
experience services, and if so, how? 2) Which attributes do consum-
ers believe are most important for evaluating credence service pro-
viders? and 3) When evaluating credence service providers, do con-
sumers weigh credence claims more heavily than experience claims 
because credence attributes are more important for these services, or 
do they weigh experience claims more heavily because these claims 
are more credible?
We address these questions by conducting a content analysis of 
real online reviews and a series of lab experiments. First, we design 
and test a rigorous classification method for identifying credence and 
experience services based on their core and peripheral attributes. The 
economics of information literature categorizes goods and services 
into search, experience and credence categories, but does not discuss 
the possibility that credence services may have search, experience 
and credence attributes (e.g., a doctor’s office location is a search 
attribute, bedside manner is an experience attribute, and accurate di-
agnosis is a credence attribute). Our categorization method fills a 
gap in the literature by explicitly linking a product’s relevant search, 
experience, and credence attributes (Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1988) 
to the categorization of the product as a search, experience, or cre-
dence good (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Previous work has 
simply assumed the classification of goods as search, experience, or 
credence a priori, which has led to conflicting classifications. For 
example, in Nelson’s original work (1970) and in subsequent papers 
a camera was classified as a search good, but other authors have ar-
gued that cameras should be labeled experience goods (Huang et al. 
2009).  We propose a replicable and rigorous method for classifying 
services based on their core and peripheral attributes.
Next, we content analyze online reviews of service provid-
ers to compare their content and structure across services that are 
dominated by credence vs. experience attributes. Using Toulmin’s 
(1958) theoretical framework for evaluating arguments and claims, 
we compare the structure of claims made in reviews of experience 
vs. credence service providers. We find that negative reviews contain 
higher-quality arguments as well as more information than positive 
reviews for the same types of service providers. This finding pro-
vides an alternative explanation for the greater impact of negative 
reviews in online word of mouth that has been demonstrated in ear-
lier work (Cao, Duan, and Gan 2011; Laczniak 2001). This pattern of 
results also may explain why review length seems to mediate the ef-
fect of review valence on helpfulness ratings (Wu, van der Heijden, 
and Korfiatis 2011). 
Further, we code claims about specific service provider attri-
butes that are mentioned in reviews. Our results indicate that reviews 
of credence services include a mix of claims about both credence 
and experience attributes, but claims about experience attributes ap-
pear more frequently than claims about credence attributes. Thus, we 
find that although reviews of credence services contain claims about 
experience attributes (e.g., a doctor’s bedside manner), they also 
contain claims about credence attributes that consumers cannot ac-
curately evaluate (e.g., whether the doctor’s diagnosis was accurate).
Finally, we are conducting a series of experimental studies to 
explore consumers’ perceptions of reviews, manipulating factors 
such as the type of service provider (experience or credence), the 
type of attribute in the review (experience or credence), and the va-
lence of the review (positive or negative). We expect to find that al-
though consumers reading reviews may acknowledge the low cred-
ibility of credence claims when they are explicitly asked to evaluate 
the claims, claims about credence attributes significantly influence 
their evaluations of credence service providers.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
All emotions arise from events that have relevancy to oneself. 
Certain emotions such as pride and embarrassment are particularly 
self-relevant, since they involve self-reflection and self-evaluation 
(Tangney and Tracy 2012). It is thus not surprising that a large body 
of research has examined the intrapersonal effects of emotions. For 
example, previous research has investigated the impact of pride 
on self-control (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011) and self-efficacy 
(Passyn and Sujan 2012), the antecedents underlying the self-ap-
praisal elements of embarrassment (Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 
2001), and the impact of sadness on evaluative judgment (Schwarz 
and Clore 1983) and affect regulation (Andrade 2005). In addition 
to the intrapersonal impacts, emotion also plays a central role in 
our interpersonal life (Fisher and Manstead 2008; Van Kleef 2010). 
However, the interpersonal effects of emotions, particularly those 
self-conscious emotions (e.g., pride), have received little attention in 
consumer research.
In an attempt to advance our understanding of the interpersonal 
effects of emotion, this session brings together four papers, which 
particularly focus on pride, embarrassment, and sadness, to provide 
insights into how these emotions influence consumers’ interpersonal 
encounters. Specifically, this session investigates the following ques-
tions: How would pride influence consumers’ tendency to conform 
to others? How would embarrassment impact consumers’ impression 
management concerns in a social setting? How would taking other’s 
perspective affect consumers’ embarrassment avoidant behaviors? 
How would sadness influence consumers’ reactions towards inter-
personal persuasions?
In the first paper, Huang, Dong, and Mukhopadhyay investigate 
the impact of pride on consumers’ conformity behavior. They show 
that pride can either increase or decrease conformity depending on 
lay theories of achievement (entity/incremental). Specifically, those 
who attribute achievement to personal traits (entity theorists) are less 
likely to conform than those who attribute achievement to effort (in-
cremental theorists).
In the second paper, Huang, Wang, and Zhu examine the effect 
of embarrassment on consumers’ impression management concerns 
in product selection and donation behavior. They show that when 
feeling embarrassed, consumers demonstrate behaviors to create a 
positive self-impression and at the same time to be consistent with 
their agentic-communal orientations. 
In the third paper, Rossi and Scott also explore embarrassment 
by focusing on how taking other’s perspective influences embar-
rassment-avoidant behavior. They suggest that perspective-taking 
prompts consumers to engage in less embarrassment-avoidant be-
havior. But this only occurs for consumers with high public self-
consciousness.
In the fourth paper, Coleman and Williams investigate the im-
pact of sadness on consumers’ reactions to interpersonal persuasion. 
They show that consumers are naturally suspicious of sad (vs. hap-
py) appeals by engaging in emotion regulation. This effect could be 
strengthened when persuasion knowledge is made accessible. 
 We believe that this session will appeal to a wide audience at 
ACR. There has been a limited understanding on emotions, particu-
larly those self-conscious emotions, in an interpersonal setting. This 
session advances the literature by investigating certain important yet 
less studied emotions that range from cognitively differentiated af-
fects (e.g., pride and embarrassment) to more global affects (e.g., 
sadness) , and by providing insights into how each emotion may af-
fect consumers’ interpersonal behaviors (e.g., conformity, donation). 
Twelve studies were included in total with three studies in each pa-
per. Also, this session echoes the conference mission of making a 
difference by reinventing established perspectives in theory and by 
providing socially impactful insights in practice. 
Proud to Belong or Proudly Different? Contrasting 
Effects of Incidental Pride on Conformity 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Pride is as an emotional response to success or achievement 
(Lazarus 1991; MacInnis and Patrick 2006; Mukhopadhyay and 
Johar 2007), in which the self is attributed as having achieved an 
important goal (Tracy and Robins 2004). It is a common response 
to important life events (e.g., graduation) as well as everyday oc-
currences (e.g., get praised by teacher). Previous research on pride 
has mainly focused on how incidental pride influences one’s own 
behavior in a personal setting. For example, pride can influence con-
sumers’ self-control (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011), and is linked 
to self-efficacy (Passyn and Sujan 2012), and motivation for future 
achievement (Fredrickson 2001; Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 
2005). In contrast, the current research aims to explore whether and 
how incidental pride can influence consumers’ preferences given so-
cial influence, specifically, their tendency to conform.
We propose that the effect of pride in such situations depends 
on the lay theories that consumers hold about their achievements. 
Lay theories influence how people interpret and predict their social 
worlds (Wyer 2004). Given that our domain of interest is the pride 
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that people feel in response to achievement, we draw on Dweck and 
Leggett’s (1988) seminal concepts of lay theories of achievement. In 
this model, “entity theorists” believe that intelligence and ability are 
fixed quantities and cannot be changed, whereas “incremental theo-
rists” believe that intelligence and ability are malleable resources 
and thus can be improved through effort. Hence success is attributed 
differently depending on one’s lay theories – either to traits (for en-
tity theorists), or to efforts (for incremental theorists; Molden and 
Dweck 2006).  
How do these lay theories influence the effect of pride on con-
formity? The key insight here is that pride is not a unitary construct, 
but rather two different types of pride – hubristic and authentic (Tra-
cy and Robins 2007). Hubristic pride results from achievement that 
is attributed to internal, stable, and uncontrollable causes (“I did well 
because I’m great.”), whereas authentic pride results from achieve-
ment that is attributed to internal, unstable and controllable causes 
(“I did well because I tried.”). Importantly, the distinct patterns of 
attributions for hubristic versus authentic pride are parallel to those 
made by entity versus incremental theorists.
Now, hubristic and authentic pride can lead to different inter-
personal relationship goals. Hubristic pride is associated with supe-
riority (Tracy and Robins 2007) and narcissism (Lewis 2000; Tracy 
and Robins 2007). People feeling hubristic pride are motivated to 
“get ahead” at the expense of others (Cheng et al. 2010). In con-
trast, authentic pride is associated with feelings of self-worth and 
authenticity (Tracy et al. 2009), and activates the interpersonal goal 
of “getting along with others” (Cheng et al. 2010). People feeling 
authentic pride are more likely to feel similarity with others (Batson 
et al. 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997). 
Because perceptions of similarity are an important predictor 
of conformity (Castelli et al. 2001; Cialdini 2001), we hypothesize 
that authentic pride will increase conformity, whereas hubristic pride 
will enhance uniqueness preference. More generally, incremental 
theorists who feel proud will make effort-based attributions and thus 
conform, similar to those experiencing authentic pride. In contrast, 
entity theorists who feel proud will make trait-based attributions and 
not conform, similar to those experiencing hubristic pride.    
Three studies investigated these possibilities. In study 1, we 
examined if participants who experience effort-based pride (i.e., in-
cremental theorists) express greater conformity than those who ex-
perience trait-based pride (i.e., entity theorists). We first asked par-
ticipants to recall an event when they felt pride due to their efforts 
versus due to their own traits. Participants then performed an osten-
sibly unrelated on-line shopping task in which they chose one T-shirt 
from a set of four options, which were identical except that three of 
them were white and one was red. A significantly greater percentage 
of participants in the trait-based (versus effort-based) pride condition 
chose the uniquely-colored T-shirt. 
The procedure of study 2 was essentially the same, except for 
two differences. First, , instead of using manipulating two types of 
pride, we manipulated entity versus incremental lay theory by pre-
senting participants with a Psychology-Today type article describing 
the lay theory of achievement (Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1997), and 
then asked participants to recall either a pride experience or a typi-
cal school day experience (control condition). Second, we used four 
different product categories to measure conformity. Results showed 
that proud participants who believed in the entity (vs. incremental) 
theory showed less conformity. There was no effect in the control 
condition, meaning lay theory itself did not influence conformity. 
Study 3 extended the previous results in the following ways. 
First, we measured participants’ lay theories, instead of manipulating 
them. Second, we generalized our findings using a different product 
category and a different measure of conformity. Participants first re-
called either a pride experience or a typical school day experience, 
and then indicated their evaluations of a popular brand of hiking GPS 
and a unique one. The difference between the two evaluations served 
as an index for conformity. In the third task, participants indicated 
their belief toward implicit theory (entity vs. incremental). Regres-
sion analyses with pride condition, mean centered lay theory, and 
their interaction as independent variables and the conformity ten-
dency as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect 
of lay theory and a significant interaction effect. Spotlight analyses 
(Aiken and West 1991) revealed entity (vs. incremental) theorists 
evaluated the popular hiking GPS less favorably when they were 
feeling proud. However, no significant effects were obtained among 
incremental theorists.
This research demonstrates a novel effect of incidental pride 
on consumers’ conformity preference. The distinction between the 
two types of pride is new to consumer research, and the underlying 
mechanism represents a synthesis of the literatures on emotions and 
lay theories. 
The Interplay Effect of Embarrassment and Agentic-
Communal Orientation on Consumer Behavior
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Embarrassment is an experience that nearly everyone is famil-
iar with. It occurs “whenever an individual is felt or have projected 
incompatible definitions of himself before those present” (Goffman 
1956), such as when people purchase embarrassing products or when 
they do not have enough money to pay at the register. Despite its 
prevalence, little research has been done looking at how embarrass-
ment influences consumer behavior. Hence, this research seeks to 
investigate how embarrassment impacts consumers’ product selec-
tion and donation behavior. 
According to typical psychological models of embarrassment 
(e.g., Edelmann 1981; Keltner and Buswell 1997), behavior incon-
sistent with social rules in the presence of real or imagined others 
leads to arousal. The arousal gives rise to nonverbal behavior that 
provides information to the self and the observer to label the arousal 
as embarrassment. There is a need of “face-saving” after embarrass-
ing interchange to honor, maintain, and restore the desired public 
identity (Goffman 1956, 1959). The need motivates people to devel-
op strategies to alleviate distress and create a favorable impression 
(Brown and Garland 1971; Keltner and Buswell 1997). 
We argue that this face-saving need interacts with agentic-com-
munal orientation to influence consumers’ product selection and do-
nation behavior differently. Individuals with agentic orientation are 
self-centered and tend to be independent from other people, whereas 
individuals with communal orientation are other-oriented and tend 
to focus on interpersonal affiliation (Eagly 1978, 1987; Carlson 
1972). Therefore, we hypothesize that when feeling embarrassed, 
people will follow strategies that are consistent with their orienta-
tion and at the same time try to create a positive self-impression. 
Specifically, for product selection which is self-focused, when feel-
ing embarrassed, communal individuals (e.g., females) will prefer 
in-group options to enhance affiliation with others, while agentic 
individuals (e.g., males) will prefer non in-group options to reflect 
their individuality. Both strategies create a positive self-impression. 
In the domain of donation which is other-focused (Eagly 1987), the 
results will reverse (i.e., favor in-group) for agentic individuals. This 
is because agentic individuals normally favor out-group charity, but 
when feeling embarrassed, favoring in-group charity helps them cre-
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ate favorable self image and at the same time allows their agentic 
goals still to be met (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). 
We tested these hypotheses in three studies. In Study 1, we 
used participants’ gender as a proxy of agentic/communal orienta-
tion. Participants came in groups of three, and were asked to choose 
and evaluate products in a hypothetical shopping task. The products 
contain either embarrassing products (e.g., adult diapers) or regular 
products (e.g., paper towel), depending on the condition. The experi-
menter verbalized each participant’s choice loudly and ensured other 
participants to hear it. Embarrassment was successfully induced in 
this way, as the awareness of social presence is critical in creating 
embarrassment (Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001). After the em-
barrassment manipulation, participants chose between two pens as 
a thank-you gift, one with a university logo and the other with no 
logo (i.e., in-group vs. non in-group).Their pen choice served as our 
dependent variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a sig-
nificant interaction between emotion (embarrassing vs. control) and 
gender, such that females preferred the logo pen whereas males pre-
ferred the no-logo pen when feeling embarrassed. 
In study 2, we tested our hypothesis in the donation domain. Af-
ter a similar embarrassment manipulation with study 1, participants 
indicated how much they were willing to donate out of their $10 
compensation towards either an in-group or an out-group charity.
Their agentic-communal orientation was also assessed at the end. 
As predicted, we found a three-way interaction between gender, 
emotion, and charity type. Specifically, for females, there was only 
a main effect of charity such that females preferred in-group (vs. out-
group) charity regardless of the emotion. However, for males, there 
was an interaction between emotion and charity type, such that males 
donated more to in-group charity in the embarrassing condition, but 
donated more to out-group charity in the control condition. The pat-
tern maintained the same when we replaced gender with agentic/
communal scores, which further supported our proposition.
In Study 3, we manipulated agentic-communal orientation and 
looked at both donation and product evaluation. We adopted a sen-
tence-scrambled task from Kurt, Inman, and Argo (2011) to prime 
agentic/communal orientation at the beginning. Embarrassment was 
induced as per previous studies. After the same donation task as that 
in study 2, participants were asked to evaluate a hypothetical vacuum 
that was made either domestically (i.e., in-group) or internationally 
(i.e., out-group). For donation task, we replicated our previous re-
sults. For product evaluation, there was a three-way interaction be-
tween priming, country of origin, and emotion, such that agency-
primed individuals showed more favorable attitudes towards the 
out-group vacuum when feeling embarrassed (vs. neutral), whereas 
communally-primed individuals had more favorable attitudes toward 
the in-group vacuum in the embarrassing condition. 
Results from three studies show that embarrassment and agen-
tic-communal orientation jointly influence consumers’ behaviors. 
Embarrassed individuals tend to engage in behavior consistent with 
their orientation and creating a positive self to “save face”.  
Empathy-Neglect in Embarrassment-Avoidance: 
Observations from an Outsider
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As consumers, we often forgo opportunities to help ourselves 
and others in order to avoid embarrassment. Our fear of embarrass-
ment prevents us from admitting we do not know how a product 
works such as a mortgage or birth control, and from asking advice 
about what we should do such as our mounting mortgage bills and 
unplanned pregnancies. In many cases, if we are to help ourselves 
and others, we must overcome our fear of embarrassment. This 
research offers advice on how to curb consumers’ embarrassment-
avoidant behavior.
Recent research should bring comfort to those who worry about 
others witnessing our embarrassing blunders. First, our blunders of-
ten go unnoticed by others (Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky 2000). 
Nevertheless, we overestimate how much others pay attention to us; 
a tendency termed the ‘spotlight effect’. Second, when others do 
notice our embarrassing blunders, they tend to make kinder judg-
ments than we expect (Savitsky, Epley, and Gilovich 2001). Still, 
we fail to take others’ empathy into account, a tendency termed ‘em-
pathy-neglect’ (Epley, Savitsky, and Gilovich 2002). Both of these 
tendencies—the spotlight effect and empathy-neglect—underlie em-
barrassment-avoidance. However, no studies to date have examined 
how these two factors interact to increase or decrease embarrassment 
avoidance. 
A main goal of our research is to investigate the roles that both 
the spotlight effect and empathy-neglect play in influencing embar-
rassment-avoidance. For example, if empathy-neglect was reduced, 
would a spotlight still cause embarrassment-avoidant behavior? This 
is an important issue since it may often be impossible for consum-
ers to avoid being in the spotlight (e.g. when purchase of a product 
is public knowledge). Alternatively, would empathy-neglect cause 
embarrassment-avoidance absent a spotlight? This is also an impor-
tant issue since it would imply an influence on consumer behavior 
regardless of whether it occurs in public or private. For example, do 
consumers who avoid public opportunities to learn about a product, 
such as a mortgage or birth control, avoid private opportunities as 
well? An understanding of the separate and combined effects of the 
spotlight effect and empathy-neglect could provide a basis for ef-
fective strategies to manage embarrassment-avoidance. To this end, 
we must investigate the role of one individual-difference variable, 
namely public self-consciousness (PUBSC), since it determines 
whether one or both of these tendencies are at play.
Experiment 1 tested the initial hypothesis that although high 
(vs. low) PUBSC consumers have higher expectations of being em-
barrassed and thus engage in embarrassment-avoidance, all consum-
ers regardless of PUBSC suffer from empathy-neglect and persist 
in embarrassment-avoidant ways. Three ads for an embarrassing 
but well-paying job were created: control, spotlight disclaimer, and 
empathy reminder. Analysis found that PUBSC moderated embar-
rassment-avoidant behavior due to the spotlight effect but not due to 
empathy-neglect. Specifically, the significant interaction between ad 
type and PUBSC arose from the control ad, which simply provided 
details about the job opportunity. High PUBSC was associated with 
lower application intentions. However, there was no relationship be-
tween PUBSC and application intentions in response to either the 
spotlight disclaimer or the empathy-reminder ad.
We next investigated a process by which empathy-neglect can 
be countered. Experiment 2 demonstrated in the healthcare context 
that perspective-taking is a helpful (hurtful) tool to correct for empa-
thy-neglect among high (low) PUBSC consumers. Participants were 
prompted to take the perspective of either the interviewer or the in-
terviewee, depending on the condition, and indicated their intentions 
to be interviewed about sensitive issues relating to their sex lives. 
In a control condition there were no perspective-taking prompts. In 
addition, half of participants received a cognitive load manipulation. 
We predicted that cognitive load would inhibit the presumably ef-
fortful empathy-transfer. Analysis revealed a three-way interaction 
among PUBSC, perspective-taking, and cognitive load, such that 
empathy-transfer (and reduction of empathy-neglect among high 
PUBSC consumers) could be triggered by adopting the perspective 
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of the interviewer (but not the interviewee), and required psycho-
logical effort (no load). 
Experiment 3 tested our theorizing in another important con-
sumer context, advertising embarrassing products. After exposure 
to a real-world flatulence prevention brand, participants’ purchase 
intention was assessed and open-ended responses were collected to 
examine the proposed empathy-transfer process. Analysis found the 
predicted three-way interaction among PUBSC, ad type, and cogni-
tive load on purchase intentions. A two-way interaction emerged be-
tween PUBSC and load for the control ad conditions, whereby higher 
PUBSC levels were associated with more embarrassment avoidance 
under no load. Load exacerbated the PUBSC effect. Further, analysis 
of the thought protocols in terms of self-related versus other-related 
thoughts under load and no load provided ancillary evidence as to the 
effortful nature of the empathy-transfer process, as well as chronic 
differences in how high versus low PUBSC consumers respond to 
embarrassing ads and perspective-taking prompts.
Together, these three experiments demonstrate the power of 
our theory to explain, predict, and modify embarrassment-avoidant 
consumer behavior, even when the consequences are financially and 
socially significant.
Hardening My Heart: Persuasion Knowledge and 
Emotion Regulation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers do not passively process marketing influence at-
tempts, but rather use persuasion schemas to interpret, resist, and 
reject persuasion (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Friestad and Wright 
1994). The “Persuasion Knowledge Model” (PKM) proposes that 
consumers develop knowledge structures about persuasion, influ-
ence agents, and selling tactics, and they use this knowledge to cope 
with persuasion episodes. Researchers propose an assortment of 
persuasion tactics; invoking social norms, “buttering up” the target, 
bargaining, and more (Friestad and Wright 1994; Rule, Bisanz, and 
Kohn 1985). While many of these have been investigated, a repeat-
edly mentioned but rarely examined tactic is emotions. In fact, us-
ing emotional appeals was one of the most common interpersonal 
persuasion techniques (Rule, Bisanz, and Kohn 1985). Given this, 
understanding whether consumers recognize emotional appeals as 
persuasive tactics and how they respond to these attempts is needed.
We specifically focus upon emotion appeals that use sadness to 
motivate consumers. Sadness results from experiences of loss that 
cannot be avoided (Frijda 1986), and prompts actions to change the 
situation (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). Expressions of sad-
ness indicate a need for help (Izard 1977) and promote feelings of 
sympathy (Small and Verrochi 2009), leading to enhanced prosocial 
behaviors (Small and Verrochi 2009). We draw upon emotion regula-
tion theories—how individuals manage the emotion antecedents and 
emotional responses (Gross 1998)—to propose that when consumers 
recognize an emotional appeal as an influence attempt, they regulate 
their emotions to resist persuasion. 
Study 1 examined whether consumers spontaneously regulated 
their emotions when they encountered emotional advertisements, 
and whether this would differ for happy versus sad appeals. This 
was a three-group design, where participants saw either a happy, sad, 
or neutral commercial. Emotional content was manipulated through 
pictures and music with identical information. After the commercial, 
participants reported attitude toward the ad, the degree of emotion 
regulation, and beliefs about manipulative intent (to measure persua-
sion knowledge). Attitude toward the ad was the highest for the hap-
py commercial compared to both the neutral and sad commercials. 
The amount of emotion regulation was highest for the sad commer-
cial, whereas no difference occurred for the neutral and the happy 
commercials. Also, the sad commercial prompted beliefs of manipu-
lative intent, but the happy and neutral commercials were seen as 
only mildly manipulative. And indeed, serial mediation found that 
sad appeals prompted inferences of manipulative intent, which in 
turn induced emotion regulation, which finally predicted attitude to-
ward the ad. Once the indirect effects were accounted for, the direct 
effect of emotion appeal was no longer significant in predicting at-
titude toward the ad, implying full mediation through both manipula-
tive intent and emotion regulation (Preacher and Hayes 2008). These 
results suggest that consumers naturally see sad appeals as manipu-
lative, triggering an emotion regulating response. However, happy 
commercials “fly under the radar” and do not prompt the activation 
of persuasion knowledge and its concomitant rejection.
Study 2 manipulated the accessibility of consumers’ persuasion 
knowledge. The design was 3 emotions (happy, sad, neutral) x 2 ac-
cessibility (high, low); accessibility was manipulated by reading an 
article about persuasive tactics (high) or about superstitious beliefs 
(low) prior to the commercial. As before, participants rated their at-
titude toward the ad, emotion regulation, and manipulative intent. In 
the low accessibility conditions, the results from study 1 were rep-
licated: emotion regulation and manipulative intent were only high 
for participants viewing the sad commercial. However, results in the 
high accessibility conditions showed a different pattern. Specifically, 
those who viewed the happy or the sad commercials both increased 
emotion regulation and manipulative intent inferences. Results sug-
gested that when persuasion knowledge was accessible, consumers 
relied on it to interpret the persuasive messages; happy appeals were 
also seen as utilizing persuasion, leading to consumers’ emotion 
regulation.
Study 3 replicated study 2 in the context of donation. Specifi-
cally, participants first read the article from study 2 to manipulate ac-
cessibility. Then participants were exposed to one of three advertise-
ments for a children’s cancer charity, where the child in the ad was 
expressing either happiness, sadness, or a neutral expression (Small 
and Verrochi 2009). Previous work has shown that individuals who 
view the sad child experience sadness themselves, via emotion con-
tagion, and this experience of sadness then increases sympathy and 
prosocial behaviors. We predicted that the accessibility of persuasion 
knowledge would moderate these effects. A significant interaction of 
persuasion knowledge accessibility and emotion emerged: for those 
with low persuasion knowledge accessibility, sympathy toward the 
child was the greatest for the sad ad, replicating earlier work. How-
ever, for those with high persuasion knowledge accessibility, the pat-
tern reversed that sympathy for the child was the lowest for the sad 
ad (no difference occurred between the happy and the neutral ads). 
Three studies demonstrate that individuals resist emotion-based 
persuasive attempts through emotion regulation; however the natural 
response is only toward sad appeals. When persuasion knowledge is 
made accessible, individuals recognize that happy appeals are also 
influence attempts and regulate those as well. Our findings certify 
that emotion regulation can be used to resist persuasion, suggesting 
new directions for studying emotion regulation. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Who is materialistic, and why, and whether materialism has 
positive or negative implications, fluctuates pending the social con-
text.  Such fluidity suggests that it may be time to reevaluate the 
basic concept, which has been formulated as an individual construct, 
to consider encompassing the social milieu—religious influences, 
group tensions, and socio-economic context.
This special session creates such an opportunity, allowing re-
searchers to explore the meaning of materialism and to move the 
construct from a deeply rooted personal value to one shaped by so-
cial conditions and tensions. To do so, it demonstrates how the con-
cept can have widely different results even when all the studies pull 
from the same scale (Richins and Dawson 1992). The studies stretch 
the concept across diverse geographical regions—Malaysia, South 
Africa, Israel and America —and across divergent groups of con-
sumers and social settings Some pull at the social tensions and con-
sumer stress associated with materialism, others demonstrate how 
it can be used as a positive force to rejuvenate the economy. This 
session would open up the constructed scale to expose its inherent 
biases, to explain what aspects of the scales give rise to the varied 
findings and how the social context influences these findings, and 
ultimately, provide a starting ground where cultural biases that shape 
our understanding and study of the general concept of materialism 
can be brought to the fore. 
Fon Sim Ong and George P. Moschis open the session with 
evidence that may help explain the contradictory outcomes that have 
often plagued materialism and well-being studies. Using a large sur-
vey of Malaysians, their study finds adherents of Islam, who tend to 
place material possessions in direct philosophical conflict with pi-
ous living, experience higher levels of stress if they are materialistic, 
which in turn will lower their level of life satisfaction. In contrast, 
these results differ from Hindus and Buddhists, who conceptualize 
the relationship between the material and spiritual in a different way. 
Consequently, the effects of materialism are strongly moderated by 
both religion and the level of religiosity.
Laurel Steinfield and Linda Scott similarly build from the moral 
tensions materialism creates around consumption, but view “mate-
rialism” as an epithet that is used in South Africa to protect racial 
stratifications. They demonstrate that “materialism” is a local racial 
slur, intended to discredit the consumption behavior of blacks when 
they purchase goods formerly available only to whites. Hurling an 
insult about black “materialism” thus acts as a moral restriction to 
protect the demarcating power of goods.
Ayalla Ruvio, Eli Somer, and Aric Rindfleisch discuss how 
materialism influences coping in extreme stress situations. When 
traumatic stress increases, materialistic people react more adversely, 
often by engaging in maladaptive consumption behaviors such as im-
pulsive buying and shopping escapism. 
Dee Warmath and Nancy Wong end by discussing how materi-
alism can help a society navigate economic downturns through trig-
gering consumer spending. They break apart the materialism scale 
to note how the different sub-categories affect consumer behavior. 
Two dimensions of materialism (success and centrality) combined 
with hope bolsters consumer confidence about the economy, while 
the happiness dimension of materialism combined with hope influ-
ences personal confidence and leads to higher spending expectations. 
Each of the studies points to a different way of viewing materi-
alism and offers potentially fruitful avenues for future research, yet 
the sum of these approaches may also help us to imagine how a bet-
ter understanding of the social dimensions of materialism can guide 
policies, even in high stress situations and among diverse groups, 
toward more humane tactics. This session should be of relevance 
to researchers interested in materialism, cross-cultural studies, con-
sumption and wellbeing, and moral versus immoral consumption.  
Materialism and Well-Being among Consumers of Three 
Asian Subcultures: The Effects of Religion and Ethnicity
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Studies on the relationship between materialism and life satis-
faction have produced contradictory findings across cultural settings. 
There is little theory to suggest the reason(s) materialism is associ-
ated (positively or negatively) with well-being in some countries and 
not in others, the processes that link materialism to life satisfaction, 
and the variables that moderate this relationship. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether materialism is the cause or the consequence of 
well-being, whether the two variables are causally related, or even 
whether the previously reported relationships between them repre-
sent the effects of third variables.
This paper explores the impact of the socio-cultural context on 
materialism. It presents the results of a government funded large-
scale study that seeks to explain the relationship between materialism 
and well-being by assuming that materialism 1) affects well-being, 
2) is a consequence of a person’s well-being, or 3) its relationship 
with well-being is the result of third variables, especially ethnic and 
religious differences among consumers of a culturally diverse Asian 
society. By confining the present study to a sample of consumers 
drawn from Malaysia—a country of diverse subcultures who share 
similar cultural values (collectivistic), we attempt to control the ef-
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 127
fects the other possible reasons that generate these differences, rang-
ing from broad macro-environmental factors (e.g., country-related) 
to mediating processes, as well as ways people in different countries 
respond to questions and measurement instruments.
The study involved a survey using face-to-face interviews with 
1,025 adult Malaysian consumers who lived in five major cities/
towns.  Non-probability quota sampling was employed to ensure 
equal representation of the three ethnic groups, Malays, Chinese, and 
Indians. All of the respondents were age 20 or older, and the average 
(mean) age of the sample was 48.08 years old, with a standard devia-
tion of 16.58 years. The percentages of female and male respondents 
were almost equal: 51.4% of the respondents were female and 48.6% 
were male.  The respondents’ ethnic backgrounds were: 52.9% Ma-
lay, 29.4% Chinese, 15.6% Indian, and 2.1% were of other ethnic 
backgrounds. 
The items in the questionnaires were designed to collect data on 
the variables related to the hypotheses of this study.  The constructs: 
materialism, well-being (measured using life satisfaction and self-
esteem), stress, and religiosity were measured by using established 
scales. All of the scales had a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .70. A 
measure of social desirability was also used.
In this study, we first assumed that materialism is a causal vari-
able that adversely affects well-being, as this is the implicit assump-
tion of most studies (e.g., Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002). We then, 
however, tested a second explanation for the observed negative re-
lationship between well-being and materialism, assuming a reverse 
causality - i.e., well-being leads to materialism. Because well-being 
is defined by psychologists in several ways, including self-esteem 
and strength of aversive feelings (e.g., depression, anxiety, stress) 
(Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002), it has been shown that material-
ism helps consumers alleviate negative feelings and low self-worth 
(e.g. Belk 1988; Chaplin and John 2007).  We use structural equa-
tions modeling with instrumental variables to decompose the pos-
sible reciprocal effects of the two constructs, but our instruments 
turn out to be weak predictors of their respective variables. 
In using conventional methods of data analysis to test our hy-
potheses, we find that stress mediates the effects of materialism on 
life satisfaction, and religiosity moderates the relationship between 
materialism and stress, which has negative effects on well-being. 
However, this finding holds among the most religious Malays (Mus-
lims). These findings suggests that it is the specific values of the 
Islam religion that might be in direct conflict with material posses-
sions, not those promoted by Hinduism or Buddhism; and they help 
clarify the conflicting values perspective (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 
2002) because they suggest that religiosity is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition (i.e., religious beliefs matter).
In viewing materialism as a consequence of well-being, we find 
that only lower degree of stress significantly moderates the effects of 
self-esteem on materialism. These findings suggest that self-esteem 
is a coping resource, as suggested by Thoits (1995). During stress-
ful times, material possessions may be viewed as means to reducing 
stress—i.e., medicating one’s adverse emotions, rather than serving 
as means of enhancing one’s self in the eyes of others. In contrast, 
in the absence of stress, Malays may value material possessions as a 
way of “showing face” to others, a motivation commonly noticed in 
Asian countries (Wong and Ahuvia 1998).
The study findings suggest that consumers in different Asian 
ethnic subcultures are affected unequally by their religions and re-
ligiosity.  Religion may constitute one of the main factors that af-
fect each subculture’s belief system regarding life in general and 
consumption in particular.  As shown in this study, religiosity sig-
nificantly and directly affects the life satisfaction of all three ethnic 
groups.  However, in terms of consumption behavior, other factors 
may also influence each subculture differently. Specifically, the 
study findings suggest that because the materialistic values of the 
Indians cannot be predicted by either religiosity or life satisfaction. 
When comparing the three ethnic subcultures, the Malays, who are 
Muslims, appear to be affected by religiosity the most, both in terms 
of life satisfaction and materialism.  Although the Chinese are less 
religious than the Indians, their levels of religiosity have a greater 
effect on their life satisfaction and materialism.  
These findings could be explained by other factors that relate to 
different social structures in which these subcultures are embedded. 
The results, for example, also demonstrate how different ethnic sub-
cultural groups have different predictors of life satisfaction (Diener 
and Diener, 1995). Diener et al (1998) have found that causes of sub-
jective well-being reflect people’s values. Thus, in a collectivist cul-
ture, differences in subjective well-being could be due to culturally 
defined norms that lead to different emotional reactions depending 
on what the subculture defines as acceptable (Suh and Koo, 2008). 
This study offers evidence to help explain the socio-cultural 
context and mechanisms that account for the negative relationship 
between materialism and life satisfaction reported in previous stud-
ies conducted in many countries.
Social Stratification and the Materialism Label: The 
Retention of Racial Inequities between Black and White 
Consumers in South Africa
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We begin from the observation that, in English-speaking societ-
ies, “materialistic” is an epithet. The moral polarity that results – ma-
terialism (sin) versus spirituality (virtue) – is clearly reflected in the 
early CB literature on the topic (Belk 1983; Pollay 1986). Indeed, the 
word’s status as an insult is apparent in socially desirable responding 
(Mick 1996) among research subjects. 
In this research, therefore, we focus on the circumstances in 
which one group labels another  “materialistic”:  we ask why they are 
using that particular label and question whether the people being thus 
labeled view themselves as “materialistic.” Using Goffman’s (1951) 
work on status symbols, we look at how the application of this pejo-
rative protects the demarcating power of goods when a threat of mis-
appropriation occurs. Status symbols hold expressive powers (they 
express the cultural values, lifestyles, privileges or duties a person 
holds) and categorical powers (they visibly divide the social world), 
and so their misappropriation threatens the social distinctions that 
maintain hierarchy. The accusation that someone is “materialistic” 
exemplifies a set of interested moral restrictions designed to keep 
outgroups from acquiring the symbols of the established elite.  Such 
moral restrictions are often guised as “religious scruple, cultural dis-
dain, ethnic and racial loyalty, economic and civic propriety, or un-
disguised ‘sense of one’s place’” (Goffman 1951: 297).  In this study, 
we consider how materialism acts to restrict consumption by social 
grouping, as well as the power agenda that the rhetoric of morality 
conceals. 
We look at the social context surrounding the use of material-
ism, not to discern how the meaning of materialism changes with 
differing value structures, but to look at whether it acts to produce 
judgments that protect the hierarchy. Using the luxury goods market 
in South Africa, we show how the term is imbued with power that 
maintains race-based social stratifications. We assess the reasons 
“materialistic” people consume and show how personal justifications 
illuminate stratification. 
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In South Africa, through government and business initiatives 
focused on empowerment and wealth creation (such as Black Eco-
nomic Empowerment (BEE)), there is an emerging black middle 
class starting to challenge one of the significant legacies of apartheid 
- the racial segmentation of class and consumption. Studies being 
conducted on this group, popularly labeled “Black Diamonds,” show 
an increase in the proportion of black households in the upper quartile 
income segment. In 2006, 78.8% of white households, compared to 
only 8.6% of black households, were in the upper quartile (Statistics 
South Africa 2008). Yet by 2011, black households represented 40% 
of South Africa’s richest 10 %. In demonstrating their new wealth, 
Black Diamonds often “trade-up” and emulate the respectable life of 
the elite White through living in White-majority posh areas, send-
ing their children to prominent English or Afrikaans schools, and 
procuring the status symbols once definitive of the white elites (UCT 
Unilever Institute 2011). 
Our study focuses on luxury consumption in South Africa, fo-
cusing on an observable status symbol with expressive potential, but 
with previously limited availability for blacks. Media coverage and 
speeches by prominent South Africans were first analyzed to un-
derstand the local discourse around luxury consumption and race. 
Participant observations were conducted at the boutiques where the 
line under study was sold. We then conducted forty interviews with 
luxury goods consumers and sales personnel, using pictorial stimuli 
and adjective checklists. We administered Richins and Dawson’s 
(1992) scales, but afterward showed respondents their scores and 
asked them whether they agreed with the outcome.   
As we expected, pejorative terms of “ostentatious,” “flashy,” 
and “materialistic,” were often applied to describe the luxury con-
sumption of blacks, which did not exist to the same extent for whites. 
Local terms that emerged during interviews to describe “materialis-
tic” consumers, such as “fat BEE cats” and “tender-preneurs,” are 
applied only to black people. Our analysis of media and speeches 
explain how these terms linked the origins of black wealth with cor-
ruption and government nepotism, and are used to taint the legiti-
macy of blacks’ wealth and luxury consumption. Blacks are believed 
to consume luxury goods for less appropriate reasons than whites: 
blacks purchased products for status or brand labels, versus the white 
elite who are believed to purchase and truly appreciate luxury goods 
for their quality and craftsmanship. These beliefs were accepted and 
internalized by both blacks and whites, and reflected in their justi-
fications for their own materialistic tendencies. When asked about 
their own “materialism” scores, blacks would often accept that they 
could be considered materialistic because they wanted to achieve 
and demonstrate their new wealth.  For them, status symbols were 
“game changers” in business meetings, in wedding proposals, and 
for their own personal sense of accomplishment. In contrast, white 
consumers would downplay the applicability of their materialism 
scores, saying they merely appreciated the finer things in life.
Thus, we argue that the social dislocations resulting from the 
post-apartheid power shifts have given rise to moral polarities de-
scribing luxury consumption of different races. From this perspec-
tive, “materialism” is not a consumer value or trait, but instead a 
word with a social use: to maintain racial stratifications. These 
findings suggest that “materialism” is used by people as a moral re-
striction, and as such, these findings may have relevance for other 
contexts with intense social dislocations or for other stratifications 
(gender, class, religion) in which the threat of status deprivation ex-
ists.
When the Going Gets Tough the Materialistic Go 
Shopping: Materialism and Consumption Response to 
Stress
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Recent consumer research has examined the influence of ex-
istential insecurity on a variety of consumption-related behaviors. 
Drawing upon Terror Management Theory, this research suggests 
that in times of upheaval and stress people often seek relief via shop-
ping and consumption (Arndt, et al., 2004; Mathwick, et al. 2001 
Rindfleisch et al., 2009). Unfortunately, research indicates that con-
sumption provides little benefit to materialistic individuals (Belk, 
1985; Burroughs & Rindfleisch 2002; Richins & Dawson 1992). 
Thus, it might be the case that materialism may actually make bad 
events even worse. Our research explores this question. 
Specifically, we suggest that highly stressful life events (such as 
a terrorist attack) will generate higher levels of post-traumatic stress 
(PTS) among materialistic individuals compared to their less mate-
rialistic counterparts. Furthermore, we theorize that materialistic in-
dividuals will also exhibit higher levels of maladaptive consumption 
behavior such as compulsive consumption and impulsive buying. In 
other words, we focus on the moderating effect of materialism on 
the relationships between PTS and the maladaptive consumption be-
havior. As such, we extend previous research that largely centers on 
direct negative outcomes of materialism, by examining the indirect 
(moderated) effect materialism, which makes negative outcomes 
even worse. 
We conducted a field study that consists of 139 participants in 
the extreme-stress group who experienced ongoing terrorist attacks 
and 179 individuals in the low-stress group who were exposed to 
these events via the media only. Our measures include scales for 
materialism (Richins and Dawson 1992), PTS Symptom Scale (Foa 
et al. 1993), compulsive (Babin et al. 1994) and impulsive buying 
(Beatty & Ferrell 1998).
The results of our hierarchical regressions show that threat 
condition (0 = non-mortal-threat, 1 = mortal-threat) is positively 
associated with PTS (b = .44, p < .01). The mean level of stress 
in the mortal-threat condition was 17.4 (range: 0-51) compared to 
6.5 (range: 0-40) in the non-mortal-threat condition (t(310) = -8.30, 
p =.001), indicating that participants from the mortal-threat threat 
condition experienced higher PTS than participants from the non-
mortal-threat condition. In addition a significant interaction between 
threat condition and materialism (b = .10; p < .05) was established, 
which indicates that stress associated with a mortal threat is greater 
among highly materialistic individuals than their less materialistic 
counterparts.
We tested the effect of PTS as a mediator of maladaptive con-
sumption, compulsive consumption and impulsive buying, and ma-
terialism as a moderator of these relationships.
Compulsive Consumption. Threat condition has a significant ef-
fect upon compulsive buying (b = .06; p < .05). In addition, PTS 
(the mediator) also exhibits a significant effect upon this outcome 
(b = .21; p < .05). Moreover, when this mediator is accounted for, 
the effect of the threat condition is reduced to non-significance (b = 
.02; ns). In addition, the interaction between PTS and materialism 
(the moderator) is also significant (b = .17; p < .01).  These results 
indicate that PTS mediates the association between threat condition 
and compulsive buying and that materialism moderates the effect of 
PTS upon this outcome. Specifically, it appears that the use of com-
pulsive consumption as a means of coping with the stress associated 
with a mortal threat is much more prominent among individuals high 
in materialism than those low in materialism.
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Impulsive Buying. Threat condition has a significant effect upon 
impulsive buying (b = .02; p < .05). In addition, PTS (the mediator) 
also exhibits a significant effect upon this outcome (b = .27; p < 
.01). Moreover, when this mediator is accounted for, the effect of the 
threat condition is reduced to non-significance (b = -.01; ns). In ad-
dition, the interaction between PTS and materialism (the moderator) 
is also significant (b = .13; p < .05). These findings indicate that PTS 
mediates the association between threat condition and impulsive 
buying and that materialism moderates the effect of PTS upon this 
outcome. Specifically, it appears that the use of impulsive buying as 
a means of coping with the stress associated with a mortal threat is 
considerably more prominent among individuals high in materialism 
than those low in materialism.
Our results reveal that, in addition to its well-documented harm-
ful direct effect on psychological well-being, materialism also exerts 
an indirect negative effect by making bad events even worse. Our 
findings contribute to this school of thought by offering a more com-
prehensive view of the relationship between materialism and stress. 
Going beyond the simple association between materialism and high-
er levels of stress (in the form of PTS), our study suggest that mate-
rialism also shapes the manner in which individuals cope with this 
stress. Specifically, our results indicate that, materialistic individuals 
are more likely to respond to traumatic stress via impulsive and out 
of control consumption activities. Thus, materialism’s relationship 
with stress may be even more pernicious than commonly thought.
Living in a Material World: The Role of Materialism in 
Consumer Confidence & Well-Being
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In 2008, America entered its worst recession since the Great 
Depression.  Two perspectives were offered as the proper response 
to lead the country out of that state:  the recovery perspective and 
the reset perspective.  The recovery perspective suggests that we 
awaken the materialism of Americans and get consumers spending 
again (Posner 2009). In contrast, the reset perspective suggests that 
materialism is what got us into this mess and that the current cir-
cumstances offer a perfect opportunity to seek alternative belief and 
value systems that promote greater health and well-being (Arndt et 
al. 2004).  These perspectives fundamentally differ in their views on 
the impact of materialism on well-being, recovery assuming a posi-
tive impact and reset assuming a negative one.  
Despite our cultural inclination toward materialism, there is 
meaningful variation in the levels of materialism from one individ-
ual to another, due to biological, personal and social circumstances 
(Giddens, Schermer and Vernon 2009).  Numerous studies have ex-
amined the relationship between materialism and such consequenc-
es as quality of life (Roberts and Clement 2006), life satisfaction 
(Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002), pro-social behavior (Briggs et al. 
2007), and racism (Roets et al. 2006) and generally find that negative 
effects of materialism outweigh the positive ones; thus suggesting 
that we should find ways to reduce our materialistic tendencies.  
However, notwithstanding its negative consequences, material-
ism has also led to increased standard of living, productivity and 
technological advances (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). More recently, 
Gardarsottir, Dittmar and Aspinall (2009) suggest that it is not neces-
sarily the pursuit of acquisition, but the motives for that pursuit that 
determine whether the welfare results are negative.  Ingrid, Majda 
and Dubravka also suggest that “materialistic aspirations will not 
decrease people’s well-being if they help them to achieve basic fi-
nancial security of some intrinsic goals” (2009, p. 317).  Therefore, 
motives for acquisition play an important role in determining wheth-
er materialistic values produce positive or negative welfare results. 
“Materialism has often been blamed for consumers’ overspending 
and excessive debt levels, but there is little understanding of how 
materialism influences these practices” (Richins 2013).
This study embeds materialism in a broader decision context to 
examine the process by which materialism triggers consumer spend-
ing.  Materialism, or possession-defined success and the centrality of 
acquisition (Richins and Dawson 1992), is shown to bolster general 
confidence while possession as happiness increases one’s personal 
level of confidence toward the economy, thus leading to increased 
expected spending.  Another psychological factor, hope (Snyder et 
al. 1991) provides the motivation, which is conceptualized as “a 
positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived 
sense of successful (1) agency (goal-directed energy) and (2) path-
ways (planning to meet goals)” (p. 287).  Based on this psychologi-
cal representation, consumers who are more materialistic and who 
have higher levels of hope will have higher expectations for future 
consumption.  
Past research on consumer confidence indicators has found that 
consumer attitudes about the future predict future consumption over 
and above changes in future economic resources (Carroll, Fuhrer and 
Wilcox 1994; Ludvigson 2004).  More recently, researchers are ad-
vocating that marketing and psychological variables that bridge the 
gap between production and consumption (Bovi 2009) could also 
play a role in predicting consumer spending.  For example, Fornell, 
Rust and DeKimpe (2010) find that aggregate customer satisfac-
tion (ACSI) predicts 23 percent of the variation in future consumer 
spending growth.  However, these studies tend to use time-lagged 
indices as predictors of current period consumption whereas the cur-
rent study links individual material values to personal confidence 
and future consumption behavior.
This paper uses the November and December waves of The 
Economy Tracker (2009) from The NPD Group, Inc. to provide an 
empirical assessment of materialism and hope and to observe its 
combined impact on consumer confidence and buying behavior. 
We examined the joint effects of materialism (Richins and Dawson 
1992) and hope (Snyder et al. 1991) on consumer confidence and 
purchase intention using structural equations modeling. Confidence/
concern regarding the U.S. economy in general and personal eco-
nomic perception were measured using a weighted score of a series 
of questions relating to the near-term outlook for the U.S. economy 
in general.  Since all these scales have been extensively validated, 
they demonstrated strong composite reliabilities (Materialism = .97, 
Hope = .95, General Confidence = .96, Personal Confidence = .96). 
Spending behavior was measured by the retail response indicator de-
veloped by The NPD Group, Inc.
The results in Study 1 (N=1620) showed that two materialism 
dimensions (success and centrality) and hope bolsters confidence 
toward the economy while happiness and hope positively influence 
personal confidence leading to higher spending expectations. Study 
2 (N=1420) replicated the findings from Study 1 at a special time 
of the year (December, 2009) when consumer confidence was in-
fluenced by the Christmas shopping season and consumers became 
more susceptible to the impact of materialism and hope. Study 3 
(monthly surveys from January 2010-September 2011) further ex-
plores the relationship between monthly measures of materialism, 
consumer confidence, purchase intentions and subjective wellbe-
ing (as measured by Diener’s Life Satisfaction scale (Diener et al., 
1985)).  Findings from this paper will not only explore the role of 
materialism as a key indicant of consumer confidence and spend-
ing during economic uncertainty, but also its impact on consumer 
wellbeing over time. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
What does it mean to make a choice? From exerting agency, to 
drawing conclusions about the self’s values, to wanting to produce a 
normatively right outcome, to expressing one’s preferences, choice 
is a fundamental route by which the self is empowered to “make a 
difference” (as per the theme of ACR 2013). 
Theorists (e.g., Baumeister 1998) depict the self as housing 
three processes that drive behavior: executive functioning, which is 
comprised of self-regulation and decision making, interpersonal pro-
cesses, and self-evaluation (e.g., self-esteem). The executive func-
tioning aspect of the self is that which makes humans unique among 
animals (Baumeister 2005). Hence, there is a special relationship be-
tween the self and decision making, one with practical implications 
for everyday choices as well as ramifications for big decisions about 
well-being.
The first paper offers a new connection between the self and 
decision making via maximization tendencies. Vohs and Olson won-
dered why people would elect to engage in maximization, given its 
associations with regret, uncertainty, and decision stress. They pre-
dicted and found such tendencies arise from the belief that choices 
represent the self, which explains why and to what degree people 
exhibit maximizing tendencies.
The second paper builds on the first by overlaying the notion 
of attribution to choices and the self. Sela and Berger predicted and 
found that the interpretation of unexpectedly difficult decisions var-
ied by culture. The authors demonstrated that priming American and 
Indian consumers with the notion that choices represent the inner-
self versus societal roles leads to different interpretations about what 
choice difficulty means for the self.
The third paper tackles the motivational side of the choice-self 
connection. When people are faced with a consumption decision with 
a host of options, how might they decide? In a further instantiation 
of constructed preferences, Goodman and Vohs demonstrated people 
with limited mental resources tend to seek variety. Furthermore, this 
effect is especially strong in people who often rely on System 1 pro-
cessing, compared to those who generally rely on System 2 process-
ing. These results suggest a variety-seeking heuristic exists, which 
helps consumers with a constrained capacity for decision processing.
The fourth paper takes a physical tack on the issue of the self 
and choices. One would think humans’ sophisticated capacity for 
self-expression would render all forms psychologically equivalent, 
but that is not what Klesse, Levav, and Goukens found. They found 
that when choice is expressed vocally (that is, through speech), con-
sumers make decisions that are more consistent with their automatic, 
emotional reactions (i.e., choosing unhealthy foods) compared to 
those who express choices non-vocally (such as by pushing a button). 
With new and counterintuitive findings that nonetheless follow 
from established theories, this session will be of interest to a host 
of consumer behavior scholars. Most centrally, scholars interested 
in the self, choice, and choice processes, as well as those interested 
in expressiveness, self-regulation, ego depletion, and meta-cognition 
will find a home in this session, as will policy makers seeking to 
nudge consumers toward making decisions that ‘make a difference’ 
on the self and society.
Thinking That Choices Reflect the Self Leads to 
Maximizing Behavior
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers must often employ one of two goals when mak-
ing choices. They can satisfice and seek any option that meets some 
minimum standard, or they can maximize and attempt to find the best 
possible option available. Research suggests that while consumers’ 
tendency to maximize may vary depending on characteristics of the 
decision (Simon 1956; Levav, Reinholtz, and Lin 2012), maximiz-
ing is also an individual difference (Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, 
Lyubomirsky, White, and Lehman 2002). Certain people, known as 
maximizers, display high chronic levels of maximizing behavior and 
often endeavor to make the optimal choice for every decision. They 
engage in this behavior despite the many negative effects caused by 
maximization, such as less decision satisfaction, higher regret, and 
longer decision times compared to those who chronically satisfice 
(Schwartz et al. 2002; Levav et al. 2012). Furthermore, even when 
maximizing creates objectively better outcomes than satisficing, 
maximizers are subjectively less happy with the outcome than are 
satisficers (Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz 2006). 
In light of these findings, one could reasonably wonder why 
consumers would ever be motivated to maximize. We hypothesized 
that one possible cause of maximization is the belief that one’s choic-
es reflect the self, which is to say that choices are a representation 
of one’s identity. We specifically predicted that those who strongly 
believe that one’s choices reflect the self will be more likely to maxi-
mize compared to those who only weakly believe this notion. Three 
experiments provided support for this hypothesis.
Experiment 1 tested whether people who generally think that 
their choices are representative of the self also tend to exhibit maxi-
mizing behaviors. Participants completed a scale that measured the 
extent to which they believed that choices reflect the self (Choices 
Reflect the Self scale). They then completed two additional scales 
that measured their tendency to maximize and experience regret. 
Previous research suggests that in addition to maximizing more fre-
quently, chronic maximizers also experience more regret than those 
who maximize less (Schwartz et al. 2002). Based on these results, we 
expected that Choices Reflect the Self scores would have a positive 
relationship with maximizing and regret scores.
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The results were consistent with predictions. Choices Reflect 
the Self scores were positively and significantly correlated with both 
maximizing and regret scores. The more participants thought their 
choices reflected them, the more they tended to maximize and ex-
perience regret. 
Experiment 2 tested whether a situational manipulation could 
induce participants to think that choices either reflect the self or do 
not reflect the self. Participants were asked to write an essay that pur-
portedly would be used to help middle schoolers who were having 
trouble making choices. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two groups for this essay: the choices are the self group and the 
choices are not the self group. They were then instructed to complete 
the Choices Reflect the Self scale. 
In the choices are the self condition, participants were told mid-
dle schoolers today were underestimating how much their choices 
say about who they are, an attitude that leads them to make deci-
sions that reflect poorly on them. Participants were instructed to help 
middle schoolers with their supposed problem by writing an essay to 
make kids realize that choices reflect them. The choices are not the 
self condition used an identical procedure, except in this condition 
participants were told middle schoolers cared too much about what 
their choices said about them. Participants were instructed to help 
middle schoolers with this purported issue by writing an essay to 
let the kids know they are more than just the choices they make. Af-
ter writing the essays, participants in both conditions completed the 
Choices Reflect the Self scale. Results show that those in the choices 
are the self condition had significantly higher Choices Reflect the 
Self scores than those in the choices are not the self condition, indi-
cating the manipulation 
Experiment 3 replicated and extended experiment 2 in that in 
addition to manipulating the idea that choices do or do not reflect 
the self, experiment 3 tested whether these beliefs would influence 
maximizing tendencies. Participants were again instructed to help 
middle schoolers who, it was reported, were bringing about nega-
tive consequences for themselves either because they underestimate 
how much their choices reflect them (choices are the self condition) 
or overestimate how much their choices reflect them (choices are 
not the self condition). Participants then wrote an essay that purport-
edly would be used to help these middle schoolers who were having 
trouble making choices. They were then instructed to complete the 
Choices Reflect the Self scale. Finally, participants indicated their 
tendency to maximize. 
As predicted, the results from experiment 3 show that those in 
the choices are the self condition (vs. choices are not the self condi-
tion) indicated significantly stronger beliefs that choices reflect the 
self, suggesting our manipulation was effective. This condition also 
reported stronger maximizer tendencies. Furthermore, the extent to 
which participants believed that choices reflect the self mediated the 
effect of condition on maximizer scores. This experiment showed 
that manipulating the idea of choices signifying individuals was 
effective in eliciting maximizer behavior insofar as the manipula-
tion caused participants to actually believe choices represent the 
self, which further supports our hypothesis that it is specifically the 
thought that choices reflect individuals that is leading to maximizer 
behavior. 
Summary: With all of the choices afforded to consumers in so-
ciety today, it is no wonder that those who frequently attempt the 
daunting task of maximizing each decision often end up less satisfied 
than those who merely satisfice. By recognizing why certain con-
sumers feel compelled to strive to select the best option, people can 
better comprehend the merits of such behavior and ways of counter-
ing its adverse effects.
On Metacognition and Culture
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Metacognitive experiences have an important impact on judg-
ment and decision-making. How difficult information is to process, 
for example, influences liking (Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz, 
1998), perceived distance (Alter and Oppenheimer, 2008), perceived 
uniqueness (Pocheptsova, Labroo, and Dhar, 2010), and frequency 
estimates (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
Based on existing research, one might assume metacognitive 
effects are universal. But could they differ by culture? We suggest 
this possibility based on the notion that metacognitive effects on 
judgment are largely inference-based (Schwarz 2004) and that there 
are cultural differences in the lay theories that give rise to such infer-
ences (Markus and Kitayama, 2003). What people infer from meta-
cognitive experiences depends on their lay theory regarding what 
makes information easy or difficult to process in a particular situ-
ation (Winkielman and Schwarz, 2001). Given culture’s ability to 
shape people’s lay theories in general (Briley, Morris, and Simonson 
2010), it should also impact the inferences people draw from meta-
cognitive experiences. 
Consider the act of choice. A European-American cultural con-
text is characterized by independent self-construal and a disjoint 
model of agency, where people see choice as reflecting or corre-
sponding to the inner-self (Markus and Kitayama, 2003).  An Indian 
cultural context, however, is characterized by interdependent self-
construal and a conjoint model of agency, in which,,  choice is seen 
less as self-expression and more as reflecting contextual influences 
such as social roles (Kim and Drolet, 2003; Kim and Markus, 1999; 
Savani, Markus, and Conner 2008). Building on these two streams of 
research, we suggest the inferences people draw from the cognitive 
experience of choice difficulty should depend on cultural differences 
in self-construal and related models of agency. 
We test this possibility by examining how culture moderates 
the tendency to infer decision importance from decision difficulty. 
Prior research (Sela and Berger, 2012) has shown people perceive 
unexpectedly difficult decisions as more important and therefore de-
serving of increased deliberation. Ironically, such a metacognitive 
inference is more likely to happen for decisions that initially seemed 
unimportant, because people expect them to be easy, whereas im-
portant decisions are expected to be difficult to begin with (Schwarz 
2004; Wänke, Schwarz, and Bless 1995). 
Importantly, inferring decision importance from difficulty is 
based on the lay-theory that a difficult decision is likely to also be 
of personal/inner importance. We hypothesize that this lay-theory is 
more salient in cultures characterized by independent self-construal 
and a disjoint agency model and less salient in cultural contexts 
characterized by interdependent self-construal and a conjoint agency 
model.   
In Study 1, we presented American and Indian participants with 
a choice between two university courses and manipulated decision 
importance framing (important versus unimportant) and processing 
difficulty (fluent versus disfluent). We measured how long partici-
pants spent deciding (Sela and Berger 2012, experiment 4). We pre-
dicted processing difficulty under unimportant framing to increase 
perceptions of decision importance and consequently the amount 
of time spent deciding, but only among American participants. To 
examine the mediating role of perceived decision importance, par-
ticipants also rated the extent to which it was important to make a 
good decision. 
A 2(importance framing) x 2(processing difficulty) x 2(culture) 
ANOVA on time spent revealed the predicted 3-way interaction. 
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Consistent with prior research, American participants spent more 
time deciding in the disfluent than in the fluent condition, but only 
in the unimportant framing condition. However, Indian participants 
spent slightly less time in the disfluent compared with the fluent 
condition when the decision was framed as unimportant. Processing 
difficulty did not influence decision time in the important framing 
conditions. 
A moderated-mediated-moderation analysis suggested that the 
effect of processing difficulty on time spent, through perceived deci-
sion importance, was significant among Americans under unimport-
ant framing but not among Indian participants or under important 
framing. 
Studies 2 and 3 examine whether manipulating the salience of 
disjoint versus conjoint agency models can reverse the effect of cul-
ture on metacognitive inferences. In study 2, we expected priming 
Indian participants with the notion that choice reflected their inner-
self would lead them to spend more time on unexpectedly difficult 
decisions. We first asked half the participants to describe a choice 
they had made that strongly expressed who they were, their individ-
ual preferences, beliefs, emotions, or goals (e.g., an item they bought 
because they felt it communicated their identity as individuals). In 
the control prime condition, we asked participants to list all the food 
items they consumed that day.
In the next task (borrowed from Sela and Berger 2012), partici-
pants chose between two flight options. All the participants chose a 
flight option and the decision was framed as unimportant. We ma-
nipulated decision difficulty (fluent versus disfluent). The dependent 
variable was the amount of time participants spent deciding.
A 2(prime) x 2(processing difficulty) ANOVA on time revealed 
the predicted prime x difficulty interaction. Disfluency had no effect 
on time in the control prime condition. However, in the choice-as-
self-expression prime condition, participants spent more time decid-
ing in the disfluent than the fluent condition. 
In Study 3, American participants completed a similar sequence 
of tasks as in Study 2, but this time half of them described a choice 
they had made that was strongly influenced by a societal imperative 
(e.g., an item they bought because they were expected to). The other 
half listed foods they consumed that day, as in Study 2. The remain-
der of the procedure was identical to Study 2. 
We expected the social-imperative prime to eliminate American 
participants’ baseline tendency to spend more time on unexpectedly 
difficult decisions. A 2(prime) x 2(difficulty) ANOVA on time re-
vealed the predicted prime x difficulty interaction. As expected, in 
the control prime condition, participants spent more time deciding 
in the disfluent than the fluent condition. However, in the social-
imperative prime condition, disfluency had no effect on time spent. 
See Table 1.
This research makes an important contribution by showing that 
susceptibility to metacognitive influences may differ by culture and 
that these differences may reflect cultural differences in the lay-the-
ories people recruit to interpret their metacognitive experiences. The 
findings suggest limitations to the idea that metacognitive effects are 
universal. 
One of Each: Variety Seeking to Avoid Choice Difficulty
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When consumers are faced with a choice conflict from infor-
mation overload, they use heuristics and non-compensatory choice 
processes, such as elimination-by-aspects and conjuctive models, 
to reduce the consideration set and come to a choice (Broniarczyk 
2008; Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Yet in so 
many modern-day choice situations, consumers are able to choose 
multiple options. Moreover, decision difficulty seems to propel con-
sumers to purchase more options (Goodman, Broniarzcyk, Griffin, 
and McAlister 2013). Consumers may seek variety as a way to mini-
mize the conflict and difficulty associated with choice. Consumers 
seek variety due to actual or anticipated satiation (McAlister 1982), 
a desire to reduce preference uncertainty (Kahn and Lehman 1991), 
anticipated satiation (Simonson 1990). 
We propose that consumers possess and use a variety-seeking 
heuristic to relieve choice conflict and information overload, and 
provide evidence that variety seeking increases when consumers’ 
mental resources are taxed. We tested our hypotheses by both ma-
nipulating participant’s mental resources (via ego depletion) and 
measuring consumer’s decision-making processing tendencies (by 
measuring System 2 processing via a Cognitive Reflection Test). 
Depletion served as a unique test of our theory because it does not 
create conflict, per se, but rather reduces the resources available to 
deal with the existing conflict and difficulty. Three studies tested and 
found support for our hypotheses. 
In study 1, we used a traditional ego depletion manipulation 
(Vohs et al. 2008). We asked 186 undergraduate participants to watch 
a video of a woman being interviewed for 4 minutes, with random 
words flashed on the side of the video. Participants in the depletion 
condition were instructed to not look at the words.  The nondepletion 
condition was not instructed to control their attention. Participants 
then completed an unrelated study to measure variety-seeking. Par-
ticipants imagined that they were purchasing ice cream and asked to 
choose how many of each flavor (chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry) 
and size (small, medium, large) they would buy.  As expected, the 
results showed that depleted participants chose more variety (M = 
3.27) compared to nondepleted participants (M = 2.45). This effect 
was not driven by a difference in quantity, as the depletion condition 
did not increase quantity purchased (F < 1). 
In study 2 we examined a common method by which consumers 
become depleted in the shopping environment by manipulating con-
sumption decisions. We also tested whether the use of the variety-
seeking heuristic can be reduced after resources are replenished. We 
paid 88 participants $7 as part of a longer 40-minute study. Partici-
pants in the depletion condition made 24 choices and received one 
of the products that they chose at the end of the study (Vohs et al. 
2008). Participants in the control condition indicated whether they 
Table 1: Results for these studies
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had used each specific product. Participants were then instructed 
to take a break and choose four snacks, in any combination. This 
choice task served as our dependent measure, and the snack and 
break also served to replenish participants’ resources. As expected, 
depleted participants chose more variety (M = 2.81) compared to 
the nondepleted participants (M = 2.40, t (87) = 2.10, p < .05). After 
replenishing their resources, participants responded to the same ice 
cream choices as in study 1. As expected, there was no longer any a 
difference in variety seeking after replenishment (M = 2.35 vs. M = 
2.40, t < 1).
In study 3 we measured individual differences in System 1 
versus 2 processing by administering the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT, Frederick 2005) after the choice task. We also manipulated 
depletion as in Study 2. If variety is used as a heuristic, then low 
CRT participants should exhibit more variety seeking. As in study 2, 
depleted participants showed more variety seeking (M = 4.52) than 
nondepleted participants (M =4.25, t (513) = 2.05, p < .05), and par-
ticipants that scored low on the CRT chose more variety (M =4.57) 
than those high on CRT (M = 4.11, t (513) = 2.61, p < .01).
These results support the presence and use of a consumer vari-
ety-seeking heuristic. Furthermore, they suggest that consumers use 
variety seeking as a shortcut to manage the decision process. Further, 
the results have important implications for the myriad decision situa-
tions that evoke depletion, such as long shopping trips or multi-stage 
product customizations. 
At a theoretical level, these findings imply that consumers who 
have limited executive resources might variety seek in order to miti-
gate the potential for future losses, which could be a boon to overall 
well-being. Yet a contrary view suggests that variety seeking can 
be a recipe for dissatisfaction. Future work will unravel the conse-
quences of heuristic-driven variety seeking, drawing a pathway from 
documenting the prevalence of this new heuristic to its implications 
for consumer welfare. 
Imago Animi Sermo Est – Speech is the Mirror of the 
Mind: The Effect of Vocal Expression on Preferences
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The marketplace affords consumers different modes by which 
to express their preference. These include, but are not limited to, 
pressing a button, noting something on paper, and vocal expressions. 
New technologies enable consumers to interact with vending ma-
chines and even kitchen devices. Normatively these different modes 
of expression should not yield different choices, as there is nothing 
about the option (or the consumer) that differs as a function of ex-
pression mode. Yet, we find in our research that mode of expression 
has a substantial effect on people’s choices.  
The study of response mode effects is not new; four decades of 
research on decision-making show that preference construction can 
be influenced by the form in which these preferences are elicited (Li-
chtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990; 
Nowlis and Simonson 1997). However, to date no studies have tested 
the effect of response modality—that is, the form in which the pref-
erence is expressed—on people’s choices.  Previous research hints at 
the possibility of differences due to modality. In particular, vocal and 
non-vocal preference elicitation modes differ in what is required to 
translate one’s preference into the desired outcome. Most non-vocal 
preference elicitation modes--such as pushing a button at a vend-
ing machine--require the translation of one’s choice (e.g., Snickers) 
into another medium (e.g., button B4) to obtain the desired outcome. 
Speech, on the other hand, is directly connected to emotionality: 
During a child’s emotional development, speech serves as a main 
vehicle for emotional expression (Chen, Kennedy, and Zhou 2012). 
Numerous studies have shown that speech and emotionality are in-
deed strongly interlinked (e.g., Pavlenko 2002).  We conjecture that 
translating one’s choice into another medium might therefore reduce 
emotional resonance, which suggests that the more that the situa-
tion calls for explicitly vocalizing one’s preferences, the more that 
emotional, automatic preferences will guide choice outcomes. This 
would imply that speech, more than non-vocal expressions, would 
produce decisions reflective of automatic emotional reactions, a pre-
diction that was confirmed in three experiments.
We tested this conjecture in three lab studies. In Study 1 (N = 
101), we let participants choose between vices and virtues. General-
ly, individuals prefer vices because they are inferred to be tastier, but 
this initial impulsive response can be overridden if more cognitive 
evaluation takes place (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). In this study, par-
ticipants chose a snack from a vending machine with healthy (e.g., 
apple slices, cereal bar, etc.) and unhealthy snacks (e.g., M&Ms, 
Kit Kat, etc.). Depending on condition, participants expressed their 
choice non-vocally (i.e., by pushing a button) or vocally (i.e., by 
speaking in a microphone attached to vending machine). 
Based on participants’ choices, we computed the average calo-
rie content of the snack selected in each condition.  Participants who 
expressed their choice vocally chose snacks significantly higher in 
calorie content (Mv = 239.56) than participants who expressed their 
choice by pushing the button (Mb = 209.04; F(1,99) = 5.81 p < .05). 
A logistic regression with choice of snack as a dichotomous variable 
(i.e., unhealthy vs. healthy) revealed a significant effect of condition 
(b = -1.06, p < .05). Participants that expressed their choice vocally 
were less likely to choose a healthy snack. 
In Study 2 (N = 59), we let participants choose between regular 
and low-fat ice cream. Based on research that shows that perceived 
healthiness and inferred tastiness are negatively correlated (Rag-
hunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006), we assumed that participants’ 
initial impulsive reaction would be to go for the regular version. 
During the study, participants were asked to choose an ice cream 
flavor among three different flavors available in a regular or a non-
fat version. Participants expressed their choice either by using the 
computer mouse or by expressing it vocally into a microphone that 
was connected to voice recognition software. We conducted a logis-
tic regression with ice cream flavor as the outcome and preference 
elicitation mode as the predictor. The results revealed an effect of 
condition, such that participants who expressed their choice vocally 
were less likely to choose a low-fat ice cream.
Study 3 (N = 132) was designed to provide evidence that ex-
pressing one’s choice vocally fosters choices that are more in line 
with an individual’s automatic emotional reactions. We therefore 
focused on the special situation of dieting. For dieters, high calo-
rie food is implicitly associated with positive affect, even though 
at an explicit level they endeavor to override this natural response 
(Strack and Deutsch 2004). We therefore measured individuals’ diet-
ing status (e.g., ‘I am on a diet’) and expected an interaction effect 
with preference elicitation mode so that dieting increases the likeli-
hood of choosing a snack higher in calorie content when expressing 
one’s preferences vocally. An ANOVA conducted on calorie content 
of the chosen snack revealed a (marginally) significant main effect 
of condition (F(1,130) = 3.02, p < .09): Participants who expressed 
their choice vocally chose snacks higher in calorie content (Mv = 
220.64) than participants who expressed their choice by pushing the 
button (Mb = 196.397). A logistic regression with choice of snack 
(i.e., unhealthy vs. healthy) revealed a significant effect of condi-
tion (b = - .691, p < .05): Participants who expressed their choice 
vocally were less likely to choose a healthy snack. Further, we find a 
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(marginally) significant interaction effect between preference elicita-
tion mode and being on a diet (p < .09). Using ‘floodlight’ analysis 
(Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch and McClelland, forthcoming) to probe 
the interaction we find that the region of significance for preference 
elicitation mode is all values of being on a diet equal to or higher 
than 1.696. This indicates that dieters choose snacks higher in calorie 
content.
Our findings highlight that consumer preferences differ de-
pending on whether they are expressed in spoken word or otherwise. 
Spoken choices appear to be more congruent with initial emotional 
reactions, while the translation into another medium (e.g., button B4) 
acts as a distancing function, promoting more reflective decision-
making.  
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SESSION OVERVIEW
This special session examines how power shapes consumption 
and limits policies or economic actions that attempt to bring about 
societal change through challenging social hierarchies. We bring 
together four papers that consider different types of stratification: 
geographical, religious, racial, generational, gender, and class. We 
demonstrate how consumption norms and practices that reinforce 
the stratifications are perpetuated or contested in the marketplace. 
We start by considering the different ways power dynamics and 
stratifications intersect and are experienced in the marketplace and 
build toward recognizing how these dynamics shape and influence the 
implemenation of policies. Each of these presentations use different 
methods, and thus extend our awareness of tools researchers can use 
to study normative and socio-economic forces. 
Russell Belk and Rana Sobh open the session with vignettes that 
reflect the intersectionality of geographical, religious, generational 
and gender stratifications occurring in the prosperous Islamic 
countries of Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Through cases that 
emerged in their three years of fieldwork, these scholars examine 
how consumers navigate the traditional structures and stratifications 
when Western popular culture starts to influence traditional family 
life. 
David Crockett investigates the racial stratification of America 
through an historical analysis of postwar black middle-class 
consumers. He discusses the historical transitions from legislated 
racial segregation to stratifications maintained through structural and 
symbolic systems. Using life histories of black middle-class families, 
he documents how race and class stratifications are maintained 
through myths about consumption while their reproduction is being 
contested by generational differences. 
Laurel Steinfield and Linda Scott explore the gender 
stratifications perpetuated by consumption practices in rural and 
urban Uganda. Policy and legislative protocols are encouraging 
women to become more educated and employed in the private and 
public sectors, yet the effectiveness of these changes is hampered by 
gender biases that affect the consumption of women. Using projective 
techniques and armed with a shopping bag of goods, Steinfield and 
Scott conduct interviews that unearth the normative prejudices and 
pejorative labels that limit the consumption choices that can be made 
by women and observe the flow of these ideologies to urban areas. 
Kathy Hamilton and Katherine Trebeck close with a presentation 
that demonstrates how economic stratifications are intensified by 
regeneration strategies. They call into question policies that attempt 
to spur economic investments and a culture of consumption, noting 
how too much emphasis on the marketplace can lead to an increase 
in poverty, inequality and health problems. Presenting the work they 
have done on the “Glasgow effect”, they remind us that the consumer 
marketplace is only one of many places in which the effects of 
stratifications are felt and experienced. 
Our session asks how social stratifications are institutionalized 
and contested through the marketplace, but also reflects on the 
reasons why such stratifications should matter to policy-makers 
and should be accommodated in planning and interventions.  It 
explores the tension that exists in market-based solutions to societal 
change, asking: in what instances does the marketplace perpetuate 
vulnerabilities and when does it enable empowerment and societal 
transitions? This session should be of interest to researchers interested 
in social stratifications, power, religion, race, gender, class, emerging 
economies and transformative consumer research.
Effects of Geographic and Religious Stratification and 
Modernity in the Arab Gulf
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Stratification in Qatar and UAE occurs both within these 
nations and between these nations as well as between the countries 
of origin of its non-citizen residents who make up 80 to 85 percent 
of local populations.  Religion, location, citizenship, age, income, 
ethnicity, country of origin, and gender all play a role in the status 
of those living in these Arab Gulf countries. These stratifications are 
embedded within one another and in order to appreciate their impact 
on consumption, it is necessary to consider their intersections. 
Illustrations of the importance of local intersectionalites include 
contrasts such as the following:
1. A male Hindu guest worker from Kerala working in UAE 
for two years versus the same man when he returns to India.
2. A female Muslim Qatari married to a Bedu Qatari man (a 
Bedouin Arab of Qatari tribal origin) versus another Muslim 
Qatari woman married to an Ajam Qatari man whose heritage 
is Iranian and who may speak Farsi rather than Arabic.
3. A 45-year-old Qatari Muslim woman versus her 20-year-old 
daughter in university.
4. An expatriate Christian British businessman living in UAE 
versus an expatriate Muslim Indonesian cleaning woman for 
an Emirati family.
5. A 20-year-old Sri Lankan Muslim non-citizen born and 
raised in UAE versus his Emirati university friends.
These illustrations, based on a three-year ethnography, 
demonstrate how the recent petro-wealth and Western popular 
culture has affected social status and consumption patterns.
In the first case the guest worker in the UAE lives in a “labor 
camp” in Dubai and is bused daily between the camp and a high 
rise construction site.  He has one day off a week and his employer 
holds his passport and sponsors his visa.  He is near the bottom of 
the social hierarchy in UAE.  He repatriates his money to his family 
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in Kerala where he will build a house and become a nouveau riche 
“king” when he returns home.  
In the second case the woman married to the Bedu man has 
higher social status than the one married to the Ajam man, even 
though they are both citizens of Qatar and thereby entitled to benefits 
such as higher salaries, free education, water, and electricity, low cost 
housing loans, and free land for building a house.  There is a further 
status hierarchy depending on the prominence of the Bedu couple’s 
clan.  Although there are virtually no poor Qataris (or Emiratis), clan 
and heritage are stratification variables within these societies, with 
Abd Muslims who originate from North Africa being lower status 
than either Bedu or Ajam.
In the third case the mother and daughter occupy the same 
social status (unless the woman gained citizenship by marrying a 
Qatari man, in which case her daughter would not be a citizen).  But 
the influence of modernity is likely to be strikingly different between 
the two.  Both are likely to wear the traditional black abaya (gown) 
and shayla (head covering), but the daughter’s is more form-fitting, 
covers Western designer clothes including tight fitting jeans, red high 
heels, and accessories from Gucci, Prada, and Louis Vuitton, and 
is left partly unbuttoned with her hair peeking out from her shayla, 
also revealing her heavy makeup.  Her abaya may be covered in 
Swarovski jewels and may even have a rock star insignia on the 
back.  It costs hundreds or thousands of dollars and may be out of 
fashion in two months.
The fourth case involves a relatively wealthy businessman who 
lives in a high rise apartment and enjoys a high salary, but not enough 
to keep up with Emirates who have one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the world (along with Qataris).  Unlike the businessman 
who lives far from the palatial homes of local Emirates, the cleaning 
woman lives with an Emirati family in a separate quarters.  Like 
the guest workers she repatriates most of her money to her home 
country.  She learns some Arabic and may be able to make the Hajj 
to Mecca.  
Like the Brit, the Sri Lankan man may have a wealthy family, 
but they enjoy none of the privileges of citizenship and he can never 
become a citizen, even if he were to get permission to marry an 
Emirati woman.  Since citizens have 20 percent of the jobs set aside 
for them and earn considerably higher salaries than non-citizens 
doing the same job in the same establishment, he is at a considerable 
economic disadvantage.
We draw on our ethnographic data to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of singular analyses of location, nationality, citizenship, 
age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, or religion alone in order 
to understand the status hierarchies of the Gulf States.  Rather the 
structural inequalities that begin with religion and location, are 
entangled with the intersectionality of other characteristics that must 
be considered jointly in order to understand the role of consumption 
in the daily lives and statuses of those living in these newly rich 
nations.
Viewing the Creation and Reproduction of Racial 
Stratification through Consumption: Life Histories of the 
Black Middle-Class in America
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research documents the racial stratification that occurs in 
the marketplace of America as consumer culture attains dominance 
in the mid-twentieth century. The history of consumer culture in 
the West can best be characterized as a social formation that shifts 
commodity consumption from a peripheral activity in social life to 
the quintessential activity of social life. The insights generated herein 
are intended to highlight the critical role played by consumption 
practices, and consumer culture more broadly, in the creation and 
maintenance of the Black middle-class. 
Any broad-reaching investigation of black middle class family 
life must place consumption practices and consumer culture at its 
center. Unfortunately, such a perspective has been either largely 
absent or marginalized in scholarship found in the humanities as well 
as the social sciences. Traditionally, scholars in the US study Black 
life largely by looking at labor and income inequality in isolation 
or in tandem with critical social institutions like family, school, and 
church. This traditional approach is very limiting insofar as it ignores 
or marginalizes consumption’s centrality to identity formation as well 
as its role in the reproduction of culture. Fortunately, contemporary 
scholarship has begun to include consumption as part of the analysis 
of the black experience. Unfortunately, consumption still lurks at the 
margins.
This research addresses this imbalance by moving consumption 
to the center of the analysis of the Black middle-class experience. It 
views the construction of personal and social identity in the Black 
middle-class as well as upward and downward social mobility 
through the lens of consumption. It forms part of a larger project that 
studies consumption at the intersection of race-, class-, and gender 
stratification under historical conditions specific to late capitalism. 
The Black middle-class (typically inclusive of African, Afro-
Caribbean, and other immigrants designated as “black” in the U.S.) 
emerges in recognizable form at roughly the same historical moment 
that a culture of mass consumption emerges to supplement and then 
replace a culture of mass production at the very center of U.S. social 
life.  Although the emergence of a black middle class began in the 
Reconstruction period immediately following the U.S. Civil War 
(DuBois 1935), the focus of this study is on the post-World War II 
black middle class, which is qualitative different from its pre-war 
counterpart (Patillo-McCoy 1999). The post-war black middle class 
emerges in a consumer culture that is simultaneously a “democracy 
of goods” yet rife with racial stratification: African Americans are 
initially the object of legalized racial stratification in markets and 
the state (Drake and Cayton 1962). Following the collapse of the 
Jim Crow regime in the U.S., access to markets (and certainly to the 
cultural capital thought to flow from full participation in them) is at 
times attenuated even for high income African Americans. Structural 
features (e.g., high levels of residential segregation) and symbolic 
representation (e.g., widely-held stigmatization) continue to stratify 
the market. At the same time consumption serves as a primary means 
by which the black middle class distinguishes itself from the black 
working class and poor (Patillo-McCoy 1999). But, even more 
disconcerting for what Lacy (2007) describes as the “elite” black 
middle class, in an intergenerational boundary: evident feelings of 
alienation separate black middle class informants from their children. 
This interconnection and interplay between consumer culture and 
black middle class status comes to the fore through the life histories 
interviews of these informants. Using boundary theory, I show how 
their histories demonstrate two broad categories of consumption-
focused strategies for configuring ethno-racial identity. 
In the first category, actors seek to change boundary topography. 
That is, they try to expand boundaries to incorporate out-group 
members into an identity group, or, they contract boundaries to expel 
in-group members. These strategies are on the whole unavailable to 
Blacks in the US. Thus, I focus on the second category, where actors 
seek to change their affiliation with particular boundary-created 
identity groups or alter a boundary’s meaning. Following Wimmer 
(2008), I show how informants implement consumption-focused 
strategies (inverting the racial hierarchy, equalization, boundary-
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crossing and collective repositioning) to attenuate the impact of 
stratification with varying degrees of success. Part of this success 
is determined by the destruction of myths by generational changes; 
that is, I find that racial stratification in the marketplace is maintained 
through myths yet these myths, and thus the stratification, lose 
meaning and power over consumption as they become challenged by 
generational divergences.
Controlling Consumption: The Illusiveness and 
Pervasiveness of Gender Stratifications in the Ugandan 
Marketplace
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In Uganda, as women become more educated and employed, 
and as laws are enacted to protect their rights, male economic power 
might be expected to erode. Ideologies, however, continue to uphold 
the gender hierarchies in this traditional patriarchal society. In rural 
communities, where traditional tribal laws are still practiced, women 
continue to be treated like property, traded for a bride-price as soon 
as they can bear children, or, if a widow, being inherited by her 
husband’s family and forced to marry his male relative should she 
have no male children to provide for her. Women continue to submit 
to these laws for fear that they will be outcasts of society. The local 
model of domestic virtue continues to restrict a woman’s role in the 
economy even in urban areas (Kyomuhendo and McIntosh (2006).
Our research investigated the way such gender restrictions are 
perpetuated through family consumption decisions. We frame our 
analysis using two of Lukes (2005) faces of power: decisions and 
preferences. In rural Uganda, a woman is limited in her ability to 
keep her own money or to get to the shops to buy needed goods. If 
she works with her husband, the money goes directly to him. Any 
money she earns through selling small amounts of produce can 
easily be taken by her husband who, culturally, is allowed to beat her. 
She becomes trapped at home, burdened with the responsibility of 
childcare, kept from travelling the miles between her homestead and 
the trading center by cultural beliefs that make female mobility on 
a motorcycle immoral. Although norms are less openly restrictive in 
urban areas, the other face of power – power over preferences – does 
exist in judgments of appropriate versus inappropriate consumption, 
with pejorative terms applied to women who challenge gender norms 
for consumption. 
It is infamously difficult for respondents to articulate these 
kinds of gender issues.  To study the influences of power over 
preferences, therefore, we devised techniques that could be used in 
spite of language differences and low literacy rates. For instance, 
we researched typical purchasing habits in remote areas in order to 
create a typical “shopping bag” of groceries and augmented that set 
of goods with objects said to have strongly gendered identities in 
local habits. The final “bag” held a broad array of items, including 
common foods and everyday “necessities,” as well as gender specific 
items for both females and males (e.g., hair extensions versus alcohol 
and phone time). We took the actual collection of objects into remote 
areas and asked participants to group the goods into piles of items 
(1) for which they pay and for which their spouse pays, (2) that the 
household often buys or never buys, and (3) items that men/women 
think are necessary versus unnecessary. The results made visible the 
social norms that elevate the consumption habits of men and place 
limits on the consumption of women. The items men denoted as 
necessary but said their wives would see as unnecessary (batteries, 
airtime, and alcohol) nevertheless were frequently purchased staples 
of the household; in contrast, goods women thought were necessities 
(sanitary pads, hair extensions, and skin-whitening lotion), but were 
not thought important by men, were rarely, if ever, bought.
Men were expected to be the main providers for the house, but 
once they have fulfilled a basic commitment they were allowed to 
spend their money as they wished – with no social stigma even for 
flashy purchases or frequent drinking. Women, on the other hand, 
were not only to grow the food and provide for the other needs of 
the family (clothes, education, etc), but were always expected to put 
their family needs before their own. They will buy their daughters 
sanitary pads, but will not buy sanitary pads for themselves. There 
is a strong moral suasion held over women to put their families first 
and to not buy things for themselves, which does not exist to the 
same level for men. 
We used a projective technique based on Haire’s (1950) coffee 
study to elicit judgments of consumption. We grouped together four 
goods: sanitary pads, hair extensions, lipstick, and skin-whitening 
cream, and asked respondents to describe a woman who purchases 
these items for herself, on a regular basis. In rural Uganda, this 
woman was often labeled as a “malaya” – a prostitute. To indulge 
in “inappropriate” consumption habits earns a woman a much 
stronger social stigma than a man. These moral restrictions protect 
a man’s money, and thus his freedom to consume, on two accounts: 
they ensure that a woman will restrict her personal consumption 
and use her own money, instead of her husband’s money, towards 
family expenses (thus allowing him more disposable income for his 
personal consumption) and they prevent her from asking her husband 
for money for personal items for fear that she will be suspected of 
prostitution. Even among university students in urban Uganda, a 
woman who buys self-indulgences on a regular basis was assumed 
to be engaging in exchange sex. Thus, the myth of the “malaya” 
transfers from rural to urban settings, applied specifically to women 
who challenge the social norm of limiting their personal consumption. 
However, the gender norms that limit economic opportunities, thus 
causing women to be dependent on men as providers of goods 
and potentially driving them to engage in prostitution, are seldom 
recognized. 
We see further through this study how gender stratifications 
in consumption limit the effectiveness of policies and legislation. 
Our research in rural Uganda, which forms part of a bigger study on 
girl’s education and sanitary pads, demonstrates how gender biases 
in household decisions can place limits on a girl’s ability to continue 
in school, despite government and civil society programs designed to 
further female education.  For instance, families consistently place a 
man’s social drinking needs ahead of his daughter’s need for sanitary 
pads, thus limiting the girl’s ability to stay in school. In turn, the 
next generation of women fails to escape the ideologically-imposed 
restriction on her economic autonomy, is traded in marriage, and the 
whole cycle begins again.  
The Consuming City: Economic Stratification and the 
Glasgow Effect
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This presentation will focus on the city of Glasgow (located 
within the central belt of Scotland) and explore the way its 
economic development is influenced by ideological, socio-cultural 
and historical forces. Images, discourse and media representations 
associated with Glasgow offer opposing views regarding the success, 
prosperity and identity of the city. On the one hand, Glasgow is 
proclaimed to be a city of retail and following London is the UK’s 
second largest shopping destination. On the other hand, Glasgow has 
high levels of deprivation. With this in mind, we will consider the 
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following research questions: Is the focus on consumption making 
the citizens of Glasgow vulnerable? Are regeneration strategies that 
centre on consumption effective both for economic development and 
individual consumers? Or are they counter-productive and instead 
harming the social assets of citizens already vulnerable due to 
decades of deindustrialisation?
The development of consumer culture in Glasgow has been 
a central strategy in response to the identity crisis caused by 
de-industrialisation and the decline of traditional employment 
opportunities, particularly that offered by the ship-building industry. 
Similar to Miles (2010), the consuming city has become central to 
urban life to the extent that policy-makers and urban planners focus 
on consumption at the expense of anything else. Since the early 
1980s, place marketing campaigns have drawn on sophisticated 
lifestyle concepts to position Glasgow as a high class destination. 
One of the most prominent, the ‘Glasgow: Scotland with Style’ 
marketing slogan was launched in 2005 in an effort to enhance the 
city’s reputation, increase visitor numbers and increase the economic 
value of tourism. Proclaimed as the ‘Style Mile,’ Glasgow’s city 
centre is presented as a destination filled with what Ritzer (2010, 
p.7) would term ‘cathedrals of consumption:’  
“Everyone knows that Glaswegians live, breathe, eat and 
sleep style. Little wonder that, in the very heart of the mar-
vellous city they call home, one square mile houses the 
most extraordinary concentration of inspirational shop-
ping, atmospheric cafés, fine restaurants, and decadent 
late night haunts.” (http://www.glasgowstylemile.com/)
The assumption is decades of regeneration policies that focus 
on physical improvements and the construction of luxury shops 
will address growing inequalities through increased employment 
opportunities and other benefits created by economic growth. Some 
point towards Glasgow being awarded European City of Culture 
in 1990 and the hosting of the Commonwealth Games in 2014 as 
evidence of success. However, poverty persists and inequalities have 
widened. Recent statistics indicated that the percentage of Scots 
living in relative poverty is 17 per cent, while income inequality has 
increased since 2004/5 (Scottish Government, 2011). In Glasgow, 
there are particular concerns related to poor health and high 
mortality rates. Walsh et al. (2010) undertook a detailed comparison 
of Glasgow and two other UK cities (Liverpool and Manchester) 
which have almost identical levels of deprivation and have similar 
experiences of deindustrialisation. Findings highlighted that 
Glasgow suffers from excess mortality beyond that attributable to 
the city’s high levels of socio-economic deprivation, a phenomenon 
known as the “Glasgow Effect.”  
In this presentation we draw on data from Oxfam’s Humankind 
Index for Scotland which was built following consultation with 
Scottish people about what aspects of life make a real difference 
to the prosperity, resilience and sustainability of their households 
and communities. Particular effort was made to ensure that the 
consultation was inclusive, especially with regard to seldom heard 
groups and data collection included focus groups, community 
workshops, street stalls and an online survey. The results are a set 
of weighted priorities that describe what Scottish people identify 
as important to living well in their communities. Findings point to 
health, security, time with friends and family, access to green spaces 
and satisfaction in work as priorities. Such priorities are dramatically 
different from how Glasgow has been marketed – competitive, 
stylish, imaged-focused. They are also unlikely to be outcomes 
flowing from the current mode of economic development being 
pursued in the city.
Although we focus on Glasgow, the trend towards more 
entrepreneurial governance means that increasingly cities across 
the world are being marketed as shopping destinations (Kavaratzis, 
2004). The danger with such an approach is that the city becomes 
‘less a place for and of the people and more a unit for the efficient 
maximisation of consumption’ (Miles, 2010, p2). We demonstrate that 
beneath idealised marketing images, this approach to regeneration is 
not conducive to the reduction of poverty and inequality. This has 
important implications for both city planners and city marketers 
as a more multidimensional focus on the planning and branding of 
cities would provide a better fit with the priorities of citizens and also 
ensure greater sustainability. By considering goals beyond economic 
growth and elevating policies which contribute to better distribution 
of that growth and growth of what matters to communities in the first 
place, policy makers would be in a better position to really make a 
difference to local residents.   
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Excess unhealthy food intake and inadequate exercise are ma-
jor contributors to the obesity epidemic, such that understanding and 
increasing healthy choices is a major issue of interest to researchers 
and policymakers. This session features three papers that use psy-
chological theories to inform our understanding of important factors 
that influence eating and exercise choices. Collectively, these papers 
raise and begin to address the following questions: 1) How can we 
leverage existing psychological research insights to understand and 
improve eating and exercise choices, and 2) How can studying psy-
chological theories in the eating and exercise domains lead to new 
theoretical insights?
The first paper builds upon assimilation and contrast research 
and demonstrates that these effects can manifest differently in food 
consumption contexts. In three studies, assimilation and contrast ef-
fects on healthiness judgments were moderated by individual differ-
ences in self-control, such that people higher (lower) in self-control 
made healthiness judgments that facilitate healthier (unhealthier) eat-
ing patterns.
The second paper builds on reactance research to show that 
highly reactant people resist the influence of direct self-control mes-
sages. Three studies show that exposing people to words directly re-
lated to a target healthy behavior (e.g., exposure to diet-related words 
to promote healthier food choices) can be less effective than expos-
ing them to words indirectly related to the target behavior (e.g., ex-
posure to exercise-related words to promote healthier food choices). 
This effect occurs among highly reactant people and indicates that 
indirect health messages can be more effective than direct ones at 
promoting healthier behavior.
The third paper builds upon research on agency and self-serving 
attributions to examine how perceptions of agency in food serving 
shape post-eating feelings and how anticipation of such feelings 
shapes eating decisions. Four studies demonstrate that people feel 
better when unhealthy food is served to them as opposed to when 
they self-serve it, that people have intuitions about ramifications 
of different serving arrangements, and that people adjust their un-
healthy food portion selections based upon whom they expect to be 
the server.
These three papers are in advanced stages and collectively le-
verage psychological theories to investigate important factors that 
influence healthiness perceptions and healthy choices. Moreover, 
two papers examine interactions between experimental manipula-
tions and individual differences (self-control, reactance), providing 
a nuanced understanding of how different consumers may respond 
to environmental cues, messages, and potential interventions. This 
session will appeal to an audience interested in self-control, healthy 
choices, and food psychology. This work relates to the “making a 
difference” theme because it sheds light on factors influencing con-
sumer welfare.
“This Isn’t So Bad”: Assimilation, Contrast, and Self-
Control on Healthiness Perceptions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Assimilation and contrast effects play an important role in the 
way consumers make judgments (Parducci 1992; Schwarz and Bless 
1992b). The order of information, in particular, may have a contex-
tual influence on the way we evaluate (Schwarz and Bless 1992a). 
In the present research, we examine how assimilation and contrast 
effects might manifest differently in food consumption related situa-
tions. Across three studies, we examine contextual order effects and 
test our hypothesis that these effects are moderated by self-control, 
facilitating better overall patterns of consumption for individuals 
higher in self-control. We show that prior exposure to healthy or in-
dulgent food options impacts consumer evaluations of healthiness 
for subsequent options differently at varying levels of self-control.
Comparative evaluations and order effects are critical to our 
understanding of consumer judgments and choice. Our research con-
tributes to this knowledge by examining the role of self-control in 
goal contexts with sequential exposure to different foods. Research 
on order effects has identified highlighting and balancing behaviors 
toward pursuit of self-regulation goals (Dhar and Simonson 1999). 
For example, a dieter may balance an unhealthy lunch by eating a 
healthy dinner or vice versa. The present research examines judg-
ments about the ambiguously healthy foods that may lead individu-
als with low self-control to use strategies such as highlighting and 
balancing ineffectively or categorizing alternatives in a manner that 
negatively impacts the pursuit of health goals (Poynor and Haws 
2009). Specifically, we hypothesize that people with lower self-con-
trol will assimilate their perceptions of healthiness for ambiguously 
healthy options following exposure to healthy foods and contrast 
after unhealthy foods. This behavior broadens the number of accept-
ably healthy choices available. For those high in self-control, we 
expect the opposite pattern to emerge and impede goal-inconsistent 
choices.
In Experiment 1, participants were shown food images one at 
a time and asked to rate the healthiness of each. Participants were 
shown either a healthy (an apple) or unhealthy food (potato chips) 
followed by an ambiguously healthy food (Goldfish® Crackers). 
Separately, participants completed the 13-item self-control scale 
(Tangney et al. 2004). Analysis revealed a significant interaction (p 
= 0.05) between the order condition and trait self-control. A spotlight 
analysis confirmed that individuals with lower self-control evalu-
ated the neutral Goldfish option as more healthy subsequent to ex-
posure to a healthier item (an apple) relative to people with higher 
self-control (p = 0.01). Consistent with our hypothesis, these results 
indicate that after seeing a healthy item, low self-control individuals 
assimilate judgments about a subsequent ambiguously healthy item 
whereas high self-control individuals contrast. In the condition be-
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ginning with an unhealthy item (potato chips), there was no signifi-
cant difference between low and high self-control participants.
In Experiment 2, we tested whether our effects extend to calorie 
estimates, which are related to consumers’ perceptions of healthi-
ness. Participants were shown Teddy Grahams® as a neutral food 
following a healthy (apple slices) or unhealthy (chocolates) item. 
After being presented with the snacks, participants were asked to es-
timate the number of calories in the Teddy Grahams. The interaction 
between health condition and trait self-control was again significant 
(p < .001). Participants lower in self-control estimated fewer calories 
in the Teddy Grahams after exposure to apple slices (p < .001) rela-
tive to participants higher in self-control, supporting the pattern of 
assimilation and contrast found in Experiment 1. After exposure to 
healthy foods, this pattern of assimilation for people with low self-
control effectively broadens the category of healthy foods and makes 
the pursuit of health goals easier, but less effective. Conversely, con-
trasting healthiness narrows categorization to protect high self-con-
trol people from threats to goal-pursuit. Consistent with Experiment 
1, there was no significant difference based on self-control in the 
unhealthy first condition, possibly because seeing the indulgent food 
first does not activate a health goal. 
In Experiment 3, we extended our study of order effects by 
presenting healthiness information for the first snack to half of the 
participants. We expected to find that conscious processing of health 
information would attenuate the tendency for people low in self-
control to assimilate to healthy items. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants were first shown either a healthy (apple slices) or unhealthy 
(potato chips) snack. Health grades (A for apple slices and D for 
potato chips) were provided to participants in the health information 
condition. Brief information about the algorithm for the health grade 
was also presented to indicate USDA guidelines and nutrient content 
as key determinants of the grade. All participants were then shown 
ambiguously healthy Goldfish and asked to estimate the number of 
calories in a serving. We find a significant 3-way interaction (p < .05) 
among order condition, health information condition, and trait self-
control. A spotlight analysis on the healthy-first condition revealed 
a significant difference between the health information conditions 
for individuals with low self-control (p < .01). Consistent with our 
hypothesis, low self-controllers estimated significantly more calories 
for the ambiguous Goldfish when health information was provided.
Our findings contribute to literature on context effects as part 
of a goal pursuit process by exploring the role of assimilation and 
contrast effects in self-control decision-making through the impact 
on healthiness perceptions. Prior research revealed the importance 
of categorizations of alternatives in goal pursuit (Poynor and Haws 
2009). Here, we identify trait self-control as a factor that moderates 
order effects, showing that low self-control individuals tend to as-
similate their healthiness judgments to prior healthy food choices, 
whereas high self-control individuals tend to contrast. This effect can 
lead to suboptimal decisions for people with low self-control. How-
ever, we find that presenting health information can reverse the effect 
and lead to contrasting judgments among low self-control individu-
als. These findings may help explain why people high in self-control 
are more successful at pursuing self-control goals.
Avoiding Behavioral Resistance to Diet and Exercise 
Messages
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People are exposed to many persuasive health messages that 
encourage them to become healthy in different ways. For instance, 
some messages encourage people to eat healthy and diet, and other 
messages encourage people to get active and exercise. How do con-
sumers respond to the constant bombardment by these messages? 
Some consumers may respond by developing an automatic ten-
dency to behave in line with the content of the persuasive health 
messages (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; 2000; Berger and Fitzsimons 
2008; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008). However, other 
consumers may respond by developing an automatic resistance to 
performing the promoted behavior, such that the original message 
has no effect on them at all (Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). We 
propose that this automatic resistance happens for some people in 
response to direct health messages (e.g., diet-related words to pro-
mote healthier eating) and that this resistance can be avoided by us-
ing indirect health messages (e.g., exercise-related words to promote 
healthier eating). 
To establish more clearly what we mean by direct versus indi-
rect health messages, we borrow an analogy from the goal structure 
literature (Shah and Kruglanski 2003). In this framework, different 
subgoals (e.g., diet; exercise) are linked to the same superordinate 
goal (e.g., self-control). Therefore, if attempting to increase healthy 
food choice, direct messaging refers to activating concepts related to 
diet, whereas indirect messaging refers to activating concepts related 
to exercise. Thus, we argue that increasing healthy food choice can 
be brought about either directly (activating diet concepts) or indi-
rectly (through activating exercise concepts, which relate to the same 
superordinate goal).   
Intuitively, one might expect direct messaging to be equally or 
more effective at promoting a desired behavior compared to indirect 
messaging. Indeed, past research has shown that exposing people 
to words directly related to the target behavior affects behavior. For 
instance, exposing people to words related to cooperation leads them 
to engage in greater cooperation in a resource management game 
(Bargh, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, Gollwitzer, and Trötschel 2001), and 
exposing people to words related to thriftiness leads them to make 
thriftier product choices (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008). 
However, for some persuasive messages, we propose that a subset of 
people frequently and consistently experience a feeling of resistance 
upon encountering the message and facing the choice of whether to 
follow through on performing the target behavior. For these people, 
indirect messaging may be more effective than direct messaging at 
promoting the target behavior, because these automatic pairings of 
resistance do not arise for words that compose the indirect messages.
Our hypothesis that a subset of people may develop automatic 
resistance to some direct messages draws from the theory of reac-
tance, or the psychological tendency to resist restrictions on one’s 
freedom to choose (Brehm 1966). Prior research by Chartrand, 
Dalton, and Fitzsimons (2007) found that people high in reactance 
display a different pattern of responses to a stimulus compared to 
people low in reactance. They argued that reactance to a stimulus can 
become automatized when people frequently and consistently expe-
rience a feeling of resistance paired with a stimulus. We propose that 
people who have habitually experienced reactance while encounter-
ing similar persuasion messages will come to experience automatic 
resistance to performing the behavior upon encountering the words 
often contained in such persuasion messages. For instance, external 
events (e.g., “eat healthy” diet message) may have been paired with 
a feeling of resistance (“I won’t eat healthy”) frequently and consis-
tently for people high on reactance. For these people, we hypothesize 
that indirect messages can be more effective than direct messages at 
promoting the target behavior because automatic resistance to per-
forming the target behavior has not developed for indirect messages, 
yet such indirect messages are still strong enough to activate the tar-
get behavior. We tested our hypotheses in three studies.
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Study 1 had a one-way between-subjects design with three lev-
els (message: direct (diet), indirect (exercise), control). Participants 
completed a scrambled sentences task that exposed them to words 
related to diet, exercise, or neutral words. Then, they chose five 
snacks from a selection of five unhealthy and five healthy snacks. 
Results showed that the direct message and the indirect message led 
to more healthy snacks chosen compared to the control condition. 
More importantly, the indirect message led to more healthy snacks 
chosen than the direct message.
Study 2 had a 2 (message: direct (diet), indirect (exercise)) x 
continuous measured reactance between-subjects design. Partici-
pants completed a scrambled sentences task that exposed them to 
words related to diet or exercise. Then, they chose five snacks from 
a selection of five unhealthy and five healthy snacks. Finally, they 
completed an individual difference measure of reactance (Hong 
1992; Hong and Faedda 1996). Results showed that the indirect mes-
sage again led to healthier snack choices than the direct message. 
This effect was moderated by reactance, such that high reactance 
participants displayed this effect, whereas low reactance participants 
did not.  
Study 3 had a 3 (message: direct (exercise), indirect (diet), 
control) x continuous measured reactance between-subjects design, 
which aimed to replicate the conceptual finding of study 2 in the ex-
ercise domain. Participants first completed a scrambled sentence task 
that exposed them to words that were diet-related, exercise-related, 
or neutral. Then, they chose three activities from a selection of three 
sedentary and three exercise activities. Finally, they completed a re-
actance scale (Hong 1992; Hong and Faedda 1996). Results revealed 
a significant two-way interaction, such that participants high in reac-
tance resisted the direct message but not the indirect message or the 
neutral words in the control condition.  
In sum, in the diet and exercise domains, an indirect message 
is more effective than a direct message at promoting the direct mes-
sage’s target behavior for people high in reactance.
Is Self-Serving Self-Serving? Who Serves Food Shapes 
Self-evaluation and Eating Decisions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Eating meals that are served by someone else is commonplace: 
50% of all meals are consumed away from the home, and two-thirds 
of Americans eat out at least every other day (Stewart, Blisard, and 
Jolliffe 2006). Being served offers convenience – but does it come at 
a cost for health? Indeed, consumers are aware of making more un-
healthy choices when eating out (Gregory, Smith and Wendt 2011). 
In this research, we explore this phenomenon and investigate how 
one predominant feature of eating out, being served by someone else 
instead of serving oneself, might drive it. Based on the literatures 
of agency and self-serving attributions, we theorize that being more 
versus less physically involved in the act of serving food differen-
tially affords self-serving attributions of responsibility for one’s food 
choices. Thereby, it may shape how consumers feel about themselves 
after eating, and even alter their portion-size choices beforehand.
A variety of consumer research has shown that consumption ex-
periences and behavior can be significantly altered by the degree to 
which the consumer is active in the process (Botti and McGill 2006; 
Norton, Mochon, and Ariely 2012). Agency – the sense of control-
ling one’s actions – considerably influences judgment and decision-
making, particularly by intensifying affective reactions (Botti and 
McGill 2011; Landman 1987). Accordingly, agency attributions are 
consequential and are often distorted in self-serving ways to pro-
tect a positive self-view (Campbell and Sedikides 1999; Miller and 
Ross 1975). People attribute responsibility for favorable outcomes 
to themselves but attribute responsibility for unfavorable outcomes 
to others (Arkin, Gleason, and Johnston 1976; Blaine and Crocker 
1993). They also self-penalize less when they can explain away re-
sponsibility to other factors (Bandura, 1990), something especially 
pronounced in goal-domains (Dunning, Perie, and Story 1991).
One such important goal-domain for today’s consumer is 
healthy eating. Most people want to eat healthily, and eating is in-
tricately linked with self-conscious feelings (e.g., many experience 
shame for eating indulgent foods) (Ramanathan and Williams 2007). 
We propose that being served unhealthy food by someone else (ver-
sus self-serving) affords an opportunity to reject responsibility and 
have more positive self-evaluative feelings as a result. Four stud-
ies show that (1) self-evaluative feelings following consumption are 
influenced jointly by the food’s healthiness and who served it; (2) 
this effect is mediated by feelings of responsibility; and (3-4) people 
adjust their food consumption in anticipation of this effect.
Study 1 established that healthiness and who serves interac-
tively affect self-evaluative feelings. In a 2 (server: self/other) × 
2 (healthiness: healthy/unhealthy) between-subjects design, par-
ticipants imagined lunch in a cafeteria where they either served 
themselves or were served, and saw a photograph of their healthy 
or unhealthy dish. Subsequently, participants indicated how good, 
justified, guilty, and shameful they would feel after eating this meal, 
yielding an index for positive self-evaluative feelings. The analysis 
yielded a main effect for healthiness, with participants reporting sig-
nificantly more positive self-evaluative feelings when they imagined 
eating healthy food versus unhealthy food. More important, how-
ever, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between 
healthiness and server. For healthy food, people had directionally 
more positive self-evaluative feelings when they imagined self-serv-
ing than being served by another person. Conversely, for unhealthy 
food, people had more positive self-evaluative feelings when they 
imagined being served by others compared to self-serving. 
Study 2 tested if this effect is mediated by attributions of re-
sponsibility for the plate of food as a function of who served and the 
food’s healthiness, based on the idea that self-serving may force con-
sumers to accept, but being served may offer an opportunity to reject, 
responsibility. In a 2 (server) × 2 (healthiness) between-subjects de-
sign, participants imagined eating with friends who had cooked din-
ner where they served themselves [their friend served them], and saw 
a photograph of their healthy [unhealthy] dish. Lastly, they reported 
their self-evaluative feelings and indicated how much responsibil-
ity they felt for their food. For positive self-evaluative feelings, the 
data fully replicated study 1. Importantly, these patterns were fully 
mediated by feeling responsibility (CI=4.03–40.50). When people 
thought about eating healthy food, those who imagined being served 
assumed just as much responsibility as those who imagined serv-
ing themselves. Conversely, when people thought about eating un-
healthy food, those who imagined being served accepted significant-
ly less responsibility than those who imagined serving themselves.
Together, studies 1–2 demonstrated that people feel better about 
themselves when unhealthy food is served to them (as opposed to 
when they self-serve the same food) because they can reject respon-
sibility for it. Studies 3–4 sought to extend these findings to down-
stream effects on consumers’ food-related decision-making.
Study 3 explored whether people’s preferences for who should 
serve food change as a function of the food’s healthiness. Partici-
pants imagined getting a healthy [unhealthy] snack and indicated 
their preference for serving themselves versus being served by their 
friend. The analysis revealed that for the unhealthy snack, preference 
shifted towards being served by the friend, compared to the healthy 
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snack. Consumers appear to have an intuition about the consequenc-
es of serving themselves unhealthy food.
Study 4 tested to what extent this intuition causes consumers 
to adjust how much food they allow themselves in a given context, 
depending on the food’s healthiness and the serving-arrangement. In 
a 2 (server) × 2 (healthiness) between-subjects design, participants 
envisioned purchasing a healthy [unhealthy] dessert at an establish-
ment where they would self-serve [be served by a clerk]. They then 
selected one of eight serving-cup sizes. For portion-size choice, the 
analysis showed a main effect of server, such that those who expect-
ed to be served selected significantly larger portions than those who 
expected to self-serve. More important, this effect was qualified by 
the predicted interaction with healthiness. Consistent with our other 
studies, for a healthy dessert, people selected equal portion-sizes 
irrespective of who would serve. Contrastingly, for an unhealthy 
dessert, people selected a significantly larger portion when they ex-
pected to be served than when they expected to self-serve the dessert. 
In combination, studies 3 and 4 showed that people have an 
intuition of the ramifications of different serving-arrangements and 
adjust their consumption of unhealthy food accordingly.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The United States is the most obese country in the developed 
world, with obesity rates already reaching epidemic proportions. 
About two thirds of adults and one third of children in the US are either 
overweight or obese. Moreover, obesity is considered to be one of the 
costliest plagues of the 21st century since it contributes significantly 
to the already high healthcare costs of the nation - obesity-related 
healthcare costs are expected to exceed $300B by 2018. 
Past efforts to address the problem of obesity have been largely 
unsuccessful and public policy makers are looking for new initiatives 
that could prove helpful in curbing the obesity epidemic. Therefore, 
the four papers in this session (all in advanced stages of completion) 
offer interventions that have the potential to solve the obesity problem 
by tackling two of its leading causes – the increased consumption of 
unhealthy foods and the lack of physical activity. 
The first three papers focus on ways in which consumers could 
be encouraged to make healthier food choices. Specifically, Shah, 
Bettman, Keller, and Ubel assess the effectiveness of economic and 
stigma-inducing interventions in reducing unhealthy food choice and 
consumption and show that stigma-inducing signals prove superior 
to economic interventions alone (‘unhealthy’ label versus 17.5% 
tax). The second paper by Dzhogleva, Inman, and Maurer examines 
how the ease-of-processing of nutritional information at the point of 
purchase impacts consumers’ food choices. The authors reveal that 
facilitating the understanding of nutritional information by disclosing 
nutritional facts in a simple manner helps consumers make healthier 
food decisions. Mohan, Chandon, and Riis study the moderating 
role of cognitive ability on consumers’ ability to objectively assess 
the value of percentage-based promotions. Importantly, the authors 
demonstrate that providing ratio-based rates nudges consumers away 
from obesogenic, higher-calorie percentage benefit offers (33% bo-
nus size) in favor of healthier, lower-calorie percentage cost offers 
(33% price discount) that are also superior from a unit-price perspec-
tive. Finally, Putnam-Farr and Riis seek to combat the lack of physi-
cal activity part of the obesity problem and evaluate the effectiveness 
of different recruitment messages on enrollment and participation in 
a physical activity tracking program. Results show that active choice 
leads to higher enrollment and equally strong participation as opt-in; 
moreover, messages focused on intangible health benefits and non-
quantified rewards lead to higher duration of participation than those 
emphasizing quantifiable rewards.
Using diverse methods (lab and field experiments, household 
shopping data) and offering the perspectives of diverse researchers 
and a practitioner, all papers in this session aim to make a difference 
in consumers’ lives by answering collectively the following question: 
How should we structure consumers’ choice environments such that 
they promote healthier choices? Thus, all papers converge around 
the common theme of nudging consumers in the right direction and 
helping them make decisions that would benefit their long-term 
wellbeing. We expect this session to be of great interest to a broad 
audience of researchers, consumers, public policy makers, and health 
practitioners interested not only in combating obesity but also in 
improving consumer welfare in general. 
‘Does This Tax Make Me Look Fat?’: Using Stigma-
Inducing Labels to Decrease Unhealthy Food 
Consumption
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Obesity and unhealthy food consumption are two of the largest 
public health concerns nationwide.  Obesity rates have more than 
doubled in the past few decades.  While there is debate regarding 
the cause of obesity, most research has argued that increased 
consumption of unhealthy food and beverages is a major driver 
of obesity (Chandon and Wansink 2007, 2011; Young and Nestle 
2002).  Many public health advocates have suggested that large-scale 
interventions are necessary to combat the epidemic.  While there are 
proponents of increased nutrition education, others have suggested 
the use of a tax on unhealthy food and drinks.  
Although an economic approach is one possible way to attenuate 
consumption of unhealthy food, will consumers even notice a price 
change?  Are there other approaches that may be equally, if not 
more so effective?  For example, an intervention that explicitly 
associates unhealthy food choices to an undesirable social identity 
may actually be more effective at reducing consumption.  Consumer 
research has shown that individuals attribute a wide array of traits 
and characteristics such as social appeal, morality, and gender roles 
to others based on their food choices and consumption habits (Rozin 
et al. 2012).  As a result, what one chooses to eat can have important 
implications for not only one’s sense of self but also impression 
management, social judgment, and status (Vartanian, Herman, and 
Polivy 2007).  One of the most devalued and negative identities 
in social contexts is stigma, which Goffman (1963) characterized 
as one of the greatest social risks that reduces the stigma bearer 
“from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (p. 
3).  Given that individuals are conscious of their social identity 
and strongly seek to avoid social stigmatization from engaging in 
negative or deviant behavior, it is surprising how little research has 
examined the influence of explicit stigma-inducing signals on how 
individuals make food choices, a major area of interest in public 
health.  Using the context of food choice and consumption in a real-
world social setting and in controlled lab experiments, we examined 
the unique and combined effect of economic and stigma-inducing 
interventions on food choice and consumption.  We also investigated 
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whether gender and social context (i.e., whether one dines with a 
friend or alone) moderated the effectiveness of these interventions. 
Finally, we examined whether self-construal differences between 
men and women, specifically independent self-construal versus 
interdependent self-construal, mediated the effectiveness of these 
interventions on unhealthy food choices.  
In Experiment 1, we used a real-world restaurant context to 
test our initial hypotheses.  Over a 16-day span we measured entrée 
choice and consumption (measured in grams) at a local, mid-priced 
tapas restaurant open from 4pm-midnight.  We ran the study from 
Monday-Thursday for 4 weeks counterbalancing conditions (N=464 
tables, 1063 people, 669 women).  We used four different menus 
containing the same entrée items: Control (no unhealthy food tax 
or stigma label), Food Tax (17.5% price increase on unhealthy food 
items, no stigma label), Stigma Label (marked unhealthy items with 
an asterisk and an explicit ‘Unhealthy’ label, no food tax), Combined 
(unhealthy food tax plus stigma label).  Stigma labels significantly 
reduced unhealthy entrée choice (p<0.01) and unhealthy food 
consumption (p<0.01) more than the food tax alone or the control 
group.  The effect of unhealthy stigma labels was moderated by 
gender, where higher proportions of men at the table significantly 
increased unhealthy choices and consumption of unhealthy food 
(p<0.01).  
In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a hypothetical food choice 
scenario to examine whether we could replicate our findings from 
the field in a more controlled laboratory setting.  Experiment 2 
tested whether gender moderated the effect of economic and stigma-
inducing signals on food choices.  An MTurk sample (N=1800) 
of men and women selected an entrée items from a hypothetical 
menu with six items (2 beef, 2 chicken, 2 fish, with 1 healthy and 
1 unhealthy item within each food group).  We used the same four 
menu conditions as Experiment 1.  Replicating the field study, stigma 
labels are significantly more effective at reducing unhealthy food 
choices than an unhealthy tax alone or the control group (p=0.007). 
There was also a significant Gender X Food Tax X Stigma Label 
interaction (p=0.05): women chose healthier dishes when unhealthy 
items had a stigma label (p<0.01).  Men and women selected more 
healthy items when unhealthy food was taxed and there was a stigma 
label (p<0.01). 
 In Experiment 3, we examined how dining with a same-sex 
friend influenced the interaction between gender and economic 
and stigma-inducing interventions on the proportion of individuals 
choosing an unhealthy menu option.  In addition, Experiment 
3 sought to investigate a potential mechanism for these effects. 
Specifically, using the same food choice scenario as Experiment 2, 
we examined whether self-construal differences between men and 
women mediated the effectiveness of economic and stigma-inducing 
interventions on unhealthy food choices.  Men eating with other 
men chose more unhealthy options (p<0.01) while women eating 
with other women chose healthier options (p<0.01) in comparison 
to dining alone.  Self-construal differences among men and women 
fully mediate the effects of the stigma label:  Men chose more 
unhealthy items when there was an ‘Unhealthy’ label, the more 
they were concerned that others would think they were wimpy and 
less masculine, a more interdependent mindset.  In contrast, women 
chose more healthy items when there was an ‘Unhealthy’ label, the 
more they felt uncomfortable by others and wanted distance from 
unhealthy individuals, a more independent mindset.
In the field and lab setting we demonstrate that increasing 
the tax on unhealthy items alone, even substantially by 17.5% is 
insufficient for reducing the proportion of individuals choosing an 
unhealthy entrée.  A combination of food tax and a stigma label such 
as marking items as ‘Unhealthy’, significantly reduced unhealthy 
choice, regardless of gender and dining partner.  We also demonstrate 
that interdependent/independent self-construal differences among 
men and women drive these effects.  These studies have important 
practical implications and also demonstrate that social constructs 
such as stigma may moderate previous notions of gender and self-
construal mindsets.
Does Reducing Nutritional Information Complexity 
Promote Healthier Food Choices?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) was one 
of the biggest efforts by policy makers to promote healthy eating 
among Americans. Unfortunately, it has failed to curb the obesity 
epidemic, so policy makers and marketers are seeking new ways 
to impact consumers’ dietary decisions. A recent trend among food 
retailers is to implement in-store nutrition scoring systems that 
communicate the nutritional value of foods in a simplified manner 
(e.g., Guiding Stars, NuVal). Our research examines whether 
facilitating the understanding of nutritional information through such 
nutrition scoring systems at the point of purchase helps consumers 
make healthier food choices. 
Past research demonstrates that the complexity of understanding 
nutritional information has impeded consumers from making smarter 
food choices. Cohn et al. (2012) report that point-of-purchase calorie 
postings in restaurants are not effective in encouraging consumers 
to embrace healthier eating because consumers find it difficult to 
comprehend and use the provided information. This suggests that in 
order for nutritional information to be incorporated into consumers’ 
decisions, it does not have to be only available at the point of 
purchase but also easily “processable” (Bettman 1975; Russo 1975). 
Russo et al. (1986) argue that consumers face three types of costs 
in incorporating nutritional information into their food decisions: 
collection costs (time and efforts to acquire the information), 
computation costs (efforts in combining the gathered information 
into an overall evaluation), and comprehension costs (efforts to 
understand the nutritional information). Reducing all three costs 
leads to greater reliance on products’ nutritional content in making 
food choices (Russo et al. 1986). 
Although the NLEA largely eliminated consumers’ collection 
costs, it had less impact on their computation and comprehension 
costs. Therefore, we propose that providing simpler and easy-to-
process nutritional information which reduces all three types of costs 
will prove helpful in prompting consumers to purchase healthier foods. 
In other words, we anticipate that the nutrition content of shoppers’ 
purchases will be higher after the introduction of the nutritional 
scoring system than before the scores were available at the store (H1). 
We further predict that this effect will be stronger in categories with 
greater variability in the healthiness of the offered products (H2). In 
such categories consumers have a wider variety of products to switch 
to. Moreover, purchasing a healthy product from a mixed set of both 
relatively healthy and unhealthy alternatives provides consumers 
with greater utility than when such a purchase is made from a 
homogeneous opportunity set (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012). We also 
propose that the effect in H1 will be stronger in healthier product 
categories (H3) because past research suggests that consumers are 
more likely to use nutritional information in categories which are 
perceived to be more nutritious (Brucks, Mitchell, and Staelin 1984). 
Finally, we anticipate that consumers who do not switch away from 
unhealthy foods after the introduction of the scoring system at the 
store will buy fewer items of those foods (H4). 
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We test our predictions using 12-months of individual shopper 
sales data for over 528K shoppers of a Northeast grocery chain. 
The data consists of 40.2M purchases in eight product categories: 
frozen pizza, ice-cream, salad dressing, soup, spaghetti sauce, 
tomatoes, granola bars, and yogurt. In early 2009, the grocery 
chain implemented the NuVal Nutritional Scoring System, which 
assigns each SKU a 1-100 score based on its nutritional value. 
Since the NuVal scores were displayed on the shelf tags, after their 
introduction, consumers could easily determine and understand the 
nutritional value of all foods. Our data contains information about 
consumers’ purchases before and after the NuVal introduction in the 
chain, allowing us to use the first 6 months as the baseline and assess 
its impact on consumers’ food choices using a quasi-experiment.
To test H1-H3, we estimate a hierarchical linear model in which 
shoppers’ purchases (level 1) are nested within the categories (level 2). 
The dependent variable is the average volume-weighted NuVal score 
of each shopper’s purchases (i.e., the nutrition content of shoppers’ 
purchases), which is predicted by the period (contrast coded: -1=pre-
NuVal introduction; 1=post-NuVal introduction). We allow both the 
intercept and the slope of period to vary randomly across the eight 
different product categories (the level-2 units); moreover, the slope 
of period is specified as a function of two category-level variables 
– the perceived category healthiness and the variability in the 
healthiness of the offered products in each category. The perceived 
healthiness was obtained from a separate survey in which shoppers 
from an online panel were asked to rate the healthiness of the eight 
product categories on a 7-point scale (1=“Very Unhealthy,” 7=“Very 
Healthy”). The variability in the healthiness of the offered products 
is operationalized using the standard deviation of the NuVal scores 
of all products in the category. Both level-2 predictors are grand-
mean centered.
Results support H1, revealing that the nutritious content 
of shoppers’ purchases in the post-NuVal introduction period 
was significantly higher than in the pre-NuVal period (p<.0001). 
Furthermore, in line with H2 and H3, the cross-level interactions of 
period with the two category-level predictors are significant (both 
p’s<.0001), suggesting that the effect of the nutrition scoring system 
on shoppers’ food choices was stronger in healthier categories 
and those with greater variability in the healthiness of the offered 
products. 
To test H4, we estimate a separate two-level random-intercept, 
random-slope hierarchical linear model in which the change in 
total units purchased by each shopper (post – pre) is predicted by 
the change in the nutrition content (NuVal score) of the shopper’s 
purchases (post – pre). Results demonstrate that shoppers who 
did not improve the nutritious content of their purchases after the 
introduction of the scoring system at the store reduced the number of 
units they bought (p<.0001), thus supporting H4.
In sum, our work reveals that facilitating consumers’ 
understanding of nutritional information by disclosing nutritional 
facts in a simple and easy-to-process format can help them make 
healthier food decisions. Our findings have important practical 
implications for consumers, food manufacturers, grocery retailers, 
and public policy makers interested in combating obesity.
Promoting Portion Downsizing by Improving Consumer 
Response to Percentage Cost vs. Percentage Benefit 
Offers
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Marketing communication, particularly in the domain of food, 
frequently contains percentage information about benefit changes 
(e.g., 50% larger food packages) or about cost changes (e.g., 50% 
price reduction). Nominally equivalent percentage changes to the 
cost versus the benefit associated with an offer are not economically 
equivalent in terms of cost/benefit or benefit/cost ratio.  To compare 
two percentage changes in cost and benefit requires knowing whether 
x% is bigger or smaller than -x/(1+x)%; this comparison involves 
multiple arithmetic operations and is very difficult to do mentally, 
even in the simplest cases (e.g., +50% vs. -33%). Chen, Marmorstein, 
Tsiros, and Rao (2012) have shown that, when comparing offers with 
percentage information (e.g., a 50% quantity increase vs. a 33% price 
reduction, which has the same unit price consequence), consumers 
focus on the nominal percentage and fail to take into account the 
base levels of these percentages, a phenomenon that they called 
“base value neglect”. 
Across four studies, we examine the robustness of the effect 
found for bonus packs vs. price changes by Chen, et al. (2012), and 
demonstrate the moderating roles of consumer goals (minimize 
cost, maximize benefit, or maximize value), cognitive reflection 
(Frederick, 2005), and provision of a cost/benefit vs benefit/cost ratio 
(such as unit price) (Manning, Sprott, & Miyazaki, 2003; Larrick & 
Soll 2008). 
Study 1 asked participants to choose between a 33% quantity 
increase and a 33% price decrease (or a 33% quantity decrease 
and a 33% price increase) for their favorite brand of yogurt or ice 
cream. Overall, consumers were indifferent between the % price 
and % quantity offers, regardless of category and whether people 
were choosing between two gains or two losses. However, there 
was a strongly statistically significant interaction between outcome 
valence (gain or loss) and consumer goal (p<.001). For example, 
consumers who were seeking to minimize cost strongly preferred 
the 33% price decrease over the 33% quantity increase in the gain 
condition and strongly preferred the 33% quantity decrease to the 
33% price decrease in the loss condition. We also find that the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) is a particularly good 
predictor of base value neglect because it captures the tendency to 
follow the intuitive (but wrong) answer instead of engaging in more 
effortful system-2 computation. Participants who scored above a 0 
on the CRT test strongly preferred the economically-superior 33% 
price change over the 33% quantity change. Finally, we show that 
providing rate information such as price per unit reduces consumer 
errors when comparing percentage offers, regardless of CRT score. 
Participants who were exposed to the unit price were no longer 
indifferent, and strongly preferred the 33% price change over the 
33% quantity change. 
In the subsequent 3 studies, we demonstrate the moderating 
role of CRT, and the corrective effect of providing a ratio, across 
a variety of tasks and domains. In Study 2, we asked participants 
to rank printers by speed after taking account either a % change 
in pages per minutes (benefit) or a % change in the minutes (cost) 
needed to print a page. Once again, we find that those scoring high 
on the CRT made better choices. Providing a ratio, in the form of 
pages per minute, also has a significant effect on participant accuracy 
(p<.01). Next, we examined whether the way a ratio is presented 
(cost/benefit vs. benefit/cost) influences a consumer’s likelihood of 
responding to the unit price implications of a cost versus a benefit 
percentage change. In Study 3, we asked participants to assess 
percent changes when comparing wireless plans, and manipulated 
the ratio type by providing either seconds/cents or cents/seconds. We 
find that people fail to realize that a percentage cost change is better 
than the opposite percentage benefit change, even when the cost and 
benefit base values are identical. Moreover, in the presence of a ratio, 
significantly more participants correctly chose the economically-
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superior cost change when the ratio was framed as a cost/benefit 
as opposed to a benefit/cost, particularly when choosing between 
2 losses. Finally, in Study 4 participants completed a word search 
puzzle at a given wage (6 cents/word), and subsequently chose 
between the following two payment options for completing a bonus 
puzzle: a 50% increase in the wage paid per word (9 cents/word), or 
a 50% decrease in the number of words needed to make the same 
wage (12 cents/word). Participants with a CRT score greater than 
zero, as well as participants given the unit wage, were more likely to 
make the economically optimal choice in this incentive compatible 
field experiment.
Our results suggest that marketers should frame their offers as 
a percentage benefit change, which produces the largest nominal 
percentage, rather than by the equivalent percentage cost change. 
In general however, framing offers as a percentage benefit change 
rather than a percentage cost change will lead consumers to sub-
optimal choices. There are practical implications for consumers 
making food choices when faced with percentage promotions 
without accompanying unit prices. If a consumer fails to comprehend 
that 35% price reduction is better than a 50% quantity bonus from 
a unit price perspective, they will tend to choose the larger portion, 
thus increasing the likelihood of overeating (Wansink, 1996; Young 
& Nestle, 2002). Conversely, consumers are less likely to choose 
a healthier but smaller portion (e.g., pastry made from real butter 
instead of palm oil) if someone points out that it is 50% smaller than 
the regular portion than if the comparison highlights that it is 35% 
more expensive. At the moment, unit prices are not mandatory for 
retail distribution in all US states and are never mandatory when 
accompanying percentage price promotions and in non-retail 
domains (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). Thus, our findings 
have important implications for public policy. They reaffirm the 
effectiveness of providing unit price information, which is currently 
only mandatory in brick-and-mortar retailers (and not in restaurants, 
for example). We think that rate information, in particular unit 
prices, should be made mandatory everywhere and not just for brick 
and mortar retailers.
Choosing to Participate: The Effects of Message Type on 
Enrollment and Participation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As more services (including health services) move online, the 
development of communication strategies to maximize enrollment 
and engagement has become increasingly important. Programs like 
Boost (activity tracking) are increasingly used as relatively low 
cost ways to engage consumers and employees in activities that can 
improve healthy behaviors and reduce problems related to obesity and 
its associated diseases. While some research has shown that message 
framing and choice architecture can affect enrollment, these studies 
have usually taken place in a forced choice environment where the 
consumer’s attention is high. The reality is that most recruitment for 
most online services comes through email or other cluttered channels 
where attention is lower. Furthermore, engagement (or participation 
after enrollment) has rarely been examined, yet engagement is 
a major objective of services that require renewal, or for services 
that are designed specifically to help consumers manage their own 
behavior, particularly in the domain of health. 
We address both of these issues in a large scale field experiment 
where over 17,000 employees of a large American company were 
invited to enroll and participate in an activity tracking program 
(Boost) and find strong benefits to active choice along with significant 
differences in participation resulting from the different message 
frames. Focusing on a high quantified reward is most effective for 
getting people’s attention, but it does not yield the best outcomes for 
participation. Thus, marketers who want to involve participants for 
the long term, such as in diet and exercise programs, would be best 
served by using an active choice frame which emphasizes a non-
quantified reward.
While research on choice architecture has focused initially 
on the differences between opt-in and opt-out, a number of recent 
studies (e.g., Carroll et al. 2009; Keller et al. 2011) have started to 
include an active choice component, where participants are forced 
to choose between enrolling or not enrolling rather than being 
presented with a default.  Active choice has generally been used 
synonymously with forced choice because the scenarios have forced 
participants to choose one or the other option (usually a yes/no for 
enrollment), yet forced choice opportunities are relatively rare under 
most recruitment situations.  
Despite the knowledge among researchers that expected rewards 
can have a deleterious effect on intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan 1999), practitioners continue to use rewards as a means 
of attracting participants due to their strong immediate impact.  We 
contrast the effects of rewards (both quantified and non-quantified) 
on enrollment and participation to demonstrate the differing short 
term and long term effects and to highlight the potentially negative 
consequences of quantifying rewards when aiming to promote long 
term engagement.
Participants (N=17,093) were recruited for participation in an 
activity tracking program run by RedBrick Health and were assigned 
to one of seven message conditions in a randomized field experiment. 
All participants were given the same introductory text with basic 
information about the health and rewards benefits of participating 
in the activity tracking program.  All participants were eligible for 
$2 per day that they tracked at least 30 minutes of activity, with a 
quarterly maximum of $125 (other programs also provided rewards). 
All participants had previously completed a health assessment survey 
as the basis for program eligibility.  
Participants in the control condition were given a standard 
opt-in message with a link to the enrollment page.  The 6 treatment 
conditions were constructed by crossing two between subject 
factors pertaining to the yes/no response options. The first factor 
was message type (3 conditions) whereby different benefits of 
the program were emphasized. One message focused on health 
benefits (health), the second focused on the rewards (non-quantified 
rewards), and the third quantified the rewards (quantified rewards). 
The second factor was the strength of the “no” option (strong versus 
weak – 2 conditions).  The strong “no” option included a reference to 
the lost benefit, while the weak “no” condition did not. For example, 
participants in the health condition all saw the following “yes” text: 
“Yes, I would like to participate in the Boost tracking program. I 
want to track my activities to help improve my health”  and one of the 
following “no” options: [STRONG] No, I do not want to participate 
in the Boost tracking program because tracking my activities to 
improve my health is not important to me at this time. [WEAK] No, 
I do not want to participate in the Boost tracking program. 
We found that all six active choice messages prompted higher 
enrollment than opt-in. Despite the expectation that the repetition of 
benefits in the strong no would increase loss aversion, we found no 
difference between the strong and weak no. Once enrolled, we found 
that there were no significant overall differences between opt-in and 
active choice in terms of their duration or frequency of participation, 
leading to an overall strongly positive relationship between receiving 
an active choice email and participation in the program.  
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Looking at the messages by type, we found that rewards and 
health were both equally effective in terms of duration of participation, 
but quantification of the rewards message resulted in lower average 
duration of participation.  This lower average duration is driven by 
a substantially higher proportion of participants who drop out in 
the first two weeks after enrollment (25% versus 15% in the non-
quantified reward condition).  We hypothesize that the $125 message 
sets a high target and that a lower than expected rate of rewards 
accumulation in the first two weeks results in demoralization and 
abandonment.  Further work (analysis and follow up experiments) is 
underway to determine the exact mechanism.
This paper provides insights to managers interested in 
recruiting participants to programs where their active engagement is 
an important objective.  Involving participants by means of an active 
choice makes them more aware of the potential benefits of a program 
that they might otherwise ignore, but marketers should beware that 
setting a high target for achievement might result in abandonment of 
the program if participants do not see early success.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumption is constituted as the final purchase of goods or 
services by individuals. Money, as an extremely efficient medium 
of exchange, is probably the most common consumption tool. And 
yet, despite its everyday use as a tool, consumers’ representation 
and reaction to money extends far beyond what one would expect 
from a tool. Instead, money is deeply embedded and intertwined in 
consumers’ minds, so much so that it produces dramatic changes in 
people’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Although recent research 
has greatly advanced the field’s understanding of money, two large 
and very important theoretical questions linger: 1) through what psy-
chological mechanisms does money operate and 2) how does every 
day uses of money change human behavior and society? This spe-
cial session brings together a novel and diverse set of findings that, 
collectively, provide fresh insight into these questions by examining 
various manners of interacting with money: seeing, possessing, and 
losing money.
The first two papers focus on the first question and show that 
subtle monetary cues trigger an exchange relationship-style, which in 
turn accounts for some of the downstream consequences of monetary 
reminders. The first paper, by Jiang, Chen, and Wyer, investigates 
the relationship between monetary reminder and people’s emotional 
expression. Five experiments show that the concept of money acti-
vates an exchange relationship orientation, and consequently leads to 
increased negative attitudes toward expressing emotions, decreased 
expression of emotion when describing events, exaggerated percep-
tions of others’ emotions, and decreased willingness to interact with 
people who express strong emotions. The second paper, by Mead, 
Caruso, Vohs, and Baumeister, builds on the first paper by examin-
ing how monetary reminders affect interpersonal interactions. Three 
experiments provide novel evidence that merely being exposed to 
monetary cues drives people to apply money-market norms to social 
relationships, regardless of the situational norm. And this heightened 
exchange orientation can hamper interpersonal relationships when 
situations call for communal norms.
The third and fourth papers address the second major question. 
The third paper, by Gneezy and Mazar, focuses on the influence of 
monetary possession on the way consumers tip. Three experiments 
show that under some circumstances, when not having enough cash 
to reciprocate the quality of the received service, customers ironi-
cally end up tipping bad service (to punish) but not good service (to 
not insult). The last paper, by Rae, Durante, Griskevicius, and Cantu, 
studies the fear of losing money from an evolutionary perspective. 
Four studies reveal that hormonal fluctuations associated with ovula-
tion lead women to become less loss averse but only when a product 
does not serve to enhance attractiveness. 
Together, these papers shed light on how the mere exposure to 
money, possession of money, and aversion of losing money affect 
human behavior. We believe this symposium will advance the field’s 
understanding of the psychology of money and, as such, will be of 
interest to a broad audience at the ACR conference.  
Monetary Reminders Lead to Exchange Orientation and 
Emotion Suppression
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The mere exposure to money, independently of the context of 
any goal to which it might be relevant, increases individuals’ motiva-
tion to be socially independent and decreases their sensitivity to oth-
ers’ needs (Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006; 2008). Thus thinking about 
money may dispose individuals to view themselves as being more in 
an exchange relationship with others (Clark and Mills 1979) in which 
interpersonal interactions are considered in impersonal, transactional 
terms. Transactions in such a relationship are governed by quid pro 
quo without regard for idiosyncratic needs of the parties involved. 
Given that emotions are used to convey information about needs of 
the senders (Ekman 1993), the expression of emotion is likely to be 
considered irrelevant and even inappropriate in such a relationship 
and, therefore, is likely to be suppressed. Our research evaluated im-
plications of this general hypothesis. Five experiments showed that 
subtle reminders of money can influence people’s disposition toward 
exchange versus communal relationships, their willingness to ex-
press emotion, and their reactions to others’ expression of emotions. 
Experiment 1 was conducted online through Amazon’s mTurk 
website. After exposure to money- vs. control-themed pictures, par-
ticipants finished items concerned the desirability of expressing emo-
tions and the exchange and communal relationship orientation scale 
(Mills and Clark 1994). Data showed that activating the concept of 
money decreases participants’ favorability towards expressing emo-
tions, and this effect is mediated by the increased exchange (vs. com-
munal) relationship orientation of money-primed participants.
Experiment 2 investigated more directly the hypothesis that 
reminding individuals of money would lead them to suppress their 
emotions. Participants were first primed with either money or control 
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concept through a sentence unscrambling task (Vohs et al. 2006). 
Next, in an ostensibly unrelated task, participants were instructed 
to imagine that their newly purchased laptop had broken down and 
they were dissatisfied with how this issue was handled by the com-
pany. They further imagined that they had decided to write a negative 
product review to complain about the incident on a popular online 
forum. After participants wrote the reviews, independent raters who 
were blind to our hypothesis read the reviews and rated the emotions 
expressed in the review. As expected, the complaints participants in 
the money-primed conditions wrote were less angry and less nega-
tive, than those of participants in control conditions.
Experiment 3 extended our findings to the suppression of posi-
tive emotions. In addition, if priming money really leads people to 
suppress their emotions, they should have relatively poorer perfor-
mance on a subsequent task that requires cognitive resources than 
control participants should (Heatherton and Vohs 2000). We also 
tested this possibility. After performing the money vs. control prim-
ing task as in Experiment 1, participants watched a funny movie clip 
and then they were asked to describe the movie in writing to future 
audience. After finishing this writing task, participants performed an 
anagrams task similar to that used by Vohs (2006) to assess resource 
depletion. Specifically, participants were given five unsolvable ana-
grams and the time they spent on the task before giving up was as-
sessed. Results are consistent with our predictions. Participants had 
significantly less intense emotional reactions to the movie (measured 
by both self-reports and independent ratings of their writing) when 
they had been primed with money than when they had not. More 
importantly, participants also persisted less long on the unsolvable 
anagrams task if they had been primed with money then if they had 
not, suggesting that they were suppressing their emotions (thus re-
source depleted) in the former condition.
People tend to believe that others are likely to behave the same 
way they personally behave under similar circumstances (Marks and 
Miller 1987). If people who have been primed with money suppress 
their emotions, they are likely to expect others to do so as well, and 
they are likely to perceive persons who do not conform to these ex-
pectations as conveying more extreme emotions than they otherwise 
would. Experiment 4 confirmed this prediction. After completed the 
sentence unscrambling task as we used in Experiment 2, participants 
were shown pictures portraying people with happy or sad expres-
sions and they were asked to judge the intensity of the emotion con-
veyed by each picture. Results showed that money-primed partici-
pants rated the emotional expressions shown in the pictures as more 
intense than control participants did.
If being reminded of money decreases individuals’ belief that 
personally expressing emotion is desirable, it is also likely to affect 
their belief about others’ emotional expressions in a similar way. 
Thus it should decrease individuals’ willingness to interact with oth-
ers who display intense emotions. In Experiment 5, after completed 
the sentence unscrambling task to prime money or control concept, 
undergraduate participants were shown faces with happiness, anger, 
or neutral emotions. Participants were told that each picture por-
trayed an incoming foreign exchange student and were asked to in-
dicate the extent to which they would want (a) know more about the 
person, (b) to meet the person, and (c) to make friends with the per-
son. As expected, money-primed participants were less inclined than 
control participants to interact with both the person who expressed 
happiness and the person who expressed anger, but not the person 
who had a neutral expression.
In sum, our findings suggest that, as the major medium of ex-
change, the concept of money activates an exchange relationship 
orientation, in which people view both their own and others’ expres-
sions of emotion less favorably. Consequently it led them to have 
more negative attitudes toward expressing emotions themselves (Ex-
periment 1), decreased their expressions of emotion when describing 
both a negative event and a positive one (Experiments 2 and 3), led 
them to interpret others’ emotional expressions as more extreme (Ex-
periment 4) and decreased their willingness to interact with person 
who express strong emotions (Experiment 5).
Monetary Cues Alter Interpersonal Harmony Because 
They Activate an Exchange-Orientation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers coordinate their interactions with others – be it 
salesclerks, supervisors, or spouses – by drawing from a small set 
of psychological scripts that serve to guide social interactions (e.g., 
Clark and Mills 1979; Fiske 1991). Throughout human history, com-
munal relationships were the basis of social life (e.g., Fiske 1991). 
However, the introduction of money ushered in a new relational 
style that is characterized by a desire to track and optimize the ratio 
between costs and benefits. This relational style is called market-
pricing mode (Fiske 1991) or exchange orientation (Clark and Mills 
1979) and it may be unique to humans. Theoretically, communal 
and exchange orientations are diametrically opposed to one another 
(Fiske 1991), which led us to hypothesize that the previously un-
explained link between money and hampered social harmony could 
be explained by exchange orientation. We tested this hypothesis in 
three experiments by varying whether participants were exposed to 
the concept of money; subsequent changes in relational-style and in-
terpersonal harmony were measured.
Experiment 1 served as a basic test of the hypothesis that the 
mere minder of money activates a preference for exchange relation-
ships (vs. communal relationships). After completing a set of filler 
questionnaires in front of a money or neutral poster (green lettuce), 
participants were led to believe they would complete a workload-
sharing task with another participant. When participants received 
this task (a number search task), it had been half completed in red 
ink, ostensibly by the partner. The dependent measure was the pen 
color that participants chose to complete the task (red and blue were 
both available on their desk in counterbalanced order). Because us-
ing a different color pen makes each person’s work distinct and ac-
countable, choosing a blue pen would be reflective of an exchange 
orientation. In contrast, because using the same pen color would lead 
to the sharing of the work and rewards, choosing the red (same) color 
of pen would reflect a desire for a communal relationship (cf. Clark 
and Mills 1979). As predicted, participants reminded of money were 
more likely to choose a different color pen than participants not re-
minded of money. Hence, the results of experiment 1 suggest that 
the mere reminder of money is sufficient to activate an exchange 
orientation.
It is possible that participants reminded of money chose a dif-
ferent pen color for reasons other than a desire to track each person’s 
contribution, such as a desire for uniqueness or a curiosity about 
one’s own performance. To rule out these alternative accounts we 
conducted a follow-up experiment. An additional goal of experiment 
2 was to test the hypothesis that money reminders cause people to 
misapply market-norms to the social relationships. In other words, 
activating a money market can trump a social market (see also Hey-
man and Ariely 2004). 
The design of Experiment 2 was a 2 (money descramble task 
vs. neutral descramble task) X 2 (money market vs. social market) 
between-subjects design. Participants thought they would complete a 
number search task with a partner, and that performance would gar-
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ner rewards. In the social-market condition, participants were told 
that each answer would result in the donation of 25grams of rice to 
malnourished children. In the money-market condition, each answer 
would result in 25cents. As predicted, a significant money X mar-
ket interaction emerged. Participants reminded of money reported a 
stronger desire to track performance relative to neutral participants, 
but only in the social market condition. In the money-market condi-
tion, there was no effect of the money manipulation. Hence, neutral 
participants were generally sensitive to the situational market norm, 
and they altered their behavior accordingly. However, people remind-
ed of money preferred a money-market orientation, and they applied 
these money-market norms regardless of the overarching context. As 
expected, no significant effects emerged when predicting desire for 
uniqueness or desire for knowledge about one’s performance.
Experiment 3 tested the full theoretical model: money remind-
ers strain interpersonal harmony because they conjure up an ex-
change orientation. Additionally, experiment 3 sought to rule out the 
possible alternative explanation that money is operating through a 
change in power. As in experiment 2, we varied the situational norm. 
After completing a money or neutral descramble task, participants 
completed measures of exchange orientation (Mills and Clark 1994) 
and a power subscale (Cassidy and Lynn 1989). The dependent 
measure was willingness to engage in conversation topics that were 
pre-rated to be positive for interacting with a new friend (communal 
relationship) and supervisor (exchange relationship). Overall, results 
supported predictions. When chatting with a new friend, reminders 
of money reduced willingness to engage in conversation topics that 
that facilitate the growth and intimacy of a new friendship. Addition-
ally, this effect was fully mediated by exchange orientation. Also 
consistent with hypotheses, in the exchange context, there was no ef-
fect of the money manipulation on willingness to engage in positive 
conversation topics. Consistent with previous work (Vohs, Mead, 
and Goode 2008) feelings of power did not shift as a function of 
the money reminder. Hence, power cannot account for the current 
findings.
In sum, three experiments provide novel evidence that merely 
being exposed to monetary cues evokes a shift in people’s relational 
style. More specifically, having money on the mind caused people 
to apply money-market norms to social relationships, regardless of 
the situational norm. Thus, when situations call for exchange norms, 
people with money on the mind may be fine. However, when situa-
tions call for communal norms, people with money on the mind may 
go awry.
To Tip or Not to Tip: Emotional and Monetary Tradeoffs 
in Tipping
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine experiencing great service in a cash-only tipping envi-
ronment, following which you realize you don’t have enough cash to 
reciprocate the quality of the service. What do you do?
Although tipping norms vary by culture, they are commonly 
used to promote efficiency by allowing consumers to reciprocate ser-
vice workers’, such as waiters’ and taxicab drivers’, efforts. The rule 
of thumb is that the better the service the higher the tip. Consequent-
ly, very low tips are more likely to be associated with poor service.
This paper investigates a tipping paradox and shows that con-
sumers that experience good service would rather not tip at all when 
the only other alternative is to tip very low. Thus, when not having 
enough cash, good service providers can end up economically “pun-
ished.” We present evidence from three experiments.
Experiment 1
Participants (N=552) were asked to imagine having dinner 
in a nice restaurant that only accepts cash tips. Using a between-
participants design, we manipulated the described behavior of the 
waiter (3 levels: rude, control, nice) and the tipping options available 
to the participants (2 levels: $0.25 vs. $0; $7 vs. $0). Participants 
reported their tipping decision, how they felt about it, the extent to 
which they cared not to offend the waiter, whether they thought that 
tipping something was better than nothing, and indicated which of 
the two tipping alternatives (tip the available cash vs. not tip) they 
considered more offensive to the waiter and more embarrassing to 
themselves. 
Not surprisingly, when having $7 (an amount considered more 
appropriate for the tip), participants were significantly more likely 
to tip the nice (96%) and control (89%) waiter than the rude waiter 
(52%). Interestingly, when having only 25 cents in their wallet, par-
ticipants were as likely to tip the nice (49%) and control (41%) wait-
ers as they were to tip the rude waiter (40%). Furthermore, while par-
ticipants in the $7 conditions felt relatively good about their tipping 
decisions, for those in the $0.25 conditions, only participants in the 
rude condition felt good about their decision but those in the nice and 
control conditions felt significantly worse. A follow up analysis re-
vealed that those with only 25 cents in their pockets did not feel that 
tipping something was better than nothing. In fact, particularly those 
in the nice and control conditions were concerned that a 25 cents tip 
would be offensive to the waiter and indicated feeling embarrassed 
about leaving such a tip. 
Together, these results contradict the general social norm that 
the better the service level the more tipping and is also in contradic-
tion of the standard economic assumption that some money is better 
than none. 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested whether we could reverse partici-
pants’ decision not to tip a good service provider by providing them 
information regarding that person’s expectations. We asked partici-
pants (N=126) to imagine using complimentary transportation of-
fered by their car dealership and that their driver was nice and cour-
teous.  Participants were then asked to choose one of three tipping 
options: $1 Tip (very low), $20 tip (very high), or No Tip. Using a 
four condition between-participants design we manipulated the driv-
er’s tipping expectations to be high ($6-$10), low ($1-$5), asked the 
participants to deliberate on the drivers tipping expectations (Own 
Reference) or did not provide any instructions/information with re-
gards to the driver’s tipping expectations (No Reference).
As predicted, our expectation manipulation had a significant 
effect on participants’ decisions (χ2(3)=12.21, p<.01). Specifical-
ly, participants in the Low Reference condition were more likely 
(67.7%) to tip $1 relative to the High Reference (27.3%), No Refer-
ence (39.4%), and Own Reference (34.5%) participants. Participants 
in the later three groups did not differ in their likelihood to tip $1.
These results add another layer to our investigation by showing 
that when the social norms are changed, by making a low tip ac-
ceptable, participants were more likely to tip $1. Experiment 3 was 
designed to test if we could replicate our findings if we restricted 
participants’ tipping alternatives to tipping a low amount versus not 
tipping at all and to see if we could find more direct evidence for the 
underlying psychological process.
Experiment 3
Participants (N=305) were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions: High Reference, Low reference, and Con-
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trol (i.e. No Reference). The first part of the scenario was identical 
to the one used in Experiment 2. Following the scenario participants 
were asked to choose between two options: Tip $1 or Not Tip and 
then answered a battery of questions that tapped into the underlying 
process.
Similar to participants in Experiment 2, participants’ tipping de-
cisions were affected by the driver’s expectation, χ2(2)=8.99, p=.01. 
Participants were more likely to tip the driver $1 when the tip expec-
tation was low (92.1%) than when it was high (77.5%), and when 
there was no tipping expectation information (82.4%). A critical 
component in our framework is the notion that the tipping decision 
might be mediated by beliefs about economic value, offensiveness 
to the service provider, or embarrassment to oneself when tipping $1 
versus nothing.  Our analyses revealed that the reference condition 
only had a significant effect on beliefs about economic value and 
the offensiveness of tipping $1 (versus nothing) to the service pro-
vider (all other measures were non-significant). Follow-up analyses 
revealed that regressing the decision to tip on both, the tipping refer-
ence condition and as potential mediators, the belief about economic 
value and the offensiveness to the service provider, respectively, 
each of the two potential mediator variables had a significant effect 
on the decision to tip and rendered the effect of the tipping refer-
ence condition insignificant. Finally, none of our measures, except 
for gender, moderated the effect of the tipping reference condition 
on the decision to tip $1 or nothing.
Together our findings are important to our understanding of so-
cial preferences and the way they are affected by individuals’ con-
cerns for others’. Considered at a broader perspective, these results 
propose our concern for others’ emotions may triumph basic norms 
and conventions.
Going, Going, Gone: Hidden Hormonal Influences on 
Loss Aversion
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Loss aversion is the tendency to be more sensitive to losses 
than comparable gains. Research has converged on the robustness of 
loss aversion in human psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahnemen 1991), yet little research has investigated 
how biological factors influence intra-individual differences in loss 
aversion. The current research examined whether women’s sensitiv-
ity to loss aversion is influenced by a universal biological factor – the 
monthly ovulatory cycle. 
The ovulatory cycle spans, on average, 28 days, during which 
a woman can become pregnant only during the week long ovula-
tory phase of the cycle. Research has shown that ovulation can 
non-consciously alter women’s psychology. For instance, ovulating 
women report less commitment to their current romantic partner 
(Durante and Li 2009; Gangestad, Thornhill, and Garver 2002) and 
are particularly attracted to men other than their partner who display 
markers of genetic fitness (e.g., physical attractiveness, masculinity, 
social dominance; Durante et al. 2012). Consequently, women are 
more likely to cheat on their partner near ovulation (Bellis and Baker 
1990; Garver-Apgar et al. 2006). Because ovulating women become 
less committed to their current partner and are more likely to engage 
in behaviors that could threaten their relationship, we predicted that 
women might exhibit less loss aversion near ovulation. Thus, we 
investigated whether ovulating women’s decreased commitment to 
their current partner translates to the marketplace. 
Study 1 tested ovulating women’s response to losing hypo-
thetical amounts of money and consumer products. Ovulating and 
non-ovulating women were asked to indicate how unpleasant losing 
money in increments of $5, $10, $15, $20, and $25, as well a pair of 
running shoes and a laptop (α=.74). Results revealed that ovulating 
women were significantly less loss averse than women who were not 
ovulating (Movulating = 3.07 vs. Mnot ovulating = 5.55). 
Study 2 examined how ovulation influenced selling price in 
an actual marketplace exchange. A high selling price indicates that 
a consumer places a higher value on the product and greater upset 
associated with losing that product (Aggarwal and Zhang 2006). 
In Study 2, women came into the lab once on a high fertility day 
(near ovulation) and again on a low fertility day. The sessions were 
counterbalanced and ovulation was confirmed via urinalysis. This 
methodology provides the most precise measure of ovulation and 
also allows us to examine behavioral change within the same woman 
across the cycle. At each session, women were given a coffee mug 
or a picture frame to keep. Women were told the mug (or frame) 
retailed for $5.00. Later in the testing session women were told that 
another participant in the same study was interested in buying the 
mug (or frame), and the participants were asked to indicate at what 
price they would be willing to sell the mug to the other participant. 
Results showed that women had a significantly lower selling price 
when they were ovulating compared to when they were not ovulating 
(Movulating = $6.59 vs. Mnot ovulating = $8.46). This suggests that women 
are less loss averse near ovulation. 
Study 3 examined the mechanism responsible for the effect of 
ovulation on loss aversion. Because ovulation leads women to be-
come less committed to their current partner to facilitate greater sex-
ual receptivity to men with markers of genetic fitness (Garver-Apgar 
et al. 2006), Study 3 attempted to suppress the effect of ovulation 
on loss aversion by manipulating a mating goal. To do this, women 
imagined they were on a date with a boyfriend who was described as 
handsome, confident, affectionate, and loving. The manipulation was 
designed to endow women with a partner who met the criteria of a 
man high in genetic fitness and effectively increase women’s desire 
to commit to one partner. After exposure to either the mate retention 
or a control condition, women were asked to indicate the price they 
would be willing to pay for a hypothetical gym membership and the 
price they would be willing to sell the membership. We predicted 
that the mate retention condition would suppress the effect of ovula-
tion by reinstating loss aversion for ovulating women. As predicted, 
there was a larger discrepancy between the sell price and buy price 
for ovulating women in the mate retention prime condition (Msell-
buy = $40) compared to ovulating women in the control condition 
(Msell-buy = $6). There was no difference in sell and buy prices across 
conditions for women who were not ovulating. Results suggest that 
women’s decreased level of commitment to a romantic partner near 
ovulation is the psychological mechanism that underlies the effect of 
ovulation on loss aversion. Increasing women’s desire to commit to 
one man in the mate retention condition effectively suppressed the 
effect of ovulation on loss aversion. 
Will ovulation always lead women to become less loss averse? 
Previous research finds that ovulating women desire to look more at-
tractive and choose clothing and accessories that are sexier (Durante 
et al. 2008; Durante et al. 2011; Haselton et al. 2007). Thus, ovu-
lating women might display increased loss aversion if the product 
serves an attractiveness-enhancement function. To investigate this 
possibility, in Study 4, women were given a coffee mug and lipstick 
palette and asked to indicate their selling price. Results replicated 
Study 2, and showed that ovulating women had a significantly lower 
selling price for the coffee mug compared to women who were not 
ovulating (Movulating = $6.09 vs. Mnot ovulating = $8.89). However, when 
women were asked to indicate at what price they would be willing to 
sell the lipstick palette, ovulating women had a significantly higher 
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selling price compared to women who were not ovulating (Movulat-
ing = $11.54 vs. Mnot ovulating = $9.10). This suggests that women are 
less loss averse near ovulation only for products that do not serve an 
attractiveness-enhancement function.
This research adds to the literature on loss aversion and pro-
vides further evidence of how biological factors such as hormones 
can influence robust psychological phenomena commonly studied in 
marketing and decision research.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The theme of ACR 2013 is “Making a Difference.” One of the 
most functional approaches to making a difference in the self is to 
incorporate feedback from the environment in a healthy, instructive 
manner and modify the self accordingly. Nevertheless, all too often 
dismissiveness and defensiveness get in the way of such personal 
growth. 
One process that repeatedly and robustly has been shown to 
open people up to unflattering feedback and turn their attention to-
ward others’ wants and needs is self-affirmation. The papers in this 
session delve into the promise for self-affirmation to bring about 
positive self-change.
Self-affirmation refers to processes that bolster a global sense of 
self-integrity (Steele 1988). Self-affirmation manipulations remind 
people of important aspects of the self, enabling them to view events 
from a reasonable, considered, rational view (Sherman and Hartson 
2011). By enhancing the psychological resources of self-integrity, 
self-affirmation reduces defensive responses to threatening informa-
tion and events, leading to positive outcomes in various areas such 
as psychological and physical health, education, prejudice and dis-
crimination, and social conflicts (Sherman and Cohen 2006).  
Although studied extensively by social psychologists, self-
affirmation has only just begun to receive attention from consumer 
researchers. This session provides an overview of self-affirmation 
theory, and discusses why self-affirmation is beneficial to consum-
ers’ personal and interpersonal well-being. The first two papers pro-
vide new evidence and insights on underlying processes that help 
explain how self-affirmation benefits the self under threat. The next 
two papers propose that self-affirmation enables people to transcend 
concerns about the self in order to care about others. 
First, Sherman, Hartson, and Binning report results from a lon-
gitudinal field experiment involving minority students and the ex-
perience of academic threat. The authors find that self-affirmation 
alters the students’ narrative explanations about events and in do-
ing so changes their perspective about threats. Self-affirmed (vs. not 
affirmed) students viewed threatening events within a larger view 
of the self and construed events at a more abstract level, with the 
result being that they were less undermined by identity threat. This 
new model has the potential to change the way that scholars think 
about self-affirmation in offering new mechanisms for how it works 
– while elucidating one of the most powerful and straightforward 
ways that consumers can ‘make a difference’ in themselves. 
Second, Klein, Harris, and Ferrer examine how self-affirma-
tion influences and is moderated by negative affect. They show that 
self-affirmation when combined with the experience of health re-
lated threats increases the negative emotions of worry and anxiety 
(about getting breast cancer after reading an article linking alcohol 
consumption with breast cancer risk). These specific negative emo-
tions consequently promote behavioral changes. Further, the authors 
find that affect moderates the effects of self-affirmation. Negative 
affect such as anger and sadness impairs the effectiveness of self-
affirmation, whereas general positive affect enhances the effects of 
self-affirmation. In tying self-affirmation to specific and theoreti-
cally-derived forms of affect, this paper opens up new avenues for 
understanding how health-related messages should be constructed.
Third, in continuing with the theme of negative emotions and 
affirmation, Kim and McGill propose that self-affirmation enhances 
caring about others’ negative feelings. They find that self-affirmation 
increases people’s willingness to spread negative word of mouth 
(WOM) on behalf of others who are angry about product failures. 
Yet, affirmation decreases willingness to spread negative WOM 
about one’s own negative experiences. These outcomes occur be-
cause a broader view resulting from self-affirmation reinforces social 
connections, enhancing the importance of others’ negative feelings. 
However, such a broad self-view uncouples the self from threat, miti-
gating the importance of one’s own negative feelings. 
Finally, Park and Vohs show that self-affirmation offsets the 
harmful effect of money priming on the interpersonal self. Money 
priming, which enhances the self-sufficiency orientation, has been 
found to reduce helpfulness toward others and requests for help, and 
to enhance tendencies to separate the self from others. The authors 
show that self-affirmation reduces such adverse money priming ef-
fects, and helps people become more sensitive to interpersonal needs. 
This work points to the power of self-affirmation while raising fresh 
and invigorating questions about the psychology of money as well.   
These four presentations propose different effects of self-affir-
mation under various contexts such as identity threats, health threats, 
product failures, and money priming, which can significantly affect 
consumers’ well-being. By focusing on the effect of self-affirmation 
on the personal self (Sherman, Hartson and Binning; Klein and Har-
ris) and the interpersonal self (Kim and McGill; Park and Vohs), the 
presentations proposed here paint a picture of how affirming the self 
impacts consumers. This presentation will be of interest to research-
ers studying goal-attainment, self-regulation, information process-
ing, word of mouth, and prosocial behavior — and anyone interested 
in one of the most effective ways that consumers can “Make a Dif-
ference.”
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Broadening Perspective, Changing Narratives, and 
Improving Academic Performance: The Effects of Values 
Affirmation Interventions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Research on self-affirmation theory has repeatedly shown that 
brief interventions designed to affirm the self-concept can produce 
lasting benefits on a variety of behavioral outcomes, including ac-
ademic performance. However, the question of what causes these 
effects is the topic of continued research attention. The purpose of 
the present talk is to summarize self-affirmation theory, to present a 
general model to explain the effects of values affirmations (Sherman 
& Hartson, 2011), and to introduce new evidence from two values 
affirmation intervention studies that supports this model.
Self-affirmation theory evolved from an alternative explanation 
for cognitive dissonance phenomena (Steele, 1988; see also Aron-
son, Cohen, & Nail, 2009; Stone & Cooper, 2001) to an intervention 
strategy employed in a wide range of settings (see Harris & Epton, 
2009; Garcia & Cohen, 2012 for reviews). Its core idea is that people 
have a general motivation to maintain self-integrity – that is, the per-
ception of one’s self as efficacious, consistent, and good (Sherman 
& Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). In the face of threats to one’s self-
integrity, people behave in ways that serve to protect the self-con-
cept. For example, when faced with the threat of confirming negative 
stereotypes about one’s group (i.e., stereotype threat), people may 
defensively disengage from the domain rather than risk confirming 
the stereotype. However, when global perceptions of self-integrity 
are affirmed, for example, via a writing task that reminds people of 
an important personal value, otherwise threatening information may 
lose its capacity to threaten the self. After completing values affirma-
tions, individuals feel, both to themselves and to others, as though 
the task of maintaining self-integrity is settled. Consequently, they 
can focus on other demands in the situation beyond ego protection—
for example—the academic tasks at hand in a school environment. 
Sherman and Hartson (2011) proposed a model that seeks to 
explain the cognitive processes by which affirmation exercises may 
exert their influence. Specifically, affirming important values is pro-
posed to augment the psychological resources available to an indi-
vidual to confront a threat. That is, self-affirmation allows people 
to experience threatening events and information within a broader, 
larger view of the self. Self-threats, when viewed in the context 
of this enhanced perception of self-resources, can be seen from a 
broader perspective. This broader perspective changes people’s nar-
rative of their ongoing experience, such that the threat does not af-
fect, to the same extent, their overall evaluations of themselves. In 
the context of a focal threat, the general attenuation of concern about 
self-evaluation can lead to attenuated stress responses, and improved 
performance. And to the extent that these effects shape enduring nar-
ratives of experience and initiate (or interrupt) recursive processes, 
they can lead to long-term psychological changes.
Evidence supporting this model comes from recent investiga-
tions in other laboratories (e.g., Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Wakslak 
& Trope, 2009; Logel & Cohen, 2011) and two recent studies we 
have conducted, each featuring a longitudinal field experiment in a 
mixed-ethnicity middle school. These studies examined the achieve-
ment gap between Latino American and European American stu-
dents and whether a values affirmation writing exercise could at-
tenuate this gap, and the processes by which this attenuation occurs. 
In Study 1, students completed multiple self-affirmation (or 
control) activities as part of their regular class assignments (in pro-
cedures modified from Cohen et al., 2006; 2009). The manipulation 
did not affect the grades of White students, but Latino American stu-
dents, the identity threatened group, had higher grades in the affirma-
tion than control condition as assessed by core course GPA over the 
academic year. Examination of quarter by quarter performance indi-
cates that the affirmation elevated Latino American students’ trajec-
tory. The results persisted for three years, the period of examination, 
and persisted despite approximately 2/3 of the sample moving on to 
high school. The long-term effects of Study 1 suggest that students’ 
narratives of their ongoing experiences changed, and that they took 
this new “story” with them into the new environment (cf. Wilson, 
2011).
To provide more direct evidence as to how affirmation shaped 
students’ narratives of their ongoing academic experience, Study 2 
featured daily diaries where participants reported their daily adver-
sity, perceptions of identity threat, and feelings of academic fit. In 
addition, Study 2 included multiple assessments of construal level 
(the Behavioral Identification Form; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) 
to examine participants’ perspective. We predicted that affirmation 
would broaden construals and prevent daily adversity from being ex-
perienced as identity threat. We also predicted that affirmation would 
insulate academic motivation from identity threat. 
Study 2 replicated the effects of values affirmation on academic 
performance, as affirmed Latino American students earned higher 
grades in their core courses than non-affirmed Latino American 
students. Evidence supporting the general model of affirmation ef-
fects (Sherman & Hartson, 2011) was also obtained, as the affirmed 
Latino American students also construed events at a more abstract 
(broader) rather than concrete level and were less likely to have their 
daily feelings of academic fit and motivation undermined by iden-
tity threat. More specifically, affirmed Latino American participants 
saw events and situations at a broader level of construal than Latino 
American students in the control condition. The measures of con-
strual focused on general topics, and not just academics, and were 
separated from the affirmation manipulation by weeks to months, 
and thus, the effects seemed quite general. Being under identity 
threat may lead individuals to experience a narrowing of perspec-
tive. Providing value affirming experiences and thereby reminding 
them of their important self-resources may broaden this perspective. 
The diary findings also suggest that when affirmed, and with 
self-worth perhaps more secure, identity-threatened students did not 
experience daily adversity as indicative of identity threat. Further, 
to the extent that they perceived threat in their environment, these 
negative experiences did not spread into and affect academic moti-
vation. Rather, the Latino American students sustained motivation 
independently of the perceived threat in the environment. Together, 
these findings suggest that affirmation can change psychological ex-
perience and instigate lasting changes in how people create narrative 
experiences over time. 
In sum, these two experiments provide evidence to support the 
general model of affirmation effects—that values affirmations exert 
their effects, in part, by bolstering resources, broadening perspective, 
and changing the narrative of ongoing experience under threat. 
The Multifaceted Role of Affect in Self-Affirmation 
Effects
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Self-affirmation theory holds that threats to the self can be re-
duced by focusing on cherished values unrelated to the content of 
the threat (Steele, 1988). Because threat often leads to defensiveness 
(Liberman & Chaikin, 1992), self-affirmation can be a useful tech-
nique to promote even-handed, non-defensive responding. Indeed, 
several studies show that people are more accepting of a threatening 
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health message – and more likely to change behavior in accordance 
with the message – if given the opportunity to focus on personal 
values prior to reading it (for review, see Harris & Epton, 2009). 
Self-affirmation can also alleviate the negative effects of threat on 
task performance and academic achievement, ostensibly because it 
uncouples performance success from the self-concept (Sherman & 
Hartson, 2011).  
Although the body of evidence illustrating beneficial effects of 
self-affirmation continues to grow, little is known about how self-
affirmation opportunities influence affective processes or how the 
effects of self-affirmation might vary with affective state. Early re-
search found that there was little or no effect of self-affirmation on 
general mood, reducing the likelihood that self-affirmation effects 
were a proxy for the effects of positive affect or that positive af-
fect mediated those effects.  Instead, we propose that the relationship 
between self-affirmation and affect is much more nuanced. In par-
ticular, we contend that (1) self-affirmation influences more specific 
affective experiences such as worry and feelings of vulnerability (in 
contrast to more general affect), (2) rather than being a direct con-
sequence of self-affirmation, general incidental emotions – that is, 
discrete emotions (e.g., sadness, anger) minimally related to the self-
affirmation experience – will moderate effects of self-affirmation, 
and (3) self-affirmation can alleviate the impairment of performance 
elicited by negative affective states such as stress.
We first consider the effects of self-affirmation on specific af-
fective experiences rather than general affect. In one study, female 
undergraduates who consumed moderate to large amounts of alcohol 
read an article linking alcohol consumption with breast cancer risk. 
Prior to reading the article, participants were randomly assigned to 
a self-affirmation condition (in which they wrote an essay about a 
value important to them) or a standard no-affirmation control condi-
tion (in which they wrote about how a value unimportant to them 
might be important to someone else). We found that participants 
in the self-affirmation condition expressed more worry and anxi-
ety about getting breast cancer – specific affective experiences that 
promote behavior change (Klein, Harris, Ferrer, & Zajac, 2011). 
Moreover, self-affirmation was found to strengthen the relationship 
between affective responses and intentions. Two additional studies 
demonstrated that these effects on message-specific affect mediated 
subsequent effects on  
Finally, as a complement to our overarching investigation of 
how affect moderates the beneficial effects of self-affirmation, we 
explored how self-affirmation might offset the influence of negative 
affect – in this case, chronic stress. Much work suggests that chronic 
stress can impair performance on difficult tasks (Liston, McEwen, & 
Casey, 2009). We hypothesized that self-affirmation can ameliorate 
such effects. Undergraduate students varying in chronic stress were 
given 30 difficult Remote Associate Test (RAT) items and asked to 
complete them in front of an evaluator. This experience was stressful 
as demonstrated by increased heart rate and blood pressure.  Impor-
tantly, self-affirmed individuals performed better on the RAT task 
than controls, particularly among participants who were chronically 
stressed.
As a group, these seven studies demonstrate a multifaceted 
relationship between affect and self-affirmation, building on previ-
ous research showing no direct effects of self-affirmation on general 
measures of affect. Self-affirmation appears to have effects on more 
precise threat-relevant affective experiences such as worry, and there 
are important interactive effects between self-affirmation and affect 
on message processing, behavioral intentions, and task performance. 
Less about Me, More about You: How Self-Affirmation 
Changes Word-of-Mouth Intentions for the Self versus 
Others 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Previous literature on WOM has focused on consumers’ com-
munications about their own experiences (Berger and Schwartz 
2011; Dichter 1966; Dye 2000), however, consumers may also talk 
about others’ consumption experiences, sometimes when jointly ex-
periencing a product or service (e.g., dining companions) or when 
another consumer reports an experience and the target consumer 
must consider whether to pass that story on. The present research 
shows that self-affirmation decreases the tendency for consumers to 
complain about their own, but to increase the tendency to talk about 
others’ negative experiences, the “Consumer Champion Effect.” We 
trace this effect to the broader perspective adopted by affirmed indi-
viduals, which mutes the extremity of their own emotional responses 
to events while it concurrently produces a more accurate understand-
ing and deeper appreciation of the intensity of others’ emotions. 
These responses thereby lead to an ironic effect of self-affirmation 
in which very calm consumers, who are not upset about their own 
negative experiences, may nevertheless be vocal critics of a firm on 
behalf of others. 
Prior research has shown that the “self-affirmation task,” that 
is, reflecting on core values, reminds people of their broader identity 
(Sherman and Cohen 2006). Within this broader perspective, people 
feel more secure in their self-integrity and less pressure to defend 
a particular aspect of the self. As a consequence, affirmed consum-
ers are more likely to process potentially threatening messages, for 
example, reports that favored products might have negative health 
consequences, in an open-minded way (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 
2000). We build on this prior research to explore additional conse-
quences of a broadened self-view. First, in a direct extension of prior 
work, we posit that a broader view of self may mute the intensity of 
people’s own feelings about a product or services failure because 
each event is “just one thing” in a broader view of the self. That is, 
the affirmed individual is not whipsawed about by each individual 
passing event because the broader view incorporates other, more sta-
bilizing influences (thoughts and feelings about the rest of one’s life). 
This theorizing leads to the hypothesis that affirmed consumers will 
be less angry after experiencing product or service failures, and, in 
turn, when they have a chance to spread negative WOM, they will 
be less likely to do so.   
However, we also propose a novel influence of a broader per-
spective resulting from self-affirmation, specifically, that a broader 
view incorporates the feelings of others to a greater extend, leading 
affirmed individuals to be more attentive toward others’ affective re-
actions. Supporting our argument Crocker et al. (2008) showed that 
self-affirmation increased other-directed positive feelings such as 
love. However, moving beyond Cocker et al. (2008) who focused on 
positive emotions expressed toward others, we show that affirmed 
consumers more deeply appreciate the intensity of others’ positive as 
well as negative emotions. Further, we suggest affirmed consumers 
estimate more extreme (and accurate) emotional profiles in others’ 
affective reactions. After self-affirmation, others’ positive emotions 
seem to be more positive, while negative emotions seem to be more 
negative. As a consequence, affirmed consumers will be more will-
ing to complain on behalf of those others, an effect we term, the 
“Consumer Champion Effect.”
The first experiment, consisting of two studies, examines the 
influence of self-affirmation on estimation of others’ emotions. In 
experiment 1a, self-affirmation was manipulated using an essay writ-
160 / Effects of Self-Affirmation on the Personal Self and the Interpersonal Self 
ing task, commonly employed in this literature (Sherman and Cohen 
2006). Participants in the high self-affirmation condition wrote an 
essay about their most important value while those in the low self-
affirmation condition wrote an essay about the least important value. 
Then, participants listened to moderately annoying sounds (e.g., 
electric drill, squeaking door) then indicated either what they felt 
about the sounds or what they thought another person felt about the 
sounds. The results show that self-affirmation reduced the intensity 
of one’s felt emotions while it amplified the estimated intensity of 
others’ emotions. We also provide evidence that affirmed consumers 
more accurately estimate others’ emotions while projecting less of 
their own emotional states. 
Experiment 1b further examines consumers’ assessments of 
others’ emotions through their interpretation of posted user reviews. 
In addition, in this experiment, instead of manipulating self-affirma-
tion through an essay writing task, we measured individual differ-
ences in self-affirmation tendency, specifically, their self-concept 
clarity. We observed that participants with high self-concept clarity 
estimated more intense emotions from both positive and negative re-
views, seeing positive reviews as more positive and negative reviews 
as more negative.   
In experiment 2, which was a scenario study, participants were 
asked to imagine various situations involving product or service fail-
ure, for example, poor restaurant service during a celebratory dinner, 
and then to estimate either their own or the other person’s emotional 
reactions. Self-affirmation was manipulated as in study 1a using an 
essay writing task. We found self-affirmation led to lower willing-
ness to generate negative WOM for the self but greater willingness 
to generate negative WOM on behalf of the other person.
Experiment 3 was intended to probe the process underlying the 
effect further by exploring the effects of a theoretically motivated 
moderator, specifically, anonymity of the communication. If self-
affirmation produces the Consumer Champion Effect by reducing 
narrow and defensive processing, it should be less prevalent when 
such processing is already limited, such as when one’s comments 
are anonymous. Consistent with this view, when participants had to 
identify themselves, we again found that self-affirmation lessened 
participants’ tendency to report their own concerns but more likely to 
champion the concerns of others. When anonymity was guaranteed, 
self-affirmation was less effective.
Self-Affirmation has the Power to Offset the Harmful 
Effects of Money Reminders
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Self-affirmation, which encourages people to ponder why their 
core values are important to them, promotes a broad-minded, big 
picture perspective of the self, and enhances psychological resourc-
es of self-integrity (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Prior research has 
provided ample evidence that self-affirmation positively affects in-
terpersonal aspects of the self by making people be more open to 
those holding opposite opinions who accordingly are judged favor-
ably (Cohen, Aronson and Steele 2000; Sherman and Cohen 2002), 
reducing within-relationship threats (Lockwood et al. 2004), and 
enhancing a key other-directed feeling—love (Croker, Niiya, and 
Mischkowski 2008)
In this paper, we asked the question: Given its impressive abil-
ity to promote prosocial responses, could self-affirmation reduce the 
negative effects of money on the interpersonal self? Money, a social 
resource, makes people feel self-sufficient and behave accordingly 
(Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006, 2008). When reminded of money, 
people pursue personal goals and prefer to be separate from others. 
Thus, people prefer that others do not depend on them, and want 
to be free from dependency (e.g., reduced helpfulness toward oth-
ers and reduced requests for help) (Vohs et al. 2006, 2008). Further, 
money leads people to prefer to be separate from others, and to be 
less distressed about social exclusion (Zhou, Vohs and Baumeister 
2009). In sum, prior research has consistently found that money 
negatively affects the interpersonal self. We proposed that affirming 
important values will help people be less affected by money. Within 
the broader and abstract perspective of the self, money should lose 
its symbolic power.   
In the first experiment, we tested whether self-affirmation re-
duces tendencies to be free of dependents and dependency that mon-
ey brings about. First, participants received the self-affirmation (vs. 
control) manipulation. In the self-affirmation condition, participants 
wrote an essay on a paper explaining why their core value is impor-
tant to them, whereas those in the control condition explained why a 
less important value would be important to the average person. In the 
middle of writing about values, one of two screensavers appeared. 
Participants in the money (vs. control) condition saw a screensaver 
depicting various denominations of currency floating underwater 
(vs. white dots on a black background). 
Next, to measure the tendency to be free of dependents, we 
used willingness to help others in need. Participants were asked to 
read about a non-profit organization—Operation Smile, which is an 
international children’s medical charity that provides reconstructive 
surgery for children born with facial deformities, such as cleft lip and 
cleft palate. Then, they were told that in this experiment, five partici-
pants would be randomly selected to win a bonus payment of $50. 
If they were chosen as a winner, they could donate all or part of the 
$50 to Operation Smile. They were asked to write down the amount 
of money they would donate to Operation Smile.
Finally, as an indicator of dependency, we used a request for 
help during a difficult task.  Participants were asked to outline all 
segments of a geometric figure without lifting their pencil or retrac-
ing any segments. Unbeknownst to the participants, the figure was 
unsolvable. Participants were told that it was not a matter of how 
many tries it took or how long it took them to solve the puzzle. They 
were instructed work on it until they either solved it or decided to 
get help from the administrator. After 10 minutes, they were asked 
to stop.
Consistent with prior research, money priming led to self-suffi-
ciency orientations, reducing helpfulness toward others in need and 
dependency on others while attempting a difficult task (Vohs et al. 
2006, 2008). In the no self-affirmation condition, participants primed 
with money (vs. not primed) donated less money and were less likely 
to request help. However, self-affirmation reduced such an adverse 
money prime effect. Participants who self-affirmed and received the 
money prime donated more money, and were more likely to ask for 
help while solving a difficult task, as opposed to those who did not 
self-affirm prior to the money prime. 
In the second experiment, we tested if self-affirmation reduces 
different effects of money priming—tendencies to reduce social 
contact and to feel less distressed under social exclusion. First, par-
ticipants received the self-affirmation manipulation and the money 
priming, as in study 1. Then, participants were asked to choose be-
tween two activities. Within each item, one option was an activity for 
one person (e.g., planning your own vacation) and the other option 
was for two people or more (e.g., planning a family vacation). 
Next, we manipulated social exclusion by asking all partici-
pants to play a computerized ball-tossing game (Cyberball; Eisen-
berger et al. 2003). Participants were led to believe they played with 
3 live participants, but in fact, the computer simulated the other play-
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ers. Initially, the ball was tossed equally among the 4 players. In 
the normal-play condition, this equal play continued throughout the 
game. In the social-exclusion condition, the simulated confederates 
stopped throwing the ball to the live participants after 10 throws. 
Afterward, participants rated the social distress they felt about the 
game using the Southampton Social Self-Esteem Scale (Sedikides 
2008). Sample items on this scale included, “I feel devalued,” and, 
“I feel rejected.”  
Consistent with prior research, money priming led to social sep-
arateness (Vohs et al. 2006, 2008). In the no self-affirmation condi-
tion, participants primed with money (vs. not primed with money) 
chose more individually focused leisure experiences and were less 
likely to feel distressed after social exclusion. However, self-affirma-
tion reduced the adverse money prime effect. Participants who self-
affirmed and received the money prime were less likely to choose 
individually focused leisure experiences, and were more likely to 
feel distressed after social exclusion, as opposed to those who did not 
self-affirm prior to the money prime. 
Conclusion: Self-affirmation and money are both simple but 
powerful motivators of behavior change. Past work has documented 
the deleterious effects that even small and subtle reminders of money 
can have on interpersonal outcomes. The current work found that 
self-affirmation can not only nullify such troubling negative out-
comes but in some cases actually reverse them. By understanding 
how self-affirmation alters the typical effects of money priming, the 
field is in a better position to understand more about the psychology 
of money as well as how self-affirmation works – seemingly to insti-
gate the interpersonal self over the personal self.  
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SESSION OVERVIEW
In an increasingly globalized world, where images are dissemi-
nated around the world in mini-seconds and economic changes chal-
lenge the fundamental principles of what we want and expect from 
society the role of women within this remains a contentious issue. In-
deed events from ranging from the role of women in the Arab spring 
revolutions to a serious of news reports from Indian on female rape 
cases serves to remind us that the cultural and societal embodiment 
of what constitutes being a women remains a site to be contested. 
Contested by the women who feel their have ownership over their 
bodies and have they are perceived, versus how others, typically 
men, perceived the role of women and their bodies. In the middle of 
this field lies the market, adapting, creating and nurturing change in 
an effort to open new market segments, opportunities and profit pos-
sibilities. How then do women use consumption in these changing 
environments – as an opportunity to thrive, resist or conform?
Perhaps central to this cultural understanding is religion, where 
women feature prominently in various roles. From the Hindu scrip-
tures where women, presented as gods, are revered and worshiped as 
a form of perfection, to Christian and Islamic teachings on women’s 
modesty, religion determines how men, society, and women them-
selves are perceived. Yet religions role, both from a cultural and 
societal, perspective has become the embodiment of why women’s 
bodies are a site to be contested. In India, the sexualization of the 
female body has recently increased not only in Bollywood films but 
wider Indian society, especially amongst the middle classes. Eco-
nomic growth has led to get feelings of female empowerment and 
consumption opportunities to dress in a more Western style. Yet this 
consumption act challenges and embodies wider societal changes, as 
traditional male roles are usurped by newly empowered women. The 
consequences of this form the basis for our first paper. 
Whilst India represents implied state control, critics of France’s 
recent laws on religious symbolism argue that the state now has im-
plicit legal powers to arrest any women wearing a hijab, burka or any 
other symbolic piece of religious clothing. As women are often the 
bearers of a religion’s tangible values, such laws inherent discrimi-
nation is targeted then at women. Yet it is not just France that views 
women’s bodies and their representation as a site for state control. 
How women respond to this is discussed in our second paper. 
The market itself continues to play an important role in cul-
tural and symbolic meaning embodied within women’s bodies. Our 
third paper, explores how enterprising organizations now see the fe-
male consumer, their body and religion as a marketing opportunity. 
Consequently, the market actively works with religion to find new 
ways of redefining women’s bodies, whilst challenging and renego-
tiating wider cultural and societal norms. Yet, the market itself may 
not lead to such renegotiation. Indeed, in our last paper, market pro-
duced goods are shown as tools to be wielded within the accultura-
tion process. Consumption then is used to redefine migrant women’s 
identities and bodily meanings, asserting greater independence and 
equality, often against the husband’s wishes.   
The four papers in this special session offer insights then into 
the contradictory themes of state and individual, male and female, 
consumption and ownership roles in women’s lives and their bodies. 
From these themes two questions emerge:
1. To what extent does consumption represent a contested site 
for the state and gender differences towards women and their 
bodies be acted out, and
2. Are women merely victims of consumption that aims to di-
rectly or indirectly reinforce their oppressed position?
Constructing Identity through Cultural and Ancient 
Interpretations of the Female Body 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In societies undergoing modernity, how do women use con-
sumption to negotiate the contrasting cultural values of tradition 
and modernity when their own bodies are held to be sacred (Agnew, 
1997; Mukherjee, 1983; Wadley, 1977)? This paper explores the nu-
ances surrounding consuming the female body in India through the 
material/spiritual dichotomy that manifests in the discourses of na-
tionalistic modernity (Chatterjee, 1989). Women are defined and lo-
cated through social and moral parameters which serve as prominent 
markers of control and surveillance over their consumption choices 
for ‘clothing’ their body. Through changes in family and household 
structures (Sardamoni, 1992), an increasing female workforce (Ven-
katesh and Swamy, 1994) and changes in media representations of 
women (Mankekar, 1999), women are encouraged to reconstruct 
their identity. 
Indian womanhood has been characterized as an ambivalent 
state, wherein women are both revered and subjugated, worshiped 
and molested, free to express themselves in different domains and 
yet voiceless. The Indian woman’s body then becomes the embodi-
ment of Hindu religious texts, such as the Vedic and Dharmic litera-
ture, with the female body as a contrasting site of power and destruc-
tion, needing to be controlled. 
Yet within India contrasting female imagery in media and so-
ciety consolidates a form of sexual, cultural and religious worship, 
women in the social sphere are still deemed the atavistic and authen-
tic ‘body’ of national traditions (McClintock, 1992). In this position 
women simultaneously function as the living archive of the national 
archaic (Reuben, 1994), becoming a standard to construct around a 
modernizing nation. Indian women then embody the spiritual quali-
ties that characterize a nationalistic form of modernity (Mukhopad-
hyay, 1969), whilst embodying the social and familial embodiment. 
Effectively Indian women are juxtaposed between contrasting and 
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opposing forces; revered and subjugated, worshiped and molested, 
free to express themselves in different domains, and yet voiceless 
(Altekar, 1987; Olivelle, 2004). Within this ambivalence, modernity 
has created a consumer culture empowering women to challenge, 
subvert or re-negotiate societal patriarchy in material world once re-
served for men. Women are portrayed not as passive but as active, as-
sertive and visible agents vivaciously participating ‘body projects’. 
The tension created here becomes one between the self as individual 
and as a collective object. It is within this fissure that women negoti-
ate their sense of self through their consumption activities. 
Shilling (2006) noted that the rise of the body within consumer 
culture was a bearer of symbolic value where the “body provides 
a firm foundation on which to reconstruct a reliable sense of self 
in the modern world” (p.2). The young Indian women in my study 
had modified their consumption choices in light of what was socially 
acceptable and they were also seen to “skillfully resolve the tension 
between being faithful and comfortable and creating, modifying, and 
vigorously legitimizing their clothing choices” (Ger and Sandikci, 
2010, p. 26). Consumption at the level of the body, then, becomes a 
metaphor for an unraveling Indian modernity, one which is fraught 
with the contradictions of Indian womanhood.  If, as Puri (2002) 
notes, women’s bodies are used to articulate discourses of moder-
nity and development, then these are also the sites where fear of 
loss of national tradition are expressed. Consumption, in this vein, 
illustrates how performing identities at the level of the body creates 
tensions between an autonomous and collective sense of self. 
A three month multi-method interpretive research study involv-
ing 23 young urban and rural women was undertaken in New Delhi. 
A mixture of focus groups and one-to-one interviews were conduct-
ed, with each interview lasting up to ninety minutes. Respondents 
were also asked to create posters and take photographs of their con-
sumer experiences. 
The findings showed how participants considered the role of the 
body as central to negotiating both consumption activities and notions 
of modernity. Conclusions were drawn about the centrality of con-
sumption for the young women in being able to forge alternative iden-
tities which have not been socially scripted. However, the attempts 
made at constructing this alternative (through rebellion, seeking loop-
holes and testing boundaries) was constrained through forms of con-
trol and surveillance from the familial and social spheres respectively, 
presenting an ongoing tug-of-war between traditional, social narra-
tives of the conduct of women, and an individually ascribed notion. 
The ‘self’ emerged as an ontological dilemma where the preoc-
cupation with the ‘self’ was looked down upon by rural respondents 
who felt that the loss of collectivity would result in a loss of tradi-
tion. The self in terms of grooming and maintaining trends was a 
project of necessity for the urban respondents; the rural girls on the 
other hand critiqued this expression of self-indulgence as unneces-
sary, especially before marriage. Control and surveillance were of 
particular importance as they operated as mechanisms to curb and 
control not only women as their physical selves, but formed to pro-
tect the ‘morality’ of the nation. The most palpable effects of the 
markers of distinction were held between the urban and rural girls, 
in that the appropriation of Western clothing, Western music, hybrid 
linguistic forms, emphasis upon professional achievement and per-
sonal grooming deemed the urban girls as directly involved with the 
project of modernity. For rural consumers, the global flows served 
to hinder and problematize the status quo and they believed that the 
erosion of village sentiment was in part attributed to the attainment 
of new global symbols of prosperity which encompassed charac-
teristics deemed as “modern‟. Ultimately, as material and discur-
sive sites where tradition is performed (Oza, 2001), the body poses 
a number of complex and often contradictory negotiations for the 
young women in light of their constructions of identity. 
This paper develops an understanding of the body through its 
cultural frame, however, as noted by Shilling (2006), contemporary 
analyses of the body as socially constructed phenomena, refer to the 
body as a theoretical space, but the body often remains relatively 
neglected as an actual object of analysis. This paper aims to address 
this shortcoming. Tracing through history, it can be concluded that 
the body project itself is tempered through both nationalistic and an-
cient ideals of womanhood in India. Consumption choices amongst 
the young women express a system of values which reflect an ethos 
of modernity where the clothing of the body demonstrates prevailing 
socio-cultural processes which condition respondents’ daily lives. 
The Halal Nail Polish: Religion and Body Politics in the 
Marketplace
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In January 2013 the Polish cosmetic company Inglot intro-
duced the first ever halal nail polish, the O2M line of breathable nail 
enamel. Wearing nail polish is a contentious issue for pious Mus-
lim women, both symbolically and materially. While some religious 
scholars emphasize that looking beautiful is a requirement in Islam, 
others call for a refrain from any action that would attract the male 
gaze. Moreover, wearing nail polish interferes with ablution, a ritu-
alized body cleansing process that every Muslim should undertake 
before prayer. Because nail polish sets a permanent barrier between 
water and nail, ablution cannot be performed without first removing 
the nail polish. Inglot claims to have devised a formula of breathable 
nail polish, which allows water to penetrate nail, hence is suitable for 
prayer. In this paper, I use halal nail polish as a case to interrogate the 
complex ways through which social, cultural, material and religious 
interpretations of body intersect with marketplace dynamics and in-
form identities. 
The perception and evaluation of one’s own body and physical 
appearance contribute significantly to self-concept (Thompson and 
Hirschman 1995). Within the logic of consumer culture, body turns 
into a site of endless choice and possibility. However, the relation-
ship between body and choice becomes complicated in the context 
Muslim identities. As substantial amount of research has shown 
the concept of modesty plays an important role in shaping Muslim 
identities and practices related to body. While modesty requirement 
applies both men and women, it is the female body that modesty 
becomes embodied, most prominently in the form of Islamic veiling 
(Ahmed 1992; El Guindi, 1999; Mahmood, 2005; Sandıkcı and Ger, 
2010). Increasingly, the discussions of a modest body take place in 
the marketplace. The veiling industry and related Muslim lifestyle 
media promote products and images that promise women fashion-
able yet modest looks (Sandıkcı and Ger 2007). Underlying these is 
an understanding that modest dressing, like other body management 
practices, is a choice for individual women. This emphasis on choice 
resonates with the construction of the neoliberal consumer subject 
and aligns religious norms with market logic. The introduction of 
halal nail polish exemplifies this mutually informing relationship be-
tween Islam and neoliberal consumerism. However, what is interest-
ing in this case is the product’s capacity to invoke internal debates 
about female body and concepts of modesty. 
I explore these debates through netnographic and ethnographic 
methods. Blog entries, news stories and forum discussions on social 
media sites as well as interviews with women selling and using the 
product constitute the data set. As the nail polish has been recently 
introduced, data collection still continues. Preliminary analysis sug-
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 165
gests three main themes. First, there is a debate about the ‘necessity’ 
of a halal nail polish that revokes on the one side the notion of market 
opportunism and on the other side the notion of consumer freedom. 
Second, there is a tension between religious and material concep-
tions of body. While references to scriptural texts and norms seek 
to define boundaries of Muslim female body and situate nail polish 
within this normative framework, testaments based on the physical 
experience of the product attempt to expand the very boundaries of 
religiously appropriate and inappropriate forms of bodily consump-
tion. Third, the debate about the nail polish brings forefront the ques-
tion of who has authority to speak on behalf of women and what 
defines being a pious and modern Muslim woman today. 
Overall, reactions toward the halal nail polish underlie the ques-
tion of what Muslim looks like, or what looks Muslim. Body features 
predominantly in these interrogations, but not only at the symbolic 
level. The nail polish draws attention to the material understandings 
of body and highlights how products shape women’s relationships to 
their bodies by enabling or preventing performance of certain prac-
tices and contribute to their sense of being a “good” Muslim. While 
introduction of halal nail polish appears to be yet another example 
of the growth of modest fashion and lifestyle sector (Lewis, 2010), 
it also shows the increasingly instrumental role market actors play 
in the construction and maintenance of pious consumer identities. 
Religiosity and acculturation through apparel 
consumption amongst North African migrant women in 
France
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Migration challenges the cultural, religious and social values 
associated with consumption for both the migrant and the recipient 
society. Previous studies have tended to focus on multi-cultural soci-
eties that take a melting pot perspective that recognizes and accepts 
difference, such as the USA and UK (Peñaloza, 1994; Gbadamos, 
2012). However what happens when migrants are faced with a soci-
ety that openly rejects cultural and religious differences? And how is 
this rejection acted through consumption? This paper mobilize post-
colonial theory which shows a perspective of the subordinated and 
marginalized (Brace-Govan and Burgh Woodman, 2008) to explore 
these themes through the role of Islam amongst North African fe-
male migrants living in France. A strongly secular country that legal-
ly prohibits public displays of religious symbolism (Tahran, 2011) 
and views ethnic marketing as an irrelevance (Héran, 2007). How 
female migrants and their daughters, who represent the most vis-
ible cultural difference, resolve potential conflict between personal 
religious and societal beliefs forms the focus of this paper. In doing 
so we address calls for further research into inter-generational influ-
ences (IGI) amongst immigrant family settings (O’guinn et al, 1986) 
and religiosity within consumer research (Cleveland and Chang, 
2009; Sandicki, 2006). We also explore how stigmatized consumers 
differentiate themselves through customizing their traditional ethnic 
dress in an established market (Sandicki and and Ger, 2010).
Acculturation, describing the level of individual and commu-
nity attachment to the values of the original culture or host culture, 
has been extensively applied to consumer research (Peñaloza, 1994; 
Askergaard et al, 2005). Whilst some studies drawing upon Berry’s 
(1997) categories, such as Üstüner and Holt’s (2007) reflect upon ac-
culturation as a range of outcomes, others have viewed migrants as 
constantly changing their identities and related consumption depend-
ing upon the context (Lindridge et al, 2006). However, these studies 
assumed that migrants actively want to assimilate, whilst retaining 
their own ethnic identity. In countries where the nation culture is 
deemed to be superior, cultural and religious differences are seen as 
subservient. Such as Islamic women wearing the Hijab (head scarf) 
in public, in France, is an illegal act. Yet, research into the role of 
religion in consumption in secular countries reflects wider tensions. 
For example Sandicki (2006) found that religion influenced poor fe-
male migrants’ acculturation into life in Turkey’s cities conflicted 
with secular demands to change their bodily representation through 
clothing. The city’s cultural codes of wearing body hugging clothes 
were viewed as an act of resistance to God. In a similar vein, Gb-
adamosi (2012) found that Black African migrant women in London 
viewed religious beliefs as sufficient to resist societal pressure to 
acculturate to wearing body revealing clothes. These findings sug-
gest that the women’s body, her ownership over it, and how it is rep-
resented becomes a site for acculturation conflict (Sandicki, 2006) 
Our paper explores these themes by researching North Afri-
can Muslim migrant women living in Paris, France, where 70% of 
migrants originate from North and West Africa constituting 8% of 
the 5 million ethnic minority population (Héran, 2010). France was 
chosen following its legal ban on all religious symbolism in Gov-
ernment spaces, such as wearing the Hijab. Forty-one participants’ 
interviews were undertaken from women born in Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Morocco living in Paris. Participants were categorized as either 
highly religious (HR) faithful to Islamic values in their life and were 
recruited from mosques. Casually religious women (CR) who prac-
tice Islam occasionally were recruited through a snowballing tech-
nique. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes to two hours supported 
by researcher observation of participants in their daily lives. 
Our analysis revealed conflicting behaviors regarding the role 
of religion within acculturation. CR migrant women favored French 
stores that sold western style clothing, demonstrating little rever-
ence for clothing that met with Islamic principles, due to their weak 
Islamic beliefs and their strong identification with France. HR mi-
grant women, in contrast, resisted French secular clothing styles 
by rejecting clothing patterns that were considered against Islamic 
teachings. For example, French clothing brands were rejected as too 
fashionable, body revealing and symbolic of legal system that out-
lawed religious clothing. In term of (IGI) whilst HR / CR mothers 
had HR/CR daughters respectfully, in some instances this was not 
always true. When HR mothers had CR daughters acculturation ten-
sions arose when CR daughters left the traditional family house to 
gain individual freedoms and to engage with secular consumption. 
Daughters’ rejection of their HR mothers manifested through con-
sumption, such as buying / renting their own apartments, living with 
their boyfriend, attending night clubs, wearing revealing apparel and 
rejecting ethnic meals. 
CR mothers who had HR daughters experienced tensions 
around food preparation, with their HR daughters’ preferring Halal 
meat. Consequently these mothers found their daughter’s extreme 
Islamic behavior manifested through refusing to shop with their 
mothers, eat from their meals, and not exchanging ideas around pur-
chases items. Our analysis locates religion then as a central variable 
within acculturation, manifesting through contesting how the female 
body should be presented. Consumption then provided the means 
to construct a project that communicated acceptance or resistance 
to society, as well as a sense of ownership and belonging to society.
Renegotiating the patriarchal bargain and the 
embodiment of womanhood
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research explores how migrant women use consumption to 
renegotiate their culturally construed gendered identity and related 
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bodily representations. Central to this renegotiation is the embodi-
ment of the migrant female identity embodied within the patriarchal 
bargain, representing a set of pre-existing rules and scripts that regu-
late gender identity and related roles (Kandiyoti, 1988). For example, 
duties the wife is expected to perform, such as mother, cook etc. As 
migrant women’s roles transition from a wife within a consanguine, 
traditional, family based around patriarchy to a nuclear family that 
encourages equality, the cultural values embodied in these women 
are challenged and renegotiated. This research then addresses previ-
ous research gender bias towards male immigrants, with female im-
migrants either invisible or stereotyped (Dona and Ferguson, 2004; 
Reid and Comas-Diaz, 1990). Consequently, although the process 
of immigration offers opportunities for culturally determined gender 
roles to be reconstructed in the new host society (Dona and Fergu-
son, 2004), the extent that immigration improves or undermines a 
women’s ability to renegotiate her sense of identity remains unclear 
(Moon, 2003).
Patriarchal bargaining exerts a powerful influence on shaping a 
woman’s gendered subjectivity and determines her sense of gender 
ideology and embodiment in different contexts, for example in the 
family, as an employee etc. Previous research has shown that men 
and women, within the family, have unequal power and, hence, abil-
ity to change the thoughts and/ or actions of each other (Olson and 
Cromwell, 1975). Consequently, the man is widely perceived as hav-
ing greater purposeful influence over his spouse and, therefore, abil-
ity to exert his decisions and his gendered expectations (Kranichfeld, 
1987). Whilst both men and women accept and collude with these 
rules and scripts, they may also challenge, redefine or renegotiate 
them.
Acculturation’s emphasis on cultural change presents an in-
teresting perspective to explore how women’s gender embodiment 
is renegotiated. This cultural re-negotiation we argue can either be 
undertaken with mutual acceptance between husband and wife, or 
resisted and subversively created by another. Drawing upon the work 
of McCracken (1986) we argue that consumption with its related 
meanings becomes a contested area, offering opportunities for mi-
grant women to construct and mediate their own sense of gendered 
identity and renegotiate culturally laden meanings embodied upon 
them.
10 first-generation Nigerian married couples and 10 British 
white couples (20 husbands and 20 wives) living in Britain were 
recruited, exceeding theoretical saturation (McCracken, 1988). This 
then provided a comparison group. Interviews were conducted on a 
sequential basis, with each female participant interviewed twice; first 
with the husband and then separately. Interviews ranged from ninety 
to one hundred and eighty minutes.
Our findings revealed that gender embodiment and cultural 
interpretations represented a nexus of shifting patriarchal power, 
driven by context and opportunity. Opportunities to embody tradi-
tional female cultural roles through consumption reflected a desire 
for equality; a desire often resisted by their husbands. Sometimes 
this arose from necessity but other times female participants used 
market construed products to intentionally assert and renegotiate 
their role. Whilst these women actively cooked and cleaned the fam-
ily home, embodying the feminine body demanded in the patriarchal 
bargain, they also undertook roles reminiscent of the man. For exam-
ple, the woman purchasing products for family members against the 
husband’s wishes, refusing to embody cultural roles of womanhood 
at community events, and publicly renouncing the husband’s posi-
tion through consumption opportunities. At other times the women 
actively supported their husband’s position, even though they had 
previously undermined it. For example, the wife would empower 
the husband to fulfil cultural duties such as purchasing meat (even 
though they women were capable of doing so).
 In conclusion, whilst these women actively sought and 
achieved a sense of equality through consumption, renegotiating 
their gender roles and physical sense of self, these acts were un-
dertaken with a wider cultural recognition. Acculturation then repre-
sented a means of renegotiating the patriarchal bargain within Nige-
rian cultural parameters, rather than a bid to acculturate into British 
White culture. Our findings then indicate the role and embodiment of 
cultural boundaries within the acculturation process.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The purpose of this session is to better understand the psycho-
logical needs that drive the often seemingly irrational consumption 
of restrained eaters.  Restrained eaters tend to chronically experi-
ence two conflicting motives when making daily food decisions: he-
donic enjoyment and weight control (c.f. Stroebe et al. 2008).  This 
conflict leads restrained eaters to be hyper sensitive to food cues in 
the environment, often resulting in disinhibited consumption.  This 
disinhibited consumption tends to be interpreted as a self-regulatory 
failure; however, the papers in this session take a different perspec-
tive.  Rather than condemning the failures of restrained eaters, the 
papers in this session each seek to answer the question, “What are 
the psychological needs that restrained eaters are addressing through 
their consumption?”
As the obesity epidemic continues to grow, at great physical, 
emotional and economic cost to both individuals and society at large, 
it is becoming clear that the efforts of chronic dieters (a.k.a. restrained 
eaters) to lose weight are not working.  In order to find a solution to 
this problem, it is important to understand why retrained eaters are 
so prone to disinhibiting their consumption, and what needs, beyond 
momentary pleasure, disinhibited consumption serves.
The first paper of this session, “Do Restrained Eaters Identify 
as Dieters? Exploring the Role of Self-Concept in the Consumption 
of Restrained Eaters,” explores how a general self-concept prime im-
pacts the consumption of restrained eaters.  These authors find that 
among restrained eaters a general self-concept prime suppresses diet 
related thoughts resulting in increased consumption, suggesting that 
dieting is inconsistent with their self-concept.  Thus, one driver of 
disinhibited consumption is the enactment of identity consistent be-
havior.
The next two papers, “Do Weight Watchers Want More Op-
tions? How Activating Self-Regulatory Concerns Triggers the Need 
for Variety,” and “The Role of Reactance in Responses to One-Sid-
ed Advertisements:  How Health-Related Appeals Backfire among 
Restrained Eaters,” both explore how restrained eaters use their 
consumption to create a greater sense of psychological freedom. 
Because restrained eaters are constantly imposing limits on their 
consumption, they are particularly sensitive to feeling trapped by 
additional restrictions.  Thus, these papers highlight that restrained 
eating fosters a greater need for behavior aimed at regaining their 
freedom. 
The final paper of this session, “The Acuity of Vice: Goal Con-
flict Improves Visual Sensitivity to Portion Size Changes,” explores 
how the food related ambivalence experienced by restrained eaters 
can actually improve their perceptions of portion size.  A series of 
studies shows that consumers experiencing ambivalence towards a 
food, such as the chronic ambivalence experienced by restrained eat-
ers for hedonic foods, are more sensitive to changes in portion size. 
It is worth noting that restrained eaters were not more accurate for 
estimating portion size for low ambivalence “diet” foods, which have 
been associated with disinhibited consumption in past research (e.g. 
Scott et al 2008).  Thus, another driver of disinhibited consumption 
is release from the hyper-vigilance of food cues.
Do Restrained Eaters Identify as Dieters? Exploring the 
Role of Self-Concept in the Consumption of Restrained 
Eaters
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research views restrained eaters’ self-regulation of food 
consumption as an effortful, conscious desire to limit their food con-
sumption, and thus control their physiological urges to consume food 
(Herman and Polivy 1980; Stroebe et al. 2008).  In support of this 
perspective, research has shown that restrained eaters consistently 
think more about dieting and weight-related issues (Boon, Stroebe, 
and Schut 1997; van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe and Aarts 2012), and 
that the chronic accessibility of dieting and weight-control thoughts 
enables restrained eaters to successfully regulate their food con-
sumption (Stroebe et al. 2008).  Consequently, situational variables 
that inhibit conscious self-regulation lead restrained eaters to con-
sume more food.  Although research has provided much insight into 
how situational influences can lead to increased or decreased food 
consumption among restrained eaters (e.g., McFarlane et al. 1998; 
Herman, Roth, and Polivy 2003), less is known about the role that 
the self-concept plays in the self-regulatory efforts of restrained eat-
ers.  Research suggests that restrained eaters are more concerned 
about their weight and physical appearance than non-restrained eat-
ers (Laessle et al. 1989; Wilksch and Wade 2004), and that restrained 
eaters are more self-aware and self-conscious about how they are 
viewed by others than non-restrained eaters (Blanchard and Frost 
1983; Heatherton and Baumeister 1991).  These differences are fre-
quently attributed to societal pressures on individuals to be thin (Her-
man et al. 2003; Strauman et al. 1991).  Yet, it is unclear the extent 
to which restrained eaters’ chronic concern about weight control and 
dieting is purely a social phenomenon, or has been internalized to 
become a part of their self-concept.
We examine the role of the self-concept in the consumption be-
havior of restrained eaters.  To do so, we use a general self-concept 
prime – signing one’s name – that has been shown to activate the 
aspect of one’s self-concept that is afforded in the present situation 
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(Kettle and Häubl 2011).  This simple intervention enables us to in-
vestigate how activating the self-concept of restrained eaters influ-
ences their self-regulatory efforts in controlling their food consump-
tion.  In particular, our research seeks to better understand the extent 
to which restrained eaters’ urge to regulate consumption has been 
internalized and incorporated into their self-concept, versus remain-
ing an essentially external force.  In other words, as restrained eaters 
engage in that never ending battle between their “love of food and 
not wanting to get fat,” which side of the battle is more closely linked 
to the self-concept?   In answering this question, our research takes 
an important step toward better understanding the self-concept of 
restrained eaters.  
In studies 1A and 1B we explore whether a general self-concept 
prime leads to increased or decreased consumption among restrained 
eaters.  Based on finding by Kettle and Häubl (2011), we theorized 
that since food is relevant to the self concept of restrained eaters that 
a general self-concept prime should impact the food consumption 
of restrained, but not unrestrained eaters.  What was less clear was 
whether a general self-concept prime would lead to increased or de-
creased consumption.  We reasoned that if restrained eaters identify 
as dieters then a general self-concept prime in the presence of food 
would activate that aspect of the self, resulting in decreased con-
sumption.  If, on the other hand, restrained eaters do not identify as 
dieters and the desire to restrict consumption remains an essentially 
social construct, then a general self-concept prime should result in 
increased consumption.  In study 1A we find that restrained eaters 
who engage in a general self-concept prime (signing their name) 
purchase more chocolates with money earned in an unrelated task 
than restrained eaters in a control condition (printing their name).  As 
predicted, the general self-concept prime has no effect on the choco-
late consumption of unrestrained eaters.  In study 1B we replicate 
the same pattern of results with non-hedonic foods finding that after 
a general self-concept prime restrained eaters eat more carrots and 
more pretzels compared to a control condition, while the consump-
tion of unrestrained eaters is unaffected by the general self-concept 
prime.
In study 2 we sought initial evidence for our proposition that the 
increased consumption exhibited by restrained eaters in response to 
a general self-concept prime is caused by decreased accessibility of 
the dieting construct.  Participants signed (did not sign) their name 
in the presence (absence) of food and then engaged in implicit mea-
sure of thought accessibility (DeMarree, Wheeler, and Petty 2005) 
in which the target words were diet related (e.g. overeat, indulge). 
Among restrained eaters in the general self-concept prime, food 
present condition, diet related words were significantly less acces-
sible compared to the control condition, providing initial evidence 
that dieting is not part of the self-concept of restrained eaters.
In study 3 participants received a bag of pretzels and engaged 
(did not engage) in a general self-concept prime.  Participants then 
listed 5 thoughts about the pretzels and rated each thought in terms 
of how relevant it was to food, dieting, and themselves.  Among re-
strained eaters, fewer diet related thoughts were reported after the 
general self-concept prime compared to the control.  Additionally, 
restrained eaters were more likely to consume the pretzels after the 
general self-concept prime compared to the control.  No effects 
were found for either D.V. among unrestrained eaters.  Furthermore, 
among restrained eaters, the number of diet related thoughts medi-
ated pretzel consumption only in the control condition, while in the 
general self-concept prime condition there was no relationship be-
tween diet thoughts and consumption.  These results provide addi-
tional support for our proposition that dieting is not consistent with 
the self-concept of restrained eaters and it is this inconsistency that 
leads to increased consumption after a general-self-concept prime.
Do Weight Watchers Want More Options? How Activating 
Self-Regulatory Concerns Triggers the Need for Variety 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In daily life food variety has become omnipresent. When dining 
out or grocery shopping consumers can select between a variety of 
different dishes and products. On the upside, these strategies corre-
spond with individuals’ preference for variety in food consumption 
and provide them with higher consumption utility (Kahn & Wansink, 
2004). On the downside, food variety fosters increased consump-
tion (Rolls et al., 1981). Parallel to this trend, weight watching has 
become a recurring theme in present-day life. When reading maga-
zines or watching TV, one is bombarded with information on dieting 
programs, creating the impression that watching one’s weight is the 
status quo. Considering these recent developments in combination, 
the question that presents itself is whether weight concerns, in gen-
eral, and restricting one’s food intake, in particular, could influence 
individuals’ need for variety: Do individuals who restrict their food 
intake seek more or less variety than individuals free from self-reg-
ulatory concerns? 
When individuals are concerned about their weight, they restrict 
their food intake and adhere to self-imposed demands instead of lis-
tening to physiologically determined satiety boundaries (Herman 
& Polivy, 1984). This brings about stronger hedonic responses to 
highly tempting food (Hofmann, et al., 2009). In fact, when individu-
als restrict their food intake, they constantly ruminate about food and 
evaluate food stimuli in terms of pleasure that can be derived from 
eating. Accordingly, restricting one’s food intake provokes a struggle 
between adhering to self-imposed demands and the desire to maxi-
mize pleasure from eating. Consuming the same kind of food easily 
results in habituation and decreases enjoyment of that particular food 
(Epstein et al., 2009) while eating a variety of different food is ex-
pected to bring about higher anticipated levels of consumption utility 
(Kahn & Wansink, 2004).
Taking these findings together, we predict that restricting one’s 
food intake potentially increases variety seeking since it provides 
a means to compensate for the decreased pleasure that comes with 
adhering to these self-imposed demands. Specifically, we argue, 
first, that dieters seek more variety than non-dieters and, second, that 
non-dieters engage in higher variety seeking if self-regulatory con-
cerns are activated. In study 1 we utilized a 2 (mental budget vs. no 
mental budget) x 2 (dieter vs. non-dieter1) between-subject design. 
Participants took part in two seemingly unrelated studies. The first 
part served to manipulate the mental budget activation. In line with 
Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2009) participants in the treatment 
condition read that people try to limit their snack consumption to 
2.13 snacks a day and were asked to type in the number of snacks 
they would allow themselves today. Subsequently, all participants 
took part in a taste test and were randomly assigned to either taste a 
small piece of chocolate cake or chocolate. At the end participants 
could choose another piece of waffle or cake as an additional re-
ward. We measured variety seeking as switching away from the food 
item just eaten2. A direct logistic regression with our manipulation 
(mental budget vs. no mental budget) and dieting status (dieter vs. 
non-dieter) and their interaction effect on the likelihood to seek va-
1 Using the restrained scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980) we categorized par-
ticipants as dieters (i.e., a score > 16) and non-dieters (i.e., a score ≤ 16).
2 Because product type (i.e., waffle or cake) eaten during the taste test did 
not influence individuals’ likelihood to seek variety, we collapsed the data 
across product types.
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riety (no vs. yes) revealed dieting status (p < .05, beta = 1.30) and 
mental budget as significant positive predictor (p < .05, beta = .79). 
Dieters as well as non-dieters with a mental budget were more likely 
to choose a different snack than non-dieters or participants without 
a mental budget. The interaction effect is insignificant (beta = - .71). 
This study provides initial evidence that self-regulatory concerns in-
creases variety seeking.  
In study 2 we exclusively focused on non-dieters. Again, we 
activated self-regulatory concerns by means of asking half of the 
participants to generate a mental budget of how many snacks they 
want to allow themselves. Afterward, all participants were allowed 
to customize their own chocolate bar by choosing any six toppings 
out of a six-item choice set (e.g., cappuccino chocolate chips, or nou-
gat piece). The results show that participants who imposed a mental 
budget chose significantly more different toppings (MMB = 3.52, SD 
= .14) than those who did not impose a mental budget (MC = 3.12, 
SD = .15), F(1, 53) =  3.93, p < .063. In study 3, we manipulate 
self-regulatory concerns by asking half of the participants to respond 
to the restrained scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980) and by assessing 
their weight. Afterward, participants obtained a cake covered with 
whipped cream and were told to customize it by choosing among 
seven different toppings (e.g., Smarties®, chocolate flakes, or small 
almond cookies). Participants for whom self-regulatory concerns 
were activated chose significantly more different toppings (MMB = 
3.73, SD = .27) than participants without activate self-regulatory 
concerns (MC = 3.0, SD = .25, F(1, 30) = 3.90, p < .06). 
By means of three studies we establish a relationship between 
self-regulatory concerns and variety seeking. In doing so, our find-
ings suggest that particularly those individuals who are watching 
their weight are most susceptible to the negative consequences of 
variety, i.e., increased food intake: When confronted with varied 
product assortments individuals with self-regulatory concerns are 
most likely to seek variety and, thereby, run the risk of overeating. 
The Role of Reactance in Responses to One-Sided 
Advertisements:  How Health-Related Appeals Backfire 
among Restrained Eaters
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In this research we explore consumer attitudes toward one-sid-
ed appeals that present only the negative aspects of consuming in-
dulgent food and determine how these attitudes influence subsequent 
food preferences. Public service announcements (PSAs) often use 
one-sided messages (e.g., “All dessert is bad”) to encourage healthy 
behaviors and to discourage unhealthy behaviors, such as overeating 
indulgent food. These kinds of messages can backfire, however, be-
cause consumers perceive them to be biased since they only mention 
the negative aspects of dessert and disregard anything positive. Since 
the intended purpose of the message is to convince consumers that 
they should eat fewer desserts, consumers may rightly feel that such 
one-sided messages are trying to limit and constrain their choices. 
Reactance theory (Brehm 1966, 1989) suggests that when individu-
als feel that someone else is constraining their freedom to choose or 
act, they will initiate a motivational state of reactance to regain that 
freedom. We propose that under certain conditions, one-sided mes-
sages will cause reactance, leading consumers to pursue goals that 
run opposite to those intended by the message, such as increasing 
consumption of indulgent food.
More specifically, we propose that consumers’ dietary restraint 
status (Herman and Polivy 1980) will determine whether one-sided 
3 We excluded one outlier on the variety-seeking measure (SD > 2.5).
messages produce reactance rather than compliance. Because re-
strained eaters (or dieters) have a greater concern for their figure 
and/or weight, and exhibit a strong desire to be thin, they are highly 
involved in and emotional about issues of indulgent consumption. 
Thus, their reactance is high because it comes from the motivation 
to be cognitively engaged with one-sided messages about indulgent 
food. In line with reactance theory (Brehm 1989) which emphasized 
the motivational construct of reactance, we posit that dieters (versus 
non-dieters) are more motivated to react to the one-sided message 
related to indulgent consumption. Particularly, dieters who see the 
message “all dessert is bad” are likely to feel their food choices are 
being constrained, thereby activating a goal to reassert their freedom 
of choice by consuming more (rather than less) indulgent food. Con-
versely, dieters who see the message that “all dessert is good” are 
unlikely to feel their food choices are being constrained, and thus do 
not need to respond with reactance to the message. Moreover, be-
cause reactance is motivational in nature, any reactance induced by a 
one-sided message should get stronger after a delay since it activates 
a goal to pursue the opposite behavior (Chartrand et al. 2008).
In a pilot study, participants (n=66) received a one-sided mes-
sage (“All dessert is bad”) or a neutral message (“Tortola is the main 
island of the British Virgin Islands”) and performed a lexical deci-
sion task, where they decided whether each string (14 unhealthy food 
words, 56 neutral words, and 70 non-words) was a word by pressing 
the “Y” or “N” key. A regression analysis revealed a significant mes-
sage by dietary restraint interaction effect on the speed of word rec-
ognition (b=–164.014, p<0.01). Dieters who received the one-sided 
message were faster at recognizing the unhealthy food words than 
dieters who received the neutral message (b=–222.086, p<0.01). 
This effect was not significant among non-dieters. Results provide 
preliminary evidence that exposure to a one-sided message focusing 
on the negatives of indulgence increases dieters’ interest in indul-
gent foods. However, an alternative explanation is that the one-sided 
manipulation simply activated thoughts of food whereas the control 
manipulation did not, particularly among dieters for whom food con-
cepts are more top-of-mind. We addressed this limitation in Study 1 
by activating thoughts of food in all experimental conditions.
Study 1 was similar to that of the pilot, except for the follow-
ing changes: (1)Participants (n=397) randomly saw one of three 
messages:“All dessert is bad” (one-sided negative message), “All 
dessert is good” (one-sided positive message), and “All dessert is 
food” (neutral message), (2)In place of a word recognition task par-
ticipants pressed the “F” and “J” keys (labeled “pos” and “neg”) to 
indicate whether they thought a word (20 healthy food,20 unhealthy 
food and 20 neutral words) was positive or negative. (3)We mea-
sured participants’ situational reactance (Hong and Faedda 1996). 
Dieters who saw a one-sided negative message scored higher on re-
actance (b=0.364, p<0.05) and generated a higher number of positive 
thoughts about unhealthy food (b=2.116, p<0.01) than dieters who 
received a neutral message. This effect was not significant among 
non-dieters. There was no effect of the one-sided positive message 
on the number of positive thoughts about unhealthy food or reac-
tance for either dieters or non-dieters. 
The purpose of study 2 was to investigate the process underly-
ing our findings.  Specifically, does a one-sided message activate a 
goal in dieters’ minds, such as the goal to choose whatever foods 
they desire? The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, except 
for the following changes: (1)We added a manipulation of delay/no-
delay to test whether the effects get stronger after a delay, and (2)Par-
ticipants (n=414) chose snacks for the next two weeks from a list of 
seven snacks pretested as unhealthy (Oreo cookies) and seven snacks 
pretested as healthy (Whole wheat crackers). Dieters who received 
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the one-sided negative message scored higher on reactance and made 
more unhealthy choices than dieters who received the neutral mes-
sage (b=1.055, p<0.01) and (b=2.844, p<0.01). Further, these effects 
were stronger after a delay (b=1.294, p<0.01 and b=4.530, p<0.01) 
and were not significant among non-dieters, suggesting that the 
one-sided negative message activated a reactance goal among diet-
ers. There was no significant difference in the number of unhealthy 
choices made by dieters who received the one-sided positive mes-
sage and dieters who received the neutral message.  
Studies 1 and 2 showed dieters’ reactance to the one-sided ap-
peal reflected in their faster recognition of unhealthy food words, and 
increased positive thoughts and choice of unhealthy snacks. Further 
research will explore the effects of consumer reactance to one-sided 
messages about healthy food, examining whether dieters react to bi-
ased, negative appeals about healthy food (e.g., vegetables) the same 
way they react to biased, negative appeals about indulgent foods. We 
expect that the effects for healthy food will be symmetric to the ones 
we have already observed for unhealthy food. 
The Acuity of Vice: Goal Conflict Improves Visual 
Sensitivity to Increasing Portion Sizes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There is a broad consensus that the rise in the obesity epidemic 
in the past several decades has been driven more by overeating (in-
creased calorie intake) than by expending fewer calories (Ludwig & 
Nestle, 2008; Swinburn, et al., 2011). These effects are compounded 
by today’s oversized food portions (Chandon & Wansink, 2007; 
Rolls, Roe, & Meengs, 2007). 
Supersized portions increase food intake partly because people 
rarely read the size information on the labels and instead rely on their 
visual impressions to estimate portion size. However, visual percep-
tion is biased, and consumers tend to underestimate the changes in 
food portions, more so for large portions than for small portions. As 
a result, consumers overeat because they fail to realize just how large 
supersized portions really are (Chandon & Wansink, 2007). These 
findings have brought the biases in portion size perception and their 
remedies to the forefront of the research and the policy agenda.
Previous research on this issue focused on the effects of physi-
cal properties of packages such as size and shape, and on solutions to 
design packages that do not bias visual perception (Chandon & Ord-
abayeva, 2009; Folkes & Matta, 2004; Raghubir & Krishna, 1999; 
Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2003). In this research, we examine how 
higher-order factors, namely, ambivalent attitudes towards food (per-
ceiving the food as desirable but harmful) influence size perceptions. 
Our results propose strategies that can effectively reduce biases in 
portion size perception without requiring any changes in physical 
package attributes such as size or shape (which may be costly, time-
consuming, and difficult to enforce through policy). 
We draw on two sets of findings in the motivated perception 
literature to formulate our hypothesis. One group of findings has 
shown that people are more sensitive to changes in the physical 
properties (e.g., quantity, distance) of desirable (vs. undesirable) ob-
jects (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010a). For example, coins look larger 
to people with low financial means and with low power (Bruner & 
Goodman, 1947; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2010). Another set of 
studies has found that undesirable stimuli, too, can enhance visual 
sensitivity, when they pose an imminent threat (e.g., a pointed gun ; 
(Van Ulzen et al 2008)), although these effects should arguably also 
occur with more common and less imminent threats such as tempta-
tions and objects detrimental to a goal (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010b). 
Building on these findings, we predict that desiring a food item 
and perceiving it as harmful should enhance visual sensitivity to 
changing portions. Since in food decisions desire and harm percep-
tions reinforce each other (Raghunathan, Naylor, & Hoyer, 2006), 
we expect that ambivalence (or conflict) between these two attitudes 
will influence impressions of food portions more than each attitude 
individually. In three studies we show that this effect occurs when 
ambivalent attitudes are chronic (e.g., among restrained eaters) and 
when ambivalence is induced through external interventions (e.g., 
through ambivalence primes).
In Study 1 we examined the effects of ambivalent attitudes to-
wards food on portion perceptions of children. We showed six por-
tions (which doubled in size from one portion to the next) of choco-
late chunks or baby carrots to eight-year old schoolchildren, who are 
an important population to study from a public policy perspective. 
Provided the size of the smallest portion (in units), we asked the 
respondents to estimate the number of units contained in the remain-
ing portions. Afterwards we measured their ambivalence toward 
the food by asking them to rate their desire for the food item and 
their anticipations of being scolded by parents for eating the food 
item. The results indicated that children who felt ambivalent towards 
chocolate were more sensitive to the increasing portions of choco-
late than children who did not experience ambivalence (because they 
perceived it as delicious but likely to be scolded by parents). Am-
bivalence did not influence perceptions of carrots.  
In Study 2 we tested whether inducing ambivalence through 
separate manipulations of desire and perceived harm would improve 
portion size perceptions of adults. Participants saw four portions of 
gummy candies (which increased in size by 75% from one portion 
to the next). Provided the size of the smallest portion (in grams), the 
participants estimated the remaining three portions. We described the 
stimuli as “Omega 3 nutrition chews” (low harm condition) or as 
“gummy candies” (high harm condition). We manipulated desire by 
either asking the participants to consume either one gummy (high 
desire condition) or no gummy (low desire condition) (Wadhwa, 
Shiv, & Nowlis, 2008). The results revealed that portion size percep-
tions were the most accurate when ambivalence (perceptions of food 
desirability and harmfulness) was manipulated to be high. Similar 
patterns were observed with the implicit measure of ambivalence (as 
captured by implicit association tests of participants’ desire and dan-
ger perceptions associated with hedonic foods).
In Study 3, we sought to extend the findings to a consumer group 
that naturally holds ambivalent attitudes towards hedonic foods. We 
therefore approached a sample of dieting and non-dieting individu-
als at a gym. The participants saw six portions of potato chips as in 
Study 3. The chips had a regular label for half of the participants and 
a low-fat label for the other half. Consistent with our predictions, 
restrained eaters (who hold naturally ambivalent attitudes toward 
hedonic foods) had more accurate portion size estimates than unre-
strained eaters for regular chips, but not for low-fat chips.
Our findings contribute to the literature on motivated misper-
ception by examining the interplay of wanting and liking in driving 
portion size perceptions. They also propose ambivalence as a useful 
tool for improving consumers’ portion size perceptions.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Sharing information goes by many names: word of mouth, 
recommendations, information transmission, voting, gossiping, or 
in modern times “tweeting.” Acts of sharing are one of (if not the) 
strongest influences on many consumer behaviors, influencing both 
the sharer and recipient of the information. Accordingly, many busi-
nesses have sought to drive and guide sharing behavior.
However, both businesses and academics remain blind to many 
of the underlying factors that surrounding sharing, particularly is-
sues surrounding the sharer. Although academics have extensively 
examined how recipients respond to sharers’ recommendations and 
general social influences, much less is known about the sharer. Par-
ticularly what motivates the sharer? And how does the sharer feel 
about transmitting different types information, to different types of 
people, in different types of situations?
The first paper by Peluso, Bonezzi, and De Angelis begins by 
examining a selfish side of advice giving, specifically examining 
how a motive to gain a sense of personal control leads people to 
share advice (even advice that may hurt recipients) to fulfill this mo-
tive. Campbell and Ariely complement the first paper by presenting 
an altruistic side of sharing, finding people share personal negative 
experiences they wish not to share in order to provide others with 
beneficial social comparison.  The second paper also examines the 
influence of differences in valence of shared content and personal 
relationship with the recipient. Du Plessis and Dubois pick up on 
the topics of valence and relation to the recipient in the case of hi-
erarchies, finding that people tend to share positive information up 
the hierarchy ladder and negative information down the ladder. The 
authors propose that arousal underlies these patterns. Kim and col-
leagues finish the session by examining a specific case of commu-
nication in ahierarchy: that between stakeholders (e.g. consumers, 
employees) and the larger firm. The authors critically examine the 
popular trend of firms (e.g. Facebook) inviting stakeholders to share 
opinions and vote on issues. Though seeming a positive step toward 
giving stakeholders a feeling of influence and autonomy, the authors 
find many negative consequences for both firms and stakeholders. 
In addition to the theme of feelings and motives, many of the 
papers tackle other overlapping themes, specifically: the trading off 
of sharer and recipient welfare (paper 1 and 2), the valence of trans-
mitted information (paper 2 and 3), recipient characteristics (paper 
2 and 3), hierarchies (paper 3 and 4), and feelings of control (paper 
1 and 4). 
In sum, this session seeks to reaffirm how basic consumer re-
search can make a big difference in a modern world of increasingly 
sharing behavior. All the benefits of sharing, tweeting, and word of 
mouth hinge on a potential sharer actually choosing to share. Ac-
cordingly, understanding what motivates the sharer and how the 
sharer feels about sharing is fundamentally important if one wishes 
to promote any type of sharing from peer-to-peer tweeting to good ol’ 
fashioned face-to-face word of mouth. 
The Selfish Side of Sharing: Effects of Need for Control 
on Advice Giving 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers’ purchasing decisions are often influenced by in-
formation provided by others in the form of advice (Cheema and 
Kaikati 2010; De Bruyn and Lilien 2008; Fitzsimons and Lehmann 
2004). Previous literature has often conceptualized advice giving as 
an altruistic behavior driven by empathic concern for others (Gold-
smith and Fitch 1997; Liu and Gal 2011). From this perspective, 
consumers provide advice to improve or protect others’ well-being 
(Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; Sundaram, Mitra, and Webster 1998). 
Despite the intuitive validity of this argument, we suggest that 
a self-serving motive, and not empathic concern, sometimes drives 
advice giving. We argue that consumers sometimes provide advice to 
fulfill a self-serving motive to restore a lost sense of personal control. 
Building on the notion that consumers experiencing a threat to their 
sense of control seek means to restore control (Kay et al. 2008; Whit-
son and Galinsky 2008), we suggest that giving advice can provide 
one means of accomplishing such an objective. Thus, we propose 
that individuals with a need to restore control are more likely to give 
advice than individuals who do not have such a need.
Experiment 1 tested whether individuals who experience a tem-
porary need to restore control are more likely to give advice than indi-
viduals without this need. Moreover, we also tested whether this ten-
dency is stronger for individuals with a higher chronic desire for control 
(Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). Eighty-two 
participants were assigned to either a need to restore control condition 
or a no need to restore control condition of a between-participants de-
sign, with chronic desire for control serving as a continuous measured 
variable. We manipulated personal control via threat, using an episodic 
recall task (Whitson and Galinsky 2008). We then asked respondents 
to recall a positive consumption experience, and write about it as if 
they were writing an email to a friend. Messages were then coded 
based on whether or not they contained an explicit advice or recom-
mendation for the recipient. A logistic regression revealed a significant 
effect of need to restore control (p = .05), indicating that respondents 
who had a need to restore control gave advice more than respondents 
who did not have such a need. Moreover, this main effect was quali-
fied by a significant interaction between need to restore control and 
chronic desire for control (p = .05), indicating that the tendency to give 
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advice when feeling out of control was stronger for individuals with 
a higher chronic desire for control (p < .01) compared to those with a 
low chronic desire for control (p > .10).
Experiment 2 directly tested for a differential effect of empathy 
and need to restore control on advice giving. We reasoned that, in 
situations in which providing advice may be potentially detrimen-
tal to the receiver, empathy vis-à-vis need to restore control should 
produce opposite effects. Specifically, individuals motivated by em-
pathy should be more likely to refrain from giving advice, to avoid 
potentially hurting the recipient. In contrast, individuals motivated 
by a self-serving need to restore control should be more likely to 
give advice, as worry less about potential negative consequences 
for the recipient. One hundred and sixty five participants were as-
signed to three conditions of a between-participants design. We used 
an episodic recall task to activate across conditions either empathy, 
a need to restore control, or a neutral state (baseline). Next, respon-
dents were asked to read a scenario describing a consumer in need 
of advice about applying for a fixed versus adjustable-rate mortgage. 
In particular, the scenario was characterized by ambiguity about 
the best course of action and potential for harm to the receiver if 
the wrong advice is provided. Respondents were asked to indicate 
whether or not they would provide advice to the person involved 
in that situation. A logistic regression revealed a positive effect of 
need to restore control on advice giving, indicating that respondents 
in this condition were more likely to give advice than respondents 
in the baseline condition (72.2% versus 53.4%, p = .04). In con-
trast, the results showed a negative effect of empathy, indicating that 
respondents in this condition were less likely to give advice than 
respondents in the baseline condition (34% versus 53.4%, p = .04). 
Experiment 3 tested whether the desire to engage in advice giv-
ing is attenuated when an alternative way to restore one’s threatened 
sense of control is provided beforehand. One hundred and sixty par-
ticipants were assigned to a 2 (need to restore control: present versus 
absent) × 2 (opportunity for self-recovery: present versus absent) 
between-participants design. We manipulated personal control using 
an anticipatory thinking task (Rutjens et al. 2010). Half of the par-
ticipants then engaged in a choice task that provided an opportunity 
to restore their threatened sense of control (Inesi et al. 2011). Finally, 
respondents were asked to recall and write about a positive experi-
ence they had with a product and indicate their propensity to advise 
others to buy that product (“I am definitely going to suggest to oth-
ers to buy this product”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). 
There was a significant need to restore control by opportunity for self 
recovery interaction, p = .03. Contrasts revealed that when no inter-
vening opportunity for self-recovery was present, participants with a 
need to restore control expressed a higher intent to give advice (M = 
8.66) than participants with no need to restore control (M = 7.60), p < 
.001. In contrast, when an intervening opportunity for self-recovery 
was present, participants’ intent to give advice did not differ as a 
function of need to restore control, p > .10. 
Overall, this research furthers our understanding of the motives 
that drive advice giving. Contrary to prior research, we show that ad-
vice giving can be motivated by a self-serving desire to restore a lost 
sense of control. Attesting to the compensatory role of advice giving 
as a means to regain a temporary threatened sense of control, our 
results suggest that advice giving might in fact be attenuated when 
an alternative way to restore control is provided.
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The Altruistic Side of Sharing: Giving Misery Company 
by Sharing Personal Negative Experiences
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
“The world needs people like you and me who’ve been 
knocked around by fate. ‘Cause when people see us, they 
don’t want to be us, and that makes them feel great. We 
provide a vital service to society!”-Avenue Q the Musical
Why do people so often share negative personal information 
(e.g. a fight with a spouse, a miserable product experience) when 
research shows focusing on one’s own or another’s negative per-
sonal experiences produces undesirable outcomes? (Neuman & 
Strack, 2000; Schwarz & Strack, 1999; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) In 
this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle. Building upon the 
altruism (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Monroe, 1994; Small, Loewenstein, 
& Slovic, 2007) and social comparison theory literatures (Corcoran 
et al., 2011; Wills 1981), we propose that the sharing of personal 
negative experiences is often motivated by social altruism such that 
people willingly trade off personal costs to provide benefit to target-
persons through the process of downward social comparison. Thus, 
people (who we call “supporters”) share negative personal informa-
tion not because they are unaware of the costs associated with focus-
ing on negative information. Instead, supporters tell target-persons 
about their own negative experiences because of a conscious inten-
tion to aid target-persons based on a lay understanding of social com-
parison (Exline & Lobel, 1999). 
In sum, the findings paint a picture of people as daily social 
altruists who engage in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of two 
competing forces. The first force, the salient negative force entails 
a cost for both supporter and target-person. This force focuses both 
parties on negative experiences, leading both parties to feel negative 
emotions and dissatisfaction. In contrast, the second force, a down-
ward social comparison force, may benefit the target-person. When 
considering the combination of the two forces involved in sharing 
personal negative information, supporters consistently predict a per-
sonal cost for sharing such information. However, supporters predict 
the effect on the target-person will vary depending on whether the 
cost of the salient negative force or the benefit of the downward so-
cial comparison force looms larger for target-persons. Importantly, 
by speaking about their own negative experiences, people believe 
they can literally give “misery” beneficial company and are willing 
to become such company.
 In the current project we conducted five scenario experiments 
to test this social altruism sharing hypothesis, assess the intuitions 
people have about the effects of sharing negative personal informa-
tion, and understand the factors that intensify and dampen the likeli-
hood of sharing personal negative information for socially altruistic 
purposes.  
In the first two experiments we found supporters shared more 
negative (and separately less positive) personal information with a 
target-person who had recently experienced negative experiences 
and that this pattern was stronger when the target-person’s negative 
experiences was unchangeable. In the third experiment we found the 
above pattern significantly occurred for targets that were and were 
not friends with the supporter, however the pattern was notably 
stronger for friends.
Experiments 4 and 5 revealed more direct evidence that this 
sharing behavior is intended to benefit target-persons through down-
ward social comparison. In Experiment 4, when sharing experiences 
with target-persons, we found supporters not only selectively choose 
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to share more personal negative experiences to benefit bad feeling 
target-persons, but that supporters also lie about their personal expe-
riences, portraying their experiences as more negative when target-
persons would benefit from a downward social comparison. Thus 
supporters may incur the moral cost of lying (Grover, 1993) for the 
benefit of target-persons. The tendency to more negatively portray 
one’s experiences with target-persons who had recently experienced 
negative rather than positive events was completely mediated by in-
tentions to benefit the target-person. Further, we found that when 
target-persons had recent negative experiences, supporters reported a 
much higher intention to benefit the target through personal sharing. 
This finding suggests that it is when others are suffering that socially 
altruistic processes in personal sharing are most often triggered.
Finally, Experiment 5 documented how in interpersonal conver-
sation situations like those explored in the first four studies, people 
predict sharing negative experiences would be A) costly for support-
ers’ general feelings and worsen supporters’ own satisfaction with 
their personal experiences and B)  beneficial for targets’ general feel-
ings and improve targets’ satisfaction with their own experiences. 
Together the experiments also rule out alternative behavioral pat-
terns and hypotheses, such as taking advantage of situations to vent, 
matching the conversation tone of a conversation partner, or a mean 
reduction in personal sharing with negative feelings others.
We began with the puzzling observation that although research 
has demonstrated negative consequences of focusing on one’s own 
or others’ personal negative experiences and people have a general 
preference against sharing and being exposed to negative personal 
experiences (De Angelis et al., 2012; Kowalski, 2002), people often 
choose to complain and share negative personal experiences. Though 
previous research has observed such behavior to occasionally be mo-
tivated by selfish desire (Taylor, Wayment, & Carrilo, 1996; Kow-
alski, 1996, Smith, 1983), here we propose a different (though not 
exclusive) motivation for this behavior: social altruism. We found 
that at times, supporters will incur a personal cost and share nega-
tive personal experiences when they believe doing so will benefit 
a target-person. We explain our findings by theorizing people hold 
a lay intuition of social comparison theory (Corcoran, et al., 2011; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Wills, 1981), such that supporters seek 
to deliberately construct downward social comparisons for target-
persons by sharing their own negative experiences. Future research 
should explore under what circumstances sharers’ strategies are ef-
fective and if sharers can anticipate when sharing personal negative 
information is most likely to provide target-persons with beneficial 
social comparison, though past research suggests this would be in 
general a beneficial strategy (Jordan et al., 2011). We discuss impli-
cations for consumer behavior, social welfare, and word of mouth. 
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La vie en Rose at the top? Why Positive (Negative) 
Information goes Up (Down) in a Hierarchy
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A key concern for marketers, both in academia and practice, 
is understanding when and why positive and negative product in-
formation spreads through word-of-mouth (WOM). Indeed, posi-
tive WOM often leads to an increase in sales (Chen, Wang and Xie 
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2011) or value (Villanueva, Yoo and Hanssens 2008) whereas nega-
tive WOM may decrease brand evaluations (Amdt 1967; Haywood 
1989) or even spark damaging rumors about a brand (Dubois, Ruck-
er and Tormala 2011). While some research suggests that consum-
ers are more likely to share negative WOM (e.g., Kamins, Folkes 
and Pernes 1997), other studies show that consumers can, at times, 
share positive rather than negative WOM (e.g., East, Hammond and 
Wright 2007). Regardless of the valence of information shared, con-
sumers tend to share information that is more psychologically arous-
ing to them (Berger and Milkman 2012). This is because arousal is a 
state of excitement which leads to mobilization (Berger and Milkman 
2012). Extant research shows that consumers’ likelihood to share a 
stimuli (e.g. a WOM message or a video) increases when the content 
evokes arousing emotions such as anxiety or amusement, relative to 
content that evokes emotions which are less arousing, such as sad-
ness or contentment (Gross and Levenson 1995). Accordingly, even 
incidental arousal unrelated to the message content (e.g., whether a 
sender is physically aroused when sharing information) can boost 
sharing (Berger 2011).  
We aim to shed light on when consumers will share more posi-
tive or negative WOM as a function of arousal. Our reasoning builds 
on the premise that information is not arousing per se. Rather; infor-
mation becomes more or less arousing depending on the context of 
the information sharing (Berger 2011) or the sender and recipient’s 
characteristics.
 In particular, we propose that the hierarchical relationship be-
tween a sender and a recipient of a WOM message can dramatically 
shift the information’s arousing properties. Specifically, we hypoth-
esize that sending a message to someone lower in the hierarchy will 
increase the arousal of negative information. In contrast, we hypoth-
esize that sending a message to someone higher in the hierarchy will 
increase the arousal of positive information. This is because low hi-
erarchical positions are typically associated with negative informa-
tion in the form of stereotypes or negative affect, while high hierar-
chical positions are often viewed more positively (Cozzarelli, Tagler 
and Wilkinson 2002). In turn, we expect that this differential focus 
will make positive or negative information more arousing, depend-
ing on the recipient’s position in the hierarchy. Thus, we predict that 
the increased arousal, elicited by an expected sharing of information 
with a recipient higher or lower in the hierarchy will result in differ-
ential sharing of positive and negative information. These ideas are 
tested across two experiments. 
In Experiment 1, undergraduates were presented with a review 
for a car, which has an equal number of pros and cons. After reading 
the review, participants were asked to send a WOM message as if 
they were to send an email. Key to the experiment, they were either 
instructed to send a WOM message to someone higher (high hierar-
chy condition) or lower (low hierarchy condition) in their company 
structure. To communicate this difference, participants were told 
that their task was to share a message to Paul, presented as their 
boss (HH) or employee (LH). To increase the hierarchical divide be-
tween the sender and the recipient, participants were presented with 
a graphical representation (i.e., a tree graph) representing Paul as 
either immediately above (HH) or below (LH) them in the tree. Next, 
participants wrote their messages. We counted the number of pros 
and cons in the message, and computed a valenced index (number 
of pros less the number of cons and divided by the total number of 
thoughts). Results indicated that participants’ message was signifi-
cantly more positive when they addressed a recipient higher in the 
company hierarchy than when they addressed someone lower, p < 
.01. 
In Experiment 2 we specifically manipulated recipient’ relative 
standing based on their own actual perceived standing, once again 
through a graphical ladder representing social hierarchy (see Piff et 
al. 2012). To do so, senders (participants) first indicated their posi-
tion on the ladder. Next, a research assistant told them they would 
be randomly assigned to another participant to whom they will send 
a WOM message, and were given an information sheet about this 
participant. Key to the experiment, the information sheet was staged. 
In the high hierarchy condition, the information sheet mentioned that 
the assigned recipient had indicated being two steps higher on the 
ladder. In contrast, in the low hierarchy condition, the information 
sheet mentioned that the assigned recipient had indicated being two 
steps lower on the ladder. Next, participants shared a WOM message 
about a car. We coded participants’ messages as in experiment 1. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, messages were more positive when 
respondents wrote an email description to a recipient higher in the 
social hierarchy than when they were asked to email someone lower 
in the social hierarchy, p < .05. 
Overall, this research contributes to our understanding of when 
and why valenced information is shared by demonstrating how psy-
chological arousal arising from the hierarchical relationship between 
the recipient and sender of the WOM message impacts the sharing 
of positive vs. negative information and are consistent with arousal-
hierarchy hypothesis. 
These findings also have important practical implications for 
understanding how information might be distorted across multiple 
successive transmissions in an organization: the same situation 
might be seen in rosy hues by those at the top but through gloomy 
lens for those at the bottom. In turn, this discrepancy in perception 
might explain why leaders can be unrealistically optimistic and ig-
nore warning signs regarding the health of their organizations, and 
why individuals lower in the hierarchy might show more distress or 
anxiety about the future—because they’ve received different infor-
mation.
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The Negative Consequences of Empowering Consumers 
and Employees 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gone are the days of managers acting as sole decision-makers 
in strategic choices. Increasingly, managers “outsource” some deci-
sions – from creating advertisements to deciding on mission state-
ments – to both internal and external stakeholders: employees and 
customers. While delegation of agency is often a strategic move to 
dodge responsibility for potential missteps or avoid being perceived 
as lacking transparency (Bowen and Lawler, 1992), collecting in-
formation through shared decision-making also allows companies 
to induce positive effects by empowering those who participate. In 
workplace settings, for instance, empowering employees leads to 
increases in job satisfaction and performance (Kirkman, 1999; Spre-
itzer, 1995). Similarly, research on consumer empowerment – such 
as allowing consumers to personalize products and services – points 
to the benefits of involving consumers (Fuchs, Prandelli, and Schrei-
er, 2010; Prahhalad and Ramaswamy, 2004; Wind and Rangaswamy, 
2001). In contrast, we explore the possible negative consequences of 
such empowerment, examining how opening the Pandora’s box of 
empowerment can prove problematic when companies wish to close 
the lid and revert to making their own consequential decisions.
Our research focuses the consequences of empowering stake-
holders to vote, with three goals, each of which contributes to a 
broader understanding of the negative consequences of empower-
ment over time. First, we explore whether allowing people to vote 
leads them to want to continue voting on subsequent decisions, even 
when the “vote giver” may no longer desire such input. Indeed, re-
search in political science shows that political participation (includ-
ing voting) engenders future participation (Finkel, 1978; Putnam, 
2000). As in the previous literature, we expected stakeholders to be 
satisfied when empowered; in addition, however, we expected em-
powerment to lead to stakeholders’ demand to continue voting. Sec-
ond, we examine whether stakeholders who are allowed to vote on 
one issue and then have the vote taken away for a second issue are 
more upset than those who are not allowed to vote on the first issue 
and then given the vote for the second: while in each case stakehold-
ers will have voted once, we suggest that having the vote taken away 
is so aversive that stakeholders are as dissatisfied as they are with 
never being allowed to vote at all. Finally, we explore whether all 
voting is good voting. In particular, we explore issues of voting on 
trivial issues.
Study 1 tests the idea that once empowered to vote, people will 
express the desire to vote more and more in the future. Participants 
(N=106) acted as consumers of a breakfast products company called 
Cereal Central. The study employed one between-subjects manipula-
tion, where participants either voted six times on company-related 
issues with one filler task in the middle, or were simply told about the 
choices the company was considering. They were then given a list of 
ten company issues and were asked whether each should be put up 
to a vote. As predicted, voting begets more voting: those in the vote 
condition indicated that they wanted to vote for more issues (M=2.98) 
than those in the no vote condition (M=2.43), t(104)=2.32, p<.05. 
Study 2 explored whether voting and then having the vote taken 
away can be worse than not voting and then being given the vote – 
and even as bad as never being able to vote at all. In a 2 (vote vs. 
no vote on the first issue) x 2 (vote vs. no vote on the second issue) 
between-subjects design, participants (N=243) acted as employees 
of a local firm whose management team decides to let employees 
vote or not vote on each of two company-related issues (revising 
bonus scheme and promotion policies). A 2x2 ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of voting on the first issue on satisfaction, F(1, 
239)=1.80, p=.18, but a significant main effect of being able to vote 
on the second issue, F(1, 239)=78.37, p<.001, such that participants 
who could vote the second time were more satisfied (M=4.00) than 
those who could not (M=2.79). Most importantly, we observed the 
predicted interaction, F(1, 239)=7.65, p<.001). Follow-up tests indi-
cated that participants who did not vote the first time and were given 
a chance to vote for the second issue reported significantly higher 
satisfaction (M=4.29) than those who voted both times (M=3.72); 
t(122)=3.32, p=.001: being given the vote feels better than having 
had the vote all along. In contrast, once empowered to vote, hav-
ing that ability taken away for the second issue made people feel 
less satisfied (M=2.89) than those who did not vote and then voted 
(M=4.29), t(122)=7.96, p<.001, despite the fact that in both cases 
participants voted once. Indeed, having the vote taken away made 
participants feel as dissatisfied as if they had never gotten to vote at 
all (M=2.69), t(117)=.90, p=.34. 
Finally, Study 3 explored whether empowerment can backfire 
in a different way: when stakeholders are repeatedly asked to vote 
on issues that they deem trivial. Using the same workplace para-
digm from Study 2, participants (N=480) were randomly assigned to 
one condition of a 2 (the first issue is important vs. trivial) x 2 (the 
second issue is important vs. trivial) x 2 (vote vs. no vote on the sec-
ond issue) between-subjects design. An ANOVA revealed that being 
able to vote the second time significantly increases people’s level 
of satisfaction overall, F(1,472)=33.44, p<.001. This main effect, 
however, was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 
472)=53.12, p<.001), In contrast to all other conditions – in which 
being disempowered on the second issue led to decreased satisfac-
tion – employees who considered trivial issues at both times were 
actually more satisfied when the vote was taken away on the second 
issue (M=4.05) than those “empowered” to keep voting on trivial 
matters (M =2.84), t(121)=7.73, p<.01.
These results suggest that while empowering stakeholders by 
giving them the vote generally increases satisfaction, such empower-
ment can come with downstream costs: stakeholders demanding to 
vote in the future (Study 1), stakeholders becoming angry when the 
vote is taken away (Study 2), and stakeholders becoming irritated 
when repeatedly forced to vote on issues about which they do not 
care (Study 3). 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The comparisons are ubiquitous in consumers’ everyday life. 
Research shows that comparisons play a key role in areas such as 
similarity (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993), categorization 
(Nosofsky, 1986), stereotyping (Biernat, 2003), attitudes (Sherif & 
Hovland, 1961), person perception (Higgins & Lurie, 1983), deci-
sion making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), affect (Higgins, 1987), 
and the self (Festinger, 1954). In the consumer context, individuals’ 
tendency to compare plays a crucial role in a wide range of sub-
stantively important phenomena. As the papers in this session show, 
comparative thinking can influence decisions in domains of goal and 
mindset, consumption satisfaction, charity donations, as well as rela-
tive income and consumption. 
The thread linking the four papers in this special session pro-
posal is a focus on the prevalence of comparative thinking and on its 
consequences for consumers’ welfare. Overall, these papers include 
13 completed studies across a variety of methods, research areas, and 
substantive settings.
The first paper, by Ma and Roese, shows that comparative tasks 
in non-consumption domains can activate a maximizing mindset, and 
that this mindset can have a cross-domain impact on consumption 
satisfaction by amplifying regret and dissatisfaction, increasing like-
lihoods of returning products and switching brands, and even nega-
tively impacting sensory experiences. This research demonstrates the 
potential psychological pain and adverse behavioral consequences 
that comparative thinking can bring about. 
On the other hand, the second paper by Hsee and Zhang, dem-
onstrates a potential gain of comparative thinking in the context of 
charity donations. The authors introduce a virtually costless method 
for boosting charitable donations: unit-asking. Unit-asking entails 
that donors are asked to indicate a hypothetical willingness-to-donate 
for one needy person before being asked to decide willingness-to-
donate for N needy persons. This method makes salient the com-
parison between one and N needy persons, increasing individuals’ 
scope-sensitivity and thus boosting donations.
The third paper by Gu, Botti and Faro, identifies conditions in 
which the pain (vs. gain) of comparative thinking is more likely to 
occur. Specifically, they show that choice closure, the psychological 
process by which consumers come to perceive a decision to be final, 
increases satisfaction when the chosen option compares unfavorably 
with the forgone options, but reduces satisfaction when the chosen 
option compares favorably with the forgone options. 
Lastly, Chabris et al. find that the preference for absolute over 
positional income levels (e.g., preferring a society in which you earns 
$100K while others earn $200K over one is which you earn $50K 
while others earn $25K) is significantly predicted by three different 
measures of intellectual abilities (vocabulary, CRT, WPT), but is not 
predicted by sex, in contradiction to most evolutionary theories.  
Our proposed session can contribute to the theme of ACR 
2013—making a difference. The research papers in this session 
extend, refine, and challenge prior research on comparative thinking 
and consumer well-being, and contribute to both basic theory devel-
opment and marketing strategy. 
The Maximizing Mindset
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Getting the best is great.  It has been advocated as ideal in al-
most every domain of life. In business, companies strive to become 
the most competitive in the market. In education, students are en-
couraged to get as many “A”s as possible. Even in entertainment, the 
most popular TV shows, such as “American Idol,” “Dancing with the 
Stars,”, and “X Factor” center on the crowning of the best performer. 
Although maximizing outcomes might be considered a goal, here we 
suggest that it may also be a mindset, that is, a way of thinking that 
carries over across different judgment domains. 
If there is such a maximizing mindset, how does it influence 
satisfaction with various outcomes in life? Moreover, most people do 
not always achieve the best outcome, and another key question is the 
consequences of a maximizing mindset after failure as well as suc-
cess. For example, does looking for the most suitable city in which 
to live have a carry-over influence on consumers’ regret level when 
they miss product promotions? Does trying to get “A”s in school 
have a cross-domain impact on satisfaction with computers or smart 
phones? Does seeking an ideal mate make consumers more likely to 
switch brands? 
Past research on maximizing has centered on individual differ-
ences in chronic behavioral patterns, such that some people consis-
tently try to get the “best” (maximizers) whereas others tend to “sat-
isfice” and settle for “good enough” outcomes (Simon 1955). It has 
been proposed that maximizers have two key features: the goal to get 
the best out of any situation and the tendency to compare and search 
for alternatives (Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz 2006; Schwartz et al. 
2002). Moreover, it has been found that maximizers tend to experi-
ence greater regret and lower satisfaction than satisficers (Nenkov 
et al. 2008 Schwartz et al. 2002). Beyond this pattern of correla-
tion, it remains unclear what causal impact a temporarily activated 
maximizing mindset might have on various affective responses to 
particular outcomes. 
The present research experimentally activated individuals’ 
tendency to maximize (i.e., mindset priming) via tasks involving 
comparing and getting the best (e.g., a choice task). In conjunction 
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with this mindset priming, we manipulated different consumption 
outcomes and measured participants’ consumption satisfaction (e.g., 
regret, satisfaction, likelihood of returning the product). We assumed 
that this experimentally activated maximizing mindset in non-con-
sumption domains would have a carry-over effect on subsequent 
consumption satisfaction. This assumption is based on the extant 
literature on procedural and mindset priming, which specifies that a 
cognitive process that is activated in the pursuing of one task remains 
active and is shifted to subsequent tasks, affecting responses in these 
tasks as well (Förster and Liberman 2007; Kray, Galinsky, and Wong 
2006; Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller 1990; 
Schooler 2002; Xu and Wyer 2007).
We showed that constantly trying to get the best in non-con-
sumption domains can induce a maximizing mindset which features 
an elevated tendency to compare and a salient goal to get the best. 
This mindset can have a cross-domain impact on consumption do-
main, amplifying regret and dissatisfaction, increasing the likelihood 
of returning products, and dampening sensory experiences, such as 
taste. 
Across six experiments, we examined the impact of the maxi-
mizing mindset activated in non-consumption domains on consumer 
satisfaction (e.g., regret and satisfaction) in various consumption 
scenarios, such as missing the best deal, product malfunction, and 
an imperfect vacation. Experiments 1a demonstrated the basic ef-
fect by showing that the maximizing mindset activated in non-
consumption domains magnified regret in a consumption domain 
when participants did not get the best product deal. In a different 
consumption scenario, Experiment 1b further demonstrated that the 
maximizing mindset activated in non-consumption domains mag-
nified regret, dissatisfaction, and likelihood of returning a product 
when the product malfunctioned. To probe the effect in Experiment 
1 further, Experiment 2 sought to validate our proposed definition of 
the maximizing mindset by showing directly that this mindset indeed 
involves a heightened tendency to conduct upward comparisons. 
Experiment 3 further showed that even the sensory experience of a 
product (i.e., the taste of a snack) was hurt by the maximizing mind-
set when this product was not participants’ best choice. Moreover, 
this experiment also showed that although the maximizing mindset 
decreased satisfaction when the outcome is not the best, when the 
outcome is the best individuals in the maximizing mindset condition 
were as satisfied as individuals in the control condition. 
To support our theory that the cross-domain impact of the maxi-
mizing mindset is a carry-over effect of procedure priming which 
is not context specific, Experiment 4 manipulated the maximizing 
mindset in the consumption domain (i.e., choosing brands) and then 
examined its impact on individuals’ satisfaction in a non-consump-
tion domain (i.e., satisfaction about performance on an IQ test). We 
found that individuals’ regret and dissatisfaction about their IQ task 
performance were magnified after their maximizing mindset was 
activated in the consumption domain. Finally, Experiment 5 was 
designed to show the maximizing mindset is different from the com-
parative mindset in earlier research. Specifically, this experiment 
showed that the maximizing mindset and the comparative mindset 
both improved task performance, but only the maximizing mindset 
amplified regret and dissatisfaction.
The present research documents a new kind of mindset that has 
not been articulated in prior research yet which has unique effects 
on consumption satisfaction. The maximizing mindset is distinguish-
able from other mindsets (e.g., comparative mindset; counterfactual 
mindset, etc.) that have been examined in earlier research. Future re-
search may explore further the unexpected impact of mundane daily 
tasks on well-being. For example, choosing the tastiest dish from 
a long menu in a restaurant, watching American Idol, and grading 
students’ assignments may all involve temporary activation of the 
maximizing mindset, which may in turn amplify regrets and dissatis-
faction in unrelated life domains. 
Unit Asking: A Method to Boost Donations and Beyond 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Raising charitable donations requires considerable time and ef-
fort. In the U.S., for example, it costs over $50 billion each year to 
raise roughly $300 billion in individual donations (Greenfield, 1999; 
National Philanthropic Fund, 2012). In this research, we introduce a 
simple and virtually costless method for boosting donations.  
To illustrate, consider a web-based fundraiser that solicits dona-
tions to help N needy persons. Imagine two alternative versions of 
the website: One version asks the donors to decide how much to do-
nate for all of the N persons. The other version first asks the respon-
dents a hypothetical question—how much they would donate for one 
of the N persons—and then asks them to decide how much to donate 
for all of the N persons. Notice that the second version merely adds 
a hypothetical question that carries no additional external informa-
tion. Yet we propose that this hypothetical question will considerably 
boost donations. We refer to this effect as the unit-asking effect. 
The unit-asking effect occurs because donors are initially scope-
insensitive (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010); thus, the willingness-
to-donate (WTD) donors in the unit-asking condition indicate for 
one needy person would be similar to the WTD donors in the control 
condition indicate for all of the N needy persons. When the donors 
in the unit-asking condition are subsequently asked to decide on 
their WTD for all of the N needy persons after having indicated their 
WTD for one needy person, their desire for consistency will compel 
them to contribute more for the N persons than for one person. Thus, 
donors in the unit-asking condition will donate more money than 
will those in the control condition, resulting in a unit-asking effect. 
We tested the unit-asking effect in three studies involving both 
real fundraisers and hypothetical fundraisers. In one study testing 
the unit-asking effect in a real fundraiser, a company in China sent a 
mass email to its employees announcing a fundraiser aimed to help 
40 students from low-income families at an elementary school in 
rural Sichuan, a school the company had sponsored following the 
region’s 2008 earthquakes. The email encouraged each employee to 
make a donation on a designated Web site within one week. The 
Web site had two versions, control and unit-asking. Within one week 
of the announcement, 320 employees visited the Web site and were 
randomly directed to one of the two versions. Consistent with our 
prediction, the unit-asking version solicited significantly more dona-
tions than did the control version. 
In another study, we replicated the unit-asking effect in a differ-
ent context and showed that the unit-asking effect is distinct from the 
well-known identifiable victim effect. One hundred and thirty-one 
participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked 
to imagine that they received a letter from the head of a trustworthy 
local orphanage soliciting donations for 30 new orphans. We ma-
nipulated two factors between-participants. One was the soliciting 
method, control vs. unit-asking. The other was victim identifiabil-
ity: Half of the participants received no identification information 
about any of the orphans; the other half were provide with the name 
and a picture of one of the orphans. A 2 x 2 ANOVA found both a 
significant main effect of method, replicating the unit-asking effect, 
and a significant main effect of victim identifiability, replicating the 
identifiable-victim effect. The interaction effect was not significant, 
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suggesting that the unit-asking and the identifiable victim effects are 
orthogonal.
In a third study we further replicated the unit-asking effect 
and addressed two questions. One is whether unit-asking worked 
because it increased the salience of the number of needy persons. 
To address this, we included a number-recalling condition in which 
respondents were asked to recall the number of the needy persons 
before indicating their WTD. Another question is whether asking the 
donors to write down their unit-WTD is necessary. To address this, 
we included a thinking-only condition in which respondents were 
asked to merely think about how much they would donate for one 
of the needy persons without writing down a unit-WTD. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect. Post hoc Duncan comparisons 
showed that WTD was significantly higher in the unit-asking con-
dition than in any of the other three conditions, the control condi-
tion, the number-recalling condition, and the thinking-only condi-
tion. No other effects were significant. These results replicated the 
unit-asking effect. They also suggested that unit-asking worked not 
because it increased the salience of the number of needy persons, 
and that asking the donors to write down their unit-WTD was neces-
sary; what was written down was concrete, and hence more likely to 
compel the donors to be consistent.  
In sum, our studies show that a subtle manipulation based on 
psychological science can make a substantial difference in real life. 
Even if only a small fraction of fundraisers adopt the unit-asking 
method, it can considerably increase total donations. 
When Choice Closure Reduces Satisfaction: The 
Moderating Role of Decision Outcome Valence
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that choice closure, defined as the 
psychological process by which consumers come to perceive a deci-
sion to be final, increases satisfaction with difficult decisions (Gu, 
Botti, and Faro forthcoming). This positive effect is explained by the 
fact that the sense of completion associated with choice closure in-
hibits comparisons between the chosen and the forgone options after 
the decision has been made. As comparisons tend to reduce an op-
tion’s attractiveness (Brenner, Rottenstreich, and Sood 1999), choice 
closure enhances satisfaction with the selected option. However, re-
search has also found that comparisons do not always decrease the 
evaluation of the option being compared (Hsee and Leclerc 1998; 
Simonson 1989), suggesting that choice closure may, under some 
conditions, be detrimental to satisfaction.
In this paper, we examine the role of decision outcome valence 
in moderating the effect of choice closure on satisfaction. Literature 
has shown that a negative outcome causes individuals to engage in 
upward counterfactuals, resulting in lower satisfaction with the out-
come, whereas a positive outcome elicits downward counterfactu-
als, leading to greater satisfaction (Markman et al. 1993). As choice 
closure works through the inhibition of these comparisons, we pre-
dict that consumers experiencing closure will be more satisfied than 
those not experiencing closure when the outcome is negative, but 
less satisfied when the outcome is positive. We also predict that con-
sumers may not anticipate the effects of choice closure, and therefore 
act contrary to what may enhance their satisfaction. Prior research 
shows that negative, as opposed to positive, affect, is more prone to 
activate counterfactual comparisons (Roese 1997). As negative (pos-
itive) outcome is likely to be accompanied with negative (positive) 
affect, we argue that when given the opportunity of reaching choice 
closure, consumers may avoid it and engage in more comparisons 
when the outcome is negative, and instead look for closure when the 
decision outcome is positive. 
We tested these two predictions in three studies. Based on lit-
erature showing that sensations can metaphorically activate a related 
abstract concept (Landau et al. 2010), in these studies we triggered 
choice closure using visual cues as signals to the decision maker that 
a decision is final and the rejected alternatives should not be further 
compared. 
Study 1 was a computer-based study involving a hypothetical 
choice of chocolate, with a 2 (choice-closure trigger: closure vs. no-
closure) × 2 (feedback: positive vs. negative) between-subjects de-
sign. On the first screen, participants were asked to choose one choc-
olate from a selection of 12 chocolates. After choosing, participants 
moved onto the next screen where they encountered both the choice-
closure-trigger and the feedback manipulations. Choice closure was 
triggered via visual alterations in the assortment presentation for-
mat. Specifically, the chosen chocolate was framed in yellow and 
shown together with the other 11 forgone chocolates. Each forgone 
chocolate was either labeled with a “rejected” tag (closure condition) 
or not (no-closure condition). Outcome valence was manipulated 
through providing feedback about the quality of the selected option 
relative to the average quality of the assortment—either above (posi-
tive-feedback condition) or below (negative-feedback condition) the 
average. As predicted, in the negative-feedback (positive-feedback) 
condition participants exposed to the “rejected” labels were more 
(less) satisfied than those who were not. 
Study 2 aimed to test the process underlying the observed effect 
by directly manipulating either negative or positive comparisons. 
This study was a 2 (choice-closure trigger: closure vs. no-closure) × 
2 (feedback: positive vs. negative) × 2 (comparison: replication vs. 
comparison) between-subjects design, involving a real experience 
with the choice outcome. The study procedure and the manipulation 
of choice-closure trigger and feedback were similar to study 1. In 
addition, participants were submitted to a comparison manipulation 
while tasting the chocolate. In the comparison condition, participants 
were instructed to describe how the selected chocolate might be bet-
ter (worse) than other chocolates in the selection, if they had previ-
ously received positive (negative) feedback. In the replication condi-
tion, participants wrote anything that came to their mind. The results 
in the replication condition replicated those of study 1: when receiv-
ing negative (positive) feedback, participants in the closure condi-
tion were more (less) satisfied than those in the no-closure condition. 
Consistent with our hypothesized process, in the positive-feedback 
condition, positive comparison enhanced satisfaction in the closure 
condition, but had no effect in the no-closure condition. In contrast, 
in the negative-feedback condition, the negative comparison reduced 
satisfaction in the label condition, but had no effect in the no-label 
condition. These results support the theory that comparisons, favor-
able or unfavorable depending on outcome valence, drive the effect 
of closure on satisfaction. 
Study 3 tested whether consumers have an intuition of when 
choice closure can help and when it can hurt their satisfaction. Par-
ticipants were asked to imagine buying a flavor of coffee online from 
12 different coffees. They were told that, after the purchase, they 
found an independent report showing that their selected coffee was 
rated either among the top three (positive-feedback condition) or 
last three (negative-feedback condition) coffees among the same set 
of 12 coffees. In the control condition, no feedback was provided. 
Next, participants were directed to two purchase history webpages 
that concluded their purchase. These two webpages differed in pre-
sentation formats: webpage A showed the chosen along with the re-
jected coffees, but separated by a solid line (closure design) whereas 
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webpage B displayed the chosen and the forgone options without 
any separation line (no-closure design). Participants were asked to 
choose which of these two webpages might enhance their satisfac-
tion with the selected coffee. Results showed that participants in the 
positive-feedback condition were more likely to select the closure-
design webpage than those in the control condition. However, par-
ticipants in the negative-feedback condition were less likely to select 
the closure-design webpage than those in the control condition. As 
predicted, consumer do not seem to have an intuition for when they 
should and when they should not seek closure, and when given the 
opportunity to choose between experiencing choice closure or not 
they act in ways that could be detrimental to their satisfaction. 
Intelligence Predicts Choice of Absolute Versus Positional 
Income
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Positional goods are those whose valuation depends, in part, on 
the levels held by others. For example, if the productivity of all PhD 
students doubles, the rising tide of publications would not necessar-
ily increase anybody’s job prospects, since publication records are 
evaluated relative to each other. Other goods, such as the amount of 
food at a picnic, are non-positional.  A picnic feast can be relished by 
all, and the satiated are not made better if some go hungry.  
Many goods lie in between. Indoor plumbing reduced the in-
convenience of bathroom visits, but before it was universal, its value 
came partly from having it when one’s neighbors did not.  Since 
income can be used to purchase indoor plumbing, swimming pools 
and other things in this intermediate category, we can presume that 
income, itself, is a positional good to some extent. 
A study by Solnick and Hemenway (1998), offers a pertinent 
data point on this issue. They posed the following question to 257 
students, faculty, and staff at the Harvard School of Public Health:
Which of these two worlds would you prefer to live in?
A. Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000.
B. Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn 
$200,000.
Note: Prices are what they are currently and prices (therefore 
the purchasing power of money) are the same in states A and B.
Respondents were roughly evenly split. Thus, if taken at face 
value, the data suggest that roughly half of these participants would 
be willing to have their real income cut in half to reduce others’ in-
come by a factor of eight. (Or, equivalently, would forego an oppor-
tunity to double their income if it meant that they would lose their 
positional status they enjoy in world A.)  
The rationality of preferring A over B (or vice versa) presum-
ably depends on individual differences in the uses of money and in 
the intensity of feelings of inequity. Without knowing more, it would 
be hard to label either preference a mistake. One can, however, ask 
whether intellectual abilities predict such preferences. And we did. 
Our participants included undergraduate students at a selective liber-
al arts college and people recruited from other sources such as Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk. Each participant completed one of several dif-
ferent measures of cognitive ability, including a 10-item vocabulary 
test (adapted from the General Social Survey), a 3 or 5-item version 
of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), or the Won-
derlic Personnel Test (WPT).
Three results are noteworthy: First, income appears to be less of 
a positional good than Solnick and Hemenway’s data suggest: 70% 
of our participants chose world B, in which they sacrifice relative po-
sition for more purchasing power. Second, the preference for B was 
predicted by intellect. For each of the three tests of cognitive ability, 
those who preferred B scored significantly higher. The vocabulary 
and WPT tests were as predictive as the CRT, which suggests that a 
preference for world A is not necessarily a product of some compel-
ling intuition that is rejected upon second thought (though the test 
results do indicate that cognitive ability affects the considerations 
brought to bear or the construal of the “tradeoff” between absolute 
and positional standing). Third, preference between regimes was un-
related to sex. This contradicts a prediction evolutionary theorists 
would likely aver: that men would be more attuned to relative stand-
ing, as this would determine mating opportunities and number of 
offspring.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Time is a pervasive theme in modern day consumer culture that 
unites a variety of scholars, themes and methodologies. Behaviors 
such as forming plans for the present and future, making decisions 
now or postponing them to later, and recalling past experiences all 
require consumers to consider time. Whether people focus on the 
present or the future also changes the way events are mentally rep-
resented and the meaning subsequently derived from those events 
(Bartels and Rips 2010; Day and Bartels 2008; Liberman and Trope 
1998; Mogilner 2010; Mogilner and Aaker 2009; Trope and Liber-
man 2000; 2003; Zauberman et al. 2009). Our proposed session 
builds on prior work by exploring new directions in time research, 
offering novel insights into how temporal perspectives affect con-
sumer decisions and experiences. 
Each of the papers included in this session adopts a unique 
perspective on time research, drawing on diverse methodology and 
theory. We will discuss, for instance, how time and temporal cues im-
pact motivation, influence information encoding and retrieval, make 
people happier, and make certain events funnier. 
Paper 1 (Etkin and Ratner) will begin the session by discussing 
how cuing consumers to focus on pursuing ongoing goals in the near 
future (e.g., this week) versus far future (e.g., this year) impacts goal-
directed motivation. Though prior work finds a focus on the future 
to improve goal-related performance, these authors demonstrate that 
in certain situations, focusing on the present (vs. future) is actually 
more motivating. Next, paper 2 (Baskin, Wakslak, and Novemsky) 
will discuss issues regarding differences in level of construal from 
when consumers first encounter and encode information (e.g., in an 
advertisement) to when they recall it at the time of choice. Results 
suggest construal level at time of choice plays a major role in deci-
sions, relative to construal at time of encoding particularly in circum-
stances when construal is incidental to the stimulus.
Papers 3 and 4 examine emotional consequences of time. In 
paper 3, Mogilner and Norton show consumers tend to prefer expe-
rienced happiness to remembered happiness, except when the focal 
time period is short (minutes, hours). Thus, though people may gen-
erally prefer experienced happiness, in minute-to-minute decisions 
they instead behave in ways that maximize remembered happiness. 
Finally, paper 4 (McGraw, Williams, and Warren) demonstrates con-
sumers’ humorous response to tragedies depends on their distance 
from the event. Moderately distant tragedies are more humorous than 
both close and far tragedies, consistent with predictions made by be-
nign violation theory.
This session aims to bridge researchers who are looking at a 
variety of consumer research
issues through the lens of time and temporal distance. Through 
that lens, it raises several interesting questions such as how meaning 
evolves over the course of time and how focusing on the present 
versus the future impacts behavior. It will also stimulate discussion 
on the effects of time across multiple areas in one’s life, both in the 
consumer and the personal realms. More specifically, several of the 
papers have implications that show marketers how to better position 
their products in ways in which people can make themselves happier. 
As such, the session aims to make a difference for people in terms of 
their overall well-being and raises questions about the implications 
of time in other related consumer domains. 
In sum, our session integrates research on a wide range of con-
sumer issues through the shared lens of time. Adopting such a per-
spective offers unique insights for consumer well-being and market-
ing practice. We expect the session to be of broad interest to ACR 
attendees, particularly to scholars interested in issues pertaining to 
goals, information processing, happiness, humor, and of course, 
time. We also hope the session will stimulate discussion of other 
ways in which time and temporal perspectives shape behavior, rais-
ing interesting questions for future research. 
All research is in advanced stages, each with substantial empiri-
cal support (e.g., from field and laboratory studies). 
Managing Motivation Over Time: How Focusing on the 
Present versus Future Influences Goal Pursuit.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many of consumers’ goals persist over long periods of time. 
Saving for retirement and being healthy, for instance, cannot be 
achieved in one night. These and other ‘ongoing’ goals (e.g., being 
successful in one’s line of work, having close relationships with fam-
ily) require that consumers behave consistently with their goal in the 
present but also well into the future, and potentially for a lifetime. 
Given the long-term nature of ongoing goals, one might expect 
looking ahead to the future (rather than simply focusing on the pres-
ent) would be critical for achieving successful outcomes. Indeed, 
consumers’ propensity to plan for the future predicts wealth accu-
mulation (Ameriks, Caplan, and Leahy 2003) and satisfaction upon 
retirement (Elder and Rudolph 1999).  Alternatively, focusing on 
goal pursuit in the future might make the goal ‘loom large’, or seem 
broader in scope. If consumers feel overwhelmed by goal pursuit, 
they may be more likely to disengage. When will focusing on goal 
pursuit in the present versus future be motivating versus demotivat-
ing?
In this research we suggest that how focusing on present versus 
future goal pursuit impacts motivation critically depends on whether 
consumers perceive they are in early or later stages of goal pursuit. 
Recent work suggests what drives goal-directed motivation evolves 
as consumers progress toward their goal (Etkin and Ratner 2012; 
Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Zhang and Huang 2010). When perceived 
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progress is low, consumers tend to be more concerned about the at-
tainability of their goal, whereas when perceived progress is high, 
consumers tend to be more concerned about the value of their goal 
(Huang and Zhang 2011; Zhang and Huang 2010). Thus, factors that 
make one’s goal seem more attainable should be motivating at early 
stages of goal pursuit, whereas factors that make one’s goal seem 
valuable (i.e., important) should be more motivating at later stages 
of goal pursuit. 
We suggest whether consumers adopt a present versus future 
focus for goal pursuit will mitigate (vs. exacerbate) their attainability 
and value concerns. Thinking about pursuing a goal over the next 
few days (i.e., present) should make the goal seem smaller in scope, 
and goal pursuit more manageable. Conversely, thinking about pur-
suing the same goal over the next few months or years (i.e., future), 
should make the goal seem larger in scope, and goal pursuit less 
manageable. Thus, focusing on goal pursuit in the present (future) 
should mitigate (exacerbate) goal attainability concerns, but exac-
erbate (mitigate) goal value concerns. Because consumers who per-
ceive low goal progress to-date are attuned to fluctuations in goal 
attainability, we predict present (vs. future) temporal cues will in-
crease motivation when perceived progress is low. In contrast, be-
cause consumers who perceive high goal progress to-date are attuned 
to fluctuations in goal value, we predict future (vs. present) temporal 
cues will increase motivation when perceived progress is high.
A series of studies supports our predictions. In study 1, we ma-
nipulated perceptions of progress (low vs. high) towards a fitness 
goal and asked participants to think about pursuing their goal over 
the next seven days (present) or over the next seven weeks (future). 
We find focusing on goal pursuit in the next seven days (vs. weeks) 
increased motivation among participants who perceived low goal 
progress (Mdays = 5.58, Mweeks = 4.65; F(1, 72) = 4.24, p < .05), but 
decreased motivation among participants who perceived high goal 
progress (Mpresent = 5.05, Mfuture = 6.18; F(1, 72) = 6.39, p < .001). 
Consistent with our theorizing, focusing on the present (this week) 
boosted motivation for those who perceived they were in early stages 
of goal pursuit, whereas focusing on the future (the next two months) 
boosted motivation for those who perceived they were in later stages 
of goal pursuit.
Study 2 replicates this interaction pattern in a different goal 
domain: savings goals. We measured participants’ perceptions of 
progress towards their savings goal and then introduced them to a 
real website (SaveUp.com) designed to facilitate saving money. We 
asked participants to think of SaveUp as a tool to help people save 
money ‘right now’ (present) versus ‘over the next year’ (future), and 
recorded whether they signed up for an account as a measure of mo-
tivation. We found the present (vs. future) cue increased sign-ups 
among participants who perceived low goal progress, but decreased 
sign-ups among participants who  perceived high goal progress to-
ward their own savings goals.
Our subsequent studies investigate moderators and mediators 
of these effects.  For example, two studies demonstrate that self-effi-
cacy (measured in one study and manipulated in another) moderates 
the impact of temporal cues on motivation for low-progress consum-
ers. Results suggest low-progress consumers differ in the extent to 
which they are concerned about goal attainability, and therefore the 
extent to which focusing on the present (future) is motivating (demo-
tivating). Consumers high in self-efficacy (Jerusalem and Schwarzer 
1992) feel confident in their ability to achieve their goals, despite be-
ing in a (temporary) state of low progress.  Consistent with our prior 
studies, near (vs. far) future temporal cues increase motivation for 
low-progress consumers low in chronic (or situationally-induced) 
self-efficacy. Among low-progress consumers high in self-efficacy, 
in contrast, far (vs. near) future temporal cues increase motivation, 
similar to high-progress consumers. 
Many of consumers’ most important goals are ongoing quests 
that require persistence over time. Understanding factors that enable 
(or detract from) consumers’ ability to stay motivated to pursue on-
going goals thus has important implications for consumers and mar-
keters alike. Our results suggest maintaining a high level of motiva-
tion may require strategic management of whether consumers look 
to the future, or instead, focus on goal pursuit in the present.
What was I Thinking? Effect of Construal on Memory-
Based Choice .
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Construal Level Theory (CLT) argues that one’s construal 
level, or the degree to which one represents information concretely 
vs. abstractly, has a broad influence on attitudes, choice, and related 
behavior (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Despite the theory’s wide im-
pact, a fundamental aspect of the theory’s mechanism is still unclear. 
Consider a situation where information is encountered long before 
a decision relevant to that information will be made. For example, 
consumers encounter most advertisements far from the moment of 
choice. This type of situation raises an important question about how 
construal operates: does abstract construal at the time of encounter-
ing a stimulus determine the effect of that stimulus on a later choice 
or does the concrete construal at the time of choice determine the 
effect of the previously encountered stimulus? In other words, does 
construal operate at encoding, causing the memory representation to 
reflect the encoding level of construal or does construal operate at 
the time of retrieval via differential weighting of information from a 
construal-free memory representation? In our research, we examine 
decisions where all the information has been learned before the mo-
ment of choice to discriminate an encoding and a retrieval account 
of CLT effects.
Across all studies, we use a single paradigm in which partici-
pants learn information at one point in time (with or without mak-
ing a choice) and later make a choice based on their memory of the 
information they saw before. Construal level at exposure and final 
choice were independently manipulated. In order to remove potential 
ceiling effects, all studies involved choices between 2 vacation des-
tinations that had 4 feasibility attributes and 4 desirability attributes. 
One of the vacations was high on desirability and one was high on 
feasibility.  
In Study 1, participants were asked to choose between 2 va-
cation destinations that involved desirability/feasibility tradeoffs at 
time 1 using a superordinate/subordinate categories manipulation 
where participants were asked questions that required them to iden-
tify either the superordinate or the subordinate category of an item. 
After completing a series of unrelated tasks for 10 minutes, partici-
pants were asked to choose between the same vacation destinations 
under either the same or a different temporal construal. This time no 
information about the vacations was presented, leaving participants 
to rely on their memory of the vacations. An attentional mechanism 
would produce a main effect of time 1 construal on time 2 choice 
or an interaction while a weighting mechanism would predict only 
a main effect of time 2 construal. Only a main effect of time 2 con-
strual was found suggesting that construal level does not influence 
memory representations, but rather operates through an attribute 
weighting mechanism. 
Memory of attributes was also tested.  Even though participants 
remembered about half of the attributes, on average, the ratio of fea-
sibility to desirability attributes remembered did not differ by con-
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dition suggesting that memory was not affected by construal at the 
time of encoding even though construal at the time of encoding did 
affect choice at encoding.   
Finally, this study also included a mouselab type measure that 
allowed us to record which attributes participants were viewing and 
for how long.  These measures also showed that while time 1 prefer-
ences were consistent with the construal level at that time, there were 
no differences in the number of feasibility/desirability attributes 
viewed or the amount of time spent viewing them.
While study 1 asked for a choice at time 1 as well as time 2, 
study 2 did not ask for a choice at time 1 in order to show that choice 
is not required to establish product memory.  Also, we used different 
types of construal manipulations at time 1 and time 2 to avoid arti-
factual dominance of the time 2 construal manipulation. Construal at 
time 1 was manipulated using the how?/why? manipulation that has 
been shown to reliably change construal level (Freitas, Gollwitzer, 
and Trope, 2004) while construal at time 2 was manipulated using 
a temporal distance manipulation similar to those used in the ear-
lier experiments. The results showed only a main effect of time 2 
construal consistent with the idea that construal operates only at re-
trieval. Study 2 memory results were consistent with Study 1. 
Finally, to generalize our results to a longer time span, Study 3 
used vacation choices with 48 hours between information exposure 
and choice. Results were consistent with our previous studies. This 
study also reconciled our results with somewhat differing results 
found by Kim, Park, and Wyer (2009).  In their study, they found 
effects of construal level at encoding after using temporal construal 
manipulations at Time 1.  Study 3 replicates their study and com-
pares their temporal manipulations, integral to the stimulus itself, 
to our manipulations, which are more priming based and incidental, 
suggesting that there is a difference in the way that these two forms 
of construal affect encoding in memory.  Study 3 results suggest that 
integral manipulations do affect attention and memory while inci-
dental manipulations do not. 
 In sum, across a series of 3 studies manipulating the construal 
level under which participants learned information as well as re-
trieved it to make choices, we find that construal level at final choice 
is a major factor in decisions, for both long and short delays. Further-
more, these findings have theoretical implications for CLT suggest-
ing that construal does not seem to influence attention or memory 
representations unless the construal level is integral to the stimulus 
itself. 
Philosophies of Happiness: Preferences for Experienced 
and Remembered Happiness
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Which life would you prefer: a life where you experience hap-
piness on a moment-to-moment basis such that you feel happy dur-
ing your life; or a life that you reflect back on and feel happy thinking 
about and remembering? Now, imagine answering this same ques-
tion for just your next hour, rather than for your life overall – would 
you choose an hour of experienced happiness or remembered hap-
piness? We explore not only people’s preferences for happiness, but 
also examine how these different philosophies of happiness play out 
in how people spend their hours – and ultimately how they live their 
lives.
Blaise Pascal observed, “All men seek happiness.  Whatever 
different means they employ, they all tend to this end.” Although 
everyone wants to be happy and research has begun informing this 
universal pursuit, the factors shown to be associated with happiness 
seem to be largely dependent on how happiness is assessed (Kahen-
man and Deaton 2010; Nelson et al. 2012; Stone et al. 2010). While 
some of the research treats happiness as a moment-to-moment state, 
where the goal is to optimize the happiness people experience over 
the course of their daily lives (Csikszentmihaly and Hunter 2003; 
Kahneman et al. 2004; Killingsworth and Gilbert 2010; Mogilner 
2010; White and Dolan 2009), other research asks people to evaluate 
their happiness by reflecting back on their lives more generally (Die-
ner, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin 1985; Easterlin 1995; Lyubomir-
sky and Lepper 1999). Kahneman (2011) describes this distinction as 
experienced happiness (being happy in your life) versus remembered 
happiness (being happy about your life). Although there has been 
considerable research identifying factors that are associated with 
each kind of happiness, researchers have not asked people which 
form of happiness they would prefer.  In short, we ask the question: 
which happiness are people looking to optimize? 
We asked 398 individuals from across the United States to 
choose which of these two forms of happiness they would prefer, and 
we varied the time frame under consideration such that participants 
chose between experienced and remembered happiness for their life, 
the decade, the year, the month, the week, that day, that hour, or 
that minute. Overall, most people (67%) chose a life experienced 
as happy over a life remembered as happy (33%). This preference 
held irrespective of gender, age, income-level, marital status, having 
children, and reported life satisfaction; indeed, the only individual 
difference that had an effect was impulsivity, with highly impulsive 
people being even more likely to choose an experienced happy life 
(88%) over a remembered happy life (12%). Most interestingly, this 
preference for experienced happiness persisted for all of the time 
frames except the minute and the hour. When choosing for these 
shorter time frames, individuals preferred remembered happiness 
(58%) over experienced happiness (42%). Because minutes and 
hours necessarily add up to days and weeks, these results suggest a 
possible mismatch between short-term and long-term preferences: 
overall, people want a life of experienced happiness, yet in any given 
minute they choose remembered happiness.
We tested the robustness of these preferences in a different 
sample of 203 Americans who were presented with this choice of 
happiness for all seven time frames in a within subjects design. The 
results persisted: 74% chose a life experienced as happy over a life 
remembered as happy (26%). Again, this preference reversed for 
shorter time frames, with 73% choosing a minute remembered as 
happy over a minute experienced as happy (27%). Interestingly, this 
preference reversal did not occur among participants who were first 
presented with the choice for their life (rather than for the minute). 
Among these participants, preference for experienced happiness per-
sisted through to the smaller time frames, suggesting that starting 
in an “experienced” mind frame in the long-term may help people 
choose experienced happiness in the shorter-term as well.
Thus, it appears that there is a general preference for expe-
rienced happiness over remembered happiness; however, when 
considering smaller time frames, people are generally more likely 
to prefer remembered happiness. Indeed, when we manipulated a 
week-long vacation to be perceived as shorter in another study, we 
saw the preference for experienced happiness decrease. Specifically, 
we asked a sample of university students to choose between experi-
encing or remembering happiness for their upcoming Spring Break, 
which was highlighted on either a year calendar (making the break 
seem relatively short) or on a month calendar (making the break 
seem relatively long). There was also a control condition with no 
calendar shown, for which the results looked very much like the long 
break condition, in which most (77%) chose a vacation experienced 
as happy over a vacation remembered as happy (23%). However, 
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when led to view their Spring Break as shorter, students’ preferences 
for experienced happiness significantly decreased (to 60%).  
Not only is one’s philosophy of happiness malleable, but the 
philosophy one adopts manifests in distinct behaviors. For instance, 
Spring Breakers who chose experienced happiness were more likely 
to spend their vacation relaxing on the beach, whereas those who 
chose remembered happiness were more likely to spend their vaca-
tion days volunteering. Similarly, individuals whom we instructed to 
maximize their experienced happiness reported being more likely to 
spend the next hour relaxing, whereas those whom we instructed to 
maximize remembered happiness reported to be more likely to spend 
that hour working or volunteering.
Although people’s lives are the sum of the minutes and hours 
they spend, our results demonstrate that individuals seek to maxi-
mize different versions of happiness when considering these differ-
ent time frames. And if people decide how to spend their next hour 
in pursuit of remembering happiness (as our results suggest), they 
might miss out on their preferred life of experienced happiness.
The Psychophysics of Humor
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Psychological distance (due to the passage of time, degree of 
social familiarity, differences between geographical locations, or de-
gree of reality) is an important factor in transforming tragedy into 
comedy (McGraw et al. 2012; Morreall 2009). Understanding how 
psychological distance influences humor perceptions has implica-
tions for happiness (enjoying life), advertising (knowing who to tar-
get with humorous ads, and when), coping (transforming pain into 
pleasure), and sensitivity (avoiding “too soon” comedy fails). 
In contrast to theories that explain why distance linearly in-
creases perceptions of humor (McGraw et al. 2012), we draw from 
the benign violation theory to predict a curvilinear relationship. 
There is a sweet spot to comedy in which humor in response to a 
tragedy will rise and subsequently fall with distance. 
The benign violation theory proposes that humor occurs when 
something that seems wrong, threatening, or unsettling (i.e., a viola-
tion) simultaneously seems okay or acceptable (i.e. benign; McGraw 
and Warren 2010). For example, tickling is physical attack that does 
not cause true harm (Koestler 1964; Veatch 1998). The theory sug-
gests two ways that something may fail to elicit humor: it can be 
purely benign (tickling oneself) or purely violating (a stranger does 
the tickling; McGraw and Warren 2010; Veatch 1998). Humor re-
quires the right balance of threat. Too much threat reduces humor by 
making it difficult to see things as benign, whereas too little threat 
reduces humor by making it difficult to see a violation.
Psychological distance reduces threat (Mobbs et al. 2007; Wil-
liams and Bargh 2008). Thus, the benign violation theory predicts 
that increased psychological distance (e.g., passing time) alters 
whether an event seems purely violating (insufficient distance), a be-
nign violation (the right amount of distance), or purely benign (too 
much distance). We thus expect that a tragic event (a severe viola-
tion) can be transformed by passing time (or other forms of distance) 
into something that is humorous (a benign violation) and then into 
something that is boring (a benign situation) producing a curvilinear 
relationship between distance and humor.
Hurricanes are anticipated tragedies, providing a unique op-
portunity to examine the influence of distance on humor found in 
social media content. As Hurricane Sandy approached the New York 
metropolitan area, people were already joking about it. @AHurri-
caneSandy tweeted, “It’s RAINING men. Literally. I just picked up 
a bunch of dudes and threw them.” To illustrate the dynamic inter-
play between the passage of time and humor, we presented online 
samples of participants potentially humorous tweets about Hurricane 
Sandy before, during and after the hurricane hit the northeastern US. 
We recruited participants at nine time points: one day before the hur-
ricane hit the northeastern United States, the day the hurricane made 
landfall there, and again numerous days and weeks following the 
natural disaster. At each point, participants evaluated the humor in 
three tweets related to Hurricane Sandy. 
Humor is highest at wave 0 (the day before the storm hits), then 
drops to its lowest point at wave 4 soon after the storm hit (16 days), 
goes back up to a second peak at wave 7 after more time has passed 
(36 days), and drops again at wave 8 (64 days) as the event starts to 
become a distant memory. These data suggest that (1) in the immedi-
ate wake of the storm, it is “too soon” to find humor in jokes about 
it, (2) with distance, it becomes “okay” to find humor in such jokes, 
but (3) with too much passage of time, jokes about the tragedy lose 
their punch. In a one-way ANOVA treating wave as a random factor, 
we find that humor significantly varies across time, F(8, 908)= 2.60, 
p= .008, partial eta-squared = .02. Contrast tests support a non-linear 
view of time on humor, as the linear contrast was not significant, but 
the quadratic (p= .004) and cubic contrasts (p = .003) were reliable. 
We suggest that psychological distance creates a sweet spot in 
which one is most likely to find humor in tragic events. The sweet 
spot should vary as a function of the degree of tragedy or threat. 
More severe violations (vs. less severe violations) should stay lon-
ger in the “too soon” category, thus taking longer to get to the “just 
right” sweet spot. They should also take longer to become benign 
and fall into the “too late” category. To illustrate we asked an on-
line panel to provide examples of tragedies (severe violations) and 
mishaps (mild violations). First, participants described an event that, 
“observers would generally agree is so bad that it is a tragedy, but 
can be joked about” (e.g., “a piano falling on one’s head”). Next, 
participants described an event that, “observers would agree is bad, 
but falls well short of being a tragedy, and can be joked about” (e.g., 
“breaking a leg”). Participants then indicated either when it is “too 
soon” to find humor, or “too late” to find humor, in jokes about the 
previously listed events.  
Participants indicated that it takes longer for it to become 
“okay” to joke about severe tragedies (median= 30.4 days) compared 
to milder negative events (median= .04 days).  It also takes longer for 
it to become “too late” to joke about severe tragedies (median= 547.5 
days) compared to milder negative events (median= 182.5 days). 
Hence, when it comes to finding humor in tragic events, the severity 
of the event determines the best time to joke about it. We conducted 
a 2 (severity) X 2 (timing) repeated measures ANOVA, with severity 
(tragedy vs. mishap) serving as the within subjects variable and tim-
ing (too soon vs. too late) serving as the between subjects variable. 
Most critically, the analysis revealed a main effect of severity, F(1, 
93)= 18.9, p< .001. 
Human history is rife with tragedy, and triumph over tragedy. 
Psychological distance is an important factor in triumphing over 
tragedy, first through humor and next through irrelevance. The dy-
namic nature of humor challenges the leading theories of humor and 
psychological distance, but it is supportive of a benign violation ap-
proach to humor and a threat reduction approach to psychological 
distance. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
If one could wish for two gifts that would substantially improve 
life, having money and strong close relationships would be ideal 
candidates.  Money and relationships, while being able to improve 
life’s outcomes, do so by dramatically different routes and mecha-
nisms—and yet have significant overlap too.  This session peers into 
the consequences that money and close relationships have for one 
another –and in doing so reveals some thought-provoking patterns 
for scientific understanding and consumer welfare.
This session features cutting-edge research in the psychology of 
money and relationships, and seeks to answer two important ques-
tions: 1) How can individuals’ close relationships influence their per-
ceptions of and decision-making with money? 2) Conversely, how 
can decisions about money influence the behavior and perceptions 
within relationships?  This session explores two fundamental areas 
of research in consumer research and seeks to understand the theo-
retical and practical implications to aid consumer well-being. 
The first two talks investigate how close relationships can influ-
ence perceptions of money and decision-making with financial as-
sets.  Vohs starts the session by examining how social support and 
money can be treated as interchangeable resources.  Vohs and Lasa-
leta demonstrate the substitutability hypothesis: when people have 
strong close relationships and feel supported by others, individuals 
have less desire to obtain and hold onto money.  Shah investigates 
the interaction between social support and money by exploring how 
marital status can affect financial portfolio compositions. Women 
make safer asset choices when they are single, divorced, or when 
they receive an income shock while married as compared to men.
The last two papers examine how money can influence percep-
tions and attitudes towards relationships.  Goldstein discusses how 
perceptions and attitudes within relationships change when lending 
or borrowing money.  The researchers show that there is a unique 
exchange expectation in lending relationships in comparison to gift-
giving for example, regarding what types of goods or services the 
recipient is expected to consume with the borrowed money. Lenders 
believe that they are entitled to a certain level of control over the 
borrowers financial decisions, reporting frustration and anger when 
they feel money has been misused. At a system level, these results 
help explain why American taxpayers were so outraged by seeing 
their money being used by the government to fund indulgences such 
as bonuses, resulting in subsequent tax avoidance and evasion. The 
final talk by Lamberton examines how to reverse this result and in-
crease satisfaction and compliance.  The authors demonstrate that 
providing consumers with an opportunity to voice their opinions 
about spending priorities increases tax compliance.    
In summary, this session investigates the interactive nature of 
money and relationships.  Using a diverse set of methodologies these 
papers have incredible implications for policy and societal well-
being, as well as basic scientific understandings of the psychology 
of money and relationships.   This session will appeal to research-
ers interested in the self, interpersonal relationships, judgment and 
decision-making, as well as those interested in policy or managerial 
decision-making.  As a consequence we expect that a diverse set of 
scientists, policymakers, and scholars will find value in the session.
With Friends Like These, Who Needs Money? Three 
Tests of the Substitutability Hypothesis of Money and 
Social Support
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Rich people have fewer friends than the rest, according to a Gal-
lup poll (2004). Respondents whose income was at the top of the 
scale reported having the fewest friends, while those making the least 
money reported having the most friends.
There are many possible explanations for these stylized facts. 
One is that having or being around money creates a preference to be 
alone or an inability to make friends. Another is that having many 
friends weakens the desire or ability to obtain money. (Of course, 
there are third-variable explanations too.) 
Our theory is that there is something correct about the two di-
rect association explanations. People seem to treat money and social 
support as interchangeable resources, a claim that we have termed 
the substitutability hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that to the 
extent that one resource is seen as plentiful, people will act as if there 
is little need to pursue the other. There already exists evidence sup-
porting one form of the substitutability hypothesis, that money can 
substitute for relationships with others (e.g., Vohs et al. 2006; Zhou 
et al. 2009). Therefore, our investigation tested the novel hypothesis 
that when people feel that they have ample support from others, de-
fined as the perception that one is cared for by others (Wills, 1991), 
they have less desire for money, defined as the motivation to obtain 
and hold onto money. Three experiments supported this hypothesis.
Aim: Experiment 1 was the initial test of the substitutability 
hypothesis. Method: Participants (n=39) were instructed to recall 
instances of social support or the number of facts they had learned 
throughout their lives. Next, participants ranked a list of twelve life 
values and traits in order of personal importance (adapted from self-
affirmation research). This list included business skills and financial 
success, both related to the acquisition of money. Results: In an ini-
tial show of our hypothesized effect, participants who recalled in-
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stances of social support ranked business skills and financial success 
as less important than those who recalled number of facts learned. 
Aim: Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication of the ef-
fect using different measures of desire for money: worry over money 
and willingness to pay. We reasoned that as desire for money weak-
ens, people would be less worried about it, and more willing to give 
it up for goods and services. Experiment 2 also aimed to address 
an alternative explanation for the proposed effect. It is possible that 
recalling instances of social support heightens positive affect, which 
could affect how much people care about money. Method: Partici-
pants (n=119) rated the number of friends they talked to every day on 
scales that cued a social network that was small (low social support 
condition) or large (high social support condition). Next, participants 
completed a worry over money scale and indicated their willingness 
to pay for twenty-two items. Results: As predicted, participants who 
were cued to see themselves as having a more expansive network 
reported less worry over money and greater willingness to pay for 
goods than those cued by a smaller social network. As expected, 
there was no effect of condition on positive or negative mood re-
ports. This rules out an alternate explanation of our effects based on 
changes in mood.
Aim: Experiment 3 further tested our theory using a face valid 
measure of desire for money and provided process evidence. Meth-
od: Participants completed the same manipulation from Experiment 
1, recalling either number of facts learned or friends made through-
out their lives. Participants then completed a standard measure of 
social support (Social Connectedness Scale – Revised; Lee, Draper, 
and Lee, 1991) to provide process evidence. Next participants com-
pleted a money importance scale as an indicator of desire for money 
(sample item: “Frankly speaking, having money is something that I 
value”). Results: As predicted, participants who were reminded of 
their friends expressed less money importance than those reminded 
of facts. Process evidence revealed that the effect was mediated by 
increased perceptions of social support. 
Conclusion: Three experiments demonstrated evidence in sup-
port of the novel hypothesis that feeling socially supported weakens 
the desire for money. More broadly, this work supports the substitut-
ability hypothesis, which states that people treat money and social 
support as interchangeable resources. Both money and help from 
others can enable people to obtain what they want and need from so-
ciety and culture, and the apparent substitutability of these resources 
translates into a diminished motivation to attain one when feeling 
flush with the other. 
 The current work connects two large literatures whose focus 
bears significantly on the daily lives of people worldwide, and yet do 
not connect much with one another. Close relationships constitutes 
a fundamental part of psychology, an entire field, economics, is de-
voted to the study of money, whereas marketing has interests in both 
relationships and money. What is therefore surprising is how little 
research there is on how these two motivations relate, which the cur-
rent work seeks to rectify.
We opened the paper by noting that a Gallup poll (2004) pre-
sented an interesting association. Respondents with the highest 
incomes said that they had on average the fewest friends, whereas 
those with the lowest incomes said that they had the most friends. 
While wanting to be popular can drive people to engage in unhealthy 
behaviors and enter dangerous situations, a putatively bigger prob-
lem (perhaps especially today) is the powerful drive to have money, 
lots and lots of money. Our research suggests a way to offset its 
power — stoke a sense of social support and people’s motivation for 
money should wane. 
Money and Marriage? How Marital Dynamics and 
Gender Differences in Risk Affect Financial Portfolio 
Composition Choices
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Disagreements over money are widely believed to be one of 
the leading causes of divorce and separation in the developed world. 
Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that examination of transitions in 
and out of marriages reveal large differences in financial portfolio 
decisions.  Women invest a significantly smaller proportion of their 
portfolios in stocks when single.  In contrast, men tend to significant-
ly increase their stockholdings when single (e.g., Hinz et al., 1997; 
Barber and Odean, 2001).  However, what remains unclear is how 
these gender differences manifest themselves in financial portfolio 
allocations.  
We examine how portfolio compositions are altered when sin-
gle individuals transition to marriage, or conversely when married 
individuals transition to divorce.  We ask how varying income levels 
or sudden income shocks amongst men and women within marriage 
affect bargaining power and subsequent financial portfolio deci-
sions?  Finally, what psychological mechanisms account for these 
differences in financial risk-taking and changes in bargaining power 
in marital dyads?  We suggest that gender differences in risk, specifi-
cally that women are more risk averse while men are risk seeking, 
can substantially influence how financial portfolios are composed 
within and out of marriage.  We argue that wanting to ensure finan-
cial certainty for the future will mediate this gender and safer portfo-
lio choice relationship.
We first used field data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of nearly 
9,000 U.S. families to investigate whether intra-household frictions 
are significant predictors for explaining life-cycle portfolio choice. 
We found significant evidence that women, both individually and 
in dyads are more risk averse than men.  This was reflected in stock 
allocation differences.  Furthermore, our results were robust to alter-
native risky asset definitions, including investments in stocks, real 
estate, and holdings in private businesses.  Also, the proportion of 
safer to risky assets was shifted towards safer holdings when women 
had sudden income shocks, such as a raise or inheritance, in com-
parison to men.  We sought to dig deeper into this relationship across 
three experiments.
In Study 1, we investigated whether differences in risk was ac-
tually moderated by gender.  We gave participants a series of twenty 
gambles to choose from varying the probability of winning and 
amount of money earned if won.  Participants were given $5 with 
each gamble costing $1 to play.  Individuals could choose to play up 
to five gambles at most or could choose to play none and keep the 
$5.  Women significantly (p<0.01) chose less gambles to play overall 
than men and chose gambles with higher probabilities of winning 
in comparison to men demonstrating the gender disparity in risky 
decision-making with money (p<0.01).  
In Study 2, we sought to investigate how perceived marital sta-
tus (i.e., single, married, divorced) influenced the relationship be-
tween gender and risky financial choices.  We repeated the study 
design from experiment 1, but asked individuals to imagine that they 
were either single, married, or divorced during the decision-making 
process.  We replicated the finding that women were more risk averse 
than men, but we found significant evidence that women made riski-
er choices when they were in the marriage stage as opposed to single 
and divorce.  In 
In Study 3, we wanted to investigate the potential mechanism of 
why women and men acted differently regarding financial decisions 
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within and outside of marriage.  We repeated the same study design 
as the first two experiments but told participants that in addition to 
their $5 they were given for gambling, they would be given an ad-
ditional either $1 or $5 in order to mimic a sudden income shock. 
Women made safer asset choices when single or divorced, and also 
made safer choices when they received larger income shocks.  This 
effect was mediated by wanting to ensure future financial certainty, 
especially for their family.  Thus, it is clear that relationship stage 
can influence decisions with assets.  Also, it seems that the need for 
financial certainty for the future, or in other words wanting to pro-
tect resources for one’s future family also influences safer or riskier 
choices with money.  
Such differences are interesting in documenting a potential 
mechanism for better understanding how and why marital status, 
gender, and intra-household bargaining can affect financial portfolio 
decisions over time.
The Psychology of Borrowing and Lending
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How do we feel when other people – like our friends and fam-
ily – spend our money? A great deal of research explores the factors 
that influence our satisfaction with the goods and services that we 
consume with our own money (Bearden and Teel 1983; Spreng et al. 
1996; Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). However, there is surprisingly 
little research on the factors that influence our satisfaction with the 
goods and services that other people consume with our money. In 
particular, we explore the case in which one person loans another 
a sum of money and then must watch (uncomfortably) as that bor-
rower spends that cash before paying it back to the lender. We sug-
gest that this mixing of friendship and finance can quickly go awry, 
harming relationships in the process.
Researchers have drawn distinctions between market and com-
munal relationships (Fiske 1992) and the unique currency (i.e., finan-
cial and social, respectively) that is acceptable for exchange within 
each (Heyman and Ariely 2004). Situations that blend the two types 
of exchanges – like close friends loaning money to each other in the 
manner of a bank – often have unexpected consequences.   
Exchange relationships between lenders and borrowers are 
unique but prevalent; the implications can be small, ranging from 
a cup of sugar lent to one’s neighbor, to monumental in the 2008 
example of the federal government loaning A.I.G. money in the larg-
est bailout in American history (Walsh 2008). Due to the everyday 
and large-scale implications of lending relationships, it is important 
for researchers to understand how the details of the exchange, the 
purchase, and different expectations influence satisfaction with the 
various dimensions of the lending and borrowing experience. 
In our research, we demonstrate that lenders and borrowers 
differ in both (a) how they mentally account for the loaned funds 
(Thaler 1985) and (b) the expectations they have for how the money 
should be spent. We argue that this asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers contributes to the dissatisfaction with the lending experi-
ence, affecting the relationship and influencing whether lending will 
occur again. 
Our first study demonstrates that what the borrower purchases 
influences the lenders’ satisfaction. Participants read a scenario in 
which they imagined they had loaned a certain amount of money to 
an acquaintance. Some participants learned that the borrower made a 
utilitarian purchase with the money (a textbook), whereas other par-
ticipants learned the borrower made a hedonic purchase (music from 
iTunes). Participants reported more anger towards borrowers who 
made the hedonic purchase than borrowers who made the utilitarian 
purchase. Participants also viewed borrowers that made the hedonic 
purchase as more selfish and ungrateful than borrowers who made a 
utilitarian purchase. 
Study 2 explored whether these different reactions to borrowers 
buying hedonic or utilitarian products was unique to lending experi-
ences – experiences that mix market and communal relationships. 
We compared three types of exchanges: one where a gift was given 
to a recipient (communal), one where a payment was made to a re-
cipient (market), and one where a loan was made (mixing the two). 
As in Study 1, we also manipulated whether the recipient spent the 
money on a hedonic or utilitarian good. Consistent with predictions, 
participants reported more anger if the borrower purchased a hedonic 
item (versus a utilitarian one), but those who had loaned the money 
(versus gifted or paid) reported the most anger. These results suggest 
that there is a unique exchange expectation in lending relationships 
regarding what goods or services the recipient is expected to con-
sume with the money they borrowed. 
In Study 3, we explored whether these effects were limited to 
loaning money to borrowers, as opposed to lending other tangible 
resources, such as products. Specifically, whereas money is fungible, 
a tangible good like a video game is not. Participants read a scenario 
where they either lent a friend a video game worth $50 or loaned the 
friend $50 cash. Participants again reported being angrier with the 
borrower who purchased iTunes (versus textbook) whether they had 
lent them a game or loaned them money; those who loaned money 
(versus lent the game), however, reported the most anger. 
In our last study we aimed to investigate whether the driver for 
lenders’ anger was the expectation that they should be able to control 
what the borrower purchases. Through a sense of endowment for the 
loaned money, the lender might expect more influence over what the 
borrower purchases than what the borrower expects of the lender. 
We asked participants how much control borrowers (versus lenders) 
believe that lenders should have over what the borrower does with 
the money.  Our results revealed that lenders believe they are entitled 
to far more control over what the borrower purchases than borrowers 
believe lenders to be. This result sheds light on the possible root of 
the anger that lenders feel when borrowers seem to “misappropriate” 
their loan (Studies 1-3).
Taken together, these findings provide insights into the psy-
chology of interpersonal lending and borrowing. More broadly, the 
results help to explain the “outrage” (Reddy and Bendavid 2009) 
American taxpayers felt after discovering that much of the money 
the federal government loaned to companies such as A.I.G. went to 
employee retention bonuses (a luxury purpose). In this example – 
as with lending between friends – lenders (in this case taxpayers) 
believed that borrowers should use the loaned money for utilitarian 
purchases, and were enraged when borrowers seemed to indulge.
Increasing Tax Compliance by Empowering Taxpayers
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers would prefer to spend their money on nearly any-
thing but taxes (Sussman and Olivola 2011). Given this deep-seated 
hatred of taxes, achieving tax compliance remains a challenge. In 
fact, as a result of tax avoidance or tax evasion, major public pro-
grams in the US are subject to funding shortfalls amounting to over 
$300 billion per year. Despite the increased attention paid to finan-
cial decision-making by consumer behavior researchers, research 
has not yet documented interventions that increase tax compliance – 
behavior that can have hugely positive effects on public well-being.
We suggest that consumers’ tax compliance can be significantly 
increased simply by providing them a structured opportunity to voice 
194 / Beyond Reciprocity: Examining the Interplay Between Money and Relationships
their opinions about spending priorities.  This voice opportunity is 
offered in a simple advisory allocation process, where consumers 
provide non-binding input regarding the way their tax dollars are 
spent. In addition, increased compliance appears to increase satisfac-
tion with payment, suggesting that such an intervention could benefit 
not only the institutions that depend on tax dollars, but decrease the 
irritation that taxpayers experience when paying taxes. 
Two experiments support these conclusions. In study 1, two-
hundred and fifty-seven English speaking US citizens recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk panel received a nominal payment in 
return for their participation. Participants first provided basic demo-
graphic information, reported their tax filing status, and stated their 
gross household income. Some participants were then given the op-
portunity to provide input about the way that 10%, 25% or 50% of 
their tax dollars would be allocated across various categories cur-
rently used by the US government to describe tax spending (www.
whitehouse.gov), while others were given no allocation opportunity. 
Then participants were asked to imagine that they became aware of a 
tax loophole that enabled them to avoid paying 10% of their income 
tax bill, and were asked if they would take the loophole.  
When not given the opportunity to allocate, approximately 
64% of participants indicated that they would take the questionable 
loophole. Allowing 10% allocation led to a significant decrease in 
likelihood of taking the questionable loophole (45%) relative to non-
allocation (chi-square = 4.00, p = .05). This effect was larger when 
25% allocation was offered, dropping to 39% (chi-square = 7.74, p = 
.005). However, allocating 50% of one’s tax dollars did not decrease 
likelihood of taking the questionable loophole (51.5%, chi-square = 
1.83, p = .18).  
Study 2 sought to replicate this pattern of effects in a laboratory 
setting, using actual payment and introducing the possibility of audit. 
One hundred eighty-nine participants (40% male, age range: 23-40) 
attended a paid lab session, and were told that they could earn an 
additional $10 for completing a task. However, they were informed 
that this additional payment would be subject to a 30% lab tax; they 
would leave $3 in an envelope placed on their desk when they left 
the session. Participants were also told that approximately 1 in every 
8 participants would be “audited,” meaning that the experimenter 
would check the amount they had put in their envelope before they 
left the session. (This proportion reflects most US taxpayers’ beliefs 
about audit likelihood). Non-compliant participants who were audit-
ed would be asked to both pay their overdue taxes and an additional 
penalty of $2.00.  Participants then completed the task and were 
given their $10 payment.  Participants were then randomly assigned 
to either the allocation or no allocation conditions. Participants in the 
no allocation simply put as much tax as they wished to pay in the en-
velope. By contrast, before continuing, participants in the allocation 
condition were told they could provide input as to how a portion of 
the lab tax dollars would be spent in the future, allocating their taxes 
across three categories: beverages for study participants, snacks for 
study participants, and enhanced incentives for future study partici-
pants. They then put as much tax as they wished to pay in the enve-
lope on the desk in the same way as the no allocation participants 
had. Then all participants answered a number of questions about 
their satisfaction with paying taxes, demographic items, and beliefs 
about how taxes would be used. When all studies in the session were 
complete, lab administrators collected the envelopes and recorded 
the amount of money paid by each participant. Lab administrators 
also audited 1 in 8 participants, consistent with the instructions read 
by participants.
Analysis revealed a bi-modal distribution of compliance, such 
that most individuals either fully complied ($3 in the envelope) or 
did not pay any tax ($0 in the envelope). This finding is consistent 
with patterns among actual taxpayers (Alm, Bloomquist and McKee 
2012). An ANOVA using advisory allocation or no allocation to pre-
dict the amount of tax paid, using a negative binomial distribution, 
showed that individuals who were not offered an opportunity to allo-
cate opinions paid significantly less in tax ($1.58) than did individu-
als who provided advisory allocation ($2.11, Wald chi-square = 4.18, 
p = .04).  Further, we find that effects on compliance are mediated 
by participants’ beliefs that taxes will support something they value 
(95% CI for indirect effect of allocation via value use: 0.01 to 0.14). 
This finding is consistent with Frey and Stutzer’s (2000) suggestion 
that higher subjective well-being associated with other direct democ-
racy actions can be attributed to “political outcomes closer to voters’ 
preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political participa-
tion possibilities.” 
In contrast, beliefs about audit likelihood did not explain com-
pliance (p > .5), consistent with a large body of literature showing 
the relative ineffectiveness of stringent penalties in this domain 
(Isaac, Schmidt and Walker 1989).  Most interestingly, we find that 
higher compliance also mediated participants’ satisfaction with pay-
ing the lab tax (95% CI for indirect effect of allocation via amount 
paid: .01 to .13); this mediation does not however hold if causality is 
reversed. This finding is consistent with recent work suggesting that 
tax payment may create, rather than result from, satisfaction (Akay 
et al. 2012). 
Future work will explore allocation’s effectiveness relative to 
other interventions designed to increase compliance, examining their 
interplay and documenting their relative effects.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The financial crisis of 2008 that originated in the U.S. and the 
subsequent, ongoing economic crisis across the industrialized econo-
mies of Western Europe have focused societal attention on the im-
portance of consumer preferences for (in)equality and social justice. 
This session sheds light on two questions that are at the core of the 
current political and public debate on inequality in many countries: 
How much (in)equality do consumers prefer, and what effects do dif-
ferent redistribution regimes designed to reduce income inequality 
have on consumer behavior and motivation?
Maddux, Frank, and Wertenbroch examine preferences for in-
come (in)equality. They observe cultural differences in preferences 
for economic redistribution, both via individual incentive schemes 
as well as fiscal redistribution via income taxation, and demonstrate 
that these cultural differences are due to cultural variations in con-
sumer just-world beliefs about the sources and deservedness of in-
dividual success. Kiatpongsan and Norton examine preferences for 
income-based health (in)equality. They assess Americans’ percep-
tions of (in)equality of health-related outcomes along with their ideal 
distributions of these outcomes, showing not only that respondents 
underestimate the concentration of gains in life expectancy among 
the wealthy and overestimate gains in life expectancy among the 
poor but also that respondents prefer greater health equality among 
the rich and the poor than is currently the case. Rick, Paolacci, and 
Burson examine how income redistribution affects motivation to 
work. Contrary to normative predictions, they show that the mere 
presence of taxes decreases effort and accuracy in a repeated labor 
task. However, people who favor both redistribution and government 
intervention are actually motivated by the presence of a tax, result-
ing in increased productivity and earnings. Briers, Wertenbroch, and 
Riley examine how people’s redistribution preferences affect con-
sumption behavior. Specifically, they posit that people who favor less 
rather than more fiscal redistribution are more inclined to perceive 
and display status consumption as a meaningful signal because they 
consider income to be more deserved, that is, because they have a 
stronger belief in a just world.
The objective of the session is to broaden the scope of consumer 
research into the political and macroeconomic realm, by linking the-
ories from economics and social psychology to derive implications 
for consumer behavior in its social context. Because the papers in the 
session address key questions in the current political, public, and aca-
demic debate of (in)equality and social justice, we expect it draw a 
large and diverse audience of consumer researchers. In turn, we hope 
this session will foster further scientific efforts that will contribute 
to such debate with novel angles. The papers have experienced con-
sumer researchers as authors and/or presenters, which may also help 
increase the visibility of the session. All empirical studies described 
in this session proposal are complete.  
Deserved Fruits of Labor? Culture, Just-World Beliefs, 
and Preferences for Redistributive Incentive Schemes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Until recently, managers and business leaders have tended to 
assume that organizational reward systems are equally acceptable 
around the world. However, several recent high-profile failures high-
light the potential hazards of applying a “one-size-fits-all” reward 
system around the world. For example, the failure of Wal-Mart’s 
entry into Germany has been attributed in part to its unwillingness 
to embrace egalitarian German wage-setting practices (Knorr and 
Arndt 2003). Similarly, the Lincoln Electric Company, the subject of 
the best-selling Harvard Business School case study, failed initially 
when it tried to expand abroad from the U.S. The CEO said execu-
tives had mistakenly assumed that all cultures would be equally re-
ceptive to the company’s performance pay system (Hastings 1999). 
The cultural acceptability of these systems, especially of “high-
powered,” individual performance incentives (Lazear 2000), is also 
of increasing relevance in the context of growing income inequality 
(Plender 2012). Thus, the French government recently discussed lim-
iting top executive salaries in state-controlled companies from ex-
ceeding those of the lowest-paid employees to a ratio of 20:1. What 
makes different incentive schemes more or less preferable in differ-
ent cultures?
We identify a particular psychological mechanism, linking cul-
tural variations in social preferences for egalitarian versus perfor-
mance-based compensation schemes to beliefs about the relationship 
between effort and success. Building on recent economic research 
on preferences for fiscal redistribution, we propose that cultural dif-
ferences in preferences for compensation schemes are at least partly 
driven by cultural differences in “just-world beliefs” (JWBs, e.g., Le-
rner 1980). JWBs refer to individuals’ general beliefs about whether 
the world is a fair place where people largely get what they deserve. 
In cultures where JWBs are relatively strong and the typical individ-
ual is seen to generally get what s/he deserves, performance-based 
compensation should be seen as fair and compensation schemes 
should be relatively motivating and desirable for employees. Thus, 
Lincoln Electric’s reward system in the United States, a country rela-
tively high in JWBs (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), reflects James 
Lincoln’s philosophy that each worker “must have a reward that he 
feels is commensurate with his contribution” (Lincoln 1951, p. 33), 
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which is consistent with the country’s dominant cultural ethos. In 
contrast, in cultures where JWBs are weaker and the link between ef-
fort and performance is generally believed to be more tenuous, more 
equal payment schemes should be seen as fairer and thus be more 
preferred. Thus, in Europe, where JWBs are lower overall and where 
Lincoln stumbled, performance-based incentives were less suc-
cessful. There, compensation practices are more regimented due to 
widespread collective bargaining (e.g., Flanagan 1999), which leads 
to wage compression (e.g., Kahn, 2000).  This wage compression 
weakens the link between an individual’s reward and her contribu-
tion and makes compensation inherently more redistributive than a 
system that aims to match wages and productivity.
An impact of JWBs on cultural differences in organizational 
reward systems and preferences for incentive schemes has not been 
noted in the literature. In hypothesizing an effect of JWBs on these 
preferences, we leverage recent cross-national analyses in econom-
ics of a link between JWBs and attitudes towards redistribution in the 
context of taxation and social spending (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos, 
2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). We build on the structural similar-
ity between tax-based, fiscal redistribution and organizational incen-
tive schemes, both of which can be designed to reward the results 
of individual performance (by taxing higher incomes at relatively 
low rates or by paying performance-based wages) or to redistribute 
them across group members (by taxing higher incomes at relatively 
high rates or by paying more equal wages for different degrees of 
performance). Based on this similarity between tax- and wage-based 
redistribution, we propose that cultural differences in JWBs impact 
preferences for more or less redistributive individual compensation 
schemes much like they impact preferences for more or less fiscal 
redistributive tax policies. Study 1 demonstrated a general corre-
lation between the JWBs of a culturally diverse sample of former 
managers (measured with items from Rubin and Peplau 1975) and 
their preferences for performance pay on an individual task, control-
ling for expected task performance. Study 2 showed that American 
participants had stronger preferences for individual performance pay 
in an experimental task (controlling for task performance) and for 
lower general tax rates than French participants and that these dif-
ferences were mediated by JWBs. Study 3 held culture constant in 
a moderation-of-process design and replicated these effects by ex-
perimentally manipulating instead of measuring JWBs, demonstrat-
ing the causal effect of JWBs on preferences for performance based 
reward systems while controlling for possible differences in cultural 
value systems (e.g., Siegel and Larson, 2009, on the role of egalitar-
ian value systems; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004, on the role of Hofst-
ede’s, 1980, power-distance and individualism).
In the current political and social debate about growing income 
inequality in countries around the world, our research provides 
guidance to policy makers and executives in gauging the cultural 
acceptability of different tax regimes and pay practices. We dem-
onstrate that cultural variations in fundamental social beliefs about 
the causes of individual performance and success—about “how the 
world works”—are responsible not only for cultural variations in 
preferences for fiscal redistribution but also for redistributive reward 
systems.
Spreading the Health: Americans’ Estimated and Ideal 
Distributions of Death and Health(care)
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Recent debates in the United States about universal health care 
– with some viewing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (or “Obamacare”) as a moral imperative but others viewing 
it a government intrusion – have highlighted differences in opinion 
about how the costs and benefits of heath care should be distributed 
among poor and rich Americans. Using two metrics – life expectan-
cy and access to healthcare – we sought to measure people’s under-
standing of how health is currently distributed among Americans, as 
well as assess their preferences for how health should be distributed. 
We then compared these estimates to the actual distribution. Impor-
tantly, we also explored whether Americans from across the politi-
cal and income spectrums (rich and poor, liberal and conservative) 
showed consensus in their ideals.
415 Americans (58% female; age range: 18 to 74) estimated the 
distribution of outcomes for Americans in each of the five income 
quintiles in two domains: a) unmet need for prescription medications 
(unable to obtain prescription medication due to cost in the previous 
year) and b) gains in life expectancy (average increase in the number 
of months people lived over the previous 20 years). Respondents 
also reported their ideal distributions of death and healthcare – how 
they thought each should be distributed among Americans. These 
estimated and ideal distributions were then compared with the actual 
distributions. 
Respondents’ estimated distributions of unmet need for pre-
scription medications as a function of income were fairly accurate. 
However, respondents underestimated the extent to which gains in 
life expectancy were concentrated among the wealthy and overes-
timated the extent to which gains in life expectancy were shared by 
the poor. Most importantly, estimated and ideal distributions differed 
significantly on both dimensions – unmet need for prescription medi-
cations and gains in life expectancy – such that respondents wanted 
these health outcomes to be spread more evenly among the rich and 
poor than they estimated them to be. Female, Democrats and lower 
income respondents preferred more equal health distributions com-
pared to Male, Republicans and higher income respondents, respec-
tively (p<0.05 for all the comparisons). However, all respondents 
– male and female, rich and poor, conservative and liberal – desired 
more equal distributions of health outcomes than the current actual 
distributions in the United States. 
In sum, estimated and ideal distributions of health and health-
care differ significantly, suggesting that Americans across the politi-
cal and economic spectrum would prefer health and healthcare to be 
more equally distributed among the rich and poor.
The Effect of Income Tax on the Motivation to Work 
Depends on People’s Cultural Philosophies
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When income is based on effort and performance, daily deci-
sions about how much and how hard to work can add up to influence 
one’s financial well-being. We investigate how income tax influences 
the decision to work. Some have famously promised to exit the labor 
force in response to income tax. For example, many Tea Party en-
thusiasts have considered “going Galt” (quitting their jobs to reduce 
the amount of income tax the government can collect), inspired by 
Atlas Shrugged protagonist John Galt. However, despite decades of 
empirical research, economists have yet to reach a consensus on how 
income taxes influence labor force participation (Keane 2011). The 
lack of a definitive answer may be due to the conflicting effects of in-
come tax posed by neoclassical economic theory. Income taxes make 
leisure relatively less expensive (substitution effects), but also make 
people poorer, producing a greater need to work (income effects). 
Beyond income and substitution effects, income tax may im-
pose psychological costs that influence labor force participation. 
Although people across the political spectrum prefer a more equi-
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table distribution of wealth than currently exists in the United States 
(Norton and Ariely 2011), the interventions required to achieve that 
more equitable distribution (e.g., income tax) may be psychologi-
cally aversive to many. 
To examine the psychology of taxation, some previous experi-
mental research has investigated the effects of the mere presence of 
taxation (taxation that did not reduce net wages or increase consumer 
prices, and thus, from an economic perspective, should not influence 
behavior). Some studies have found that taxes are more aversive than 
comparable non-tax price increases (Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 
2010; Sussman and Olivola 2011), whereas others have found that 
people respond positively to taxes (e.g., Djanali and Sheehan-Con-
nor 2012).
We propose that an important source of the mixed results is het-
erogeneity in what Kahan (2012) and colleagues refer to as “cultural 
philosophies.” Taxes involve both redistribution and government in-
tervention, and thus the extent to which people find inequality aver-
sive and endorse government intervention are likely to be influential. 
Such cultural philosophies are separable (correlated but distinct), 
stable, and differ widely across individuals. Regarding inequality, 
“Egalitarians” find it distressing, whereas “Hierarchists” are com-
fortable with existing levels of inequality. Regarding government 
intervention, “Communitarians” believe that it is needed to protect 
citizens, whereas “Individualists” object to government intervention.
To examine whether cultural philosophies influence reactions 
to income tax, we conducted a multi-round, incentive-compatible 
labor experiment in which we controlled for net wages. From a nor-
mative perspective, the presence of taxation that does not affect net 
wages should not influence productivity (persistence and accuracy). 
Psychologically, however, taxes may be irritating enough to forgo 
income unless people favor both redistribution and government in-
tervention. As a result, the mere presence of taxation may reduce 
productivity among everyone except Egalitarian-Communitarians, 
who may actually be motivated by income taxes. 
In our experiment, participants were given the opportunity to 
earn money by performing a tedious task. In each round, participants 
counted the number of zeros that appeared in a matrix of zeros and 
ones (cf. Abeler et al. 2011). Participants were assigned to a No Tax 
or Tax condition. In the No Tax condition, participants were paid 
20 cents per acceptable response (a response within ± 1 of the cor-
rect response). In the Tax condition, participants were paid 40 cents 
per acceptable response, and 20 cents in tax was immediately de-
ducted. The tax was redistributive: participants were told that their 
taxes would go to “students who participate in different studies with 
different tasks that do not allow participants to earn money them-
selves.” A paycheck, indicating their pay-rate and net pay for that 
round, appeared at the end of each round. Participants were told they 
could stop working at any time, and (unbeknownst to participants), 
they could complete up to 20 rounds. At the end of the study, fol-
lowing several filler items, participants completed the short form of 
the Cultural Cognition Worldview scales (Kahan et al. 2011). Our 
manipulation did not influence responses to these trait scales. 
Overall, we found that taxed participants earned significantly 
less than non-taxed participants (even though taxes, by design, did 
not influence net wages). This was driven by taxed participants’ 
greater tendency to make more mistakes and to quit sooner. How-
ever, as predicted, we also found a three-way interaction between 
condition, communitarianism, and egalitarianism. Among Egalitari-
an-Communitarians, the mere presence of tax increased persistence, 
accuracy, and earnings. 
The results raise the possibility that populations that include a 
high proportion of Egalitarian-Communitarians may be less resistant 
to income tax. To address this question, we compared state-by-state 
responses to the 2010-2012 ANES Evaluations of Government and 
Society Study (EGSS) with state income tax rates (a proxy for resis-
tance to income tax). The EGSS uses a representative U.S. sample 
and measures respondents’ state of residence. The EGSS includes 
nine items that capture Egalitarian/Hierarchical philosophies (e.g., 
“When women demand equality these days, they are actually seek-
ing special favors.”) and three items that capture Communitarian/
Individualist philosophies (e.g., “How much of the time do you think 
you can trust the federal government in Washington DC to do what 
is right?”). (In a pre-test, these EGSS subscales correlated strongly 
with the Kahan et al. (2011) subscales.) We averaged responses on 
the two subscales among respondents in each state, and then ran two 
regressions. In the first, we regressed the lowest income tax rate in 
each state on average Egalitarian/Hierarchical responses within the 
state, average Communitarian/Individualist responses within the 
state, and their interaction. The second regression utilized the highest 
income tax rate in each state as the dependent measure. As predicted, 
each regression revealed a significant interaction between egalitari-
anism and communitarianism: State income taxes were highest in 
states that were highest in both egalitarianism and communitarian-
ism, and clearly lower elsewhere. 
Taken together, the results suggest that income tax may gener-
ally reduce productivity, unless the population enduring the tax has 
a large proportion of Egalitarian-Communitarians. Such populations 
may support high income tax and work harder when income taxes 
are high.
Conspicuous Consumption Reflects How Redistribution 
Influences Perceived Social Justice
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The market-based economies in the United States and Western 
Europe face what has been called a crisis of legitimacy. At the heart 
of this crisis lie questions about the extent to which unequal rewards 
and the resulting inequality of incomes in society are justified and 
deserved. The wealth gap between the top one percent of U.S. earn-
ers and the rest of society has more than doubled in the last 20 years 
(The Economist 2011), while growth rates of Western economies 
have slowed. Among calls for increasing taxes on higher earners 
to reduce income inequality and fiscal debt, policy makers have to 
stimulate consumer spending. To inform this debate, we examine 
whether perceptions of, and preferences for, status consumption as a 
reliable signal depend on redistribution preferences and their mutual 
association with just-world beliefs (BJW; Lerner 1980), specifically 
beliefs about how deserved variations in people’s income are.
Status consumption, also conspicuous consumption (Veblen 
1899), is a meaningful signal of status only when it involves exerting 
effort or incurring other costs to obtain the signalled status (Grafen 
1990; Miller 2009; Spence 2002). For example, Nelissen and Mei-
jers (2011) found that the social benefits of wearing conspicuous 
clothing disappear when participants are aware that the clothes are 
not the beneficiary’s own, that is, when the beneficiary did not pay 
for the clothes. Status—and conspicuous consumption as a signal of 
status—is not meaningful when it is undeserved, that is, when it does 
not reflect exerted effort (Drèze and Nunes 2009).
The degree to which effort is a source of success reflects Le-
rner’s (1980) theory of the Belief in a Just World (BJW; Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006). BJW refers to the belief 
that individuals are responsible for their own fate and therefore gen-
erally receive what they deserve. Although it is highly functional to 
believe that individual outcomes are the predictable consequences of 
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people’s behaviors (Lerner 1980), everyday life as well as statistical 
data often belie that belief. For example, Hochschild (1982) finds no 
difference in the effort invested by the top and bottom percentiles 
of earners, suggesting that hard work is not (highly) correlated with 
high income (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Lerner 1980). 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) 
model how beliefs about the role of effort as a determinant of indi-
viduals’ success yield societal preferences for fiscal redistribution to 
reduce income inequality. A dominant social belief that individual 
economic success is highly correlated with personal agency and thus 
deserved (high BJW) yields regimes with relatively low redistribu-
tion, whereas a dominant belief that success is not (always) deserved 
(low BJW) yields regimes with relatively high redistribution. In turn, 
the resulting redistribution regimes also shape consumers’ BJW and 
perceptions of deservedness (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Bénabou 
and Tirole 2006).  
We build on these reciprocal effects between just-world beliefs 
and redistribution to investigate how redistribution-driven percep-
tions of deservedness manifest in status consumption. If people in 
favor of lower redistribution tend to have a stronger BJW and thus 
a stronger belief that people’s income is deserved, they should place 
more value on conspicuous consumption as a meaningful signal of 
deserved status. Alternately, if people in favor of more redistribution 
tend to have a weaker BJW and thus a weaker belief that people’s 
income is deserved, they should value conspicuous consumption less 
as a meaningful signal of deserved status. We thus hypothesize that a 
preference for lower (higher) redistribution leads to a higher (lower) 
value of status consumption, and that this effect is driven by BJW. 
Data from two experiments and a national consumer survey support 
this hypothesis. 
 In Study 1, we directly tested whether manipulated redistri-
bution attitudes affect the perceived deservedness of conspicuous 
consumption.  The results indicate that people with a preference for 
lower (higher) redistribution are more likely to interpret conspicu-
ous consumption as signal of deserved status. In Study 2, we then 
explored the mediating mechanism with a national panel survey that 
measured consumers’ attitudes toward taxation, their BJW, and their 
value of possessions as a signal of success. It is shown that consum-
ers’ attitudes toward taxation affect their value of possessions as a 
signal of success and that this effect is driven by BJW. The correla-
tional results of Study 2 are replicated in Study 3 in which manipu-
lated attitudes toward redistribution via taxation are proven to affect 
preferences for conspicuous yet not for inconspicuous consumption 
(Griskevicius et al. 2007), again driven by BJW. 
Our work adds to recent research that has begun to examine 
consumption behavior in its political and macroeconomic context 
(Cutright et al. 2011). Our contribution is threefold. First, we offer a 
theory of conspicuous consumption that extends beyond mere status 
signaling by linking it with recent economic theories of redistribu-
tion and beliefs about social justice (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; 
Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Thus, we show that beliefs about the 
causes of (in)equality, not just actual inequality (Christen and Mor-
gan 2005) or equality (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011), influence 
consumer spending. Second, by shedding light on the effects of re-
distribution on specific types of consumption, our theory adds a new 
facet to research on the complex and often contradictory effects of 
taxation on consumer spending and on the economy (Feldstein and 
Elmendorf 1990; Romer and Romer 2010). Third, we present initial 
experimental evidence that redistribution can undermine consumers’ 
fundamental social beliefs, such as whether hard work results in de-
served material wealth, a notion of major motivational importance in 
society and a key aspect of the American Dream.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Building on existing literature, the proposed session will con-
tribute to a better understanding of how consumers engage with 
service firms. Research papers to be presented investigate this topic 
from multiple theoretical and substantive perspectives, offering a 
broader view of consumers’ perceptions of positive and negative ser-
vice relationships. Given the growing importance of service relation-
ships for both service and product firms, a better understanding of 
how consumers react to and benefit from and are negatively impacted 
by good (vs. bad) service experiences is likely to have a significant 
effect on future research on consumer services. The proposed ses-
sion will contribute to the understanding of several content areas that 
are of great interest to ACR conference attendees, including social 
closeness, consumer revenge, consumer vulnerability, and customer 
satisfaction.
Broadly, the four papers in the session explore consumers’ re-
sponse to service experiences. First, Anderson et al. examine the is-
sue of consumer complaining through the lens of consumer vulner-
ability. They introduce a new the construct of consumer vulnerability 
and define it as a state that arises when individuals face potential 
high levels of perceived risk coupled with low levels of perceived 
control. The authors present a research model that shows a positive 
correlation between complaint rates and customer satisfaction levels 
which the authors theorize is driven by the differential vulnerability 
of the individual. 
Building on this research, both Umashankar and Ward as well as 
Rohani et al. examine how consumers respond to service failures and 
how self-expression can sometimes mitigate the residual negative 
feelings the consumer harbors toward the provider. First, Umashan-
kar and Ward observe how the social closeness between the service 
provider and the consumer impacts the way in which complaining af-
fects consumers’ perceptions of the firm after a service failure. They 
show that customers in close (vs. distant) relationships are less likely 
to complain after a service failure, and that when consumers do so, 
close consumers feel more positive about the provider as a result, 
while distant consumers subsequently feel more negative about the 
provider.  In related work, Rohani et al. look specifically, at consum-
ers’ desire to take revenge on the firm. They show that revenge can 
be mitigated with time and surveys.  Specifically, the authors show 
that time reduces the desire for revenge when combined with answer-
ing multiple surveys as consumers experience some catharsis from 
giving feedback. However, the passage of time without the presence 
of surveys surprisingly has an amplification effect on desire for re-
venge.
Lastly, Fombelle et al. examine customer service experiences 
from the opposite perspective and investigate the effects of acknowl-
edging very satisfied customers. The authors demonstrate the ben-
efits of acknowledging positive feedback from consumers following 
a successful service experience.  This research demonstrates that bet-
ter management of the post-purchase process for the most satisfied 
consumers can provide substantial gains for firms in the form of in-
creased patronage and loyalty.  
The discussion will aim at facilitating a broader understanding 
of consumers’ engagement (positive and negative) with service firms. 
Across the four papers, the way in which firms enable and respond 
to consumer feedback after a service experience will be considered 
with an eye on investigating the key questions of: How should and 
when should firms encourage consumer interaction after a service? 
How does the mode of expression affect consumers’ subsequent per-
ceptions and actions toward the firm?
Suffering in Silence: Close Customers’ Reluctance to 
Complain Damages Service Relationships
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Firms strive to create strong relationships between their service 
providers and customers (Yim, Tse, and Chan 2008). Indeed, strong 
customer relationships drive favorable word of mouth (Verhoef, 
Franses, and Hoekstra 2002), justify price premiums (Bolton 1998), 
and lower staff turnover (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995), all of which 
leads to higher firm profits. Such relationships can be cultivated 
through close customer-service employee interactions, which help 
strengthen customer–firm linkages (Yim, Tse, and Chan 2008). Fur-
thermore, the extant literature on customer service relationships touts 
the benefits of close customer-service employee relationships insofar 
as when something goes wrong, consumers are more forgiving if the 
service relationship is built on friendship rather than on an exchange 
relationship (Goodwin 1996). However, more recent research sug-
gests that close relationships with customers may not always benefit 
the firm. In fact, when consumers have a ‘friendship’ with the firm, 
in some instances they have stronger negative reactions to a service 
failure (Wan, Hui, and Wyer 2011). Yet, the few papers that exist in 
this area largely focus on customers’ perceptions of a service fail-
ure as the outcome of interest rather than the consequences of these 
perceptions, for the firm. Wan, Hui, and Wyer (2011) aptly note that 
future research should consider, “Other reactions, such as complain-
ing and switching service providers.” 
In this research, we build on prior findings and consider how 
providing feedback may impact consumers’ subsequent behavioral 
responses to the provider (i.e. perceptions of the provider, consumer 
loyalty) after a service failure or a delightful customer experience. 
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The act of self-expression (in the form of complaining or compli-
menting)  can be beneficial for consumers as complaining is cathartic 
and enables them to air their grievances and express their disappoint-
ment while complimenting may intensify the positive experience 
(Bearden and Oliver 1985; Alicke et al. 1992; Dunn and Dahl 2012; 
Pennebaker and Beall 1986). However expressing one’s opinion can 
also make the issue more salient to the individual. We identify the 
moderating variable of social closeness in differentially predicting 
whether self-expression is beneficial or detrimental to consumers’ 
loyalty to the firm after a service failure.  Research on social close-
ness indicates that although individuals in close relationships are 
more likely to self-disclose, they are also motivated to limit direct, 
negative feedback or express negative emotions in order to keep the 
relationship intact (Bell 1978; Locke and Horowitz 1990; Sommers 
1984). 
Given the extant research on self-disclosure to close others, we 
predict that customers in close (vs. distant) relationships will be less 
likely to provide feedback (complain) after a service failure, whereas 
they will be more likely to complement the provider following ser-
vice delight. Furthermore, we predict that when consumers do com-
plain, close consumers will feel more positive about the provider as a 
result, while distant consumers will subsequently feel more negative 
about the provider. Three studies support these predictions.  
Study 1
In our first study we asked participants to recall and describe a 
very poor (vs. delightful) service experience with a close (vs. distant) 
service provider. Participants were then asked whether they gave 
feedback to the service provider. The data reveal a main effect such 
that participants were more likely to give feedback to the provider 
after receiving a delightful experience. However, as predicted the 
main effect was qualified by a marginal interaction with social close-
ness such that after a poor experience, individuals were more likely 
to give feedback to a distant (vs. close) service provider (F(1, 134) 
= 3.65, p < .06).
Study 2
Based on the open-ended responses to Study 1, we created a 
scenario that drew from common experiences reported by our par-
ticipant pool. In our second study, participants read a scenario which 
manipulated both the service experience and the social distance be-
tween the participant and the service provider.  In a 2 (service expe-
rience: poor vs. delightful) x 2 (social closeness: close vs. distant) 
experiment, participants read about receiving an excellent (vs. ter-
rible) haircut from a hairdresser with whom they had a very close 
(distant) relationship. Again, the data reveal a main effect such that 
participants were more likely to give friendly feedback after receiv-
ing a delightful (vs. complaining after a bad) experience (F(1, 152) 
= 19.24, p < .0001). However, a marginal social closeness by experi-
ence interaction (F(1, 152) = 3.75, p < .05) was also replicated, indi-
cating that when consumers who receive a disappointing (vs. pleas-
ing) service from a close (vs. distant) provider, they are less likely to 
voice their dissatisfaction. 
Study 3
Finally, we more closely examine the process of giving feed-
back after a bad experience, and how giving feedback effects con-
sumers’ subsequent desire to return to the service provider. In a 2 
(social closeness: close vs. distant) x 2 (subsequent complaint: com-
plain vs. no complain) experiment, participants read only the poor 
service scenario. After reading the scenario, participants had (vs. did 
not have) an opportunity to complain about the poor service they 
received. We find a marginally significant interaction (F(1, 224) = 
2.61, p < .10)  such that close customers who complain (vs. do not 
complain) are more likely to return to the hairdresser, whereas dis-
tant customers are less likely to return to the hairdresser after com-
plaining (vs. not complaining). The results indicate that while com-
plaining enables close customers to express their discontent thereby 
mitigating their bad experience, it may increase distant customer’s 
focus on the service failure and lead them to abandon the provider. 
Pour Oil on Troubled Water: The Effects of Mere-
Measurement and Time on Customer Desire for Revenge
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Since revenge significantly affects both victim and offender, 
research on revenge has received increasing attention in the psychol-
ogy (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003; McCullough, Kurz-
ban, and Tabak 2010) and marketing literatures (Grégoire, Tripp, 
and Legoux 2009). One of the most robust findings is that revenge 
substantially and quickly decreases over time. It has been convinc-
ingly argued that revenge is associated with intense emotions (e.g., 
anger) and cognitions (e.g., betrayal) that are difficult and unhealthy 
to sustain over time.
The current research further explores the effects of time on 
customer desire for revenge, which is defined as the motivation of 
bringing the firm down to get justice after a service failure (Bechwati 
and Morrin 2003). The research addresses a key weakness of most 
longitudinal designs which refers to the confounding effect of the 
variable “time” with “answering a survey”. We argue that very fact 
of answering a questionnaire can influence a desire for revenge. This 
effect is known as the mere-measurement (Fitzsimons and Morwitz 
1996). In other words, this research wonders whether the observed 
reduction in revenge over time is caused by a mere-measurement ef-
fect, the effect of time, or the combination of both factors. 
Two rival explanations exist for the mere-measurement effect in 
this context. The “catharsis effect” paradigm argues that answering a 
survey about service failures allows customers to vent their negative 
emotions and actively process the situation (Barclay and Skarlicki, 
2009); this effect would reduce a desire for revenge over time. On 
the other hand, the “amplification effect” paradigm suggests that an-
swering questions about an unfair experience may lead customers 
to mentally re-experience the service failure (Chandon et al. 2011; 
Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996), which would reinforce a negative 
mood and enhance rumination (Bono, McCullough, and Root 2008; 
McCullough et al. 2001). This alternate process would sustain cus-
tomer desire for revenge over time. 
To address this issue, we performed a longitudinal experiment 
with an online third party organization, ConsumerAffair.com, over 
60-days. The study involved two conditions. The first condition in-
volved four series of questionnaires that were administered every 
two weeks over two months. The second condition involved a survey 
that was sent only at the end of two months. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two conditions. In the first condition, 
111 customers completed the four surveys over time. In the second 
condition, 56 participants completed the only survey received after 
the two month period. The “desire for revenge” is measured with 
an established five item scale (α=.96; M=3.41; SD=2.11) (Grégoire, 
Tripp and Laufer 2009). 
For the first condition, we analyze the evolution of the means 
with a within-subject ANOVA with the four levels of revenge desire 
that correspond to the four waves. Overall, the coefficients for the 
linear term (F[1, 111]= 22.11; p < .000) and the quadratic term (F[1, 
111]= 4.97; p < .028) are both significant. This result implies that the 
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desire for revenge decreases following a quadratic pattern over time. 
Moreover, the desire for revenge of the participants who answered 
only one survey at the end of two months is significantly higher 
compared with those who received a survey at wave 1 (M=4.32>M= 
3.41; t[50]=2.82; p<.01) in the other condition. Another t-test reveals 
that the desire for revenge of the customers who answered multiple 
surveys over the two months is significantly lower than those who an-
swered one survey at the end of the two-month period  (M=4.32>M= 
2.58; t[162]=4.87; p<.000).
Overall, our findings offer a better understanding of the effects 
of time on desire for revenge. On the one hand, time reduces the 
desire for revenge when combined with answering multiple surveys. 
In this first case, we found a catharsis effect of answering multiple 
surveys over time, which is consistent with the result of previous 
studies. On the other hand, time without the presence of measure-
ment bias surprisingly has amplification effect on desire for revenge. 
Customers who did not answer a survey about a service failure in 
the two-month period have the highest revenge desire. This result 
may be explained as follows: customers did not have the opportunity 
to retrieve and re-process their negative experience by answering 
multiple surveys. This important result contradicts most evidence 
reported in the revenge literatures, and questions the appropriateness 
of many longitudinal designs.   
The Effects of Consumer Vulnerability on Service 
Evaluations and Wellbeing Outcomes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Working with a large health service provider, we explore the 
effects of consumer vulnerability on post-service failure evaluations, 
outcomes, and behaviors. First, we introduce an individual-level, 
multidimensional construct of consumer vulnerability (potential 
harm, perceived level of risk, perceived level of control). Then, we 
develop a framework of post-service failure evaluations, outcomes, 
and behavior as a function of consumer vulnerability. Consumer 
vulnerability in the health care domain is of utmost importance, as 
patients may experience physical pain, psychological pain, illness, 
fear of the unknown, and a perceived lack of control during the ser-
vice interaction (Berry and Bendapudi 2007). Not only can service 
failures in health care lead to objective harm to patients/consum-
ers, the resulting drops in service quality and customer satisfaction 
scores can lead to decreases in federal funding for the health care 
institution and decreases in pay-for-performance for providers. Our 
key research question is: how does consumer vulnerability influence 
evaluations of the service experience, complaint behavior, and ul-
timately the health and well-being of the consumer? In examining 
department-level patient satisfaction and complaint data, we iden-
tified a positive correlation between complaint rates and customer 
satisfaction levels in some departments; these departments received 
high patient satisfaction scores but also high rates of complaints. We 
believe that the different levels of consumer vulnerability within 
each department may be driving this relationship, perhaps due to the 
differences in customer expectations for the service encounter and 
differences in the criticality of care. 
The construct of consumer vulnerability is becoming increas-
ingly important due to changing economic conditions, evolving 
health complexities and disparities, immigration patterns, and the 
widening educational divide. In this research, we define consumer 
vulnerability as a state that arises when individuals facing potential 
economic, physical, or psychological harm experience high levels 
of perceived risk coupled with low levels of perceived control. Our 
conceptualization allows potential harm to be present, (e.g., mem-
bership to a vulnerable population, such as a cancer patient), but if 
that individual feels in control of their health, then individual-level 
vulnerability can still be relatively low. Vulnerable populations or 
groups have been covered quite extensively in the macro-marketing 
sense (see Journal of Macromarketing December 2005); researchers 
typically discuss vulnerability as a grouping variable, with vulnera-
ble populations characterized by their degree of physical sensitivity/
competency, mental competency, and sophistication level (Morgan 
et al. 1995). In the consumer literature, individual-level consumer 
vulnerability has been discussed in Luce and Kahn (1999) and the 
Health Belief Model (Becker 1974, Rosenstock 1974), where vul-
nerability is operationalized as one’s perceived susceptibility to con-
tracting a disease in the future. 
Here, we re-conceptualize consumer vulnerability as a multidi-
mensional, higher-order construct with three dimensions: potential 
harm, perceived level of risk, and perceived level of control. The first 
dimension, potential harm is the presence of chronic or situational 
factors that pose objective threats to an individual, such as individual 
characteristics (e.g., physical issues), individual states (e.g., grief), 
and external conditions (e.g., discrimination) (Baker, Gentry, and 
Rittenburg 2005). The second dimension, one’s perceived level of 
risk, is a subjective perception of susceptibility to harm caused by 
a potential threat (Luce and Kahn 1999; Rosenstock 1974). And the 
third dimension, perceived level of control is a belief about one’s in-
fluence over outcomes and events (Klein and Helweg-Larsen 2002; 
Wallston et a. 1987). A new diagnosis or false-positive test results 
can lead to a loss in one’s sense of control and order (Luce and Kahn 
1999; Pavia and Mason 2004). Loss of control over the service out-
come can cause customers to experience stress, anxiety, and feelings 
of low self-efficacy (Berry and Bendapudi 2007).
We then explore how the construct of consumer vulnerabil-
ity operates within a service evaluation and outcome model. We 
posit that vulnerable consumers are more likely to be physically or 
psychologically harmed during a service failure, especially within 
a health care context. We also build upon the classic expectation/
disconfirmation models of perceived service quality (Parasuraman 
et al. 1985) and customer satisfaction (Oliver 1980; 1993), to sug-
gest that consumer vulnerability influences service evaluations and 
outcomes by impacting one’s expectations for the service experi-
ence. We hypothesize that higher levels of vulnerability may lead to 
greater expectations for the service interaction, as the consumer has 
a greater need for critical care, objectively and subjectively. To test 
Figure 1: The Effects of Mere-measurement on Desire for 
Revenge over Time
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our hypothesis, we conducted a pilot study using department-level 
survey data for 32 departments. In the survey, we asked three inde-
pendent coders to evaluate some of our key variables by department. 
The coders were selected for their wide base of knowledge about the 
health care institution and all of its departments, but were completely 
blind to our research hypotheses and purpose of the study. The coders 
rated patient-provider relationship strength and length, health sever-
ity and complexity (objective harm), patient expectations for care, 
and subjective wellbeing. We found a positive correlation between 
health severity and service expectations (r = .36, p < .05) and a posi-
tive correlation between health complexity and service expectations 
(r = .37, p < .05). These results provide some initial department-level 
support for our hypothesis that a patient’s vulnerability may influ-
ence expectations for the service interaction. We are now analyzing 
patient-level satisfaction data to test our full model.
Overall, we introduce a new conceptualization of individual-
level customer vulnerability and present a transformative consum-
er research model of how vulnerability may influence post-failure 
evaluations, outcomes and behaviors. Our research provides new 
insights to researchers interested in individual-level vulnerability, 
as well as to service firms for understanding the role of consumer 
vulnerability in shaping service quality and satisfaction ratings. We 
hope to start the discussion of how we can deliver services in a man-
ner that decreases consumer vulnerability by potentially increasing 
perceptions of control or reducing perceptions of risk. While we look 
at these relationships in the context of health care, we expect similar 
issues to be present in encounters with critical services, such as in the 
areas of financial services and education.
Acknowledging Consumer Gratitude: Leveraging the 
Voice of the Consumer to Increase Loyalty
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When consumers’ purchase experiences end in dissatisfaction, 
complaints are often triggered and most customer-oriented firms in-
vest heavily in recovery with hopes of addressing their complaints 
and restoring loyalty.  While addressing complaints is certainly a 
critical customer service strategy, it is imperative that these efforts 
don’t detract from investments in maintaining relationships with 
the most satisfied customers.  In fact, evidence from companies like 
Starbucks suggests that the revenue differential between highly sat-
isfied and satisfied customers dwarfs that of the difference between 
unsatisfied and satisfied customers (see Figure 1).  More specifically, 
highly satisfied customers spend 3.4 times more over their lifetime 
than satisfied customers (Moon and Quelch 2006).
Data like these suggest that the savvy manager would dedicate 
more effort to managing relationships with their most satisfied con-
sumers.  Traditionally, most efforts focused on managing these rela-
tionships have centered on moments of truth during the core service 
experience.  While these efforts help build baseline satisfaction lev-
els with a focus on the service delivery stage of the purchase journey, 
they ignore post-purchase stages of the journey, which offer a great 
opportunity to build the relationship outside of the service facility. 
By leveraging ongoing consumer research efforts, firms can create 
new moments of truth focused on dialogue with their best customers. 
More specifically, when these most satisfied customers reply posi-
tively to customer satisfaction assessments, these words of praise 
traditionally are documented and then quickly forgotten.  We con-
tend that these words of praise represent an opportunity for service 
firms to create a new moment of truth focused on acknowledging the 
feedback and extending the dialogue with their best customers.  Ul-
timately, these relational investments will increase bonds with their 
best customers and result in increased patronage. 
Although research on acknowledgement of positive feedback is 
sparse in the marketing literature, several other streams of research 
are particularly applicable.  At a fundamental level, research on reci-
procity finds that people respond to each other in kind—positive ac-
tions on behalf on one entity elicit positive actions from another, and 
vice versa (Gouldner 1960).  Relatedly, extensive research exists on 
the mechanism governing the process of expressing gratitude to a 
customer, as well as the resulting changes in behavior of that cus-
tomer.  The current research focuses on the organization’s expression 
of gratitude.  We are suggesting that a simple expression of grati-
tude can result in relationship-building outcomes.  Past research also 
suggests contingencies to this relationship.  Drawing on literature 
from marketing, social psychology, information systems, and online 
commerce, the authors have identified acknowledgement type, ac-
knowledgement speed, and reward provision as potential moderators 
to the relationship between acknowledgment and positive relational 
outcomes (see Figure 2 for Conceptual Model).  First, the type of 
acknowledgement indicates the level of customization the company 
response includes in the expression of gratitude.  The key question 
here is whether or not a customized response is necessary or if a ge-
neric expression of gratitude can suffice.  Secondly, the timing of the 
acknowledgment may prove critical.  While an immediate response 
may feel automated and disingenuous, a long delay may cause the 
consumer to feel like the company really didn’t care.  We seek to 
identify the proper delay in company response.  Lastly, a small token 
of appreciation or reward may play a key role.  The nature of this re-
ward may also be relevant, as monetary and social rewards may trig-
ger different consumers from consumers (Heyman and Ariely 2002). 
The current research seeks to understand the effect of extending 
the dialogue with very satisfied customers who offer positive feed-
back.  Specifically, we investigate the effects of acknowledging very 
satisfied customers with an expression of gratitude via a brief email. 
Along with an initial pilot study, Study 1 utilizes an online, scenario-
based survey to provide initial support for the benefits of acknowl-
edging positive feedback from consumers following a successful 
service experience.  In an effort to extend these findings, we partner 
with a large, full-service restaurant chain to conduct a follow-up lon-
Figure 1: Comparison of Customer Spending Across 
Satisfaction Levels Figure 2: Conceptual Model
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gitudinal field experiment for Study 2.  Additionally, we consider the 
moderating effects of acknowledgement speed, personalization, and 
incentive provision. This research demonstrates that better manage-
ment of the post-purchase process for the most satisfied consumers 
can provide substantial gains for firms in the form of increased pa-
tronage and loyalty.  
In Study 1, online panel participants read a scenario in which 
they had a great dining experience, completed a satisfaction survey 
regarding the experience, and then received or did not receive an 
acknowledgment from the restaurant.  Results support the relation-
ship between acknowledgment and positive relationship outcomes, 
as both satisfaction and willingness to recommend were significantly 
higher when consumers received an acknowledgment after providing 
positive feedback.  Although level of personalization did not produce 
significant effects, acknowledgment speed and reward incentive sig-
nificantly moderated the relationship between acknowledgment and 
positive relationship outcomes.  
The sample for Study 2 consists of customers of a large, full-
service restaurant chain who indicated high levels of satisfaction 
on a guest satisfaction survey following a dining experience.  Half 
of the sample received an acknowledgment email from the restau-
rant.  Initial results are consistent with those found in Study 1, such 
that consumer attitudes and repatronage intentions are significantly 
higher when an acknowledgment is received compared to when 
no acknowledgment is received.  Interestingly, there appear to be 
significant gender differences, as well; acknowledgment positively 
impacts womens’ attitudes and intentions significantly more so than 
men.  Also, face enhancement and communal strength appear to fully 
mediate this relationship.  
While the first phase of Study 2 data collection assesses the at-
titudinal changes associated with firm acknowledgment of positive 
feedback, the second phase will assess behavioral changes.  Over a 
six-month time period, behavioral measures such as time until next 
visit, number of visits, and total spend per visit, will be tracked. 
Thus, we hope to provide support for the attitudinal and behavioral 
changes of acknowledging positive consumer feedback
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Maintaining close relationships is an integral part of life, and 
people spend a good deal of time interacting with close others (Kahn-
eman et al. 2004; Leary et al. 1994). We go on dates with our spouse, 
cook with our family, and shop with our friends. As these examples 
suggest, many of the ways we interact with close others involve con-
sumption. Dating may require the purchase of flowers, movie tickets, 
dinner, or drinks. Cooking typically means a trip to the grocery store. 
And shopping outings may lead to any number of purchases, from 
clothes to jewelry and sporting equipment to electronics. How do our 
close relationships shape the way we behave as consumers? 
Our session sheds light on this question. Each paper adopts a 
unique perspective on how close relationships shape consumer be-
havior, drawing on diverse methodology and theory. Paper 1 (Ra-
manathan and Vohs) begins by discussing how relationships change 
inferences drawn from feelings synchrony. When consumers share 
an experience (e.g., watching a film) with a close friend, the more 
evaluations of the experience align, the more connected one feels to 
the friend (i.e., synchrony is attributed to closeness of friendship). If 
consumers instead share an experience with a stranger, greater align-
ment in evaluations improves ratings of the experience overall (i.e., 
synchrony is attributed to a higher quality experience).
Paper 2 (Anik and Norton) move from considering friendships 
to early stages of dating. They demonstrate that consumers derive 
positive utility from playing “matchmaker”. Connecting others (i.e., 
making matches) is intrinsically rewarding, increasing the match-
maker’s happiness by closing gaps in their social network. Next, Pa-
per 3 (Brick, Fitzsimons, Fitzsimons, and Chartrand) examines brand 
preferences among married couples. Brick et al. consider how the ex-
tent that two romantic partners share similar brand preferences (i.e., 
brand compatibility) impacts life and relationship satisfaction. Re-
sults of a longitudinal couples study suggest that the impact of brand 
compatibility on satisfaction depends on one’s power status within 
the relationship; high-power partners are more satisfied when brand 
compatibility is high, but the opposite is true of low-power partners. 
Finally, Paper 4 (Etkin) explores how the variety of joint-ac-
tivities couples do together influences pro-relationship motivation. 
When partners perceive their relationship to be in early stages, doing 
varied (vs. similar) joint-activities increases pro-relationship motiva-
tion (e.g., willingness to spend on dinner). When partners perceive 
their relationship to be in later stages, in contrast, doing similar (vs. 
varied) joint-activities increases pro-relationship motivation. Etkin 
demonstrates similar effects on a range of relationship-related con-
sumption behaviors.
Despite the fact that consumers often evaluate, purchase, and 
consume in the presence of others, relatively little is known about 
how close relationships influence such behaviors. Our session begins 
to address this gap. Across papers we consider a several types of 
close relationships, including friends, dating partners, and married 
couples, and a diverse set of consumer behaviors, ranging from eval-
uation of shared experiences and brand preferences, to matchmaking 
and partners’ willingness to spend on joint-activities. Together, these 
papers further understanding of how close relationships shape con-
sumer behavior.
How do Friends and Strangers Interpret Shared 
Experiences? Synchrony as Relationship-Bolstering or 
Experience-Heightening 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People spend the vast majority of their waking time interact-
ing with others, whether casual acquaintances or intimate partners 
(Kahneman et al. 2004; Leary et al. 1994). We intentionally spend 
time with friends, family, coworkers, and acquaintances by engaging 
in joint-activities such as watching TV or shopping (American Time 
Use Survey; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Government, 2003). 
Yet close others are not the only ones with who people share experi-
ences. People meet and connect with strangers in social settings such 
as shopping malls, museums, art galleries, movie theaters, concerts, 
or train and plane rides. These interactions are not meaningless, ei-
ther: they influence the way that people perceive those events. 
In the current research, we argue that shared experiences cre-
ate synchrony among interaction partners, provided they can observe 
each other during the interaction. As people share an experience, 
their evaluations of that experience become entwined and co-vary 
with each other. This synchrony emerges due to evaluations being 
colored by shared emotions (Neumann and Strack 2000; Ramana-
than and McGill 2007). We posit that when moment-to-moment rat-
ings of a shared experience become highly synchronous, synchrony 
will have spillover effects that vary as a function of whether partici-
pants have a basis for attributing the synchrony to the relationship or 
some contextual feature. 
For people in an existing relationship, the experience of similar 
emotions at similar times enhances relationship satisfaction (Gon-
zaga, Campos, & Bradbury, 2007; Murray et al., 2002) and bol-
sters the strength of the relationship. Hence, friends may consider 
a highly synchronous experience as validation of the relationship. 
We therefore predicted that friends experiencing synchrony will 
show greater interpersonal closeness after the shared experience than 
would friends who experienced low synchrony or as compared to 
strangers. We predicted that high synchrony among friends would 
not, however, influence evaluations of the experience itself because 
friends look to the relationship as being the source of the synchrony. 
We did not expect strangers to use the experience of synchrony as 
affirmation of their (nascent) relationship. To the extent that they do 
experience synchrony, strangers might focus on the situation more 
than the relationship in determining what the feeling of synchrony 
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means. We therefore predicted that strangers experiencing high lev-
els of synchrony with each other would evaluate the experience more 
positively compared to those not experiencing synchrony but would 
not differ in interpersonal closeness
In two experiments, we tested whether friends and strangers 
consume and interpret shared experiences differently. In Experiment 
1, we did or did not allow dyads of friends (22 pairs) or strangers 
(18 pairs) to see each other while they sat side-by-side to watch a 
funny film. Three key dependent variables were assessed. One was 
moment-to-moment film ratings, from which were derived our mea-
sure of synchrony. Participants moved a joystick to indicate their 
liking of the film at each second. The extent to which participants’ 
ratings could predict their partners’ ratings at different frequencies 
indicated the degree of synchrony the dyad exhibited. Further, two 
video cameras recorded participants’ facial expressions continuously 
while the video clip was played. A second outcome was retrospective 
film evaluations, which were summary judgments of the film after 
its completion. A third outcome was seating distance in a waiting 
room, which we took to indicate momentary relationship closeness. 
These outcomes were related to each other in specific ways, and they 
were predicted by relationship type and whether participants could 
observe one another during the film. Partners who could see one an-
other exhibited higher synchrony than partners who could not, and 
this was especially strong for friend dyads. The greater synchrony 
for friends in the low partition condition was due to their glancing at 
each other and sharing emotions of the same valence, while strang-
ers in the same condition seemed most influenced by unreciprocated 
glances.
The extent to which partners’ ratings exhibited a high degree 
of synchrony predicted more positive retrospective film ratings, but 
this occurred for strangers and not friends. Friends, in contrast, sat 
closer together to extent that their real-time film ratings exhibited a 
high degree of synchrony. Therefore, we hypothesized that strangers 
looked to the situation as the source of their feelings of synchrony, 
whereas friends looked to their relationship. 
Experiment 2 used a similar design to directly test the attribu-
tion hypothesis. We allowed all participants to see each other, which 
meant that friends would likely show more synchrony than strangers. 
(They did.) Germane to the attributional story, we tested whether 
telling half of the participants that the aim of the study was to test the 
effects of the quality of seating in the room on shared experiences 
would diminish not only the overall levels of synchrony (which it 
did) but also erode the link between synchrony and retrospective film 
ratings for strangers and seating distance for friends. In both cases, 
having an alternate idea of what might be causing the feelings miti-
gated the effects we had seen in Experiment 1. This attribution effect 
suggests that friends’ and strangers’ interpreted the feelings that arise 
during a shared experience as being signals of the quality of the rela-
tionship or the experience itself, respectively.
The Rewarding Nature of Matchmaking
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
At some point, most people have made matches between others, 
from grabbing and introducing two strangers at a party to brokering 
romantic connections; even if not matchmakers themselves, many 
people can think of a friend or acquaintance who is notorious for 
their efforts to make such introductions – even if sometimes awk-
wardly unsuccessful. We investigate this proclivity to match others, 
demonstrating that such matchmaking – creating ties between others 
– has a causal impact on their happiness. 
Certainly, a great deal of evidence suggests that people enjoy 
connecting themselves to others and that having such social connec-
tions is strongly and consistently associated with higher well-being. 
Indeed, humans spend some 80% of their waking hours in the com-
pany of others (Emler 1994; Kahneman et al. 2004). Social interac-
tions and social support impact both subjective and objective well-
being, with social relationships both serving as a buffer against and 
hastens recovery from negative events ranging from depression to 
physical illness (e.g., Berkman and Syme 1979; Cohen and Janicki-
Deverts 2009; Seeman 1996; Uchino 2004).
We explore the emotional impact of making matches not be-
tween oneself and others, but between two other people. In one 
view, such matchmaking should have no impact on happiness, be-
cause matchmakers are by definition introducing people they already 
know and are thus not growing their own circle of social support. 
In another view, matchmaking could negatively impact happiness; 
research in social networks has noted that “brokers” – people who 
stand between two other actors in a social network – derive power 
from those two people not knowing each other (Burt 1998; Simmel 
1955); thus, such an introduction might decrease one’s social capi-
tal. We propose a third view: closing gaps in one’s social network 
is rewarding because it facilitates people’s general and fundamental 
need for closure (Kruglanski 1989). We suggest that people high in 
need for closure are more likely to not just assume (Flynn, Reagans, 
and Guillory 2010) but actually create connections between others 
and that meeting this “need for network closure” is associated with 
increased happiness for the matchmaker. 
Four studies examine the psychology underlying people’s pro-
clivity to play “matchmaker”. Study 1 first explores the relationship 
between chronic matchmaking and happiness. In an online survey, 
participants rated their propensity to make matches between oth-
ers, reported their total number of acquaintances and friends, and 
completed a well-being scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985). We found that chronic matchmakers are happier with their 
lives overall even when controlling for the size of their social net-
works, offering correlational evidence that real world matchmaking 
is rewarding.
Study 2 documents the causal impact of matchmaking on hap-
piness in a lab setting. We assigned people (N = 128) to match in-
dividuals to each other and measured their happiness pre- and post-
matching. We also investigated whether the type of match matters 
by randomly assigning people to one of three tasks: making matches 
on the basis of who would get along well (match), who would get 
along poorly (mismatch), and who had the most similar social se-
curity numbers (random). We found that matching people with the 
goal of creating connections (match) resulted in significant increase 
in pre- to post-matching happiness compared to making matches on 
any other dimension (mismatch or random). 
 Study 3 assesses the benefits of matchmaking using a differ-
ent methodology: rather than measuring happiness directly, we mea-
sured the intrinsic reward of matchmaking by examining people’s 
persistence on a matching task. Participants (N = 168) came to the 
lab and were informed that they would be completing fifty trials of 
computer tasks and could choose how to split these trials between 
two tasks: a matching task and a boring unrelated task. We instructed 
participants either to match a target individual based on who they 
would best get along with (match) or who they looked most simi-
lar to (appearance). We measured the number of matchmaking tri-
als completed before switching to the boring task and also varied 
whether participants completed each trial of the task for free, for 1¢, 
or for 2¢, a design that allowed us to document the intrinsic reward 
of matchmaking. 
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As expected, participants in the free conditions completed 
more than twice as many match task trials than the appearance 
task, suggesting that connecting others based on liking (vs. physical 
similarity) is intrinsically more rewarding. Interestingly, incentives 
increased the number of trials participants completed of the appear-
ance task, in a significant linear trend from free to 1¢ to 2¢, but not of 
the match task; here, incentives significantly decreased willingness 
to complete trials both for participants in the 1¢ and 2¢ conditions 
compared to those in the free condition. These results suggest that 
while payment increased motivation for the less intrinsically appeal-
ing appearance task, incentives crowded out motivation for the more 
intrinsically appealing match task.
Study 4 examines the moderating effects of NFC on the rela-
tionship between condition and the number of trials completed. Par-
ticipants (N = 179) were given the same task as in Experiment 2. 
They then completed the 47-item NFC scale (Webster and Kruglan-
ski 1994; α = .85). We found that people high in “need for network 
closure” are most likely to find connecting others to each other re-
warding, with that reward being particularly pronounced when mak-
ing matches with the goal of social connection (match).
Taken together, these experiments provide evidence for a causal 
relationship between matchmaking and happiness. Inducing people 
to make matches between strangers increased happiness in the mo-
ment, and people found creating meaningful matches to be more in-
trinsically rewarding than other types of matching. We document that 
having a “need for network closure” enhances the intrinsic reward of 
matchmaking. Our investigation offers a model for how matches at 
the micro level can translate into social capital at the macro level. 
We suggest that people who make matches do not necessarily suffer 
from losing their broker status, but in fact can reap rewards from 
matchmaking and that this reward value increases social capital at 
the group level.
Power and Brand Compatibility in Close Relationships: 
A Dyadic Investigation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Although consumers often evaluate, purchase, and consume 
brands in the presence of others, relatively little is known about the 
role that brand preferences play in close relationships.  To fill this 
gap, we introduce the term Brand Compatibility, which refers to the 
extent to which two people in a romantic relationship have similar 
brand preferences.  In this first investigation of brand compatibility, 
we propose that its effect on relationship and life satisfaction depends 
on one’s personal sense of power within the relationship. Being low 
in power leads one to take on close others’ emotions (Anderson et al. 
2003), and to be more likely to incorporate close others’ intentions 
into their own intentions (VanderDrift et al. 2012). Given this, we 
suggest that brand compatibility reflects two different states for those 
high and low in relationship power: For those high in power, brand 
compatibility may indicate that their partner is accommodating their 
interests. For those low in power, brand compatibility may indicate 
that they are accommodating their partner’s interests. If so, brand 
compatibility may produce different effects on relationship and life 
outcomes for those who are high versus low in relationship power.  It 
may lead those high in power to feel happier, and those low in power 
to feel less happy, with the relationship and their lives more broadly. 
In this paper, we examine these ideas dyadically, by measuring brand 
preferences from both members of a romantic relationship.  
A diverse set of dating and married couples – 136 heterosexual 
couples (56.5% Caucasian, 33.5% Asian, 10% mixed or other; Mage = 
20.80; SDage = 2.16) with a mean relationship duration of 34.42 (SD 
= 29.10) months completed the study. 
Participants came into the laboratory as couples and completed 
a battery of personality and relationship measures, including two 
standard scales assessing power, modified for close relationships 
(Anderson, John, and Keltner 2012; Ronfeldt, Kimerling, and Arias 
1998). The two scales individually had acceptable reliabilities (al-
phas = .86 and .69), but were highly correlated (r = .53). As such, we 
combined the items to produce one mean power scale (alpha = .84). 
Participants also completed a standard life satisfaction scale (Die-
ner, Emmons, Larson, and Griffin 1985) and a standard relationship 
assessment (Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew 2005) that measured both 
self-reported satisfaction and evaluations of the attractiveness of al-
ternatives to the relationship. 
One month later, participants completed an online follow-up 
questionnaire, which measured brand compatibility.  Rather than 
asking couples to rate the compatibility of their brand preferences, 
a potentially biased measure, we asked partners about their brand 
preferences individually and then created a brand compatibility 
score from those responses. Participants provided the names of their 
own and their partner’s favorite brands for several common product 
categories (e.g., beer, chocolate).  Four research assistants, blind to 
hypotheses and familiar with brand choices in the Canadian mar-
ket, coded these responses. Responses were rated on a 1 (completely 
incompatible) to 5 (completely compatible) scale. The following 
guidelines were used: 5 for the same exact brand (e.g., Diet Coke and 
Diet Coke), 4 for almost the exact same (e.g., Diet Coke and Coke), 
3 for the same brand family (e.g., Coke and Sprite), 2 for brands 
that are related brand families, but would not be included in a brand 
price promotion (e.g., Schwepps and Dr. Pepper), and 1 for different, 
competing brand families (e.g., Coke and Pepsi). 
Analyses employed multilevel modeling procedures (Kenny, 
Kashy, and Cook 2006), which account for violations of statisti-
cal independence. As predicted, relationship power interacted with 
brand compatibility to predict life satisfaction, F (1, 207.17) = 6.38, 
p < .01. High power participants (+1SD) reported higher levels of 
life satisfaction when they and their romantic partner shared compat-
ible brand preferences than when they reported incompatible prefer-
ences, t = -2.2, p = .03. In contrast, low power participants (-1SD) re-
ported lower levels of life satisfaction when their brand preferences 
were compatible than when they were incompatible, t = 2.3, p = .02. 
Power and brand compatibility also interacted to predict relationship 
evaluations as measured by attraction to alternatives, F (1, 225.05) = 
4.14, p = .04, but not as measured by self-reported satisfaction, F < 1, 
ns. High power participants reported more attraction to alternatives 
when their brand compatibility was low than when it was high, t = 
1.9, p = .06, while low power participants reported more attraction 
to alternatives when their brand compatibility was high than when it 
was low, t = 1.95, p = .04. 
We found that for people high in power, having high brand 
compatibility with their partner leads to better evaluations of the 
relationship and their life.  But for those low in power, high brand 
compatibility leads to worse evaluations of their partner and life. 
We speculate this is because high brand compatibility results from 
low power partners accommodating the preferences of higher power 
partners, although this mechanism remains to be tested.  In sum, we 
have introduced the construct of brand compatibility and shown that 
it, in conjunction with power, influences relationship and life satis-
faction. The results suggest that brand compatibility may be a useful 
tool for looking at relationship processes, and highlight the potential 
relevance of consumer behavior for the understanding of close rela-
tionships.
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Is Variety the Spice of Love?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Relationship partners do many things together. They eat din-
ner, watch television, discuss their days, and potentially even take 
art classes or travel.  Different couples, however, vary in the vari-
ety of joint-activates they engage in. Some couples tend to do rela-
tively similar activities; watching different TV shows on consecutive 
nights or eating slightly different dinners.  Other couples tend to do 
relatively dissimilar or varied activities; watching TV one night, go-
ing out to dinner the following night, and playing tennis the next. 
Spending time together is positively correlated with relationship 
quality (Kilbourne, Howell, & England, 1990; Kingston & Nock, 
1987; Orden & Bradburn, 1968; Orthner, 1975), but might the vari-
ety of activities couples do together matter, and if so, how?
We suggest that the impact of activity-variety on relationship 
quality depends critically on where partners see themselves in the 
course of their relationship. Socio-emotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Carstensen, Gross, & 
Fun, 1997) suggests that how much time people see ahead of them 
(i.e., future time abundance) varies over the life course. Perceptions 
of future time abundance, in turn, impact what people value. When 
people see lots of time ahead of them, for instance, they value feeling 
excited, whereas when they see little time ahead, they value feel-
ing calm (Mogilner, Aaker, & Kamvar, 2012; Mogilner, Kamvar, & 
Aaker, 2011). 
Perceptions of future time abundance should also vary in ro-
mantic relationships. Couples who think they are in early stages of a 
committed relationship should see much time ahead, whereas people 
who think they are in later stages should see less time ahead (relative 
to time passed). We suggest that these differences will affect what 
people value. When partners perceive their relationship as relatively 
short to-date, they should value excitement in the relationship, but 
partners who perceive their relationship as relatively long to-date 
should value stability in the relationship.
These differences in valuation, in turn, should shape how similar 
versus varied joint-activities impact motivation and satisfaction with 
the relationship. Variety, by definition, is associated with stimulation 
and change (Berlyne, 1970; Khan, 1995; Raju, 1980). Consequently, 
we predict that varied joint-activities should make a relationship feel 
more exciting. Similar joint-activities, in contrast, should increase 
feelings of stability. Thus, engaging in varied activities should ben-
efit the relationship when partners perceive the relationship to be 
in its early stages, whereas similar joint-activities should be more 
beneficial when a relationship seems to be in its later stages.
Five experiments support these predictions. Across studies we 
assess the impact of joint-activity variety on pro-relationship moti-
vation (i.e., willingness to behave in relationship-enhancing ways). 
In study 1, we ask participants their perceptions of how long they’ve 
been in their current relationship to-date (1-7) and to list three similar 
or three different activities done with their partner in the past week. 
We then asked participants to describe their current relationship in as 
much detail as they wished; time spent writing served as our mea-
sure of pro-relationship motivation. Results suggest that among par-
ticipants who perceived their relationship as shorter, listing different 
joint-activities increased time spent writing about the relationship 
(Mdiff = 139.7, Msim = 100.2; t(132) = 2.36, p < .05). Among par-
ticipants who perceived their relationship as longer, however, listing 
similar joint-activities increased time spent writing about the rela-
tionship (Msim = 119.9; Mdiff = 80.4; t(132) = -2.35, p < .05). 
Studies 2 and 3 replicate this basic interaction, extending the 
design of study 1 in several ways. Instead of measuring perceived 
relationship duration, we manipulate it by varying the frequency 
of response scales provided to participants for questions regarding 
their relationship’s duration (see Etkin and Ratner 2012). We also 
used different measures of pro-relationship motivation: willingness 
to spend on a special occasion dinner for one’s partner (study 2) and 
avoidance of an attractive member of the opposite sex (study 3). 
Results of both studies support our predictions that varied (similar) 
joint-activities benefit one’s relationship at perceived early (later) 
stages.
Study 4 tests the proposed process driving these effects. We 
found joint-activity variety increased pro-relationship motivation by 
increasing feelings of excitement when relationships seemed short 
(95% CI: .08 to .98), but not long (95% CI: -.92 to .14). In contrast, 
joint-activity variety decreased pro-relationship motivation by de-
creasing feelings of stability when relationships seemed long (95% 
CI: -.50 to -.04), but not short (95% CI: -.05 to .35). These results 
support our suggestion that when relationships feel short (long), 
engaging in more varied (similar) joint-activities enhances pro-rela-
tionship motivation by increasing feelings of excitement (stability).  
Our final experiment tested whether these findings extend to the 
field. Particularly for men, giving flowers to one’s partner is a stan-
dard way of showing caring and devotion. We stopped men walking 
in a large downtown metropolitan area and gave them a survey that 
manipulated relationship duration and joint-activity similarity.  Then, 
as thanks, we gave them the opportunity to pick up a free rose (from 
a flower shop a few blocks away) to give to their significant other. 
We tracked whether participants redeemed the rose. Results support 
our predictions. In the short duration condition, more men picked up 
the rose after listing different joint-activities (Mdiff = 14.3%, Msim = 
2.9%; χ2 = 2.67, p = .10). In contrast, in the long duration condition, 
more men picked up the rose after listing similar joint-activities (Msim 
= 17.6%, Mdiff = 8.1%; χ
2 = 3.98, p < .05). 
Maintaining good romantic relationships is an important part of 
life. Indeed, satisfying relationships are crucial for both physical and 
psychological health (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). While popular 
wisdom suggests that people should incorporate more variety into 
their relationships, our findings indicate that this may not always be 
the best approach. Doing varied joint-activities seems to be particu-
larly, if not uniquely beneficial early on in relationships.  Later in 
relationships, or in cases where people see their relationship as long, 
doing similar joint-activities should be more beneficial. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Time is perhaps our most precious resource: the number of 
hours and days we are granted is decidedly finite. How can we spend 
the finite time we are allotted to most benefit ourselves and others? 
The four papers in this session examine time from different angles 
to highlight its central role in consumer well-being and virtue. To-
gether, they demonstrate how our conceptualization of time, as well 
as its actual passage, is imperative to understanding the effects of our 
decisions on our own well-being and the well-being of others.
In particular, the first two papers examine the effects of time 
on happiness from people’s own experiences. The first paper shows 
that exposure to fast-food brands affects subjective time perception, 
making people impatient and less able to enjoy happiness from plea-
surable experiences. The second paper demonstrates how percep-
tions of the time people have left in life impact the relative happiness 
they gain from ordinary and extraordinary experiences. The final 
two papers investigate how time influences immoral behaviors that 
could affect others’ well-being. The third paper finds that activating 
the concept of time encourages self-reflection and reduces immoral 
behaviors. The last paper examines how self-deception and immoral 
behaviors attenuate with the passage of time. 
These four papers echo this year’s theme, “Making a Differ-
ence,” as all of them illuminate specific behaviors and choices that 
can make a difference in how well people live, in terms of both ex-
perienced well-being and honest behaviors. Each paper contributes 
to the study of consumer well-being or morality by highlighting the 
integral role of time. Given the fundamental importance of these 
constructs, we expect our proposed symposium to generate signifi-
cant interest among a broad audience at ACR, including researchers 
with interests in well-being, time, aging, social connection, prosocial 
behavior, morality, and decision making. All four papers are either 
completed manuscripts or manuscripts in preparation.
The goal of the session is to incite questions and future research 
on the determinants of consumer well-being and virtue and the psy-
chological influence of temporal factors. Each presenter will have 
fifteen minutes to present their paper, leaving about fifteen minutes 
for questions from the audience, integrative discussion, and ideas for 
future research.
While all of these papers relate to consumer well-being and 
time, each paper provides a unique perspective and proposes different 
answers to the fundamental question, “What can we do to live well?” 
By integrating different dimensions of time, measures of well-being 
and virtuous behavior, environmental triggers, and psychological 
factors, we hope to provoke a fruitful discussion at ACR that bears 
on both important theoretical and substantive issues. 
Too Impatient to Smell the Roses: Exposure to Fast Food 
Brands Impedes Happiness
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There is more to life than increasing its speed. 
—Mahatma Gandhi
Innovative products and services offering convenience, speed, 
and temporal efficiency have brought remarkable changes to the use 
of time in our society. While we used to wait for weeks or months for 
letters to arrive, simultaneous global communication between indi-
viduals and groups for negligible cost is now only a few key strokes 
away. The processing of information is on a similar asymptotic tra-
jectory approaching instantaneity: Sifting through piles of papers and 
books in libraries has largely been replaced by online search engines 
that deliver almost instant hits. This societal shift towards the instan-
taneous and the acceleration of activities with the explicit intention 
of saving time is infused into our very sustenance. Frozen prepared 
meals save us from having to spend time preparing food and the mi-
crowave saves us from having to wait for an oven to cook it. Better 
yet, fast food restaurants offer hot meals that can be picked up at 
drive-thru windows and are ready to be consumed on the go.
We tested whether exposure to the ultimate symbols of an im-
patience culture—fast-food brands—undermined people’s ability to 
experience happiness from pleasurable visual and auditory stimuli. 
The essence of fast food is not what you eat (e.g., tacos, fried chicken, 
burgers, or pizza), but how you eat it. This is meaningfully conveyed 
by the manner in which fast food is served. Fast-food packaging fa-
cilitates temporal efficiency because there are no dishes to wash, no 
waiter to wait for, and portable containers make meals easier to eat 
while multitasking (i.e. in the car or at your desk). To demonstrate 
that the implicit effects of fast food occurs independent of the type of 
food, we examined whether the same food served in different pack-
aging would interfere with people’s enjoyment of pleasant stimuli. 
Participants in the fast-food condition viewed pictures of food in 
ready-to-go branded packaging; whereas, participants in the control 
condition view the same food displayed on ceramic tableware). 
To determine whether fast food impedes happiness directly or 
by interfering with enjoyment of pleasant experiences, Experiment 1 
randomly assigned participants to rate their state of happiness after 
seeing 10 beautiful nature photos or not. We hypothesize that when 
participants view the beautiful nature photos, those primed with fast 
food would be less happy than those primed with control stimuli, but 
that when there are no photos, the priming stimuli would not cause 
any differences in people’s state of happiness. Therefore, Experiment 
1 enabled us to assess whether fast food makes people less likely to 
“smell the roses.” 
Two hundred fifty-seven participants were randomly assigned 
to a 2 (fast food vs. control) × 2 (pictures vs. no pictures) facto-
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 213
rial design. Among participants who did not have the opportunity to 
view the nature pictures, those in the fast-food condition exhibited a 
non-significant trend to be slightly happier (M=4.64, SD=1.51) than 
those in the control condition (M=4.25, SD=1.62), t(107)=-1.28, 
p=.20. Among those participants who had a chance to view the na-
ture pictures, however, those in the fast-food condition reported a 
significantly lower state of happiness (M=4.86, SD=1.34) than those 
in the control condition (M=5.45, SD=1 .18), t(146)=2.83, p=.005. 
This revealed that fast food does not have a direct negative effect 
on happiness, but rather impairs individuals’ positive emotional re-
sponse to pleasant stimuli. Importantly, this suggests that impatience 
only manifests its deleterious emotional influence by interfering with 
the experience of pleasurable stimuli that have the potential to be 
relished. 
In Experiment 2, one hundred and twenty-two participants were 
randomly assigned to the same fast-food vs control condition as in 
the first experiment but in this case all participants subsequently 
listed to the first 86 seconds of ‘The Flower Duet’ from the opera 
Lakmé. Participants in the fast-food condition rated themselves as 
less happy after listening to the music, subjectively perceived of time 
passage of the music as longer (i.e., “how long do you feel you spent 
listening to the song you just heard”), and report greater impatience 
experienced while listening to the music (e.g. “I was impatient for 
the music to end so I could finish the survey”) (all ps < .05). Follow-
up tests indicated both the subjective experience of time and reported 
impatience while listening to the music mediated the effect of condi-
tion on participants’ experience of happiness. These findings suggest 
exposure to symbols of the culture of impatience can impair people’s 
ability to derive happiness from encounters with pleasurable things 
in life because they become too impatient to “smell the roses.”    
Advertising the experience of happiness is a mainstay of most 
fast-food marketing.  Consider the advertising of McDonald’s, the 
most prevalent and recognizable fast food company in the world. In 
1979, McDonald’s launched the “Happy Meal” targeted at children. 
In 2003, McDonald’s officially named its clown mascot, Ronald 
McDonald, the “Chief Happiness Officer” of the company. Many 
of McDonald’s specific advertising campaigns depict customer’s en-
joyment and pleasure emanating from the consumption of their food 
(e.g., “I’m lovin’ it” campaign). Ironically, the haste and impatience 
promoted by fast food appears poised to undermine people’s ability 
to smell the roses—experiencing happiness from enjoyable events.
Contrary to the associations with happiness typically proffered 
by fast-food advertisers in the appetitive domain, we find that the 
impatience induced by symbols of fast food can distract us from 
appreciating beauty emanating from other sensory domains where 
one might otherwise obtain happiness from smelling the proverbial 
roses. While fast food may promote instant gratification, it can also 
blind us to opportunities of greater happiness even when they are 
right in front of us. These findings lead us to pause and ponder an 
otherwise largely unquestioned aspect of speed and impatience: As 
we have become more hasty and efficient, what have we lost? 
Happiness from Ordinary and Extraordinary 
Experiences
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How should we invest our finite resources to maximize our 
happiness? One influential stream of literature finds that experiential 
purchases bring greater happiness than material purchases (e.g., Van 
Boven and Gilovich 2003). But which experiences lead to greater 
happiness? Prior work has not yet begun to categorize and compare 
experiences to see which ones most resonate and increase well-being.
While some researchers have suggested a special role for spe-
cial, once-in-a-lifetime experiences in consumer well-being (Zau-
berman, Ratner and Kim 2009), others have highlighted the im-
portance of savoring mundane, everyday experiences (DeVoe and 
House 2012). Hence, the current research investigates this important 
distinction and attempts to resolves these inconsistencies. While or-
dinary experiences are common, frequent, and within the realm of 
everyday life, extraordinary experiences are uncommon, infrequent, 
and go beyond this realm (Sussman and Alter 2012). Will consum-
ers enjoy greater happiness from a lovely dinner with a close friend 
at a favorite neighborhood restaurant, or from a once-in-a-lifetime, 
gastronomically inventive feast at elBulli? 
Because the very definition of happiness varies over time (Mo-
gilner, Kamvar and Aaker 2011), we predicted that the answer to 
this question would depend on one’s perspective on time. Indeed, 
five studies suggest that extraordinary experiences lead to greater 
happiness among those with an extensive future. Meanwhile, when 
time is seen as limited, ordinary experiences are increasingly linked 
to happiness.
An initial study, mirroring Van Boven and Gilovich’s (2003) ap-
proach, asked participants to recall and describe a happy experience 
that was either ordinary or extraordinary, and to report their result-
ing level of happiness. Content analysis suggests that engagement 
in social relationships and indulgence in comforts accounts for most 
happy ordinary experiences. Conversely, life milestones or cultural 
travel are most representative of happy extraordinary experiences. 
To serve as a proxy for future time perspective, we examined expe-
riential happiness by participant age. Among younger participants 
(whose future is more extensive), extraordinary experiences resulted 
in greater happiness than ordinary experiences (M = 7.86 vs. 6.69, 
F(1,217) = 13.20, p < .001); however, among older participants 
(whose future is more limited), no difference in reported happiness 
emerged (M = 7.84 vs. 7.59, F < 1). In other words, while happi-
ness from extraordinary experiences did not vary with age (F < 1), 
ordinary experiences led to greater happiness for older (vs. younger) 
participants (F(1, 217) = 7.72, p = .006). 
To further investigate whether these categories of experience 
naturally resonate, we asked a separate group of participants to rate 
20 randomly selected experiences generated in the first study. This 
group was able to reliably distinguish between others’ described ex-
periences, rating extraordinary experiences as significantly more ex-
traordinary than the ordinary experiences (M = 6.61 vs. 3.62, t(120) 
= 19.60, p < .001). Importantly, their predictions of happiness fol-
lowed the same pattern: younger participants reported that extraordi-
nary (vs. ordinary) experiences would lead to greater happiness (M 
= 6.96 vs. 6.24, F(1, 119) = 27.34, p < .001), whereas older partici-
pants’ reports of happiness did not differ by experience type (M = 
7.01 vs. 6.83, F(1, 119) = 1.57, p > .10).
Next, we examined a natural data source to see if the same pat-
tern holds. A sample of Facebook users reported their last five status 
updates that reflected personal experiences and completed a measure 
of future time perspective (Lang and Carstensen 2002). They then 
rated and categorized these experiences as ordinary or extraordinary. 
Results indicated that future time perspective predicted both ratings 
(β = .16, t = 2.11, p = .04) and categorizations (χ2(1) = 4.81, p = .03) 
of reported experiences: even in this organic setting, those who saw 
time as extensive made more extraordinary updates, and those who 
saw time as limited made updates reflecting more ordinary experi-
ences.
Given that our findings hinge on future time perspective, a 
fourth study tested for potential differences between past and future 
(planned) experiences. Participants described past happy experi-
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ences or future experiences they expected to be happy, then rated 
these experiences on how ordinary or extraordinary they were. Fi-
nally, they reported their future time perspective. Regression results 
were consistent: regardless of past or future status (t < 1), those with 
a more extensive perspective reported more extraordinary experi-
ences, while those with a limited perspective reported more ordinary 
experiences (β = -.28, t = -2.90, p = .005).
Our final study sought convergent evidence by manipulating 
time perspective: participants were led to view their lifespan as ei-
ther extensive or limited. A second goal of the study was to examine 
how associating a brand with consumer experiences would affect 
brand attitudes. Participants viewed an advertisement for a Flip video 
camera that urged them to “Capture life’s everyday [extraordinary] 
moments.” Results revealed a significant interaction of experience 
x time perspective on brand attitudes (F(1, 210) = 5.74, p = .02). In 
particular, those with an extensive time perspective viewed the brand 
more positively when it highlighted extraordinary (vs. ordinary) mo-
ments (M = 5.60 vs. 5.12, F(1, 210) = 5.79, p = .02). However, brand 
attitudes did not vary by experience among those with a limited time 
perspective (M = 5.46 vs. 5.66, F < 1). That is, while highlighting 
extraordinary experiences led the brand to be perceived similarly 
regardless of time perspective (F < 1), highlighting ordinary experi-
ences was seen more positively among those who viewed their future 
as limited rather than extensive (F(1, 210) = 7.29, p = .007). Results 
for purchase likelihood were fully consistent.
Together, our findings highlight a previously unexamined di-
mension of experience, distinguishing ordinary from extraordinary 
experiences. Results show that this distinction is meaningful, reso-
nates with people, and matters for brand attitudes as well as sub-
sequent happiness. Follow-up analyses from our first study suggest 
that self-definition may drive these effects  (β = .01, t = 2.56, p = 
.01): the experiences that define us vary with our perspective on 
time, and what defines us may bring us greater happiness.
Time, Money, and Morality
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It seems a day doesn’t go by without some unethical behav-
ior by a politician, movie star, professional athlete, or high-ranking 
executive splashing the cover of newspapers. Although less sensa-
tional, revelations of cheating have also crept into the sciences, and 
continue to show up in classrooms, businesses, and marriages. Sadly, 
such actions have ruinous consequences, hurting individuals, fami-
lies, corporations, and entire academic fields. Given that decades 
of psychology research have shown that people strive to maintain a 
positive self-concept (Adler, 1930; Rogers, 1959) and that morality 
is central to people’s self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Chaiken, 
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996), the prevalence of unethical behavior 
and the fact that even good people are prone to lose track of their 
moral compass is surprising (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Mazar, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Are there sim-
ple ways to encourage self-reflection, thus decreasing individuals’ 
tendencies to behave immorally? Here, we focus on two triggers that 
are ubiquitous enough in the environment to have a chance at insti-
gating a widespread effect on unethical behavior: money and time.
Prior research has shown that when people focus on money they 
behave in self-interested (but not self-reflective) ways. For instance, 
merely thinking about money leads people to be less helpful and fair 
in their dealings with others, less sensitive to social rejection, and to 
work harder towards personal goals (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006, 
2008; Yang, Wu, Zhou, Mead, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2012; Zhou, 
Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). However, when focused on time, peo-
ple become more generous in their charitable giving (Liu & Aaker, 
2008) and are more motivated to connect with loved ones (Mogilner, 
2010)—a behavior that is particularly treasured when reflecting on 
one’s life (Frederickson & Carstensen, 1990; Loewenstein, 1999). 
We thus predict that priming people to think about time, rather than 
money, will lead to more ethical behavior by encouraging people to 
reflect on who they are, making them more conscious of how they 
conduct themselves so as to maintain a positive self-image. 
Study 1 tested this by priming either time or money and then 
measuring cheating. Participants were first presented with a sentence 
unscramble task which surreptitiously exposed them to time-relat-
ed, money-related, or only neutral words (Mogilner, 2010). Next, 
participants played a “Numbers Game” in which they had the op-
portunity to cheat and receive additional money. The results show 
that participants were more likely to cheat in the money condition 
(87.5%, 28/32) than in either the control condition (66.7%, 22/33; 
χ2(1, N=65)=3.97, p<.05) or the time condition (42.4%, 14/33; χ2(1, 
N=65)=14.44, p<.001). Participants were also less likely to cheat in 
the time condition than in the control condition (χ2(1, N=66)=3.91, 
p<.05). In other words, money primes encouraged unethical behav-
ior while time primes discouraged it. 
Study 2 replicates these results while also providing initial 
insight into why time discourages unethical behavior. Participants 
were primed with time or money through searching for songs that 
had lyrics exemplifying how people feel about either time or money. 
Next, participants completed the same Numbers Game, but here it 
was framed as either an intelligence test or a personality test indica-
tive of the person they are. The results showed a significant interac-
tion (F(1,138)=3.99, p<.05): Only when the game was framed as an 
intelligence test did thinking about money lead to greater cheating 
than thinking about time (F(1,138)=6.69, p=.01); however, when the 
game was framed as a personality test, there was no difference in 
cheating between the money and time conditions, F<1. 
Study 3 again tests for the role of self-reflection. Participants 
were primed with money or time by either counting a stack of 30 
$1 bills or days in a paper calendar (1 page per day). Half of the 
participants completed this task facing a mirror while half did not. 
Participants then completed the same Numbers Game from Study 
1. Results showed a significant interaction (F(1,116)=4.30, p=.04): 
Only when participants did not complete their tasks in front of a 
mirror did thinking about money lead to greater cheating than think-
ing about time (F(1,116)=9.11, p=.003). When a mirror was present, 
however, there was no difference in cheating between those in the 
money and time conditions, F<1. 
Study 4 measured self-reflection directly through self-report 
measures. Participants were primed with time or money using the 
same sentence unscramble task from Study 1, and then asked to 
rate their amount of self-reflection. Next, they completed a word 
unscramble task which provided an opportunity to cheat for extra 
money. The results show that those in the money condition reported 
lower levels of self-reflection compared to both the control (p=.001) 
and the time condition (p=.001), and participants reported greater 
self-reflection in the time condition than in the control condition 
(p=.024). The same pattern of results was found for cheating: Those 
in the money condition were more likely to cheat than those in ei-
ther the control (χ2(1, N=143)=4.04, p=.044) or time condition (χ2(1, 
N=145)=16.44, p<.001), and were less likely to cheat in the time 
condition than in the control condition (χ2(1, N=138)=4.16, p=.041). 
Finally, a mediation analysis revealed that self-reflection drove the 
effect of the prime on cheating behavior.
Taken together, these findings suggest that although priming 
money increases cheating, priming time reduces cheating because it 
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encourages self-reflection. This suggests that finding ways to nudge 
people to reflect on the self at the time of temptation, rather than on 
the potential rewards they can accrue by cheating, may be an effec-
tive way to curb dishonesty. 
Temporal Decay, Reinstatement, and Debiasing of Self-
Deception
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Research on the individual psychology of ethical decision mak-
ing tends to take a “one-shot” approach by examining the effect of 
one or more specific variables on one subsequent unethical act, or a 
global approach assessing general beliefs such the tendency to view 
oneself in a positive light (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Chambers & Wind-
schitl, 2004; Moore & Kim, 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Along 
these lines, Chance et al. (2011) documented how a single act of 
cheating can lead to self-deception in the short term. The current 
investigation explores ethics over a longer time course, examining 
how an initial unethical behavior changes people’s beliefs in the lon-
ger term – and how those beliefs are impacted by both receiving 
more information about one’s abilities over time (Study 1) and being 
provided with subsequent opportunities to engage in further unethi-
cal behavior (Study 2). 
People misbehave: They lie, they cheat, they steal, they betray. 
Yet most view themselves as good and moral individuals (Aquino 
& Reed, 2002). One means of resolving this apparent inconsistency 
between bad behavior and a positive self-image is through self-de-
ception (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004): distorting negative behavior 
to reflect positively on the self– for example, by cheating on tests 
and attributing improved performance to ability. Given the costs 
of self-deception to both individuals and organizations, we explore 
two means by which self-deception can be decreased: natural decay 
and an attentional intervention. We show that self-deception dimin-
ishes over time when self-deceivers are repeatedly confronted with 
evidence of their true ability (Study 1); importantly, however, this 
“learning” fails to make them less susceptible to future self-decep-
tion (Study 2). Given the ease with which self-deception recurs, we 
test a mechanism for debiasing self-deception: asking participants 
to reflect on the fact that they may have cheated, thereby drawing 
their attention to the true cause of their high performance (Study 3). 
Taken together, these studies offer insight into when and how self-
deception can be attenuated.
Cheating and self-deception paradigm
Participants are assigned to a control or an answer condition. 
Both groups complete a series of tests of general knowledge trivia 
such as “What is the only mammal that truly flies?” (from Moore 
& Healy, 2008). At the beginning of the study, they learn that for 
each test, they will earn an additional $0.25 for each correct an-
swer. Participants in the answers condition have the answers to all 
ten questions printed in an answer key at the bottom of the page. 
Their instructions read, “It’s okay to check your answers as you go, 
but please do your own work.” (A pilot study showed that using the 
answers to achieve a higher score was perceived as cheating and 
unethical.) The control group has the same test questions, but no an-
swer key. Everyone completes Test 1, and then receives a score sheet 
with an answer key on which they record their score. Thus, before 
continuing to Test 2, participants in both conditions have seen the 
answer key to Test 1 and know their Test 1 score. They then look 
over Test 2 before writing down their predicted score. After predict-
ing their score, they complete the test, which does not have answers 
at the bottom. Cheating is measured by significant differences in per-
formance between the control and answers groups on Test 1. Self-
deception is measured by significant differences between predictions 
and scores on subsequent tests for participants in the experimental 
conditions but not the control condition.
In Study 1, we observed the natural decay of self-deception 
over time, finding that when faced with repeated exposure to coun-
terevidence – in this case, scoring lower on three tests they could 
not cheat on – self-deceivers eventually come to terms with reality. 
In everyday life, however, people face repeated temptations to en-
gage in questionable behavior, and thus repeated opportunities for 
self-deception. Therefore, Study 2 tested whether a second chance 
to cheat would reinstate self-deception, overwhelming the effect of 
learning from corrective feedback. It did. Self-deception is therefore 
sticky, therefore reducing it may require an intervention after cheat-
ing has occurred, but prior to making predictions of future perfor-
mance. In Study 3, we tested whether drawing attention to the an-
swer key before the prediction task would reduce self-deception. We 
added a new “answers/attention” condition in which we interrupted 
test takers before they predicted their scores on Test 2 to ask them to 
reflect on the effect that the answer key might have had on their per-
formance on Test 1. Participants in the answers/attention condition 
predicted lower scores on the second test than those in the answers 
condition, despite both groups having cheated to a similar degree on 
the first test.
In our experiments, participants have the opportunity to cheat 
on a test, and then to self-deceive about their own ability. We ex-
plored two means by which self-deception may be decreased: by 
repeated counterevidence, and drawing attention to the root cause. 
Our studies demonstrate that time and repetition of unbiased feed-
back can reduce self-deception and eventually eliminate it (Study 1); 
however, the tendency can reemerge when the opportunity for cheat-
ing presents itself again (Study 2). Attentional interventions early in 
the process, however, may debias self-deception (Study 3). While 
we examined the impact of self-deception on people’s beliefs about 
their future performance, self-deception in contexts like these may 
also impact people’s subsequent behavior. For example, it may lead 
them to spend less time preparing for future challenges, thus reduc-
ing learning in addition to hampering the possibility of good future 
performance. Future research could examine this type of behavioral 
consequence, both in the context of academic cheating as well as in 
other contexts where people may inflate their performance by cheat-
ing and then deceive themselves.  
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Common adages like, “you get what you work for” and “there 
are no shortcuts” emphasize the importance of putting in significant 
“hard work” or effort to obtain the outcomes you desire.  In the cur-
rent session, we apply the notion of “hard work” to consumption. 
While prior research has shown that shopping difficulty leads to 
greater product liking (Cardozo 1965) and people value products 
more that they make themselves (Norton Mochon and Ariely 2012), 
limited research has explored what drives the desire to expend higher 
effort, the consequences of increased effort beyond valuation, or the 
contexts in which higher effort does not yield greater valuation. What 
makes us want to work hard? How might this desire shape our prod-
uct preferences?  How does hard work change our expectations or 
beliefs?  And finally, do we always want what we work for?  In the 
current session, we answer these questions, exploring what causes 
people to desire higher-effort products and the consequences of in-
creased effort across product and service contexts.
The papers in this session flow from antecedents to consequenc-
es. First, Cutright and Samper establish low personal control as a 
causal factor that drives a desire to expend greater effort and seek 
out products that require higher effort (e.g., exercise equipment that 
emphasizes harder vs. easier effort to see results). They find that low-
control consumers view these higher effort products as a vehicle to 
restore control.  Next, Naylor, Haws and Summers look at the conse-
quences of higher consumer effort in a loyalty context, establishing 
that the increased effort put forth by active loyalty program mem-
bers leads to increased feelings of control over randomly-determined 
outcomes.  Buechel and Janiszewski also look at the consequences 
of higher vs. lower effort in contexts where consumers have control 
over product design and composition (e.g., Build-a-Bear).  They find 
that when choices and assembly are integrated (i.e., you create as you 
build), increased effort drives increased value of the components, yet 
this effect reverses when choices and assembly are segregated (you 
make a plan first, then build).  Finally, Mathur, Block and Yucel-
Aybat examine how higher effort tasks can be shaped to improve 
performance and satisfaction for different types of consumers (entity 
vs. incremental theorists) depending on the presence of common goal 
progress cues.  
These papers, all at advanced stages of completion, should ap-
peal to anyone with an interest in consumer effort, identity, personal 
control, product design, customization, loyalty programs and goals. 
More broadly, this session should resonate with anyone interested in 
how hard work is shaped by and shapes the consumption process. 
Consumers are becoming more involved in choosing and design-
ing the products, services and activities they enjoy, thus expending 
a higher level of effort.  By examining this effort, we provide an 
avenue to make a difference in consumer welfare; we can empower 
consumers to use hard work to restore control over their lives, be 
cognizant of their biases in light of their hard work, target their work 
toward activities that will yield greater value, and help develop prod-
ucts that can more aptly benefit different types of consumers in high-
effort contexts.  
Doing it Hard Way: Low Personal Control Drives 
Preference for High-Effort Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Get stronger, healthier, skinnier, smarter, and cleaner with less 
work.  Such messaging is hard to escape in today’s marketplace.  At 
every turn, a product promises to help us improve in a variety of 
areas with exceptional ease.  Consistent with such communication, 
research suggests that people often seek experiences that require the 
least effort (e.g., Child 1946, Russell and Mehrabian 1975).  How-
ever, people also often appreciate more effortful experiences (Aron-
son and Mills 1959, Gibbs and Drolet 2003, Kivetz and Simonson 
2003).  Thus, we ask the question—when it comes to improving the 
self (and its extensions, such as the home), do consumers seek high 
or low effort products?  
We predict that feelings of control will be a critical determinant 
of whether consumers choose high or low effort products.  Specifi-
cally, we posit that when feelings of control are low, individuals will 
want to re-establish control (e.g., Fiske, Morling and Stevens 1996). 
Consequently, they will prefer products that emphasize and demon-
strate how their personal effort is required to generate results.  We 
test this hypothesis across 5 studies.
In study 1, our goal was to simply establish that low control 
leads people to favor the idea of high effort over that of low ef-
fort.  Participants first completed a common control manipulation 
(“write about a time when you had low (high) control”) (e.g., Kay, 
et al. 2008) and were presented with 9 different inspirational ads, 3 
emphasizing high effort (e.g., “You get what you work for”) and 3 
emphasizing low effort (e.g., “Relax.”).  For each ad, participants 
were asked, “How much do you agree with this quote?”  Analyses 
revealed a significant interaction of control manipulation by ad type 
(F(1, 54) = 7.42, p = .01).  Individuals in the low control condition 
preferred the high effort ad (M = 5.95) over the low effort ad (M = 
4.99).  The difference was not significant in the high control condi-
tion (in this study or in the remaining studies).
In study 2, we established that the desire for high effort products 
when control is low manifests itself in product attitudes.  We ma-
nipulated control as in study 1 and then presented participants with 
two current Swiffer™ commercials.  In the low effort condition, the 
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Swiffer ad stressed how easy it is to clean with Swiffer.  In the neu-
tral condition, the Swiffer ad highlighted the technical features of 
Swiffer.  Analyses revealed a significant interaction of control and 
effort condition on liking for Swiffer (F(1, 92) = 4.67, p = .03).  In-
dividuals in the low control condition preferred Swiffer more when 
it was associated with the neutral ad (M = 6.04) than when it was 
associated with the low effort ad (M = 5.33). 
In study 3, we sought to better understand the drivers of our ef-
fect.  We manipulated control with an established essay manipulation 
similar to studies 1 and 2 and then presented participants with a Nike 
sneaker that emphasized that it would either take less effort to get in 
shape with the shoe (“You don’t have to work as hard to get fit fast”) 
or more effort (“If you work hard, you get fit even faster.”).  Results 
revealed a 2-way interaction, (F(1, 151) = 3.90, p = .05) such that 
when control was low, individuals preferred the high effort ad (M = 
4.75) to the low effort ad (M = 3.91).  This result was fully mediated 
by the degree to which people felt empowered and restored feelings 
of control when thinking about the sneakers (95% CI, B=-.66; -1.34, 
-.06).
In study 4, our goal was to build on the prior studies and under-
stand not only purchasing attitudes, but also behavior.  We manipu-
lated feelings of control and then presented individuals with an ad 
about golf clubs that either emphasized that very little effort (“Im-
proves performance with limited practice or effort”) or a great deal of 
effort is required to improve performance (“Improves performance 
when accompanied by diligent practice and effort”) outcomes with 
the club.  Participants were then given an opportunity to practice 
putting, followed by questions regarding purchase intent.  Results 
indicated that when control was low, participants practiced longer 
(F(1, 160) = 5.34, p = .02) irrespective of effort condition, indicating 
a desire for greater control over their performance.  Importantly, par-
ticipants were more likely to purchase the clubs that were advertised 
with the high effort message (M = 3.78) than the low effort message 
(M = 2.91), suggesting preference for a product that was congruent 
with their desire to expend greater effort.    
In study 5, we ran a field experiment to test our hypotheses.  We 
recruited intramural basketball players directly after a game and pre-
sented them with a Nike shoe print ad.  The ad suggested that either 
less effort (“Work Less, Jump Higher”) or more effort (“Work Hard-
er, Jump Higher”) was required to improve their performance.  Re-
sults revealed a 2-way interaction (F(1, 82) = 3.91, p = .05) whereby 
when feelings of control were low (i.e., when individuals lost), indi-
viduals were more interested in purchasing the shoe when presented 
with the high effort ad (M = 3.76) versus the low effort ad (M = 2.75).
In conclusion, we find that when feelings of control are low, 
people prefer products that require hard work over those that require 
little work to achieve the same outcome.  We posit that this seeming-
ly irrational preference is due to a desire to reassert control through 
high effort.
Earning Luckiness: The Effect of Active Loyalty 
Program Membership on Consumer Predictions of 
Randomly-Determined Marketing Outcomes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research on loyalty programs has examined how structural 
and motivational features affect consumer behavior within program 
confines (Bagchi and Li 2011; Dréze and Nunes 2009; Kivetz 2005; 
Kivetz and Simonson 2002, 2003; Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 
2006; Lewis 2004). We add to this work by showing that loyalty 
program membership has psychological effects extending beyond 
the context of the program itself. Our series of studies demonstrates 
that consumers display a “lucky loyalty” effect, such that active loy-
alty program members feel they have a greater subjective likelihood 
of experiencing positive randomly-determined outcomes offered by 
the firm administering the loyalty program, even when these out-
comes are unconnected to the loyalty program. We propose that sta-
tus earned in a loyalty program through past purchases can lead to a 
relative illusion of control compared to non-members of the program 
or program members who lack elite status. This illusion of control, 
in turn, leads consumers to believe that randomly-determined posi-
tive firm-related outcomes are more likely to happen to them than to 
other customers of the firm. Why should this be the case? 
Thompson et al. (1998) introduce the “control heuristic” to ar-
gue that judgments about control are based on two conditions: In 
order for an individual to perceive that he or she has control over an 
outcome, he or she must (1) find the outcome desirable and (2) per-
ceive a link between his or her actions and the outcome. We propose 
that both of these conditions are present for elite members of loyalty 
programs considering randomly determined, positive outcomes like 
winning a sweepstakes or other promotional contest. These consum-
ers will naturally find the outcome desirable and, if they have put 
in enough effort to earn elite status with the company through past 
patronage, they will feel that they have earned special treatment. We 
posit that these two conditions (desirable outcome and perceived 
link between actions and outcome) lead to the perception that ac-
tive members of loyalty programs who have earned elite status are 
more likely to receive randomly-determined firm-related positive 
outcomes compared to others who have not earned the same elite 
status in the loyalty program.
We test our hypotheses across five studies that explore dif-
ferent types of loyalty programs and different types of randomly-
determined outcomes. The primary purpose of study 1a was to test 
whether hotel loyalty program members with elite status feel they 
are more likely to win a random drawing for a gift basket during a 
hotel stay than non-members of the loyalty program. Note that the 
drawing was open to all hotel guests and was not contingent on loy-
alty program membership or status. We conducted a 2 (loyalty pro-
gram elite status: yes vs. non-member of loyalty program) between-
subjects ANOVA with predicted likelihood of winning the random 
drawing as the dependent variable. The results revealed that elite 
loyalty program members thought they were more likely than other 
guests to win the drawing (2.91 vs. 2.39; F(1, 196) = 7.27, p < 0.01), 
supporting our prediction of a relative illusion of control for elite 
loyalty program members versus non-members. We also found that 
the perception that one has earned special treatment from the firm 
mediated the effect of loyalty program status (vs. non-membership) 
on predicted likelihood of winning the gift basket using procedures 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Zhao, Lynch, and 
Chen (2010); the mean indirect effect was positive and significant (a 
x b = .0522), with a 95% confidence interval excluding zero (.0069 
to .1172). Study 1a thus provides evidence that elite loyalty program 
members think they are more likely to receive positive randomly-
determined outcomes than non-loyalty program members and that 
this “lucky loyalty” effect is mediated by a sense of having earned 
special treatment from the firm. Study 1b compares retail credit card 
holders who have earned versus not earned “Valuable Customer” sta-
tus with the retailer. The results replicate the lucky loyalty effect and 
mediation by special treatment using a different positive firm-related 
outcome (Melite status = 2.88, Mno status = 2.44; F(1, 286) = 5.67, p < 0.05).
Study 2 again uses a retailer discount context and provides ad-
ditional evidence for the causal role of effort in the lucky loyalty 
effect by manipulating whether the consumer had to exert effort (by 
making purchases with the firm) in order to obtain elite status within 
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a loyalty program. As expected, the lucky loyalty effect obtains only 
when status is earned and not endowed (Mearned status = 3.16, Munearned status 
= 2.59, Mno status = 2.38; F(1, 198) = 6.61, p < .01). 
In studies 3 and 4, we demonstrate important boundary condi-
tions to the lucky loyalty effect that provide further support for the 
control heuristic as the causal mechanism. Specifically, in study 3 we 
show that the lucky loyalty effect does not extend to randomly-deter-
mined desirable outcomes not related to the firm administering the 
loyalty program, including outcomes related to other firms (i.e., win-
ning a prize under a soda cap, winning a restaurant raffle, getting an 
airline upgrade) or organizations (i.e., winning money in the lottery), 
and outcomes not related to any firm or organization (i.e., hitting 
green lights vs. getting stopped at red lights) (all p’s > .15). Finally, 
study 4 provides additional evidence in support of the control-related 
mechanism by demonstrating that the lucky loyalty effect does not 
obtain when the random firm-related outcome is undesirable (i.e., a 
sprinkler going off in the customer’s hotel room during their stay). 
Theoretically, our work contributes to the literature on illusory 
control (Langer 1975; 1977; Thompson et al. 1998), as our research 
shows that individuals appear to believe that they can “earn” control 
over positive randomly-determined outcomes through effort. It also 
has significant implications for firms deciding how to use loyalty 
programs and promotional contests.
Customized Assembly: How Does Effort Influence the 
Value of To-be-assembled Products?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often invest effort by participating in the production 
of products. Customized product assembly, for example, involves 
making a series of product composition choices while investing 
physical effort in assembling a product (e.g. Build-a-Bear).
Consumer participation in the production of products has been 
shown to lead to a greater valuation of the finished product (Dahl and 
Moreau 2007; Deng et al. 2010; Norton et al. 2012). This increased 
valuation has been attributed to an increased fit between the final 
product and consumer preferences (Delleart and Stremersch 2005; 
Franke and Piller 2004), feelings of competence (Dahl and Moreau 
2007; Norton et al. 2012), and feelings of pride/accomplishment 
(Dahl and Moreau 2007; Deng and Hutchinson 2011). The increase 
in valuation contrasts principles of economic theory, which suggest 
that effort expended during the design and assembly process should 
be subtracted from the value of the co-produced product (Bendapudi 
and Leone 2003; Dellaert and Stremersch 2005; Etgar 2008; Meuter 
and Bitner 1998).
We propose that positive or negative utility can be derived from 
the product assembly experience itself. To understand the utility 
from customization and assembly efforts that is independent from 
the end product (product fit, pride and accomplishment) we assess 
how customized assembly influences the perceived value of the com-
ponents of the to-be-assembled product. This approach assumes con-
sumers will assign more value to the components (e.g., the parts at 
Build-a-Bear) that provide a better customized assembly experience.
We hypothesize that assembly effort increases the perceived val-
ue of the components of the to-be-assembled product when the assem-
bly experience is positively engaging (i.e. creative), whereas assembly 
effort decreases the perceived value of the to-be-assembled product 
when the assembly experience negatively engaging (i.e., irritating). 
A customized assembly experience is more positively engaging when 
customization and assembly are integrated (i.e., the experience is cre-
ative) as opposed to segregated (i.e., the experience is irritating). 
We tested our predictions in four experiments using simple craft 
activity kits. Participants in our experiments were asked to create 
holiday themed figures by (1) choosing adornments from different 
adornment options  (e.g. two different ears, mittens, shoes), (2) cut-
ting out the adornment pieces and (3) assembling the figures by past-
ing these pieces onto a line-drawing of the figures. In all our experi-
ments effort expended to create the figure was manipulated by the 
number of adornments participants selected (3 vs. 8). Our dependent 
variable was their valuation of the craft activity kit (i.e. the to-be 
assembled-product). 
Study 1 manipulated whether customization decisions and as-
sembly actions were integrated or separated.  In an integrated “as-
semble-as-you-go” condition, participants were asked to pick the 
first adornment (e.g. ears) from two options, cut them out and paste 
them on the figure. Then they were asked to pick the second adorn-
ment (e.g. mittens), cut them out and paste them on the figure, and 
so forth. In a separated “assemble-at-the-end condition” participants 
chose their adornments and cut them out but did not paste them on 
the elf (i.e. assemble) until all choices were made and all pieces were 
cut out. In the ‘create-as-you-go” condition more effort (i.e. more 
choices and more pasting) led to a higher valuation of the compo-
nents of the to-be-assembled product (F(1, 152) = 6.75, p < .05). 
Mediation analysis revealed that this higher valuation was a conse-
quence of participants being positively engaged in the assembly task 
(i.e., finding the task creative; 95% CI = .56, 9.22). In the “assem-
ble-at-the-end condition, more effort led to a lower valuation of the 
components of the to-be-assembled product (F(1, 152) = 4.81, p < 
.05). This lower valuation was a consequence of participants being 
negatively engaged in the assembly task (i.e., finding the task irritat-
ing; 95% CI = -7.6, -.06).
Study 2 used the “create-as-you-go” condition from study 1. To 
separate the customization decision from the assembly process, half 
of the participants in this study created a plan of their choices before 
creating the figure “as they were going”. As in study 1, in the “no-
plan-create-as-you-go” condition more effort led to a higher valua-
tion of the components of the to-be-assembled product (F(1, 162) = 
8.38, p < .05). In the “plan-create-as-you-go”, more effort led to a 
lower valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product 
(F(1, 162) = 7.76, p < .05).
Study 3 used the “assemble-at-the-end” condition from study 1. 
To make this negatively engaging assembly process more positively 
engaging, half of the participants’ mindset was manipulated by  hav-
ing these participants think about what it was like to be young, create 
art at school and bring it home to share it with the family during 
the assembly process. As in study 1, in the “no-mindset-assemble-at-
the-end” condition, more effort led to a lower valuation of the com-
ponents of the to-be-assembled product (F(1, 174) = 3.49, p = .06). 
In the “positively-engaging mindset assemble-at-the-end” condition, 
more effort led to a higher valuation of the components of the to-be-
assembled product (F(1, 174) = 11.22, p < .05).
In summary, we show that the effort associated with customized 
assembly can add or detract from the perceived value of the compo-
nents of the to-be-assembled product.  By focusing on the value of 
the craft kit (or the-to-be-assembled-product) we show an influence 
of the customized assembly experience that is independent of the 
consequences of the customized assembly (i.e., the finished product). 
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The Effect of Goal Progress Salience Cues in Effortful 
Consumer Domains: An Implicit Theory Perspective
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers are faced with a plethora of products and services 
that provide cues to mark progress (called goal progress salience or 
GPS cues). Several firms endeavor to provide indications of prog-
ress (e.g., e-book readers that provide information about the percent-
age of the e-book completed; video games that provide information 
about the skill a player has learned at different levels) with the as-
sumption that consumers appreciate this information. The literature 
on goal progress has generally shown that providing progress cues 
tends to bolster performance and goal achievement (Cheema & 
Bagchi, 2011). However, contrasting research (e.g., Amir and Ari-
ely 2008) has shown that progress cues could hinder goal pursuit 
and task performance. In this research, we suggest that the effects 
of GPS cues may not be uniform for all individuals and for all kinds 
of consumption domains. Specifically, we suggest and find that the 
consumption domains that are deemed demanding and require con-
sumer effort are differentially impacted by the presence and type of 
such progress cues, contingent on whether consumers endorse an 
incremental-theory and focus on learning goals or endorse an entity-
theory and focus on the outcome.
Research has identified two types of implicit theories: entity and 
incremental. Entity-theorists tend to view people, events, and objects 
in relatively fixed, unchanging terms; whereas incremental-theorists 
possess a more dynamic and flexible view (Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 
2005). People often rely on their implicit theories to guide judgment 
and behavior when they encounter task domains that require effort 
and are deemed difficult. In the current research, we propose that 
when encountering demanding domains, entity-theorists, who are 
outcome-focused, will prefer opportunities that demonstrate favor-
able outcomes and provide evidence of their ability/achievement. 
Hence, cues that will inform entity-theorists about their achievement 
(e.g. cues that highlight percentage completed) will help them meet 
their performance goals. Thus, they will be less likely to persevere 
on a task and their performance will be negatively impacted. How-
ever, due to the positive outcome they infer from these cues, entity-
theorists’ task-evaluations will be favorable. In contrast, incremen-
tal-theorists, who are process-focused and are driven by learning 
goals, will not be impacted by GPS cues that highlight completion. 
Since incremental-theorists focus on building mastery skills in or-
der to achieve end goals, they will only be impacted by GPS cues 
that highlight learning, such that they will more favorably evaluate 
tasks that include learning-GPS cues, but their performance will be 
unaffected. In three studies, we support these expectations with both 
behavioral and self-reported measures using scenarios in which con-
sumers must expend effort (proofreading a difficult article) and find 
converging evidence in different consumption domains (maze books 
and language learning products). 
In study 1, set as a proofreading task, respondents proofread a 
dense chemistry article (demanding task) or a gossip article (less de-
manding task) that had been separated into five sections. After each 
section, half the respondents saw completion-GPS cues indicating 
the extent of completion, while the rest of the respondents did not 
see any completion-GPS cues. Implicit theory was manipulated by 
having respondents read and internalize proverbs associated with ei-
ther an entity or incremental-theory (Poon & Koehler, 2006). Results 
supported our expectations, such that in the demanding task condi-
tion, when the completion-GPS cue was present, entity (vs. incre-
mental) theorists evaluated the task more favorably (MET-Cue = 2.82, 
MIT-Cue = 2.25; p = .06), but their performance (measured as the ac-
curacy of proofreading) was worse (p < .05). When the completion-
GPS cue was not present, entity (vs. incremental) theorists evaluated 
the task less favorably (MET-no-Cue = 1.97, MIT-no-Cue = 2.82, p < .05). In 
the less demanding task condition, both theorists’ task evaluations 
and performance were unaffected regardless of the absence/presence 
of GPS cues. 
In study 2, we extended this finding by examining the effects 
of GPS cues that highlight learning, expecting incremental-theorists 
to more favorably evaluate tasks that included such cues. Implicit 
theory was manipulated as done in study 1. In a high-effort consumer 
domain, in which a Morse-code training package was presented as 
four modules, participants saw progress bars which informed them 
either about the percentage of the task completed (completion-GPS 
cue condition), or the skill they had learned (learning-GPS cue con-
dition) at the end of the each module. As expected, entity (vs. incre-
mental) theorists evaluated the Morse code training program more 
favorably when completion-GPS cues were present (MET-Completion = 
5.26, MIT-Completion = 4.88) and were more likely to buy the training 
module when they saw the completion (vs. learning GPS cues) (MET-
Completion = 3.77, MET-Learning = 3.02; p < .05).  Incremental-theorists, in 
contrast, evaluated the Morse code training product more favorably 
when they saw the learning (vs. completion) GPS cues (MIT-Completion = 
4.90, MIT-Learning = 5.62; p = .06). We also observed that entity (vs. in-
cremental) theorists felt better about themselves (MET-Completion = 5.34, 
MIT-Completion = 4.59; p < .05) and thought that they were good at Morse 
code when they saw the completion (vs. learning) GPS cues (MET-
Completion = 4.40, MET-Learning = 3.83). 
In study 3, we replicated these results using another consumer 
product category that requires consumer effort, a puzzle book of 
mazes. Participants completed four different mazes and saw either 
completion-GPS cues or learning-GPS cues. Results show that in 
the presence of completion (vs. learning) GPS cues, entity-theorists 
evaluated the mazes more favorably (MET-Completion = 4.85, MET-Learning 
= 4.11) and felt that they improved their ability (MET-Completion = 4.19, 
MET-Learning = 3.48). However, incremental-theorists evaluated the 
mazes more favorably (MIT-Completion = 4.10, MIT-Learning = 4.99) and felt 
that they improved their ability (MIT-Completion = 3.25, MIT-Learning = 4.20) 
in the presence of learning (vs. completion) GPS cues.
Thus, in three studies, we show that an individual’s implicit 
theory of change and whether the consumption domain is associated 
with expending effort, serve as important determinants of how such 
cues that highlight progress or learning impact task pursuit, achieve-
ment, and consumer satisfaction. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Digital technologies are becoming a pervasive component of 
consumers’ purchase experience. For example, U.S. e-commerce 
sales accounted for 5.4% of total sales in 2012 (Thomas, Davie, and 
Weidenhamer 2012) while mobile technologies influenced 5.1% of 
all U.S. retail sales in 2012 (Brinker et al. 2012). As we progress into 
the digital age, marketers have the opportunity to use advanced tech-
nologies, such as computers, smartphones and location-based ser-
vices, to gather consumer insights, influence consumer decisions at 
the point-of-purchase, and engage consumers in a truly unique man-
ner. However, in order to tap into the wealth of opportunity offered 
by digital advancements, marketers must first understand how con-
sumers utilize, interact, and react to these technologies. Therefore, 
the four papers in this session explore how new technologies impact 
consumers decisions and behaviors.   
In the first paper, Sciandra and Inman investigate consumers’ 
lay beliefs associated with in-store mobile technology use and assess 
how mobile technologies alter purchases. In particular, the authors 
explore the influence of shopping-related and shopping-unrelated 
mobile device use on consumer outcomes. Depending on use, Sci-
andra and Inman find that, counterintuitively, mobile technologies 
can lead to more unplanned purchases, more forgotten items, longer 
time spent shopping, and additional shopping trips. The second paper 
by Sheehan and Van Ittersum examines the influence of temporal 
distance on consumers’ mobile promotion redemption. They dem-
onstrate that the perceived temporal distance between a promotional 
offer and the promoted product influences redemption and evalua-
tion of the promoted product. While smartphones and smart carts 
provide flexibility in interacting with consumers, the results suggest 
that the timing of mobile marketing interventions during a shopping 
trip significantly impacts consumer decisions. In the third paper, Jia, 
Dai, and Jia explore the impact of mobile technologies on pro-social 
behaviors such as donation activities, recycling habits, and aiding 
strangers. The authors find that consumers’ wireless social network 
characteristics predict behavior in pro-social contexts. In particular 
Jia et al. show that greater social status (as measured by iPhone usage 
and connectivity asymmetry) negatively impacts voluntary behav-
iors intended to help others. Finally, Sharma assesses the impact of 
digital technology on the consumer package goods (CPG) industry 
and outlines key principles for marketing success. The author identi-
fies two barriers and accelerants to success of CPG in digital chan-
nels and finds that consumers’ preference for digital outlets depends 
upon the characteristics of the shopper and product category. 
This proposed session brings together a combination of lead-
ing scholars and practitioners to examine consumers’ use of and re-
sponse to digital technologies in general and mobile in particular. As 
a cohesive unit, the four papers illuminate the role of technology in 
the consumption environment and provide guidance for managers 
as they interact with the new “digital consumer.”  These papers ad-
dress a broad range of digital issues; further, each paper focuses on 
real-world problems facing marketers and consumers and maintains 
a cogent session theme. Importantly, because these papers also make 
conceptual contributions to multiple streams of literature (e.g., con-
strual-level theory, social influence, in-store decision making), this 
session should appeal to a broad audience.
Smart Phones, Bad Decisions? The Impact of In-store 
Mobile Technology Use on Consumer Decisions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A critical topic of interest to marketers, in-store decision mak-
ing is common for many consumers (Inman and Winer 1998). One 
understudied factor impacting consumer decisions are mobile tech-
nologies such as cellphones and smartphones. As mobile devices 
continue to grow in popularity, it is critical that marketers understand 
how these devices are used in retail environments. 
Recently, mobile technologies have been praised for helping 
consumers make better decisions (Shapiro 2012). However,  research 
acknowledges unintended visual and cognitive impairments associ-
ated with these devices (e.g., Strayer, Drews, and Johnston 2003; 
Strayer and Johnston 2001). Consequently, the use of mobile tech-
nologies in shopping environments may act as a double-edged sword 
with both positive and negative implications for shoppers. 
We argue that the nature of mobile use (shopping-related vs. 
shopping-unrelated) will differentially impact consumer outcomes. 
When used in an unrelated manner (e.g., talking, texting, surfing the 
web), we predict that multi-tasking exhausts attentional resources 
and results in negative outcomes such as purchasing more unwanted 
products or more time spent shopping. When used in a related manner 
(e.g., checking prices, using shopping applications), we predict that 
mobile technologies may have both positive and negative outcomes. 
For example, consumers should be better equipped to track spending 
and be more likely to purchase forgotten needs items. However, we 
also argue that relevant technology use may still prove distracting 
and result in more impulse purchases and longer shopping times.  
To gain a richer understanding of consumer in-store mobile use 
we completed two exploratory studies. In Study 1a, 30 consumers 
were asked to describe a time they used their mobile device in a re-
tail setting. Seventy percent of respondents indicated they used their 
phones to perform at least one shopping related and one shopping 
unrelated function during the trip. Despite using phones in both re-
lated and unrelated manners, 80% of respondents indicated that their 
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phone enhanced their decision making while only 13% of respon-
dents indicated that their phone acted as a significant distraction.
In Study 1b consumers again described a time they used their 
mobile device in a retail setting. However, half of the participants 
were prompted to discuss a time they used their phone in a related 
manner, while the remaining half were prompted to discuss a time 
they used their phone in an unrelated manner. The purpose of this 
study was to reveal lay beliefs of in-store mobile technology use. As 
anticipated, participants in the related condition believed their phone 
use helped with shopping (p <.001) and enhanced decision making 
(p <.001) more than participants in the unrelated condition. 
In addition, we asked participants to evaluate shopping out-
comes in direct comparison to situations in which they were not us-
ing their phone. In comparison to not using a mobile device, partici-
pants in both groups disagreed that they had bought more; disagreed 
that they forgot to purchase more products that they intended to pur-
chase; and disagreed that they spent more money (all p’s <.001). 
This implies that consumers do not believe mobile technology use 
to greatly impact the nature, number, or cost of products purchased.  
Study 2 used data from the 2012 POPAI Shopper Engagement 
Study to investigate the influence of in-store phone use on consumer 
purchases. In the study, shoppers across the U.S. were interviewed 
before and after grocery shopping. We included a survey question 
asking about mobile technology use during the trip. This information 
allowed us to partition consumers into four mobile usage categories: 
1) no phone use, 2) related use (Related), 3) unrelated use (Unre-
lated), and 4) related and unrelated use (Both).
We find that in-store mobile technology significantly altered 
consumers’ behaviors. First, looking at unplanned purchases, we 
find that consumers in the Unrelated usage condition made more un-
planned purchases when compared to consumers not using phones (β 
= .12, p <.01). However, shoppers in the Related or Both conditions 
did not show any difference in unplanned purchases compared to 
shoppers not using phones. Therefore, under certain conditions in-
store mobile phone use stimulates additional consumer purchases. 
Second, looking at number of items planned but not purchased, 
we found that participants in the Unrelated condition missed more 
planned items than consumers not using mobile technologies (β = 
.26, p <.05) Further, consumers in the Related condition missed mar-
ginally more planned items than individuals not using mobile tech-
nology (β = .19, p <.10). This result is consistent with our contention 
that mobile technology use distracts consumers from the shopping 
task. 
Third, assessing trip length, we found that Unrelated phone 
use enhances the positive effect of number of items purchased on 
shopping time (β = .01, p <.05). Therefore, it appears that Unrelated 
phone use can substantially increase the amount of time spent in-
store for shoppers planning to purchase many items.  
Finally, we found an interesting relationship between phone 
use and deviations from expected spending. Overall, shoppers in the 
Unrelated condition spent less than they expected compared to shop-
pers not using a phone (p <.05). However, Unrelated technology 
use strengthened the positive impact of number of items purchased 
on deviations from expected spending (β = .02, p <.01). Essential-
ly, as consumers in the Unrelated condition made more purchases 
they exceed expected spending more rapidly. Further, Unrelated use 
strengthens the negative relationship between planned items not pur-
chased and deviations from expected spending (β = -.05, p <.05). 
This result is consistent with our prior finding that consumers using 
phones in an Unrelated manner miss more planned items and sug-
gests that these consumers may need to make additional shopping 
trips to purchase forgotten items. 
In summary, we find that mobile phone use can exert a distract-
ing influence on shoppers and interfere with shopping goals. Fur-
ther, it appears that consumers do not anticipate these effects. While 
consumers understand the positive implications of in-store mobile 
technology use, it appears they are unaware of the negative impact 
these devices can have, especially when used in a distracting manner. 
Depending on use, mobile technology may lead to more unplanned 
purchases, more planned but not purchased items, longer shopping 
times, and additional shopping trips.  
So Close, Yet So Far Away: The Influence of Temporal 
Distance on Mobile Promotion Redemption during a 
Shopping Experience
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers have traditionally been exposed to price promotions 
either before entering a store or at the moment of choice (Blattberg, 
Briesch, and Fox 1995). Yet, with the proliferation of consumer fac-
ing technology, such as smartphones or smart shopping carts, retail-
ers and manufacturers have a greater level of flexibility as to when 
to present shoppers with promotions during a shopping experience. 
This research contributes by examining the role of the temporal 
distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product 
and its influence on redemption likelihood, product perceptions, and 
spending behavior. 
Priming literature states that promotional offers should be tran-
sient, which suggests that shoppers are more likely to redeem a pro-
motion when it is encountered closer to the purchase decision for 
the promoted product (Crowder 1976). However, temporal construal 
theory suggests that the temporal distance between the promotion 
and the promoted product positively influences consumer percep-
tions about the product (Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002). 
Specifically, when decisions are perceived to be temporally distant, 
individuals construe these decisions in terms of abstract, high-level 
terms, while more temporally proximal decisions are based in con-
crete, low-level considerations (Liberman and Trope 1998). Tem-
poral distance increases the influence of the value of high-level 
construals, while reducing the value of low-level construals, in con-
sumer purchase decisions and evaluations.
An important distinction between high- and low-level constru-
als of goal-directed behavior is the focus on desirability versus feasi-
bility considerations (Liberman, Trope, and Wakslak 2007; Vallacher 
and Wegner 1987). Desirability considerations refer to the value of 
the decision outcome (the “why” of the behavior), whereas feasi-
bility considerations refer to the ease or difficulty of reaching the 
decision outcome (the “how” of the behavior; Trope, Liberman, and 
Wakslak 2007). This implies that when the temporal distance be-
tween the promotional offer and the promoted product is close (e.g., 
the promotion is offered immediately prior to the purchase decision), 
shoppers would be relatively more influenced by feasibility consid-
erations, such as the costs and uncertainties associated with acquir-
ing the promoted product (Castaño et al. 2008). When the temporal 
distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product 
is longer (e.g., the promotion is offered in advance of the purchase 
decision), shoppers are relatively more influenced by desirability 
considerations, such as the brand or taste (Alexander, Lynch, and 
Wang 2008). 
In order to examine the influence of temporal distance between 
the promotional offer and the promoted product on redemption like-
lihood and spending behavior, we conducted a number of simulated 
shopping tasks.  In Study 1, participants were presented with a shop-
ping list consisting of 8 different product categories and told that 
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their decisions would occur in the order of the shopping list. Af-
ter every purchase, the shopping list indicated what purchases have 
been made with a strikethrough (ex: bread) to draw attention to the 
temporally sequence of purchase decisions (Hornik 1984). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a tempo-
rally distant promotional offer (received prior to the 2nd purchase 
decision), a temporally proximal promotional offer (received prior 
to the 5th purchase decision that was for the promoted product), or 
a control condition with no promotions. The promotional offer was 
“$2 off Starbucks ground coffee.” The results indicate the promo-
tions were effective: participants in both promotion conditions were 
more likely than the control condition to purchase Starbucks (21% 
vs. 6%; χ2=9.129, p<0.01)]. More importantly, and consistent with 
temporal construal level theory, participants were more likely to re-
deem temporally distant promotions than proximal promotions (34% 
vs. 17%; χ2= 4.78, p<0.05), 
Study 2 replicated Study 1 with the three exceptions. First, to 
mitigate concerns of primacy, participants shopped for 12 items with 
the promoted product as the 11th purchase decision. The temporally 
distant promotion occurred before the 5th purchase decisions, while 
the proximal promotion occurs before the 11th purchase decision. 
Second, the promotional offer was reduced from $2 to $1. Third, 
perceptions of the promoted product were collected to examine the 
salience of desirability considerations. As in Study 1, the promotions 
were effective (37% vs. 8%; χ2=7.05, p<0.01), and participants were 
more likely to redeem temporally distant promotions than proximal 
promotions (50% vs. 26%; χ2=2.84, p<0.1). Furthermore, partici-
pants who received the temporally distant promotional offer evalu-
ated the taste and quality of the coffee more favorably than those 
who received the temporally proximal promotion (F(1,87)= 5.57, 
p<0.05).  This suggests a temporally distance promotion may actu-
ally enhance a shopper’s evaluation the desirability characteristics of 
the promoted product.
In order to examine the robustness of the effect of promotional 
temporal distance and the proposed mechanism in more detail, Study 
3 promoted a product in a different category: $1 off for Freschetta 
frozen pizza. Furthermore, additional perceptual measures were col-
lected to examine the effect of the temporal distance on both de-
sirability and feasibility considerations. The results again show that 
the promotional temporal distance increases the likelihood that par-
ticipants redeem the promotion and purchase the promoted product 
(50.0% vs. 39.5%; χ2=1.85, p<0.10). Furthermore, the promotional 
temporal distance is shown to positively relate to a consumer’s per-
ceptions of the promoted product’s taste (5.66 vs. 5.18, F(1,96)=4.15, 
p<.05). An examination of the purchases of those participants that 
did not purchase the promoted product revealed some interesting re-
sults. The temporally proximal promotion leads to a lower spending 
on pizza ($6.39 vs. $6.19; t(1,94)=1.63; p=0.10), resulting in higher 
share for the least expensive brand (39% vs. 20%; χ2=4.14, p<0.05). 
Thus, temporally distant promotions appear to enhance the desirabil-
ity considerations (e.g., taste) of the promoted product, while the 
temporally proximal promotion enhances the influence of feasibility 
considerations (e.g., price).
This research makes two important contributions. First, we are 
among the first to examine how consumer make distinct inferences 
about products by increasing the temporal distance between the pro-
motion and product within a single shopping trip. Second, we sig-
nificantly extend the literature on Construal Level Theory (Thomas, 
Chandran, and Trope 2006) by demonstrating how the level of a con-
strual about a promoted product changes within a shopping trip as a 
function of only a few purchases.
The Wireless Good Samaritan: Pro-social Behavior in 
Mobile Networks
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A growing body of research on individual and group behavior 
in digital social networks (Borgatti et al. 2009; Eagle, Pentland, and 
Lazer 2009; Kossinets and Watts 2006; Lazer et al. 2009; Onnela et 
al. 2007) suggests that network and telecommunications patterns can 
predict social relationships and other behavioral constructs (Eagle et 
al. 2009; Onnela et al. 2007). Population-scale telecommunications 
databases of prior behavioral histories thus open new avenues for 
investigating pro-sociality, especially given how the ubiquity of mo-
bile telecommunications in modern life has irrevocably altered the 
basic parameters of social interactions. In a world where most human 
beings are constantly interconnected through wireless networks, mo-
bile telecommunications (e.g. voice call, text message, internet) have 
not only expanded the boundaries of traditional social interactions, 
but have also began to substitute for face-to-face interactions (Eagle 
et al. 2009; Onnela et al. 2007). How pro-social behaviors function 
within humanity’s unprecedented state of networked interconnectiv-
ity remains an open question, especially given the known basis of 
pro-sociality in face-to-face environments.
Pro-social norms are evolutionarily adaptive social character-
istics displayed not only by humans (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; 
Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; 
Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971) but also by species rang-
ing from chimpanzees to rats (de Waal 2008; de Waal, Leimgruber, 
and Greenberg 2008; Rutte and Taborsky 2007). For many species, 
including our homininae relatives, pro-social acts are strongly biased 
in favor of kin and reciprocating partners, and are never extended to 
strangers (Rutte and Taborsky 2007). Even amongst humans, adher-
ence to pro-social norms is often determined by un-altruistic factors 
such as personal identification, relatedness, immediacy, peer pres-
sure, and potential future interactions (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; 
Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; 
Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971). However, these conven-
tional theoretical preconditions for pro-social behavior are much 
weaker, if not completely non-existent, during interactions between 
strangers in non-traditional wireless network contexts. Vastly dif-
ferent from our evolutionary environments (Axelrod and Hamilton 
1981; Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 
2000; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971), wireless or virtual 
social contexts are often anonymous, distant, one-to-one, and single-
shot. Exploring pro-social behavior within such contexts not only 
allows us to explore how social network characteristics can predict 
pro-sociality in the modern social landscape, but also tests the dura-
bility of the social norm in a ‘vacuum’ environment. 
In a large-scale exploratory phone survey and two random-
ized field experiments, we successfully use people’s social network 
characteristics to predict the strength of objective and verifiable pro-
social behavior in a large wireless network. Besides demonstrating 
what specific network characteristics predict actual pro-social be-
havior in multiple domains (Studies 1 and 2), we also test the causal-
ity of our predictors in between-condition field experiments within 
the network (Study 3). 
Across three studies that involved 10,000 mobile phone us-
ers (who were connected to 330,000 other users on a mobile net-
work), we used field experiments that combine measures of verifi-
able behavior, population-scale databases of network behavior, and 
between-condition manipulations to study the basis of pro-social 
behavior. We found that individuals’ social status (e.g., iPhone own-
ership) and network structure (e.g. network centrality) could predict 
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their pro-social behavioral intentions (Study 1) and actual pro-social 
behavior in a range of contexts (Study 2). Specifically, in Study 2, 
we sent text messages, ostensibly messages from a stranger, to 5,000 
randomly selected mobile phone numbers (directly connected with 
137,710 other subscribers) that requested a response, e.g. “I’m feel-
ing depressed with the holidays, can you send me some cheerful 
message?” Higher status predicted less altruistic helping behavior, 
more response latencies, less detailed responses, etc. 
Critically, we are able to causally test this relationship with 
between-condition experimental manipulations.  In Study 3, re-
search assistants called 2,000 randomly selected numbers (with 
76,783 other direct connections) and masqueraded as a visitor who 
just arrived in a city, who ostensibly misdialed while trying to call 
a friend, and attempted to ask for directions “since you’re already 
on the line”. Number of questions answered and time spent were 
used as dependent variables. We manipulated the accent of the caller 
as a novel proxy for social status, and found that individuals with 
higher status within their wireless network discriminated against 
lower-class accents in terms of amount of help rendered. That an in-
teraction between social status network-variables and an exogenous 
manipulation of social status moderated previous effects showed that 
the network variables in Studies 1 and 2 did not reflect some factor 
unrelated to social status, such as dispositional curiosity or informa-
tion overload
Whereas previous network research has often been limited by 
correlational results and lack of hypothesis testing, our research 
strategy bridges the gap between network research and traditional 
scientific research by allying the predictive power of network data 
with classic experimental design and hypothesis testing. Our meth-
odology is the first to combine measurements of verifiable behav-
ior, exogenous between-condition experimental manipulations, and 
large-scale network data analysis, and uses a previously untapped 
wealth of individual behavioral histories from wireless devices to 
identify and confirm the drivers of pro-social behavior.
We advance the understanding of theoretical constructs of so-
cial network connections by linking them to real behavior. We show 
that it was not the number and strength of connections between peo-
ple in a network, but the relative structure of those connections that 
best predicted actual behavior. In particular, we identified connectiv-
ity asymmetry as a network variable that proxies for social status and 
can predict a wide range of behaviors. We show that greater social 
status predicted less pro-social behavior in several domains, contrary 
to traditional notions of social responsibility and social welfare. 
Furthermore, we introduce several new measurement tech-
niques to capture real and verifiable pro-social behavior; our use of 
binary response rate and strength of response (measured both explic-
itly by task completion, and implicitly by time spent) represents an 
ecologically valid measurement that can be used in numerous com-
munication contexts for any research question that looks at response 
strength (e.g. advertising response, falling for phishing). 
Most importantly, our results showcase the possibilities of us-
ing large network based field experiments in experimental social 
sciences, which has recently come under criticism for small sample 
sizes, biased selection and self-reported information, and other meth-
odology flaws. A network based approach can potentially facilitate 
experiments with sample sizes in the millions and capture real be-
haviors that were previously inaccessible before detailed and objec-
tive histories of individual behavior from large consumer-technology 
databases became widely available. 
Digital Shopping: What You Need to Consider
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Success in the digital shopping environment requires a deep 
understanding of shopper needs and the ability to effectively de-
liver products to consumers. The digital revolution has transformed 
industries like music, books and travel almost entirely because e-
commerce solutions delivered shopper needs in ways that traditional 
channels couldn’t match. Are consumer packaged goods (CPG) next 
in line? Further, is technology a friend or a foe to retailing in CPG? 
This paper provides a thorough assessment of the impact of digital 
on the CPG industry, and outlines key principles for marketing suc-
cess in a world where digital is the new normal. While we acknowl-
edge that both shopper understanding and economic considerations 
dictate success in the digital world, this paper focuses primarily on 
the former: the shopper, their category needs, and the digital touch-
points that influence their behavior. 
Digital technology is widely pervasive today and will only con-
tinue to grow at a rapid pace into the future. For example, over 117 
million people own smartphones, and approximately 80 percent of 
them use these devices for shopping activities like finding stores, 
making lists, checking prices, researching products, sharing content, 
and purchasing (Nielsen Mobile Shopping Report, Q1 2012; Nielsen 
Mobile Panel, 2012). Amidst these activities, people seek to satisfy 
three fundamental needs when they shop: convenience, choice, and 
value. We believe that product category characteristics will interact 
with these fundamental needs and influence digital sales of CPG 
products.    
To examine this contention, we conducted extensive research 
across 36,000 shoppers of CPG products spanning 18 categories, in-
cluding both food and non-food items. Based on our research and 
analysis of online purchase data, we identified two barriers and two 
enablers that collectively determine how successful a CPG category 
can be in e-commerce. The two category characteristics identified as 
barriers to digital success are urgency and inspection. The urgency 
barrier refers to shoppers’ desires to buy and use immediately, with-
out waiting to have the product delivered. The second barrier is the 
inspection barrier or the need to inspect certain products. Concerns 
about spoilage can discourage online purchasing because they neg-
atively affect the product value proposition if items get discarded. 
Moreover, since consumers are more likely to buy other products 
that they need while examining spoilable goods, the inspection bar-
rier has a secondary effect on the entire basket. 
In addition, our research uncovered two category characteris-
tics which enable the success of CPG in e-commerce: the stock-up 
enabler and the price enabler. Storable goods, such as products with 
predictable consumption rates and a long shelf life (e.g., diapers and 
dog food) lend themselves to online purchasing. As for price factors, 
online retailers enjoy several cost advantages over traditional opera-
tions, particularly related to overhead. Lower costs of doing business 
online often translate directly to lower consumer prices or steeper 
discounts for digital shoppers. This allows marketers to retain price 
sensitive shoppers in a more profitable way. 
Along with CPG product categories, our research also investi-
gates consumer usage of digital touchpoints (e.g., websites, social 
media sites, blogs, and coupon sites) and how these touchpoints 
influence shoppers’ purchase decisions for various CPG categories. 
Based upon our analysis, three key findings emerged. First, prefer-
ence for digital touchpoints varies across shoppers. In particular, con-
sumer demographics influence the type of digital media consulted. 
For example, African-American shoppers use store websites more 
than other consumers while Hispanic shoppers tend to rely more 
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on blogs. Second, shoppers prefer different digital touchpoints for 
different CPG categories. For example, consumers use coupon sites 
most often when purchasing diapers; brand emails most often when 
purchasing baby food or diet aids; and store websites most often 
when purchasing small appliances. Finally, an integrated approach, 
leveraging traditional and digital touchpoints, is most effective. Fo-
cusing solely on a social or mobile strategy is not prudent. Marketers 
must recognize which digital touchpoints are effective and use them 
judiciously in concert with traditional marketing efforts.
For the CPG industry, digital shopping represents an evolution-
ary development bringing manufacturers and retailers closer to the 
consumer. Effective digital shopper marketing requires that market-
ers identify the decisions shoppers make along the path to purchase, 
when they intend to buy specific products, and then determine the 
right mix of digital touchpoints to influence those decisions. In con-
clusion, our research investigates how category characteristics of 
CPG alter digital sales and identifies how consumers’ preferences 
for digital outlets vary across categories. We contend that by leverag-
ing digital and its distinct characteristics, retailers can complement 
brick-and-mortar operations rather than replace them, building sales 
on both fronts.  For manufacturers, we conclude that digital is no 
longer optional. It is paramount that manufacturers engage shoppers 
using digital touchpoints, particularly mobile, to influence relevant 
decisions on their path to purchase. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Understanding how people make decisions about consumption, 
particularly indulgences, is important from the perspective of not 
only marketing but also public health and policy. Much of the exist-
ing research examines decisions in which a more virtuous/healthy 
option is contrasted with a more indulgent/unhealthy one.  Further-
more, the experimental target is often to understand how related 
goals or particular attributes of the choice targets might bias the out-
come. However, in everyday life, consumption decisions can arise in 
a manner that is intertwined with other considerations. A choice to 
go to a party might add social elements or framing to a decision to 
accept an alcoholic drink, or to absent-mindedly dip in to a bowl of 
chips. Thus this session examines how seemingly separate events can 
influence individuals to pursue more or less indulgent consumption 
paths. The events studied range from personal choices or experiences 
to entirely exogenous occurrences. However, across findings, their 
impact on consumption appears to be related to how important a per-
son feels the event is to their own self and/or goals. 
To better approach the complexity of these effects, the work in 
this session represents both laboratory experiments, and empirical 
analyses of “real world” data.  The first paper, by Karmarkar and Bol-
linger, shows that taking an environmentally virtuous action caused 
grocery shoppers to reward themselves by increasing purchases of 
indulgent foods in addition to purchasing more “green” items. But it 
also shows that this result was sensitive to common competing mo-
tivations. In the second paper by Wadhwa and Kim, losing a chance 
based game subsequently led to an increased desire for unrelated re-
warding items.  Notably, this effect was dependent on how strongly 
the loss was felt – that is, on the game’s outcome being  “near-win.” 
The work by Cornil and Chandon extends beyond losing a game 
oneself, to watching others lose. Using archival and experimental 
data, they find that a loss in a sporting event can increase consump-
tion of unhealthy food by fans who identify with the losing team. 
This effect was tied to degree to which the loss was felt as a personal 
one. Balancing these data on increased indulgences, work by Dai, 
Milkman and Riis, provides evidence that externally defined events 
can also promote more “industrious” choices when they are seen 
as opportunities or signals for the individual to make a fresh start. 
Again, the power of these events arose from how meaningful they 
were to the individual. 
As implied, these papers raise the general question of how im-
portant self-identification with an event is as a mechanism (or mod-
erator) for these effects.  Related discussion questions are 1) whether 
it is also important that the acts of consumption are strongly affective 
and/or associated with the self and 2) whether the impact of separate 
events is related to being an unconscious influence, or a conscious 
motivation.  By combining experimental results with field (or empiri-
cal) data, these findings may provide practical suggestions for “mak-
ing a difference,” in addition to appealing to researchers who study 
consumption, health-related behavior and goals/motivation.
BYOB: Bringing Your Own Shopping Bags Leads to 
Indulging Yourself and the Environment
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As concerns about climate change and resource availability be-
come more central in the public discourse, the use of reusable grocery 
bags has been strongly promoted as an environmentally and socially 
conscious virtue. Thus it is useful to ask whether adoption of this 
behavior could subconsciously influence consumers’ in-store choices 
(e.g. Dijksterhuis et al. 2005). As a physical reminder of a virtuous 
act, reusable bags might be assumed to prime shoppers’ attention or 
motivation towards environmentally responsible products. Similarly, 
bringing one’s own bags could be self-signaling, suggesting to the 
consumer that they themselves are “green” or “good”, leading to a 
higher spend on organic or healthy foods and possibly avoiding in-
dulgent ones, for the sake of consistency.  
However, we propose that as an indicator of a virtuous self, 
bringing a bag gives shoppers permission to make less virtuous 
choices.  Such a result is consistent with licensing effects, in which 
a virtuous action in one domain allows individuals to select indul-
gences in subsequent choices (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005, Khan and 
Dhar 2006). Here we demonstrate support for both priming and li-
censing effects of bringing one’s own grocery bags via a combination 
of experimental studies and empirical analysis of real world shop-
ping data. 
In our first study, participants (N = 74) were asked to examine 
a schematic of a grocery store layout, and to imagine going to shop 
at this store. We asked participants to list ten food items they would 
be likely to purchase during this trip.  People who imagined they had 
brought reusable bags with them listed significantly more indulgent 
items, such as desserts or snack chips, than those who had received 
no information about bags (F(1,72) = 4.39, p<.05).  
A second experimental study investigated whether this in-
creased consideration of indulgent purchases was accompanied by 
an increase in their perceived value.  Participants (N=377) again 
were instructed to imagine shopping for groceries, and were (were 
not) told that they had brought their own bags with them. They then 
indicated their willingness to pay (WTP) for groceries from “green”, 
“hedonic” and “baseline” (e.g. canned soup) categories. In an ad-
ditional manipulation, participants either did, or did not, see prices 
associated with each item.  For the group who received no price in-
formation, those who imagined shopping with reusable bags showed 
a relatively higher WTP for both green (F(1,337)=8.52; p<.005) and 
hedonic (F(1,373)=13.97; p<.001) foods as compared to the baseline. 
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However, when price information was present, no effects of bringing 
a bag were found for either category.  
Together, these experimental results suggest that the use of re-
usable shopping bags might have a significant influence on grocery 
purchasing behavior in stores.  However, the findings here are sensi-
tive to other information, such as the salience of reference prices. 
Thus it was important to examine whether these results existed “in 
the field”, where consumers are exposed to many different compet-
ing influences.  In addition, using real data meant that the decisions 
reflected true incentive compatibility, in comparison to the hypothet-
ical experimental situations.  
Thus as a third study, we performed an empirical analysis of 
cardholder transaction data from one location of a large U.S. grocery 
store chain. The data include over 2 million transactions by approxi-
mately 60,000 households, although we restrict the sample to fre-
quent shoppers.  Transactions in which the consumers had their own 
shopping bags were identified by a small monetary bag credit.  Using 
a rich set of controls, we found that having one’s own bags increased 
consumers’ probability of purchasing both hedonic items (e.g. chips 
and high sugar foods like desserts or candy) as well as organic ver-
sions of products. These data also show how the effects of bringing 
one’s own bag are sensitive to common competing motivations. In 
studies 1 and 2, the data was restricted to individuals who did not 
have dependents under the age of 18, as the presence of children in 
a household has distinct influences on grocery basket composition, 
particularly in the realm of health conscious choices (Mangleburg, 
1990; Prasad et al, 2008;).  For study 3, we designed one set of con-
trols to identify shoppers with young dependents in their household. 
Our analysis confirmed that the effects of bringing one’s own bag 
on indulgent purchasing only held for those consumers who did not 
show other purchases related to having very young children. 
We demonstrate that remembering to bring one’s own grocery 
bags may license consumers to treat themselves while also priming 
them to treat the environment.  This suggests that consumers would 
be particularly sensitive to the impulse indulgences often found at 
checkout registers, as the presence of the bags becomes highly sa-
lient at this point.  It also predicts that environmentally related prod-
ucts could benefit from this stage of the shopping experience, since 
their consideration should be increased as well.  In addition, seating 
our effect within the licensing literature suggests that its occurrence 
is dependent on consumers’ having some agency in choosing to bring 
their bags (Khan and Dhar 2006). Thus as several communities, cit-
ies and countries consider laws banning disposable bags (New York 
Times, 2012), the strength of these effects are likely to depend more 
on individual consumer’s attributions for whether they (or the gov-
ernment) are the reason they are bringing their own bags.  
The Nearly Winning Effect
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research on goal gradient theory has shown that one’s mo-
tivational drive associated with a reward intensifies with increasing 
advancement toward the reward (Hull 1983). These findings raise an 
interesting question—what would happen to this intensified motiva-
tional drive when one nearly wins a reward? To answer this ques-
tion, we turn to an emerging body of research on motivation, which 
suggests that the motivational drive is more general in nature, such 
that once induced through an incidental cue, it could lead to a broad 
array of reward seeking behaviors (Van den Bergh, Dewitte and 
Warlop 2008; Wadhwa, Shiv and Nowlis 2008). Drawing upon these 
findings, we propose that the intensified but unsatiated motivational 
drive induced as a result of nearly winning a reward could enhance 
the desire to seek subsequent unrelated rewards. We term this effect, 
the “nearly winning” effect. We examine our nearly winning effect 
hypothesis in four studies, including a field study, and also rule out 
alternative accounts related to mood and arousal.
In Study 1, we tested our basic research hypothesis related to 
the nearly winning effect. The winning factor was manipulated by 
having participants play an eight trial game, similar to the comput-
er game—minesweeper—where they saw a box of 16 tiles, half of 
which contained a rock, while other half contained a diamond. If 
they managed to find eight diamonds, they could win a pen. The 
game was rigged such that in the clearly-losing condition, partici-
pants only managed to find one out of the eight diamonds. In order 
to examine our argument related to increasing advancement toward 
the reward, we included two nearly-winning conditions in this study. 
In both the nearly-winning conditions, participants managed to find 
seven of the eight diamonds. However, in one of the conditions, 
participants missed a diamond on the eighth trial (nearly-winning- 
advancement) whereas in the other condition, participants missed a 
diamond on the second trial itself (nearly-winning-no advancement). 
Therefore, in the nearly winning-no advancement condition, while 
participants still nearly won the reward, they were aware of losing 
the reward from the second trial and thus the feeling of advancement 
toward the reward was attenuated early on. Subsequently, partici-
pants were informed that they could return their survey and collect a 
small gift (a chocolate bar) from another experimenter at the end of 
the corridor. The speed with which they walked to get the chocolate 
bar became the main dependent variable in this study. Consistent 
with the nearly winning hypothesis, our results show that those who 
missed a diamond on the eighth trial in the computer game (nearly-
winning-advancement condition) showed a greater desire for choco-
late bar, as manifested in the walking speed toward the chocolate bar, 
than those in the nearly-winning-no advancement or clearly-losing 
conditions. Furthermore, there was no difference in walking speed 
between the nearly-winning-no advancement and the clearly-losing 
conditions. Given there was no difference in these two conditions, in 
the subsequent studies, we dropped the nearly winning-no advance-
ment condition.
In the second study, we sought to provide stronger support for 
our underlying conceptualization by examining the role of reward 
value in moderating the nearly-winning effect. Further, in this study, 
we used level of salivation toward a reward as a way to measure 
one’s desire for a reward (Gal 2012). We argue that if the nearly win-
ning effect is driven by a general increase in desire for a reward, then 
those in the nearly-winning condition versus clearly-losing condition 
should salivate more when presented with an unrelated high reward 
value item, but not a low reward value item The winning factor was 
manipulated using the same game used in the first study and the re-
ward value was manipulated by having participants view a picture of 
either a high reward value (100 dollar bills) or a low reward value 
(five cents) item. Our findings provide support for our hypothesis—
nearly winning versus clearly losing in the game subsequently led to 
a higher salivation level toward an unrelated high reward value item, 
but not toward a low reward value item. No such difference was 
found in the level of salivation for participants in the clearly-losing 
condition. Moreover, there were no differences found in the mood 
or arousal levels across conditions in this or in subsequent studies. 
In the third study, we provide further support for our conceptu-
alization related to the activated motivation drive by showing that the 
nearly-winning effect gets attenuated when the motivational drive is 
dampened in an intervening task. Participants played the same game 
used in the previous two studies. In this study, we also included a 
winning condition (wherein participants did manage to find all the 
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eight diamonds). Subsequently, we manipulated the motivational 
drive dampening by having participants sample either an unpleasant 
odor or a neutral odor (adopted from Wadhwa et al., 2008). Partici-
pants then engaged in a purportedly unrelated card arranging reward 
responsivity objective test (CARROT; Powell et al. 1996), which 
measures how much effort an individual exerts to earn a reward. 
Consistent with our predictions, those in the nearly-winning condi-
tion, versus clearly-losing condition and clearly-winning conditions, 
exerted significantly more effort to earn an unrelated reward (as 
measured by CARROT). Further, this nearly winning effect was at-
tenuated when the motivational drive was dampened in an unrelated 
intervening task. 
In the last study, we test the generalizability of the nearly win-
ning effect by conducting a field study at a fashion-accessory store. 
Consumers participated in a short survey in an exchange for a chance 
to win $20 gift certificate by playing an instant scratch-off lottery. 
Consumers were randomly assigned to one of the three winning con-
ditions where they won (clearly-winning) the lottery, or lost the lot-
tery by one digit, which was the last digit (nearly-winning) or by the 
last five digits (clearly-losing). The amount they spent in the store 
became the main dependent variable in this study. Consistent with 
our predictions, our findings show that those who nearly won the 
reward spent significantly more than those who clearly won or lost 
the reward. 
In sum, findings from this research show that nearly winning a 
reward as compared to clearly losing or winning a reward can acti-
vate a general motivational drive leading to a broad array of reward 
seeking behaviors. 
From Fan to Fat?: Vicarious Losing Increases Unhealthy 
Eating, but Self-Affirmation Is an Effective Remedy
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Sport watching is more popular than ever: 108 million Ameri-
cans watched the 2013 NFL Super Bowl and 2.2 billion people 
watched the 2010 FIFA soccer World Cup. Using archival and ex-
perimental data, we explore whether the vicarious defeats and vic-
tories that supporters experience influence their ability to regulate 
their food intake. 
Supporters tend to perceive their team’s successes and failures 
as theirs (Hirt et al. 1992), which has a measurable effect on their 
self-regulation abilities. Football and soccer defeats, especially when 
they are narrow or unexpected, increase alcohol-related criminality 
(Rees and Schnepel 2009), traffic fatalities (Wood, Mcinnes, and 
Norton 2011), and domestic violence (Card and Dahl 2011). 
Consistent with studies showing that ego threats increase pref-
erences for indulgent food (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1993), 
we expected that people would eat less healthily after the defeat of a 
football team that they support. Second, as vicarious sports victories 
improve the perceived self-worth of supporters (Hirt et al. 1992), we 
hypothesized that vicarious football victories would lead to healthier 
eating. Third, we expected that allowing supporters to self-affirm 
after experiencing a vicarious defeat would eliminate its impact on 
unhealthy eating, as self-affirmation reduces the impact of vicarious 
sports defeats on self-serving biases (Sherman et al. 2007) and, more 
generally, improves people’s self-regulation abilities (Schmeichel 
and Vohs 2009).
The first study is a quasi-experiment in which we examined 
the self-reported daily food consumption of a representative panel 
of 730 US consumers and 3150 consumption days, during two NFL 
seasons. We assumed that most people in the panel watch football 
games and support the team of the city where they live, based on sur-
veys showing that about 60% of Americans declare being NFL fans 
(Gallup 2012).  We examined the effects of 450 Sunday games on 
consumption on the day of the game and on the following Monday 
and Tuesday. We measured unhealthy eating by calculating saturated 
fat consumption and calorie intake from the food consumption data 
provided by the panelists. 
Compared to their average consumption, people consumed 
16% more saturated fat and 10% more calories on Monday if their 
team had lost the day before but consumed 9% less saturated fat 
and 5% less calories if their team had won. In contrast, consumption 
was at its usual level on the same Monday among people assigned 
to control groups: those living in cities without an NFL team and 
those living in cities whose NFL team did not play on that Sunday. 
Second, we found that the outcome of the game had no effect on 
food consumption on the Sunday of the game and on the following 
Tuesday. This shows that the Monday effects were not compensated 
on the subsequent day or anticipated on the previous day. Third, we 
found that these effects were particularly strong when the outcome 
of the game was uncertain, as measured by a low point spread in 
the bookmakers’ predictions. This suggests that surprise and disap-
pointment are important drivers of the effect. Fourth, we found that 
saturated fat consumption was especially low when the victory was 
crushing and particularly high when the defeat was tight, which is 
consistent with the literature on close-call counterfactual thinking 
(Medvec and Savitsky 1997). Finally, we found that the effects were 
stronger in cities where people identify the most to their NFL team 
(based on survey data): a 28% increase in saturated fat consumption 
following a defeat, and a 16% decrease following a victory. Gender 
did not moderate these results, which is consistent with extant stud-
ies on the impact of game outcomes on cardiac accidents (Carroll et 
al. 2002; Kloner et al. 2011).
We replicated these results in a controlled laboratory experi-
ment in France. Participants were asked to describe either a victory 
or a defeat by their favorite sport team. After this, they were given 
the opportunity to eat different foods. We found that people asked to 
think about a defeat ate more unhealthy food and less healthy food 
than people asked to think about a victory. Three coders also mea-
sured the extent to which the participants engaged in spontaneous 
self-affirmation when describing the sporting event. As expected, we 
found that spontaneous self-affirmation helped vicarious losers limit 
their consumption of unhealthy food. 
In a third study, we asked a representative panel of French 
participants to watch a 7-minute video of a soccer game and ma-
nipulated self-affirmation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
a 3 (defeat, victory, control) x 2 (self-affirmation, control) between-
subject design. The games of the victory and defeat conditions were 
important finals that the French national soccer team had either won 
(Euro 2000) or lost (World Cup 2006) against its archrival, the Ital-
ian national team. The control game opposed two Belgian soccer 
teams, irrelevant to participants’ identity. In the self-affirmation con-
dition, participants were asked after watching the videos to rank their 
core values and to elaborate on their top-ranked value (McQueen and 
Klein 2006). Participants in the control condition were asked to list 
the important features of chairs. Then, we measured participants’ de-
sire for various foods. Compared to the control condition, watching 
the defeat video increased preferences for less healthy food whereas 
watching the victory video increased preferences for healthier food. 
As expected, the effect in the defeat condition was attenuated when 
participants could affirm their core values. 
These results contribute to the literature on self-control by 
showing how an important contextual factor of everyday life (sport-
ing events) can promote or hinder healthy eating. We also show how 
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the interplay between sport watching and eating relates to identity 
issues. A simple self-affirmation intervention can eliminate the un-
healthy consequences of the vicarious defeat. Ultimately, this re-
search has important managerial and political implications: we show 
what kinds of games are susceptible to raise health issues, providing 
precious information to regulators -and socially responsible advertis-
ers- concerned with the obesity epidemic.  
The Fresh Start Effect: Temporal Landmarks Motivate 
Aspirational Behavior
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The notion that renewal is possible and offers individuals an op-
portunity to improve themselves has long been endorsed by our cul-
ture. For example, many religious groups engage in ritual purification 
ceremonies, Christians can be “born again,” and the metaphorical 
phoenix rising from the ashes ubiquitously represents rebirth. This 
suggests a widely shared belief that we have opportunities through-
out our lives to start fresh with a clean slate, with the well-known 
“New Year’s effect” representing just one example of a far broader 
phenomenon. The current research explores naturally-arising points 
in time when an individual is particularly motivated to engage in 
aspirational behaviors (or activities that help people achieve their 
wishes and personal goals). 
Past research suggests that temporal landmarks, including 
personally-relevant life events (e.g., anniversaries, birthdays) and 
reference points on the calendar (e.g., holidays, the start of a new 
week/month/year/semester) demarcate the passage of time and cre-
ate discontinuities in our memories, experiences, and time percep-
tions (Robinson, 1986; Shum, 1998). Further, temporal landmarks 
may increase the subjective distance between a person’s current self 
and past self (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Peetz & Wilson, 2013; Wilson 
& Ross, 2003). The theory of temporal self-appraisal posits that the 
more disconnected people feel from their past selves, the more likely 
they are to disparage their past selves (Wilson & Ross, 2001). By 
doing so, they are able to maintain a positive perception of them-
selves in spite of past failures (Wilson & Ross, 2001). Consequently, 
we conjecture that temporal landmarks separate people from their 
imperfect past selves, which makes them feel superior and thus ca-
pable of pursuing their aspirations. We hypothesize that this process 
of wiping the slate clean generates fresh start feelings and motivates 
people to tackle their goals.  
Across three studies, we document evidence of the proposed 
“fresh start effect” in the field. Study 1 examines public interest in a 
widespread goal – dieting – by using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to predict daily Google search volume for the term “diet” 
(N_days=3,104). We find that relative to baseline, interest in dieting 
increases at the start of new weeks (by 14.4%), months (by 3.7%), 
and calendar years (by 82.1%), and following Federal holidays (by 
10.2%; particularly following holidays that survey respondents re-
port “feel more like a fresh start”) (all p’s<0.001).
Study 2 moves from measuring intentions to actions by exam-
ining the actual frequency of engagement in another aspirational 
behavior – exercise – using university gym attendance records (N_
members=11,912, N_days=442). Again, OLS regressions show that 
relative to baseline, the probability of visiting the gym increases at 
the beginning of the week (by 33.4%), month (by 14.4%), year (by 
11.6%), and semester (by 47.1%), as well as following school breaks 
(by 24.3%) (all p’s<0.05). Also, birthdays (with the exception of 21st 
birthdays) increase gym attendance by 7.5% (p<0.001), indicating 
that personal temporal landmarks, like calendar landmarks, can pro-
duce a “fresh start effect”.
Study 3 uses data from the goal-setting website StickK.com to 
examine a wider range of goals (including job, educational and fi-
nancial pursuits). OLS regressions (N_goals=66,062, N_days=866) 
show that people are more likely to create goal contracts at the begin-
ning of a week (by 62.9%), month (by 23.6%), year (by 145.3%), and 
following Federal holidays (by 55.1%; again particularly following 
holidays that feel like fresh starts), as well as following their birth-
days (by 2.6%) (all p’s<0.05 except birthdays: p=0.07). Importantly, 
we find that temporal landmarks motivate people to tackle a broad 
set of health-irrelevant goals (e.g., “study harder for GMATs”), sug-
gesting that the fresh start effect is not merely the result of efforts to 
rebalance one’s health after over-indulging. 
Three additional laboratory studies provide support for our hy-
pothesized mechanism. In Study 4, we manipulated the psychologi-
cal meaning associated with a temporal landmark. Participants (N = 
303) read about a middle-aged female, Jane, who was not satisfied 
with her weight and would soon start a new position at work. In this 
three-condition, between-subject experiment, participants were told 
either that Jane (a) viewed the new job as a meaningful life change, 
but it would not affect her daily routines; (b) did not view the job 
change as meaningful, but it would shift her daily routines; or (c) did 
not consider the job change to be meaningful, and it would not shift 
her daily routines. Participants then rated how motivated Jane would 
be to add healthier habits to her life following the change. As ex-
pected, a meaningful job change was perceived to be more likely to 
motivate health improvements than a job change described in either 
of the other two conditions (ps < .001). Furthermore, participants’ 
rating of the extent to which the new job would feel like a fresh start 
to Jane fully mediated the effect of the meaningful job change on 
Jane’s motivation to improve her health. 
Studies 5a (N = 199) and 5b (N = 203) present scenarios exam-
ining the effects of two different temporal landmarks: moving to a 
new city (5a) and celebrating a birthday (5b).  We replicate our Study 
4 finding that more meaningful temporal landmarks generate stron-
ger fresh start feelings and thus are perceived as more likely to moti-
vate aspirational behaviors (in this case, quitting smoking) than less 
meaningful but objectively equivalent temporal landmarks. We also 
measured the extent to which participants believed each scenario’s 
protagonist would feel (1) disconnected from his/her past self, and 
(2) close to his/her ideal self. Supporting our proposal mechanism, 
mediation analysis shows that fresh start feelings following temporal 
landmarks originate from a psychological dissociation from one’s 
past self and a perceived increase in closeness to one’s ideal self.  
Together, this research investigates how and why temporal 
landmarks can affect individuals’ motivation to engage in aspira-
tional behaviors. Organizations and individuals may be able to capi-
talize on various temporal landmarks to facilitate goal pursuit. Also, 
marketers of products designed to help people attain desirable objec-
tives (e.g., gym memberships, healthy restaurants, online education 
programs) may be best able to appeal to consumers’ desires for self-
improvement by advertising to consumers at fresh start moments. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Many important consumption decisions, such as making a pur-
chase now (vs. saving), paying more for faster delivery (vs. being 
patient) or choosing to pursue long-term goals (vs. giving into temp-
tation), have intertemporal components. Extensive research studying 
preferences over time has demonstrated that consumers often deviate 
from normative theories (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 
2002), effectively acting against their long-term interest. Despite the 
calls to utilize decision research to increase consumer welfare (Rat-
ner et al., 2008), little research has examined ways to help consumers 
make decisions that are in line with their long-term goals. Four pa-
pers in this sessions address this gap by pointing out important ways 
in which consumers can be nudged to make decisions that are in line 
with their long-term interests. 
The first paper by Bartels, Urminsky, and Frederick demon-
strates that consumers’ patience in financial decision-making de-
pends on: (1) consumers’ awareness of the inherent intertemporal 
tradeoff and (2) their caring about the future self. They show that 
connectedness to one’s future-self influences financial decision mak-
ing primarily when tradeoffs are apparent. Their research shows that 
getting consumers to make far-sighted financial decisions, in line 
with their long-term goals, require a combination of both valuing 
future outcomes and recognizing opportunity costs.
The second paper by Kim and Iyengar informs us that impa-
tience, observed mainly with monetary outcomes, might underes-
timate consumers’ impatience when it comes to durable purchases. 
They show that consumers are significantly more impatient when 
considering durable goods than monetary outcomes and that this im-
patience is rooted in the shrinking estimates of their usage duration 
for such products. Their results show that interventions that would 
help decrease shrinkage in time perceptions (Zauberman, Kim, Mal-
koc and Bettman 2009) can increase patience for both durable (and 
monetary) goods. 
The third paper by Lee, Malkoc, and Rucker shows that con-
sumer impatience can be remedied by giving them contextualized or 
generalized control. Their studies demonstrate that consumer impa-
tience can be, at least in part, attributed to consumers feeling not in-
control of their decisions. They show that endowing consumers with 
control either locally (by giving them explicit options) or globally 
(by making them feel powerful) decreases their impatience. Their 
results point out simple interventions that can nudge consumers to 
make long-term oriented decisions.
The final paper by Munichor and LeBoeuf demonstrates that de-
scribing the future intervals as extents (e.g., in 3 months) as opposed 
to dates (e.g., by July 1st) increases consumers’ likelihood of pursing 
long-term goals. Their results indicate that when time is presented as 
extents consumers’ attention to long-term goals and their benefits is 
increased, while date descriptions draw attention to day-by-day pas-
sage of time. Their results highlight how simple framing changes can 
be powerful tools in increasing consumers’ long-term orientation. 
Taken together, papers in this session propose ways to nudge 
consumers to make long-term oriented decisions. The session is 
aligned with the conference theme, as it attempts to “make a differ-
ence” in consumers’ well-being. We expect this session to draw an 
interdisciplinary audience from intertemporal choice and consumer 
welfare literatures.
To Know and To Care: How Awareness and Valuation 
of the Future Jointly Shape Consumer Savings and 
Spending
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers are often advised to cut back on everyday small 
spending and invest the money instead, which can make a substantial 
difference in the long run.  Adopting and maintaining such a strategy 
requires the consumer to both (i) consider the tradeoff inherent in 
the purchase; i.e. purchasing now requires foregoing an opportunity 
to use the money to further one’s long-term interests, and (ii) care 
enough about the future self who would benefit from their forbear-
ance to warrant restraint in the present. We argue that consumer 
financial decision-making hinges on a specific interaction between 
both components that has not been demonstrated in prior research. 
Across six studies, we show that the psychological relationship with 
one’s future self (operationalized as the degree of connectedness to 
one’s future self; Parfit 1984) influences financial decision making 
primarily in those contexts where tradeoffs are apparent (Frederick et 
al., 2009). Thus, far-sighted choices require the combination of both 
valuing future outcomes—as affected by connectedness and reflected 
in the discount rate—and the recognition of opportunity costs. 
In Studies 1a (N=88) and 1b (N=233), we show that manipulat-
ing participants’ awareness of opportunity costs interacts with mea-
sured factors relating to their valuation of the future (connectedness 
in Study 1a and estimates of temporal discounting in Study 1b) to 
impact a typical purchase decision. As in Frederick et al. (2009), 
participants were asked whether or not they would purchase an en-
tertaining DVD for $14.99, and in the opportunity cost condition the 
reminder “keeping the $14.99 for other purchases” was added to the 
not-purchase option. Participants were also asked to rate their per-
ceived connectedness to the future self in Study 1a and were asked 
to complete a short temporal discounting task (choosing between 
$900 available in a year and various smaller amounts available im-
mediately) in Study 1b. In both studies, we find a significant interac-
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tion between the opportunity cost reminder and factors relating to 
people’s valuation of the future. In Study 1a, participants’ ratings of 
connectedness influenced purchase decisions when participants were 
reminded of opportunity costs (r= -.41,  p < .01 ), but not in the no-
reminder control condition (r =.04). Similarly, in Study 1b, purchase 
decisions are related to our measure of temporal discounting when 
participants were reminded of opportunity costs (r= -.20, p < .05 ), 
but not in the no-reminder control condition (r’s =.09, p>.10).
In Study 2 (N=199), we replicate Study 1a (manipulating the 
salience of tradeoffs and measuring connectedness), and also mea-
sure the propensity to plan.  We find a significant three-way interac-
tion between connectedness, opportunity cost salience and planning, 
such that connectedness reduces spending when participants either 
see an explicit opportunity cost reminder or have a high propensity 
to plan (and therefore spontaneously consider opportunity costs).
In Study 3 (N=146), using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, 
we crossed a manipulation of connectedness with an opportunity 
cost manipulation, measured people’s purchase intentions, and then 
measured temporal discounting. We manipulated connectedness by 
having participants read a short description of “recent research” sug-
gesting that young adulthood is either characterized by stability in 
identity (inducing high connectedness) or is characterized by insta-
bility in identity (inducing low connectedness).  Participants then 
chose between purchasing one of two iPads (64 Gb for $829 or 32 
Gb for $599) or buying neither product. The price difference was 
highlighted for the lower cost iPad in the “opportunity cost” condi-
tions (“leaving you $230 for other purposes”), but not in the control 
condition. We found that making people feel less connected to the 
future self increased temporal discounting (δs = .51 vs. .58 for low 
vs. high connectedness,  p <.05), replicating Bartels and Urminsky 
(2011). When people were reminded of opportunity costs, manipu-
lating connectedness reduced purchases of the expensive iPad (9% 
vs. 0%, low vs. high connectedness, p <.07), but the manipulation 
had no effect when people were not prompted to consider opportu-
nity costs (8% vs. 7%). We found a significant interaction of manipu-
lated connectedness and manipulated opportunity cost on the aver-
age spend (p < .05). The difference in intended spend was mediated 
by the connectedness-manipulation-induced changes in discounting 
when opportunity costs were highlighted, but not when they weren’t.
 In Study 4 (N=130), we generalize to a more naturalis-
tic manipulation of tradeoff salience. We  asked participants to rank 
the desirability of six product categories (pocket video cameras, 
blenders, bed sheets, pocket watches, laser printers, and nonstick 
frying pans), and choose between one more expensive and one less 
expensive product from each of these categories. The order of the 
last two blocks (ranking and choosing) was varied and served as our 
manipulation of tradeoff salience.  Ranking before choosing induces 
recognition of tradeoffs—that the satisfaction of one purchase goal 
is likely to entail the subordination of other purchase goals—and it 
also causes participants to think of at least five other uses of their 
money before their first decision to splurge or save. Our primary 
dependent variable was the number of expensive items purchased, 
which was reduced by manipulated connectedness when tradeoffs 
were highlighted (2.19 vs. 1.45, low vs. high connectedness) but not 
when tradeoffs were not highlighted (i.e., when participants chose 
before ranking the product categories: 2.03 vs. 2.36; interaction p 
< .05). In particular, the increase in fiscal restraint that we observe 
occurs almost exclusively for decisions involving those product cat-
egories that each participant ranked as less personally desirable. As 
a result, higher-connectedness respondents’ tastes for spending are 
both reduced and more focused on higher-valued goods when con-
sidering opportunity costs (i.e., after completing the ranking task).
Lastly, Study 5 (N=304) measured adult bank account holders’ 
savings and spending behaviors and attitudes. We find a correlation 
between connectedness and savings (even controlling for income 
and demographics) among participants who reported that they en-
joyed managing their finances and looked forward to it.  In contrast, 
we find no such correlation among participants who report that they 
dislike managing their finances and dread having to do so, presum-
ably because their lack of engagement suppresses consideration of 
financial tradeoffs.
Making Decisions For the Future: Value of Delayed 
Durables and Shrinkage in Usage Duration
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Durable goods provide not only immediate benefits but also an 
extended stream of benefits over their usage duration. Consumers 
often face situations where they have to make purchase decisions for 
durables available only after a delay. Delayed purchase of durables 
are challenging both to consumers and retailers. For consumers, they 
should appropriately compare a future alternative to any available 
immediately and decide whether it is worth delaying their purchases. 
Such decisions are essentially intertemporal tradeoffs. For retailers, 
selling goods not in stock is challenging as they have to consider ap-
propriate financial incentives for inducing consumers to delay their 
purchase (e.g., price discounts for back-orders). How consumers 
change their valuation for alternatives depending on temporal avail-
ability will clearly impact the level of monetary compensation. 
Past work on intertemporal decision making has repeatedly 
shown that delayed alternatives look less attractive than immediately 
available ones. This may be due to individuals preferring immediate 
over delayed consumption, uncertainty associated with future prefer-
ences, or subjective perception of delays. Note that these factors are 
likely to influence the discounting of all types of goods like mon-
etary outcomes or consumables as well as durables. 
Durables, however, are different from other types of goods be-
cause they provide a stream of utility over a usage duration. For in-
stance, a television purchased today provides benefits starting from 
the purchase time till the time of discard. Does using a product over 
a duration have implications for how their benefits are discounted? 
Past work provides little direction. In fact, some past research has 
tested factors impacting time discounting using durables but reports 
no systematic difference in preference for durables and for monetary 
outcomes. 
In the current article, we seek to investigate how durables are 
discounted and, in particular, what role does usage duration play in 
this process. We posit and find evidence that consumers subjectively 
shrink the expected usage duration associated with durables that are 
expected to be purchased in the future. That is, they expect to use the 
same durable for a shorter period of time when it is purchased in the 
future than immediately. This shrinkage in usage duration serves as 
a factor of time discounting in addition to other factors such as time 
preference or uncertainty in future preference (which are unrelated 
with usage). As a result, a future durable looks even less attractive 
than an immediate one even after accounting for all factors known to 
influence time discounting. 
Supporting our premise on the shrinkage in usage duration, 
we found evidence for the shrinkage effect in usage duration in two 
types of judgment: estimation of unknown usage duration and sub-
jective perception of a known duration. In study 1, we show that 
estimated usage duration shrink when a durable (e.g., a smartphone) 
is planned to be purchased in the future as compared to the present. 
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In study 2 and 3, we demonstrate the shrinkage effect in subjective 
scaling of a given duration that is objectively given to participants. 
Demonstrating the implication of the shrinkage effect, in study 
4 we show that individuals’ tendency to shrink future usage dura-
tions (relative to usage durations starting from the present) is an im-
portant determinant of their impatience for durables. That is, those 
who shrink future usage duration more would expect to use the same 
durable purchased in the future for a shorter period of time as com-
pared to those who shrink it less. As a result, the former consum-
ers would discount the value of delayed durables more and would 
become more impatient for immediately available durables than the 
latter consumers. 
In study 5 we further demonstrate that the shrinkage effect in 
usage duration would result in more impatience for durables than 
for monetary outcomes, if all other conditions are equal. Note that 
various factors known to influence time discounting for monetary 
outcomes such as pure time preference, uncertainty, subjective per-
ception of delays, and various individual and situation factors would 
influence time discounting for durables as well. But the shrinkage 
effect in perceived usage duration is a unique factor that influences 
only the time discounting of durables. Therefore, if all other condi-
tions are equal, consumers would be more impatient for durables 
than they would be for money. 
Taken together, our results demonstrate the important role of 
usage duration and its judgment in determining consumers’ intertem-
poral preference for durables. We also discuss the implications for 
retailers in determining the optimal level of monetary compensation 
for delayed durables.
Loosing vs . Gaining Control: Enhancing Feelings of 
Control Reduces Present Bias
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers regularly make decisions about the timing of their 
consumption. For instance, they decide how fast to ship an online 
purchase, when to take vacations, or when to make a large purchase. 
Extant research on such decisions has shown a variety of consumer 
phenomena, most notably present bias (a.k.a. hyperbolic discount-
ing). Preferences are considered present-biased when a consumer is 
willing to pay higher premiums to avoid a 3-day delay in shipment 
(e.g., $5, or $1.8 per day) than a 10-day delay (e.g., $10, or $1 per 
day; Malkoc and Zauberman 2006). 
A substantial amount of research has investigated the underly-
ing mechanisms for present-bias. The last decade has seen a surge in 
research that theorized, and empirically tested, a host of cognitive 
explanations, based on changes in mindsets (Malkoc, Zauberman 
and Bettman 2010), representation of the outcomes (Malkoc and 
Zauberman 2006), resources (Zauberman and Lynch 2005) or time 
itself (Zauberman et al. 2009). 
In this research, we propose a more affective mechanism to ac-
count for present-biased preferences. Prior research has theorized 
that forgoing a current outcome is painful and leads to a feeling of 
deprivation (Hoch and Lowenstein 1991), resulting in impulsive-
ness and impatience; however, this account has not been empiri-
cally tested. More importantly, the theory is not precise as to why 
the act of deferral is so painful. Based on this notion, we propose 
that the mere act of consumption deferral leads consumers to feel 
that they have less control of their consumption. In a typical pres-
ent bias elicitation task, participants are asked to imagine having an 
outcome in the present (e.g., a DVD available today) and then asked 
to delay this outcome for monetary gain. Such a proposition elicits a 
feeling of lack of control over the consumption decision. Therefore, 
we propose that when asked to forgo a presently available outcome, 
consumers feel they have less control over their consumption. As 
a result, consumers, now wanting to regain control, represent the 
subsequent intertemporal choice as an opportunity to gain control, 
requiring higher premiums in their immediate responses and result-
ing in present bias. We investigate this proposition in four studies. 
Experiment 1 shows that giving people control over their consump-
tion timing decreases present bias. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that a more generalized sense of power and control leads to similar 
reductions in present bias. Finally, experiment 4 shows that decreas-
ing the level of control can increase present bias. 
In experiment 1, using a typical present bias paradigm, we asked 
participants to imagine having ordered a DVD online where their de-
fault delivery was scheduled for the same day. They then imagined 
delaying their delivery by 3 days and 10 days (within-subjects) and 
asked to indicate the premium they required to delay. Participants in 
the “choice control” condition were first asked whether they would 
like to delay the delivery before they indicated their delay premium. 
We expected that merely having a chance to express their willingness 
to delay to make participants feel more in control of their consump-
tion decision, decreasing present bias. Results supported this predic-
tion, with significantly lower level of present bias in the choice con-
trol condition (M3days-10days = .45), compared to the standard present 
bias paradigm (M3days-10days = .66; t(147) = 2.04, p < .05). 
In experiment 2, we examined whether a generalized and previ-
ously evoked sense of control could influence the extent of present 
bias in subsequent tasks. To evoke control, we induced participants 
with power, which has been found to directly affect one’s sense of 
control (Fast et al. 2009). Since high power individuals feel they 
have more control over their outcomes, we predicted that high power 
would diminish present bias. To test this idea, half of the participants 
recalled an incident where they had power over others, a task that has 
been successfully used to induce power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee 2003). The other half simply recalled events of the previous 
days. Next, all participants imagined having a cash refund ($45) that 
was available that day and asked to delay it by 4 and 10 weeks. As 
predicted, participants who were induced with power showed less 
present bias (M4weeks-10weeks = 1.29), compared to the control condition 
(M4weeks-10weeks = 2.62; t(97) = 1.78, p = .07),. In experiment 3 we repli-
cated these findings using an alternative method to induce power (via 
an employee/employer task, Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2010). 
In the final experiment we examined whether taking control 
away from participants would have the opposite effect and increase 
present bias. To that end, some participants completed a deferral task 
where they imagined ordering a DVD online, scheduled to arrive 
within 24 hours. They were then asked to indicate their premium to 
delay it by 3 days and 10 days. The remaining participants (low con-
trol) were instructed to imagine that they chose to pick up their DVD 
from a local store. However, when they arrived at the store, their 
DVD was not available, but the clerk offered to have it delivered to 
their home within 24 hours. They were then asked to indicate their 
delay premium to defer the receipt of this DVD by 3 days and 10 
days. We predicted and found that having already lost control over 
their consumption, these low control participants showed greater 
present bias (M3days-10days = .66), compared to those in the baseline 
condition (M3days-10days = .38; t(171) = 2.26, p < .05). Moreover, we 
found that feelings of control over consumption mediated the ob-
served effect. 
In sum, our studies show that the feeling of control in related 
(experiments 1 and 4) and unrelated (experiments 2 and 3) contexts 
influences the extent of present bias. Further, we consistently find 
that decreasing (increasing) feelings of control increases (decreases) 
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present bias. Taken together, this research suggests that the feeling 
of control plays an important role in present bias, and demonstrate a 
more affective explanation for present bias.   
The Influence of Time-Interval Descriptions on Goal-
Pursuit Decisions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A diet ad proclaims, “Sign up today and lose 25 pounds in 2 
weeks!” What would influence a consumer’s decision to pursue this 
diet? Although many factors might play a role (Aarts, Gollwitzer, 
and Hassin 2004; Freitas et al. 2002; Zhang, Fishbach, and Dhar 
2007), this paper focuses on one unexplored factor in particular: 
the description of the time interval allowed for goal completion. We 
suggest that whether the interval is described by extents (“2 weeks 
from today”) or dates (“between today and May 6”) influences goal-
pursuit decisions.
Although how a time interval is described may seem unimport-
ant, it can affect how people plan for the future (LeBoeuf and Shafir 
2009) and evaluate future transactions (LeBoeuf 2006; Read et al. 
2005). We suggest that time-interval descriptions also affect whether 
people initiate goal pursuit, with people being more likely to pursue 
goals with completion intervals described by extents than by dates. 
We suggest that changes in time focus (i.e., focus on the near vs. dis-
tant future; Lee, Lee, and Kern 2011) underlie such effects. Whereas 
extent descriptions refer to “chunks” of time (e.g., weeks, months) 
and may lead to a focus on the interval as a whole, date descriptions 
direct attention to specific time points (LeBoeuf 2006; Malkoc et al. 
2010; Read et al. 2005) and may prompt a focus on the day-by-day 
passage of time, conjuring considerations such as what one will do 
each day. Thus, an interval described as “three months from today” 
may focus people more on the distant future than does an interval 
described as “between today and July 23.” This leads us to predict 
that, when people are contemplating pursuing a goal during a time 
interval, extent descriptions of that interval may direct people’s at-
tention more to the goal’s long-term benefits, which may increase 
the goal’s perceived importance, and less to the other mundane tasks 
that will occupy the interval. This may result in greater willingness 
to pursue desirable goals.   
Study 1a tested the effect of interval description on people’s 
willingness to diet. Participants indicated whether they would be 
willing to lose 1.5 pounds in two weeks, with time interval described 
either by extents or dates. Participants also reported how long the 
target interval seemed. More participants were willing to diet when 
the interval was described by extents than dates (65% vs. 44%, re-
spectively, χ2(1)=4.06, p=.04), but interval description did not affect 
perceived interval length. Study 1b replicated these results using a 
savings goal. Thus, people are more likely to pursue a goal when 
the allocated time interval is described by extents, rather than dates, 
and this effect seems not to be driven by a change in the interval’s 
perceived length.   
In study 2, participants indicated whether they would be willing 
to read three books in one month (described by extent or date) and 
indicated how many books they would commit to reading within that 
interval. Study 2 also examined the possible mechanism by collect-
ing ratings of the goal’s importance. When the interval was described 
by extents, versus dates, participants pursued reading at a higher 
rate (35% vs. 10%, respectively, χ2(1)=4.74, p=.03), were willing to 
read more books (Mextents=1.84 vs. Mdates=0.93, t(53)=2.62, p=.01), 
and found the goal more important (Mextents=4.31 vs. Mdates=3.26, 
t(53)=2.19, p=.03). Goal importance mediated the relationship be-
tween interval description and goal pursuit (95% CI: .040, 1.51). 
These results hint at one possible underlying mechanism: extent de-
scriptors lead to greater perceived goal importance and to greater 
goal pursuit, perhaps because extent descriptions trigger a focus on a 
longer time horizon and long-term consequences.  
If extent descriptors lead people to focus more on the distant 
future than do date descriptors, they should only increase willing-
ness to pursue goals with positive long-term consequences, such 
as studying, and not goals with negative long-term (but positive 
short-term) consequences, such as watching television. To test this 
hypothesis, participants in Study 3 considered pursuing one of two 
goals—watching more television or studying more—for one month. 
The effect of time-interval descriptor depended on the type of goal 
(χ2(1)=5.38, p=.02). Participants were more likely to pursue the tele-
vision goal when time was described by dates versus extents (45% 
vs. 26%, respectively, χ2(1)=4.38, p=.04). For studying, however, 
dates yielded less goal pursuit than extents (4% vs. 14%, respec-
tively, χ2(1)=3.17, p=.075). Thus, people are more likely to pursue 
goals with positive long-term consequences when time is described 
by extents, but they are more likely to pursue goals with positive 
short-term consequences when time is described by dates. These 
findings suggest that extents lead to a greater focus on the distant 
future than do dates.
Study 4 explored another boundary condition: interval length. 
When goal completion stretches out over a very long interval, people 
may naturally focus on the distant future and therefore on long-term 
consequences. In this case, people may be less sensitive to relatively 
small focus adjustments caused by description nuances (see also 
Goodman and Malkoc 2012), and therefore descriptions may have 
a lessened impact on people’s general time focus and subsequent 
decisions. To test this hypothesis, participants read an article about 
adverse effects of dairy consumption and indicated their likelihood 
of reducing their dairy consumption within either one month or three 
years. The effect of interval descriptor depended on interval length 
(F(1,131)=4.80, p=.03). Participants were more likely to reduce con-
sumption within one month when the interval was described by ex-
tents than dates (Mextents=3.03 vs. Mdates=2.23, t(64)=2.29, p=.03). For 
three years, however, there was no such difference (Mextents=3.00 vs. 
Mdates=3.52, t(67)=1.06, p>.2).   
In summary, even small nuances in how a goal and the time 
interval allocated to its pursuit are described can alter the decision 
to pursue that goal. An interval described by amounts of time may 
focus people more on the distant future than an interval described 
by dates. This increases people’s willingness to initiate goal pursuit 
during that interval, as long as goal pursuit has positive long-term 
consequences and a relatively short duration.  
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Even though the world has seen great economic growth in past 
decades, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen in most 
nations (Gurría 2011). While some consumers’ resources are increas-
ing, a large number of consumers are increasingly facing more dif-
ficult financial situations. As this disparity between the wealthy and 
the poor grows, understanding how consumers arrive at different 
points along this spectrum and how they behave is more important 
than ever. Along these lines, a recent JCR curation highlighted the 
importance of studying the financial climate of the consumer and 
understanding how it affects consumers (Peracchio, McGill and Luce 
2012). 
The goal of this session is shed further light on this increasingly 
important topic, and to gain a better understanding of the anteced-
ents of, beliefs about and implications for consumers’ financial con-
straints. In doing so, this session looks at financial constraints from 
a number of angles, and addresses implications for consumer policy 
and well-being. While the first two papers explore antecedents of 
actual and perceived future financial constraints, the last two papers 
examine outcomes of financial constraints on consumer behavior.
The first paper by Olivola and De Neve looks at a potential an-
tecedent of financial constraints and explores evidence from a unique 
15-year longitudinal dataset suggesting that intuitive decision mak-
ers are more likely to have lower financial well-being. The second 
paper by Berman et al. demonstrates an important bias in consumer 
predictions of their own future financial constraints. In seven studies, 
they provide evidence that consumers under-weight the impact of 
future changes in expenses compared to future changes in income on 
estimations of future available monetary slack. Tully, Hershfield and 
Meyvis next present four studies examining the effects of financial 
constraints on consumers’ decision criteria and choices in discretion-
ary spending. The authors suggest that financially constrained con-
sumers are more apt to prefer material versus experiential purchases 
when spending discretionary money due to an increased focus on 
how long their purchase will last. Finally, Fernbach, Lynch, and 
Kan investigate the relationship between resource constraints and 
consumer planning. They differentiate two psychologically distinct 
types of planning (“efficiency planning” and “priority planning”) and 
show how consumers’ level of constraint affects the type of planning 
a consumer employs. 
The papers included in this session offer findings that are of 
interest both theoretically and practically. The papers offer new in-
sights regarding the causes of real and perceived future financial 
constraints and the shifts in consumer behavior that result from such 
constraints. On a pragmatic level, the included papers further our un-
derstanding of when financial constraints can lead to potentially sub-
optimal behaviors. Finally, by looking at financial constraints with 
a multi-method approach, this group of papers suggests many new 
avenues for future research focused on financial constraints.
From Intuition to Insolvency: Intuitive Decision Makers 
End up More Financial Constrained
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People shape their lives through the decisions that they make. 
Whether these choices produce beneficial or detrimental outcomes 
for the decision maker largely depends on the decision process itself. 
Therefore, how people approach decisions, and not just what they 
choose, has important consequences. Broadly speaking, people can 
approach decisions in two ways (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; 2011; Slo-
man, 1996): through careful deliberation (using logic, reason, and 
rational considerations) and/or by relying on their intuitions (going 
with their “gut feelings”). Poets, philosophers, and scholars have 
long debated the relative merits of human deliberation vs. intuitions. 
This debate has raged on in the social sciences, particularly among 
decision researchers, with some arguing that intuitions alone gener-
ally lead to suboptimal choices (Baron, 1998; Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002; Kmett, Arkes, & Jones, 1999), while others have 
defended the merits of intuitions and questioned the value of deliber-
ation (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
Far from abating, this ongoing debate about intuitions has received 
renewed attention from researchers and spilt out of academic circles 
and onto the public sphere (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007; Gilovich, 1991; 
Gladwell, 2005; Groopman, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Myers, 2002).
Yet most studies examining the success or failure of intuitive 
choices have been carried out in controlled settings with limited real-
world validity. More importantly, in nearly all of these studies, the 
impact of relying on intuitions has been evaluated over very short 
time periods. In contrast, there have been few longitudinal studies 
relating individual decision making tendencies (whether someone 
tends to rely on intuitions when making decisions) to important life 
outcomes. Clearly, understanding the long-term impact of an intui-
tive decision making style would inform the debate concerning the 
merits of intuitions.
Here, we use a unique longitudinal dataset to measure the pre-
dictive impact of an intuitive decision making style on financial 
wellbeing. Specifically, we examine how the tendency to rely on 
intuitions (even in adolescence) predicts financial outcomes up to 
12-15 years later. These data were drawn from a multi-wave, panel 
study that surveyed a nationally representative U.S. sample of ap-
proximately 15,000 respondents over four time periods (Waves 1-4), 
starting in adolescence, and going up to adulthood. In all four waves, 
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respondents reported whether they tended to rely on their “gut feel-
ings” when making decisions, using a five-category scale. In the 
most recent wave (Wave 4), they reported various aspects of their 
financial circumstances, including their income, financial assets, 
debts, gambling problems, etc. The richness and longitudinal nature 
of these data allow us to measure the impact of intuitive decision 
making styles on later (and current) financial well-being while con-
trolling for a host of variables related to respondents’ characteristics 
and early environments (e.g., ethnicity, gender, socio-economics, 
parents’ education, respondents’ academic performance, etc.).
We find that intuitive decision making is a negative predictor of 
financial wellbeing: the more respondents reported relying on their 
gut feelings to make decisions, the worse their financial situation 
was in the final wave of the survey. Specifically, a greater reliance 
on gut feelings to make decisions was associated with lower positive 
indicators of financial wellbeing (personal yearly earnings, neigh-
borhood safety, likelihood of having health insurance, and likelihood 
of owning their home) and higher negative indicators of financial 
wellbeing (debt problems and difficulty paying bills, the need for 
government financial assistance, job loss, and gambling problems). 
Furthermore, for many of these indicators, this relationship holds 
whether decision making style is measured early on (in Waves 1 and 
2) or when respondents are older (Waves 3 and 4). We also find that 
this relationship holds when we control for indicators of cognitive 
ability (e.g., GPA and other measures of school performance) and for 
conscientiousness (one of the ‘Big Five’ personality traits).
Finally, we test (and ultimately reject) a rational self-selection 
account of our results, according to which intuitive people are less 
well off financially because they have intentionally chosen to pur-
sue careers that pay less (e.g., the arts), and not because they are 
more prone to errors in financial decision making. Specifically, three 
pieces of evidence refute this account. First, the tendency to rely on 
gut feelings also predicts an increased risk of having gambling prob-
lems, which is presumably not caused by one’s career choice. Sec-
ond, intuitive decision making styles measured in Waves 3 or 4 (i.e., 
after most respondents have already selected their career paths) neg-
atively predict financial wellbeing even when we control for intuitive 
decision making styles measured in Waves 1 and 2 (i.e., before and/
or while most respondents select their career paths). In other words, 
even after controlling for an early tendency to rely on gut feelings 
when making decisions (which may be correlated with a person’s 
career preferences), we find that additional increases (vs. decreases) 
in this tendency later in life are associated with more negative (vs. 
positive) financial outcomes. Finally, we find that the tendency to 
rely on gut feelings when making decisions is negatively related to 
self-reported life satisfaction, which runs counter to the notion that 
intuitive decision makers are deliberately (and happily) choosing to 
pursue low-paying professions. 
Our findings suggest that relying on gut feelings to make deci-
sions leads to negative life outcomes, at least in the financial domain. 
The recent financial crisis and the events that followed have high-
lighted the dangers of hasty financial decisions and their impact on 
individual, national, and global financial wellbeing. Based on our 
results, we strongly caution against teaching children and/or adults 
to rely on their gut feelings when making financial choices.
Expense Neglect in Forecasting Personal Finances
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In economics, “life cycle” consumption models postulate that 
consumers borrow and save across time periods in order to account 
expectations about changes in income and expenses over time. But 
it is a nontrivial problem to predict future income and expenses, and 
therefore whether it makes sense to consume now, to save or to bor-
row. Any mistake in the forecasting of one’s finances can cause se-
rious negative consequences, such as derailing a future retirement 
plan or driving someone into long term-debt. How, then do people 
form their expectations about how much money will be available in 
the future? Zauberman and Lynch (2005) demonstrated the role of 
perceptions of spare money (i.e., money slack) in influencing peo-
ple’s intertemporal preferences. But we know little about what inputs 
drive these perceptions of spare money, and in particular, whether 
people are sensitive to changes in income and expenses as they form 
these judgments. 
Across seven studies, we demonstrate that even though people 
generally think their expenses will rise in the future, they neglect or 
under-weigh expenses compared to income when forecasting their 
future spare money. In other words we find that while people expect 
that both their income and expenses to increase in the future, they 
naturally are much more sensitive to changes in income rather than 
changes in expenses when predicting their future financial situation.
In Studies 1a-c (N = 580), we sampled a wide range of partici-
pants with varying financial conditions. Our sample included fully 
employed and part-time employed adults, unemployed adults, and 
adults not currently in the labor force (Study 1a); university students 
(Study 1b); and business executives (Study 1c). Participants were 
asked to tell us how much spare money they currently have this week 
and how much spare money they expect to have over a fixed time in 
3 months and 12 months from now (1 = “Very little spare money” to 
11 = “Lots of spare money”). In addition, participants estimated how 
much they expected their income and expenses to change in 3 months 
and 12 months from now (-5 = “I expect my income[expenses] to 
greatly decrease” to +5 = “I expect my income[expenses] to greatly 
increase”). 
For each sample, we ran a regression that included expected in-
come change and expected expense change as independent variables, 
and expected change in spare money as a dependent variable. The 
results show that the growth in spare money is fueled by the expecta-
tion that income will be higher at more distant points in the future 
than it is today. Interestingly, people do not factor in their expense 
growth when estimating their future finances, and consequently, their 
expectations about spare money are determined primarily by their 
expected change in income rather than their expected change in ex-
penses. See table 1 for a summary of the results.
In Study 2 (N = 244), we examine whether the previous re-
sults are due to the possibility that participants evaluate income and 
expenses on different scales. To test this, half the participants were 
asked to evaluate their expected income and expense growth on a 
standard likert scale, as before, whereas the other half of the par-
ticipants were asked to evaluate their expected income and expense 
growth using a modulus that normalizes judgments on a single scale 
(e.g., if your income today is 100 chips, what will be your income 
in 12 months). We find that regardless of scale, participants consis-
tently neglected to incorporate expenses when judging future slack. 
Study 3 (N = 301) rules out the possibility that participants un-
der-weigh future expenses because they believe that future expenses 
are more uncertain than future income. Participants were first asked 
to make judgments of their future income and expense growth and 
were then asked to state how confident they were in their estimate. 
Surprisingly, we find that participants felt more confident about their 
future expense growth (M = 8.09), than their future income growth 
(M = 7.83, paried-t = 2.27, p = .024). Furthermore, we replicate our 
main finding, suggesting that even though participants are highly 
confident about the extent to which their expenses will grow in the 
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future, they still do not sufficiently account for expenses compared 
to income when estimating future slack.
Studies 4a (N = 302) and 4b (N = 74) rules out the possibility 
that these results are due to a bias caused by the manner in which we 
ask participants to estimate their available spare money. In particular, 
asking participants about how much slack they have may be prim-
ing them to think about the driver of spare money (i.e., income). If 
so, then asking participants to think about how financially constraint 
they are may cause participants to think about the driver of financial 
constraint (i.e., expenses). In Study 4a, half the participants are asked 
to estimate how much slack they have now and in the future, whereas 
the other half is asked to estimate how financially constraint they 
are now and in the future. We find that a focus on constraint does 
not diminish or eliminate expense neglect. In Study 4b, we replicate 
our findings using a three-item measure of resource availability that 
includes (1) a subjective assessment of spare money, (2) a subject as-
sessment of financial constraint, and (3) an assessment of whether or 
not participants think they are likely to be able to pay an unexpected 
bill of $1,500. 
Finally, we make a series of attempts to debias participants by 
focusing their attention on the various sources of expenses that may 
change in the future (Study 5, N = 243), how their expenses have 
changed in the past (Study 6, N = 159), and the role that exceptional 
expenses may play on current and future slack (Study 7, N = 184). 
However, we are unable to find any consistent factor that leads par-
ticipants to increase the weight that expenses play in determining 
future available money slack. This speaks to the robustness of ex-
pense neglect as a bias that impacts the way individuals forecast their 
future available spare money.
Financial Constraint Induces a Shift Toward Material 
Versus Experiential Purchases Through Long Term 
Focus
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As people try to spend their money in ways that maximize their 
happiness, they need to trade off investments in experiential versus 
material purchases. Past research has shown that money allocated 
to experiential purchases may result in greater long-term happiness 
(e.g., Carter and Gilovich 2010; Nicolao, Irwin, & Goodman 2009; 
Van Boven & Gilovich 2003), suggesting that consumers should 
spend more money on experiential purchases (Dunn et al. 2011). The 
current research examines what happens when people feel finan-
cially constrained and this trade-off is more pressing than usual. Are 
financially constrained consumers more likely to spend their limited 
resources on experiences, thus allocating their scarce resources to 
get a bigger happiness bang for their buck? We propose that, rather 
than increasing the hedonic efficiency of their investments by focus-
ing on experiential purchases, financially constrained consumers in-
stead allocate more of their scarce income to material goods. Specifi-
cally, we propose that financial constraint increases concerns about 
durability, which in turn shifts preferences towards material goods.
Given that financial constraints tend to highlight opportunity 
costs (Spiller 2011), we propose that, financially constrained con-
Table 1: Summary of Main Results
Study Scale N Time Period (Months)
Mean Slack 
Change
Mean 
Income 
Change
Mean 
Expense 
Change
β (Income) β (Expense)
β(Inc.)/ 
β(Exp.)
1a Likert 300 3 0.62 0.55 0.81 0.22 *** 0.07 -
1a Likert 300 12 1.43 1.11 1.10 0.36 *** -0.05 6.65
1b Likert 216 3 0.78 0.64 0.76 0.33 *** -0.05 6.81
1b Likert 216 12 1.79 2.17 1.46 0.31 *** 0.00 -
1c Likert 64 3 0.48 0.80 0.64 0.10 0.08 1.30
1c Likert 64 12 0.98 1.48 1.00 0.31 * -0.06 5.37
2 Likert 125 12 1.44 1.69 0.68 0.59 *** -0.38 *** 1.53
2 Modulus 119 12 1.73 +25% +5% 0.48 *** -0.11 4.32
2 Likert 125 36 2.56 2.69 1.59 0.63 *** -0.26 *** 2.38
2 Modulus 119 36 2.74 +100% +40% 0.42 *** -0.14 3.12
3 Likert 301 24 1.90 1.54 0.76 0.52 *** -0.22 *** 2.37
4a Likert 150 24 1.32 1.70 0.85 0.52 *** -0.19 ** 2.71
4a Likert - Constraint 152 24 1.02 1.64 0.86 0.35 *** -0.17 * 1.98
4b
Likert –  
3 Item  
Measure
75 24 1.62 1.81 1.15 0.63 *** -0.31 ** 2.02
Note: A ratio of greater than 1 indicates that participants are over-weighing income relative to expenses, whereas a ratio of less than 1 
indicates that participants are over-weighing expenses relative to income.
For studies using a modulus scale, we report median income and expense change in percentages.
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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sumers will recognize that a purchase today may inhibit a purchase 
tomorrow, thus focusing them on future consequences of the pur-
chase and the longevity of their purchase. Whereas material goods 
tend to physically persist over time, experiences are characterized by 
a shorter objective life expectancy. Thus, although experiences have 
been shown to provide longer lasting happiness, material purchases 
may appear more enduring. Because physical duration is likely more 
salient than the longevity of memories at the time of purchase, we 
suggest that consumers under financial constraint are partial to mate-
rial rather than experiential options. 
In three studies, we provide evidence that consumers thinking 
about real or hypothetical financial constraints are more likely to 
choose material versus experiential choices across a variety of shop-
ping scenarios. In study 1, we manipulate financial constraints by 
asking consumers to imagine and write an essay about life on or not 
on a budget. Next, they are asked to imagine that they have decided 
to spend their money on something nice for themselves as a treat 
and then are provided with six pairs of options that were pre-tested 
to equate on expected happiness, desirability, and perceived value of 
the item at the stated price. We observe that participants imagining 
life on a budget are more likely to prefer the material options than 
participants imagining life not on a budget, F(1,71) = 12.02 p < .001. 
Importantly, they are also more likely to mention duration as a fac-
tor in their choice than participants in the no-budgeting condition, 
F(1,71) = 4.30, p < .05.
In Study 2, we replicate the findings of Study 1 using another 
manipulation of financial constraint. Further, we rule out an alter-
native explanation that the increased focus on duration in study 1 
was due to the fact that budgeting artificially increases a consumer’s 
focus on the future. 
The study uses a 2(income change: increase, decrease) by 
2(response type: planning, feeling) between-subjects design. To 
manipulate financial constraint, participants are asked to imagine 
that their income has either increased or decreased by thirty per-
cent. In the planning conditions, participants are asked to devise a 
plan or budget for how they would live on their new monthly in-
come, whereas in the feeling conditions, participants are asked to 
write what kind of emotional response they would have to the new 
monthly income.  Participants then complete a shopping task similar 
to the one used in Study 1.  We present participants with possible 
reasons for each of their choices and ask them to indicate which ones 
they considered. As predicted, participants who imagine an income 
decrease are more likely to prefer the material option than partici-
pants who imagine an income increase, F(1,252) = 21.01, p < .001. 
Neither response type nor the interaction of response type with in-
come change has any effect on choice (all Fs < 1). We show that 
this shift in choice is mediated by participants’ increased focus on 
duration while making their choice (95% CI = .2521, .6349; 10,000 
re-samples) (Preacher and Hayes 2008).
Study 3 aims to show the relationship between financial con-
straints and preference for material options by highlighting par-
ticipants’ actual financial constraints. Instead of manipulating par-
ticipants’ perceived financial situation, we manipulate the extent to 
which participants consider their own financial constraints while 
making their choices. To do so, half of the participants are asked 
to consider their current financial situation before completing the 
shopping task. As in Study 2, we present participants with possible 
reasons for each of their choices and ask them to indicate which ones 
they considered. As predicted, participants who are asked to consider 
their financial constraints are more likely to prefer the material op-
tions than participants in the control condition, F(1,160) = 3.89, p 
=.05. Replicating Study 2, an increased focus on duration mediates 
the effect of the manipulation on preference for the material options 
(95% CI = .2398, .9392; N = 160; 10,000 re-samples) (Preacher and 
Hayes 2008). Thinking about one’s financial situation shifts partici-
pants’ focus towards duration, which in turn leads to an increased 
preference for the material options. 
Finally, using data from The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), we show that in quarters of higher unemployment, when fi-
nancial constraints are greater, consumers spend disproportionately 
more on material items (goods) than experiences (services), β = .06, 
t(210) = 5.25, p < .001. This analysis provides real world support 
for the hypothesis that during times of greater financial constraints, 
consumers shift their expenses toward material goods. 
The present research indicates that consumers facing financial 
constraints are more likely to choose material purchases over experi-
ential purchases when making discretionary expenditures. Ironically, 
it appears this shift is driven by a belief that material goods will 
provide longer lasting benefits – even though prior research suggests 
that long-term happiness is better served by investing in experiences.
Squeezed: Effects of Constraint on Consumer Planning
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research investigates the relationship between different 
types of consumer planning and resource constraint. The connection 
between resource constraint and planning has been acknowledged in 
previous research (Lynch et al. 2010; Spiller 2011) but has not been 
explored or analyzed in detail. Furthermore, in contrast to the notion 
that planning is a unidimensional phenomenon (Lynch et al. 2010), 
we differentiate between two psychologically distinct types of plan-
ning: “efficiency planning” and “priority planning.”
Efficiency planning is intended to yield resource savings by ac-
complishing a goal as efficiently as possible, with the aim to avoid 
opportunity costs entirely. For instance, consumers ‘trip-chain’ 
to accomplish several shopping goals without wasting travel time 
(Brooks, Kaufmann, and Lichtenstein 2004).
In contrast, priority planning requires deciding what to forego 
given current constraints and necessitates direct consideration of op-
portunity costs. Whereas efficiency planning concerns local consid-
erations relevant to the current goal, priority planning weighs coun-
tervailing goals against one another. For instance, given only an hour 
to accomplish numerous shopping goals, a consumer might decide 
that not everything can get done and forego visiting the shoe store. 
These two kinds of planning are connected in that both are re-
sponses to resource constraint (or lack of resource slack; Zauber-
man and Lynch 2005). The difference is that efficiency planning is 
relevant when savings in the resource are precious, but there is no 
consideration of competing goals. Prioritization comes when one 
realizes that the resource is so constrained that tradeoffs have to be 
made. 
Because efficiency planning does not involve incurring oppor-
tunity costs but priority planning does, consumers should begin with 
efficiency planning, switching only when increasing resource con-
straint requires that they do. Thus we predict that the type of plan-
ning consumers tend to do should vary with resource constraint. 
Moreover, if efficiency and priority planning are indeed dis-
criminable constructs, there is reason to believe that engaging in one 
type will inhibit the other type. Local concerns associated with ef-
ficiently accomplishing a single goal may crowd out global concerns 
related to competing goals (as in the planning fallacy; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Buehler, Griffin, and Peetz 2010). More gener-
ally, generating a plan of one-type may lead to output interference 
for other types (Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985). From a motivational 
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perspective, developing an efficiency plan may feel like progress, 
making it harder for people to release the goal (Kivetz, Urminsky, 
and Zheng 2006). Relatedly, consumers are averse to wasted utility 
(Bolton and Alba 2012), suggesting that abandoning an efficiency 
plan to prioritize a different goal may feel like a loss. 
In study 1, 153 mTurk participants answered a series of ques-
tions about holiday gift shopping and reported their financial con-
straint level. We show by confirmatory factor analysis that efficiency 
and priority planning are distinguishable constructs, and find that the 
share of priority plans made to efficiency plans increases with con-
straint. 
In Study 2 we manipulated constraint level rather than measur-
ing it; We asked 102 mTurk participants to list what they planned to 
buy each of five people over the holidays, then asked them to report 
how they would change their holiday gift shopping plans in reaction 
to a small, moderate or large financial shock in the form of an unex-
pected bill. Blind coders categorized responses into ‘priority’ (e.g., 
“give up on the gift”, “buy something different”) and ‘efficiency’ 
(e.g., “shop sales”, “use coupons”). Corroborating study 1, the pro-
portion of priority plans relative to efficiency plans increased with 
constraint. Moreover, participants were significantly more likely and 
faster to generate a plan of the same type as their previous plan as 
compared to a plan of the other type, supporting the idea that engag-
ing in one type of planning interferes with the other. 
A weakness of studies 1 and 2 is they cannot shed light on the 
dynamics of planning as it unfolds in real time. Therefore, in studies 3 
and 4 we utilized a virtual environment that simulates a shopping trip 
in a mall. Undergraduate participants completed a shopping list by 
visiting stores and purchasing items from their list. Maps positioned 
in the mall indicated the location of different store types throughout 
the mall and the items available in each store, allowing participants 
to save time by viewing the map and engaging in efficiency plan-
ning. This paradigm allowed us to manipulate time constraint and the 
presence of a priority structure, so that we could observe planning in 
a setting that resembles how behavior unfolds in real time. 
In study 3, we varied the time allowed to complete a series of 
shopping trips, providing a separate time budget for each trip. The 
key result was that participants (N=41) engaged in more efficiency 
planning (i.e., map viewing) under constraint. 
In study 4, rather than giving a separate time budget for each 
shopping trip, participants were given a single time budget to cover 
trips to three malls shopped in sequence. As in Study 3, participants 
(N=62) were paid for each item they located and purchased off an 
8-item shopping list for that mall, with an additional payment if they 
purchased all 8 items at the mall.  A priority structure was induced by 
doubling the payments at the third mall. Thus, if all three shopping 
lists could not be completed, participants would earn more by being 
sure to purchase all eight items at the third and final mall, abandon-
ing shopping at the first two malls if that was required under condi-
tions of higher constraint. We found that with increasing constraint, 
more time spent efficiency planning in the earlier malls reduced pri-
oritization, causing efficient planners to fail to allocate enough time 
to maximize payoffs in the last mall.  
The four experiments provide converging evidence about how 
different types of planning are influenced by resource constraint. 
Ironically, the attempt to save a resource by being efficient can some-
time lead people to get caught up in local considerations, neglecting 
a course of action that may be preferable when considered in the 
context of other, more important goals. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Goffman (1963) describes stigma as the possession of an at-
tribute that has a negative connotation, and that deviates from what 
is considered normal in a specific category of people. Prior work in 
consumer research has looked at stigma in relation to low-literate 
consumers (Adkins and Ozanne, 2005), coupon redemption (Argo 
and Main, 2008), senior citizen discounts (Tepper, 1994) and subcul-
tures (Henry and Caldwell 2006). However, the focus of this research 
has primarily been on stigma management, and the strategies that 
consumers use to deal with the negative effects of stigma, while the 
dynamics of stigmatization remain largely unexplored. In addition, 
bearing in mind the extent to which technology impacts consumers’ 
lives, it is surprising to note that little effort has been made to exam-
ine the relationships between stigma and the media (see Kozinets, 
2001 for an exception). Specifically, what roles do the media and 
media consumption practices play in the dynamics of stigmatization, 
including the perpetuation of existing stigmas and creation of new 
stigmas? What consequences are associated with the end of a stigma, 
either when the stigmatized practice ends, or when it gains greater 
legitimacy in the marketplace?
Overall, in line with the conference theme ‘Making a differ-
ence’, the proposed aim of this special session is to make a difference 
by going beyond stigma management and exploring the complex dy-
namics at the nexus of stigma, consumption, and the media. 
The session will begin with a focus on the role of television in 
the context of the stigmatization of African American women. Eliza-
beth Crosby will present her work on the impact of sexual stigma-
tization on African American women. The findings suggest that the 
media play an active role in perpetuating sexual stereotypes, some-
times resulting in their internalization into women’s sense of self. The 
focus of the session will then shift to stigmatized media consump-
tion practices, and particularly the consequences of the cessation of 
a stigmatized media practice. Cristel Russell and Hope Schau draw 
on a longitudinal research program addressing consumers’ experi-
ence of four discontinued television programs to develop a model of 
consumer loss accommodation and find evidence that stigma associ-
ated with some TV series impairs consumer loss accommodation. 
Stephanie Feiereisen, Dina Rasolofoarison, Kristine de Valck and 
Julien Schmitt also examine the consequences for consumers of the 
end of a stigma, but in a different context: the legitimization of the 
stigmatized media practice (watching TV series). The authors inves-
tigate the tensions in consumer narratives arising from traditionally 
negatively-laden television consumption and the positive evaluations 
of current television series viewing, gained from increasing legiti-
mization processes of TV series such as Mad Men. In line with this 
research, Eileen Fischer will present her work with Daiane Scaraboto 
which also looks at the dynamics of stigmatization and legitimization 
in the marketplace. Fischer and Scaraboto draw on longitudinal on-
line archival research in the network of Fatshionistas to examine the 
consequences for a collective of stigmatized consumers, of engage-
ment in efforts to gain greater legitimacy in mainstream markets. 
Jezebels, Gold Diggers, and Hoes: African-American 
Women’s Experiences with Sexual Script Development
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
African-American women continually face sexual stigmati-
zation. Scholars observe that African-American women are often 
viewed as promiscuous (Collins, 2000). This research unpacks the 
relationship between sexual stereotypes and consumption. Specifi-
cally, I examine how consumption can perpetuate sexual stereotypes 
and create sexual scripts. Additionally, I investigate how sexual stig-
matization affects African-American women and how they manage 
the stereotypes. As part of a larger study exploring African-Amer-
ican women’s experiences with stigma, I conducted 23 interviews. 
Informants also constructed collages. All informants live in a small 
city in the Midwest. They come from a variety of social classes and 
are between the ages of 19 and 56. All interviews were audiotaped 
and transcribed, yielding more than 650 pages of text. In analyzing 
both the collages and the written text from the depth interviews, I 
searched for emergent themes while also engaging in dialectical 
tacking (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Although I did not initially in-
tend to focus on sexual stigmatization, the prevalence of it in the 
narratives prompted me to further explore the stereotypes. Sexual-
ity is an important component to an individual’s identity. People are 
often defined in part by their sexuality (Foucault, 1978). Simon and 
Gagnon (1984) argue that sexual identity frameworks can be viewed 
as sexual scripts. They help build people’s attitudes and beliefs about 
their own and others’ sexuality. These scripts are developed through 
exposure to sexual stereotypes. African-American women’s sexual 
stereotypes have evolved into very particular sexual scripts, such as 
the promiscuous Jezebel or “hoe”, gold digger, and welfare mother. 
These scripts are often reinforced through consumption. Informants 
argue that their sexuality is criticized more than women of other 
races, especially in the media. Sonya argues that African-American 
women are portrayed as promiscuous or as gold diggers in sharp 
contrast to other races. Another informant, Shenelle, says “It’s al-
ways in the media that we are gold diggers.” Informants also note 
that music-related products can increase these stereotypes through 
lyrics and videos that frequently portray African-American women 
as sexual objects.  Because of the stereotypes, society expects Afri-
can-American women to make certain consumption decisions. For 
example, informants argue that they are expected to dress in pro-
vocative clothing. These fashion expectations are reinforced through 
the media. African-American women also face the welfare mother 
stereotype. While the primary characteristics of this stereotype are 
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associated with economics, there is a sexual component, in that the 
welfare mother is portrayed as promiscuous and willing to have chil-
dren with multiple men to increase her standard of living. Informants 
discuss how the welfare mother is often a negative caricature in the 
media. The sexual stereotypes denigrate African-American women, 
reinforcing negative perceptions. With these sexual scripts being 
constantly reinforced, some African-American women accept the 
stereotypes and incorporate it into their identity, in a process known 
as stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson, 1995). The existence of the 
ascribed sexual scripts actually results in its internalization into the 
women’s sense self. This outcome is something that my informants 
admit battling. On informant, Sherry, discusses how the prevalence 
of the gold digger stereotype in the media, makes it hard to resist. 
Other informants note that they know African-American women 
who fall victim to stereotype threat. The reinforcement of these 
sexual scripts is especially influential to adolescents, significantly 
affecting how they view their own sexuality and what is acceptable 
sexual behavior. This can lead to significant negative health conse-
quences for African-American women as these sexual scripts may 
encourage them to engage in unsafe sexual practices. For example, 
African-American women run a higher risk of adolescent pregnancy 
and sexually transmitted diseases than women of other races (Cen-
ters for Disease Control, 2013).
However, some African-American women fight against the 
stereotype and refuse to internalize it. There are several ways that 
informants combat sexual stereotypes. Many informants stress the 
importance of education in reducing stereotypes. Paige designs pro-
grams to educate people about African-Americans so society learns 
that they are not reducible to a set of stereotypes. Mentoring other 
African-American women is also important. Sonya describes the ad-
vice that she gives young African-American women: “I tell young 
women when you go on a date don’t feel like you have to have sex 
with someone... don’t dress in a way that is inappropriate. You can 
feel elegant and glamorous without feeling like you have to lower 
yourself by putting on hot pants.” Other informants refuse to buy 
products that promote stereotypes. Marissa says “I think [rap music] 
perpetrates a sexual stereotype … I don’t like my kids to listen to it.” 
Similarly, Sonya purchases music that portrays African-American 
women in a more positive light and encourages others to do the same. 
Informants feel that they need to constantly fight against so-
ciety’s preconceived expectations. Elise says, “You need to be on 
guard to make sure that you don’t give the image that you are going 
to be in any way allowing yourself to be open to any funny busi-
ness.” The constant battle to transcend the stereotypes can be ardu-
ous. Many informants say that it is “exhausting” and feel as though 
people are constantly watching them. These women need to con-
stantly exhibit front-stage behavior (Goffman, 1959), which is tiring 
and makes them smother part of their identity. This can lead to feel-
ings of unfairness.  Adele notes: “Women may feel they have to sup-
press part of themselves... [My grandmother] would say that people 
think black girls are fast or promiscuous so you have to be extra, 
extra careful to make sure you never give the impression that you are 
in anyway doing that. You need to be… an extra, extra, extra good 
girl in order to make sure no one thinks anything is going to happen.”
Sexual scripts can distort African-American women’s attitudes 
and beliefs about their own sexuality identity and how it should be 
expressed. Unfortunately, consumption plays a significant role in 
reproducing sexual stereotypes of African-American women. The 
sexual scripts that emerge in this research yield consumer welfare 
implications that demand serious consideration. 
Stigma and Accommodation to Consumption Loss
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Stigma is a known impediment to identity expression and iden-
tity work (Goffman, 1963; Snow and Anderson, 1987). By examin-
ing four discontinued television (TV) series varying in cultural stig-
ma attached to the series, we show how accommodation processes 
unfold and are affected by the countervailing effects of consumption 
sociality and stigma. Triangulating across data sources and methods 
(extended participant observation, long interview and online forum 
analysis), we find compelling evidence that consumers experience 
loss on multiple levels (personal, social and cultural) and that so-
ciality affects practices available in the interconnected processes of 
intrapsychic transformation, psychosocial status transition, as well 
as the continuation of communal and symbolic connections.TV se-
ries were selected because consumers’ experience of TV series often 
spans several years and usually occurs in domestic space fostering 
intimacy through intense parasocial attachments, which form and 
evolve like interpersonal relationships (Russell et al., 2004). TV se-
ries are also often consumed socially, allowing assessment of the 
impact of brand withdrawal on social interactions and networks sur-
rounding brand consumption like families experiencing the loss of 
a ritual-infused retail space (Otnes et al., 2008) and fellow brand 
enthusiasts (Kozinets, 2001; Schau et al., 2009). Finally, TV series 
are intricately connected to the broader cultural environment which 
impacts consumers’ responses to withdrawals. For example, Star 
Trek fans experience social derogation stemming from mainstream 
North American attitudes about their brand devotion being “geek-
ish” (Kozinets, 2001), which impacts their experience of brand loss.
Loss accommodation is theorized to be anchored in culture, or the 
manner in which the broader community views the relationship with 
the lost person or object and sanctions ways to deal with the loss. 
When the general community provides sympathy and support for 
one’s loss, it acknowledges its legitimacy and facilitates the accom-
modation process (Kamerman, 1993). When loss is felt throughout 
a community, as in a natural disaster (Delorme et al., 2004), the so-
ciocultural dynamics surrounding loss are essential to the meaning-
making process and identity reconstruction that ensues (Bonsu and 
Belk, 2003). Conversely, if the broad culture does not recognize the 
validity of the loss, disenfranchisement can ensue. When the loss is 
a “socially undervalued relationship,” people may feel stigmatized 
and this stigma “contravenes or cancels out the meaning of the loss” 
(Fowlkes, 1990) impairing the accommodation processes. Stigma 
leads to disenfranchised grief because their affection for the product 
is not widely accepted and their grief is invalidated. Echoing previ-
ous research (Henry and Caldwell, 2006; Goffman, 1963; Snow and 
Anderson, 1987), we find different ways in which fans deal with 
the powerlessness resulting from this stigma: some withdraw into 
an enclave, mainly a virtual one, through the fan forums that of-
fer a safe social space for expressing and sharing their grief; oth-
ers instead, attempt to conceal their grief symptoms altogether and 
deny themselves the right to express it, even though this maladaptive 
strategy usually led to chronic grief; yet others distance themselves 
from the stigmatized groups and attempt to return to the mainstream 
(Snow and Anderson, 1987). In contrast, the Auckland Museum, an 
institution of high culture, celebrated the TV series OF and placed 
the brand at the center of New Zealand culture. The mainstream me-
dia contributed to the creation of a collective memory (Connerton, 
1989), for viewers and non-viewers. The museum acted as a public 
forum where personal experiences of the brand became interlinked 
with collective experiences (Rowe and Wertsch, 2002). These highly 
publicized events served not only transformation and transition roles 
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for the viewers but a connection role as well. The exhibit’s opening 
event was a commemorative one that allowed participants to cel-
ebrate the life of the series. But this connective role was missed by 
those OF fans who were unable to attend because they live overseas. 
Unable to prepare for, attend, and then reflect on the event, they feel 
disenfranchised. We identify the countervailing roles of consump-
tion sociality and consumption stigma in allowing or preempting ac-
cess to transitive and connective resources, thus altering the ways in 
which loss accommodation unfolds. Consumption sociality is signif-
icant in consumers’ loss accommodation because kin collectives (im-
mediate and extended families), proximal social networks (corporeal 
friends), and the broad cultural context offer access to practices of 
transition and connection that supplement the intrapsychic transfor-
mation process that has been the primary focus of previous research 
on loss. We find that consumers who hide their emotional connection 
to a cancelled series from the wider community are hindered in their 
loss accommodation. Their grief is never validated by the commu-
nity and becomes a shameful affliction (Doka, 2002). Social media 
enable cultural bereavement by sustaining or creating communi-
ties of fans who feel safer from outsiders’ view and can grieve and 
mourn together (Sanderson and Cheong, 2010). Our findings that 
online communities grew upon the discontinuation of soap operas 
echo an early study by Fischer, Bristor and Gainer (1996): we find 
unambiguous evidence that consumers seek out support in online en-
vironments when it is difficult to find proximal people dealing with 
the same issue (in their study it was families with Down’s Syndrome 
children). We find consumers seeking support for their loss in part 
because of perceived stigma from their proximal friends, who do not 
understand the loss. In contrast, online community forums offer the 
opportunity for reciprocal self-disclosure (Moon, 2000). As Sander-
son and Cheong documented in the case of Michael Jackson’s death 
(2010), accessing sociality via social media enables consumers to 
create tributes and share them with receptive and sympathetic others. 
The sharing is therapeutic in that it allows for meaning reconstruc-
tion following the loss (Neimeyer et al., 2010). Thus, even when a 
consumption loss is stigmatized by the mainstream, consumers can 
access or even build sociality resources unavailable in their proximal 
social networks by turning to social media.
The End of Stigma? Understanding the Dynamics of 
Legitimization in the Context of TV Series Consumption
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research focuses on the consumption practices and mean-
ings associated with television series. Specifically, we investigate the 
tensions in consumer narratives arising from traditionally negative-
ly-laden television consumption and the positive evaluations of cur-
rent television series viewing, gained from increasing legitimization 
and normalisation processes. We show that these tensions generate 
complex dynamics through which legitimization is accompanied by 
the reproduction of existing stigmas and the creation of new stigmas. 
TV watchers have been stigmatized for a long time. Collins (1993) 
reports that television has traditionally been regarded by scholars as 
the least legitimate form of popular culture, judged as a “bad object” 
despite increasingly sophisticated textual analyses and equally so-
phisticated audience research. Lodziak’s assertion (1986) that heavy 
TV consumers cannot afford to do anything else is illustrative of this 
stigma. These early findings are echoed in Mitu (2011)’s recent work 
which shows that television is still regarded as a low-quality medium 
nowadays. However, while television remains stigmatized, TV series 
are widely popular. In 2011, fiction was rated the top genre world-
wide (41% of the best performing programmes), and among fiction, 
TV series were the best performing format, accounting for 69% of 
the fiction entries (Cassi, 2012). Some TV series like Madmen have 
even acquired the status of cultural object in highly educated spheres 
(Glevarec, 2012). This suggests that perceptions towards TV watch-
ers, or at least towards individuals who watch certain TV programs, 
are gradually shifting. Goffman (1963) argues that a stigma “refers 
to an attribute that is deeply discrediting”. According to Crocker, 
Major, and Steele (1998), stigmatization affects how individuals 
perceive themselves, but also how they feel others perceive them. 
Despite its relevance, consumer research on stigma remains lim-
ited and focuses mainly on stigma management (e.g., Adkins and 
Ozanne, 2005; Tepper, 1994; Viswanathan, Rosa, and Harris, 2005; 
see Sandikci and Ger, 2010 for an exception). Particularly notewor-
thy is that stigmatization does not affect all TV series watchers in the 
same manner, as certain series are stigmatized while others are high-
ly respected. For instance, to define “quality television” Thompson 
(1996) referred to Hill Street Blues or Moonlighting, while Knight 
Ryder and McGyver were classified as “regular television”. We inter-
viewed 16 demographically diverse TV series watchers. The authors 
asked a mix of grand tour questions and floating prompts (McCrack-
en, 1988). Following a general discussion, participants were asked 
to discuss the meanings they associate with series, their watching 
practices and whether they believe watching TV series is associated 
with social stigma. Interviews lasted from 25 minutes to 1h05 min-
utes, were audio recorded and transcribed. An initial identification 
of themes was developed, and theoretical categories were elaborated 
on during open and axial coding procedures. We then began a pro-
cess of dialectical tacking, moving back and forward between our 
findings and the relevant literature to deepen our understanding of 
the practices and meanings associated with TV series consumption. 
Five key narratives were identified. First, the role of new practices 
in the legitimization process of TV series consumption emerged: 
Consumers watch TV series less on television than using stream-
ing, downloads or DVD box sets. These practices allow watchers to 
engage in TV series consumption while distancing themselves from 
the negative connotations associated with television as a medium. 
Thus, consumer narratives replicate the cultural stigmatization dis-
courses around television conveyed by the media and scholars, but at 
the same time, watching TV series is part of an on-going normalisa-
tion process. Second, this process is facilitated by a shift from con-
sumers’ bond to TV channels’ schedule and agenda, to consumers’ 
perceived control of their viewing time, accessing series online or 
using DVD boxed sets. Third, a process of ‘reverse stigmatization’ 
was identified: Whereas TV series viewers used to be stigmatized, 
those who do not watch any TV series would now be stigmatized 
as outside the norm. Fourth, the normalisation process does not ap-
ply to all TV series and is contingent on the low social status of the 
perceived audience. A recurring example of genre that remains stig-
matized is soap operas. Non-soap-viewers distance themselves from 
soap-viewers, while soap-viewers’ narratives echo confession-like 
acknowledgment of their viewing practice, and engage in a strategy 
of concealment (Miller and Kaiser, 2001). Fifth, new stigmas are ap-
pearing as new practices develop. A key example of such practices is 
binge-watching i.e. watching several episodes of the same TV series 
in a row. Binge-watchers are stigmatized by non-binge-watchers, 
the latter considering the former as antisocial. Interestingly, stig-
matization occurs among binge-watchers themselves. Tensions are 
particularly evident between those binge-watching socially versus 
individually. The social ones use an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse to 
legitimize their own behaviour. They present their binge-watching 
as a group activity, shared with friends or with their partner, which is 
considered as normalised whereas binge-watching alone is regarded 
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as asocial and deviant. We contribute to prior work on stigmatization 
(Kozinets, 2001; Sandikci and Ger, 2011) by looking at the dynamics 
of stigmatization and normalisation as social processes in the context 
of TV series. TV series seem to undergo a legitimization process fol-
lowed by other popular genres in the past e.g., jazz; graphic novels; 
thrillers (Glevarec, 2012).This evolution is facilitated by the Internet 
which has profoundly reshaped the patterns of TV series consump-
tion. However, we show that far from operating in a linear manner, 
the dynamics of legitimization are complex and accompanied by the 
reproduction of existing stigmas, i.e. soap operas, and by the creation 
of new stigmas, i.e. reverse stigmatization and binge-watching prac-
tices. Our informants’ narratives evince a degree of cognitive reflex-
ivity that underscores their awareness of the complexities associated 
with the legitimization process. Consider Stefan’s comment: “For 
TV series it’s different because TV in a way is sort of stigmatized 
right now […]. I think for TV series it’s much more of a cultural 
thing. The fact that you don’t watch strictly on TV but you watch on 
a laptop, it’s different from watching on TV. And you find a lot of 
friends who feel cool when they watch TV series, but they don’t feel 
cool when they watch TV. That’s my thought”. 
Factionalized Fatshionistas:  Dynamics within Collectives 
of Stigmatized Consumers Engaged in Marketplace 
Change Efforts
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer researchers have typically studied stigmatized con-
sumers as individuals facing powerlessness, constrained product 
choices, discrimination in customer service, and higher risk in mar-
ket interactions (Adkins and Ozanne, 2005; Henry and Caldwell, 
2006). The focus of this work has tended to be on understanding 
experiences of marginalization and the tactics individual consum-
ers use to cope with stigma. Researchers have noted, for instance, 
that instead of withdrawing into an enclave, stigmatized consum-
ers may challenge the stigma by making attempts to participate in 
mainstream markets (Henry and Caldwell, 2006). Recently, some at-
tention has been directed toward understanding the factors that may 
lead stigmatized consumers who face marginalization in a particular 
marketplace to mobilize collectively and to engage in efforts to gain 
access to the goods and services they desire (Scaraboto and Fischer, 
2013). Thus far, however, we lack an understanding of what happens 
to the collective of stigmatized consumers when they engage in mar-
ket change efforts. In this study, we address this gap. We ask: What 
are the consequences, for the collective of consumers who consider 
themselves to suffer from the stigma, of engagement by stigmatized 
consumers in efforts to participate in mainstream markets? To ad-
dress this research question, we have engaged in ongoing online ar-
chival research in the network of Fatshionista bloggers and followers 
that we studied in our earlier work. Fatshionistas are plus-sized con-
sumers who want more options from mainstream fashion marketers 
(Scaraboto and Fischer, 2013). They are stigmatized within main-
stream society in general, and the fashion industry in particular, be-
cause their body size exceeds that regarded as attractive and socially 
acceptable (Bordo, 1993; LeBesco, 2005). In earlier work, we moni-
tored 10 blogs that discuss plus-size fashion regularly, from their 
first post through to December 2010. Since then, we have monitored 
blogs and responses for two additional years, and have collected 
media articles that discuss Fatshionistas’ engagement in the fashion 
market. Our analysis of this data was guided by our research ques-
tion, and informed by concepts from relevant theories. From insti-
tutional theory, we consider the notions of legitimacy (the degree of 
which can vary across categories of actors within a market or field); 
institutional boundaries (distinctions perceived between categories 
of actors in a market or field [Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010]); and 
institutional work (actions aimed at creating, maintaining and/or dis-
rupting institutions [Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006]). We also drew 
on concepts from actor-network theory, including its central premise 
that the success of any network relies on the ability of focal actors 
in the network to tie together the interests of multiple actors through 
processes of “translation.” Translation processes are those in which 
disparate actors are recruited to engage in alliances that help stabilize 
the network in a way that suits the focal actor’s interests. Our find-
ings highlight three consequences for the collective of engagement 
by stigmatized consumers in efforts to ameliorate their marginaliza-
tion in a marketplace: 1) Some members of the consumer collective – 
but not all of them – gain recognition for taking on institutional work 
that is supportive of the institutional norms and logics. In the case of 
Fatshionistas, this institutional work is the creation of fashionable 
“looks” with available plus-size outfits, and of fashion commentaries 
that are disseminated online through blog postings. This activity is 
in essence the same kind of institutional work undertaken by fash-
ion photographers and fashion editors, and contributes to reinforcing 
the logic of art that is central to the field of fashion (Scaraboto and 
Fischer, 2013). However, while a few Fatshionistas gain recognition 
from others and attract an online following, most actors in the Fats-
hionista collective are not active in these kinds of institutional work. 
2) Institutional boundaries emerge between members of the stig-
matized collective. Those who have been most fully enrolled in the 
fashion industry are singled out from those who have been largely 
ignored by focal actors in that network. In the case of Fatshionistas, 
a boundary emerges that differentiates those who fit “the formula 
for mainstream media: white, cis(gendered), good looking, middle 
class, young and able-bodied,” (Perkins, 2013). These Fatshionistas 
tend to be at the lower end of the plus size range. This contributes to 
the formation of a boundary between the younger, smaller plus-sized 
consumers and those who are older and/or in the larger end of the 
plus-size range. The emergence of this division is in part due to the 
fact that mainstream marketers, when faced with pressure from Fat-
shionistas, cater to those in the smaller size ranges so as to concede 
conditional, or “phantom acceptance” (Goffman, 1963) to plus-size 
consumers.  3) Stigmatized consumers who are members of the more 
favored sub-group and who gain recognition for their institutional 
work may abandon – or may be perceived as having abandoned – the 
goal of promoting social transformation. This is especially likely if 
the stigmatized consumer can, and does, reduce the pervasiveness 
of her stigma. In the case of Fatshionistas, this can happen through 
weight loss and/or through the formation of a close alliance (e.g. paid 
employment) with a mainstream marketer.  Fatshionistas who have 
neither lost weight nor allied closely with mainstream marketers may 
then publicly call into question the actions of those who have done 
so, labeling them as “sell-outs” who have been co-opted and have 
“let down” others who nominally share the same stigmatized status. 
Stigmatized consumers who continue to be neglected by mainstream 
marketers may further polarize schisms within the collective by re-
inforcing, in their fashion blogs, other issues of ongoing concern to 
the stigmatized group, such as medical negligence and employment 
discrimination. These bloggers consider gaining access to the main-
stream fashion field as insufficient to fight the stigma of fat and “fear 
that the joining of oppressed and oppressor in brand relationships 
is not furthering fat activism” (Perkins, 2013).  Our analysis sug-
gests that these consequences can significantly destabilize an actor 
network anchored on a shared stigmatized identity.  Whether this 
destabilization will impede stigmatized consumers from accessing 
mainstream markets should be the subject of future research. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers and practitioners are often mistaken about the most 
effective ways to get motivated or to enhance perceived value. In 
part, their mistakes may be due to not recognizing the counterintui-
tive forces that operate on consumer value and motivation. This ses-
sion will highlight the variety of counterintuitive ways that people 
come to see things as particularly valuable, and get motivated to act. 
In the first talk, Maglio describes how consumers who rely on 
careful, rational reasoning end up making poor decisions. Remark-
ably, those who rely on their intuition feel more satisfied with their 
chosen options, leading them to pursue these options with larger 
investments of both money and effort. Next, Akhtar, Paunesku, and 
Tormala outline how using weak rather than strong arguments can 
motivate political advocacy. Weak arguments bolster supporters’ ap-
praisals of their abilities to advocate effectively, making these argu-
ments, surprisingly, more useful than strong arguments for rousing 
supporters. Third, Kappes and Balcetis find that focusing on the ac-
tions people have done makes them feel less entitled to rewards—al-
though they apply the opposite criteria when judging others’ entitle-
ment. Finally, Hershfield, Galinsky, and Roese show that, ironically, 
thinking about how a company almost didn’t make it (rather than how 
it was destined for success) makes its products seem more valuable. 
Counterfactual reflection on the company’s origin imbues it with 
meaning, which in turn heightens willingness to pay for its products.
While surprising at first, these interesting effects are, in fact, 
far from counterintuitive and instead derive from predictable psy-
chological precursors to valuation and action. The papers included 
here show that the manner in which basic facts are framed steers the 
course for how they are processed and acted upon: feelings of satis-
faction predicting donations (Maglio), feelings of efficacy predicting 
behavioral intentions (Akhtar et al.), feelings of self-worth predict-
ing consumer demands (Kappes & Balcetis), and feelings of mean-
ing predicting willingness to pay (Hershfield et al.). By focusing on 
the processes underlying valuation and motivation, these four papers 
provide a way forward for consumers and practitioners hoping to 
better understand surprising judgments of value and investment of 
resources. 
Taken together, these papers ask: What are the larger themes 
that account for counterintuitive, and even ironic, consumer be-
havior? These studies highlight the fact that value and motivation 
depend not only on qualities of the product and of the person, but 
also on the way that the consumer approaches a decision. Since these 
decision processes are more malleable than product attributes or per-
sonality characteristics, they offer new insights into the precursors 
of purchase decisions, and into understanding counterintuitive con-
sumer behavior. 
Implementing Intuitive Decisions
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Deliberative decision strategies have historically been consid-
ered the surest path to sound decisions, but recent evidence suggests 
that intuitive strategies may be equally effective. By relying upon 
an affect heuristic, people use their feelings as a guide to decisions 
about choice options rather than weighing the individual pros and 
cons (Slovic et al. 2002). Such feeling-based choice has been shown 
to improve decision quality, leading people to more accurately 
choose among hypothetical cars and vacations (Mikels et al. 2011) 
and to more accurately predict real-world outcomes like stock prices 
and the weather (Pham, Lee, and Stephen 2012). However, an open 
question remains as to how feeling-based decisions are translated 
into action. Because intuition boosts choice satisfaction (Mikels et 
al. 2011), which in turn enhances effortful action (Locke and Latham 
1990), we predicted that people would work harder toward decisions 
reached using gut feelings versus deliberation.
Study 1 assessed commitment to choice options as a function of 
decision strategy. Participants were presented with information about 
four different (ostensibly real) restaurants. Beforehand, they were 
randomly assigned to process the information based on either a “de-
liberative, rational analysis”, their “intuitive, gut feeling”, or with no 
explicit instruction. The information was presented in a grid format 
in which participants saw the 12 pieces of information defining the 
first restaurant for 10 seconds, then the 12 pieces of information de-
fining the next restaurant for 10 seconds, and so on. We constructed 
the choice options such that one restaurant was the ‘best’ option in 
that it had more positive attributes (75%) than the others (50%, 50%, 
and 25%). After learning about the restaurants, they received 12 en-
tries into a lottery in which they could win a $50 gift certificate. Par-
ticipants indicated, for each of the entries, one of the four restaurants 
about which they had learned. They were free to allocate the tickets 
however they wished among the four restaurants. They were told that 
we would select a random entry (i.e., one participant + restaurant 
choice) to win $50 to the restaurant indicated on that specific ticket. 
Our dependent variable of interest was the number of lottery entries 
participants allocated toward the best restaurant. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, participants in the gut feeling condition allocated more 
tickets to the best restaurant than those in the rational or control con-
ditions; the later two conditions did not differ from each other. 
Study 2 used a similar paradigm to consider the relationship be-
tween intuition and effortful action. It also tested the moderating role 
of when decisions are implemented, as past research has suggested 
that a break between learning and choosing can compromise the ben-
efits of intuition (Mikels et al. 2011). Participants were presented 
with information about four different restaurants (one at a time and 
for 10 seconds each), but they then choose the one they preferred. 
They were told that each participant would, by default, receive 5 
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 251
entries into a lottery for a $50 gift certificate toward the restaurant 
they chose. Additionally, they would have the opportunity to earn 
additional entries into the lottery by performing a word search task 
after making their choice, and all bonus entries would go toward 
their chosen restaurant. Participants were randomly assigned to pro-
cess the information deliberatively or intuitively, and the information 
about the restaurants was presented in the same manner as Study 1. 
Here, however, the options were constructed such that no one restau-
rant dominated the others; instead, each was defined by 50% positive 
attributes and 50% negative attributes. After the information presen-
tation, participants chose the restaurant they preferred.
Next, participants had the chance to find up to twenty words in 
the word search task. For each correctly identified word, we would 
provide them with one additional entry in the lottery. For half of 
the participants, they performed the word search task uninterrupted. 
For the other half, a pop-up ad appeared very early during the word 
search (before any words were identified) that participants had to 
close in order to proceed. We recorded how long participants spent 
on the word search task and also scored how many words they had 
correctly identified.
Neither the main effect of decision style nor the main effect of 
distraction was significant, but we did obtain the predicted interac-
tion between the two factors. When not presented with a pop-up ad, 
participants in the gut feeling condition spent more time working on 
the word search task than those in the rational condition. However, 
when the pop-up ad was presented, participants in the gut feeling 
condition spent less time working on the word search task than those 
in the rational condition. We observed an identical pattern of results 
for the number of words found. This suggests that intuitive deci-
sions are most effectively translated into action immediately. Adding 
a break – even briefly – between choice and implementation negated 
the benefit for intuition.
Study 3 examined choices in a different domain and targeted ac-
tual spending behavior. Participants were presented with information 
about four different children’s charities (one at a time and for 10 sec-
onds each). They were randomly assigned to process the information 
deliberatively or intuitively. All of the options were defined by 50% 
positive attributes and 50% negative attributes. After the informa-
tion, they chose the charity they preferred. Additionally, they were 
given the opportunity to donate to their chosen charity from the $2 
they had received for participation. As predicted, participants who 
chose their charity based on intuition felt more satisfied with their 
choice and donated more money to that charity.
In sum, this research identifies important downstream conse-
quences for how people approach decisions in the first place. Consis-
tently, people focused on feelings worked harder and longer toward 
their choices, suggesting that affect facilitates the immediate imple-
mentation of decision-relevant action.
Weak > Strong: The Ironic Effect of Argument Strength 
on Supportive Advocacy
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A great deal of research has tested the effect of argument qual-
ity—or message strength—on persuasion (for reviews see Petty & 
Wegener, 1998; Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004). This vast 
literature consistently shows that, when argument quality does exert 
an impact on persuasion (e.g., under conditions of high message pro-
cessing), strong arguments produce more persuasion than do weak 
arguments. The present research suggests that under some condi-
tions the opposite strategy may be superior—in particular, presenting 
weak rather than strong arguments might motivate greater advocacy 
and action. Across three studies, we show that when individuals al-
ready agree with a cause (i.e., it is pro-attitudinal), receiving weak 
arguments in its favor can prompt them into advocating more on its 
behalf. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediates this effect such 
that people exposed to weak arguments are more likely to feel they 
have something valuable to contribute. Moreover, consistent with 
the notion that it is driven by subjective feelings of increased ef-
ficacy, the effect is more likely to emerge when initial argumentation 
efficacy and attitude certainty are moderate or low. Individuals with 
high argumentation efficacy and high certainty generally advocate 
regardless of the strength of arguments received.
Study 1. Prior to the 2012 presidential election, participants 
were told that the researchers conducting the study were part of 
a new national initiative entitled Voter’s Voice. The initiative was 
ostensibly designed to inform Americans about why other citizens 
are motivated to support or oppose particular political candidates. 
All participants were told that the researchers were investigating the 
ways in which voters view and make sense of their fellow citizens’ 
reasons for supporting and opposing those candidates. All partici-
pants were also led to believe that the information they provided 
could be used in get-out-the-vote campaigns and political advertise-
ments. Following this introduction, participants reported their atti-
tudes towards Obama’s reelection. Then, participants were assigned 
to read arguments made by other citizens in support of Obama’s re-
election campaign. They read either weak or strong arguments for 
Obama, and then they answered questions about their willingness 
to advocate (i.e., trying to persuade others, making phone calls for 
Obama, donating money to Obama’s campaign) and their subjective 
feelings of efficacy (i.e., knowledge compared to others, perceived 
argumentation effectiveness).
Results indicated that when participants received pro-attitudinal 
(i.e., pro-Obama) arguments, they ironically showed greater inten-
tion to advocate for Obama when those arguments were weak rather 
than strong. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediated this effect. 
In essence, when participants came to feel more efficacious at argu-
ing for a cause than their like-minded peers, they displayed greater 
willingness to promote, endorse, and advocate for it. This subjective 
feeling of efficacy was derived from weak arguments. As expected, 
this pattern did not hold for counter-attitudinal participants, who had 
similar levels of advocacy regardless of whether they saw weak or 
strong arguments. Finally, the argument quality manipulation (even 
among pro-attitudinal participants) did not change participants’ at-
titudes or affect their voting preference.
Study 2. The primary objectives of Study 2 were to replicate 
the weak > strong effect among pro-attitudinal participants and to 
explore the moderating role of perceived argumentation efficacy. 
Pro-attitudinal participants went through the same paradigm as in 
Study 1, except that before seeing the weak or strong arguments, 
they completed an ostensibly unrelated task in which their argumen-
tation skills were analyzed. Participants were given false feedback 
that their argumentation skills were either in the 91st percentile (high 
argumentation efficacy) or in the 53rd percentile (moderate argu-
mentation efficacy). Results indicated that weak arguments led to 
greater advocacy for those who were told that they were moderately 
effective at arguing. Participants in the high argumentation efficacy 
condition had higher levels of advocacy regardless of the type of ar-
guments they saw. As in Study 1, perceived efficacy mediated this ef-
fect. Thus, participants were more motivated to advocate for a cause 
more when they felt that they would be effective at doing so, whether 
that feeling came from our efficacy manipulation or the fact that their 
peers had made weak arguments.
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Study 3. Our goals in the third study were to replicate the weak 
> strong effect in a completely different paradigm and to determine 
its relationship with a well-established, conceptually related mod-
erator—attitude certainty. Participants were asked to imagine that 
their town recently proposed a policy that would make all school 
cafeterias vegetarian by law. After reporting their attitudes and at-
titude certainty towards the policy, participants were told that the 
town government was going to hold a town hall meeting before they 
made their decision. In this town hall meeting scenario, participants 
were exposed to either weak or strong arguments from other citizens 
against the policy (i.e., pro-attitudinal arguments as participants also 
were largely against this policy). After reading these arguments, par-
ticipants answered questions about their willingness to advocate for 
their views (i.e., trying to persuade others, sharing their views with 
friends). Results indicated that pro-attitudinal (i.e., anti-vegetarian 
policy) participants who were low in attitude certainty showed the 
weak > strong effect, expressing greater intent to advocate when they 
saw others’ weak rather than strong arguments. By contrast, partici-
pants who were high in attitude certainty expressed high advocacy 
intentions irrespective of the quality of arguments others made.
Discussion. Taken together, these findings reveal that weak ar-
guments can play an important role in motivating advocacy. They 
suggest, counterintuitively, that it might sometimes behoove ad-
vocacy groups to expose their supporters to weak arguments from 
others—especially if those supporters initially feel uncertain about 
their attitudes or about their ability to make the case for them. Weak 
arguments appear to be capable of bolstering such supporters’ sub-
jective appraisals of their own abilities to advocate effectively, and 
perhaps also of the need to advocate in the first place. Ironically, 
then, motivating supporters to advocate on behalf of a cause might 
be facilitated by the strategic use of weak arguments. New questions 
for research exploring the intersection of attitudes, persuasion, feel-
ings, and motivation will be raised, and implications for understand-
ing self-efficacy and attitude certainty will be discussed.
Feeling Entitled Because of Who You Are
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer behavior is driven in part by feelings of entitlement. 
Particularly when selecting goods and services that are not necessi-
ties, consumers may reward themselves with particularly desirable 
selections to the extent that they feel deserving. Although entitle-
ment beliefs may therefore play an important role in consumption 
behavior, these beliefs are also associated with negative outcomes 
like acting selfishly in ways that take a toll on others (e.g., Campbell, 
Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; Fisk, 2010; Harvey & 
Martinko, 2009; Moeller, Crocker, & Bushman, 2009). The goal of 
the current research was to aid in understanding the source of entitle-
ment beliefs.
Lerner (1991) defined entitlement as “the judgment, often tacit, 
that someone, or some category of people, is entitled to a particular 
set of outcomes by virtue of who they are or what they have done” 
(italics added; p. 13). Who people are, or their attributes, include 
personal characteristics like being smart, a hard worker, and expe-
rienced in a given area; what people have done, or their actions, are 
behaviors like having earned a degree from a prestigious university 
and working a 60-hour week. A pre-study supported our supposi-
tion that people see others as entitled to desirable outcomes to the 
extent that those others emphasize their actions rather than their 
attributes. We predicted, however, that this would not apply when 
people thought about their own entitlement. Instead, people should 
feel more entitled to desirable outcomes when they think about who 
they are than when they think about what they have done. 
We tested this idea in four experiments by manipulating wheth-
er people focused on their attributes or their actions and then measur-
ing entitlement. As dependent variables, we measured both general 
entitlement, using an established instrument, the Psychological En-
titlement Scale (PES; Campbell, et al., 2004), and also beliefs about 
specific outcomes that were deserved (e.g., salary). 
In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to think about 
either “the kind of person that you are” (attribute focus condition) 
or “the kinds of things you do” (action focus condition) as they re-
sponded to a resource dilemma. Those in the attribute focus condi-
tion subsequently scored higher on the PES than those in the action 
focus condition. Control measures indicated that construal level (ab-
stract versus concrete thinking) did not explain the effect. 
In Experiment 2, law students read that many lawyers earn a 
high salary “because of who they are” (attribute focus condition) or 
“because of what they do” (action focus condition). Controlling for 
gender and the type of law participants were interested in practicing, 
those in the attribute focus condition had higher PES scores and also 
gave a higher number as the starting salary to which they believed 
they were entitled.
We next investigated mechanisms underlying entitlement be-
liefs. As the first mechanism tested, we asked whether perceived 
consistency of favorable inputs increases entitlement. Attributes de-
scribe more enduring behavior than actions (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). 
Perhaps the attribute focus manipulations made participants think 
about their favorable inputs as being especially enduring or charac-
teristic, and they rewarded themselves accordingly. Apart from this 
consistency mechanism, we tested a second mechanism. We asked if 
self-worth increases entitlement. Most people think of themselves as 
good and worthy people (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989), so the 
more that they base their judgments of entitlement on these global 
evaluations of the self, the more entitled they should feel. In this 
case, even information about an ancillary negative input might boost 
entitlement, if it leads people to focus on their attributes. 
In Experiment 3, we tested both the effects of perceived con-
sistency and self-worth on entitlement. Students completed a tat-
too-drawing task and received positive or negative feedback that 
focused on their attributes or actions. Participants indicated how 
much (hypothetical) pay they deserved for their drawing. Both 
attribute-framed feedback and positive feedback increased entitle-
ment to pay, and the effects of one factor did not depend on feedback 
valence. If consistency were the only underlying mechanism, then 
attribute-framed feedback would have increased entitlement when 
positive and decreased entitlement when negative, but there was no 
such interaction effect. Moreover, participants who received nega-
tive attribute-framed feedback also reported the highest PES scores 
of any condition. Thus, these findings provide support for the self-
worth mechanism.
Further support came from Experiment 4, where participants 
were randomly assigned to complete a task that would induce tem-
porarily low or high feelings of self-worth (Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 
2001), before they wrote personal ads focusing on the “kind of per-
son you are” (attribute focus condition) or on the “kinds of things 
you do” (action focus condition). PES scores as well as entitlement 
to a desirable romantic partner were highest in participants with high 
feelings of self-worth who focused on their attributes. 
 In sum, these four experiments shed light on the sources of 
high entitlement beliefs, which in turn have consequences for con-
sumer behavior. 
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Wanting What Almost Wasn’t: Counterfactual Reflection 
Heightens Valuation of Branded Products
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Apple and Google were started in garages. Fedex took off with 
$27,000 in winnings at a Vegas blackjack table. Southwest was con-
ceived on a cocktail napkin. The story behind a brand has always 
been important to its consumers; indeed when the above companies 
come up for discussion, references to their interesting starting points 
are often not far behind. These examples also suggest that some ori-
gin stories contain a particular twist, a fork in the road or a close-call 
with disaster, that make the current stature of the brand seem more 
valuable. If not for the improbable blackjack win that saved the com-
pany from bankruptcy, there would be no Fedex today, and this story 
may make the company seem, as a result, more valuable. The present 
research explores the impact of these “what might have been” reflec-
tions on brand perceptions and consumption experiences. We further 
explore whether a particular mechanism – the elevation of product’s 
sense of meaningfulness to the individual – underlies the counterfac-
tual reflection effect on brand experience.
In Study 1, we tested the idea that counterfactual reflections are 
associated with greater preference for given brands at a very general 
level. If counterfactual reflection enhances brand attitude, then all 
else being equal, the salience of counterfactuals regarding brand ori-
gin might be associated with brand preference. To this end, we asked 
participants to list either their favorite or least favorite brand. We pre-
dicted that participants would be more likely to indicate that their fa-
vorite brand had a turning point or “fork-in-the-road” moment (i.e., a 
salient counterfactual embedded in the brand origin story) compared 
to their least favorite brand. In line with our hypothesis, a greater pro-
portion of participants noted a fork-in-the-road moment (i.e., counter-
factual connected with brand) for their favorite versus least favorite 
brand (32.3% vs. 22.1%), c2(1, N = 324) = 4.27, p = .039.
The goal of Study 2 was to test the causal impact of counter-
factual reflection on brand valuation. We manipulated counterfac-
tual reflection by creating two framings of the origin story behind a 
well-known brand (Gatorade), one inviting the participants to reflect 
on “what might have been” and the other sticking solely to factual 
events. We predicted that participants in the counterfactual condi-
tion would be willing to pay a greater amount for a correspondingly 
branded product than those in the factual condition. Indeed, partici-
pants in the counterfactual-reflection condition expressed a higher 
willingness-to-pay (M = $2.14, SD = $1.18) than did participants 
in the factual-reflection condition (M = $1.72, SD = $0.89), t(132) 
= 2.33, p = .021, d = .40. In short, highlighting the counterfactual 
origins of Gatorade led to a higher willingness to pay for a 20-ounce 
bottle of Gatorade.
Whereas Study 2 documented the impact of counterfactual re-
flection on product evaluation, Study 3 pushed further to examine 
consumption experiences. Specifically, in Study 3 we examined 
whether counterfactual reflection influences how much participants 
enjoyed consuming a product. If the counterfactual reflection makes 
evaluations of the brand more positive, this evaluative effect might 
spill over to consumption experience. To this end, participants in 
the counterfactual-origins condition read a description of a fictional 
chocolate company that highlighted the ways in which events could 
have turned out differently. Participants in the factual-origin condi-
tion read a description that simply discussed the origins of the com-
pany. All participants were then given a chocolate wrapped in silver 
foil ostensibly from Droese Chocolates to sample and rated the taste 
and flavor of the chocolate on 7-point scales, from which we created 
a composite taste-flavor score (a = .93). We predicted that reflect-
ing on the counterfactual origins of a chocolate company would im-
prove the very taste of its chocolates. An omnibus ANOVA revealed 
significant differences among the three conditions in ratings of the 
chocolate, F(2, 38) = 4.35, p = .02, hp
2 = .19. As predicted, a contrast 
test revealed that participants in the counterfactual-origins condition 
rated the chocolate as having better taste and flavor (M = 4.90, SD = 
.71) than did participants in the factual-origins condition (M = 4.00, 
SD = .90) and the control condition (M = 4.33, SD = .89), t(38) = 
2.72, p < .01.
Past research has found that people find meaning in mutabil-
ity (Galinsky et al. 2005; Kray et al. 2010, Ersner-Hershfield et al. 
2010). That is, counterfactual reflection increases the meaningful-
ness of an event or relationship. Study 4 tests whether perceptions 
of meaningfulness underlie the effect of counterfactual reflection on 
branded product valuation. We hypothesized that counterfactual re-
flection would lead to a heightened sense of meaningfulness, which 
would in turn heighten willingness-to-pay. To do so, participants 
read about a man who had nearly missed his flight (counterfactual 
condition) or missed his flight by a large margin (non-counterfactual 
condition), and then went on to having a meeting with a friend at 
the airport that led to the formation of a chocolate company. An out-
lier from the near-miss condition who was more than 2.5 SDs above 
the mean WTP price was excluded from the analyses that follow. 
In line with our hypothesis, participants in the near-miss condition 
were willing to pay significantly more for the box of chocolates (M 
= $9.20, SD = $5.02) than were participants in the far-miss condition 
(M = $6.87, SD = $3.98), t(70) = 2.19, p = .032, d = .51. Moreover, 
participants in the near-miss condition also saw Droese Chocolates 
as more meaningful (M = 3.99, SD = .95) than did participants in 
the far-miss condition did (M = 3.31, SD = 1.04), t(70) = 2.90, p < 
.01, d = .68. To examine the mediating role of meaningfulness, we 
regressed willingness to pay scores on condition and perceptions of 
meaningfulness. As hypothesized, when taking into account mean-
ingfulness, condition was no longer a significant predictor of will-
ingness to pay, b = .15, t = 1.26, p = .212, whereas meaningfulness 
was a significant predictor, b = .32, t = 2.76, p = .007.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
This session is focused on the current ACR theme of “Make 
a Difference” by exploring how individuals can make a difference 
in their own lives, enhancing their abilities to pursue desired self-
regulation goals, understanding the obstacles to self-regulation, and 
improving goal engagement and goal outcomes. Decades of research 
in both psychology and consumer behavior have attempted to iden-
tify behaviors that support and moderate self-regulation. A multitude 
of products and therapies have all targeted self-regulation goals, at-
tempting to help consumers save money, exercise more, quit smok-
ing, lose weight, and address dozens of other self-regulation goals. 
We address this critical domain by asking: when do consumers re-
main engaged with self-regulation goals, and when do they disen-
gage? In particular, we explore this question from the perspective 
of the self through a focus on various moderators such as individual 
traits, self-perception, and self-affirmation.
In the first paper, Touré-Tillery and Fishbach focus on self-per-
ception as driver of goal engagement. The authors show that when 
individuals perform actions that have a strong visual impact (e.g., 
writing a donation amount with brightly colored ink versus subdued 
ink) this leads them to perceive the behavior as more diagnostic 
of the self, thus increasing goal engagement as individuals seek to 
maintain a positive image of the self. 
In the second paper, Zemack-Rugar, Corus, and Brinberg show 
that imagined or anticipated goal failure can sometimes impact goal 
engagement in the same way as actual, past goal failure, and at other 
times – differ from past failure. The authors explore moderators of 
goal engagement preceding or following goal failure including in-
dividual characteristics (one’s score on the “Response to Failure” 
scale) and the reason for failure (internal vs. external attribution). 
In the third paper, Koo, Labroo, and Lee look at the role of self 
in self-regulation by examining how a potent individual difference 
– regulatory focus – affects goal engagement. The authors explore 
why a prevention (vs. promotion) focus is more effective at increas-
ing goal engagement, and show that prevention oriented individuals 
succeed at self-regulation by focusing on goal-engagement, and not 
by focusing on avoiding goal-inconsistent behaviors. 
In the fourth paper, Vohs, Park, and Schmeichel uncover unex-
pected effects of self-affirmation on goal engagements. The authors 
show that affirming the self can aid in goal-engagement when the 
goal is easy (consistent with prior research), however, self-affirma-
tion can be detrimental to goal pursuit when the goal is challenging 
and individuals experience failure. 
In summary, all papers address the role of self in self-regulation, 
presenting counter-intuitive findings, unexpected effects, new pro-
cess theories, and new moderators. These papers (all in advanced 
stages of completion) further the field’s understanding of self-regula-
tion and should be of interest to a variety of researchers focusing on 
goal behavior, sequential choice, individual differences, and self-reg-
ulation. This session provides great insight for consumers, marketers, 
and researchers alike as to how we can all “Make a Difference” and 
promote successful self-regulation goal pursuit. 
Making an Impact on the Self: How Sounds and Colors 
Increase Goal Engagement
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine completing a form to indicate how much money you 
want to donate to charity. Now imagine that, for some reason, you 
receive a bright orange pen to complete this form. Would this visu-
ally impactful ink color influence your donation? Would it influence 
how you see yourself? 
People will make goal-consistent choices when they believe 
these choices matter for the goal outcome, or for their own self-con-
cept (i.e., self-signaling; Bodner and Prelec 1996; Prelec and Bodner 
2003). Thus, a person will donate money to charity because it will 
save lives, or because it will make her feel more generous—or both. 
Many factors can make a choice seem consequential for the self-
concept. For example, explicitly linking a choice to an identity (e.g., 
be a voter; Bryan, Walton, Rogers, and Dweck 2011), or positioning 
a choice at the beginning or end of a sequence (Touré-Tillery and 
Fishbach 2012) promote adherence to goals by making choices seem 
more representative of the self, or self-diagnostic. These patterns of 
behavior occur because individuals are motivated to maintain a posi-
tive self-concept (Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv 2009; Schlenker 1985) 
and will “do the right thing” when it seems most telling of the self.
Research shows individuals for whom outcomes are typically 
experienced as dependent upon their own actions tend to develop an 
internal locus of control, and become more likely to exert themselves 
when engaged in important tasks (Rotter 1966). We propose the im-
mediate perceptual effect of an action, although irrelevant for goal 
pursuit, will operate as a type of contingent outcome. Producing a 
visual contrast when writing with a bright color on a form printed 
in black, or producing sound while clicking through webpages will 
increase people’s sense of control and responsibility for that action. 
Thus, we hypothesize that actions with such visual or auditory im-
pact will seem more self-diagnostic, and hence will increase adher-
ence to valued goals, because individuals wish to maintain a positive 
self-concept. Three experiments confirmed our hypotheses for pro-
social and voting goals. 
In Experiment 1, we started with participants who generally 
value charity goals involving monetary donations (MBA students). 
Participants indicated their likelihood to donate to UNICEF on a sur-
vey printed in black ink. The study employed a 2 (visual impact: 
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high vs. low) between subjects design. Participants in the low-impact 
condition received a black pen to fill out the survey, whereas those in 
the high-impact condition received a bright-color pen (orange, light 
blue, or purple) which contrasted more sharply with the survey print. 
We found participants were more likely to donate when using color 
(vs. black) pens. We argue visual impact made the decision appear 
more diagnostic for self-inferences about generosity, and thus pro-
moted adherence to prosocial goals.
Experiment 2 used the same design and visual-impact manipu-
lation to explore our hypotheses in the domain of civic goals and 
test the mediating role of self-diagnosticity. Participant (US citizens) 
wrote a short essay about their political views in color or black, and 
we assessed the perceived self-diagnosticity of this action by mea-
suring perceptions of (1) political identity and (2) representativeness 
of expressed views. Participants also indicated their voting inten-
tions for the presidential elections—a measure of goal adherence. 
We found writing in the visually impactful color (vs. black) pen 
seemed more self-diagnostic, and increased voting intentions. Final-
ly, perceived self-diagnosticity mediated the effect of visual impact 
on voting intentions.   
In Experiment 3, we extended these findings to real giving be-
havior and auditory impact, and tested the moderating role of the 
“need to self-signal.” The 2-part experiment employed a 2 (need to 
self-signal: high vs. low) x 2 (auditory impact: high vs. low). First, 
participants indicated how frequently they engage in various chari-
table acts. The scales provided to answer these questions constituted 
our manipulation of need to self-signal. In the high need to self-
signal condition, participants used a high-frequency scale designed 
to make them feel selfish; but the low need to self-signal condition 
featured a low-frequency scale meant to make them feel generous. In 
a presumably separate study, a computerized dictator game, partici-
pants allocated money between themselves and an anonymous other. 
In the high-impact condition, participants heard computer sounds 
when clicking to move to the next screen, whereas the computer vol-
ume was off in the low-impact condition. We found participants with 
a low need to self-signal were unaffected by auditory impact. By 
contrast, participants with a high need to self-signal shared more in 
the sound (vs. mute) condition, suggesting the auditory impact made 
their decision seem more diagnostic for inferences about their own 
generosity, and thus promoted adherence to prosocial goals. 
Taken together, these studies show actions producing a minor 
visual or auditory impact are deemed more diagnostic for self-in-
ferences, and therefore promote adherence to prosocial and voting 
goals. These findings suggest marketers and public policy makers 
can promote adherence to important goals by incorporating subtle 
perceptual effects into consumers’ decision making processes. For 
example, having consumers fill out retirement planning paperwork 
in ways that produce visual contrasts or sounds might improve sav-
ing decisions. 
What I Haven’t Done Can’t Hurt Me: The Effects of 
Imagined Future Failure on Goal Disengagement
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research has identified a phenomenon called the “What-
the-Hell Effect” in which consumers who experience initial goal fail-
ure respond with goal disengagement, and enact further counter-goal 
behaviors (Cochran and Tesser 1996). Recent research has qualified 
these findings, by demonstrating that the tendency to enact this dis-
engagement response is based on an individual difference, and that 
a scale (the Response-to-Failure scale) can be used to predict who 
will respond to failure with goal disengagement and who will re-
spond with resumed goal efforts (Zemack-Rugar, Corus, and Brin-
berg 2012).
In the present research we extend these findings by looking not 
at the response to real, past failure, but rather the response to imag-
ined, future failure. Whereas previous research has explored the ef-
fects of imagined future virtues on current behavior (Khan and Dhar 
2007) and the effects of other self-regulation plans or intentions 
(Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs 2011), no research has explored 
the effects of imagined future vices on current behavior. 
Yet, anticipating failure is quite common in consumer lives. For 
example, if a consumer is expecting to attend a conference during 
which they are unlikely to be able to adhere to their health/fitness 
goals, they face a decision in the days leading up to the conference – 
should they engage with the goal and try to lose a few extra pounds 
to allow for the upcoming, inevitable weight gain? Or should they 
disengage from the goal, give up, and indulge in the days leading up 
to the conference? We explore the similarities between anticipated 
future failure and past failure (studies 1 and 2), and the differences 
between the two (study 3). 
In studies 1 (food domain) and 2 (budget domain) we show that 
anticipated future failure can lead to the same behavioral patterns as 
past failure, thus, response to future failure can be predicted by the 
Response to Failure scale. We conduct a one factor (future failure/
no future failure) between subjects design, with a second measured 
factor of Response-to-Failure scale. Prior research shows that indi-
viduals high (low) on this scale tend to respond to past failure with 
more (less) goal disengagement. We predict that the same pattern 
will occur in response to anticipated, future failure. 
In both studies, participants were presented with a scenario that 
either had an anticipated future failure described or had no future 
failure, followed by a self-regulation choice in the present (i.e., at 
a time preceding the future failure). After indicating their choice, 
participants completed the Response-to-Failure scale. As predicted, 
we found a two way interaction of the scale by future failure condi-
tion in both studies (ps < .05). When no future failure was expected, 
the scale did not predict choice; when future failure was expected, 
individuals with high (low) scores indulged more (less), enacting 
more (less) of the “What the Hell” effect (i.e., disengaging from the 
goal) even when failure had not actually occurred (i.e., was in the fu-
ture). These findings indicate that imagined future failure and actual 
past failure can give rise to similar emotions and cognitions, and that 
these emotions and cognitions have similar predictive power relative 
to sequential behavior.
Study 3 explores whether and when past and anticipated fail-
ure may differ. We argue that the key difference between anticipated 
failure and past failure is the perception of changeability (Gilbert 
and Ebert 2002). When failure is in the past, it cannot be changed. 
Thus, the cause of failure is not important; only the fact of having 
failed matters. We thus predict that when past failure has occurred 
(regardless of cause) individuals high (low) on the Response-to-
Failure scale to enact more (less) goal disengagement. In contrast, 
when failure is in the future it can be perceived as changeable. Thus, 
individuals will focus on the causes of failure, perceiving that if they 
are the cause of failure (i.e., internal attribution) they could some-
how change things and perhaps avoid or mitigate failure. Given that 
individuals might perceive they could avoid failure, we expect they 
would not enact the “What the Hell” regardless of their Response-to-
Failure scale score, and will remain engaged with the goal. 
In contrast, if individuals perceive that someone else is the 
cause of failure (i.e., external attribution) they would feel failure is 
less changeable or avoidable; thus, they will respond to future fail-
ure in the same way they would respond to past failure, with those 
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higher (lower) on the Response-to-Failure scale enacting more (less) 
of the “What the Hell” effect, i.e., showing more (less) goal disen-
gagement. 
To test these predictions we conducted a 2 (timing of failure: 
future/past) by 2 (failure reason: internal [me]/external [others] attri-
bution) between subjects design, with measured Response-to-Failure 
scale as a third factor. Participants were presented with a scenario in 
the academic domain, in which they either expected future failure or 
had incurred past failure related to a school assignment. We sepa-
rately manipulated whether the reason for failure was either internal 
(they chose not to study) or external (circumstance outside their con-
trol prevented them from studying). Participants were then asked to 
indicate the likelihood that they would continue to study (i.e., engage 
in goal) versus go out with friends that night (i.e., disengage from 
goal). Participants were also asked to indicate the degree to which 
they perceived the events described in the scenarios as changeable, 
as both a manipulation check and potential mediator measure. 
As predicted, we found a significant three way interaction of 
time of failure by cause of failure by individual score (p<.05). Pat-
terns of means indicate that when failure was in the past, partici-
pants high (low) on Response-to-Failure-score disengaged from the 
goal more (less) regardless of the failure’s cause. However, when 
the failure was in the future, only participants whose cause of fail-
ure was outside of their control (i.e., external) disengaged from the 
goal, while participants whose cause of failure was internal did not 
respond with goal disengagement even if they were high on the Re-
sponse-to-Failure scale. 
The Role of Goal Engagement in Self-Regulation
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
One of the ways to frame goal engagement is through a simple 
but elegant two category model, distinguishing between promotion 
and prevention self-regulatory orientations. Prior research has shown 
that a prevention orientation is associated with better self-regulation 
relative to a promotion orientation (Chen et al. 2005; Freitas et al. 
2002; Sengupta and Zhou 2007; Shah et al. 2002). The present re-
search looks at why this occurs. 
Prior work would suggest that prevention-oriented people would 
prioritize resisting temptations as the strategy for goal attainment. 
However, there are reasons to believe that a prevention orientation 
may not necessarily entail active avoidance of temptation. Instead, 
we propose that a prevention orientation heightens the engagement 
with the goal overall, thus leading to self-regulation success. In par-
ticular, given prevention-focused individuals’ sensitivity to negative 
outcomes, the possibility of goal failure looms large for them. When 
faced with self-control dilemmas, their vigilance is heightened, and 
their attention focuses on what is most important—to engage with or 
approach the goal — rather than necessarily on avoiding temptations 
that may thwart successful goal pursuit. In contrast, promotion-ori-
ented individuals focus on preventing errors of omission; this leads 
to a multifocal strategy of engaging in goal pursuit by both approach-
ing the goal and countering temptation simultaneously. Despite the 
fact that multipronged approaches would, on the surface, seem to 
predict more successful outcomes, this approach may ironically un-
dermine self-regulation. 
As a result we predict that prevention-oriented individuals will 
be more engaged with the goal, and more focused on approaching 
goal-related stimuli. We predict that they will make self-regulation 
choices based on a preference for/approach towards goal-congruent 
behaviors, will have more goal-approach thoughts, and less thoughts/
strategies related to avoidance of goal-incongruent behaviors. As a 
result of this goal-engagement strategy, prevention-oriented indi-
viduals will be more successful at self-regulation than promotion 
oriented individuals. 
We tested these hypotheses in four studies. In Study 1, we focus 
on the role of self by looking at regulatory focus as an individual 
difference (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda 2002). Participants were 
asked to indicate which self-regulation strategies they would use to 
resolve a self-regulation dilemma of studying versus spending time 
with friends. We found that the more prevention-oriented partici-
pants were more likely to adopt a goal-centric strategy that moves 
towards the goal and were more likely to succeed at self-regulation 
(i.e., to stay home and study).
In Study 2, we sought more direct evidence for the different 
self-regulation strategies by assessing participants’ reasoning of self-
regulation choices. Participants tasted and evaluated two sample 
products: a granola bar (health goal-compatible) and a chocolate 
bar (temptation). After the test, participants chose one of the sample 
snacks as a token of appreciation, and indicated the strategy they 
used to choose their snack by selecting one of the following: 1) “go-
ing for the sample that is healthy” (goal-engagement strategy); 2) 
“not choosing the sample that is unhealthy” (temptation-avoidance 
strategy); 3) “going for the sample that is tasty” (goal-disengagement 
strategy) and 4) “not choosing the sample that is not tasty” (goal-
avoidance strategy). Finally, we measured participants’ regulatory 
orientation. We found that the more (less) prevention-oriented par-
ticipants were, the more (less) likely they were to deploy the strategy 
of “going for the healthy option,” which led to a higher likelihood of 
choosing the granola bar.
In Study 3, we primed participants with different regulatory ori-
entations, and presented them with the same self-regulation dilem-
ma as in Study 1. Then, we asked participants to list all the factors 
they considered when making their decision. We found that partici-
pants in the prevention (promotion) condition generated more (less) 
thoughts that focused on academic success, which in turn led to a 
higher likelihood of their deciding to stay home to study, reflecting 
better self-control.  
In Study 4, we instructed individuals to adopt a goal-engage-
ment strategy or a temptation-avoidance strategy, and explored 
the effects on promotion- versus prevention- oriented individuals; 
a control (no thought) condition was also included. As predicted, 
among promotion-oriented participants, those who followed the 
goal-engagement strategy were more likely to choose the healthy 
salad, demonstrating better self-control, relative to those in temp-
tation-avoidance or control conditions. Among prevention-oriented 
participants, those who followed the temptation-avoidance strategy 
were less likely to choose the healthy salad than those in the goal-
engagement or control conditions.  
These findings provide convergent evidence regarding the role 
of self in self-regulation and the importance of goal-engagement. 
The findings show that individuals who are higher on prevention ori-
entation are more successful at self-regulation, consistent with pre-
vious findings. What is more, the data further show that the reason 
for this is not avoidance of temptation or counter-goal behavior, but 
rather goal-engagement and approach towards goal-congruent be-
haviors. Our research counters what is currently thought about what 
it means to be promotion- and prevention-oriented, which opens up 
new avenues for insights and exploration. 
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Self-Affirmation Can Enable Goal Disengagement
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Research indicates that affirming core values helps to bolster 
the legitimacy of the self and promotes reacting with equanimity to 
threats to self-regard. Self-affirmed people accept information about 
their personal flaws as credible and view those flaws as plausible 
causes of future problems. They have been shown to react to these 
humbling realizations by intending to bring the self in line with more 
virtuous standards (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Thus, an open ac-
knowledgment of one’s personal characteristics (perhaps especially 
one’s flaws) is central to how self-affirmation helps regulate goal-
directed behavior. 
In contrast, we propose that engaging in self-affirmation can 
sometimes dampen performance and motivation. We predicted that 
compared to non-affirmed individuals, self-affirmed individuals will 
react to initial task failure with goal disengagement. In particular, 
because self-affirmation can increase openness to negative informa-
tion about the self, we reasoned that being self-affirmed before fail-
ing at a task could lead individuals to take the negative feedback of 
failure more to heart, thus lowering their perceptions of self-efficacy. 
In turn, self-affirmed individuals who failed at an initial task might 
exert diminished effort and show reduced motivation on a subse-
quent task related to the same goal. 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (self-affirmed/not) by 2 (failure/no fail-
ure) between subjects design. After a self-affirmation (or no self-
affirmation) manipulation, participants were instructed to move 
individual pieces of rice with chopsticks. In the failure condition par-
ticipants were instructed to perform quickly and well, a goal likely 
to result in failure due to the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the task. 
In the no-failure condition participants were expected simply to give 
the chopsticks task a try, without performance expectations. After an 
initial attempt at the task we measured three outcomes: performance 
expectations and actual performance on subsequent attempts, and in-
terest in attempting another rice-moving task.
We found that when failure had occurred, affirming core val-
ues led to reduced performance expectations and actual performance 
and less desire to engage in a subsequent chopstick task (MExpecta-
tion =4.04 , MPerformance = 5.66, MInterest in another attempt = 
4.34 ) relative to the no-affirmation condition (MExpectation = 5.34, 
MPerformance = 9.80, MInterest in another attempt = 5.37). In con-
trast, when no failure had occurred, participants who self-affirmed 
showed improved performance expectations and actual performance 
and a greater desire to engage in a subsequent chopstick task (MEx-
pectation = 6.21, MPerformance = 12.03, MInterest in another at-
tempt = 5.77) relative to non-affirmed individuals (MExpectation = 
4.53, MPerformance = 6.47, MInterest in another attempt = 5.00). 
This latter finding is consistent with prior work on the benefits of 
self- affirmation (Epton & Harris, 2008). These effects suggest that 
initial failure caused self-affirmed individuals to disengage from a 
goal. 
Experiment 2 utilized a 2 (affirmed/not) by 2 (attainable/not) 
between subjects design. Once again, participants self-affirmed (or 
not), and then completed two tasks: (1) the chopsticks and (2) the 
RAT task (RAT; Mednick, 1968); the tasks were said to measure 
“thinking on one’s feet”. In the attainable (unattainable) condition, 
participants were given the impression that achievement of the tasks 
was likely (unlikely). As predicted, in the unattainable goal condition 
having affirmed cherished values reduced effort expended on the 
chopstick task, intended effort on another attempt at the chopsticks 
tasks, and performance on the RAT task (self-affirmation condition: 
MEffort = 4.97, MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.00, MRAT 
performance = 8.30, non-self-affirmation condition: MEffort = 5.65, 
MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.81, MRAT performance = 
10.06). In the attainable condition, being self-affirmed (vs. not af-
firmed) led to enhanced effort and performance (self-affirmation 
condition: MEffort = 6.2, MIntended effort on another attempt = 
6.64, MRAT performance = 10.92, non-self-affirmation condition: 
MEffort = 5.50, MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.40, MRAT 
performance = 9.10).
Experiment 3 further explored the process underlying the ef-
fects of self-affirmation. We posited that people who are self-af-
firmed and fail at a goal would downgrade their ability to reach the 
goal and therefore adopt a more negative attitude toward the self. We 
predicted that this drop in perceived self-efficacy would statistically 
account for ensuing poor performance. We test this hypothesis by 
conducting a 2 (failure/not) by 2 (affirmation/not) between subjects 
study in which participants were asked to rate their competence, re-
sponsibility, capability, and work ethic. Participants first affirmed/
not, and then were given either easy (no failure) or difficult (fail-
ure) versions of RAT. Participants were then asked to rate their self 
efficacy (using the measures above) with respect to a subsequent 
(moderately difficult) RAT task; performance on this task was also 
measured. 
Participants who self-affirmed and did not experience failure 
(easy RAT) rated their self-efficacy as being higher and performed 
better on a subsequent version of the task relative to those who did 
not self-affirm. In contrast, participants who self-affirmed and ex-
perienced failure (difficult RAT) evaluated themselves unfavorably 
relative to those that did not self-affirm. These individuals also per-
formed worse on a second version of the task, an effect that was 
statistically accounted for by changes in self-efficacy. 
These results suggest that what self-affirmation does to af-
fect goal-directed behavior, it does through changes to the working 
self-concept. Affirming the self can lead people to internalize the 
implications of failure, which in turn leads to disengagement from 
unattainable goals. This research helps move the field toward a fuller 
understanding of the nature of self-regulation by exploring how self-
affirmation works in dynamic choice. The effects of self-affirmation 
are shown here to differ depending on whether prior task experience 
was positive or negative. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Although we would like to believe that dishnest behavior is 
limited to a small group of unscrupulous individuals, the fact is that 
most of us engage in these behaviors (Ariely 2012). This session ex-
plores three overarching and important questions about dishonesty: 
(1) What are the interpersonal dynamics that influence dishonest be-
havior? (2) What are the psychological processes that govern unethi-
cal behavior? (3) What are the consequences of dishonest behavior? 
Existing research, published in marketing and psychology, has not 
explored this combination of themes. Further, we examine these 
questions in consumer situations, such as using counterfeit products, 
failing to disclose information on surveys, and being unfaithful to a 
favorite brand.
The first two papers examine interpersonal dynamics and con-
sequences. Both papers examine how people respond to situations 
where being honest might elicit negative judgments from others. 
John and Norton show that individuals prefer to withhold informa-
tion (e.g., recreational drug use) that could cause others to judge 
them in a negative way. But, paradoxically, individuals who chose to 
withhold information (and not tell the truth) are judged more nega-
tively than individuals who chose to reveal the information. Wang 
and John examine the use of counterfeit luxury goods, and explore 
how consumers respond when others either compliment (“That looks 
nice on you”) or question (“Is that real?”) the counterfeit user. Com-
pliments encourage more dishonest behavior (hiding the fact it’s a 
counterfeit; interest in buying more counterfeits), whereas a simple 
question deters subsequent dishonest behavior.
The last two papers examine psychological processes and con-
sequences. Amaral and Meyers-Levy study how construal level influ-
ences expectations of unethical behavior. When judging an unknown 
person, individuals adopt a high construal level, leading them to an-
ticipate this person will engage in more unethical behavior. However, 
when individuals consider their own behavior, which encourages an 
extremely low construal level, they anticipate much less unethical 
behavior. Consiglio, Kuper, Norton, and Gino explore a new type 
of dishonest behavior—being unfaithful to one’s favorite brand by 
flirting with a competing brand. They find that flirting with a compet-
ing brand raises arousal levels, and arousal is misattributed to their 
favorite brand, which results in an even greater desire for the brand. 
Interestingly, being “unfaithful” to the favorite brand has a positive 
impact on one’s relationship with the brand.
Taken together, this set of papers opens up several new avenues 
of research on dishonesty. Each paper includes a completed set of 
experiments. Given the variety of settings and questions, this session 
is likely to appeal to a broad set of conference attendees interested in 
morality and ethics, self-presentation, social signaling, and branding. 
Further, this session fits well with the theme of the 2013 ACR con-
ference, “Making a Difference.” Dishonest behaviors are pervasive 
among consumers, yet there is a need for further understanding of 
how these behaviors emerge, and how they negatively impact indi-
viduals.  
What Hiding Reveals: Ironic Effects of Withholding 
Information
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine being asked about your recreational drug habits by 
your employer, and realizing that in order to be completely truthful 
you’ll have to admit that you have occasionally indulged. In four 
experiments, we show that people believe that the best way to deal 
with such situations is to opt out of answering at all – but that this 
strategy is costly, because observers often infer the very worst when 
consumers choose not to answer such questions: “If he refuses to 
even answer this question, he must have a serious drug problem.” 
The internet has created a fundamental shift toward openness, and 
with this shift, consumers are increasingly facing choices of whether 
to share or withhold information. Previous research shows that con-
sumers tend to ‘infer the worst’ about products when marketers fail 
to provide information on the products’ key attributes (e.g., Kivetz 
& Simonsohn 2000; Huber & McCann, 1982; Simmons & Lynch 
1991). In contrast however, we focus on consumers’ decisions of 
whether to share or withhold their personal data – and the wisdom or 
error of such decisions.
In Study 1, participants were asked which of two individuals 
they would prefer to date. They were shown, side-by-side, each “pro-
spective date’s” response to multiple choice questions about their 
frequency of engagement in six taboo or illegal behaviors (such as 
failing to inform a partner about a sexually transmitted disease): the 
response options were “never,” “once,” “sometimes,” “frequently,” 
and “choose not to answer.” One of the prospective dates answered all 
six questions; the other prospective date answered four questions but 
selected “choose not to answer” for the remaining two. We also var-
ied the prospective dates’ responses to the questions: in the “never” 
condition, for example, one of the prospective dates endorsed “nev-
er” for all six questions, while the other prospective date endorsed 
“never” for four questions and “choose not to answer” for the other 
two. We included similar conditions using “once,” “sometimes,” and 
“frequently.” In all conditions, participants expressed greater interest 
in the prospective date who had answered all six questions – even in 
the “frequently” condition. In other words, relative to a prospective 
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date who had left two questions blank, participants were more inter-
ested in dating someone who had admitted to frequently neglecting 
to tell a partner about a sexually transmitted disease and to frequently 
stealing goods worth more than $100.
Study 1 shows that omitting information can lead to more nega-
tive judgments; Studies 2A and 2B begin to address whether con-
sumers understand this process, or erroneously believe that leaving 
questions blank is an effective impression management strategy. In 
Study 2A, participants were asked to indicate how frequently, if at 
all, they engage in two behaviors – one desirable (donating to char-
ity), the other undesirable (fantasizing about doing terrible things 
(e.g., torturing) others). They were told that their response to only 
one of the questions would be shown to a rater, who would rate their 
attractiveness as a date. The other question would simply be dis-
played without the participant’s response. Participants were asked 
which of the two responses they would like to display. The majority 
of participants (62%) chose to display their answer to the desirable 
question, leaving the undesirable question blank. 
Study 2B tests whether this choice is a mistake. Both questions 
from Study 2A were displayed and participants were shown how a 
prospective date had answered one of them (the modal response from 
Study 2A was used); the other question was purportedly left blank by 
the prospective date. We manipulated whether the desirable or unde-
sirable question was unanswered. In contrast to choices in Study 2A, 
participants in Study 2B expressed greater interest in the prospective 
date when s/he had answered the undesirable question, relative to 
when s/he had answered the desirable question (and left the undesir-
able question blank). Moreover, when we asked participants to guess 
the prospective date’s answers to a series of new questions, results 
were consistent with the dating interest ratings, suggesting that non-
disclosure may have enduring effects on person perception. Taken 
together, Studies 2A and B show that ironically, participants choose 
to opt out of answering questions about undesirable behaviors even 
though doing so makes them less attractive in the eyes of others.
Finally, Study 3 tests a moderator for observers’ negative judg-
ments of non-disclosers. We predicted that people who have recently 
withheld information – and therefore are more likely to understand 
that nondisclosure may not be driven only by desires to hide horrible 
information – are less likely to subsequently judge non-disclosers 
harshly. Participants were first asked to answer sensitive questions 
about themselves; for each question, they had the option of select-
ing “choose not to answer.” We manipulated participants’ propen-
sity to select “choose not to answer” by varying the other available 
response options (i.e., sometimes / frequently / always VS. never / 
once / sometimes); participants were more likely to select “choose 
not to answer” for the former response scale than the latter. Next, 
participants were shown a prospective date’s answers to the same 
questions and rated their interest in dating the person. We again ma-
nipulated whether the prospective date had chosen not to answer 
some of the questions. As predicted, the negative judgments of pro-
spective dates who had left questions blank were buffered when the 
raters themselves had been induced to leave questions blank.
Taken together, these results suggest consumers can be prone 
to withholding information when they would be better off sharing 
it, and point to situations in which this tendency may be exacerbated 
(e.g. when those who are judging them have not, themselves, recent-
ly withheld information). Moreover, the internet’s fundamental shift 
toward openness may exacerbate these issues, as withholding infor-
mation becomes more anomalous, and hence, more conspicuous.
Faking It with Luxury Counterfeit Products: How Social 
Feedback Can Make Us More or Less Dishonest 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Purchase of counterfeit luxury goods is a worldwide phenom-
enon. Past research in marketing has mostly focused on why con-
sumers purchase counterfeit luxury goods (e.g., Han, Nunes, and 
Dreze 2010;Wilcox, Kim and Sen 2009). However, little attention 
has been directed toward understanding how consumers feel, think, 
and respond to wearing luxury counterfeits. A notable exception is 
research by Gino, Norton and Ariely (2010), who found that wear-
ing luxury counterfeits made users feel less authentic and resulted in 
more subsequent episodes of cheating.
We examine the social context of wearing luxury counterfeit 
goods. We propose that consumers feel and respond differently to 
the experience of wearing luxury counterfeit goods when it takes 
place in a social context. The first two experiments (Study 1A & 1B) 
show the social context of purchasing luxury counterfeits influences 
the way people feel about wearing counterfeits. We find a reversal 
of Gino, et al.’s results when consumers purchase counterfeits in a 
social setting. The next two experiments (Study 2 & 3) show that 
social feedback from others regarding luxury counterfeits influences 
whether users will engage in further dishonest behavior. We find that 
consumers engage in further dishonest behaviors—lying about the 
luxury good being real and being interested in buying more coun-
terfeits—only when others compliment them on their fake luxury 
product. When others ask a simple question (“Is it real?”), we show 
a reversal of Gino, et al.’s results. Subsequent dishonest behavior is 
diminished.
Study 1A & 1B
In study 1A, female participants were randomly assigned to 
wear (1) an authentic Tiffany’s bracelet (2) an authentic Tiffany’s 
bracelet labeled as counterfeit or (3) control unbranded bracelet. Par-
ticipants wore the bracelet for 15 minutes while filling out a survey 
of filler questions. After 15 minutes, participants rated themselves on 
different personality traits, including “honest” and “genuine”(focal 
measure), on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Results 
replicate previous research (Gino, Norton and Ariely, 2010), show-
ing participants in the counterfeit condition felt less honest and less 
genuine than participants in the authentic condition (M = 6.41 vs. 
6.12, p < .05). 
In study 1B, we followed the same procedure, except partici-
pants were told to imagine the bracelet was purchased while overseas 
in a study abroad program (social setting). We expected the social 
setting would provide a way for users to rationalize their purchase of 
a counterfeit, which would eliminate negative feelings about them-
selves. As predicted, we found no differences in feelings of “honest” 
and “genuine” between participants who wore the counterfeit versus 
authentic Tiffany’s bracelet (p > .90). Interestingly, participants in 
the counterfeit bracelet condition reported themselves to be signifi-
cantly more honest and genuine than participants wearing the control 
bracelet (M = 6.05 vs. 5.50, p = .01). Thus, the results from Study 
1A and 1B suggest that wearing counterfeits without a social context 
elicits negative self feelings, but wearing counterfeits purchased in a 
social setting eliminates these negative feelings. 
Study 2
In this study, we examine how social feedback while wearing 
counterfeits influences subsequent dishonest behavior. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the following experimental condi-
tions: 2 (bracelet: counterfeit vs. control) x 2 (social feedback: com-
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pliment vs. question). The bracelet conditions and basic procedures 
were the same as Study 1B. However, after wearing the bracelets 
for a period of 20 minutes, all participants were asked to imagine 
themselves wearing a counterfeit Tiffany’s bracelet to a shopping 
mall, where they are approached by a salesperson who comments on 
the bracelet in a complimentary way (e.g., “I really like your Tiffany 
bracelet. It looks so cute on you!”) or a questioning way (e.g., “I 
really like your Tiffany bracelet. Is it real?”). Participants were then 
asked to write down how they would respond to the salesperson, and 
these responses were coded in terms of honesty on a 5-point scale 
(1=confess it’s a counterfeit; 3=intentional ambiguous response; 
5=lie and hide the fact that it’s counterfeit). Results showed that so-
cial feedback mattered. For participants in the counterfeit bracelet 
condition, those receiving a question (vs. complement) were more 
likely to be honest and confess the bracelet is not real (M =3.26 vs. 
1.55, p < .001). Moreover, these participants were also more likely 
to confess than participants in the control condition who received 
a question from the salesperson (M=3.26 vs. 2.47, p = .04). Thus, 
receiving a compliment while wearing a luxury counterfeit product 
encouraged users to engage in more dishonest behavior.
Study 4
We continued to examine how social feedback influences sub-
sequent dishonest behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions: compliment, question, or no feedback (con-
trol). Each participant was brought to a private interviewing room 
and was asked to wear a Burberry scarf (which was labeled as a 
counterfeit) and complete filler tasks. After 15 minutes, a female 
confederate entered the room pretending to look for a lost cell phone. 
She made a quick comment about the Burberry scarf in the compli-
ment and question conditions consistent with Study 3, or made no 
comment at all (control). After this brief interruption, participants 
completed a survey, including an assessment of attitudes toward 
counterfeit products (4 items, e.g., “It is okay to buy a counterfeit 
product as long as I buy the real authentic product someday”). Fi-
nally, participants were taken to another private room which had dif-
ferent “counterfeit” luxury products displayed. Participants evalu-
ated them in private and indicated their interest in purchasing these 
products in the future (1-9 scale). Results showed that participants 
who received a compliment when wearing a fake luxury scarf were 
more likely to engage in subsequent dishonest behavior involving 
counterfeits. Compared to participants in the question condition, par-
ticipants receiving a compliment exhibited more positive attitudes 
towards counterfeit products (M = 4.22 vs. 3.27, p = .02), as well 
as more interest in purchasing counterfeit products in the future (M 
= 7.19 vs. 4.09, p < .001). Counterfeit purchase intention was also 
higher for participants receiving a compliment versus those in the 
control condition (M = 7.19 vs. 5.89, p = .07). 
The Effect of Construal Level on Consumers’ 
Anticipations Involving Ethical Behavior
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Despite the many lapses in ethical behavior that have attracted 
widespread attention in recent years, little is known about the cogni-
tive processes that shape people’s (un)ethical behavior and expecta-
tions of when it will occur. This lack of understanding exists despite 
substantial research on this topic within marketing. One factor that 
has contributed to this state of affairs is that most of the research 
has focused simply on the practical implications and applications of 
ethics in marketing. Limited attention has focused on theory-driven 
inquiry.
This research offers an initial attempt to fill this void by draw-
ing on a corpus of work concerning both psychological distance and 
construal level theory (Liberman and Trope 2008). Psychological 
distance refers to the gap that often exists in time, space, or likelihood 
that separates an event or object from the personally experienced 
reality of the here and now. Moreover, variations in psychological 
distance have been found to affect people’s construal level, which re-
fers to the level of abstraction at which people think about and men-
tally represent an event in memory (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 
2007). Increases in an event’s psychological distance (e.g., an event 
will happen in the more distant future or to a person other than one-
self) prompts individuals to think about an event in a more abstract, 
less detailed manner, while decreases in psychological distance elicit 
thoughts about the event in a more concrete or specific manner. So-
cial distance would seem to be of importance in ethical situations for 
at least two reasons. First, ethical issues generally emerge in social 
contexts, making it likely that variation in social distance could be 
germane in ethical situations. Second, and more critically, because 
psychological distance regards the self, here and now as its lowest 
endpoint or anchor, assessing one’s own behavior should stimulate 
exceptionally concrete representations of the situation.
Importantly, prior research has demonstrated that adoption of 
a high construal level prompts people to place greater priority on 
the desirability of pertinent end-states or goals. In contrast, adop-
tion of a low construal level leads people to place higher priority on 
the feasibility and means used to achieve the end-state or goal. We 
found these observations particularly pertinent to ethical contexts 
because in such contexts people aspire to achieve a desirable end-
state or higher level goal by employing a means that is unethical. 
The theory that underlies our hypotheses integrates the preceding 
two notions, namely, (a) a high (low) construal level increases the 
relative importance assigned to desirability (feasibility) aspects of 
ethics-related situations, and (b) a focus on desirability encourages 
unethical behavior by fostering a desire to attain end-states/goals ir-
respective of ethical considerations, yet a focus on feasibility/means 
promotes more ethical behavior by heightening the salience of un-
ethical actions. Combining the aforementioned premises we derived 
the following hypotheses. When individuals consider the behavior 
of an unknown (distal) person and thereby adopt a relatively high 
construal level, they should anticipate that this person will engage in 
more unethical behavior when the event’s psychological distance is 
greater. But when individuals consider the behavior of the self -- an 
individual that fosters adoption of an extremely low construal level 
-- they anticipate that the self will eschew unethical behavior, irre-
spective of other less potent factors that alter construal level. 
The first two experiments found support for this hypothesis in 
nine different ethical scenarios that varied construal level in a num-
ber of ways.  In both experiments, construal level was manipulated 
by altering the focal actor (i.e., social distance: the self or an un-
known other). In experiment 1, it was also manipulated through the 
temporal distance (i.e., close vs. far distance) of the event; in experi-
ment 2, changes in temporal distance were replaced by a fluency ma-
nipulation that varied a novel dimension of psychological distance 
(see Alter and Oppenheimer 2008). In both experiments a significant 
two-way interaction revealed that for an unknown other, a higher 
construal level (i.e. more temporal distance or reduced reading flu-
ency) increased the expectation of unethical behavior, but expecta-
tions that the self would behave unethically were low regardless of 
variation in the event’s temporal distance or fluency.  
Experiment 3 sought to extend our research from the cognitive 
to the behavioral domain.  This was accomplished by providing par-
ticipants with an opportunity to behave dishonestly (Gino and Ariely, 
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2010). In this experiment, participants were primed to process infor-
mation at a higher or lower level through a series of categorization 
tasks (Fujita, et al., 2006). The results indicated that participants who 
were exposed to the high (low) construal-level prime cheated more 
(less).
Finally, study 4 sought evidence of the mechanisms that under-
lie the preceding effects.  Consistent with our theorizing, by rely-
ing on a design very similar to that used in experiment 1, we found 
that participants generated more desirability-related thoughts when 
the expected behavior concerned an unknown other and a tempo-
ral distance manipulation prompted participants to further process 
the scenarios at a higher construal level. But, participants produced 
more feasibility-related thoughts (i.e. thoughts about the unethical 
means) when the event concerned one’s own anticipated behavior 
(i.e., which prompted use of a very low construal level), and this 
occurred regardless of variation in the temporal distance factor.  Fur-
ther, analyses of mediated moderation and mediation found that the 
number of participants’ desirability and feasibility related thoughts 
accounted for the effects of the social and temporal distance factors 
on participants’ expectations of unethical behavior.
Brand (In)fidelity: When Flirting with the Competition 
Strengthens Brand Relationships
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The consequences of infidelity are detrimental to the continu-
ity of romantic relationships. In order to shield themselves against 
temptations, individuals who are committed to a relationship devalue 
the attractiveness of alternatives or pay less attention to them (John-
son and Rusbult 1989; Lydon, Fitzsimons, and Naidoo 2003). Such 
defensive tactics are more difficult to implement in the context of 
marketing relationships. In the marketing world, numerous brands 
are available and actively try to lure consumers away from their 
competitors by means of commercials, promotions, free samples, 
and other attempts to win consumers’ preferences. Even the most 
loyal consumers are exposed to positive information about attrac-
tive alternatives, and may even find themselves appreciating other 
products and brands that compete with their favored brands. What 
happens when loyal consumers are tempted by other brands? In five 
studies, we demonstrate that a temporary interest spurred by a com-
petitor positively impacts committed brand relationships. We pro-
pose that flirting with a competing brand induces arousal, and this 
arousal increases consumers’ commitment with their favorite brands 
through a misattribution process: consumers who flirt with a com-
petitive brand feel more aroused than participants who do not flirt, 
and they misattribute this arousal to their favorite brand. 
We test the positive effect of being unfaithful to brands in a 
series of studies using a diverse array of paradigms. In study 1, we 
show that appreciating a competitive brand’s favorable characteris-
tics induces loyal participants to consume greater amounts of their 
favorite brand in the near future.  We presented participants with four 
favorable features of a soft drink and asked them to evaluate each 
of them. As predicted, participants loyal to Coca-Cola (Pepsi) who 
rated favorable features of Pepsi (Coca-Cola) intended to consume 
more of their favorite soft drink in the upcoming week, compared 
to loyal participants who rated the same favorable features of Coca-
Cola (Pepsi). 
In study 2, we provide initial evidence in support of the misat-
tribution hypothesis by examining if the effect of flirting depends on 
the similarity between one’s favorite brand and a competing brand. 
The reason for this prediction is that flirting with a similar brand 
may facilitate the misattribution of flirting-induced arousal from the 
similar brand to the favorite brand. Participants listed their favorite 
beer as well as other five beers, and then ranked these five other beers 
from the most similar to the most dissimilar to their favorite beer. 
Subsequently, they were asked to imagine that their favorite beer, a 
beer that was similar or dissimilar to their favorite beer, or red wine 
(control) was chosen by experts as the best beverage to complement 
a plate of smoked meats in a food tasting event. Analysis revealed 
that loyal participants who read a positive scenario about a similar 
beer expressed even greater love for their favorite beer compared to 
participants who read the same scenario involving their favorite beer, 
a dissimilar beer, or wine. 
In study 3a and 3b, we investigated the role of perceived agency 
in flirting, and examined whether the brand flirting effect could in-
fluence real behavior. In both studies 3a and 3b, participants in a 
control condition were instructed to watch a 30-second advertise-
ment for their non-preferred brand. Participants in the experimental 
condition were given a choice between watching either a 10-min-
ute advertisement for a favorite brand or a 30-second advertisement 
for a competing brand in the same product category. We predicted 
that the vast majority of participants in the experimental condition 
would choose to watch the shorter advertisement – in other words, 
we predicted the majority of participants would choose to flirt with 
a brand competing with the brand to which they were loyal.  The 
30-second advertisements presented in the experimental condition 
and control condition were identical. Specifically, participants in 
study 3a watched a 30-second advertisement for their non-preferred 
soft drink (either Coca-Cola or Pepsi). As additional compensation 
for their participation in the survey, participants were then instructed 
that they would be entered into a lottery to win a 2-Liter bottle of 
a soft drink. Participants indicated whether they would like to re-
ceive a bottle of Coca-Cola or Pepsi if they won the lottery. In study 
3b, participants watched a 30-second advertisement of Starbucks or 
Dunkin’ Donuts and were told that they would be asked to watch 
another advertisement later in the survey, and that they could choose 
which one of two 30-second advertisements they preferred to watch. 
Participants were further instructed that one of the advertisements 
was for Dunkin’ Donuts, and that the other advertisement was for 
Starbucks. In both studies, participants expressed a greater prefer-
ence for their favorite brand when they chose to watch an ad for a 
competitive product, compared to when they were forced to do so, 
indicating that perceived initiation of flirting is an important anteced-
ent of its effect. 
Our last study shows that excitement mediates the effect of 
flirting on the desire to consume one’s favorite brand. In this study, 
participants were asked to imagine consuming their favorite potato 
chips, or a similar brand of potato chips. Participants next indicated 
how exciting it would be to eat those chips and the extent to which 
they intended to consume their favorite brand of chips in the near 
future. Consistent with the proposed misattribution process, media-
tion analysis indicated that flirting with a similar brand elicits excite-
ment, and this excitement, in turn, leads to higher desire to consume 
a favorite brand in loyal consumers. 
In short, this research offers important new insight into the 
consequences of flirting with a non-favored brand on consumers’ 
subsequent attitudes and behavior. Taken together, our findings sug-
gest that being unfaithful does not damage committed brand relation-
ships - on the contrary, it can even strengthen the bond between loyal 
consumers and their favorite brands. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of this research for competition dynamics and customer 
retention.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers try to make optimal decisions and companies want 
those decisions to be optimally profitable. In pursuit of that optimi-
zation, companies carefully calibrate how to present information 
to consumers. Although rational economic theory suggests that it 
should not matter how the information is structured, work in social 
psychology and economics have found dramatic effects on consumer 
behavior.  This session features research on key aspects and novel 
applications of choice architecture, bringing to light new means to 
substantially affect consumer decision making. Together, they seek 
to answer the question of how each part of the decision can be most 
effectively structured to maximize welfare for all parties.
One well-documented means of influencing choice is posting 
reference prices. In the first talk (Perfecto, Jung, Nelson, Gneezy, 
& Gneezy), Perfecto will discuss four large field data sets (N = 
124,193) and two large-scale field experiments (N = 4,119) from on-
line companies, which examine the efficacy of defaults and anchors 
in a pay-what-you-want setting. In this context of maximal consumer 
flexibility, Perfecto finds that reference prices do influence behavior, 
but not always as previous lab research would suggest.
Not only are certain choices (e.g., defaults) important in deci-
sions, but their order of presentation is important as well. In the sec-
ond talk (Lee & Feinberg), Lee will propose a model of attraction 
effects, applied to appeals scales in a donation context (e.g., several 
suggested donations and an “other” option). Lee’s 3.5-year quasi-ex-
periment suggests that scale points do exert significant attraction ef-
fects, and that these effects vary across different donors. Lee’s model 
also has consequences for “laddering,” in which charities alter their 
requests depending on individuals’ donation histories. 
Regardless of the order of choices, the information that accom-
panies them is critical in decision making. The third talk (Goswami 
& Urminsky) will show how posting the exercise equivalent (e.g., the 
number of minutes biking needed to burn the calories in the item) is 
more effective and helpful metric to consumers looking to eat health-
ily. One field study and two lab studies reveal that, compared to no 
information, including the exercise equivalent significantly reduces 
caloric consumption, whereas including calorie information yields 
only a negligible reduction.
Finally, the previous talks have examined situations in which 
there are many options. Mochon will begin the session by discussing 
the opposite problem: choice sets of one. With five studies, Mochon 
demonstrates people’s strong aversion to having only one option, 
aside from deferral. He shows that this effect is not due to the addi-
tional information a larger choice set provides, and that it disappears 
when the deferral option does not include further searching.
In summary, this session addresses some of the gaps and short-
comings in the choice architecture literature. The issues examined 
in this session have important implications for policy and societal 
well-being, as well as basic scientific understandings of how people 
make decisions. As a result, this session will appeal to researchers 
interested in the prosocial behavior, health psychology, judgment and 
decision making, as well as those interested in policy or charitable 
giving. This session speaks to the theme of making a difference in 
a number of ways: all four talks challenge the status quo in their 
respective literatures. Some, such as Perfecto and Lee do so method-
ologically, with novel methods testing the robustness of longstanding 
findings. Others, such as Mochon and Goswami, do so theoretically, 
by probing the boundaries of their respective fields.
Default Effects Under Pay-What-You-Want: Evidence 
from the Field
EXENDED ABSTRACT
Pay-what-you-want pricing is a flexible pricing system which 
allows consumers to pay any price they want, typically including 
very small amounts or even $0. A classically selfish consumer might 
be expected to pay the lowest price possible, exploiting the oppor-
tunity to acquire goods or services for free.  However, real-world 
examples of online companies adopting pay-what-you-want indicate 
that people frequently choose to pay more than the minimum.  In 
fact, we observe that customers are heavily influenced by sugges-
tions offered (implicitly or explicitly) by the company. In this re-
search, we investigate the power of these suggestions in the forms of 
reference prices and defaults under pay-what-you-want with a new 
level of precision.  
Reference prices can be powerful in the context of pay-what-
you-want. Some references can be implicit, such as when a company 
donates some of their profits to charity (Gneezy, Gneezy, Brown, & 
Nelson, 2010). Other references can be explicit prices: for example, 
when customers learn about the average price paid by others, that 
information eliminates the otherwise significant influence of ano-
nymity (Gneezy, Gneezy, Reiner, & Nelson 2012). Such a reference 
price may contain information about what is “fair”, “appropriate”, or 
simply “common”. A plausible consumer approach might be to find 
such a reasonable cue and adjust (down) to a preferred amount. The 
weakest type of reference price is in the provision of a simple default. 
Research on default effects in various contexts suggests that a major-
ity of people follow the default choices set by companies (Madrian 
& Shea, 2001; Thaler & Bernartzi, 2004; Johnson et al., 1993). By 
studying reference prices in the maximally flexible environment of 
pay-what-you-want, and by doing so through collaborating with 
three online companies, we can investigate the influence of reference 
price with precision.  
To achieve this, we analyzed the sales data from three online 
companies: a board game company, a video game retailer, and an 
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ebook retailer. In Study 1, we analyzed data from the board game 
company’s promotion of a small expansion set of cards under pay-
what-you-want pricing (N=74,592). Customers saw an unexplained 
default price of $5.00 on a sliding scale and told customers that it 
costs them $3.00 to make and ship the cards. Both of these prices 
proved to have substantial effects on consumer behavior: 56.1% paid 
the default price of $5, and 7.7% paid $3, the cost to the company 
per product. 21.1% paid nothing, but the promotion was still quite 
profitable, earning over $70,000. 
Although the board game company allowed its customers to 
pay $0, their product was physical and therefore difficult to pirate 
illegally, unlike other online goods (e.g., digital music). Perhaps the 
pull of piracy would overwhelm this success if the product were 
purely electronic or sold at a nonzero price. In Study 2, we looked at 
an ebook retailer that employs pay-what-you-want pricing and has 
both of these factors at play. The company sets a default price and 
each bundle features one to two additional, bonus books, which are 
unlocked by paying more than a set price. We find a similar pattern 
of payments across their four promotions (N=10,615): roughly 30% 
paid the default, 33% paid a lower reference price (the minimum 
price for bonus books), and 15% paid the minimum price ($1). 
These findings indicate that a substantial proportion of cus-
tomers choose to pay a default price. Perhaps people think that the 
default or reference price are somewhat fair. How does a high de-
fault price perform when there are other competing reference prices? 
Also, what price do customers settle in the end if they are adjusting 
from a reference price?  To answer these questions, in Study 3 we 
collaborated with an online video game store that sells a single com-
puter game. Our field data set (N=44,042) includes the company’s 
35 pay-what-you-want promotions. The default price was $5.00. The 
company also features two additional reference prices: $1.00 and the 
current average price.  If a customer pays $1, they will have an ac-
cess to a virtual video library to download games.  When customers 
beat the moving average, they receive small bonus features such as 
game music and screensavers.  Across 35 promotions, less than 3% 
paid the default price, 26.6% paid $1, and 18.43% beat the aver-
age by paying $0.01 more than the average.  These results suggest 
that a high default price was overridden by the two other competing 
incentive-ridden reference prices. One of these, the moving average 
exposed a different peculiarity in human responses to the choice ar-
chitecture: a strong magnetism towards round numbers.
We conducted two randomized field experiments in which we 
manipulated the default settings on the ebook retailer’s site.  In our 
first experiment (Study 4), we tested how the salience of charity as 
well as the default charity option influenced payments and purchase 
rates. We also manipulated the default price. In a 2x2x2 between-
subjects design (N=3,214), we manipulated whether an option to do-
nate to charity was put before or after the payment question, whether 
donating was opt-in or out, and whether the default price was $12 
or $15. We found a large increase in donation rates when donating 
was opt-out (77.4% vs. 38.7%, t(3212)=24.2). However, much more 
surprising was the absence of an effect of default price on amount 
paid (M=$8.24 vs. M=$8.31, t(3212)=0.49). This wasn’t because the 
defaults weren’t influential, as customers were 12 times more likely 
to pay $12 in the $12 condition (Χ2=273.03), and 5 times more likely 
to pay $15 in the $15 condition (Χ2=139.42). The price defaults were 
very influential, but a higher default did not lead to a higher overall 
payment amount. 
In our second field experiment with the ebook retailer (Study 5), 
we further investigated the consequences of a high reference price 
and the corresponding high default price. To test this, we ran a 2 
(reference price: normal vs. high) x 2 (retail price: absent vs. salient) 
between subjects design (N=906). The retail price ($28.88) was 
about twice the other default price ($14) and acted as the high refer-
ence price. Customers pay more when they see a higher default price 
(M= $11.63 vs. $10.75, t(905)=-2.5). They paid less (M=$10.78), 
however, when they knew the retail value than when they did not 
(M=$11.60, t(905)=2.0).  Intuitively, the retail value should help 
them justify the default price and adjust down less from it.  Yet, our 
results suggest that the retail price as a reference price helps custom-
ers to justify adjusting their price further down from it.  
In summary, reference prices and defaults heavily influence 
consumer decisions under pay-what-you-want.  People like paying 
in round numbers.  More people choose to give and they pay more 
when the charity is opt-out. Depending on the other available refer-
ence prices, the high default price can produce higher payments.
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Modeling Scale Attraction Effects: An Application to 
Charitable Donations and Optimal Laddering
EXENDED ABSTRACT
The charity industry is substantial ($300B annually), expanding 
rapidly, and presently accounts for over 2% of US GDP. Intriguingly, 
individual, non-corporate giving comprises the lion’s share of this 
total, nearly three-quarters in 2012. To obtain these individual-level 
donations, charities nearly universally present an “appeals scale” 
when contacting potential donors. In the charity sector, the appeals 
scale refers to a list of “scale points” (specific suggested amounts) 
and an “other” category, allowing the respondent to donate any 
amount not on the scale. Orthodox economic theory might there-
fore suggest that the points used on the scale “should be” irrelevant, 
since one can ignore them without penalty or effort. But it remains 
an empirical question whether, behaviorally, respondents are indeed 
influenced by these sorts of commonly-used scales and, if so, in what 
ways.
Choosing scale points well is an important decision for chari-
ties: overly high scale points can be ignored as being “outside my 
comfort zone”, or even potentially alienate donors who feel they are 
being pressed for much more than they’re prepared to give. Worse 
for the charity, overly low scale points may actually pull donations 
downward. Despite their widespread use, such scales seem to be de-
signed in a one-off manner by individual charities, and to date there 
have been no formal models in marketing to help guide them, based 
on data they already possess. To that end, we develop a comprehen-
sive model of scale attraction effects that describes in detail how 
each scale point ‘pulls’ a donor away from the latent, intended dona-
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tion amount; and moreover, how the pulls of each of the points on the 
scale accumulate to influence the final, observed donation.
Our model is grounded in a variety of behavioral theories, main-
ly from the traditions of pro-social influence (Cialdini and Goldstein 
2004), specific manipulations in charitable contexts (Weyant and 
Smith 1987, Shang and Croson 2009), the use of both internal and 
external referents (Mayhew and Winer 1992), assimilation-contrast 
(Schwarz and Bless 1992), as well as prior modeling work in chari-
table giving specifically (e.g., Diepen et al. 2009). This is accom-
plished in several stages. First, each potential donor is presumed to 
have some personal propensity to comply with a donation request 
that is either higher or lower than what they might have otherwise 
given; the “compliance degree” is 100% when the asked amount is 
the same as the intended amount (if one is asked for what one in-
tended anyway, compliance should be perfect), and decreases with 
the distance between these. Second, the “pulling amount” captures 
how much influence is exerted by a scale point. The model intrinsi-
cally captures a “Goldilocks Effect” where asking for a bit more is 
likely to be successful, and asking for much more is unlikely to be, 
but the best course of action is somewhere in between; and we can 
then estimate this “optimal” ask point for each individual. Lastly, an 
“accumulated pulling amount” provides a number of possible mech-
anisms for the multiple scale points’ pulls to work together. 
Using panel data from a unique 3.5 year quasi-experiment, we 
provide a joint account for both whether a donation is made (inci-
dence) and, if so, its size (amount). This allows us to resolve, on 
a household basis, a conundrum present in all donation drives, as 
well as prior research: how are the act of asking for donations and 
the amount received statistically intertwined? The model incorpo-
rates heterogeneity across donors in scale attraction effects, and this 
is critical: otherwise, we would presume that every household is 
equally susceptible to scale attraction effects. Estimating a variety of 
models allows us to empirically choose, for the first time in a dona-
tion context, among previously-posited operationalizations of both 
internal and external reference effects.
Results suggest that scale points do exert substantial attraction 
effects, and moreover that these vary markedly across donors. In 
addition, there is a strong asymmetry in the size of pulling effects: 
donors are more easily persuaded to give less than more, roughly 
three times as much. Seasonal donation patterns are pronounced, and 
these too differ across the donor pool. A significantly negative error 
correlation (-0.387) between (latent) donation propensity and (ob-
served) donation amount highlights the importance of accounting for 
unobserved correlation in these quantities, and that merely modeling 
donation amount alone would provide an insufficiently rich basis for 
charities to optimize their appeals. Regarding reference point theory, 
for these specific data, the “internal” referents were best captured by 
the average of all prior observed donation amounts; “external refer-
ents”, by including all five scale points, as opposed to a particular 
subset on which respondents might anchor. 
One advantage of our method is the ability to conduct a “coun-
terfactual” analysis, whereby possible appeals scale policies can be 
compared. We examine three of especial interest: finding an optimal 
request for each household, finding one for each donation “group” 
provided by the charity, and simply allowing people to continue at 
their habitual donation levels. Results suggest that, compared to “no 
appeal”, the “group appeal” is 24.4% better, and “individualized ap-
peal” 27.1%, in terms of yearly expected donation amount. This in 
turn provides some preliminary guidance on “laddering”: how much 
charities should increase amounts subsequently requested of indi-
vidual donors, based on their donation histories.
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Working out Consumption: Designing a Robust 
Information Intervention for Healthful Eating
EXENDED ABSTRACT
Providing consumers with calorie information has received 
a great deal of attention, as municipalities such as New York City 
have mandated greater disclosure and retailers (including Panera and 
McDonalds) now provide calorie information on their menu boards 
nationwide. However, tests of providing decision makers with infor-
mation on the calorie content of food has yielded very mixed results 
(Bollinger, Leslie, & Sorensen, 2010; Elbel, Gyamfi, & Kersh, 2011; 
Loewenstein, 2011).  Using the idea of channel factors (Leventhal, 
Singer, & Jones, 1965), we develop a low cost and robust mapping 
intervention (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) which makes the welfare 
consequences of choices more easily evident to the decision maker.  
In a field study conducted at the end of December and begin-
ning of January, museum visitors (n=1127) were offered a choice of 
candy bars before completing an unrelated survey as a compensation 
for their time.  The survey was about gift card preferences, and a 
few demographic questions were asked at the end.  Visitors chose 
between four different candy bars whose calorie content ranged from 
70 to 280 calories in increments of 70 calories (Snickers, 280; Her-
sheys, 210; Chips Ahoy, 140; M&Ms 70).  Notably, the candy bars 
all disclose calories on their packaging. The museum patrons chose 
a candy bar from one of four boxes which either showed in large 
font (a) just the names of the candy bars, (b) the names and calo-
rie information, (c) names with calories and “exercise equivalents” 
(e.g., number of minutes of running or biking required to burn the 
calories).  Ordinal regression revealed that, compared to the no infor-
mation disclosure condition, visitors consumed significantly fewer 
calories, on average, in the conditions where exercise equivalents 
were additionally made available (mean = 177 calories vs. 199 calo-
ries; Wald=9.4, p<.01).  However, the reduction in calorie consump-
tion was only marginally significant when calorie information alone 
were disclosed.   The effect of exercise equivalents was robust across 
age, income, and gender.  
The two waves of data collection in our field study provided 
an opportunity to contrast the effects of informational interventions 
with a natural experiment on goal-setting.  Prior research has re-
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ported that making New Year’s resolutions facilitates success in goal 
pursuit (Norcross, Mrykalo and Blagys 2002).  We find that nearly 
a third of our January sample made a New Year’s resolution, and 
80% of the resolutions were health and fitness related.  In a separate 
initial question about general goals asked in both waves, we also find 
a higher rate of health goals in January than in December (73% vs. 
65%, p < .01).  However, despite the effect of New Year’s on set-
ting health goals, we find no main or interaction effect of December 
vs. January on the calories of the option chosen.  Likewise, collaps-
ing the December and January data, we find no direct or moderating 
effect of having a self-reported health goal.  Participants with and 
without either health goals or New Year’s resolutions were equally 
likely to take a high-calorie candy bar in the control condition, and 
were not differentially affected by the informational interventions.
In two additional hypothetical-choice studies we replicate the 
effect of the exercise equivalent information (although mere calo-
rie information had similar effects in these studies) and find no ef-
fect of health goals or New Year’s resolutions. We do find that the 
exercise equivalents intervention is more effective for those higher 
in food guilt (Cepeda-Benito, Gleaves, Williams, & Erath, 2001) or 
who score higher on restrained eating (Polivy, Herman, & Howard, 
1988).  To put it another way, higher guilt and restrained eating sig-
nificantly predict lower calorie consumption when exercise equiva-
lent information is present, but not otherwise.
Our studies provide strong evidence that providing exercise 
equivalents along with calorie disclosure is a robust and effective 
way to reduce calories in unplanned consumption opportunities.  Our 
results highlight the need for informational interventions to be sa-
lient and interpretable, and demonstrate a surprising advantage in ef-
fectiveness of well-communicated informational interventions over 
spontaneous goal-setting.
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Single Option Aversion
EXENDED ABSTRACT
This work documents an effect labeled ‘Single Option Aver-
sion’ where the choice share of an option increases (relative to defer-
ral) when a competing attractive option is added to the choice set, 
contrary to the predictions of rational utility based models of search 
(Weitzman 1979), and recent work in consumer behavior on choice 
conflict and choice deferral (Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; 
Tversky and Shafir 1992). A series of studies demonstrate this effect, 
and establish some of its boundary conditions.
Experiment 1A demonstrates the existence of single option 
aversion. In this study, participants were presented with a decision 
scenario where they were asked to imagine that they were looking to 
buy a DVD player. Participants in the Sony condition were shown a 
Sony DVD player, and were asked whether they would buy that op-
tion, or continue searching. Participants in the Philips condition saw 
a similar setup, except with a Philips player. Participants in the Both 
condition were presented with both options and the option to con-
tinue searching. Participants were reluctant to choose a DVD player 
when only one option was presented, as 9% chose to make the pur-
chase in the Sony condition and 10% in the Philips condition. How-
ever, when both options were presented together, the choice shares of 
each of the alternatives significantly increased (32% chose the Sony 
and 34% chose the Philips; p’s < .05). Experiment 1B replicates this 
effect using the same design, but with real choices involving candy 
bars.
Experiment 2 demonstrates that single option aversion is not 
driven by the additional information available in the two option con-
dition (e.g. Hsee et al. 1999; Moorthy et al. 1997). Rather, there is 
something psychologically unique about being presented with the 
choice between a single option and deferral. In this study, partici-
pants were asked to imagine that they were looking to purchase a 
camera. Three of the conditions replicated the conditions in Experi-
ment 1. Participants were presented with either a Sony, a Canon or 
both of these cameras, and were asked whether they would pick one 
of the options available or continue searching. In the fourth condi-
tion, participants were presented with both cameras, and were asked 
to pick the one they preferred. Following this forced choice, they 
were presented with the camera they chose and were asked whether 
they would purchase that model, or continue searching. Thus par-
ticipants in this ‘single option plus comparison’ condition had all 
of the information available in the ‘both’ condition, but ultimately 
had to make a choice from a choice set containing only one option. 
Replicating the prior studies, participants chose both the Canon and 
Sony cameras less often when presented alone than when presented 
together (p’s < .01). Importantly, participants were also less likely to 
pick these options in the ‘single option plus comparison’ condition 
(p’s < .01) than in the both condition. Thus, even holding the infor-
mation constant, participants were reluctant to pick an option when 
the final choice set involved a single option. Interestingly, these re-
sults suggest that single option aversion doesn’t just depend on the 
total number of options available, but also how these are partitioned. 
Temporarily isolating one of them can dramatically increase deferral.
Experiment 3 examines whether single option aversion occurs 
only when the deferral option involves further search, or whether 
consumers avoid single options regardless of what the deferral op-
tion is. In this study participants were asked to imagine that they 
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were looking to buy a new dishwasher. They were then randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions based on a 2X2 between subjects 
design. Half of the participants were presented with one option, 
while the other half were presented with two options. For half of the 
participants, the deferral option involved further search (as in the 
prior studies) while for the other half the deferral option involved not 
choosing any of the options presented. While single option aversion 
was replicated in the ‘search’ conditions, this effect was eliminated 
in the conditions where the deferral option did not involve search. 
Therefore single option aversion is moderated by the framing of the 
deferral option.
Experiment 4 tests whether single option aversion has any last-
ing effects on choice. It examines what choices participants who 
choose to defer in the single option condition make, once more op-
tions are added to the choice set. In this study, participants got to de-
cide which charity received a $1 donation. Participants in the single 
option condition were initially presented with the choice between do-
nating their dollar to the American Red Cross or deferring to see what 
other charities were available. If they deferred, the Wounded Warrior 
Project was added to the choice set, and they had to decide whether 
to pick one of the two charities available or to continue searching. If 
they deferred again, a third charity was added to the choice set and 
they were forced to pick one of the three options. Participants in the 
two option condition were initially presented with both the American 
Red Cross and the Wounded Warrior Project, and if they chose to 
defer, the third option was added and they were forced to pick one of 
the three options. Replicating the prior studies, participants were less 
likely to donate their dollar to the American Red Cross when this was 
the only option presented than when it was presented with a compet-
ing option (p < .05). Importantly, participants in the single option 
condition continued to be reluctant to pick an option even after the 
second charity had been added to the choice set. Indeed, participants 
in this condition were significantly less likely to donate their money 
(relative to those in the two options condition) to both the American 
Red Cross and the Wounded Warrior Project (p’s < .05), once this 
second option had been added to the choice set. Thus single option 
aversion can have lasting effects on choice. Once participants have 
been exposed to a single option and begin to search, they continue 
search even after more options are added.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
The familiar maxim about gift-giving, “it’s the thought that 
counts” assumes that simply demonstrating a desire to give is enough 
– the gift itself does not matter. This session presents research chal-
lenging the assumption that giving is always altruistically-motivated 
and provides evidence that the gift presented communicates more 
about the giver than just his/her desire to give (Belk 1979; Caplow 
1982; Sherry 1983; Ward and Broniarcyzk 2011). The gift giver may 
hope to achieve many goals with his/her gift, ranging from the al-
truistic desire to provide joy to more egoistically-motivated reasons 
that benefit the giver. These motivations often interact with the goals 
of the recipient to determine the effectiveness of the gift and its im-
pact on the relationship. Extant consumer research on gift giving has 
primarily focused on the exchange of dyadic gifts from the giver to 
the recipient for purposes of interpersonal relationship maintenance 
and as a means of symbolic communication in relationships (Belk 
1979; Caplow 1982; Sherry 1983; Belk and Coon 1993). In this ses-
sion, we focus on instances in which the purpose of giving is to af-
fect change on the relationship (Anthony, Cowley, and Duhachek) 
influence relationship closeness (Broniarczyk and Ward; Schlosser 
and Beck) or to avoid guilt by spending appropriately (Rucker and 
Denton). Across the four papers, some important aspects of the gift 
purchase process are considered, investigating the key questions of: 
How much to spend and what should the giver spend it on? What 
will be the impact of the gift on the relationship now and over time?
First, Anthony, Cowley, and Duhachek investigate the selection 
of an appropriate gift to facilitate forgiveness for a previous trans-
gression from the perspective of the giver. In related work, Broni-
arczyk and Ward examine the impact of gifting as a function of the 
social distance between giver and recipient. The authors demonstrate 
that givers may ignore a recipient’s gift requests in favor of a gift that 
demonstrates how well the giver knows the recipient. Schlosser and 
Beck corroborate this notion and demonstrate that the selection of a 
gift is based on what it says about the giver.  Specifically, they show 
that a sweet gift is given in the hope of leaving a positive impression, 
or at least avoiding a negative impression of the personality of the 
giver. Finally, Rucker and Denton provide evidence that the purchas-
ing process can partially be driven by the desire to avoid feelings of 
guilt on the part of the giver. In each of these cases it is the thought 
that counts, but the thoughts may not be what the recipient, nor the 
giver, might have expected.
The four papers in this session offer interesting synergies that 
should be of broad appeal not only to researchers in the area of gift-
giving, but also researchers working on social distance and network 
effects, motivation, regulatory focus, emotions and anticipatory 
emotions, mental accounting and relationship marketing. 
Forgive by Remembering or Forgive by Forgetting: 
The Temporal Match Between Victim Motivation and 
Apology Gift Preferences
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gift giving involving a reparative motivation has received lim-
ited attention in the consumer behavior literature. However, using 
gifts to encourage forgiveness is so common there are websites dedi-
cated to apology gifts, apology cards, and forgive-me gifts. There is 
even an apology gift buying guide in Shopwiki.com with sugges-
tions for consumers based on the severity of the transgression: itty-
bitty mistakes, big mistakes and absolutely massive mistakes. Their 
premise is that the severity of the transgression should determine gift 
selection. The other tip offered is that the more luxurious or decadent 
the gift the better. We agree that choosing the right gift may be a 
worthwhile investment as research has found that simple apologies 
are not always effective (e.g. Fehr and Gelfand 2010). However, we 
argue that the most effective type of apology gift is one that matches 
the temporal focus that is activated by the victim’s motivation fol-
lowing an interpersonal transgression. In other words, luxurious and 
decadent may not always be the answer.
Consumer researchers have made a distinction between hedonic 
goods that induce pleasure and alternatives that are more functional/
utilitarian in nature and instrumental to achieving another goal (e.g. 
Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Strahilev-
itz and Myers 1998). Whereas hedonic alternatives are associated 
with the attainment of immediate pleasure, utilitarian goods provide 
delayed benefits and thus are conducive with a longer-term focus 
(Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister 2003; Wertenbroch 1998). Gifts 
offered as a form of apology following an interpersonal transgres-
sion, may also vary along this dimension such as offering the victim 
a voucher for an aromatherapy massage known to be a relaxing ex-
perience (hedonic gift) or a deep tissue massage know to relieve back 
ache and pain (utilitarian gift).
We propose that the victim’s preference for either a hedonic ver-
sus utilitarian apology gift, will vary given the victim’s motivation 
for forgiveness, and in turn, the temporal focus activated by their 
motivational goal. Specifically, we argue that if the victim is mo-
tivated to forgive the transgressor by avoiding thoughts about the 
problem (i.e. an avoidance motivation) - a ‘forgive by forgetting’ 
mentality- we propose that a hedonic gift should be preferred as it 
will help to maintain the short-term focus necessary to distract the 
individual from thinking about the transgression incident thereby 
facilitating temporary mood regulation. Consequently, the resulting 
positive mood should signal that all is well, and that no changes to 
the relationship need to occur (Schwarz and Clore 1983), which may 
encourage relationship reparation. Alternatively, rather than forget-
ting about the incident, the victim may be motivated to forgive the 
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transgressor by thinking about the incident (i.e. an approach mo-
tivation) via engaging in a more problem-focused style of coping 
(Carver 1989). In this case, the victim’s motivation to ‘forgive by 
remembering’ will require a long-term focus to remember the past 
and consider the future, such that the transgression incident can be 
integrated into the bigger picture of the relationship. This in turn, 
should lead to a preference for a utilitarian apology gift, which is 
consistent with a longer-term focus and will encourage the victim to 
maintain the broad focus necessary to understand how the transgres-
sion is an isolated event. 
Study 1: The Reparation Gift Preference Effect
Eighty-one university students participated in a study compris-
ing a 2 (victim motivation: avoidance, approach) × 2 (apology gift: 
hedonic, utilitarian) mixed-design with the last factor as a repeated 
measure. Participants were first instructed to imagine that a close 
friend had revealed a secret of theirs to a large group of people. Par-
ticipants were then given an explicit motivation to avoid or think 
about the incident. Next they were told that the friend wanted to offer 
them an apology gift. As hypothesized, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction (F(1,79) = 10.50 , p < .005). Par-
ticipants with an avoidance (approach) motivation preferred hedonic 
(utilitarian) gifts to a significantly greater extent. 
Study 2a and 2b: Measuring Temporal Focus
The purpose of study 2a and 2b was to provide evidence that 
victim motivation activates a differential temporal focus, which in 
turn, affects gift preference. In study 2a, 80 university students were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (victim motivation: approach, avoid) × 2 
(gift type: utilitarian, hedonic) between-subjects design. Victim mo-
tivation was manipulated using an implicit priming word-puzzle and 
temporal focus was measured using a reaction time task (with aver-
age time to respond on neutral words as a covariate).The results re-
vealed a significant interaction for the primed factor (F(1, 77) = 3.97, 
p < .05). Participants primed with an avoidance (approach) motiva-
tion responded more quickly to words associated with a short-term 
(long-term) focus, and tended to prefer hedonic (utilitarian) apology 
gifts (F(1, 76) = 4.08, p < .05).
In Study 2b we replicated the effects using the Construction 
of Narratives Questionnaire (Liberman, Trope, Macrea and Sherman 
(2007) as a measure of temporal orientation. We also provide evi-
dence that when an avoidance (approach) motivation is activated, 
participants reported they would spend less (more) time thinking 
about the transgression (t (1, 39) = -2.44, p < .05). Hence, supporting 
our ‘forgive by forgetting and forgive by remembering’ claim.
Study 3: Manipulating Temporal Focus
In Study 3, to provide direct causal evidence for our claims tem-
poral focus was manipulated with 175 university students randomly 
assigned to a 2 (victim motivation: avoid, approach) × 2 (temporal 
focus: near, far) between-subjects design. When the primed temporal 
focus was consistent with the temporal focus that naturally occurs 
with victim motivation (avoid – short-term focus, approach – long-
term focus), the pattern was consistent (F(1, 171) = 2.91, p = .09).  
Discussion
Choosing the right apology gift is important as it may serve to 
encourage forgiveness if made appropriately, and may be detrimen-
tal to relationship reparation if made inappropriately. We show that a 
match between the temporal focus of the victim’s motivation and the 
consumption benefit of the gift is an important determinant of for-
giveness and relationship repair. Buyer beware, gift selection is not 
simply a matter of matching the purchase price to the severity of the 
transgression, nor will a hedonic gift always get you out of jail free.
Sweet Protection: Using Sweets to Manage Relationships
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gifting food is a common consumer behavior. For instance, 
when going to a Superbowl party, an individual may bring a bag of 
chips or cookies. Likewise, one may choose a gift box of assorted 
nuts or chocolates, or a gift basket of coffee or cocoa. In all of these 
instances the gift involves an indulgent food. Yet we propose that 
the taste of the food will influence its likelihood of being given as 
a gift, especially when the giver’s motivations are to avoid negative 
evaluation.
Individuals manage relationships to balance self-other 
connections and to self-protect. Because foods with sweet (vs. 
other) tastes carry prosocial associations (Meier et al. 2012), 
individuals may give sweet gifts in order to communicate that they 
are metaphorically sweet (agreeable) or to buffer against potential 
negative evaluation—sweeten the recipient. Thus, our goals are 
twofold: to examine (1) whether sweet foods are given more often 
as gifts, and if so, (2) whether this is motivated by self-presentation 
or self-protection.
Our first goal motivated study 1, in which we randomly 
assigned160 undergraduates to either a sweet or salty condition. Those 
in the sweet (salty) condition were asked to think of foods such as 
chocolates and cookies (chips and pretzels). Next, participants rated 
their agreement with the following statements: “I give these foods 
as gifts,” “I often celebrate with others by having these foods,” “I 
give these foods as a ‘thank-you’.” As expected, there was an overall 
effect of taste on associations with gift-giving (F(1,158) = 108.89, 
p<.01). Those in the sweet condition rated foods as more strongly 
associated with gift-giving (M=4.86), celebrations (M=5.42), and 
thank-you gifts (M=4.78) compared with those in the salty condition 
(M= 2.28, 3.87 and 2.52, respectively). Thus, evidence supported our 
prediction that sweets are used more during gift/social exchange than 
a different (salty) taste.
If sweet foods are given to manage relationships, then giving 
foods with sweet (vs. other) tastes should vary depending on (1) 
whether the gift-giver is primed to think of oneself as agreeable (i.e., 
as a caring person), and (2) how close the giver is to the recipient. 
Our second study thus builds on the first by examining this as well 
as why sweets are given as gifts. In particular, we assess whether the 
underlying mechanism is to (a) convey one’s own sweetness (a self-
presentation motive) or (b) buffer against negative evaluation (a self-
protective motive). We expect that the closer givers feel to recipients, 
the greater their fear of negative evaluation, especially when they 
perceive themselves to be agreeable (i.e., concerned about others). 
We expect that fear of negative evaluation will result in giving the 
sweetest option as a self-protective strategy to make others kinder 
(i.e., to sweeten others).
In study 2, 203 undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 
condition in a 2 (agreeableness: high vs. low) x 2 (social distance: 
far vs. close) design. To manipulate agreeable self-perceptions, 
participants in the high (low) agreeableness condition were asked 
to recall and describe one time (15 times) in the past week when 
they did something nice for someone. Logic suggests that increasing 
the number of recalled occasions should increase the difficulty 
of completing this task, and this recall difficulty should reduce 
perceptions one is agreeable (Schwarz et al. 1991). Next, participants 
rated how caring, nice, and supportive (α=.92) they perceived 
themselves to be. Then in a purportedly unrelated study, participants 
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in the close (far) social distance condition were asked to imagine they 
were attending a birthday party for a close friend (former roommate) 
with whom they had a good (strained) relationship. They were told 
this person enjoys gourmet chocolate and asked to choose one from 
among four bars to give as a gift. The bars differed in taste: sweet 
berry, sour berry, sea-salt, and bitter espresso. Prior research (Beck 
and Schlosser 2013) shows that although all options are sweet, the 
sweetest option (sweet berry) had the strongest prosocial association.
Next, participants rated the extent to which they wanted to 
be perceived as prosocial (helpful, friendly, dependable, and kind; 
α=.74) in addition to other decoy positive items such as intelligent, 
strong, assertive, logical, attractive, and dominant (Leary and Allen 
2011). Following this, participants rated their agreement with three 
items from a fear of negative evaluation scale (α=.89) that included 
“I am afraid that others will not approve of me” (Leary 1983). After 
this, as a manipulation check, because the IOS (inclusion-of-other-
in-self) scale reflects social distance (Ijzerman and Semin 2009), 
participants were asked to rate how close the fictitious person is to 
themselves using the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992). 
The results supported the effectiveness of both our agreeableness 
and social distance manipulations.
As expected, we found a significant interaction between level 
of agreeableness and social distance on sweet gift choice (Wald’s 
χ2 = 4.04, p<.05). As predicted, in the close condition, those feeling 
more agreeable were significantly more likely to give sweeter gifts 
(77%) than those feeling less agreeable (50%; Wald’s χ2 = 7.49, 
p<.01). There were no differences between levels of agreeableness 
in the far social distance condition (61% vs. 61%; Wald’s χ2 <1). 
This interaction is suggestive that individuals give sweets to mitigate 
the fear of negative evaluation. To test this more directly, we 
modeled both direct and indirect interactions on both the mediator 
and dependent variable. Importantly, using the bootstrap analysis 
(Preacher and Hayes 2008), we found support that the indirect effects 
of agreeableness on choice through fear of negative evaluation occur 
when social distance is close (95% CI: .11, .75) but not when social 
distance is far (95% CI: -.05, .36). We did not find evidence for a 
mediating role of self-presentation (95% CIs included zero across 
levels of moderator). 
This research makes at least three contributions by (1) identifying 
how metaphors serve a symbolic function in gift exchange (Belk and 
Coon 1993), (2) demonstrating how relational context (McGraw et 
al. 2003) influences the selection of gifts with certain tastes, and (3) 
isolating the mechanism—fear of negative evaluation—influencing 
sweet gift choice.  
Ask and You Shall (Not) Receive: Close Friends Prioritize 
Relational Signalling Over Recipient Preferences in Their 
Gift Choices
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine your birthday is approaching and a friend asks you 
what you want as a birthday gift. You consider for a moment, then 
tell your friend exactly what you want. When your birthday arrives, 
does your friend present you with the gift you suggested or an al-
ternative item that s/he has chosen especially for you? This familiar 
scenario brings to light the persistent tension in communal relation-
ships between the opposing forces of behaving altruistically (doing 
things that benefit the other without concern for oneself) versus ego-
istically (responding to others’ needs to ensure one’s own relation-
ship needs) (Clark and Mills 1993; Batson 1987; Sherry 1983). In the 
context of gift gifting, givers may select gifts altruistically, resulting 
in the choice of an item that matches the recipient’s expressed prefer-
ences, or egoistically, resulting in the choice of an item that allows 
the giver to demonstrate his/her knowledge of the recipient, thereby 
signaling the relationship. 
In the context of a gift registry we consider the difference be-
tween how close versus distant friends manage these conflicting 
goals as prior research has identified social closeness to account 
for many of the differences in gifting behavior (Belk 1976; Gino 
and Flynn 2010; Ward and Broniarczyk 2011). One might expect 
a close friend, who is particularly concerned with the needs of the 
recipient, to choose altruistically an item that satisfies the recipient’s 
explicitly expressed preferences. However, we show that close (vs. 
distant) givers are also more sensitive to the social and interpersonal 
expectations that underlie gift exchanges and are likely to choose 
egoistically instead. 
In three studies, we demonstrate that close (vs. distant) givers 
are more likely to experience a conflict between their competing 
goals. A pilot study confirmed that givers endorse their two main 
goals to be to choose 1) an item that matches the recipient’s prefer-
ences and 2) expresses the relationship between them. Ultimately, 
givers resolve this conflict by distorting their perceptions of the gift 
options, enabling them to favor the egoistic (over the altruistic) gift-
ing goal, and relationally signal (Balcetis and Dunning 2006; Kunda 
1990). In contrast, distant friends ironically are more likely to choose 
altruistically. 
Study 1
In our first study we examine givers’ two opposing goals of 
choosing a gift that matches the recipient’s expressed preferences 
versus making a free choice that allows the giver to relationally sig-
nal.  In a single factor design, using giver-recipient dyads composed 
of actual close or distant friends, we simulate a realistic registry 
choice in which half of the participants are designated recipients 
and the other half, givers. The recipients create their own individual 
registries from a set of lamps, which reveal their true preferences to 
the giver. Subsequently, givers choose a gift from among the lamp 
options. The results reveal a main effect of social closeness on giv-
ers’ likelihood to choose one of the non-registry lamps (χ2 = 5.9, p < 
.01) such that 61% of close friends versus 23% of the distant friends 
chose a non-registry gift.
Study 2
Next, we examine how close friends justify diverging from the 
registry to a potentially less liked gift. Specifically we look at how 
close friends’ perceptions of the degree to which three gifts fulfill 
their gifting goals change depending on whether the giver assesses 
or chooses the item. We predict that when close givers are simply 
assessing the gift (without any intention of making a choice), they 
are objective about its match with recipients’ preferences. However, 
when close givers have to make a choice, they are encumbered with 
their concerns about how the gift will behave as a signal to the re-
cipient about the relationship. By interpreting the relational signaling 
gift as most liked by the recipient, the close giver may resolve the 
goal conflict and choose this gift without sacrificing his/her impor-
tant goal to choose altruistically. 
We manipulate whether participants chose or did not choose a 
gift. The gift choice set was specifically designed such that choice of 
a particular lamp gift was indicative of a specific gifting motivation 
to 1) match recipient’s preference (the Registry gift) or 2) relation-
ally signal.  Thus the study design pits the relationally signaling gift 
against the Registry gift. As predicted, those in the Non-choice con-
dition were significantly more likely to think the Registry gift would 
be liked by the recipient (M= 5.08) while those in the Choice condi-
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tions indicate that the relationally signaling gift will be preferred by 
recipients (M =4.18, (F (1, 107) = 13.40, p < .01). 
Study 3
Lastly, we investigated close (vs. distant) givers’ propensity to 
persist in gift search to resolve their goal conflict and whether having 
an additional registry item diminishes or exacerbates givers’ likeli-
hood of choosing a relationally signaling gift. Givers were presented 
with the same gift lamps described in Study 2. After looking at the 
lamps close (vs. distant) participants were asked if they wanted to 
choose one of the lamps as a gift for the recipient or continue look-
ing at an additional product category which included another item 
that the recipient had put on his/her registry and two other non-reg-
istry products. We expected close (vs. distant) friends to feel more 
conflicted and persist in looking at additional gift options that could 
satisfy both objectives. We find the predicted interaction between 
givers’ choice strategies and the social closeness to be significant, 
X² (5, N = 156) = 44.37, p > .0001) indicating that social closeness 
influences givers’ choice strategies. Yet, ultimately, close givers were 
even more likely to choose the relationally signaling classic gifts 
(60%) than registry gifts (22.5%) (1, N=156), t = -4.11, p>.0001). 
Conversely, in the distant friend condition, givers were far more 
likely to choose registry items (68.4%) than make a relationally sig-
naling classic choice (11.84%) (1, N=156), t = 7.69, p>.0001) across 
both choice sets. 
These studies demonstrate that close (vs. distant) givers are 
more likely to experience a conflict between their competing goals 
resulting in the choice of egoistically motivated gifts rather than al-
truistic gifts.
Mental Stealing Effects on Purchase Decisions for Others
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Past research on mental accounting has focused on how con-
sumers create budgets for themselves to control the flow of resources 
(Thaler 1980; 1999; Thaler and Johnson 1990). This research exam-
ines how consumers’ creation of a mental account, or budget, for 
another person affects the consumers purchase decisions for that 
other. Although some prior research suggests might focus on finding 
a good gift, we predict that the formation of a mental account for 
another can sometimes lead to consumers avoid optimizing on the 
best gift. Instead, consumers will spend in a manner to avoid feeling 
as if they have stolen from another person’s account, an experience 
we term mental stealing. 
Mental stealing is defined as a sense of guilt due to an individu-
al feeling that they are stealing from another individual by spending 
less money than they had cognitively committed to the person in 
their mind. The creation of a mental account may lead consumers to 
be averse to spending significantly below the budget due to the feel-
ing that they are stealing resources that have already been given to 
the other person. In experiment 1, we predict that aversion to mental 
stealing can lead to decreased purchase intentions towards gifts that 
meet gift criteria but which are priced significantly below the bud-
get. In experiment 2 we examine whether a mental account must be 
created for mental stealing to occur, as well as the mediating effect 
of self-reported guilt. Finally, experiment 3 examines a moderator 
of the mental stealing effect based on a consumer’s ability to make 
future reparations.
Experiment 1: Does Mental Stealing Occur?
Undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 3 Gift Price ($10, 
$25, $50) x 2 Recipient (self, other) between groups design.  Par-
ticipants were asked to imagine they were shopping for a gift for 
themselves or for a friend. The creation of a mental account was 
manipulated by instructing all participants that they had not decided 
how much money they wanted to spend, so they have budgeted and 
set aside $50 dollars in available funds for this gift.  Subsequently, 
all subjects were asked how likely they would be to buy a $10, $25, 
or $50 gift.  Gifts were described as well-made and of good quality, 
and participants were told that the gift recipient was sure to like the 
gift and would not know the amount paid. A significant interaction 
emerged (p < .01). Participants shopping for a friend were signifi-
cantly less likely to buy the $10 gift compared to the $25 gift and 
$50 gift (p < .05). In contrast, participants shopping for the self were 
significantly more likely to buy the gift in the $10 condition com-
pared to the $25 gift condition and $50 gift condition (p < .05). These 
findings are consistent with concerns for mental stealing as the dis-
crepancy between the $50 mental budget and $10 gift was sufficient 
to elicit concerns for keeping too much money from another person’s 
account for oneself. These effects did not emerge when consumers 
are buying for the self, working against an anchoring interpretation 
and consistent with the idea it is harder to steal money from the self 
than from others.
Experiment 2: Does the Creation of a Mental Budget 
Matter? 
Undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 Mental Budget 
(no mental budget, $50 mental budget) between-group design.  All 
participants were instructed that they were shopping for a friend. The 
creation of a mental account was manipulated by giving participants 
in the $50 mental budget condition the same prompt as in Experi-
ment 1. All subjects were asked how likely they would be to buy a 
$10 gift, as well as asked to rate their current experience of guilt. A 
significant main effect for the creation of a mental budget on pur-
chase likelihood emerged, (p < .001). Participants who created a $50 
mental budget were significantly less likely to buy the $10 gift than 
participants who did not create a mental budget. This finding sug-
gests that the creation of a mental budget was critical to observing 
the declined purchase intentions.  In addition, we found a significant 
main effect for the creation of a mental budget on self-reported guilt 
(p < .001).  Overall, participants with a $50 mental account reported 
higher self-reported guilt than participants with no mental budget 
consistent with mental stealing concerns. Finally, we found evidence 
that self-reported guilt mediated participants’ lower willingness to 
pay when having created a mental budget versus not.
Experiment 3: Ability to Make Future Reparations 
Moderates Mental Stealing . 
Undergraduates were assigned to a 2 Mental Budget (no mental 
budget, $50 mental budget) x 2 Ability to Make Reparations (Yes, 
No) between-group design. All participants were instructed that they 
were shopping for a friend. We manipulated the ability to make repa-
rations by instructing participants with the ability to make repara-
tions that a second, unrelated gift occasion for the friend was coming 
up next week.  Mental account was manipulated as in experiment 2. 
Subsequently, all subjects were asked how likely they would be to 
buy a $10 dollar gift. A significant main effect for the ability to make 
reparations emerged (p < .05). Participants with a $50 mental budget 
were significantly more likely to buy the $10 gift when given the 
ability to make reparations compared to those without the ability to 
make reparations. There were no differences in purchase likelihood 
between the no mental budget conditions (p >.10). Further contrasts 
revealed that guilt was significantly reduced for consumers with a 
$50 mental budget who were given the ability to make reparations 
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compared to those without the ability to make reparations (p < .05) 
consistent with guilt being the main motivator for decreased pur-
chase likelihood as a result of mental stealing concerns.   
Conclusion and Contributions
Consumers shopping for others showed decreased willingness 
to purchase gifts priced significantly below the established mental 
budget, despite high gift desirability. This effect was mediated by 
guilt and moderated by participants’ ability to make future repara-
tions.  Implications for the mental accounting literature and how con-
sumers purchase gifts for others are discussed.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Marketing scholars and practitioners widely acknowledge that 
an understanding of consumer memory is vital to an understanding 
of consumer behavior. The literature on consumer memory has con-
vincingly established that consumer behavior is shaped considerably 
by prior learning, and that consumer decisions are mostly memory-
based (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991). It has linked memory 
to diverse responses, including attitudes, preferences, and decisions 
(Crowley and Mitchell 2003; Nedungadi 1990). Nevertheless, the 
literature on memory and consumption is dominated by a “cold cog-
nition” approach that emphasizes the mechanics of memory, rather 
than a social or situated cognition approach, which would emphasize 
how social context and personal factors influence memory. Conse-
quently, little is known about the interplay between memory and so-
cial factors of import to marketers. 
One social construct of critical importance to marketers is social 
identity. Social identities, including gender, age, nationality, or racial 
group, can be central to consumers’ self-concepts and can be key 
determinants of preference and choice. Only recently, however, has 
research begun to examine social identity effects on memory (Mer-
curio and Forehand 2011). The objective of this special session is 
to bridge the gap between literatures on consumer memory and so-
cial identity. Collectively, the papers ask how social identities affect 
memory and how memory, in turn, affects identity-related consump-
tion behaviors (including preferences, product disposal, and prod-
uct evaluation). This exploration into the interplay between social 
identity and memory results in a series of papers that nicely progress 
through the stages of memory processes, from encoding, to memory 
protection, to retrieval.
First, Dalton et al. examine memory encoding. Social identi-
ties affect memory by facilitating or inhibiting consumers’ attention 
to and encoding of identity-linked ads. The second and third papers 
examine memory protection. Mercurio et al. show that consumers 
protect identity-linked memories by avoiding further identity-related 
consumption. Winterich et al. show that consumers who protect iden-
tity-linked memories feel safe to sell/donate identity-linked products, 
but those who fail to protect identity-linked memories will instead 
throw away their products. Finally, Larson and Poehlman examine 
memory retrieval. Social-identity-linked products with sentimental 
value can bias memory for the past and thereby affect current con-
sumer preferences.
As these papers will illustrate, the effects of social identity on 
memory do not necessarily map on to product evaluation and choice. 
This fact underscores the importance of studying the unique effects 
of social identity on consumer memory. 
Memory for Advertising: When do Consumers 
Remember and When do they Forget Social-identity-
linked Ads?
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
What makes advertising memorable? One popular approach 
is to link ads to consumers’ social identities (e.g., gender, lifestyle, 
race). For instance, sales promotions routinely offer “10% discount 
to senior citizens” or “1 free drink for ladies” hoping that target-
consumers will attend to and remember ads that are personally rel-
evant (and financially beneficial). But despite the popularity of iden-
tity-linked advertising (ILA), evidence for its effectiveness is mixed 
(Reed 2002; Weigl et al.1980; White and Argo 2009). Thus, in the 
present work, we document when and explain why ILA can either 
help marketers (by attracting attention, thereby boosting memory 
for ads and desire for identity-linked products) or hurt marketers 
(by producing poor ad-memory and product avoidance). To guide 
our enquiry, we draw on two constructs well-established in identity 
research: identity distinctiveness (ID) and strength of ingroup iden-
tification (SOII). 
Identity, or comparative, distinctiveness occurs when a person 
possesses a characteristic (e.g., a social identity) that differentiates 
her from others (McGuire et al. 1978; Wooten 1995). Because com-
parative distinctiveness allows one to feel special, individuals enjoy 
being part of distinctive minorities (Brewer 1991). Thus, identity 
distinctiveness is a common tactic used in ILA. For instance, hoping 
to peak women’s interest, a clothing ad may seek to activate female-
identity by featuring a single woman amid multiple men. 
As implied earlier, we argue that identity distinctiveness may 
actually backfire under certain conditions—specifically, among weak 
ingroup-identifiers. That is, the extent to which consumers connect 
with a given identity can vary greatly. For some women, being fe-
male is a mere social fact bearing little influence on how they define 
themselves. Other women, in contrast, very much feel and identify 
as females (Oyserman 2008). We conjecture that strength of ingroup 
identification (SOII) moderates the effect of identity distinctiveness 
on memory. Specifically, the stronger (weaker) one identifies with a 
given ingroup, the more positively (negatively) one should respond 
to ILAs when that ingroup is distinctive in a social setting. 
To test this prediction, three experiments followed an ID (manip-
ulated by altering the relative size of participants’ ingroup) by SOII 
(measured by Cameron’s (2004) 12-item scale) between-subjects 
design. Recruited to participate in a study about “media and market-
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ing influences,” participants in a distinctive (non-distinctive) identity 
condition learned that 50 (150) students from their university as well 
as 150 students from another local university would be surveyed. 
After viewing 20 retail ads (8 of which were identity-linked: “10% 
discount for University X students”), participants completed a filler 
task before recalling as many ads as possible. Then they completed 
a recognition memory test for the ads. Similar results were obtained 
across measures, so we report recognition results. As expected, SOII 
moderated the effect of ID on ILA memory (t(189)=-6.93, p<.001). 
Spotlight analyses (Aiken and West 1991) at 1 SD below/above the 
mean revealed that strong-identifiers recognized more IL-ads in the 
distinctive than non-distinctive condition (β= -3.54, t(189)= -7.08, 
p<.001) whereas weak-identifiers recognized fewer IL-ads in the 
distinctive than non-distinctive condition (β= -3.28, t(189)=-6.52, 
p<.001). 
To explain the results, we theorized that ID facilitates (inhibits) 
attention to and encoding of ILA among strong (weak) identifiers. 
But poor memory is perhaps due to retrieval, not encoding, failure. 
To address this possibility, study 2 added a third IV: task sequence 
(control vs. reverse order). The control condition mirrored study 1’s 
procedure (i.e., ID  Encoding  Retrieval). In the reverse-order 
condition, the ID manipulation followed encoding (i.e., Encoding 
 ID  Retrieval). If, per our theorizing, ID affects encoding, 
study 2 should replicate study 1’s findings only when ID precedes 
encoding. If, in contrast, forgetting is due to retrieval failure, study 
2 should replicate study 1’s results regardless of task sequence. As 
predicted, SOII moderated the effect of ID when distinctiveness 
preceded (t(72)=2.05, p<.05) but not when it followed encoding (p 
>.75). Spotlight analyses in the control condition replicated study 
1’s results.
According to our theorizing, ID (e.g., being part of a minority 
group) makes a social-identity special/important to people who con-
sider ingroup membership integral to the self (i.e., strong-identifiers; 
Brewer 1991). But for those who consider ingroup membership a 
mere social fact (i.e., weak-identifiers), being part of a small, under-
represented group makes the given social identity unimportant. It 
follows from this theorizing that if a manipulation could make the 
ingroup seem more (less) important to weak (strong) identifiers, the 
effects documented in studies 1-2 should reverse. To this end, study 
3 added a third level to the ID manipulation, a majority condition 
wherein participants learned that 150 students from their university 
as well as 50 students from another local university would be sur-
veyed. Once again, spotlight analyses revealed that strong-identifiers 
recognized more IL-ads in the minority than control non-distinctive 
condition (β= 1.97, t(186)= 2.45, p<.02) but recognized fewer IL-
ads in the majority than non-distinctive condition (β= -1.13, t(186)= 
1.53, p=.13). Conversely, weak-identifiers recognized fewer IL-ads 
in the minority than non-distinctive condition (β= 1.99, t(186)=-
2.50, p<.02) but recognized more IL-ads in the majority than non-
distinctive condition (β= 1.42, t(186)= 1.94, p=.05). Mirroring the 
interactive effects of ID and SOII on old-new recognition of ILAs, 
study 3 also found that strong (weak) identifiers in the minority (ma-
jority) condition were more willing to buy identity-linked products 
(e.g., a stuffed animal wearing a university t-shirt) than counterparts 
in the equal and majority (minority) conditions. 
This work makes several substantive and theoretical contribu-
tions. Aside from showing when and shedding light on why identi-
ty-linking leads to better/worse ad memory, our results add to the 
literature on social identity by suggesting that consumers do not al-
ways prefer being part of a distinctive minority. By examining iden-
tification strength, this research also furthers our understanding of 
weak identifiers. Little is known about the factors that affect their 
responses to identity-linked content. Finally, this work contributes 
to literature on memory. While most memory research to-date adopts 
a cold-cognition approach, we adopt a social-cognition approach to 
understand how social context and personal factors interact to shape 
memory.
Savoring through Avoidance: Identity-based Strategic 
Memory Protection
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Today marketers are keenly aware that our memories of a con-
sumption experience can greatly impact whether we will consume a 
product or experience again in the future.  Yet, there is very little con-
sumer research about how memories of identity-related experiences 
will impact consumers’ future identity-related consumption choices. 
We build on the idea of strategic memory protection (Zauberman et 
al. 2008) and propose that consumers will protect identity-relevant 
memories to help reinforce that identity. The protection of identity-
related memories is likely due to the critical role of identity in con-
sumer self-conception. Salient experiences related to one’s romantic 
identity or friend identity are almost by definition special and valued. 
Moreover, consumers tend to revisit these memories when the rel-
evant identity is activated, as in “interactions with important others 
(e.g., friends or loved ones) or momentous events (e.g., graduations, 
child birth)” (Wildschut et al. 2006).  Thus, it should hold that we 
do not just protect special memories but we protect the memories 
experienced with special people. 
One method consumers use to protect strong identities is to de-
lay new experiences that could potentially weaken the link between 
memory and identity. Such delays allow consumers to savor the 
memory and thereby reinforce the identity. Although some consumer 
research has examined the effect of delayed consumption of products 
on evaluations of enjoyment through the process of savoring (Chew 
and Ho 1994; Lovallo and Kahneman 2000; Nowlis et al. 2004), and 
other research has begun to connect identity and memory (Mercurio 
and Forehand 2011), the identity reinforcement related motivation 
and process is important yet understudied (Reed II et al. 2012).
To assess whether consumers with strong identities will delay 
new experiences that might interfere with identity-linked memories, 
we conducted two studies investigating behaviors related to consum-
er romantic identities. In study one, we asked married individuals 
to report the year and destination of their honeymoon and measured 
their romantic identification.  Participants were then asked them to 
imagine that they were planning a vacation within the next year and 
had to choose between returning to their honeymoon destination and 
going someplace new. We hypothesized that both weak and strong 
romantic identifiers will attempt to reinforce their romantic identity, 
but will use opposing methods of doing so.  Weak romantic iden-
tifiers will be drawn to the honeymoon locale to re-establish their 
identity and this desire should increase as their honeymoon became 
a more distant memory. In contrast, strong romantic identifiers will 
try to maintain their romantic by waiting a longer period of time to 
return to the honeymoon locale in order to not dilute the memory. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, a binary logistic regression showed 
a significant closeness (strength of identity measure) x year of hon-
eymoon interaction (χ2(1) = 4.2, p = .04).  We interpret this finding 
that those with strong and weak romantic identities are more likely 
to want to return to the original location but there may a process 
difference as to when they want to return and their motivations for 
returning. 
To further investigate when consumers engage in behaviors to 
build or reinforce identities, we examined how consumers behave 
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when faced with the choice to re-live consumption experiences tied 
to specific identities.  For example, if a consumer with a strong ro-
mantic identity went on a honeymoon trip with their romantic part-
ner to a hotel in Mexico, they may be less likely to want to return 
to the same hotel for a bachelor party.  This protection effect would 
occur largely because the romantic identity has a stronger associa-
tion to the self-concept than the friend identity and consumers want 
to protect and savor the memories experienced when the romantic 
identity is activated.
In Experiment 2(a) we manipulated who participants went on a 
trip with to Mexico (friends vs. romantic partner), how special the 
original trip was (special vs. not special) and who they were return-
ing with on a future trip in 2 years (friends vs. romantic partner). 
We then asked if they would want to return to the original hotel or 
to go to a similarly rated new hotel in the same city. We found that 
after consumers experienced a special identity-linked vacation, they 
were more likely to choose to go to a new vacation location in 2 
years if the return trip was linked to a new identity (F (1, 397) = 
10.65, p <.01).  We also find that a similar pattern of results whereby 
participants indicated that the original trip would be tainted if they 
returned (F (1, 399) = 13.616, p <.01).  This suggests that consumers 
choose to protect their identity-based memories when they are faced 
with having to return to the same location when a different identity 
is activated.  However, we found that those who had their romantic 
identity activated during the special hotel trip to Mexico were more 
inclined to return to the same hotel in 2 years when their romantic 
identity was re-activated (F(1,380) = 5.031, p < .05). 
Experiment 2(b) examined a time variable in order to under-
stand whether those with strong (weak) social identities tend to savor 
and protect identity-linked memories.  Using the same methodol-
ogy as that used in Experiment 2a, we found that strong and weak 
romantic identifiers wished to return to their previous “special ro-
mantic getaway” at the same rates (presuming the upcoming trip was 
also for a romantic event). However, we found that those with strong 
romantic identities wanted to wait longer to return than those with 
weaker romantic identities (weak identity wait time to return M = 3.2 
years; strong identity wait time to return M = 4.73 years; F (1,192) = 
25.152, p < .00).  This suggests that when an identity-based memory 
is good and the identity is important to a consumer’s self-concept, 
consumers are more inclined to savor their memories. However, 
similar to experiment 1, the results also suggest that consumers who 
have social identities may want to return more frequently to the place 
where they created the original memory to recreate the experience 
and re-ignite the strength of the social identity. 
Identity Preservation: If I Can Remember It, You Can 
Have It
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Possessions can define the self and become a part of one’s iden-
tity even to the extent that the loss of possessions can threaten self-
identity (Belk 1988). Given the attachment consumers feel to their 
possessions, they often struggle to dispose of their possessions (Fer-
raro et al. 2011; Haws et al. 2012). Yet, little is known about how 
consumers could be encouraged to dispose of special possessions 
in a way that allows them to retain the memory associated with the 
product and minimize any identity threat from giving up their pos-
session. One notable exception is Brough and Isaac’s (2012) work 
demonstrating that buyer usage intent influences consumers’ selling 
price when product attachment is high. Selling was the only prod-
uct disposal method examined, but there are various other disposal 
methods such as throwing the product away, giving it away (to a 
friend or family connection associated with the self), and donating 
it. Not only is it important to understand what may aid consumers 
in product disposition, but it is also important to understand when 
consumers will dispose of their product in a method that may be ben-
eficial to others rather than harmful to the environment (e.g., donate 
or sell versus throw away). Given the extent to which consumers 
strategically seek to retain their memories (Zauberman et al. 2009), 
we propose that memory preservation strategies assist consumers 
with disposal of identity-relevant products. Moreover, engaging in 
memory preservation will increase disposal through donating or sell-
ing items rather than throwing them away. 
In Study 1, we examine the effect of memory preservation on 
product disposal preferences and memorability. Undergraduate par-
ticipants identified one item they currently owned that was of senti-
mental value (because it was connected to a specific person or event 
that was relevant to their identity) and wrote a vivid description about 
the product and how they would feel if they had to dispose of it due 
to an upcoming move. Participants then indicated their perceived 
memory retention: “When you give up the product, how well do you 
think you’ll be able to remember the event or person associated with 
the product?” and indicated how likely they would be to give up the 
product in each of the following ways: throwing it away, trying to 
sell it (e.g., on EBay, at a garage sale), donating it (e.g., to Good-
will or other charity), and giving it to a friend or family member 
(1=very unlikely to 7=very likely). Then, participants either engaged 
in memory preservation by imagining and describing a photograph 
of the item or described their typical evening (control).  Participants 
then reported their memory retention and disposal preferences again. 
Results indicated memory retention was greater when consumers en-
gaged in memory preservation (t(63)=2.10, p=.04). For disposition, 
consumers in the memory preservation (vs. control) condition were 
more likely to sell their product (F(1,63)=5.39, p=.02) or donate 
their product(F(1,63)=3.06, p=.09). However, memory preservation 
condition did not impact preference for giving away (F(1,63)=.01, 
p=.91) or throwing away the product (F(1,63)=.22, p=.64). Thus, 
this study suggests that engaging in memory preservation (e.g., tak-
ing a photograph) can enhance the perceived retention of product 
memories, increasing consumers’ willingness to sell or donate the 
product rather than giving or throwing it away. 
We argue that consumers prefer not to sell or donate the prod-
uct without memory preservation because they do not want another 
individual (not affiliated with the self through a friend or family con-
nection) to use their identity-relevant product, as this, in some way, 
takes their identity. Memory aids do not influence giving to friends 
or family members because these recipients are already part of the 
extended self, so there is no concern that part of the self will be 
“taken” with the product. Memory aids do not influence throwing the 
product away because there is no risk of losing part of one’s identity 
when no one else will use the special possession. 
In the second study, we replicated this effect and examined an 
alternative memory preservation method. Undergraduate student 
participants imagined they had a special college t-shirt that they wore 
to a memorable football game that reminds them of this special event 
and wrote down what they imagined the shirt meant to them. Then, 
participants were informed that they were moving and had to get rid 
of this t-shirt and were assigned to one of three conditions: personal 
memory aid (similar to study 1 photograph), memory sharing (attach 
something to the shirt when they dispose of it to help the next person 
understand how special the shirt was and their memories associated 
with the shirt), or control. Participants then indicated their disposal 
preferences and the extent to which their identity would be preserved 
depending on if they did or did not have future exposure to the prod-
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uct (see the other person wearing their shirt). Results indicated there 
were no differences between the two memory preservation condi-
tions (personal aid vs. sharing) in disposal preferences such that con-
sumers in either memory preservation condition were more likely to 
sell (F(1,217)=11.68, p<.01) or donate (F(1,217)=4.27, p=.04) their 
product relative to the control condition. However, neither memory 
preservation condition resulted in differences in giving or throwing 
away the product relative to the control (ps>.25), replicating the re-
sult of Study 1. Interestingly, memory preservation type did influence 
identity preservation when participants imagined future product ex-
posure (F(2,216)=3.22, p=.04) such that when participants imagined 
seeing the other person wearing their shirt, identity preservation was 
stronger in the memory sharing condition than in either the memory 
aid or control conditions. There were no differences in when there 
was no future product exposure.
These studies indicate that memory preservation, either through 
personal aids or sharing, can increase consumers’ likelihood of sell-
ing or donating their possessions. Notably, the type of memory pres-
ervation does impact the extent to which the identity is preserved 
when individuals see another person using their product. These stud-
ies open the door for future research regarding product disposal and 
identity preservation.
Sentimental Social Roles and the Objects that Elicit 
Them
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The history of objects as carriers of culture has been noted by 
anthropologists since the early 20th century (De Saussure 1915) and 
that objects have a social meaning for their possessors and users has 
continued on to become one of the central tenets of consumer re-
search (Belk 1988). Objects themselves are known to reflect, elicit 
and signal identities (Levy 1959; LaBoeuf et al. 2010), prime specif-
ic motor movements in muscle (Larson et al. 2012) and elicit social 
roles by their mere presence (Kay et al. 2004). Further, many objects 
produced in—or in fashion during—particular eras become associ-
ated with the time periods they represent (the “Flapper” dresses of 
the 1920s, bell-bottomed jeans from the 1970s) and one repeating 
trend in design is calling back to those eras with vintage design ele-
ments. Interesting work (though surprisingly little) has been done by 
researchers to understand what creates interest in these vintage items 
(Loveland et al. 2010), but the current work seeks to examine the im-
pact the vintage items themselves have on their beholders. While re-
search on implicit racism (Greenwald et al. 1998) and sexism (Rud-
man et al. 2001) has implied historical, quasi-anthropological origins 
for unsavory attitudes, recent research into less politically-charged 
subjects like North-South distinctions in American behavior (Nisbett 
and Cohen 1996) and implicit Puritanism in Americans (Uhlmann et 
al. 2011) has attempted to link current attitudes and behavior with 
specific historical periods. This work attempts to extend similar 
insights into the realm of consumer behavior and vintage products 
(there is no precise definition of terms like vintage, but consensus 
has formed that vintage design refers to designs under 80 years but 
over 30 years old). 
One striking aspect of the differences between ‘vintage’ era 
products and modern products is the extent to which they should 
evoke different (i.e., more traditional) gender roles. In particular, 
female gender roles have changed enormously in the last 30 years 
and women now make up the majority of the labor force and college 
attendants—domains once seen as male-dominated (England 2006). 
This shift has seen women’s primary social role change from being 
‘homemaker’ to ‘breadwinner’ and women are perceived as becom-
ing more agentic in society (Diekman and Eagly 2000). However, 
men’s roles are generally not seen as modified and society does not 
expect an opposing move from men into lower-earning, lower-status, 
feminine roles in the future (Diekman et al. 2004). Together, these 
attitude shifts allow the possibility that, for women, vintage products 
might elicit social identity cues tied to the era in which they were 
produced, and that those cues would be distinct from modern era 
products. Yet, because men’s roles have not changed as much, they 
may be unaffected by behavioral cue differences in vintage and mod-
ern-era products. The current work, in fact, hypothesizes just this: 1) 
Because of the more substantial change in societal roles for women 
in the last half-century, vintage products will be a more powerful 
eliciting cue for women than for men in terms of idealizing accom-
panying behaviors. And 2) priming traditional gender identity will 
lead women, but not men, to enhance valuation of gender-stereotypic 
products with vintage design features because vintage-design posi-
tively biases women’s memory for the past. 
In Study 1, we examined the effect of vintage vs. modern prod-
uct design on how people idealize their behavior. Undergraduates 
were shown a range of products (either stereotypically feminine—
e.g., a mixer—or masculine—e.g., a barware set—verified by pretest 
data to be gender stereotypic) with either vintage or modern design 
(pretests confirm this distinction). Following presentation of the 
products, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale (1 = “not 
at all”; 7 = “all the time”) how much they currently did the activity 
associated with the product (i.e., baked, made cocktails) and then 
how much they would like to do that activity in their ideal life. The 
‘current activity’ score was subtracted from the ‘ideal activity’ score 
to give an ‘Idealization’ index for every participant. After averaging 
idealization scores for each of the four product types (masculine vs. 
feminine; modern vs. vintage), two interactions emerged that sup-
ported our predictions. First, with respect to idealization of activi-
ties associated with traditionally female products, participant gender 
and design era interacted (F(3,173)=5.12, p =.025) such that women 
idealized the activities more after seeing a vintage-designed product 
rather than a modern one, F(1,173)=12.41, p=.001. Men, however, 
did not idealize these activities.  Conversely, with respect to mascu-
line consumer products, participant gender and design era interacted 
(F(3,173)=12.01, p=.001) such that women showed more idealiza-
tion for modern products than vintage masculine products, F(1,173) 
=19.12, p<.001) while men showed no preference for products as a 
function of design era. These findings suggest that vintage-design 
products can positively bias memories of times-gone-by and thereby 
affect current preferences.
Study 2 was designed to test whether gender role activation 
underlies the effects in Study 1. Using a manipulation from Shih 
et al. (1999) we primed participants with gender roles. Because we 
hypothesized these roles are central in vintage product valuation for 
women—but not men—we expected gender primed women provide 
better evaluation of, and higher valuation for, vintage products as 
compared with modern products. We again expected no effect for 
men. Consistent with our predictions we found, in females, an in-
teraction between gender role prime and preference for products, 
such that women primed with traditional gender roles evaluated 
vintage (but not modern) products when they were gender stereo-
typic (e.g., a mixer), but lower (compared with modern items) when 
they were seen as generally masculine items (e.g., a cocktail making 
set; F(3,65)=3.41, p=.023). Importantly, we also find that vintage-
design makes women remember the past as being more positive for 
women, and this biased memory for the past mediates these effects. 
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that products from 
the same era can evoke different social identities and behavioral ide-
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als. Women, who have seen vast role changes since the design era of 
the vintage products, seem to carry with them two era-specific sets 
of associations whereas men only carry one. 
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SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers are frequently called on to make choices without 
knowing in advance what their consequences will be.  For example 
the decision to purchase a mutual fund or a product warranty must 
be made without knowing whether the investment will beat the mar-
ket or the product will fail.  Consumers are also frequently called 
on to make judgments of uncertain quantities.  For instance, setting 
budgets and formalizing contracts require assessments of how much 
one expects to spend or the likelihood that a contractor will complete 
good work in a timely manner.  The current session brings together 
four papers that break new ground in the study of consumer choice 
under uncertainty—including such topics as consumer forecasting, 
budgeting, financial decision making, and simple games of chance. 
Across four papers, we discuss theoretical questions including a) 
mechanisms underlying systematic judgment biases such as over/
underestimation, overconfidence, and hindsight biases, and b) how 
consumer knowledge, meta-knowledge, and attributions of predict-
ability affect biases in consumer judgment and choice.
The first paper by Ülkümen, Tannenbaum, and Fox proposes 
that uncertain events can be distinguished by the extent to which the 
event is deemed inherently knowable (epistemic) or stochastic (alea-
tory). They demonstrate that such categorization shapes people’s 
evaluation of the uncertain outcomes, mediates hindsight bias, and 
affects their budget estimates for the uncertain events. The second 
paper by Walters, Fox, Fernbach, and Sloman explores the role of 
metacognitive awareness of “known unknowns” in consumer judg-
ment and choice. They suggest that the illusion of understanding 
leads to over-confidence in judging uncertain events and making 
choices under uncertainty.  The capacity to spontaneously consider 
known unknowns (and thereby minimize the illusion of understand-
ing, overconfidence, the comparative ignorance effect) is predicted 
by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).  They also find that 
consumers can be induced to consider known unknowns by induc-
ing them to make detailed causal explanations of complex household 
products (thereby piercing their general illusion of understanding). 
The third paper by Zhang, Bhargave, and Guha pushes the role of 
knowledge one step further. In the context of two-stage choice, they 
find that merely anticipating to know extra information before the 
2nd stage decision, people would become optimistic about the un-
certainty and consequently prefer more uncertain options when mak-
ing the decision for the 1st stage. The final paper by Oleg Urminsky 
documents a basic bias in probability estimates for uncertain events. 
Specifically, his finding shows that, in coin flip games, low probabil-
ity outcomes gets overestimated and high probability outcomes gets 
underestimated. 
Opening remarks will introduce the pivotal role of uncertainty 
in various contexts of consumer choice and preview papers to be 
presented; the session will close with an open integrative discussion. 
Consistent with the theme of “Making a Difference,” the primary 
goal of this session is to develop is to explore how consumers per-
ceive uncertainty, how this affects their important judgments and 
choices, and how various interventions can make a difference in im-
proving consumer welfare. 
Distinguishing Two Forms of Consumer Uncertainty
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Probability is a janus-faced concept. Probability can be concep-
tualized either as the quantification of stochastic events (aleatory un-
certainty) or as subjective degrees of beliefs (epistemic uncertainty) 
(Fox & Ülkümen, 2011). In this talk, we develop a novel Epistemic 
and Aleatory Uncertainty Scale (EARS), demonstrating that consum-
ers meaningfully distinguish between these two variants of uncer-
tainty. Along the way, we show that these representations of uncer-
tainty have important consequences for various facets of consumer 
judgment and choice, including attributions of credit and blame, 
hindsight bias, and budgeting decisions.
EARS Development and Attributions of Credit and 
Blame
Many consumption activities require an explicit or implicit 
evaluation of expert forecasting. For example, consumers trust finan-
cial advisors to manage their savings partly because they believe ad-
visors can skillfully predict market conditions in ways that help grow 
their investments. In our first study, we examined if people reliably 
distinguish between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, and if these 
variants of uncertainty are differentially implicated in judgments of 
praise and blame.
We presented 116 participants with four scenarios that varied 
in their degree of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty: (i) predicting 
the answer to a trivia question (High Epistemic, Low Aleatory), (ii) 
predicting the outcome of two dice rolls (Low Epistemic, High Alea-
tory), (iii) an predicting where a hurricane will first make landfall 
(High Epistemic, High Aleatory), and (iv) predicting whether the 
US will elect a gay president within the next 30 years (Low Epis-
temic, Low Aleatory). For each scenario, participants learned that 
the protagonist either made a successful or unsuccessful prediction, 
and subsequently rated how much credit/blame and luck/unluckiness 
should be attributed to the correct/incorrect forecast. Lastly, partici-
pants rated each scenario in terms of epistemic and aleatory uncer-
tainty (EARS). For epistemic uncertainty participants were asked to 
rate each forecast along dimensions such as the degree the outcome 
was “in principle knowable in advance” or “something that becomes 
more predictable with additional knowledge or skills”. For aleatory 
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uncertainty they rated items such as the degree that the outcome 
“could play out in different ways on similar occasions” or had “an 
element of randomness.”
First, people appeared to distinguish between epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty. Both scales showed adequate reliability (Cron-
bach’s alpha ranged from .72 to .94) and differentially predicted at-
tributions of praise/blame and luck/unluckiness. For both success-
ful and unsuccessful forecasts, perceptions of epistemic uncertainty 
uniquely predicted judgments of credit (epistemic: p < .001; alea-
tory: p = .395) while perceptions of aleatory uncertainty uniquely 
predicted judgments of luck (aleatory: p < .001; epistemic: p = 
.957). Furthermore, judgments of epistemic and aleatory judgments 
were not merely opposites of one another. For example, participants 
viewed the task of forecasting the location of where a hurricane first 
makes landfall as both high in epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, 
and thus attribute both credit and luck to the forecaster.
Hindsight Bias
One of the most robust judgmental biases is that outcomes ap-
pear more predictable in retrospect than in prospect. This hindsight 
bias has been shown to have important implications for consumer 
choice, such as how policymakers and consumers evaluate equip-
ment malfunctions and product recalls (Ben-Shahar, 1998; Hastie, 
Schkade, & Payne, 1999). We speculated that the hindsight bias may 
result from a shift in how uncertainty is represented over time. In 
particular, we expected that once an outcome is known, perceptions 
of aleatory uncertainty would become less salient while epistemic 
uncertainty would become more salient. To examine this hypothesis, 
we recruited a sample of 118 participants two days prior to the U.S. 
presidential election and asked them to estimate the likelihood of 
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, or some other third candidate winning 
the election. Two days after the election, we sampled a new group 
of 202 participants to postdict each candidates’ chances of winning 
(i.e., what their likelihood estimates would have been two days prior 
to the election). Both before and after the election, participants also 
completed our EARS measuring the degree of epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainty associated with predicting a presidential election. 
We find that prior to the election, the average likelihood of 
Obama winning was 59%; after the election, the average likelihood 
of Obama winning was 68%, t = 5.08, p < .001 (hindsight bias). Im-
portantly, representations of uncertainty also shifted over time. Par-
ticipants viewed the prediction as more epistemic, and considerably 
less aleatoric, once the outcome was known (epistemic ratings: M = 
4.31 vs 4.05, t = 1.96, p = .051; aleatory ratings: M = 3.91 vs. 4.47, 
t = 4.25, p < .001). In other words, the outcome felt more inevitable 
in hindsight than in foresight. Also note that the shift in uncertainty 
was larger for aleatory uncertainty, consistent with Fischoff’s notion 
of “creeping determinism.” Both perceptions of epistemic and alea-
tory uncertainty mediated the hindsight bias, together accounting for 
23% of the increase in likelihood judgments from time 1 to time 2.
Budgeting Decisions
One of the most important consumption domains influenced 
by uncertainty is budgeting. Uncertainty regarding future spending 
involves both a predictable (epistemic) component that is based on 
consumers’ plans, and a stochastic (aleatory) component that is due 
to external influences that are mostly unpredictable from the con-
sumers’ point of view. Consistent with prior work on prediction in 
general (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993), and specifically on budget 
estimates (Ülkümen et al 2008), budget estimates rely disproportion-
ately on plans and do not spontaneously incorporate the necessary 
adjustment for unplanned expenses. If this is the case, then budget 
estimates should be influenced by epistemic uncertainty, but not by 
aleatory uncertainty. 
Eighty-nine undergraduate students were asked to estimate 
their total budget for the month of April (the study was conducted 
in the beginning of March). Participants also completed a version of 
EARS modified to assess uncertainty regarding expenses. We coun-
terbalanced the order of the two tasks. We regressed log transformed 
budget estimates on epistemic and aleatory ratings. The results sug-
gest that budget estimates were influenced positively by epistemic-
ness ratings (b = .24, t = 2.13, p < .05), but were independent from 
aleatoriness ratings (b = -.04), t = -.40, p > .50). 
Taken together, these studies show that epistemic and aleatory 
components of uncertainty, as measured by EARS, have important 
downstream consequences for consumer judgment and choice, in-
cluding attributions of credit and blame, hindsight bias, and budget-
ing decisions.
Known Unknowns in Judgment and Choice
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many consumer judgments and choices are made under condi-
tions of uncertainty—from budgeting, planning and contracting to 
investing and insuring.  Such activities require not only predictions 
of relevant outcomes, but also metacognitive awareness of the ade-
quacy of such predictions.  In this presentation I’ll review a series of 
studies that investigate various illusions of understanding in which 
consumer metacognition fails, and explore interventions designed to 
improve consumer judgment and choice.
Rozenblit and Keil (2002) report that people tend to be over-
confident in how well they understand how everyday objects like 
toilets and combination locks work. Inducing them to generate a 
detailed mechanistic explanation shatters this sense of understand-
ing and leads judges to decrease their rated confidence in their own 
understanding (see also Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla 2010; Keil 
2003).  We argue that this illusion of understanding reflects a more 
general tendency for consumers to focus on known facts and present 
information and ignore or underweight unknown facts and missing 
information, similar to the What You See Is All There Is (WYSIATI) 
phenomenon discussed by Kahneman (2011).  We find that the Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) is a valid indicator of 
the tendency to spontaneously consider “known unknowns”.
In Study 1 we find that the illusion of explanatory depth only 
afflicts consumers with lower CRT scores. We adapted Rozenblit and 
Keil’s (2002) method in which participants rate their understanding 
of a number of common household objects (e.g. a toilet).  Next they 
are asked to generate mechanistic explanations for a subset of the 
objects and then re-rate understanding. An illusion of explanatory 
depth exists if the pre-explanation rating of understanding is higher 
than the post explanation rating.  We find a highly significant interac-
tion between timing of the judgment and CRT score. The effect was 
driven by low CRT scorers providing higher ratings of understanding 
pre-explanations.  Because all participants showed the same under-
standing after the task, it appears that this effect is driven by differ-
ences in metacognitive awareness, rather than differences in actual 
knowledge about how these products work.  
In Study 2 we sought to confirm CRT is an indicator of meta-
cognitive awareness by measuring it directly. We asked participants 
to estimate various quantities (e.g. the number of visitors in 2010 to 
the Great Wall of China) and then to give a range for their estimate 
such that they were 90% sure the true answer lay within the range. 
Soll & Klayman (2004) provide an analysis that allows for the dis-
sociation of two sources of overconfidence: failures of knowledge 
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and failures of meta-knowledge. A failure of knowledge refers to 
providing an estimate that is far from the true value. A failure of 
meta-knowledge refers to generating a range that is too small. We 
predicted that low CRT participants would be more overconfident 
than high CRT participants and that this difference would be driven 
by a failure of meta-knowledge. We also expected that low CRT par-
ticipants would be more susceptible to failures of knowledge, i.e. 
they would provide estimates further from the truth, though this was 
not our main interest. Confirming our hypothesis, high CRT scorers 
showed greater knowledge, and significantly greater meta knowl-
edgeable.
In Study 3 we explore awareness of known unknowns in the 
context of the comparative ignorance effect (Fox & Tversky, 1995). 
A recent study of consumer financial decisions, from willingness to 
participate in a 401(k) program to willingness to invest in mutual 
funds, can be diminished by asking consumers difficult question 
about investment or providing them with information that is more 
difficult to process (Hadar, Sood, & Fox, 2012).  In this study we ex-
plored whether individuals with a greater tendency toward cognitive 
reflection would exhibit more stable assessments of their subjective 
knowledge and be less affected by spurious attempts to manipulate 
their subjective knowledge.  Following Fox and Weber (2002), we 
asked participants whether they wanted to gamble on the inflation 
rate in Chile (or receive a certain return).  One group of participants 
were provided economic data that in principle could be used to pre-
dict the inflation rate (GDP growth, interest rates, unemployment). 
Fox and Weber (2002) found that people were less willing to gamble 
when provided the objectively useful economic data, presumably be-
cause it made them feel subjectively less knowledgeable.  Consistent 
with our hypothesis we find that this effect is significantly more pro-
nounced among low CRT scorers than high CRT scorers.
In Study 4, we investigated whether we could nudge partici-
pants to more actively consider known unknowns when assessing 
90% confidence intervals.  We attempted to shatter the illusion of un-
derstanding for one group of participants by asking them to describe 
the causal mechanisms influencing outcomes of complex policies 
(e.g. cap-and-trade policy for curbing carbon emissions). In prior 
work (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman, in press) this manipula-
tion was found to reduce confidence in the understanding of relevant 
policies, and pilot work indicated that this shaken confidence may 
extend beyond the focal topic.  In Study 4 we found, consistent with 
our prediction, that this manipulation reduced overconfidence when 
assessing 90% confidence intervals on unrelated topics.  Again, using 
the method of Soll & Klayman (2004), we found that shattering the 
illusion of understanding improved metacognitive knowledge (i.e., 
width of confidence intervals relative to their accuracy) rather than 
merely improving knowledge (i.e. accuracy of the center of confi-
dence intervals). Also, the benefactors of increased metacogntive 
knowledge were higher CRT scorers, suggesting meta-knowledge 
improvements may be facilitated by a greater capacity for cognitive 
reflection.  
In Study 5 we found that piercing the illusion of understand-
ing (by inducing mechanistic explanations of household objects as in 
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) eliminated the comparative ignorance effect 
for all participants, both high and low in CRT.  
In summary, we find the failures in metacognitive knowledge 
are linked to increases in overconfidence, the illusion of understand-
ing, and the comparative ignorance effect.  We propose that increas-
ing metacognitive awareness (e.g. by inducing detailed causal expla-
nation) will increase attention to known unknowns and can provide a 
useful tool to improving consumer judgment and choice.
(Over-)Optimism in Two-stage Choice
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When facing multiple choice options, decision-makers often 
adopt a two-stage choice strategy. Specifically, they first select some 
options to form a consideration set (the screening stage), and then 
make a final choice among this set (the choice stage). Past research 
has shown that a piece of information may receive different weights 
in the screening stage versus the choice stage (Beach 1993; Chakra-
varti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006). However, past work has 
not examined how screening influences decision makers’ weighting 
of uncertainty. Many everyday decisions involve uncertainty, from 
choosing among new restaurants, to choosing among a set of risky 
investment plans. We investigate how anticipating to receive infor-
mation during a two-stage decision process affects people’s prefer-
ence for uncertain options. 
In two-stage decision processes, consumers may utilize and at-
tend to different information in the choice stage versus the screening 
stage (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006). Additionally, 
decision-makers may search extra information after forming the 
consideration set (Ge, Haübl and Elrod 2012). In cases where the 
choice options involve uncertainty (such as new restaurants, invest-
ment plans, etc.), sometimes – but not always – the extra information 
obtained between the screening and the choice stage could (partial-
ly) resolve the uncertainty of the options. Thus, during a screening 
stage, decision-markers may feel that they will resolve uncertainty in 
the final choice stage.
People are generally averse to uncertainty during decision mak-
ing. In Ellsberg’s two-urn problem (Ellsberg 1961), people win a 
prize by drawing a certain colored ball from an urn. In this setup, 
people prefer to draw balls from an urn containing 50 red and 50 
black balls than from an urn containing a total of 100 red and black 
balls, with exact split unknown. In other words, people feel more 
optimistic about obtaining a positive outcome (e.g., drawing the pre-
ferred color) when the situation is less uncertain (or, per Ellsberg’s 
term, less ambiguous). Past research has focused on how present-
ing information can reduce perceived uncertainty, leading to greater 
optimism. However, we contend that merely anticipating additional 
information could also lead to greater optimism, thereby influencing 
decision-makers’ preferences.  More specifically, we argue that be-
cause decision-makers feel that they have an opportunity to resolve 
uncertainty later by acquiring additional information, they are less 
averse to uncertainty during screening.
In our investigation, we compare people’s chosen options in 
a direct choice versus two-stage choice.  We show that people are 
more optimistic about uncertain outcomes in screening than in di-
rect choice (study 3). Moreover, and consistent with this notion, they 
prefer options that have a greater range of possible outcomes (study 
1-3) in two-stage (vs. direct choice). We further demonstrate that 
this reduced aversion to uncertainty is not driven by the number of 
options to select (single vs. multiple; study 2 and 3), and only occurs 
when people believe that there will be extra information before they 
make their final choice (study 3). 
In study 1, participants (n = 202) chose to trade in their com-
puter among four shops, which provided price quotes with the same 
midpoint but different ranges. Some participants made final choices 
directly; others (two-stage choice condition) were told that the two 
shops with smaller-range quotes were in location A and the two 
shops with wider-range quotes were in location B. They would de-
cide on the location first, get a final quote from both shops at that 
location, and then decide between them. Consistent with our predic-
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tion, the choice share of the two wider-range shops (i.e. location B) 
was significantly higher in the two-stage condition. 
Study 2 replicated the effect in a real choice context. Partici-
pants (n = 98) in a lab were required to complete a tedious word rec-
ognition task, but could choose among four versions of this task. For 
two versions, the task was estimated to contain 80-120 words; for the 
other two versions, the task was estimated to contain 50-150 words. 
As a between-subjects manipulation, participants were asked either 
a) to choose one version of the task directly, or b) to shortlist two ver-
sions between which they would make the final choice after seeing 
both versions, or c) to shortlist two versions of the task but with the 
final assignment between the two determined by other people. We 
found that participants preferred the wider range versions (50-150-
word documents) in screening than in direct choice, but only when 
the final choice would be made by themselves instead of others. This 
study further confirmed that the tendency for choosing more uncer-
tain options in screening was not due to the act of picking multiple 
options (vs. a single in direct choice), but due to participants’ ex-
pected opportunity to make a final choice in the second stage.
In study 3, participants (n = 152) were asked to choose among 
four 50-50 lotteries, each having a different combination of high and 
low payoffs. They were told that the outcome of the lottery would be 
determined by drawing a ball (white vs. red) from a bag containing 
100 balls, with exact color split unknown. In a three-condition be-
tween-subjects design, some participants were asked to choose one 
lottery directly; the rest were instructed to shortlist two lotteries, with 
or without being told that the exact color split would be revealed be-
fore their final (2nd-stage) choice. As a result, shortlisting shifted the 
general preference toward the more uncertain lotteries (the lottery 
with higher and lower probabilistic payoffs), but only among partici-
pants who expected to learn the exact color split later. To maximize 
the potential payoff in this condition, one should go for the most 
uncertain options plus the most certain option in the first stage. How-
ever, in our study, only the choice share of the former, but not the 
latter, was higher when comparing by whether participants knew the 
color split in advance.  Further, these participants expected to earn 
more from this lucky draw than participants in other conditions ex-
pected by predicting higher likelihood to draw the high-payoff ball, 
reflecting a pure optimism without rational bases.   
Taken together, this research shows that anticipating informa-
tion during decision-making affects sensitivity to uncertainty. These 
findings are important for advancing existing knowledge on how 
people respond to uncertainty and how decision structure affects 
preferences. 
The Unlikely Middle: Overestimation of Most and Least 
Likely Outcomes
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Assessing of the probability of future outcomes is central to 
most forward-looking behaviors, from an investor assessing the risk 
of a portfolio to a consumer assessing how a currently available price 
is likely to compare to future prices. There is a large literature on how 
people make probability judgments and risk estimates and the degree 
to which such estimates are biased (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 
Gigerenzer 1994, Slovic 2000, Loewenstein et al 2001, Krizan and 
Windschitl 2007, etc.). One limitation in this literature has been that 
probabilities are often estimated in isolation or merely rated based on 
subjective risk. In this paper, we present a new task in which partici-
pants jointly estimate the probability of mutually exclusive events 
that can be objectively calculated, but which is difficult to do so. 
The goal is to test the accuracy of people’s probability judgments and 
whether biases in perceived probability would extend to this context. 
In the studies, a simple and intuitive situation is described to 
participants, e.g. “In the game, you would flip a fair coin 10 times 
and you would show the experimenter the result each time.  Each 
time that it comes up heads, you win $1, and each time it comes 
up tails, you get nothing.”  Participants are then asked to estimate 
(using different elicitation methods) the probability of each of the 
possible outcomes (getting $0 to $10) simultaneously.  By jointly 
eliciting the probabilities, and enforcing the provision that they must 
add up to 100%, we avoid the separate issue of subadditivity in prob-
ability judgments (Tversky and Koehler 1994).
In Study 1, attendees at the 2012 Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing Conference read the game scenario and either were asked to 
draw a histogram (N=58) or to choose one of six histograms (N=31). 
Participants’ drawn histograms differed significantly from the actual 
binomial distribution, overestimating the probability of unlikely out-
comes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimating the more likely outcomes 
(3,4,5,6). Of participants presented with six histograms, only 42% 
chose the correct one.  
In Study 2 (N=85), MBA students in a marketing research 
course read about a population in which exactly half the people pre-
ferred Coke to Pepsi, and half preferred Pepsi to Coke. They were 
asked to estimate, for a randomly drawn sample of 10 people, the 
probability of each of the eleven possible outcomes (from none pre-
fer Coke over Pepsi to all ten prefer Coke).  If their estimates did not 
sum to 1 their estimates were divided by the total such that the stan-
dard estimates summed to 1. The elicited distributions significantly 
from a binomial distribution, significantly over-estimating both the 
least likely outcomes (0,1,2,8,9 or 10 Coke choosers) as well as the 
most likely outcome (5) and underestimating the intermediate out-
comes (3,4,6 and 7). 
In Study 3 (N=200) participants did one of four tasks: (a) the 
coin flipping game, estimating probabilities, (b) the same game, but 
estimating frequencies among 100 players, (c) a soccer scenario 
equivalent to the coin game, estimating probabilities or (d) the coin 
flipping game where participants could either win or lose a dollar, 
estimating probabilities.  All estimates were made using a bar chart 
slider tool.  Overall, we again find significant overestimation of low 
probability outcomes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimation of interme-
diate probability outcomes (3,4,6,7). We find no differences based 
on probabilities vs. frequencies (a vs. b) or framing the game as coin 
flips vs. soccer (a vs. c).  However, we do find an optimism bias, 
with significantly higher average estimates when the outcomes could 
involve losses (i.e. less estimates of losses than of equivalent small 
gains).  In this study, participants were also asked to estimate the 
distribution of height in the US, using the same tool.  Their height 
estimates, unlike their probability estimates, are approximately nor-
mally distributed, suggesting that the elicitation method is not sup-
pressing beliefs about normal-shaped distributions.
In Study 4 (N=355) we replicate our findings and test both the 
optimism bias and illusion of control (Langer 1975).  Participants 
read the scenario with the same outcomes framed as either starting 
with $0 and winning $1 for each tails (gain frame) or starting with 
$10 and losing $1 for each tails (loss frame).  In addition, each sce-
nario either described the respondent flipping the coins while the 
experimenter observed (high control) or the experimenter flipping 
the coins while the respondent observed (low control).  Combin-
ing the four conditions, we find significant overestimation of low 
probability outcomes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimation of inter-
mediate probability outcomes (3,4,6,7) as well as underestimation 
of the most likely outcome (5).  Comparing across conditions, we 
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find that participants are more optimistic about avoiding losses than 
about getting gains when control is low (p < .01).  However, there 
is no difference in the mean of the reported distributions when con-
trol is high (interaction p=.12).  For accuracy, we find a main effect, 
such that estimated distributions are closer to the actual binomial 
probabilities in the loss versions (both p’s < .001).  We also find an 
interaction, such that people are the least accurate in the low control, 
gain-framed version (p = .05).   
In the last study (N=88), participants completed the task in an 
online survey with either a more arousing red background or a less 
arousing blue background (Vosgerau 2010).  Overall, we find sig-
nificant overestimation of low probability outcomes ($0, $1, $2, $9 
and $10) and underestimation of intermediate outcomes ($3, $4, $6, 
$7). We find directionally higher (and more accurate) mean estimates 
from distributions elicited in the lower arousal blue background con-
dition ($4.42 vs. $4.11).  More importantly, we find that the distribu-
tions in the blue condition have significantly higher variance than the 
distributions in the red condition.
We discuss the implications of our findings for research on 
probability estimation as well as, more broadly, how inferences 
about people’s choices may be distorted by biased in their subjective 
likelihood judgments.
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SESSION OVERVIEW
People are motivated to care about others. This motivation of-
ten reflects their social goal to be perceived positively by others and 
themselves. To achieve this goal, people live their lives expressing 
concern toward the welfare of others and helping others who are in 
need. This session brings together contemporary research that ex-
amines the motives behind consumers’ prosocial behaviors. Four 
papers portray the intricacy of consumers’ prosocial motives and 
decision-making in varying social contexts. Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, 
and Nowak examine how consumers’ concerns for reputation can 
foster cooperation in preserving public goods. In a large-scale field 
experiment (N=1,408) in collaboration with a major electric utility 
company, they investigated the effect of observability in increasing 
participation in an energy efficiency program. Participants in the ob-
servable treatment were three times more likely to participate than 
those in the non-observable treatment. Observability was also four 
times more effective than offering a $25 incentive. Jung, Nelson, 
Gneezy, and Gneezy investigate how consumers respond to an op-
portunity to signal their generosity under pay-what-you-want pricing 
in four field experiments (N=58,501). When people paid what they 
want and a portion of their payment goes to charity, they paid more 
but more people opted-out of engaging in the transaction entirely. 
Customers were sensitive to the presence of charitable signals but 
insensitive to the scale of charitable signals. Inbar, Zitek, and Jordan 
show that people’s prosociality is influenced by their desire to main-
tain a sense of equity. Across three studies, participants who were 
over-rewarded subsequently acted more prosocially than those who 
were rewarded fairly. When participants were over-rewarded, they 
donated more to charity, volunteered more time for a good cause, and 
were more willing to help others. People are motivated to “balance 
out” their unearned fortune by behaving more prosocially towards 
the world at large. Barasch, Levine, Berman, and Small demonstrate 
that the strength of positive emotion towards charitable giving sig-
nals authenticity, therefore, is perceived deserving charitable credit. 
Participants judged a donor to be more authentically motivated when 
the donor felt a strong emotion from giving. However, when a donor 
explicitly stated a utilitarian motive or emotional benefits from giv-
ing, they were perceived to be less authentically motivated. Taken 
together, this session contributes to the understanding of consum-
ers’ prosocial motives. In contributing to public goods, consumers 
are more responsive to a reputational incentive than to a monetary 
reward. Consumers pay more for a product when a portion of their 
payment benefits charity but fewer consumers engage in such trans-
actions. They are not sensitive to the scale of their charitable con-
tribution. People are motivated to maintain a sense of equity and 
behave more prosocially when they are overly rewarded. People per-
ceive a strong positive emotion towards charitable giving to signal an 
authentic motivation that deserves charitable credit.
Powering Up with Indirect Reciprocity in a Large-Scale 
Field Experiment
EXENDED ABSTRACT
The evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity has been 
a topic of great interest in recent years. Mathematical models and 
computer simulations have demonstrated the power of indirect reci-
procity for promoting cooperative behavior (1-23). This body of the-
oretical work is supported by behavioral experiments where subjects 
play economic games in the laboratory. People are substantially more 
cooperative when their decisions are observable, and when others 
can respond accordingly (24-43). Subjects understand that having a 
good reputation is valuable in these settings (32), and so are willing 
to pay the cost of cooperation. Observability particularly increases 
cooperation when the prosocial nature of the cooperative choice is 
made salient (38, 44). Moreover, experimental evidence indicates 
that indirect reciprocity is deeply entrenched in human psychology: 
subtle cues of observability have large effects on cooperation levels 
(45-48), and our initial impulse to cooperate in one-shot anonymous 
settings is likely the result of adaptation in a world dominated by 
reputational concerns (49, 50). These laboratory experiments gener-
ate powerful insights into human psychology, and provide clear evi-
dence for the importance of indirect reciprocity. However, they typi-
cally employ abstract economic games and involve the interaction of 
only a handful of subjects. Thus the question of whether observabil-
ity effects large-scale cooperation in real world settings outside of 
the laboratory remains largely unexplored (exceptions include (51-
53)). The extent to which findings from theory and the lab general-
ize to natural field settings is of great importance, both for scientific 
understanding and for public policy (54). We address this question by 
running a large-scale field experiment on the effect of observability 
in a public goods game. We collaborated with a major electric util-
ity company to enroll consumers in a “demand response” program. 
This program helps to prevent blackouts by reducing excessive use 
of air-conditioning during periods of high electricity demand. The 
cost of electricity production can spike hundreds-fold during demand 
peaks. Yet the price consumers pay is typically constant across time. 
Thus during peak periods there is a dramatic mismatch between 
price and actual cost, leading to excessive energy use. This reduces 
grid reliability, drives up energy costs, increases the risk of black 
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outs, and harms the environment. In recent years, reducing exces-
sive peak energy use has become a target of regulatory efforts to 
increase efficiency in the electricity industry. To explore the effect of 
observability on this real-world public goods problem, we solicited 
residents of 15 homeowners associations (HOAs) to participate in a 
demand response program. Residents who volunteered for this pro-
gram allowed the utility to install a device that remotely curbs their 
central air-conditioners when necessary: on days with unusually high 
demand or in the case of an unexpected plant or transmission failure. 
Residents who volunteered, therefore, contributed to a public good 
by improving the stability of the electrical grid in all of California, at 
the cost of some personal inconvenience. We solicited volunteers by 
delivering mailers to residents and asking them to participate. Sign-
up sheets were posted in a communal area near their home, usually 
by a shared mailbox kiosk. In our primary manipulation, we varied 
whether residents’ neighbors could tell who had signed up for the 
program. We did so by varying whether the publicly posted sheets 
required residents to print their name and unit number (observable 
treatment) or only a code that does not reveal their identity (anony-
mous treatment). We find that residents in the observable treatment 
are nearly three times as likely to participate in the demand response 
program as residents in the anonymous treatment (Fraction of resi-
dents participating: anonymous = 0.030, observable = 0.088, p < 
0.01, N = 1408). All statistics presented are from Probit regressions 
including various controls, with standard errors clustered at the HOA 
level; for details and regression tables, see Supporting Information 
(SI). The effect of the observable treatment is nearly five times that 
of offering a $25 incentive (the estimated effect of the incentive is 
0.009; a Wald test rejects that the coefficients on observability and 
the $25 incentive are identical, p = 0.024). The observable treatment 
is also more effective among populations where ongoing relation-
ships and reputations are expected to play a larger role. Observability 
increased participation among those living in apartment buildings 
(Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.048, observable 
= 0.114, p < 0.01, N = 582), while it had little effect on the inhabit-
ants of row houses or individual homes (Fraction of residents par-
ticipating: anonymous = 0.024, observable = 0.038, NS, N = 826; 
yielding an estimated interaction of 0.052, p = 0.04). Additionally, 
observability dramatically increased participation among owners 
(Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.024, observable 
= 0.099, p < 0.01, N = 1015) but had little effect on renters (Frac-
tion of residents participating: anonymous = 0.045, observable = 
0.059, NS, N = 393; yielding an estimated interaction of 0.046, p < 
0.01). Finally, we provide evidence that the effect of observability 
is unique to public goods. An additional 1005 subjects received ex-
actly the same treatment as described above, except that the mailers 
they received were stripped of any language that framed the demand 
response program as a public good. The effect of observability was 
dramatically reduced in this cohort (Fraction of residents participat-
ing: anonymous = 0.061, observable = 0.086, NS, N =1005; Estimat-
ed interaction between observability and the public good message in 
a pooled regression is 0.035, p = 0.047). We have shown that indirect 
reciprocity promotes cooperation in a real-world public goods game 
effecting thousands of people. Indirect reciprocity offers a powerful 
tool for promoting cooperation in contexts of great societal impor-
tance. Developing interventions that harness indirect reciprocity is a 
promising direction for future public policy initiatives.
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Signaling Virtue: Charitable Behaviors under Consumer 
Elective Pricing
EXENDED ABSTRACT
People want to be seen as kind, fair, and generous, and that 
goal influences their decision-making. Pay-what-you-want pricing 
highlights those goals by allowing consumers’ to express their so-
cial preferences in a diagnostic transaction environment. This paper 
investigates how the opportunity to signal social identity influences 
consumer behavior under pay-what-you-want pricing. 
In a large field experiment, Gneezy et al. (2012) found that 
when people pay-what-they-want and a portion of their payment 
goes to charity, they are less likely to buy, but pay substantially more 
when they do. The authors attribute this behavior largely to people’s 
identity and self-image concerns. People want to pay a low price, but 
when a purchase looks like charitable giving, they also want to avoid 
looking greedy, either by paying a generous amount or simply not 
purchasing. These behaviors highlight two related questions. First, 
how important are the relative concerns for self-signaling and social 
signaling? Second, the logic above contrasts a quantitative concern 
(finding the right low price) with a qualitative one (feeling like a 
nice person). If that is correct, then we might expect to see high sen-
sitivity to charitable giving, but low sensitivity to the extent of that 
giving. In four field experiments we manipulating the presence and 
magnitude of charitable signals to understand how these forces oper-
ate. In Study 1, we sold gourmet coffee at a farmers’ market in Cali-
fornia. All participants (N=18,672) saw a sign indicating they can 
pay-what-they-want for coffee and that 50% of their payment goes to 
a local charity. Purchasers (N = 406) were randomly assigned to one 
of four payment conditions as they approached the cashier. To ma-
nipulate whether the signal was social, some people were told to pay 
anonymously (by placing their payment in an envelope and dropping 
it in a sealed box) whereas others paid the cashier directly. We also 
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manipulated the value of the external signal by placing either a com-
mercial (the coffee vendor’s logo) or a charity logo on the coffee cup. 
Highlighting the value of self-signaling, people paid no more when 
paying directly than when paying anonymously (Mdirect = $2.76 vs. 
Manonymous = $2.81). People paid more when they saw the charitable 
logo on the cups than when they saw the commercial logo (Mcharitylogo 
= $3.00 vs. Mcoffeelogo = $2.59). Perhaps the charitable logo induced 
higher payments because people were reminded of the substantial 
proportion of their payment (50%) going to charity? Would the same 
influence persist if a trivial proportion (e.g. 1%) went to charity? In 
Study 2 we again investigated the value of the external signal of the 
product by manipulating the observable logo. In addition, we looked 
at sensitivity to the scope of the charitable signal by manipulating the 
amount going to charity. For this field experiment we sold reusable 
shopping bags in front of an organic grocery in San Francisco. As in 
Study 1, we manipulated a charitable vs. commercial signal by sell-
ing bags with either the grocery store logo or a local charity logo. We 
also manipulated what percentage of the payment would go to a local 
charity (0% vs. 1% vs. 50%). People (N=12,394) who entered the 
grocery store saw a sign indicating the randomly assigned condition. 
The bag logo had no effect on either purchase rate or purchase price. 
There was, however, a significant effect of the percentage going to 
charity. Replicating Gneezy et al. (2010), people were less likely to 
buy, but paid more, when a portion of their payment went to charity. 
Notably, this was true even when only 1% was going to charity; cus-
tomers were significantly less likely to buy (3.65% vs. 4.94%), but 
paid more for a bag compared to the strict PWYW condition (MPWYW 
= $2.43 vs. MPWYW + 1% to Charity = $1.41). There were no differences in 
purchase rates between the 1% and 50% conditions, but customers 
in the 50%-to-charity condition, paid a higher price. In Study 1 and 
2, people approached our shop after seeing a shop sign clearly indi-
cating it was a pay-what-you-want shop and that a portion of their 
payment went to charity. It is entirely likely therefore that difference 
in purchase prices is a pure reflection of self-selection. If we remove 
this selection bias, will people still show sensitivity to the proportion 
of charitable giving? In Study 3, we returned to the same gourmet 
coffee vendor as in Study 1. This time, customers (N = 150) did 
not see a pay-what-you-want sign, but instead, after saying that they 
wanted coffee, were told that they could find out the price of coffee 
by drawing a piece of paper out of a box. The box contained three 
different types of prices: Pay-what-you-want, pay-what-you-want 
and 10% going to charity or pay-what-you-want and 50% going to 
charity. We found that when the selection bias was removed, people 
did not pay more for a small charity proportion (10%) than no char-
ity condition (M=$2.31 vs. M=$2.18), but they still paid more when 
50% went to charity (M=$3.23). Even though a 1% (or 10%) contri-
bution is financially much more similar to 0%, people opt out of pur-
chase at similar rates to the 50% contribution. Their payments show 
some incomplete sensitivity to the contribution percentage (Study 
2 and 3). How sensitive will people be as the proportion increases? 
In Study 4 we sold reusable shopping bags in front of a traditional 
supermarket in Oakland, California. People (N=27,285) were ran-
domly assigned to one of five different pay-what-you-want pricing 
conditions, each reflecting a different percentage going to charity 
(0% vs. 1% vs. 50% vs. 99% vs. 100%). The first condition is pure 
pay-what-you-want, the latter is pure charitable giving. Signs clearly 
indicated the condition (randomized every 50 passersby) outside the 
store entrance. Again we replicated Gneezy et al. (2010): people pur-
chased less frequently but paid significantly more when they saw the 
sign with a charitable proportion than when no proportion went to 
charity. However, the purchase rates and average payments did not 
differ across the four charity conditions: People were highly sensi-
tive to whether or not a charity was benefiting, but almost entirely 
insensitive as to whether that benefit was 1% or 100%. In summary, 
consumers exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to social signals 
under pay-what-you-want pricing. This is observed in how they re-
spond to the types of signal (charitable vs. commercial), the magni-
tude of the signals, and their payments. People show clear sensitivity 
to the qualitative social value of a purchase, but much less sensitivity 
to the quantitative social value of a purchase.
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Benefiting from Inequity Promotes Prosociality
EXENDED ABSTRACT
People care about fairness. In our interpersonal relationships, 
we strive to maintain an equitable balance of costs and benefits 
(Fiske, 1991), and even in economic games with strangers people 
are reluctant to maximize their earnings at equity’s expense (Bolton, 
Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). Indeed, 
a concern with equity may be part of our evolutionary heritage, as an 
inclination to return favors can confer adaptive benefits when indi-
viduals’ reputations are known (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). The 
central role that notions of equity play in our relations with others 
suggests that feeling that one has been treated inequitably should 
have important consequences for behavior. Indeed, feeling that one 
has been the victim of inequitable treatment can license people to 
act more selfishly. In one study, for example, people who had just 
unfairly been denied a bonus payment allocated themselves a larger 
portion of a shared payment on a hypothetical subsequent task (Zi-
tek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). This research is consistent with 
the notion that just as people seek equity in their interpersonal rela-
tionships, they may also strive to maintain “equity with the world” 
(Austin & Walster, 1975). According to this view, people expect to 
get what they deserve (and to deserve what they get) not just in rela-
tion to specific others, but also across different relationships. Being 
unfairly denied a deserved bonus therefore justifies one in “balanc-
ing the scales” by subsequently taking more from others (Zitek et al., 
2010; see also Nisan, 1990, 1991). Most relevant for the current re-
search, this perspective predicts that those who have benefited from 
unfair treatment—by, for example, receiving an overpayment or un-
deserved bonus—should subsequently act more generously, because 
they have received an undeserved benefit that must now be “balanced 
out.” Some evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from a study 
in which people were led to believe that based on their qualifications 
they were either being over-paid or equitably paid for an interview-
ing job. When pay was hourly, the over-paid completed more inter-
views per hour than the equitably paid; when pay was piece-rate (i.e., 
per interview), the over-paid conducted fewer interviews per hour 
(Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962). The authors argued that the over-paid 
participants were motivated to reduce the discomfort of iniquitous 
overpayment by working faster (in the hourly-pay condition) or 
more thoroughly (in the piece-rate condition). However, there is as 
yet no evidence that—as the equity with the world account would 
predict—over-rewarding leads to generalized prosocial behavior 
in addition to attempts to directly compensate the over-rewarding 
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party. Here, we report such evidence. In three studies, we examine 
the effect of two different manipulations of over-rewarding on three 
different prosocial behaviors and consistently observe that people 
seek to “balance out” undeserved rewards by acting more prosocial-
ly. In Study 1, we tested the effect of over-rewarding on prosocial 
behavior by giving all participants the same €3 bonus, which they 
received in addition to the research credit that they had been prom-
ised for participating in the study. The circumstances under which 
they received this bonus, however, varied. Some participants were 
told that the reward was based on their superior performance on a lab 
task, some were told that the reward was distributed randomly, and 
a final group was told that due to a technicality they would receive 
the reward despite their poor performance. We expected the final 
group—those who had received their rewards despite supposedly 
poor performance—to subsequently give more generously when 
asked to make a charitable donation. Indeed, participants in the over-
rewarded condition donated more than those in the fairly-rewarded 
condition, and more than those in the randomly-rewarded condition. 
The latter two conditions did not differ significantly from each other. 
Study 2 used the same paradigm but omitted the randomly-rewarded 
condition. Conceptually replicating Study 1, participants were more 
willing to volunteer their time for a good cause when they had been 
over-rewarded rather than fairly rewarded. Finally, in Study 3 we 
used a different over-rewarding paradigm: participants were told that 
a “gender correction” would be applied to their scores (purportedly 
because gender was related to performance on the task). Those in 
the over-rewarded condition were told that without the gender cor-
rection they would not have qualified for the full reward, whereas 
those in the fairly-rewarded condition were told that they earned 
the full reward regardless of the gender correction. As in Study 1, 
we also included a randomly-rewarded condition. Consistent with 
Studies 1 and 2, over-rewarded participants were more helpful when 
the experimenter “accidentally” knocked a cup full of pencils off 
the desk at the end of the study. Across the three studies, we also 
tested (and ruled out) a variety of possible alternative explanations 
for this effect, including more positive mood (Isen & Levin, 1972), 
reduced feelings of entitlement (Zitek et al., 2010), gratitude to the 
experimenter (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2010), and 
fear of being envied (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010). We 
believe most plausible explanation for our findings is that people feel 
motivated to “balance out” their unearned good fortune by behaving 
more prosocially towards the world at large. That is, they attempt 
to maintain “equity with the world” (Austin & Walster, 1975)—an 
equitable balance of burdens and benefits between themselves and 
other people in general.
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Selfish or Selfless? On the Signal Value of Emotion in 
Altruistic Behavior
EXENDED ABSTRACT
Emotions are both a motivating force and a consequence of con-
sumer prosocial behavior. The debate over whether people are truly 
altruistic has often focused on the direction of emotion that someone 
feels when engaging in prosocial behavior. While some argue that 
the emotions people feel can genuinely involve empathic concern 
(e.g. Batson 1987), others argue that emotion-driven prosocial be-
havior is at odds with altruism because emotional actors reap intra-
psychic rewards, such as a boost in positive affect (Andreoni 1990), 
or a reduction in negative affect (Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent 1973). 
In the current research, we find that naïve theories run counter 
to theories that decry emotions as selfish. We predict that because 
emotions are perceived as spontaneous and natural (Tiedens 2001) 
and reflective of an actor’s true motives (Ames and Johar 2009), ex-
pressing emotion in the context of prosocial behavior signals infor-
mation about a consumer’s true character. Our results demonstrate 
that lay people view emotion as reflecting genuine altruism despite 
recognizing that those who feel good about doing good reap intra-
psychic rewards. 
In Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate the survey re-
sponses of a fictitious donor who had supposedly given to the Af-
rican Children’s Fund. The donor filled out a post-donation survey 
that included his answer to the following question: “When you think 
about children in Africa, how emotional do you feel?” Participants 
were randomly assigned to view one survey that had one of the five 
possible responses to that question (not at all emotional, slightly 
emotional, moderately emotional, very emotional, or extremely 
emotional). Participants then rated the donor on a 12-item Chari-
table Credit scale (altruistic, moral, sincere, etc.), a 6-item Authentic 
Prosocial Motivation scale (e.g., “The donor sincerely cares about 
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children in Africa,”), and a 2-item Emotional Benefits scale (e.g., 
“How much will donating improve the donor’s mood?”). All α’s > .7.
Regression results demonstrate that the more emotional the do-
nor felt, the more participants granted him charitable credit (β = .34, 
t(211) = 5.19, p < .001), the more he was judged as authentically 
motivated (β = .31, t(211) = 4.72, p < .001), and the more he was 
thought to reap emotional benefits from donating (β = .35, t(211) = 
5.45, p < .001). Thus, the signal of emotional benefits did not lead to 
any discounting of charitable credit. 
In Study 2, we examine whether reason-based motives can sub-
stitute for emotion by comparing emotional donors to those moti-
vated by utilitarian concerns. In Study 2, the post-donation survey 
included the additional question: “Please tell us more about why you 
donated.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
tions. In the emotion condition, the donor checked “very emotional.” 
In the no-emotion condition, the donor checked “not at all emo-
tional.” Finally, in the no-emotion-utilitarian condition, the donor 
checked “not at all emotional,” but responded to the question with: 
“I donated because I wanted to help as many people as possible.” 
Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant effect of 
emotion condition on charitable credit, authentic prosocial motiva-
tion, and emotional benefits (all F’s > 17, p’s < .001). Participants 
viewed the donor as significantly more charitable in the emotion con-
dition compared to the no-emotion condition and no-emotion-utili-
tarian condition. Participants also viewed the donor as more chari-
table in the no-emotion-utilitarian condition than the no-emotion 
condition. This pattern of results also held for measures of authentic 
prosocial motivation and emotional benefits. These results show that 
reason does not substitute for emotion. Once again, participants in 
the emotion condition were given the most credit, despite being per-
ceived as reaping intrapsychic benefits from giving. 
In Study 3, we directly manipulate emotional benefits by manip-
ulating how happy the donor felt after their donation. Specifically, on 
the fictitious survey, donors responded to the question, “How much 
did donating make you feel happy?” We also replaced the African 
Children’s Fund with Nothing But Nets (an organization which dis-
tributes mosquito nets to families in Africa) to examine robustness 
across charities. In addition, we investigate whether or not charitable 
credit is conferred upon donors who describe their motivation for do-
ing good explicitly in terms of emotional benefits to the self. Partici-
pants were assigned to one of three conditions: no-emotion, emotion, 
and emotion-benefits-motive. In the no-emotion condition, the donor 
checked “not at all” while in the emotion and the emotion-benefits-
motive conditions, the donor checked “very”. Finally, when asked 
about why they donated, in the emotion-benefits-motive condition 
the donor wrote, “I donated because I wanted to feel better.” 
Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant effect of 
emotion condition on charitable credit, authentic prosocial motiva-
tion, and emotional benefits (all F’s > 14, p’s < .001). Participants 
viewed the donor as significantly more charitable in the emotion con-
dition compared to the no-emotion and emotion-benefits-motive con-
dition. There was no difference in charitable credit between the no-
emotion condition and the emotion-benefits-motive condition. This 
pattern of results also held for authentic prosocial motivation, except 
that the emotion-benefits-motive condition was seen as less authentic 
than the no-emotion condition. In other words, feeling happy as a 
result of donating led to increased credit, unless a donor explicitly 
stated that they donated in order to feel happier. 
In all studies, we predicted that authentic prosocial motivation 
would mediate the effect of emotion level on charitable credit. Us-
ing bootstrap analyses, we find a significant indirect effect across all 
studies, suggesting that emotional donors were given the most credit 
because they were seen as having a more authentic motivation to 
donate to charity. 
The present research offers novel insights into psychological 
lay theories of prosocial consumer behavior. Whereas people are of-
ten suspicious and discount charitable credit if they suspect a selfish 
motive, emotion fails to elicit suspicion even when the consumer 
attains hedonic benefits. Moreover, by articulating the mediating role 
of authenticity in evaluations of moral character, our findings pro-
vide a deeper understanding of how others make attributions about 
traits from behaviors. 
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ABSTRACT
Consumer behavior theory is grounded in the here and now, yet 
consumers may be influenced by beliefs concerning the hereafter. 
How might our theories be altered, if consumer projections of the 
world-to-come could be factored in? The present study examines the 
beliefs consumers have about possessions and behaviors available in 
the afterlife. Using depth interviews with a diverse set of persons, we 
investigate the possibility that conceptions of heaven may be struc-
tured according to earthly cultural patterns, including those concern-
ing the marketing system. We find that both cognitive and cultural 
patterns relevant to current consumption practices are projected into 
narratives of the afterlife and that these may be usefully employed 
by theorists.
Cognition, Culture and Consumption in the Afterlife
Recent empirical research suggests that pre-existing cultural 
and cognitive patterns may be determinative of humans’ ability to 
imagine their lives, both on earth and in the afterlife. This would 
imply that to some extent individuals are constrained both in their 
behavior as consumers and in their interactions with the marketplace 
by cultural and cognitive templates – our imaginations are bounded 
(e.g., Boyer, 2001; Smith, 2009; Wright, 2009).
The present study proposes that by examining the beliefs con-
sumers have about the world-to-come, we may learn much about how 
consumption patterns their current circumstances here on earth. For 
example, what ‘perfections’ might heaven offer that current life does 
not? Does consumption continue in the afterlife? If so, would brands 
be available? Do consumers’ believe their preferences, attitudes, and 
beliefs about brands and products will be the same as in mortal life?
 The present study is intended to address these issues through 
the use of depth interviews with consumers who recently lost a loved 
one. The narratives they create regarding the afterlife existences of 
their loved ones provide us with access to human’s capabilities to 
construct desired images of an afterlife and also indicate the signifi-
cance which consumption may play in this realm – and the improve-
ments desired in both.
Theorizing the Afterlife: Cognition, Culture and 
Marketing
In their Introduction to Religion, Anthropology and Cognitive 
Science (2007, p. 5), Whitehouse and Laidlaw present the central 
crux upon which our present study turns:
‘When… Claude Levi-Strauss shifted his area of interest from 
kinship and social organization to mythology, it was on the 
grounds that the relative lack of material constraint would allow 
the structure of thought to express itself more freely…’ 
Images of the afterlife should be limited only by consumers’ 
mental capacity to conjure up ideas within the frameworks learned 
from those around them.  And ideas would seem to be potentially 
unlimited, like the infinite range of possible sentences in a natural 
language (Chomsky 1965). However, recognizing the variety of 
potential ideas about the afterlife has to be counterbalanced by ac-
knowledging the many recurrent features of religious thought found 
across the world (Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2007).  The constancies 
across religious beliefs over different times and places may be due to 
the way human brains are constructed (Tremlin 2006), 
Boyer (2001, p. 17) puts forward an evolutionary anthropologi-
cal argument which is heavily reliant on the assumption that humans 
share a set of automatic, inferential cognitive processes. Smith (2009) 
criticizes Boyer’s proposed theory as being too mechanistic and as 
overlooking intra-cultural and inter-cultural variations not only in re-
ligious beliefs, but more broadly in political structure, value systems, 
and levels of interpersonal cooperation and competition. The find-
ings from our study provide further support for her argument.
Yet while Smith’s points are well-taken, they do not seem to un-
dermine Boyer’s central thesis that religious and/or spiritual thought, 
which are features of every human society, represent a species-wide 
characteristic and are therefore likely to be present in some men-
tal substrate of the human mind. Atran (2002) proposes that humans 
construct religious beliefs in an effort to cope with aspects of the 
world that we wish were otherwise. In the present inquiry, we an-
ticipate that consumers may view the afterlife as a place where the 
consumption inadequacies  found on earth no longer exist. 
Walter Burkert in Creation of the Sacred (1996) moves beyond 
the conceptualizations of Boyer and Atran, as well as other evolu-
tionary-cognitive theorists, by recognizing not only the causal-pre-
dictive potency which religious beliefs provide to humans, but also 
their intrinsically normative nature. Burkert proposes that humans 
believe in afterlives not only to understand events, but also to up-
hold personal and cultural standards of justice, morality, and right 
and wrong; (Boyer terms this intuitive morality.)  In a world full 
of unhappy events, often beyond the individual’s control, notions of 
supernatural justice, of a cosmic morality, become both cognitively 
and emotionally compelling.  
Empirical Support
Unfortunately, these fertile insights have not been matched by 
convincing efforts to empirically test their proposition (see e.g., Bar-
rett and Keil 2006). There is an imbalance between theoretical specu-
lation concerning religion, culture and cognition and actual empirical 
documentation. Whitehouse (2007), for example, suggests that we 
must look to more ethnographic and historical research for a bet-
ter understanding of views on the afterlife.  Smith (2009, pp.48-49) 
makes a plea for combining naturalistic approaches to the study of 
religion with psychological studies of behavior, cognition, and cul-
ture involving religion. 
Research Questions
Neither cognitive nor cultural researchers have investigated 
what contemporary consumers’ notions of an afterlife might be and 
how persons are believed to function within it.  For instance, if the 
deceased are hungry, what do they eat?  If they enjoyed music and 
dancing on earth, do they continue these activities in the afterlife? 
Do they live in the same style of house and wear the same types of 
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clothing, as when they were living? If current theories are correct, 
then consumers will project directly from their earthly experiences 
and cultural knowledge to construct visions of the afterlife.  Cer-
tainly consumption theory, which stands at the intersection between 
people and the fulfillments of their earthly desires, would benefit 
greatly from a deeper understanding of how we imagine paradise.
METHOD
In-depth interviews were conducted with adult consumers who 
had recently lost a loved one over a 2-year period.  In the first round 
of interviews, 60 adults ranging in age from 22 to 81 were inter-
viewed by trained graduate students.  The interviews were part of 
a research project for which the students received credit.  Each stu-
dent was instructed to interview (with permission) a friend or family 
member who had lost a loved one.  The interviewee was asked to 
describe in detail “What do you think [the decedent] is doing now?” 
Follow-up questions were used only if the interviewee requested 
specific guidance as to content.  Most interviewees simply launched 
into a narrative describing what they believed the decedent was do-
ing in the afterlife with little or no additional prompting. No direct 
inquiries were made as to the religion or ethnicity of the interviewee 
or decedent, although these were often noted by the interviewer upon 
submitting the interviews.  This was labeled the Unprimed Condi-
tion, because no explicit mention was made regarding religion, eth-
nic background, age, social class or any other cultural identifiers 
prior to or during the interview.
A year later, a second round of interviews was conducted with 
58 different subjects using the same format as before.  However, in 
this second effort the interviewers were requested to follow an in-
terview protocol [Exhibit One] which asked about the interviewee’s 
and decedent’s religious affiliation, ethnicity, social class, age and 
occupation. This was termed the Primed Condition and permitted us 
to see if there were any effects on the respondents’ afterlife narra-
tives due to being reminded of earthly cultural structures. The result-
ing transcripts were read independently by the three researchers who 
periodically discussed the emergent themes.  
FINDINGS
Unprimed Afterlife Narratives
Perhaps the most significant initial finding from the first in-
terview set is that the deceased loved one was usually described as 
using the same products, eating the same foods, and enjoying the 
same pastimes she/he did on earth – with one very important differ-
ence; those aspects of earthly existence deemed by the interviewee 
to have been unhappy, stressful or damaging to the deceased loved 
one are now absent in the afterlife.  In other words, “life” goes on 
as before, but only the positive aspects are present; all sources of 
negativity are removed.  Notably, the marketing system was deemed 
to be functioning in heaven, but absent any delays, surly salespeople 
or price tags – consumers could largely obtain whatever they wanted 
whenever they wanted it.
For example, one young woman, whose father recently passed 
away, now sees him in heaven dressed in his favorite button-down 
plaid shirt, smiling, and wearing his Transition® eyeglasses.  She 
pictures him “doing all the things he loved doing in life: floating 
in the middle of the pool, talking on his cell phone,…sitting in his 
favorite chair watching the news,… eating his favorite foods.”  She 
believes his present home in heaven is a replica of his former house 
on Earth, because “he would want to stay in the house he loved so 
much”.  Another woman believed that her recently deceased Grand-
ma Clare, an excellent cook on Earth, is “without a doubt still cook-
ing away today; perhaps she even has her own bakery up in heaven” 
(Anne-Marie). In these narratives the respondents clearly are envi-
sioning their loved ones having a life structured very much in keep-
ing with their earthly existences. There is little evidence that novel 
social or cognitive schemas are being invoked; rather current experi-
ences are being projected forward.
In contrast, a middle aged woman reported that her mother’s 
soul was now in Heaven together with the soul of her father.  Having 
a somewhat “ghostly appearance”, her parents do not feel pain, hun-
ger, thirst, or anxiety about employment or paying bills, and do not 
experience time pressure. In this person’s narrative we see the sus-
pension of ‘normal’ earthly life patterns and the substitution of im-
ages likely drawn from religious and cultural texts about the afterlife.
Another unprimed example is provided by a male respondent 
whose mother “lived hand-to-mouth in Kartarpur [India].”  Her 
son, who has immigrated to the United States, believes that his de-
ceased mother is presently making clothing, specifically Indian sa-
ris “which she gives to children, close friends and the poor.”  He 
reports that she got great joy during her lifetime from creating the 
saris, designing each one to suit the unique taste of the individual for 
whom she was making it.  This same woman, her son believes,  “is 
supporting the local bazaar (in heaven), hand embroidering art work, 
waking at 4 a.m. to perform poojas at the [heavenly] temple and 
then returning home where she reads the Ramayana, Mahabharata, 
and the Gita.”  He believes she also celebrates all the traditional 
Hindu festivals in the afterlife and maintains her strict vegetarianism 
(Bhalla). In this narrative, the decedent’s earthly religious practices, 
as well as consumption practices, are projected as being a part of 
her heavenly existence. Notably, this occurred in an unprimed state, 
where no advance suggestion of religion had been made prior to the 
interview. This suggests that those consumers who were deeply in-
volved in religious practices here on earth are seen by their loved 
ones as continuing this involvement in the afterlife – it is an integral 
part of their identity
These unprimed narratives provide initial support for the theo-
retical propositions of Boyer (2001) and Atran (2002) that consum-
ers’ cognitions would be directed toward constructing an afterlife 
that is similar to the life preceding it, but more perfect. The narra-
tives also support their hypothesis that culture and personal learn-
ing structure consumer conceptions of the supernatural.  In a larger 
theoretical sense, then, our data document that humans are able to 
personally imagine more perfect worlds – and believe that they exist 
– but the contents of those worlds appear to be constrained by each 
individual’s pre-existing cognitive schemata.  To our awareness, we 
are the first researchers to provide empirical documentation support-
ing these propositions in a contemporary setting. From a consumer 
behavior standpoint, this initial finding is also very significant.  We 
can now document that consumers’ favorite possessions, activities 
and dwelling places are deemed to be sufficiently central to the self 
to be required in the composition of their ‘ideal’ life-after-death. We 
have also provided evidence that earthly anxieties about financial 
obligations, maintaining one’s home, and job performance, which 
often seem to ‘haunt’ consumers here on earth, are believed to be 
absent in the afterlife. 
Beyond life experiences
Another highly significant finding is that several unprimed re-
spondents created narratives that permitted the deceased loved one to 
venture beyond his/her consumption experiences on earth – yet still 
we found that these were governed by cultural norms and earthly 
expectations. For example, one young woman, whose grandfather 
died recently from a degenerative illness, believes that “he is now 
in excellent health and is definitely attending all of the Washington 
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Redskin’s practices, meetings and games…I believe his living space 
[home] in heaven is decorated with tons of Redskin’s parapherna-
lia.”  In heaven she believes her father is either wearing khaki shorts, 
sneakers and a Redskins cap, or his police officer uniform. (Shan-
non). What is interesting in the narrative above is that the normal 
marketplace “rules” do not seem to apply – the father is now not 
only able to attend all his favorite team’s games, he also has gained 
entrée to their clubhouse meetings and team practices. Such afterlife 
fantasies may possibly serve as guides for marketers to increase their 
clients’ happiness here in the present day.
A more materially grandiose view of the afterlife, which ex-
tends far beyond the deceased’s earthly experiences, is reported by 
a young woman whose mother raised her amidst impoverished con-
ditions in the Philippines.  Describing how her recently deceased 
mother is now living in heaven, the daughter reported that in the 
afterlife she has “a beautiful new home with granite countertops, 
marble floors and modern décor; her new kitchen includes a stovetop 
island and extensive wine bar; a chef and housekeeper are available 
fulltime.”  In her mother’s walk-in closet “is overhead lighting which 
illuminates racks of designer dresses, purses and other apparel.  She 
is driven about by her chauffer and flies in private jets.” This narra-
tive –although it provides the deceased with a much more affluent 
lifestyle than that experienced on earth -- appears to still be bound by 
earthly conventions about luxury products and services. The family’s 
relative deprivation compared to the material grandeur of American 
celebrity lifestyles appears to have made these earthly luxuries seem 
perfect or ideal in a Platonic sense (see e.g., Shrum, Burroughs and 
Rindfleisch 2005).
There is also evidence to support Boyer’s (2001) and Burkert’s 
(1996) proposals that afterlife cognitions would be formulated ac-
cording to cultural constructions of ‘just outcomes’ or intuitive mo-
rality.  Several respondents spontaneously commented that certain 
rewards in their loved-one’s afterlife are due to his/her ‘deserving’ 
them; that is, their rewards were justified based on righteous earthly 
deeds. For instance, one self-identified Muslim informant stated, 
Our faith is Islam and our background is Egyptian, which has 
a huge influence on our view of the afterlife…[My] father is 
in heaven due to all the great deeds he has done for society 
and the dedication he had towards his faith, family, and work…
[In heaven] Father would have good health, youth, and would 
never sense pain…Eventually, [our family] will be all gathered 
again…in a huge mansion full of furniture and luxury we al-
ways dreamed of owning…[We] would be able to spend quality 
time together every hour of the day… Material things that were 
unattainable to my father in life would be at his hands in the 
blink of any eye…Alcohol would be allowed…Trees will be 
growing around my father’s mansion, and as soon as his ap-
petite causes him to crave a specific food, it will grow on the 
trees.  Food will … not cause my father to feel too full or sick 
(Sheren). 
In this narrative, the informant spontaneously introduced as-
pects from the Qur’an regarding the characteristics of the afterlife 
experienced by the righteous. In the Islamic tradition, all wishes are 
fulfilled in heaven and there is never any unpleasant or unhappy 
experience for those dwelling there (Blair & Bloom, 1991). In this 
instance, the rewards of a devout life are taken to a further extreme 
in that sacrifices and denials due to religious proscriptions in life are 
compensated in the afterlife – one was forbidden alcohol in mortal 
life, but can partake of this in heaven; one might overeat in mor-
tal life, but never suffer from over-indulgence in the hereafter.  The 
imagined removal of earthly proscriptions and penalties for the righ-
teous is a theme that occurred elsewhere in our data with Christians.
Other examples among the unprimed interviews documented 
the continuation of the loved one’s personality traits and preferences 
into the afterlife, as well as explicating additional aspects of Intuitive 
Morality. In particular, persons who died ‘before their time’ were 
seen as appropriately receiving special rewards in the afterlife, due 
to their uncompleted lives on earth. One informant, describing a rela-
tive who died of leukemia at age 41, believed that his uncle now, 
“watches soccer games and [being] a big Elvis fan, finally got to 
meet him up there” (Luis).  A 40-year-old man is reported to have 
…loved music to the day he passed away…[He] is in the after-
life playing with famous musicians and surrounded by people 
who share his passion for music.  He is now riding through 
the universe on his new motorcycle…listening to the bands that 
influenced him” (Greg).
In these passages we glimpse the hoped-for fulfillment of lives 
which ended ‘too soon’. To die in the middle of life is not only tragic, 
but viewed as unjust: the person did not receive his/her full due of 
earthly happiness. To assuage this sense of injustice, these deceased 
friends and relatives are envisioned as living out their immortal lives 
in fulfillment of their earthly dreams (Boyer, 2001; Burkert, 1996).
 Primed Condition 
In the Primed condition, interviews were conducted using the 
questionnaire described earlier. This was done to see how or if af-
terlife narrative content was altered when the interviewee was asked 
to recall both his/her own religious beliefs, ethnicity and social class 
and those of the deceased loved one.  Our reasoning here was that 
this priming might result in a stronger presence of these socio-cul-
tural structures in the narratives produced. This did turn out to be 
the case.  We also found explicit informant commentaries on social/
cultural values (such as anti-materialism) which were not present in 
the unprimed condition.  This suggests that in future studies it is 
important to distinguish between responses obtained when the infor-
mant is simply asked to construct a personal narrative or is specifi-
cally requested to do so within the context of his/her religious, ethnic 
or social heritage.
A Roman Catholic Puerto Rican informant believes both her 
deceased mother and father are “looking over” all their children and 
grandchildren.  She attributes the survival of two young nephews 
involved in a serious traffic accident to the protective powers of her 
deceased parents.  This informant’s narrative stated that the afterlife 
is “filled with white clouds and all the inhabitants are dressed in 
white…  It is filled with light, purity and calmness.” The narrative 
seems to be grounded in the Hispano-Catholic values of family-cen-
teredness and draws upon traditional depictions of heaven as being 
atop the clouds and occupied by angels in white gowns  (see e.g., 
Fox 1997). A Pentecostal African-American woman’s description of 
her mother’s afterlife states that she is acting as a “guardian angel” 
and that heaven, itself, is “exactly as the Bible says it is: white lights, 
streets paved with gold and mansions.”  She believes her mother “no 
longer suffers from obesity, arthritis or back problems…” Notably, 
the detailed consumer behavior descriptions seen in several of the 
unprimed narratives are absent from both of these respondents’ nar-
ratives and more literal Biblical descriptions are invoked.    
        The narratives collected in the primed condition also ex-
hibited much greater idiosyncrasy and inter-informant variation than 
was found for the unprimed condition.  For example, Brandon, who 
was raised a Roman Catholic, does not believe in heaven, per se. 
Rather he believes that “the universe is infinite and multi-layered. 
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There are other places where life exists in the galaxy…” Brandon 
believes his father (who recently died) is one layer of life ahead of 
him and they will be reunited when Brandon dies. What is particu-
larly interesting in these idiosyncratic images is that they still appear 
to have conceptual ‘anchors’ in cultural texts and experiences.
We found Atran’s (2002) speculations that human religious 
cognition could be used to construct “better worlds” are supported 
by some of our narratives, and that these extend into several norma-
tive areas of contemporary social structure – but not all.  For ex-
ample, some respondents conjectured about sex roles in the afterlife, 
noting that earthly sex roles often were constraining to women, es-
pecially of older generations, and expressing the hope that women in 
the afterlife would experience more personal freedom.  . 
Other afterlife narratives envisioned large-scale normative so-
cial structure changes, as compared to earthly life.  Both Alicia and 
Maia believe the afterlife where their fathers now dwell is a place 
where “everyone is equal, there are no social classes and no gap 
between rich and poor” (Maia). Notably, both these informants were 
the children of immigrants to the U.S. (from Indonesia and China, re-
spectively) whose parents had faced discrimination and employment 
problems upon their arrival in America. Thus, the priming of ethnic 
and class identity may cause consumers to become more aware of 
personal disadvantages and envision a world-to-come where these 
are removed (Ger and Belk 1996).
DISCUSSION
The present study provides empirical documentation that both 
supports and casts doubt upon portions of prior theorization. We find 
that some contemporary adults believe their deceased loved one is 
able to experience sensory pleasure in an afterlife – eating, drink-
ing, talking with others, playing music, riding in vehicles, cooking 
and singing, among other prior earthly pursuits.  Further, these de-
ceased persons are viewed as maintaining the same personality traits, 
preferences and attitudes that characterized them prior to death.  Of-
ten they wear the same type of apparel as during their earthly lives. 
The primary difference between the conceptualized afterlife and the 
decedent’s earthly existence, in the reports we collected, is that all 
negative emotions, stresses and events are now absent – the loved 
one is immortal and happy, yet still him/herself.
The results of the present study open multiple novel pathways 
for future research on consumption phenomena.  For example, it 
would be very interesting to investigate if consumers who have vivid 
conceptions of their loved one’s afterlife consumption patterns have 
similarly detailed and emphatic views of their own consumption pat-
terns. Does the marketing system – and all the goods and services 
it offers – loom larger in the lives of these individuals? Does  con-
sumption serve as a central organizing cognitive structures for some 
people?  
We view this issue as existing apart from current research and 
theorization on materialism, per se (see e.g., Shrum et al, 2005). 
Materialism research usually concerns itself with the importance 
of goods and activities to the consumers’ sense of well-being (see 
e.g., Belk 1985; Richins and Dawson 1992; Richins and Mick 2004). 
What we advocate is studying to what extent the consumer’s sense of 
self and the world is grounded in the marketplace. 
Second, by examining the ‘improvements’ characterizing the 
afterlife (among those persons who believe such a place exists), we 
may gain deeper knowledge of what the inadequacies, shortcomings 
and failures are seen to be by those same consumers here on Earth, 
both in terms of what they currently possess and what they believe it 
should be possible to acquire under perfect or ideal conditions..  If 
life – and consumption – ‘gets better’ in heaven, how is this made 
manifest in the consumer’s imaginings?  By delving into the heav-
enly consumption ideal, we may come to better comprehend the con-
straints and inadequacies of earthly consumer realities.
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EXHIBIT ONE
1. Please tell me a little about yourself. What is your religious 
background and current practices?
2. Tell me about your family. Who has been most recently 
born? Who has passed away?
3. If someone were to describe your family, what social class 
label do you think they would use?
4. What recently deceased family member do you remember 
most vividly. Can you tell me about that person’s life, job, 
religious beliefs and personality.
5. Now that ______ is no longer here, do you believe he is 
experiencing any kind of an afterlife?
6. Tell me about how his afterlife is similar or not similar to 
the life he had.
7. Who do you think Barry is with in his afterlife? Do you 
think he is having reunions or is making new friends?
8. What do you think he eats or drinks?
9. Do you think he works or sleeps in his afterlife?
10. Do you think he is influencing anything or anyone on 
earth?
11. Do you think he is influencing his relatives here on earth 
or your life?
12. What is place ______ is now in called. Where is it and 
what is it like? If someone took a picture of it, what would 
it look like?
13. If you could provide any advice to _____ in his afterlife, 
what would you say?
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ABSTRACT
The academic discipline of consumer research continues to de-
velop and grow. Many recent trends offer to enrich and enliven the 
field in almost endless ways, and a renewed sense of the field’s scope 
and direction has been proposed recently (Deighton et al. 2010; Ma-
cInnis and Folkes 2010). Such future-looking views are needed to 
advance the field. It has been 21 years since Hoffman and Holbrook 
(1993) published their bibliometric study of the Journal of Con-
sumer Research (JCR) that helped to solidify the unique contribu-
tors and intellectual structure of consumer research. This provided 
a foundational understanding of influential consumer research that 
set the tone until today. More recently, an examination of 20 years 
of research highlighted the emergence of “consumer culture theory” 
(Arnould and Thompson 2005, 868). However, uncertainty about the 
future direction and unique contribution of consumer research is ever 
present. As such, our understanding of its intellectual structure as a 
field requires a fresh take on the uniquely important and significant 
theoretical perspectives in the domain.
In that spirit, we conduct a complete analysis of all JCR articles 
from 1998 through 2011. The purpose of this study is to reliably as-
sess and establish the scope and contribution of mainstream consum-
er research and to offer suggestions concerning promising opportu-
nities and emerging directions based on past research. We base our 
bibliometric analysis on 27,510 citations from 651 JCR articles and 
rely on the sociology of philosophies literature to provide a basis for 
interpreting our findings and offer possible suggestions to research-
ers. Our study follows the rationale of intellectual historians who 
seek to identify and track the key networks of ideas that have shaped 
disciplines over time to provide important information to research-
ers, editors, reviewers, and academic leaders of a discipline. Collins 
(1998) stated, “Creativity is not random among individuals, it builds 
up in intergenerational chains…. The social structure of intellectual 
attention is fluidly emergent … and can be seen only in retrospec-
tive mode” (6, 15). This applies to the advancement of consumer 
research, as well. Only by examining past contributions in a system-
atic way can past research contribute to future work. With the study’s 
limitations in mind, our research offers a review of consumer re-
search that is anchored in multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis.
Such an approach is important because consumer research has 
evolved into its own epistemic community of shared knowledge. At 
the outset, the historical analysis of the discipline has developed over 
time and has served an important part of the field’s development 
(Hoffman and Holbrook 1993). For example, Wells (1993) discussed 
the relative positioning of JCR among the top marketing journals, 
citing its strong business orientation and its increasingly interdis-
ciplinary nature. Tellis, Chandy, and Ackerman (1999) evaluated 
JCR and found it historically less diverse than other top marketing 
journals. In fact, they called for research to determine whether the 
emerging pattern of diversity using naturalistic inquiry would hold 
up over time. A rejoinder stated that “JCR articles are more likely to 
rely on sources that are more conceptually distinct from marketing 
and business” (Bettencourt and Houston 2001, 313) but called for 
more research to confirm this claim and to include an expanded time 
frame. Responding to these expressed concerns and using a concep-
tual thinking approach critical to the advancement of any research 
domain (MacInnis 2011), the discipline itself is the object of analysis 
in this study.
METHOD
To evaluate the intellectual structure of recent consumer re-
search, we used 27,510 citations from 651 articles published in JCR 
from 1998 through 2009. Importantly, we excluded 2010–2011 which 
allowed us to examine recent published works in JCR by evaluating 
this two-year period in light of our established findings. Addition-
ally, standard protocol in intellectual structure research was carried 
out and the data were gathered from the Thomson Reuters Web of 
Science (WOS) database. Ancillary research material was excluded 
to focus the study on developments in mainstream peer-reviewed 
consumer research.
To effectively illustrate the recent intellectual structure of JCR, 
the citation data required purification and development for co-citation 
analysis. This step is critical since the conclusions gleaned from cita-
tion data on their own are minimal. In contrast, co-citation analysis 
allows researchers to evaluate the interrelationships between distinct 
units of analysis (e.g., articles or ideas). Though authors (Hoffman 
and Holbrook 1993) and journals (Baumgartner and Pieters 2003) 
have been levels of analysis in previous research, this study empha-
sizes the thematic relationships between the most influential publica-
tions in JCR. This is distinct from other types of analysis. Though 
other approaches such as content analysis are valuable in evaluating 
a research domain, the importance of MDS is that the method allows 
for the relational analysis of published articles. In other words, the 
ability to determine the closeness or distance between research ideas 
permits additional understanding of the nature of consumer research.
We were able to identify the 27 most cited influential works 
during the period of this study. The basis for this analysis configu-
ration is two-fold: (1) unequal citation patterns among influential 
works and (2) maintaining the period’s stress value below the ac-
cepted threshold to retain good fit. The stress value for the co-citation 
data used was .09, thus providing a clear indication that the period 
had good model fit (Ramos-Rodríguez and Ruíz-Navarro 2004).
In addition, to maintain interpretability of the results, a stan-
dardized distance of .275 was used to indicate research groups and 
cliques in the MDS results. Typically, research groups are comprised 
of two publications and note an integral research topic within a gen-
eral intellectual structure (e.g., JCR). Research cliques are known as 
an advanced form of research group as they possess three or more 
influential publications in a given research domain (Alba and Moore 
1983; Tsai and Wu 2010; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The terminol-
ogy used in our study for research groups, cliques, and areas is based 
on: (1) the influential publications themselves, (2) the JCR articles 
citing the included influential publications, (3) the influential publi-
cations found in the same or related research groups, and (4) the JCR 
thirty-year subject index.
RESULTS
Similar to the citation-based tradition evaluating JCR (Bet-
tencourt and Houston 2001; Cote, Leong, and Cote 1991; Hoffman 
and Holbrook 1993; Leong 1989; Tellis et al. 1999; Zinkhan, Roth, 
and Saxton 1992), we build on recent research providing boundar-
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ies and opportunities to consumer researchers (MacInnis and Fol-
kes 2010). In fact, by using bibliometric analysis for this study, we 
survey the predominant research themes published in JCR over 14 
years (Deighton et al. 2010; Kuhn 1962). As indicated in the Table 
and Figure, three broad research areas were found during the 1998–
2009 period. To permit this generalization of mainstream consumer 
research and extend our application of the bibliometric method used, 
the connectedness of research groups was the basis for determining 
each distinct research area.
Table 1: Overview of Generalized Research Areas and Related 
Research Groups in JCR, 1998-2009
Information Processing and Choice Models
1) Information Processing 
Moderation & Mediation 
Effects
Alba and Hutchinson 1987; 
Baron and Kenny 1986
2) Adaptive Decision Moderation 
& Mediation Effects
Baron and Kenny 1986; 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
1993
3)  Adaptive Information 
Processing
Bettman, Luce, and Payne 
1998; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson 1993
4) Contextual Information 
Processing and Choice 
Models
Bettman, Luce, and Payne 
1998; Simonson 1989; 
Simonson and Tversky 1992
5) Contextual Choice Models Huber, Payne, and Puto 
1982; Simonson 1989; 
Simonson and Tversky 1992
Behavioral Decision Theory and 
Choice*
Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Thaler 1985; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1991
Sociological Analysis and Symbolic Consumer Behavior
1) Sociological Analysis and 
Postpositivism
Belk, Wallendorf, and 
Sherry 1989; Holt 1997; 
Holt 1998
2) Sociological Analysis and 
Consumer Culture
Firat and Venkatesh 1995; 
Holt 1997; Holt 1998
3) Consumer Culture and 
Consumption
Firat and Venkatesh 1995; 
Schouten and McAlexander 
1995
4) Consumer Culture and 
Advertising Effects
Mick and Buhl 1992; 
Schouten and McAlexander 
1995
5) Brand Community and 
Advertising Effects
Mick and Buhl 1992; Muniz 
and O’Guinn 2001
6) Relational Consumer Branding Fournier 1998; Muniz and 
O’Guinn 2001
7) Relational Consumer Branding 
and Identity
Belk 1988; Fournier 1998
Notes: Generalized research areas are indicated in underlined italic text 
while their respective related research groups are indicated below each 
research area;
Research cliques are indicated in bolded text;
* - one research group identified in research area (research area bears name 
of specified research group).
Figure 1: JCR Intellectual Structure, 1998-2009
 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 8 
Group 9 
Group 10 
Group 11 
Group 12 
Group 13 
Notes: Stress value: .09; Standardized distance: .275; Bolded lines indicate 
research clique
V1 = Aaker and Lee 2001; V2 = Alba and Hutchinson 1987; V3 
= Baron and Kenny 1986; V4 = Belk 1988; V5 = Belk, Wallendorf, 
and Sherry 1989; V6 = Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; V7 = 
Chaiken 1980; V8 = Dhar 1997; V9 = Feldman and Lynch 1988; 
V10 = Festinger 1957; V11 = Firat and Venkatesh 1995; V12 = 
Fournier 1998; V13 = Friestad and Wright 1994; V14 = Hoch 
and Loewenstein 1991; V15 = Holt 1997; V16 = Holt 1998; V17 
= Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; V18 = Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; V19 = Mick and Buhl 1992; V20 = Muniz and O’Guinn 
2001; V21 = Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; V22 = Schouten 
and McAlexander 1995; V23 = Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; V24 = 
Simonson 1989; V25 = Simonson and Tversky 1992; V26 = Thaler 
1985; V27 = Tversky and Kahneman 1991
Group 1 (V2 and V3): Information Processing Moderation 
and Mediation Effects; Group 2 (V3 and V21): Adaptive Decision 
Moderation and Mediation Effects; Group 3 (V6 and V21): Adap-
tive Information Processing; Group 4 (V6, V24, and V25): Con-
textual Information Processing and Choice Models; Group 5 (V17, 
V24, and V25): Contextual Choice Models; Group 6 (V18, V26, and 
V27): Behavioral Decision Theory and Choice; Group 7 (V5, V15, 
and V16): Sociological Analysis and Postpositivism; Group 8 (V11, 
V15, and V16): Sociological Analysis and Consumer Culture; Group 
9 (V11 and V22): Consumer Culture and Consumption; Group 10 
(V19 and V22): Consumer Culture and Advertising Effects; Group 
11 (V19 and V20): Brand Community and Advertising Effects; 
Group 12 (V12 and V20): Relational Consumer Branding; Group 
13 (V4 and V12): Relational Consumer Branding and IdentityWe 
should note that every work highlighted in the Table and Figure has 
made key contributions to the consumer research literature via JCR. 
The three bold zones in the Figure represent research cliques con-
taining the most influential research streams. The first consists of 
Groups 4 and 5 – the most influential research related to information 
processing and choice models. The second is comprised of Group 
6 – the research that developed the concept of behavioral decision 
theory and choice. The third consists of Groups 7 and 8 – works that 
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helped develop sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behav-
ior research.
As shown in the Figure, the three general research areas can 
be identified as comprised of individual research groups. First, one 
research area included five specific research groups: (1) information 
processing moderation and mediation effects (Group 1), (2) adap-
tive decision moderation and mediation effects (Group 2), (3) adap-
tive information processing (Group 3), (4) contextual information 
processing and choice models (Group 4), and (5) contextual choice 
models (Group 5). Supported by two research cliques, the combined 
focus of these research groups indicates a research area emphasizing 
information processing and choice models.
The second area of research consists of a single research clique. 
The emphasis of this distinct research topic relates to behavioral de-
cision theory and choice. Driven by both economic and consumption 
considerations, this topic incorporates the behaviors and risks related 
to consumer choices that can be made in a competitive landscape.
Finally, the last research area includes seven research groups. 
The themes for this research topic relate to: (1) sociological analysis 
and postpositivism (Group 7), (2) sociological analysis and consum-
er culture (Group 8), (3) consumer culture and consumption (Group 
9), (4) consumer culture and advertising effects (Group 10), (5) 
brand community and advertising effects (Group 11), (6) relational 
consumer branding (Group 12), and (7) relational consumer brand-
ing and identity (Group 13). In effect, these research groups indicate 
a research area emphasizing sociological analysis and symbolic con-
sumer behavior.
DISCUSSION
The implications related to the MDS findings covering can be 
discussed in two distinct sections. First, the broad-based set of re-
sults points to the development of an integrative consumer research 
framework on which to base possible studies in the future. Based on 
recent recommendations concerning the development of consumer 
research (Deighton et al. 2010; MacInnis and Folkes 2010), we relate 
this framework to the research areas of consumer research identi-
fied in the 1998-2009 period: (1) information processing and choice 
models, (2) behavioral decision theory and choice, and (3) sociologi-
cal analysis and symbolic consumer behavior.
Second, we develop suggestions for possible future consumer 
research by indicating gaps to date in published JCR articles. After 
evaluating research published in JCR through 2011 for this portion 
of the study, the potential research syntheses are presented as oppor-
tunities based on the foundations and recent trends of consumer re-
search. Taken together, this provides the basis for continued theory-
based consumer research development and suggests possibilities for 
innovative research insights yet to emerge (Kuhn 1962).
An Integrative Consumer Research Framework
Information Processing and Choice Models. JCR articles con-
firm this research area and point to the need for expanded consumer 
research on the topic. For instance, some research indicates that in-
formation structure is more predictive of information overload than 
information amount (Lurie 2004). Findings related to this topic indi-
cated that information processing mediates the relationship between 
information structure and overload. Also, based on an analysis of 
consumer responses to websites, the influence of priming and exter-
nal search has been assessed in novice and expert consumer choices 
(Mandel and Johnson 2002). As such, results indicate that, in a net-
worked environment, novice consumer choices are mediated by ex-
ternal search while experts’ are not. Finally, the advantages and dis-
advantages of information flow control in consumer decision quality, 
memory, knowledge, and confidence are very applicable to infor-
mation processing and choice models (Ariely 2000). In fact, while 
consumers may make better decisions in contexts of information 
flow control, consumer information processing can be compromised 
when information demands exceed capacity. Taken together, these 
recent research developments support the changing and adaptive na-
ture of consumer processing in an increasingly networked economy. 
Therefore, its place as the first dimension in our parsimonious con-
sumer research framework indicates its continued importance.
Behavioral Decision Theory and Choice. One example of the 
application of behavioral decision theory and choice relates to per-
ceived value differences among buyers and sellers (Carmon and Ari-
ely 2000). More specifically, the focus of loss aversion as well as the 
willingness to exchange was found to be different between buyers 
and sellers. Another recent article indicated the prevalence of inter-
nal budgetary parameters typically used by consumers on purchase 
visits to the grocery store (Stilley, Inman, and Wakefield 2010). The 
two different aspects of a consumer’s mental budget (itemized and 
in-store slack) reflect the behavior and decisions made in the mar-
ketplace. Taken further, the balance between monetary and temporal 
costs in consumer purchases has been examined (Soster, Monga, and 
Bearden 2010). Findings indicate that monetary costs are considered 
across time while temporal costs terminate at the end of a speci-
fied time cycle. Further, the shift of a tangibly-valued attribute to 
zero creates ambiguity in the consumer choice process (Palmeira 
2011). Based on these developments, the nature of consumer-firm 
exchanges shows that behavioral decision theory and choice must be 
included as the second dimension in our framework.
 Sociological Analysis and Symbolic Consumer Behavior. 
Though the extent of this research area in elite consumer-focused 
research is considerable, current articles in particular synthesize both 
aspects of this research area to denote its importance as a dimension 
in integrative consumer research. First, a conceptual overview of 
consumer culture theory provides a clear indication of the domain’s 
boundaries (Arnould and Thompson 2005). However, recently, JCR 
research has emphasized the importance of sociological analysis and 
consumer symbolism. For instance, themes such as the role of inner 
dialog in consumer decision-making (Bahl and Milne 2010), the rel-
evance of a signature as an indication of self-identity with a product 
or consumption group (Kattle and Haubl 2011), and the altered prac-
tices of an individual vested in a particular consumption community 
(Arsel and Thompson 2011) show this continued examination. How-
ever, equally prevalent has been a focus on different facets of a con-
sumption community. The latest issues have related to the use and 
meaning of objects (Epp and Price 2010; Fernandez and Lastovicka 
2011), the formation of consumption beliefs in light of an established 
legal or belief structure (Humphreys 2010; Karababa and Ger 2011), 
and the construction, development, and advancement of a consump-
tion community when different perspectives and interpretations may 
exist (Belk 2010; Berger and Ward 2010; Luedicke, Thompson, and 
Giesler 2010; Sandikci and Ger 2010). Taken together, it is obvious 
that this research area is critical to an inclusive consumer research 
perspective.
Possible Integrative Research Directions
Based on the bibliometric-supported framework suggested, we 
build on established consumer research areas to advance the field 
(Deighton et al. 2010). By emphasizing the recombination of sub-
disciplines in this domain, we suggest a generalized perspective 
from which to develop future research (MacInnis and Folkes 2010). 
However, since the primary co-citation analyses were conducted 
through 2009, it is imperative to evaluate the most current consumer 
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research as well. Accomplishing this will provide critical informa-
tion concerning two main issues with regards to establishing our 
suggested research directions: (1) it allows us to categorize recent 
consumer research and assess the extent that our framework has been 
used already, and (2) it permits us to identify the possible gaps in 
current research such that future framework-related topics may be 
suggested. Additionally, we acknowledge limitations related to the 
research conducted. However, first, we examine the current consum-
er research trends published in JCR assimilating specific elements 
of our integrative framework. Then, we suggest future research op-
portunities which may encourage the advancement of the field. The 
result is a clarified perspective on the possibilities which exist in the 
consumer research domain.
The first combination which has been integrated to some de-
gree would relate to aspects of the information processing and choice 
models as well as the behavioral decision theory and choice research 
areas. First, after comparing situations of increased and decreased 
consumer options, results indicated that the relationship between as-
sortment and choice is moderated by product availability (Chernev 
2003). Also, findings have shown that an increased frequency of 
price discounts tends to increase consumer processing errors but can 
lead to increased firm profitability as well (Chen and Rao 2007). 
Another area regarding the competitive marketplace reflects recent 
findings that consumers opt for product specialization choices even 
in cases of identical product attributes between specialized and all-
in-one products (Chernev 2007). Lastly, results indicate that the role 
of important and unique categorical product attributes in dominated 
consumer options can reduce the attraction effect (Ha, Park, and Ahn 
2009). Taken together, these studies have combined various elements 
of information processing, behavioral decision theory, and choice.
The second integrative topic is one which examines the socio-
logical analysis and symbolic consumer behavior as well as the be-
havioral decision theory and choice research areas in tandem. One 
example studied the importance of consumer time with (rather than 
consumer money spent for) a product (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). 
By evaluating consumer perspective as well as experience after the 
purchase has been made, increased temporal understanding of the 
consumer experience is critical to assessing long-term relational 
(as well as branding) considerations. Another recent study showed 
that the establishment of relational norms between two consumers 
tended to increase the willingness of a partner to accept the terms of 
a consumer exchange with a firm (Aggarwal and Zhang 2006). This 
identifies the social element to consumer interaction and provides 
richness to the purchase context not possible when evaluating only 
the consumer-firm interaction. In addition, pricing and social inter-
action were explored to find variation across four distinct relational 
types: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and 
market pricing (McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003). These findings 
indicated that market pricing provided the most stable results to sup-
port the notion that other relational types seeking to improve on con-
sumer pricing have complex ramifications yet to be fully examined. 
Also, a genetic basis for consumer judgment and choice has been 
forwarded as requiring focused research (Simonson and Sela 2011). 
However, heritable effects have not been detected to any significant 
degree. Instead, a construct related to risk aversion (“prudence”) has 
been advanced as showing future research potential.
Another combination of two research areas includes sociologi-
cal analysis and symbolic consumer behavior and integrates facets 
of information processing and choice models. However, contrary to 
the other advances in consumer research, this facet appears to have 
mainly conceptual and qualitative underpinnings. For instance, one 
approach acknowledges that consumer knowledge can become a 
form of human capital. With this in mind, the knowledge possessed 
by consumers is related to life cycle patterns and various aspects of 
consumer behavior (Ratchford 2001). In addition, another approach 
presents a framework to examine the opportunities regarding perfect 
product-consumer fit. By evaluating the likelihood of a holistic ex-
perience, examining and quantifying heightened consumer intimacy 
appears to have been established (Allen 2002). As such, the combi-
nation of these two research areas has yet to be fully realized. Un-
doubtedly, this creates considerable opportunity for future research.
Granted, there are many possibilities not discussed here to in-
tegrate consumer research in different ways. However, we focused 
only on particular exemplars which synthesized research based on 
the framework suggested in this study. Undoubtedly, there are other 
generalized opportunities and exemplars which may best spur future 
integrative studies, as well.
LIMITATIONS
As with any study, there are limitations to this research. First, 
the interpretation of MDS results can be subjective and based on 
the researcher’s own perspective. As such, there could be multiple 
interpretations to the data summarized in the Table and displayed in 
the Figure. Therefore, other researchers may come to different con-
clusions regarding the specific nature of the research groups, cliques, 
and areas identified in our analysis.
The second limitation identified in this study relates to the 
method used. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the intel-
lectual structure and the most influential research topics as published 
in the premier peer-reviewed consumer research journal. A widely 
accepted approach to accomplish this is to use MDS as a basis for 
analysis and discussion. Still, there are many different types of anal-
ysis which may be used to evaluate the nature of JCR. For example, 
content analysis may be used to gain an idea of the major themes in 
the journal. Similarly, to evaluate JCR’s intellectual structure, factor 
analysis or cluster analysis could be used instead of the MDS ap-
proach employed here. As such, there are a variety of distinct meth-
ods which may be used to evaluate the influence of specific topics in 
consumer research.
Finally, another limitation in this study is based on the sample 
drawn for analysis. As the objective of this study was to evaluate 
JCR in specific, there may be other influences in consumer research 
which went unnoticed. Specifically, related yet distinct consumer 
research is published in other leading journals. Therefore, to gain 
a better understanding of the domain’s intellectual structure, future 
researchers may seek to include journals such as the Journal of Con-
sumer Psychology or Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
which are known to publish quality consumer research. This would 
allow for a more complete understanding of the domain’s intellec-
tual structure and could provide additional insights for subsequent 
analysis.
REFERENCES
Aggarwal, Pankaj and Meng Zhang (2006), “The Moderating Effect 
of Relationship Norm Salience on Consumers’ Loss Aversion,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 33(3), 413-19.
Alba, Richard D. and Gwen Moore (1983),”Elite Social Circles,” in 
Applied Network Analysis, ed. Ronald S. Burt and Michael J. 
Minor, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications: 245-61.
Allen, Douglas E. (2002), “Toward a Theory of Consumer Choice 
as Sociohistorically Shaped Practical Experience: The Fits-
Like-a-Glove (FLAG) Framework,” 28(4), 515-32.
302 / Using Bibliometrics to Evaluate the Journal of Consumer Research: Suggested Future Consumer Research Directions
Ariely, Dan (2000), “Controlling the Information Flow: Effects on 
Consumers’ Decision Making and Preferences,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 27(2), 233-48.
Arnould, Eric J. and Craig J. Thompson (2005), “Consumer 
Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty Years of Research,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 31(4), 868-82.
Arsel, Zeynep and Craig J. Thompson (2011), “Demythologizing 
Consumption Practices: How Consumers Protect Their Field-
Dependent Identity Investments from Devaluing Marketplace 
Myths,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37(5), 791-806.
Bahl, Shalini and George R. Milne (2010), “Talking to Ourselves: A 
Dialogical Exploration of Consumption Experiences,” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 37(1), 176-95.
Baumgartner, Hans and Rik Pieters (2003), “The Structural 
Influence of Marketing Journals: A Citation Analysis of the 
Discipline and its Subareas Over Time,” Journal of Marketing, 
67(2), 123-39.
Belk, Russell (2010), “Sharing,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
36(5), 715-34.
Berger, Jonah and Morgan Ward (2010), “Subtle Signals of 
Inconspicuous Consumption,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
37(4), 555-69.
Bettencourt, Lance A. and Mark B. Houston (2001), “Reference 
Diversity in JCR, JM, and JMR: A Reexamination and 
Extension of Tellis, Chandy, and Ackerman (1999),” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 28(2), 313-23.
Carmon, Ziv and Dan Ariely (2000), “Focusing on the Foregone: 
How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyer and Sellers,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 27(3), 360-70.
Chen, Haipeng (Allan) and Aksay R. Rao (2007), “When Two 
Plus Two Is Not Equal to Four: Errors in Processing Multiple 
Percentage Changes,” Journal of Consumer Research, 34(3) 
327-40.
Chernev, Alexander (2003), “When More Is Less and Less Is 
More: The Role of Ideal Point Availability and Assortment in 
Consumer Choice,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30(2), 
170-83.
________ (2007), “Jack of All Trades or Master of One? Product 
Differentiation and Compensatory Reasoning in Consumer 
Choice,” Journal of Consumer Research, 33(4), 430-44.
Collins, Randall (1998), The Sociology of Philosophies, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Cote, Joseph A., Siew Meng Leong, and Jane Cote (1991), 
“Assessing the Influence of Journal of Consumer Research: 
A Citation Analysis,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18(3), 
402-10.
Deighton, John, Debbie MacInnis, Ann McGill, and Baba Shiv 
(2010), “Broadening the Scope of Consumer Research,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 36(6), 1-3.
Epp, Amber M. and Linda L. Price (2010), “The Storied Life 
of Singularized Object: Forces of Agency and Network 
Transformation,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(5), 820-
37.
Fernandez, Karen V. and John L. Lastovicka (2011), “Making 
Magic: Fetishes in Contemporary Consumption,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 38(2), 278-99.
Ha, Youn-Won, Sehoon Park, and Hee-Kyung Ahn (2009), “The 
Influence of Categorical Attributes on Choice Context 
Effects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 463-77.
Hoffman, Donna L. and Morris B. Holbrook (1993), “The 
Intellectual Structure of Consumer Research: A Bibliometric 
Study of Author Cocitations in the First 15 Years of the 
Journal of Consumer Research,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 19(4), 505-17.
Humphreys, Ashlee (2010), “Semiotic Structure and the 
Legitimation of Consumption Practices: The Case of Casino 
Gambling,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37(3), 490-510.
Karababa, Eminegül and Güliz Ger (2011), “Early Modern Ottoman 
Coffeehouse Culture and the Formation of the Consumer 
Subject,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37(5), 737-60.
Kettle, Keri L. and Gerald Häubl (2011), “The Signature Effect: 
Signing Influences Consumption-Related Behavior by Priming 
Self-Identity,” Journal of Consumer Research, 38(3), 474-89.
Kuhn, Thomas (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Leong, Siew Meng (1989), “A Citation Analysis of the Journal of 
Consumer Research,” Journal of Consumer Research, 15(4), 
492-97.
Luedicke, Marius K., Craig J. Thompson, and Markus Giesler 
(2010), “Consumer Identity Work as Moral Protagonism: 
How Myth and Ideology Animate a Brand-Mediated Moral 
Conflict,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(6), 1016-32.
Lurie, Nicholas H. (2004), “Decision Making in Information-Rich 
Environments:  The Role of Information Structure,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 30(4), 473-86.
MacInnis, Deborah J. (2011), “A Framework for Conceptual 
Contributions in Marketing,” Journal of Marketing, 75(4), 
136-54.
MacInnis, Deborah J. and Valerie S. Folkes (2010), “The 
Disciplinary Status of Consumer Behavior: A Sociology 
of Science Perspective on Key Controversies,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 36(6), 899-914.
Mandel, Naomi and Eric J. Johnson (2002), “When Web Pages 
Influence Choice: Effects of Visual Primes on Experts and 
Novices,” Journal of Consumer Research, 29(2), 235-45.
McGraw, A. Peter, Philip E. Tetlock, and Orie V. Kristel (2003), 
“The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value 
of Things,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30(2), 219-29.
Mogilner, Cassie and Jennifer Aaker (2009), “’The Time vs. Money 
Effect’: Shifting Product Attitudes and Decisions through 
Personal Connection,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(2), 
277-91.
Palmeira, Mauricio M. (2011), “The Zero-Comparison Effect,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 38(1), 16-26.
Ramos-Rodríguez, Antonio Rafael and José Ruíz-Navarro 
(2004), “Changes in the Intellectual Structure of Strategic 
Management Research: A Bibliometric Study of the Strategic 
Management Journal, 1980-2000,” Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(10), 981-1004.
Ratchford, Brian T. (2001), “The Economics of Consumer 
Knowledge,” Journal of Consumer Research, 27(4), 397-411.
Sandikci, Özlem and Güliz Ger (2010), “Veiling in Style: How 
Does a Stigmatized Practice Become Fashionable?” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 37(1), 15-36.
Simonson, Itamar and Aner Sela (2011), “On the Heritability of 
Consumer Decision Making: An Exploratory Approach for 
Studying Genetic Effects on Judgment and Choice,” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 37(6), 951-66.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 303
Soster, Robin L., Ashwani Monga, and William O. Bearden (2010), 
“Tracking Costs of Time and Money: How Accounting Periods 
Affect Mental Accounting,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
37(4), 712-21.
Tellis, Gerard J., Rajesh K. Chandy, and David S. Ackerman 
(1999), “In Search of Diversity: The Record of Major 
Marketing Journals,” Journal of Marketing Research, 36(1), 
120-31.
Tsai, Wenpin and Chia-hung Wu (2010), “Knowledge Combination: 
A Cocitation Analysis,” Academy of Management Journal, 
53(3), 441-50.
Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust (1994), Social Network 
Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Wells, William D. (1993), “Discovery-Oriented Consumer 
Research,” Journal of Consumer Research, 19(4), 489-504.
Zinkhan, George M., Martin S. Roth, and May Jane Saxton (1992), 
“Knowledge Development and Scientific Status in Consumer-
Behavior Research: A Social Exchange Perspective,” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 19(2), 282-91.
304 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Turning to Brands When Close Others Turn Away: The Hydraulic Relation between Social 
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ABSTRACT
The findings of the four studies showed that social support was 
inversely influence individual’s brand choice that low social support 
should predict more brand reliance, particularly for those who place a 
high value on belonging and being accepted by others. This is because 
social support satiated the need to express self-worth, thus eliminat-
ing the need to rely on brand to achieve self-worth. Furthermore, this 
negative relationship was robust when taking into consideration of in-
dividuals’ price sensitivity. 
Social Support and Self-Worth
There is strong empirical support to suggest that, for better or 
for worse, an individual’s self-worth is strongly affected by those 
around them (Crocker and Wolfe 2001). Sociometer theory (Leary 
and Baumeister 2000) posits that self-esteem is ultimately interperson-
ally based, with self-esteem serving as a barometer for one’s value to 
others; when one is doing well interpersonally, they feel good about 
themselves, and when the quality of their relationships is under threat, 
self-esteem subsequently decreases.  
Social support comes from numerous significant others in our 
lives throughout the lifespan, all the while contributing to our sense of 
self-worth. Frequency of social support – from authorities such as par-
ents and teachers, to peers such as classmates and close friends – pre-
dicts one’s self-concept and self-worth (Cauce et al. 1996; Demaray, 
Malecki, Rueger, Brown, and Summers 2009; Robinson 1995), with 
parental support predicting self-worth longitudinally, and peer support 
predicting self-worth concurrently (McMahon, Felix, and Nagarajan 
2011). 
While forging strong relationship with others is an important 
source of self-worth, sometimes these relationships fail to serve this 
important psychological function. Conditional love by parents and ne-
glect serve to create the expectation in people that they will be rejected 
by others (Downey and Feldman 1996; Downey, Khouri, and Feldman 
1997; Park, Crocker, and Vohs 2006). This kind of parenting style con-
tributes to creating an anxious attachment style in children, which is 
associated with a negative self-views (Kim and Horowitz 1991; Levy, 
Blatt, and Shaver1998; Park et al. 2006), and a sense of self-esteem 
that is strongly contingent on the approval of others (Collins and Read 
1990). Similarly, outright unloving and malicious parenting is associ-
ated with a fearful attachment style, which is leads people to see them-
selves as unworthy of love, as well as other people are unloving and 
indifferent (Kim and Horowitz 1991; Levy et al. 1998).  
Brands as Surrogates for Social Support and a Source of 
Self-Worth
Previous research has shown that people do indeed find a sense 
of self-worth in brands, and use brands as a means of expressing them-
selves and their identity (Banister and Hogg 2003; Dalton 2008; Grubb 
and Grathwohl 1967; Shachar et al. 2001; Shepherd et al. 2011). 
Research also suggests that brands are also substitutable for more 
traditional means of achieving a sense of identity and self-worth. Those 
who are chronically lonely show an increased tendency to anthropo-
morphize (i.e., attribute consciousness and free will) products and non-
conscious objects (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2008). Con-
versely, reminding people of supportive others decrease the amount 
that people are willing to pay for larger choice sets, and decreased the 
appeal of having more choice (Ybarra, Lee, and Gonzalez, 2012). The 
substitutable nature of brands and significant others’ is also illustrated 
in the bi-directionality of these effects; the more people value material-
ism, the less then tend to value having close relationships with others 
(Richins and Dawson 1992).
The substitutable nature of brands and traditional sources of self-
worth is further illustrated in how materialism and valuing brands de-
velops over the lifespan. As mentioned above, parents and peer groups 
play an important role in shaping a child’s sense of self-worth (Cauce 
et al. 1996; Demaray, Malecki, Rueger, Brown, and Summers 2009; 
Downey and Feldman 1996; Downey, Khouri, and Feldman 1997; 
Kim and Horowitz 1991; McMahon, Felix, and Nagarajan 2011; Park, 
Crocker, and Vohs 2006; Robinson 1995). At the same time that these 
significant others are shaping a child’s sense of self-worth, so too are 
these relationships shaping the child’s materialistic orientation. For 
example, teenagers whose mothers are cold and less nurturing tended 
to see their self-worth as hinging on the possession of money or fi-
nancial success (Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff 1995). Conversely, 
supportive parents and peers decrease a child’s perceived need to turn 
to material goods to develop a positive sense of self-worth (Chaplin 
and John 2010). 
 CURRENT RESEARCH
While past work is suggestive of brands and close others as being 
interchangeable in their ability give people a sense of self-worth, in 
the current research we seek to fully test the substitutability of brands 
and social support. Specifically, we predict that individuals who are 
either a) chronically perceive low levels of social support, or b) are 
primed with low social support, will show increased brand reliance 
– that is, the extent to which a branded product is preferred over un-
branded products or products that without a recognizable national 
brand (Shachar Erdem, Cutright, and Fitzsimons 2011).
EXPERIMENTS AND FINDINGS
In Study 1a and Study 1b, we established a direct, inverse, re-
lationship between relationship between social support and brand re-
liance by both measuring and manipulating social support. In Study 
2 we replicate this effect while also showing that it still exists even 
when controlling for the inherent price differences between branded 
and unbranded products. In Study 3 we show that the need to belong 
is a theoretically-relevant moderator of this effect. Finally, in Studies 
4a and 4b, we find that the extent to which one derives a positive sense 
of self from branded products mediates the effect of social support on 
brand reliance, such that social support corresponds with lower lev-
els of brand-based self-worth, and that self-worth then predicts brand 
reliance(see table 1)
CONCLUSION
Our research centers on the role of social support in individuals’ 
brand choice. Our research answers who really relies on brand from a 
different perspective-interpersonal relationship to. We further explore 
the moderator and mediator of the impact of social support on brand 
reliance. We believe that our research extends the research on social 
support and brand choice and provides a new research perspective for 
social support and brand choice. 
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Table 1: Summary of Studies and Results
Study Objectives of the Study Results
Study1 Study 1a Measuring social support to test the 
relationship between social support and 
brand reliance 
Social support was negatively related to brand reliance 
:β = -.04, t (262) = -2.69, p = .01
Study1b 1): Manipulating social support to confirm 
the casual relationship between social 
support and brand reliance
2): Ruling out the confounding effect of 
materialism and religious commitment
Main Effect of social support, M social support =4.9, SD 
=.39; M control =6.22, SD =.40; F (1, 104) = 5.62, p = .02
Covariant: Materialism, F (1, 104) = 11.83, p = .001
Study2 Confirming the impact of social support on 
brand reliance by taking into consideration 
of price sensitivity
Main effect of social support: F (1,138) =3.766, p =. 05
Main effect of price sensitivity: F (2,210) =29.260, p 
=. 000
Study3 Testing the moderating role of Need to 
belong
Interaction between social support and need to belong: 
β = -1.57, t (69) = -2.35, p = .02.
Study4 Study 4a Measuring social support to test the 
underlying process of the impact of social 
support on brand reliance
Social supportàBrand Reliance: β = -.05, t (121) = 
-2.08, p = .04
Social supportàBrand-based self-worth: β = -.03, t 
(121) = -3.78, p < .001
Social supportàBrand Reliance (with mediator): β = 
-.02, t (120) = -.08, p = .38
Bootstrapping: 95% CI  = -.05721 to -.0085
Study 4b Manipulating social support to confirm the 
results from study 4a is causal relationship
Social supportàBrand Reliance β = -.41, t (65) = 
-2.20, p = .03
Social supportàBrand-based self-worth: β = 1.59, t 
(65) = 4.04 p < .001
Social supportàBrand Reliance (with mediator): β = 
-.76, t (65) = -1.21, p = .23
Bootstrapping: 95% CI  = -1.54 to -.07
REFERENCES
Cauce, A. Mari, Craig Mason, Nancy Gonzales, Yumi Hiraga, 
and Gloria Liu (1994), “Social Support during Adolescence: 
Methodological and Theoretical Considerations,” in Social 
Problems and Social Contexts in Adolescence, ed. Klaus 
Hurrelman and Stephen F. Hamilton (pp. 131-151). New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter.
Chaplin, N. Lan and Deborah R. John (2010). “Interpersonal 
Influences on Adolescent Materialism: A New Look at the 
Role of Parents and Peers,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
20, 176-184.
Crocker, Jennifer and Connie T. Wolfe (2001), “Contingencies of 
Self-Worth,” Psychological Review, 108(3), 593-623.
Crocker, Jennifer and Lora E. Park (2004), “The Costly Pursuit of 
Self-Esteem,” Psychological Bulletin, 130(3), 392-414.
Demaray, K. Michelle, Christine K. Malecki, Sandra Y. Rueger 
and Sarah E. Brown (2009), “The Role of Youth’s Rating 
of the Importance of Socially Supportive Behaviors 
in the Relationship Between Social Support and Self-
Concept,”Journal of Youth Adolescents, 38, 13-28.
Downey, Geraldine and Scott. I. Feldman (1996), “Implication of 
Rejection Sensitivity for Intimate Relationships,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1327-1343.
Downey, Geraldine, Hala Khouri and Scott I. Feldman (1997), 
“Early Interpersonal Trauma and Later Adjustment: the 
Meditational Role of Rejection Sensitivity,” in Development 
Perspectives on Trauma: Theory, Research, and Intervention, 
Rochester symposium on developmental psychology, Vol. 
8., (pp. 85-114), ed. Dante Cicchetti and Sheree L. Toth 
Rochester, NY, US: University of Rochester Press.
Epley, Nicholas, Scott Akalis, Adam Waytz and John T. Cacioppo 
(2008), “Creating Social Connection through Inferential 
Reproduction: Loneliness and Perceived Agency in Gadgets, 
Gods, and Greyhounds,” Psychological Science, 19(2):114-
120.
Kasser, Tim, Richard M. Ryan, Melvin Zax and Arnold J. Sameroff 
(1995), “The Relations of Maternal and Social Environments 
to late Adolescents’ Materialistic and Prosocial Values,” 
Developmental Psychology, 31(6):907-914.
Kim, Bartholomew and Leonard M. Horowitz (1991), “Attachment 
Styles among Young Adults: A test of a Four-Category Model,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(2), 226-244.
Leary, R. Mark and Roy F. Baumeister (2000), “The Nature and 
Function of Self-Esteem: Sociometer Theory,”Advance in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 1-62.
Levy, N. Kenneth, Sidney J. Blatt and Phillip R. Shaver (1998), 
“Attachment Styles and Parental Representations,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2), 407-419.
McMahon, D. Susan, Erika D. Felix and Thara Nagarajan (2011), 
“Social Support and Neighborhood Stressors among African 
American Youth: Networks and Relations to Self-worth,” 
Journal of Child and Family Studies, 20, 255-262.
Park, E. Lora, Jennifer Crocker, Kathleen D. Vohs (2006), 
“Contingencies of Self-Worth and Self-Validation 
Goals: Implication for Close Relationships,” in Self and 
Relationships: Connecting Intrapersonal and Interpersonal 
Processes (pp.84-103), ed. Kathleen D. Vohs and Eli J. Finkel, 
New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
306 / Turning to Brands When Close Others Turn Away: The Hydraulic Relation between Social Support and Brand Reliance
Richins, L. Marsha and Scott Dawson (1992), “A Consumer Values 
Orientation for Materialism and Its Measurement: Scale 
Development and Validation,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
19(3), 303-316.
Robinson, S. Nancy (1995), “Evaluating the Nature of Perceived 
Support and Its Relation to Perceived Self-worth in 
Adolescents,”Journal of Research on Adolescence, 5(2), 253-
280.
Schachar, Ron, Tülin Erdem, Keisha M. Cutright and Gavan J. 
Fitzsimons (2011), “Brand: the Opiate of the Nonreligious 
Masses?” Marketing Science, 30(1), 92-110.
Shepherd, Steven, Aaron C. Kay, Mark J. Landau, Lucas, A. Keefer 
(2011), “Evidence for the Specificity of Control Motivations 
in Worldview Defense: Distinguishing Compensatory Control 
from Uncertainty Management and Terror Management 
Processes,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47 
(5), 949-958.
Ybarra, Oscar, David Seungjae Lee and Richard Gonzalez (2012), 
“Supportive Social Relationships Attenuate the Appeal of 
Choice,” Psychological Science, 23(10), 1186-1192.
307 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Postmodern Cultural Complexities: The Two Worlds on Cuba Street
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a Design Research project investigating the 
cultural worlds found on Cuba Street in Wellington, New Zealand. 
The work demonstrates that the known culture of Cuba in the geo-
graphic location of the Gulf of Mexico has been adopted, adapted 
and essentially, hijacked by Wellingtonians and is therefore argued 
as a postmodern spectacle. To begin, a brief discussion is presented 
on the culture of Cuba where the cultural essence of this geograph-
ic location is argued as pre-modern (Sutherland and Denny 2005). 
From there, in seeking to demonstrate the hijack of Cuban culture in 
Wellington’s Cuba Street, postmodern theory is applied as an ana-
lytical framework. In contrast to the pre-modern cultural essence of 
Cuba, the culture of Cuba Street located in Wellington New Zealand 
is shown to hold the cultural essence of postmodernism.
THE PRE-MODERN CULTURE OF CUBA
The culture of Cuba as captured and described by Sunderland 
and Denny (2005) in their photographic essay is shown to be a cul-
ture of juxtapositions. Cuba is described as “a place of movement 
where time has stopped” (Sunderland and Denny 2005: 292); a place 
where the cultural and consumption practices of the past are current 
and vibrantly present; a place where resourcefulness demanded of 
suffering and poverty is combined with cultural fantasies and global 
tourism. Quoting Dopico (2002: 452-454), Sunderland and Denny 
emphasize the visual elements of the Cuban culture as a metaphori-
cal window and state that the imagery of Cuba is “a contrasting and 
broken-down background for first-world travelers and their luxu-
ries.” Decaying colonial structures and vintage vehicles are repre-
sentative of the sentimental essence of an idealized era. Accordingly, 
Sunderland and Denny (2005: 305) describe the Cuban culture as a 
“romance of the pre-modern.”
POSTMODERNISM
In reviewing various postmodern theories, Firat and Dholakia 
(2006) argue five conditions of postmodernity: hyperreality, frag-
mentation, decentering, juxtaposition, and difference. 
Hyperreality is about the social and cultural construction of re-
ality where the distinction between the real and fantasy is evident in 
our orientation to surroundings rather than the nature of the surround-
ings. The experience of a long queue at Disneyland for example is 
a fantastical experience where the magic of the Disney experience 
overrides the inconvenience of the queue (Pettigrew 2011). More 
than that, the spectacle (Kozinets et al 2004) that is the Disneyland 
servicescape is arguably co-constructed by the consumers within that 
fantastical experience.   
Fragmentation is about the playful but critical engagement with 
different modes of being. The study of the experiential meaning of 
Harley-Davidson by Schembri (2009) shows consumers at play (Holt 
1995) to be co-constructing the postmodern spectacle of the HOGs 
(Harley Owners Group) but simultaneously to be professional work-
ers and ordinary suburban folk. As Firat and Dholakia (2006) argue, 
postmodernism is a return to communities, both multiple and simul-
taneous therefore fragmentation may entail finding meaning in the 
experience of multiple selves. One way to enact such multiple selves 
is through participation in various communities, such as brand com-
munities (Schau et al 2009). 
Decentering as a condition of postmodernism is about the 
blurred and complicated relationship between subject and object. 
While modernity held clear cut lines as to what constitutes the sub-
ject and what constitutes the object, in postmodernity this clarity is 
decentered. Toyota’s Japanese advertisement for the 2013 Auris for 
example, depicts the back view of a model wearing a sleek black 
jacket and red bikini bottom strutting down the runway. The model 
allows the jacket to fall away and the back view shows the model to 
be topless. When the model arrives at the end of the runway and stops 
to turn beside the Auris, the front view shows the model as not fe-
male but possibly transgender and quite definitely stunning nonethe-
less. In effect, this clever ad is not only a transcendence of gender but 
also objectification. What becomes the object; the car or the model? 
And what of the subject; transport innovation and hybrid engines, or 
the increasing acceptance of transgender individuals? This playful 
spectacle is evidence of the marketer as the archetypal trickster as 
per Grayson (1999). 
The element of juxtaposition in postmodernism is well dem-
onstrated within architectural design. Paradoxical oppositions are 
evident in architecture with contrasting textures, colors and other 
aesthetics. However, spectacular postmodern juxtapositions are also 
evident in the ideological oppositions of for example, hospitals un-
dertaking an aggressive marketing campaign and moral oppositions 
such as a CEO confessing the dishonor and responsibility of a cor-
porate crisis. 
Difference as a condition of postmodernity is about the experi-
mentation with and tolerance for different multiple orders. In other 
words, difference is allowed and more than that, difference is en-
couraged. Multiculturalism for example is not only tolerated but 
welcomed and globalization is questioned in terms of the detrimental 
effects on culture.   Having now examined each of the five conditions 
of postmodernity as per Firat and Dholakia (2006), the discussion 
turns to the context of application, Cuba Street. 
CUBA STREET
Cuba Street in Wellington New Zealand, is considered by many 
as ‘the soul of Wellington’ with many local businesses using this 
statement as a tagline in their promotional efforts. In terms of struc-
ture, the street is a shared zone of foot traffic and vehicular traffic, 
with part of the street designated as Cuba Mall where cars are pro-
hibited and pedestrians only allowed. But the entire street is open air, 
with no overhead roof anywhere in the street despite the high wind 
and rainfall of the area.
At the most basic level, Cuba Street can be described as a vi-
brant place filled with colorful characters. But as ‘the soul of Wel-
lington’ - what does that mean? In seeking to uncover that meaning 
and decipher what to do with that uncovered meaning, the research 
question formulated for this industry project was to understand how 
to leverage the soul of Wellington as a local experience.    
RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design of this project is Design Research (Koski-
nen et al. 2011; Laurel 2003; O’Grady and O’Grady 2006). A concise 
background on the contemporary discourse about Design Research 
is provided by Nigel Cross (2006) in his book, Designerly Ways of 
Knowing. However as Wassan (2005) highlights, the field of design 
is all about innovation and the field of design ethnography is in its 
308 / Postmodern Cultural Complexities: The Two Worlds on Cuba Street
infancy. Consequently, as awareness grows, the importance of rigor 
is noted. 
This Design Research project began with a rapid (visual) eth-
nography conducted on Cuba Street and the findings of that rapid 
ethnography were taken through an ideation process of in-house 
brainstorming. The outcome of the in-house ideation process was 
a developed prototype, which was taken back to the street for the 
purpose of arriving at a refined concept. The following discussion 
elaborates on each of these stages in the research design. 
In the field of design, ethnography has a narrower and some-
what different meaning than it does in anthropology (Wassan 2000); 
research is done quickly and typically with limited theoretical con-
textualization. 
In this Design Research project, the rapid ethnography com-
bined fieldwork with a visual component. The fieldwork involved 
two days of participant-observation in Cuba Street, which provided 
the opportunity to capture more than 450 images such as Figure 1. 
During these two days, 15 field interviews were conducted with a 
diversity of participants; each interview between 15-45 minutes in 
length. In terms of analysis, design ethnography is associated more 
with the collection of textual evidence than with the analysis of that 
text (Wassan 2000). However, the emphasis here is on rigor and 
hence some detail is provided. For this ethnographic component of 
the project, the bulk of the text to be interpreted was visual text. This 
visual text was considered in the context of field notes and interview 
text. The contextual text was considered by the team of researchers 
who queried and questioned each aspect, emergent pattern, and sug-
gested dimension. In a hermeneutic manner, this analytical task was 
both an individual and collective effort. Having the text as visual text 
enabled the research team to work either individually and/or collec-
tive at different times during this analytical process. The goal was to 
arrive at stability in this sort and resort, question and query process 
of reading and treating the text.
Figure 1: The Corporate Suits with an Eclectic Twist
FINDINGS OF THE RAPID ETHNOGRAPHY
There are many aspects that make Cuba Street what it is, but 
this research has identified four dimensions: the people, the space, 
the art, and the culture.
The people theme begins with the comment that “the people 
make this place what it is.” In the context of Cuba Street, there is a 
diversity of people; young and old, gay or not, punk and conserva-
tive, the alternative people and the corporates. Many people empha-
sized that part of the appeal of Cuba Street is that “we all get along, 
there is no violence!” However, the contrast is evident between the 
alternative people and the corporate people and a quote that captures 
this contrast is, “there are two worlds on Cuba Street, the alternative 
world and the suits.” The alternative people are those individuals 
more willing to live simply, consume less, and dress in a manner 
that reflects a non-conventional way of life. Many of the buskers 
and beggars on Cuba Street fit this description. In contrast, the re-
tail and corporate workers (referred to as suits) dress more formally, 
and are typically in transit either on their way to or from work. The 
suits are professionals who choose to engage in the culture of Cuba 
Street in more subtle ways than that of the alternative people. More 
specifically, the suits wear formal corporate wear with an eclectic 
twist, which might take the form of a bright red vest teamed with an 
old school time piece, or an oversized cross worn with a little black 
dress and knee high rainbow socks for example. The suits told the 
story that “Cuba Street is the local people, with a local style making 
a local stamp.” 
Like the people theme, the space theme also involves contrast 
and juxtaposition. There is a juxtaposition of old with new architec-
ture where some of the older buildings have received more refur-
bishment than others. There is also the juxtaposition of the high end 
restaurants with the more casual cafes, and then there is the juxtapo-
sition of mainstream retail with retro retail. Notably, the retro style 
is evident not only in the predominance of retro retailers but also in 
the Art Deco architecture as well as the decor of both high end res-
taurants and casual cafes.    
The art theme is evident on Cuba Street in the high end galleries 
as well as many unexpected places. While there are many large and 
authorized artworks on Cuba Street, there are also many unauthor-
ized artworks on Cuba Street that beautify even the most mundane 
street aspects. Cuba Street is an artistically vibrant street where local 
artisans choose to display their talents. The artistic works on Cuba 
Street is also not only found in the physical art pieces such as painted 
works and sculpture but also the music. The artistic expression and 
musical talent is further evidenced on the street with the many and 
varied buskers who choose to share their talent publicly. With a clus-
ter of independent music specialists located on Cuba Street, vinyl 
devotees are well serviced and musician venues well attended. More 
than that, there are iconic nightlife venues on Cuba Street that gener-
ate a heavy duty after dark party. One of the iconic retailers, Cosmic, 
closes off a section of their central retail outlet to platform a live DJ 
on the weekend after trading hours. Conversely, one of the popular 
alternative bars known as The Fringe Bar doubles as a retro fashion 
retailer during weekend business hours.   
The culture of Cuba Street is therefore described as a counter 
culture with an overwhelming Bohemian style that is most appar-
ent with the alternative people and more subtly demonstrated by the 
suits. A common ground between this counter culture and corporate 
sector is the coffee culture. The coffee is served strong in Wellington, 
reflecting the strength of the coffee culture itself. As well as a bridge 
between the alternative and corporate worlds, the Wellington coffee 
culture is also a bridge between the business hours and nightlife of 
Cuba Street.
Table 1 summarizes these findings and articulates the four di-
mensions that show Cuba Street as the soul of Wellington. Having 
detailed these four identified themes, the overall summative finding 
of this Design Research project is that Cuba Street is a rich untapped 
cultural resource. As a local experience there is much that can be 
done to leverage the Cuba Street experience.
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Table 1: Summary of the Four Identified Dimensions of the 
Culture of Cuba St
The cultural dimensions of Cuba St
The people There are two worlds of people on Cuba St: the alternatives and the suits.
The space
The space of Cuba St entails a juxtaposition 
of both old and new architecture, high end 
restaurants and casual cafes, as well as retro and 
mainstream retail.
The art
The artistic element has a strong presence in 
Cuba St in both authorized and unauthorized 
forms. High end art galleries are complemented 
by the street art that beautifies even the most 
mundane aspects of Cuba St.
The culture
The culture of Cuba St is described as a counter 
culture with an overwhelming bohemian style 
that is most prominent amongst the alternative 
people and more subtly expressed by the 
corporate suits. However, common ground 
is evident in the strong coffee culture that 
permeates Cuba St. 
THREE POINTS OF VIEW AND A PROTOTYPE
With regards to the practical implications of this work, the per-
spective of the local Council is an important consideration. But, as 
well as the Council perspective, there is a need to consider the people 
of Wellington and their perspective as users of the space. In seek-
ing to accommodate both the Council’s perspective as well as the 
people’s perspective, the following points of view were developed. 
However, rather than aggregating all the people into one group the 
alternative people are segmented from the corporate people as set out 
in Table 2. Note that in Design Research, when developing a point 
of view, the task is to state who the user is, what they need, and why. 
Also, the alternative and corporate segments are given labels indica-
tive of their purpose within the Cuba Street scene. Accordingly, the 
alternative people are labeled Culture Generators and the corporate 
suits are labeled Culture Voyeurs because while they appreciate the 
vibrant culture of Cuba Street, they predominantly watch from a safe 
distance rather than directly engage.   
Table 2: Summary of Developed Points of View
Wellington City 
Council (WCC) Culture Generators Culture Voyeurs
...provides public 
benefit
with limited 
resources
and requires
community 
confidence
to be re-elected
Young street 
performers,
broke and transient 
musicians and 
artisans
who need space for
creative expression
because this is their 
currency
Career focused 
professionals
proudly wearing
an eclectic twist
who look for a 
momentary escape 
and safe cultural 
experience because 
this provides social 
capital
Taking each of these three points of view into account, the pur-
pose and priority of any prototype for the Council will be to enhance 
the maintenance of public space. For the Culture Generators, the pur-
pose and priority is simply sustenance and for the Culture Voyeurs, 
the purpose is the provision of a safe cultural experience. The goal of 
the prototype therefore is to deliver on each of these three purposes. 
With this in mind, the prototype developed is outlined in Table 3.
Table 3: The Prototype
• WCC funds a street art competition where 10 street 
performers are commissioned for 10hrs/wk for 4 weeks 
• The public votes (online/offline) on which performers get 
the 10 spots 
• During the month long performance, the public again votes 
for the ‘The Best’ performer/artist/musician
• Winner gets $5,000
TAKING IT TO THE STREET
As a Design Research project and having a developed prototype 
in hand, the next step was to take the prototype back to the street 
to gauge public/user response. In taking this next step, another two 
days was spent in ethnographic mode back on Cuba Street. The re-
searcher spoke to another 15 participants, where an overwhelming 
positive response was received from all but two of the 15 partici-
pants. From this second group of participants however, several im-
provements and refinements were suggested and the prototype was 
revised accordingly to arrive at the finalized concept as per Table 4. 
Table 4: The Final Concept
• WCC sponsors a street art competition where street 
performers/artisans/musicians nominate themselves
• During a 2-wk period, the public votes for the ‘The Best’ 
performer/artisan/musician
• Winner takes home $5,000 and Top 5 get $1,000 each
• Winner and Top 5 are recognized as ‘artists-in-residence’ 
on Cuba Street for the following month
Some of the refinements incorporated into the prototype on the 
advice of the participants included, dropping the initial monetized 
incentive by allowing the performers, artisans, and musicians to 
nominate themselves and removing the initial public vote. Rather 
than a four week performance period, the performance period is re-
duced to two weeks, during which time the public vote for ‘The Best’ 
performer/artisan/musician. Then, in addition to giving the winner 
$5,000, the next top five performers are each given $1,000. This way 
six winners rather than just one are honored as ‘artists-in-residence’ 
on Cuba Street for the following month.  
DISCUSSION
Relating these findings and outcome to the postmodern lit-
erature, the following discussion addresses how each of Firat and 
Dholakia’s (2006) five conditions of postmodernity apply. 
In terms of hyperreality, this work reports two worlds co-exist 
on Cuba Street where the people found in each of these worlds in-
terpret and experience the same reality in different ways, through 
different cultural lenses. The Culture Generators (the alternative 
people) make Cuba Street what it is and if they are not sustained, 
they will move on. But the Culture Generators demonstrate an ex-
treme type of communal production, where what is being produced 
is a counterculture designed to resist market forces (Goulding and 
Saren, 2007). In this socially and culturally constructed reality, 
the corporate suits live in a different world but on the same street. 
Effectively, the Culture Generators construct the postmodern spec-
tacle of the counter-culture that is observed from afar and co-con-
structed by the Culture Voyeurs. With fragmentation tightly linked 
to hyperreality, people who live in Wellington and frequent Cuba 
Street negotiate this cultural site in fragmented ways. More specifi-
310 / Postmodern Cultural Complexities: The Two Worlds on Cuba Street
cally, while the alternative people generate the spectacle of Cuba 
Street the suits as observers and voyeurs are another fragment of this 
same spectacle. However, in terms of decentering, rather than the 
corporates holding the power as usual, in this context, the Culture 
Generators hold the power because without the alternatives, there is 
no culture for the Culture Voyeurs (ie. suits) to observe.
The many spectacular juxtapositions found on Cuba Street in-
clude moral oppositions, aesthetic and artistic oppositions, retro and 
contemporary oppositions. The cultural values held by the Culture 
Generators entail anti-consumerism and anti-corporatism, whereas 
the Cultural Voyeurs are corporate and career oriented. The aesthetic 
oppositions are evident in the juxtaposition of old and run-down 
buildings, located beside refurbished Art Deco buildings, sitting 
beside new character buildings. Artistic juxtapositions are apparent 
in the upmarket galleries and authorized artwork positioned beside 
unauthorized pieces of artwork. Similarly, the upmarket restaurants 
reside alongside more casual cafes and yet there is the commonality 
of the retro style carried throughout, which is most evident in the 
coffee culture. 
CONCLUSION
In the spirit of pre-modern Cuba, Wellington New Zealand is 
shown to have adopted and reshaped this culture in a more sophisti-
cated and postmodern manner. The cultural complexities document-
ed in this research show this cultural hijack to entail complexities 
evident as four dimensions: the people, the space, the art, and the 
counter consumer culture that include a strong coffee consumption 
element. As shown in the visual elements of this Design Research 
project, the culture of Cuba Street can be described as a postmodern 
spectacle. In effect, this work offers a theoretical contribution as ap-
plication of Firat and Dholakia’s (2006) postmodern framework as 
well as an extension of Kozinet et al.’s (2004) theory play and retail 
servicescapes as spectacle. More practically, this work showcases 
the research design of Design Research.  
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ABSTRACT
In the popular culture of critical journalism (Klein 1999; 
Schlosser 2001), the detailed unpacking of specific market systems 
in terms of institutional details, organizational structures and their 
effects has, as pointed out by Thompson (2007), contributed with the 
rare but important scholarship needed to understand the functions, 
ideologies and complexities of how market systems work. In recent 
years an increased, holistic understanding of whole market systems 
has been called for in consumer culture theory, CCT (Arnould and 
Thompson 2005), as a needed complement to researchers’ (occa-
sionally) too strong a focus on phenomenological lived experience 
(Askegaard and Linnet 2011), as the pivotal core of market evolution 
(Giesler 2008), and as a manifestation of larger social relations and 
structures (Üstüner and Thompson 2012). But in contrast to the jour-
nalistic works mentioned above, academic consumer culture research 
lacks detailed empirical work that identifies and contextualises these 
structural relationships according to cultural dynamics and norms, 
ideological conditions, social structures and historical conditions. 
The need has indeed been identified (Askegaard and Linnet 2011; 
Giesler 2008; Holt 2003) but the methodological implications re-
main vague or even non-existent. What does Holt (2003: 49) mean in 
practice when he calls for knowledge that “doesn’t come from focus 
groups or ethnography or trend reports—the marketer’s usual means 
for ‘getting close to the customer’”? Holt (2003: 49) suggests that 
this knowledge might come “from a cultural historian’s understand-
ing of ideology as it waxes and wanes, a sociologist’s charting of the 
topography of contradictions the ideology produces, and a literary 
critic’s expedition into the culture that engages these contradictions”. 
But, given that research in CCT seldom engages in these expeditions, 
we argue that we lack guidelines on how to integrate it with our more 
usual phenomenological consumer focus.
Regardless of how imperative it is to highlight concrete methods 
with which CCT researchers can empirically explore the dynamics of 
market systems, we first need to refine the conceptual frameworks in 
order to do so. The frameworks used today to explain market dynam-
ics are typically grand (and sometimes unclear), which is probably 
one reason why it is difficult to find empirical research on the matter 
(other than from journalists, who do not suffer under the institutional 
demand of theoretical contribution). Holt’s (2002) dialectical model 
of branding and consumer culture is a typical example of a macro-
level model that tries to supply grand theoretical explanations for the 
development of a market system. Holt’s analysis is based on consum-
ers’ micro-level stories about their consumption and, although his 
historical analysis is theoretically appealing, the leap he makes from 
micro-level consumer stories to macro-level model is very long. This 
not only raises methodological questions regarding the trustworthi-
ness of this type of analysis but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
generates questions about how to conceptualise the development of 
a market system on a meso-level. Schau, Muñiz and Arnould (2009) 
take a more meso-level approach in their analysis of the value-cre-
ating practices of brand communities. We agree with their assertion 
that “value is manifested in the collective…rather than firm-consum-
er dyads” (2009:41). However, as Schau et al focus on individual 
brands, their findings cannot sufficiently explain market subsystems 
that consistent of diverse brands and products. The purpose of this 
conceptual paper is therefore two-fold: firstly we introduce a (ten-
tative) theoretical framework to conceptualise the development of 
market systems on a mid-range (or meso-) level; secondly, we spell 
out methodological suggestions for how to study such development.
INTRODUCING THE CFR FRAMEWORK
In this section we introduce the Consumption Field Refinement 
(CFR) framework with the aim of conceptualising the development of 
market systems on a meso-level.
A market system consists of a physical collection of commer-
cially connected entities as well as a symbolic collection of cultural 
meanings and interactions, hence a market culture. In addition to 
Giesler’s (2008) and Holt’s (2002) conceptualizations of the evo-
lution (rejuvenation) of a market culture as a dialectical interplay 
between two macro-entities—the branding paradigm and the con-
temporary consumer culture—we suggest that on a mid range level 
the market system consists of several subsystems, or consumption 
fields, that together make up the entire (macro-) market system. 
Consequently, in order to understand how the entire market system 
and the entire consumer culture develops; we need to understand the 
development of its constituting subsystems—the various consump-
tion fields.  We propose that the development of each consumption 
field is propelled by the actions of three main entities: the consumers; 
firms/brand owners; and media, where consumers and their interest 
is the strongest driving force in the development process. The state 
may also influence the evolution of consumption fields, for instance 
by encouraging, discouraging or outlawing types of consumption. 
However, as we do not believe that the state is a necessary entity in 
the evolution of consumption fields, we will leave this complicated 
area to other researchers.
We hereby introduce a (tentative) theoretical framework, which 
we refer to as Consumption Field Refinement (CFR) to conceptualise 
the development of market systems on a meso-level, see figure 1. In 
the following sections, we will further explain the different elements 
of the framework. 
Figure 1: The CFR Framework
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DRIVING FORCES OF THE CFR FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop our ideas and outline the various ele-
ments constituting the Consumption Field, which is the centrepiece 
of the CFR framework.
The Consumption Field refers to a consumption-oriented in-
terest around which consumers gather and organize. The concept is 
heavily influenced by Bourdieu’s (1984) idea of social fields (see 
also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)—a concept that has been widely 
used in CCT (Arsel and Thompson 2011; Holt 1997; 1998; Üstüner 
and Holt 2010; Üstüner and Thompson 2012). A social field can be 
seen as a micro-cosmos of the social organization of society itself 
where people strive for status and power—thus playing the status 
game—by drawing upon resources that Bourdieu (1984) refers to as 
various forms of capital: social, cultural and economic (see also Ve-
blen [1899]1994). More capital (as a combination) provides higher 
status and power, making the presence of status hierarchies, rules 
and norms quite obvious. Bourdieu (1984) and Holt (1997; 1998) 
see society being comprised of an aggregation of separate macro-
level fields—e.g. the field of consumption, the field of art, the field 
of religion, and so on. Consumption then is seen as a single field 
that encompasses all consumer interests, whether in food, furniture, 
fashion or something else. We, like Arsel and Thompson (2011), 
would rather envisage each of these macro-fields as a collection of 
different meso-fields. In our CFR framework, the field of consump-
tion encompasses several separate consumption fields, each of which 
relates to a different consumption interest. Each of these meso-fields 
is “roughly equivalent to prior conceptualizations of subcultures 
of consumption” (Arsel and Thompson 2011: 793). Like Arsel and 
Thompson, we refer to these meso-fields merely as consumption 
fields.
Here we would like to emphasise that consumption fields draw 
together multiple—rather than single—product categories and com-
mercial experiences via a dialectic interplay between consumers and 
the various commercial actors that see opportunities to capitalize on 
an emerging consumption field. We have, for some time, observed 
how consumers convene around particular brands to form communi-
ties and subcultures as a result of a common interest in those brands 
(Belk and Tumbat 2005; McAlexander, Schouten and Koenig 2002; 
Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Muniz and Schau 2005; Schouten and 
McAlexander 1995). However, what we, here, refer to as a consump-
tion field may consist of many, sometimes interlinked, types of com-
munities or subcultures, and thus pertain to a wider form of consum-
er interest than that ascribed to one single community. The Foodie 
Culture is one example (Cairns, Johnston, and Bauman 2010). It is 
its own little system with its own culture that involves many different 
product categories and industries (e.g. food, equipment, books, com-
petitions) without being exclusive like a members club. Over time, 
the consumption field has been so refined and internally interlinked 
that it can be broadly defined as a sub-system situated in a larger 
social organisational scheme. In these respects a consumption field 
is conceptually tighter than both Bourdieu’s (1984) aggregated so-
cial class lifestyles and Holt’s (1998) “tastes and consumer practices 
across a variety of popular cultural categories”, but broader than spe-
cific product categories, brands, or brand communities—although 
such distinct formations are, no doubt, at the core of the broader 
formation, the system and the culture. We may therefore have some-
thing to learn from studies of value co-creation in brand communi-
ties (e.g. Schau et al 2009). But we believe that previous research on 
status hierarchy formation in communities (Kozinets 2001; Ostberg 
2007; Schouten and McAlexander 1995) should be more relevant in 
this discussion, as we believe that it is status that drives the consumer 
interest on which a consumption field thrives.
Consumer Interest in a certain consumption area is central 
to the emergence and development of a consumption field. With-
out consumer interest, there is no development. However, there is 
a dearth of theory on how and why consumers develop interest in a 
particular consumption category and thus, how and why new fields 
emerge. The formation of fields is not addressed by Bourdieu (1984) 
or Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). The emergence of the field of art 
was described by Bourdieu (1996) but no theoretical framework was 
proposed. We suspect that any consumption category that has not yet 
been colonized by consumer cultivation as a means to form identity 
and gain status may constitute a viable and attractive opportunity for 
such motives. As more traditional lifestyle consumption categories 
have been exploited by consumers looking to obtain recognition and 
status, middle class consumers increasingly look for new fertile ar-
eas to utilise for identity construction (Belk 1988; Bertilsson 2009; 
Elliott and Wattanasuwan 1998; Hirschman 1980) and distinction 
(Holt 1998; Thompson and Haytko 1997; Ulver-Sneistrup 2008). 
Since product categories such as fashion/clothing (Bertilsson 2009; 
Thompson and Haytko 1997), cars (McAlexander et al 2002; Mu-
niz and O’Guinn 2001), motorcycles (Schouten and McAlexander 
1995), computers (Belk and Tumbat 2005; Muniz and Schau 2005) 
and TV-shows (Kozinets 1997; Kozinets 2001) have already been 
over-exploited by consumers with a desire for aesthetization and dis-
tinction, we argue that consumers tend to (consciously or otherwise) 
look for unexplored consumption fields—which are less single-
product-focused and more interest-focused. Consumption categories 
that were previously considered mundane, every-day or boring may 
be a last resort for consumers who find that all other areas have al-
ready been colonized.
Consumers immerse themselves within these unexplored con-
sumption fields, and develop extensive knowledge and experience, 
thus becoming what Holt (1998) refers to as high cultural capitals 
within that field. In this way, consumption fields develop and are 
refined. For example, running, as consumption field, has developed 
immensely in recent years: as more consumers have taken them up, 
certain types of running have become more mainstream while more 
niche forms have gained popularity. Marathon running is no longer 
quite so unusual as it once was, but other forms of endurance running 
have become more popular as media of distinction (e.g. triathlons 
and ultra-running). The type of running one does (barefoot versus 
ordinary running), the distances and other challenges one includes 
(marathons, ultra-runs, triathlons), and the equipment one purchases 
to participate; these are all potential sources of status and opportuni-
ties for distinction. We would argue then that it is consumers’ need 
for recognition and status that drives interest within a consumption 
category, and consequently the development of new consumption 
fields.
Refinement Materials are resources in the form of products, 
brands, symbolic material, services and information, which may be 
contributed by firms/brand owners or media, as well as consumers. 
They feed consumers’ newly acquired consumption interests, and are 
therefore are essential in order for consumption fields to develop 
and be refined. Holt’s classic (1998) CCT article suggests that accu-
mulated cultural capital is consumers’ main resource for positioning 
themselves in consumer culture. While we agree that various forms 
of symbolic capital are at work in newly formed consumption fields, 
we also argue that other resources are required in order for new fields 
to emerge. For this reason, we concentrate on less abstract resources 
in our CFR framework.
Wilk (2006) supplies an interesting description for how wa-
ter has developed from a market obscurity and a commodity to a 
cultural consumer product as a response to an increased consumer 
interest and the actions of marketers. We argue that the actions of 
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three different entities are necessary to ensure consumer interest and 
consumption field refinement. Firms/brand owners, media, and con-
sumers must all contribute refinement material if a new consumption 
field is to emerge and take-off. Firms might feed a new consumption 
interest by developing and marketing a widening range of products, 
innovations and brands. Consumers then cultivate themselves via 
the consumption of these products, innovations and brands, and the 
refined knowledge and taste they develop in relation to them. Me-
dia might also contribute resources in the form of expert knowledge 
and cool advocates supplied through lifestyle magazines or trendy 
TV-programs. Media resources help to convey the newly developed 
consumer interest to the overall audience, which includes both con-
sumers and firms. Consumers might contribute refinement material 
in the form of blog posts, recipes, and so on, that serve to inspire in-
terest in other consumers or to reinforce the importance of the grow-
ing consumption field in the eyes of media and firms. It is worth 
noting here that there may be overlaps in our framework’s catego-
ries. Consumer bloggers may also be considered media. Celebrities 
may straddle the line between media and firms/brand owners. Jamie 
Oliver, celebrity chef, could be considered media but his range of 
saucepans, garlic crushers and flavour shakers may also make him 
a brand owner.
Consumer interest need not necessarily be initiated by consum-
ers themselves. It is possible to imagine a scenario where firms or 
media use their refinement materials to purposively create a consum-
er interest in a certain consumption activity. However, such an un-
dertaking would probably require fairly heavy resource investment. 
And there is no guarantee that consumer interest would be piqued. 
Regardless of which entity initiates the consumer interest, from our 
perspective, consumption field refinement can only occur, and new 
consumption fields develop, if all three entities—consumers, firms/
brand owners and media—interact, perform their parts and contrib-
ute their refinement materials.
COMPLETING THE CFR FRAMEWORK
In this section, we outline how consumers, firms/brand owners 
and media fit into the CFR framework and suggest how we might 
go about finding out more about their roles in consumption field 
refinement. As stated, we see these entities as the most important 
forces in consumption field refinement and market evolution (i.e. in 
constructing, destructing or reforming market (sub)systems for the 
development of new consumption fields).
Consumers as Entities in the Market (Sub)System. Although 
the consumption field itself consists of consumers’ practices and en-
gagements, consumers, as entities, should be conceptually lifted out 
of the consumption field triangle as they must be analysed like the 
other entities in the market (sub)system. Within the CFR framework, 
consumers may organize themselves or act as individuals—although 
this can still be objectively patterned (Holt 1997; 1998). It is among 
consumers that refinement processes, or nerdification, is manifested 
and hence researchable. Research questions that could be asked are: 
How and when do consumers pick up on or start new consumption 
fields? How does the dialectic process look from their perspective? 
How are hierarchies, or other power structures, patterned? What is 
construed as cool and why? How do meaning structures evolve? 
How do consumers become part of (non)co-productive processes of 
meaning and culture with other entities?
Firms/Brand Owners as Entities in the Market (Sub)Sys-
tem. Firms and brands can be regarded as another key entity. Their 
main role is in providing refinement material to the consumption 
field. Firms/brand owners are interested in discovering and effectuat-
ing new ways to capitalise on consumer interest. Their dialectic and 
longitudinal relationship (Giesler 2008; Holt 2002) with consumers 
makes active coproduction with consumers a possibility (Arvidsson 
2005; 2008; Humphrey and Grayson 2008; Schau and Muniz 2009). 
This creates opportunities to speed up consumer desire for new and 
refined products and experiences. This is where “innovation” is most 
often initiated. Potential research questions could be: How and when 
do firms/brand owners pick up on or start new consumption fields? 
How does the dialectic process look from their perspective, e.g. 
market research, shops, or campaigns? How are consumption fields 
discovered and capitalized upon? How are consumer meanings re-
trieved and acted upon in communication and product development? 
What power structures emerge?
Media as Entities in the Market (Sub)System. TV, blogs, 
magazines, pop culture and social media are normally regarded as 
intermediaries in the dialectic process between consumers and firms. 
However, if one wants to investigate consumption field refinement, 
media must be emphasized as an entity on its own. The media may 
benefit itself by being a main player in creating a new consumption 
field that grows and is refined. We argue that the media itself may 
initiate a new consumption field even before consumers and firms 
have identified it. From that perspective it then becomes interesting 
to pose research questions such as: How and when do media pick up 
on or start new consumption fields? How does the dialectic process 
with consumers and/or firms look from media’s perspective? How 
do media fit into power structures and what does this mean for social 
relations?
The process of CFR has logically been simplified for the pur-
poses of the framework and we are well aware that real-life emer-
gence and refinement of fields is likely to operate in a more nuanced 
and less linear fashion.
INVESTIGATING CFR
In this section, we identify methods to explore the dialectic and 
co-productive CFR process.
CCT researchers often have ambitions to contribute with “high-
er context” understandings (Askegaard and Linnet 2011). However, 
methods for how to investigate these higher contexts are seldom of-
fered. Although some of the methods we outline below have been 
empirically demonstrated by consumer behaviour researchers (Scott 
1994; Stern 1994), there is a dearth of concrete explanations and 
summaries of such concepts and methods. These, we argue, are 
needed if the idealised integration of individuals, structures and ide-
ologies is to be realised.
Identifying the entities and their relationships within the 
consumption field. This approach involves obtaining a rough idea 
of what the market (sub)system is, including some kind of identifica-
tion of what entities are involved. For example, who are the brand 
owners, producers, consumers, and media actors? This part of the 
investigation would be the closest to what Naomi Klein, and other 
journalists have done in their investigations of whole industries. This 
would be pure and simple footwork in terms of finding, calling, trav-
elling and interviewing informants. The key entities, as well as less 
obvious ones would need to be identified. One could then engage in 
real life (Elliott and Jankel-Elliott 2003) or netnographic (Kozinets 
2001) longitudinal observations of and interviews with consumers. 
Interviews among commercial entities could also be pursued along 
with collection of material documents (e.g. marketing material, mag-
azines, blogs). The purpose is to find out exactly what is happening 
here.
Defining the consumption field. According to Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992), a specific social field can only be defined empiri-
cally. Üstüner and Thompson (2012: 799) add that a relational and 
structural analysis would be required to map out “the network of 
relations that position social actors in a given, historically shaped 
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field of power and status competitions over valued forms of capi-
tal”. Hence, once one has identified the actors and their relationships, 
one can start defining the field. Power structures can be described 
based on the flows, exchange, and guarding of economic, social and 
cultural capital. This does not necessarily need to be in quantitative 
categories, as Holt (1998) did with cultural capital, but could rather 
be in comprehensive, relational and qualitative terms. For example, a 
baker offers sour dough bread to a consumer in exchange for money 
(economic capital), but because this specific consumer is connected 
to a clique of leading food bloggers (social capital), he also offers 
some expert narratives (cultural capital) that he knows will score 
highly in the bloggers’ informal connoisseurship hierarchy and hope-
fully lead to goodwill and publicity.
Investigating the historical context. Holt (2003: 49) argues 
“that when the national ideology crumbles and is then reinvented, 
new contradictions form”. Holt criticizes academics and practitio-
ners for not understanding these contradictions and for wrapping 
themselves up in the social-psychologically-informed “consumer 
insight” paradigm when trying to understand social trends in con-
sumer society. Instead, he proposes three historical approaches that 
we develop briefly below (2003:49):
I. A cultural historian’s understanding of ideology as it waxes 
and wanes:A cultural historian uses historical material in order to 
identify dominant ideologies in specific cultural contexts and times. 
A good example from CCT is Karababa and Ger’s (2010) sociohis-
torical (and cultural historical) investigation of the formation of the 
consumer subject in the development of the Ottoman coffeehouse 
consumer culture from the sixteenth century onward. They use a 
“critical documentarist approach to make sense of what a particular 
document might have meant at the time it was produced” (ibid: 740). 
They collect and analyse, for instance: expert analyses of poetry, in-
terviews with historians, decrees from cultural authorities, poems, 
chronicles, books on morality and etiquette, price lists, miniatures, 
and drawings. One just has to use one’s imagination to realize that 
equivalent modern day sources can be found in printed media, as 
well as television and radio archives. Giesler’s (2008) examination 
of the evolution of the contemporary music market is a good ex-
ample. Apart from doing longitudinal interviews, he also collects 
historical material including court documents, newspaper articles, 
press releases, and activist material. In a similar vein, Holt (2002) 
makes use of historical advertisements to show how certain brands 
developed into cultural icons by supplying brand myths that resolved 
cultural contradictions.
II. A sociologist’s charting of the topography of contradictions 
the ideology produces:The poststructuralist cultural history approach 
used by Karababa and Ger (2010) is closely related to sociological 
charting. They use their data to form a historical representation by 
recording historical events chronologically, and then attain a mac-
roscopic view by studying the relations between the consumption, 
demographic, economic and social structures found in these repre-
sentations.
III. A literary critic’s expedition into the culture that engages 
these contradictions: Literary critics typically use texts and images 
from selected cultural products. These products can be books, news-
papers, magazines, movies, television shows, or web sites (Hollows 
2002; 2003a; 2003b; Hommerberg 2011). The social constructions, 
discourses, ideologies, arguments, and narratives found in these texts 
can be analysed as representation of culture, and its inherent contra-
dictions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we argue that CCT lacks an integrated conceptual 
framework for the development of a market system from a mid-range 
perspective. We therefore, introduce a conceptual framework, which 
we refer to as Consumption Field Refinement (CFR), to represent 
such development. Central to our framework is the idea that the mar-
ket system consists of several interlinked consumption fields and, 
as consumers develop a particular interest in a certain consumption 
activity (that has not yet been over-explored by other consumers) and 
strive for refinement within that area, the market subsystem—with 
the consumption field at its heart—evolves. However, in order for 
consumer interest to gain momentum and for refinement to occur, 
the consumption field requires refinement material from the firms/
brand owners (e.g. increased product development both in width and 
depth); from media (e.g. expert knowledge, advocates); and from 
consumers (e.g. blog posts, recipes). The market system then evolves 
incrementally as consumption field after consumption field evolves 
due to consumer interest and refinement.
We believe that investigating CFR will have important impli-
cations for future research, as it will encourage a stronger focus on 
theoretical explanations and descriptions of meso-level consump-
tion phenomena. We have suggested some concrete methods for 
researchers to work with meso-level conceptualizations, which we 
argue will complement prior macro-level conceptualizations derived 
from micro-level data. The CFR framework also implies that it is 
perhaps not only brands and services that are co-produced by firms 
and consumers but that these two entities, together with media, are 
co-producers in the development of new or existing market subsys-
tems and industries.
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ABSTRACT
A significant amount of food produced ends up as waste. It has 
been estimated that up to a half of all food purchased by households 
is thrown away (Imeche.org 2013). This is alarming from the point of 
view of the environment, and relates to the negative consequences of 
Western overconsumption (Achrol and Kotler 2012). It has also been 
found that intentions of not wasting food do not correlate with actual 
food waste. Instead, routine practices of food purchasing and provi-
sioning are more significant (Ropke 2009; Stefan et al. 2013). These 
practices are often unreflected upon by consumers yet they have a 
big impact on sustainability. Therefore, it is essential for research to 
focus on these practices in order to make a difference: to understand 
how waste emerges and to find ways to reduce it. 
The purpose of this study is to examine consumer practices 
aimed at actively reducing food waste. These practices, consisting of 
materials, meanings and competences (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 
2012), are investigated through a netnographic study of a Finnish 
food blog campaign. Special attention is paid on how consumer blog-
gers and their audience turn reducing food waste into a collective 
project of innovation, making these practices more socially accept-
able and even trendy.
SUSTAINABILITY AND DISPOSITION PRACTICES
Sustainable consumption has received increased interest among 
consumer researchers in the past few decades, for instance mani-
fested in TCR movement (Mick 2006). However, previous research 
has concentrated on consumer choices, whereas the full consumption 
cycle, with the exception of recycling, has often been overlooked 
(Prothero et al. 2011). Secondly, it has been acknowledged that 
more attention should be paid to empowering consumers as citizens 
(Prothero et al. 2011). As Trentmann (2007, 155) states, “examin-
ing washing, watching television, shopping and so forth as practice 
could provide a useful additional perspective for our understanding 
of the dynamics between consumption and citizenship.” 
This study uses practice theory as a theoretical lens. It shifts the 
focus from individual intentions, attitudes, and behavior toward col-
lective and shared practices. A practice is a routinized form of behav-
ior consisting of a combination of elements that are interconnected 
(Reckwitz 2002). As people engage in a wide range of practices in 
their daily lives, the practices are carried on and maintained. It has 
been suggested that the way to change unsustainable practices would 
be to break certain links between the elements of the practice and re-
place them with new, more sustainable linkages (Hargreaves 2011). 
Food consumption takes place amidst a web of intersecting practices, 
which is why it becomes essential to study the elements of these 
practices and the context where they are performed by consumers. 
Due to increasing environmental concerns, consumer disposal 
of goods has become even more central (Black and Cherrier 2012). 
It has been realized that disposition is not necessarily the end stage 
of a commodity’s life-cycle and it may have an interesting role in 
consumers’ lives as objects are moved along and re-valued (Par-
sons and Maclaran 2009). Practices of disposition identified include 
sharing, donating, exchanging, recycling or ridding (Albinsson and 
Perera 2009). While disposition practices in general have attained 
increasing attention, the realm of everyday life and particularly 
food consumption has not been studied very thoroughly (Cappellini 
2009; Cappellini and Parsons 2009; Evans 2012; Munro 1995). Yet 
in terms of sustainability, household consumption patterns are in a 
central role. Disposition of food is also different from the disposition 
of more durable consumer objects, because after a certain time, the 
only option is to throw it away. Moreover, food waste is not related to 
any single behavior but it is caused in the intersection of several dif-
ferent influences: the way food industry produces, stores, packages, 
delivers and promotes food, the way food is purchased and stored at 
homes, personal values and habits, social and cultural norms, knowl-
edge and skills as well as facilities and resources available for con-
sumers (Quested et al. 2011). Cappellini (2009) and Evans (2012) 
have studied households’ food disposition practices ethnographi-
cally. Their findings reveal the socio-material contexts and routines 
wherein food waste emerges, but do not focus on how consumers 
actively attempt to reduce it.
This study is conducted in the online context, in consumer 
blogs. Social media has become a central social site for consumers to 
discuss and share their consumption practices. Online communities 
have also become arenas for collective innovation (Kozinets, Hem-
etsberger, and Schau 2008). It has been argued that cultural practices 
related to ecological consumption can be fruitfully studied in online 
communities where people constantly negotiate them (Rokka and 
Moisander 2009). For ordinary consumers, blogs give an opportunity 
to seek an audience for their acts of consumption (McQuarrie, Miller, 
and Phillips 2013) and a way to manifest opinions, share experienc-
es, and represent taste and know-how (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). 
Thus for researchers, blogs offer an insightful and fruitful context 
to observe consumer practices as they are explicitly reflected and 
verbalized. The collective context means that consumers are likely 
to also influence each others’ practices, especially in the role of es-
teemed bloggers.
METHOD
The data for the study is generated by netnographic observation 
and analysis of a blog campaign initiated by consumers to avoid food 
waste. Netnography is a methodology developed for the study of on-
line communities that pays attention to their social and cultural as-
pects (Kozinets 2002, 2009). The ongoing blog campaign was started 
in Finland in May 2012 by a food blogger who had read about the 
food waste statistics and become concerned about the issue: 
In general, every one of us carries food to the garbage bin with 
both hands. Together with about thirty other food bloggers, we 
decided that something must be done... We want to inspire rather 
than lecture you all to magically transform waste into delicacy 
and at the same time reduce our own food waste (From Waste to 
Delicacy Blog Manifesto, Salt and Honey blog)
The data for this study was generated by closely following the 
blog campaign for nine months during data generation and analysis. 
All blog entries (293 entries between May 2012 and Jan 2013) with 
the campaign tag, along with the audience comments were down-
loaded and analyzed. Permission was asked from each blogger to 
conduct the study. The textual data from the blog entries and com-
ments are approached as cultural text that gives access to cultural 
forms and understandings according to which people make sense of 
the world and perform their practices (Rokka and Moisander 2009). 
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Thus, the focus is not on individual consumers but on the collec-
tively shared practices as they emerge from the online interaction.
We analyzed the data according to a practice theoretical frame-
work developed by Shove et al. (2012) – categorizing the data into 
elements; materials, meanings and competences. This framework 
focuses on the changes taking place in practices as links between 
elements are made and broken. 
FINDINGS
We present the findings beginning with practices related to 
cooking from food waste and continue with related practices such 
as shopping, storing, and preserving food. The elements that are 
particularly related to changing the bloggers’ and their audience’s 
practices into more sustainable ones through reducing food waste 
are highlighted.
Materials. Materials consist of “objects, infrastructures, tools, 
hardware and the body” (Shove et al. 2012, 23). They gain a sig-
nificant role in consumers’ discussions of their food waste practices. 
Certain kitchen appliances are found useful in terms of reducing 
food waste, such as the freezer, the toaster and the blender. Consum-
ers describe detailed procedures of using these appliances to reduce 
food waste. Procedures are also shared and spread through blogs, 
since many bloggers quote one another’s recipes and procedures, and 
the audience members also thank bloggers for their advice and tips:
When reducing food waste, baking flatbread is handy because 
you can use yesterday’s boiled potatoes or mashed potatoes, 
just adjust the amount of water…When you have baked the flat-
bread, the toaster helps you to reduce waste. The flatbread is of 
course at its best on the baking day but it tastes good for several 
days when you toast it. (Salt and Honey)
I have to get that device for myself too! As I was cutting apple 
ringlets to dry, I wondered why I have not bought that kind of a 
slicer. (Comment in Apples and Honey)
The bloggers also introduce dishes that are easier to make with 
leftovers, such as casseroles, soups or pies where the ingredients are 
processed again. These dishes are not downgraded by the bloggers. 
In contrast, their positive aspects are brought forth in very enthusi-
astic words.
My favorite leftover dish is the pie. In addition to making art 
out of varying the fillings (walnut-banana-blue cheese vs. dan-
delion-smoked bream-potatoes) the dough can also be varied; 
you can make it vegan or low-carb, it tastes good both cold and 
heated, you can take it with you to the office as lunch and you 
can even freeze it! (Gobbler)
In addition to sharing recipes and dishes that are easy to make 
with  leftovers, the bloggers also discuss specific ingredients that are 
easier to make use of (e.g. cheese, milk products) or more difficult 
such as items that are bought in large quantities but only needed in 
small amounts (e.g. celery). Acquiring a selection of certain basic 
ingredients that help make dishes out of leftovers is also suggested. 
Besides discussing the practices related to cooking, the blog-
gers also report and reflect upon the material elements related to 
other practices that intersect with food waste. Regarding the prac-
tices of shopping food, package sizes are quoted several times as 
problematic.
If you want newly baked bread with your salad or soup, you 
have to buy the whole bread and the half that does not get eaten 
tends to cause problems... (Jokihaka Cooks)
Consumers reflect upon their daily practices and schedules in 
relation to food waste, such as how much time they spend at home 
versus in restaurants or how travelling impacts their food waste. 
Some bloggers are also conscious that because of their blogs, they 
have to purchase more food than they need. However, food blog-
ging can also be a way to be more systematic in purchasing food 
and therefore have more influence on reducing waste. Regarding 
the storage and preservation practices, bloggers report having inad-
equate space to store food, causing it to go bad quicker. However, 
tips are eagerly shared about making practical arrangements, such 
as organizing the fridge differently by making a map of the space or 
marking food that is put in the freezer.
I am a very visual kind of person and I have made a so-called 
freezer map. It charts the sections of my freezer on a sheet of 
paper and then I use small (4,5 x 1,5 cm) post-it notes to mark 
what I have in each section and how many portions. This sys-
tem has enabled me to get the frozen stuff moving very well. 
Without the map they would no doubt be forgotten in the dark-
ness of the freezer. (Comment in In the soup) 
Meanings. Meanings represent the “social and symbolic sig-
nificance of participation” (Shove et al. 2012, 23). Bloggers describe 
leftover food as tasty in addition to saving the environment and 
money. Making dishes from leftovers is considered as a sign that the 
person is accomplished and skilled as well. Thus, food bloggers are 
actively breaking the link between the association of food waste and 
leftovers with bad taste and lazy cooking. They are re-associating it 
with being a good cook and making tasty food:
The salmon pie is actually really good and it is not just a desper-
ate attempt to minimize the damage caused by too much food 
hoarding! (Salt and Honey)
I think that a master chef can be identified from the way he or 
she can use the even not-so-delicious parts of ingredients and 
magically turn waste into delicacies! (In the Soup)
The bloggers’ efforts seem to be successful, because they re-
ceive a lot of enthusiasm from their audience. Some of them even 
wish they had leftovers so that they could try the recipes. 
Part of the food blogging practice is photographing food and 
laying it out in an aesthetically pleasing way. This aspect is not lost 
when the bloggers post about food waste either. In many blogs, 
words like ‘magic’, ‘sorcery’, and ‘wizardry’ are used in connection 
with making new dishes out of leftovers and avoiding food waste. 
Thus, food waste practices are associated with innovation, imagina-
tion and superior skills. Related to this is also the aspect of trusting 
one’s own competence rather than blindly following recipes or tak-
ing the expiry dates in food packages literally. 
I absolutely love leftovers and the challenge to conjure up 
something new to eat instead of just warming it up and eating it 
as such. (On the Foodie’s Plate)
I’m not too faithful to the expiry dates. I try to trust my sense of 
smell more. (Belly Upside Down)
Regarding meaning elements that are not strictly related to 
cooking but to other practices, bloggers also break the taboo of serv-
ing leftover food to guests. In previous research (Cappellini 2009), 
consumers considered leftover meals somewhat lower quality and 
reserved them for family members only. However, in this study, the 
bloggers encouraged their audience to act differently; to take the 
dishes to their neighbors or to the workplace to be shared with others. 
318 / From Waste to Delicacy – Collective Innovation in Food Disposition Practices Through Blogging
I have taken my dishes to friends and family, neighbors, my 
hairdresser and the nearest flower shop keeper. You don’t have 
to take a whole pie or cake every time; after your own family 
has had their share, you can spread the rest along. Try it out: I 
bet the store owner or service provider will be happy to receive 
a piece of pie or a cupcake that is made with love! (Heleen’s 
Hobbies)
Besides sharing recipes and tips for dealing with food waste, 
the bloggers also report about practices that prevent food waste from 
emerging. The pursuit of reducing their food waste is portrayed as a 
personal fight or a heroic deed that requires sacrifices such as eating 
too much, or having to plan shopping much more carefully:
Inspired by the “From waste to delicacy” theme, I decided to be 
a superwoman and in addition to saving my own kitchen, save 
the nearby food stores from threatening waste. I managed to 
save my wallet from threatening emptiness too since the stores 
often give discount for those products that have expiry dates 
coming. (Gobbler)
For a carefree person as I who cooks whatever pleases me, it 
has taken some effort and extra labor to be this systematic… 
I’m putting on the saint’s crown here because the result is so 
much better than what I could even dream of…but it has not 
come without pain. (Salt and Honey)
On the other hand, the bloggers also publicly acknowledge and 
admit that they are not immune to the bad habit of wasting food. 
According to Evans (2012), there is a lot of anxiety involved in the 
disposition of food. Consumers try to avoid throwing food away, but 
also regularly purchase more than they need, causing waste. This is 
largely due to social and material contexts of food practices such 
as time constraints, different tastes, conventions, family relations, 
and domestic divisions of labor. Also the bloggers in this study use 
language that refers to guilt and bad behavior regarding food waste:
I myself admit that I belong to the group that wastes the most; 
single women. I felt a sting in my heart when I heard about this 
issue. I cannot preach and point my finger to others because I 
need to look myself in the mirror first. (Soul Kitchen)
One reason for my naughtiness is that I live in a one person 
household – giant packages of food end up as waste sometimes 
– and the other reason is my own stupidity and laziness. I al-
most always eat whatever I please and what I feel like eating. If 
leftovers do not interest me, they go to waste. (Italian Evening)
One must eat vegetables, for sure. This thought comes to mind 
apparently much more often in the store than at home. Too of-
ten I pull wilted, blackened or even moldy vegetables from the 
fridge. (Salt and Honey)
Competences. Competences consist of understanding and prac-
tical knowledgeability (Shove et al. 2012, 23). As discussed above, 
food bloggers share detailed descriptions of how they have reduced 
food waste or made delicious food from leftovers. Techniques of 
freezing and drying food as well as boosting leftover dishes are 
shared in detailed manner.
I use wilted vegetables and fruit well; either they go to the 
blender to make drinks or they are used into making pastes or 
new delicacies with the dryer. I even use the peels of oranges 
for an efficient washing detergent. (Oranges and Honey)
Bloggers also share their know-how regarding how to tell good 
waste from waste that can no longer be used in cooking, or how to 
adapt recipes:
You might as well use leftover boiled potatoes to cook the om-
elet, even though most recipes tell you to put raw potatoes on 
the pan. (Belly Upside Down)
Using creativity is part of food blogging in general, and it suits 
the project of reducing waste well. Becoming a better and more in-
novative user of leftovers is considered a skill worth pursuing. The 
empty fridge becomes a sign of success rather than financial trouble. 
New and innovative practices also include transforming the category 
of a dish, such as making smoothies out of salad. Ideas also move 
from the audience to bloggers:
I got an excellent tip from a reader. She had made a profound 
inventory of her cupboard and conjured self-made muesli from 
the scrapings of many kinds of flakes, cerials and dried cranber-
ries. I followed her example right away! (Belly Upside Down)
Bloggers also develop their competences in using leftovers and 
avoiding food waste through becoming more reflective of their shop-
ping practices and storing practices. It includes avoiding impulse 
purchasing and planning more in advance, as well as learning how to 
tell good fruit from too ripe ones in the store, for instance. Bloggers 
also engage in making public promises and challenges:
The situation is much better when the fridge is organized and 
with just one glance you can draw a mental image and shopping 
list of what you need to buy from the store. (Scallop)
Before going to the store I promise to look in my fridge in case 
there’s something I can use. I will make a shopping list and plan 
in advance in order to avoid impulse buying. I won’t go to the 
store feeling hungry… If I make a lot of food, I will serve it to 
friends or neighbors. Doggy bags for the guests if they want, 
but not forcing it! (Terhi’s Kitchen)
Bloggers also engage in new practices that help them achieve 
their goals, such as counting the amount of food that goes to waste 
every week and trying to reduce that number, or intentionally empty-
ing the freezer.
CONCLUSION
The study is situated within the recent stream of research that 
uses practice theory to study consumption, and in particular, ecologi-
cal consumption (Gram-Hanssen 2011; Hargreaves 2011; Rokka and 
Moisander 2009; Ropke 2009). Several contributions are provided 
to studies on food disposition practices, sustainability and blogging. 
Firstly, our analysis highlights consumers’ active role in diminish-
ing food waste. In contrast to earlier studies about food disposition 
practices in households (Cappellini 2009; Evans 2012), bloggers 
made their practices public and shared them with their audience. 
As bloggers engage in reflecting about their practices in order to 
blog about them, they become more aware of the sustainability of 
their food purchasing, storing, cooking, and preserving practices. 
While previous research has emphasized the reasons why food waste 
emerges and the routines and socio-material contexts wherein this 
happens, our study focuses more on how consumers actively attempt 
to change their practices and reduce food waste.
In our study, bloggers countered the negative meanings related 
to food waste with more positive ones, such as innovation, imagina-
tion, trends and aesthetics. Reducing food waste became a collective 
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project of innovation. Our results can be reflected with Fernandez, 
Brittain, and Bennet’s (2011) study on dumpster diving, where con-
sumers also engaged in turning the meaning of trash into something 
valuable. The bloggers in our study endeavored in becoming the 
most innovative, imaginative and skilled user of leftovers and waste. 
Thus, it can be argued that our results complement previous stud-
ies on collective innovation in online communities (Kozinets et al. 
2008) by showing how bloggers can become the leaders of innova-
tion inspiring a larger crowd to creatively change their consumption 
practices. Our study also complements earlier findings on fashion 
bloggers who act as taste leaders for their audience and accumulate 
cultural capital (McQuarrie et al. 2013) as well as change markets 
(Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Besides acting individually, bloggers 
can make a difference and mobilize other consumers collectively, 
such as through campaigns where they interact with other bloggers. 
Investigating these collective efforts in more detail is a fruitful op-
tion for further research.
Our study has implications for companies within food indus-
try, policy-makers and consumers themselves. According to practice 
theory, the key to changing behavior is not in changing people’s at-
titudes or influencing their individual decisions regarding sustain-
ability (Ropke 2009). Rather, focus should be moved toward collec-
tive practices; habits and routines as well as socially and culturally 
shared patterns of action (Evans 2012; Hargreaves 2011). In addi-
tion to influencing policy-making and through government-initiated 
campaigns such as Love Food Hate Waste in the UK (http://www.
lovefoodhatewaste.com/), practices are transformed and changed in 
the daily interactions between consumers. Blogs appear as a spe-
cific social site where consumers can reflect, discuss and attempt to 
change their practices related to food waste. Future research might 
focus more on the long-term impact of online collective innovation 
and especially short-term blog campaigns on consumers’ everyday 
practices.
Table 1: Summary of the Empirical Results
Practices/
Elements MATERIALS MEANINGS COMPETENCES
Practices 
related to 
cooking 
from food 
waste
Kitchen 
appliances,
specific recipes, 
Dishes and 
ingredients 
Food = 
delicious
Cook = 
professional, 
skilled, 
competent
Cooking = 
aesthetic, 
imaginative, 
innovative, 
magical
Techniques 
(boosting, drying, 
freezing)
Know-how to 
recognize good 
waste and to 
innovate
Transforming dish 
category
Other 
practices 
intersecting 
with
food waste 
(shopping, 
storing, 
preserving, 
sharing)
Food packages
Schedules 
(allocation of 
time)
Storage and 
preservation 
facilities and 
materials
Sharing waste 
food as gifts
Reducing food 
waste is heroic 
and requires 
effort 
Guilt reported 
publicly
Reflecting and 
developing 
shopping and 
storing practices
Listing goals and 
promises
Challenging others
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to analyze Japanese consumers’ 
decision-making processes for environmentally friendly products. 
Using consumers’ market and non-market behavior after the Great 
East Japan Earthquake to group them, intersegment differences in 
decision-making are analyzed using the theory of planned behavior 
(TPB). The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear ac-
cident on March 11, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “3.11”) shocked 
the nation. In the weeks following, energy saving and alternative 
energy became immediate and pressing social issues. In a wider 
context, environmental consciousness and a sense of social respon-
sibility were also heightened, resulting in shifts in consumption and 
normally uncommon charitable behavior. Though Japanese typically 
do not donate or volunteer as much as in the West (Japan Fundrais-
ing Association 2012), post-3.11 saw a groundswell of such behav-
ior, with an unprecedented number donating and volunteering for 
disaster-hit areas. In addition, many firms undertook cause-related 
marketing (CRM) where a portion of revenues were donated to re-
construction efforts. 3.11 acted as a catalyst for Japanese consum-
ers to gain insight into how consumption choices could contribute 
toward social issues.
Before 3.11, the idea that social issues could be addressed 
through consumption was not widespread. For example, low con-
sciousness of solving social issues through consumption was de-
scribed by the Cabinet Office in Japan (2008). Though many con-
sumers purchased some environmentally friendly products, these 
decisions were driven primarily by economic incentives (i.e., 
energy and cost-saving in the long-term). Also, the availability of 
environmentally friendly, organic, CRM, and other such products 
with social and environmental implications was limited. After 3.11, 
products to aid reconstruction efforts became widely available. This 
phenomenon was expressed as ouen (aid) consumption by the media, 
and included supporting businesses in affected areas. Also, rolling 
blackouts and the ongoing threat of nuclear meltdown heightened 
awareness of energy-saving devices, organic food, and other envi-
ronmentally friendly products. By purchasing these products after 
3.11, Japanese consumers experienced and gained understanding of 
consumption in the context of addressing social issues.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Previous research on green consumers can be divided into their 
characteristics and decision-making. Studies analyzing their charac-
teristics employed market segmentation methods using demographic 
and psychographic variables (e.g., Kinnear et al. 1974; Roberts 1996; 
Diamantopoulos et al. 2003). Some studies further observed hierar-
chies of consumers using cluster, factor, and discriminant analysis 
based on these characteristics (e.g., Roberts 1995). These studies 
found three to five clusters and assessed intersegment differences. 
Though few studies address the characteristics and percentage of 
green consumers in Japan, around 60% of Japanese are reported to 
be environmentally conscious (e.g., Yamamura et al. 2010, 2011). 
However, such studies focus on environmentally friendly behavior 
overall, and purchase behaviors were shown to be lower than other 
related behavior (e.g., recycling). Therefore, actual green consumers 
are likely to be a lower percentage than previous research suggests.
Many studies on decision-making processes of green consum-
ers utilize the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991; Ajzen 
and Madden 1986). TPB assumes that attitude toward behavior, 
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control influence in-
tention, which then influences behavior. Attitude toward behavior 
is composed of beliefs and evaluation of these beliefs. Subjective 
norm addresses the influence of others and is based on beliefs about 
what others think. Perceived behavioral control is related to a per-
son’s “confidence in their ability to perform [the behavior]” (Ajzen 
1991, 184). Some studies have added original variables including: 
self-identity, perceived consumer effectiveness, knowledge, sense 
of responsibility, past behavior, and habit (e.g., Berger and Corbin 
1992; Kaiser et al. 1999; Knussen et al. 2004; Sparks and Shepherd 
1992). However, the majority of research do not address differences 
in decision-making among segments, leaving practitioners with little 
insight into how to target environmentally friendly products to vari-
ous segments. (There are some notable exceptions: Bamberg 2003; 
Li 2009; Knussen et al. 2004.)
Though there are many studies on green behavior in Japan, 
only a few clarify decision-making processes of green consumers 
(e.g., Ohtomo and Hirose 2007). These studies used TRA/TPB while 
adding additional constructs including: perceived consumer effec-
tiveness, cost-benefit evaluations, ecological involvement (Nishio 
2005), social responsibility, and man-nature orientation (Li 2009). In 
this paper, we first consider the standard TPB model while dividing 
perceived behavioral control into internal factors related to self-effi-
cacy (perceived consumer effectiveness) and external factors related 
to potential barriers (perceived availability) in line with Sparks et al. 
(1997) and Vermeir and Verbeke (2007).
Hypothesis 1: Attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, per-
ceived consumer effectiveness, and perceived 
availability positively impacts intention to pur-
chase environmentally friendly products.
Ajzen (1991) noted past behavior as a predictor of future behav-
ior. Sparks and Shepherd (1992), Cheung et al. (1999), Biswas et al. 
(2000), and Knussen et al. (2004) have verified the use of past behav-
ior as an addition to the TPB model. Thøgersen (2002) interprets past 
behavior as direct experiences of consumers, and consumer culture 
theory notes the importance of purchase experiences in influencing 
consumer consciousness (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). We pro-
pose that consumers who undertook socially beneficial consumption 
after 3.11 also gained understanding of the meaning behind these 
products (Hirshman 1980; Richins 1994), and that these experiences 
influence their current decision-making.
In addition to past consumption, this study also considers non-
market charitable behaviors (i.e., donating and volunteering), be-
cause consumers are also citizens in society who undertake actions 
to solve social issues outside of the marketplace (Harrison 2005). 
As such, those who wish to solve social issues may undertake both 
market and non-market behaviors toward this end. In the aftermath 
of 3.11, many Japanese people gained deeper understanding of how 
market and non-market behaviors can help solve social issues. Con-
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sumers who engaged in post-3.11 aiding behaviors are likely to have 
higher intention to continue to do so as these behaviors have become 
more salient since the disaster. In fact, our previous analysis of data 
provided by a Japanese firm found that post-3.11 green consump-
tion was highly correlated with other post-3.11 market (CRM and 
ouen consumption) and non-market (donations and volunteering) 
aiding behaviors (Ohira et al. 2013). Furthermore, the same research 
found that clustering based on post-3.11 aiding behavior resulted in 
statistically significant differences between demographic and psy-
chographic variables in line with previous findings on hierarchies 
of green consumers. Thus, it is proposed that clustering based on 
post-3.11 behavior is likely to result in intersegment differences in 
decision-making.
Hypothesis 2: Differences in past aiding behavior will influ-
ence the structural paths of the TPB model, re-
sulting in distinct decision-making by segments 
clustered by these behaviors.
METHOD
An online survey was administered in August 2012. Of 2589 
invites sent to an online panel, 1073 surveys were collected with sex 
and age evenly distributed. From this, 757 useable responses were 
obtained (29.2% useable response rate), with 51.1% male, 64.3% 
married, 56.1% with children, 69.6% with post-high school educa-
tion, and a mean age of 44.23 (range 20–60). Items to measure the 
TPB constructs were based on past research (attitude and subjective 
norm: Taylor and Todd 1995; perceived consumer effectiveness: El-
len et al. 1991; perceived availability: Vermeir and Verbeka 2007; 
intention: Ajzen and Madden 1986; and past behavior: Knussen et 
al. 2004) with adjustments made for the Japanese context. Respons-
es were made on a 7-point scale labeled from “strongly agree” to 
“strongly disagree” on items of the TPB constructs.
Attitude toward behavior. [1] I like environmentally friendly 
products (M = 4.43, SD = 1.09) [2] I am interested in environ-
mentally friendly products (M = 4.50, SD = 1.12) [3] When I 
buy environmentally friendly products, I feel like I did some-
thing good (M = 4.51, SD = 1.11) [4] Buying environmentally 
friendly products is cool (M = 4.01, SD = 1.16) [5] I am inter-
ested in environmental issues (M = 4.83, SD = 1.12).
Subjective norm. [1] My family (M = 3.72, SD = 1.22) [2] My 
friends/acquaintances (M = 3.54, SD = 1.16) [3] Society (M = 
3.67, SD = 1.17) thinks I should buy environmentally friendly 
products. 
Perceived consumer effectiveness. [1] If I buy environmentally 
friendly products, it will lead to resolution of environmental is-
sues (M = 3.80, SD = 1.19) [2] An individual’s consumption 
cannot solve environmental issues [reverse-scored] (M = 3.52, 
SD = 1.33).
Perceived availability. [1] I have many opportunities to buy 
environmentally friendly products (M = 3.71, SD = 1.05) [2] 
It is easy to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 4.10, 
SD = 1.00). 
Intention. [1] I do not plan to buy environmentally friendly 
products [reverse-scored] (M = 3.78, SD = 1.29) [2] I would 
spare no effort to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 
3.69, SD = 1.10) [3] I intend to buy environmentally friendly 
products (M = 4.10, SD = 1.00).
Past behavior (post-3.11 aiding behavior). After 3.11, how 
many times did you: [1] make donations (including those un-
related to 3.11) (M = 2.29, SD = 1.91), [2] volunteer (including 
those unrelated to 3.11) (M = 0.48, SD = 1.36), [3] buy envi-
ronmentally friendly products (M = 1.89, SD = 2.19), [4] buy 
CRM products (including those unrelated to 3.11) (M = 1.32, 
SD = 1.92), [5] do ouen consumption (M = 2.20, SD = 2.37)? 
Responses were made on a 5-point scale labeled from zero to 
more than 6 times. 
RESULTS
Factor analysis (principal factor method with pro-max rotation) 
was conducted. Subjective norm [2] (friends and acquaintances) had 
factor loading over 1. As this item and subjective norm [1] (family) 
had high correlation (.871), they were made into the composite vari-
able “People I know” to resolve this issue. Also, post-3.11 volunteer-
ing was removed due to low communality (.10). All remaining items 
loaded above .40 with an absence of cross-loadings. Cronbach’s al-
pha values were: past behavior .783, attitude .892, subjective norm 
.795, perceived consumer effectiveness .594, perceived availability 
.664, and intention .782.
Figure 1: Theory of Planned Behavior Model of 
Environmentally Friendly Products (Overall Sample)
The theoretically assumed model of the structural relation-
ships between TPB constructs was tested in Amos with all paths 
significant at p < .005. Attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, 
perceived consumer effectiveness, and perceived availability posi-
tively impacts intention to purchase environmentally friendly prod-
ucts, supporting hypothesis 1. The model had good fit statistics (χ² 
= 216.655, p = .000, RMR = .057, GFI = .960, AGFI = .934, CFI = 
.974, RMSEA = .056). 
To further analyze intersegment differences in decision-mak-
ing, past behavior was used to cluster the overall sample. Three 
clusters were created using post-3.11 market (green, CRM, and ouen 
consumption) and non-market (donations) behaviors as dependent 
variables, where the number of clusters was determined by two-step, 
and final clusters were obtained by k-means clustering. (Volunteer-
ing was excluded here also.) The three clusters were labeled as: 1. 
Greens (20.3%); 2. Yellow Greens (34.6%); and 3. Browns (45%). 
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These clusters were tested for differences in demographic variables 
(chi-squared tests) with statistically significant differences for sex 
(p = .000), age (p = .000), marital status (p = .006), children (p = 
.004), and education (p = .009) among segments. Greens tend to be 
female (61.0%), older (M = 48.56), married (71.4%), have children 
(66.9%), and have post-high school education (72.7%). They have 
the most experience across all behaviors. Yellow Greens also tend to 
be female (53.1%), older (M = 46.88), married (67.9%), have chil-
dren (56.5%), and have post-high school education (72.6%)s, though 
to a lesser extent than Greens. Their experience is mainly with do-
nations and ouen consumption (both were behaviors stimulated by 
3.11). Browns tend to be male (59.8%), comparatively younger (M 
= 40.24), less likely to be married (58.4%) or have children (51.0%), 
and have less post-high school education (66.1%). They tend to have 
little to no experience across all behaviors. This is in line with our 
past research (Ohira et al. 2013) and also shows similarities between 
the Greens and the Japanese LOHAS segment, which consists of ap-
proximately 25% of the Japanese market (Nishio 2010). 
Mean structure analysis was used to compare the intention con-
struct across clusters (Kano and Miura 2003; Sörbom 1978). The 
mean and variance of Greens’ intention constructs were fixed to 0 
and 1. Comparing against this, Yellow Greens’ mean and variance 
is -0.64 and 0.71, and Browns’ mean and variance is -1.17 and 0.96. 
Going from Greens to Browns, intention to purchase environmen-
tally friendly products decreases.
Next, multiple group analysis was carried out to analyze dif-
ferences in structural paths between the three clusters with good fit 
statistics (χ² = 384.153, p = .000, RMR = .072, GFI = .933, AGFI = 
.892, CFI = .965, RMSEA = .035). Results are summarized in table 
1 and show support for hypothesis 2. Greens had two statistically 
significant paths to intention: attitude (p = .000), and perceived avail-
ability (p = .003). All paths to intention were significant for Yellow 
Greens: attitude (p = .000), subjective norm (p = .022), perceived 
consumer effectiveness (p = .011), and perceived availability (p 
= .020). Perceived availability to intention was not significant for 
Browns, but the remaining paths were: attitude (p = .000), subjective 
norm (p = .003), and perceived consumer effectiveness (p = .028).
Table 1: Multiple Group Analysis Results
SN: Subjective Norm, PCE: Perceived Consumer Effectiveness, PA: Perceived Availability
Proposed Model Final Model
Group Path Estimate S.E. C.R. p-Value Std. Estimate Estimate S.E. C.R. p-Value
Std. 
Estimate
Greens
(N=154) 
Attitude →
Intention .325 .076 4.279 .000 .396 .484 .096 5.029 .000 .500
SN →
Intention .005 .030 .178 .859 .016 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――
PCE  →
Intention .140 .074 1.881 .060 .181 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――
PA →
Intention .209 .076 2.743 .006 .233 .235 .080 2.950 .003 .254
Yellow
Greens
(N=262)
Attitude →
Intention .308 .060 5.167 .000 .397 .298 .058 5.134 .000 .390
SN →
Intention .058 .026 2.288 .022 .179 .059 .026 2.289 .022 .180
PCE →
Intention .143 .057 2.483 .013 .234 .151 .059 2.555 .011 .246
PA →
Intention .098 .042 2.352 .019 .155 .096 .042 2.320 .020 .153
Browns
(N=341)
Attitude →
Intention .317 .075 4.249 .000 .343 .397 .095 4.159 .000 .397
SN →
Intention .088 .037 2.365 .018 .195 .102 .034 2.989 .003 .227
PCE →
Intention .297 .117 2.532 .011 .331 .258 .117 2.195 .028 .288
PA →
Intention .079 .062 1.266 .206 .083 ―― ―― ―― ―― ――
DISCUSSION
Since 3.11, consumption to help solve social issues has become 
more notable in Japan. In order to encourage this movement, deci-
sion-making processes behind this phenomenon must be understood. 
Toward this end, we grouped consumers based on post-3.11 behav-
ior to gain insight into each segment’s decision-making to purchase 
environmentally friendly products. Past behavior was shown as a 
useful indicator for marketers to analyze markets for these products. 
Analysis of the overall sample showed that the TPB model had an 
explanatory ability of R2 = 0.65 for Japanese consumers’ intention to 
purchase environmentally friendly products. An unexpected finding 
was that subjective norm did not have much influence on purchase 
intention, even though Japan is a collectivist society. This may be 
due to the fact that the survey did not specify a product category (a 
limitation of this study), and respondents may have imagined pri-
vately consumed products, such as energy-saving household devices, 
when answering.
Across all groups, an individual’s attitude had the strongest in-
fluence on intention. This was most notable for the Greens, whose 
decisions were influenced by their attitudes, followed by perceived 
availability. This indicates that their positive attitudes may be trans-
lated into action as long as the behavior is accessible. This simplified 
decision-making is ripe for further research, which could consider 
the effects of high involvement or habits (Knussen et al. 2004; Chan 
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et al. 2008). In addition, the strong impact of attitude may be as-
sessed in the context of attitude formation. The elaboration likeli-
hood model (ELM) of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1981) theo-
rizes on how attitudes are formed and changed through central and 
peripheral routes depending on motivation and ability of consumers. 
Petty et al. (1981, 1983) showed that the level of consumer involve-
ment influences attitude formation and change. Greens are likely to 
have higher involvement and knowledge—potentially indicating for-
mation of attitude through central routes. Yellow Greens and Browns 
may have low involvement and knowledge, thus forming attitude 
through peripheral routes. Differences in attitude formation process-
es may explain why fewer variables influence Greens’ purchases. 
It can be construed that their attitudes are already firmly formed, 
resulting in heuristics-based decision-making. Further understand-
ing of Greens may be obtained by clarifying their attitude-formation 
process. For example, past research into consumers who are highly 
concerned with ethical issues have focused on values, self-identity, 
and ethical obligation (e.g., Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw and Shiu 
2003).  
The influence of perceived availability was highest for Greens, 
diminished for Yellow Greens, and not significant for Browns. This 
may be due to the fact that Browns have little experience with green 
consumption, resulting in a lack of understanding of the actual avail-
ability of these products in the marketplace. The influence of per-
ceived consumer effectiveness was highest for Browns, diminished 
for Yellow Greens, and not significant for Greens. The lower groups 
may have skepticism about how these products are related to solving 
social issues, resulting in lower evaluation of perceived consumer 
effectiveness and lower intention. The influence of subjective norm 
was also highest for Browns, diminished for Yellow Greens, and not 
significant for Greens. This is likely because Greens are the “influ-
encers” in this marketplace (rather than being influenced) as they 
lead the way in consumption of environmentally friendly products. 
To better understand these possibilities, we are currently undertaking 
research into skepticism and word-of-mouth in the marketplace for 
environmentally friendly products in Japan.
The three-cluster solution offers insight into segments that are 
of interest to marketers wishing to expand the reach of environmen-
tally friendly products. Compared to the indifferent Browns, Yellow 
Greens are more likely to respond to marketing activities to per-
suade green consumption. Attitude has the highest impact on Yellow 
Greens, followed in order by perceived consumer effectiveness, per-
ceived availability, and subjective norm. While marketing strategies 
to build and reinforce positive attitudes would be effective for all 
segments, Yellow Greens will particularly benefit from marketing 
strategies that boost perceived consumer effectiveness and perceived 
availability (i.e., perceived behavioral control). Browns are also in-
fluenced by their lower attitude and perceived consumer effective-
ness. As such, increasing perceived consumer effectiveness may be 
vital to increasing green consumption among those who are currently 
less likely to purchase environmentally friendly products. Research 
to understand barriers to the formation of positive attitudes and per-
ceived consumer effectiveness (e.g., lack of information regarding 
actual environmental impact resulting from product choices) would 
help improve the appeal of these products. If these lower groups can 
be persuaded, then environmentally friendly products will have more 
distribution in the marketplace, improving perceived availability, 
which could then stimulate consumption across segments. 
Past research observed the existence of various segments of 
green consumers, but differences in decision making among them 
have seldom been addressed. Our research shows intersegment dif-
ferences do exist, with these differences having implications for 
marketing strategies. Though this study used both market and non-
market past behavior to segment consumers, non-market behaviors 
(volunteering and donating) were shown to have less impact. In Ja-
pan, 1995 (the year of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake) is often 
considered the first year that volunteerism took off, and very little 
time has passed since it has gained wide social recognition. Simi-
larly, it is noted that donating had not taken root in Japanese culture 
prior to 3.11 (Japan Fundraising Association 2012). The results of 
this study were affected by such cultural constraints, but in societ-
ies where charitable behaviors are common (e.g., the United States), 
non-market behaviors may be shown to help predict purchase inten-
tions for environmentally friendly products. Replicating this study 
with consumers in other cultures could help refine the framework 
used here.
One underlying meaning of environmentally friendly products 
is to help solve environmental issues through consumption of these 
products. Green consumers, who are motivated and able to interpret 
such underlying meaning in their consumption experiences, exist 
among consumers who purchase these products. In that sense, ex-
perience can be considered an important factor in green consumers’ 
decision-making. This suggests the need to capture decision-making 
processes more dynamically by integrating rational decision-mak-
ing theories, such as TPB, with an understanding of the meaning of 
consumption, as found in consumer culture theory, to obtain deeper 
understanding of green consumers. To this end, focus groups and 
in-depth interviews are currently under way by the authors to obtain 
such insights. Future research into the meanings of green and other 
socially beneficial consumption among consumers across various 
cultures is likely to provide fertile ground for international compara-
tive research.
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ABSTRACT
Consumer attention has long been known to influence evalu-
ations of, and responses to, advertising stimuli in meaningful ways 
(e.g., Krugman, 1971; Morrison & Dainoff, 1972). Indeed, behav-
ioral eye-tracking studies have been utilized for quite some time to 
link attention to outcomes of interest such as product recognition 
(Kroeber-Riel & Barton, 1980), recall (Krugman, Fox, Fletcher, 
Fischer, & Rojas, 1994; Rosbergen, Pieters, & Wedel, 1997), and 
product sales (Treistman & Gregg, 1979). Although tremendous in-
sights have been gained from this work, the context of consumer at-
tention has changed dramatically in at least two ways that necessitate 
novel exploration. 
First, the emergence of social media (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, 
Pinterest) has created a context where massive amounts of image and 
text-based messages compete for consumer attention like never be-
fore. According to a recent report (Bennett, 2012), consumers share 
more than 600,000 pieces of content and create over 25,000 social 
media posts every sixty seconds. In such an over-saturated environ-
ment, text and image elements must compete to get noticed at all. 
This is significant because in order for message elements to have 
an impact on consumers (i.e., make a difference), they must first be 
noticed. Yet, attention is typically studied in offline contexts, such as 
print (e.g., Lohse, 1997; Pieters & Wedel, 2004), where the number 
of visual and textual stimuli competing to get noticed is substantially 
more limited. 
Second, the growing influence of consumer-generated elec-
tronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) has given consumers an unprec-
edented stake in product advertising (Chu & Kim, 2011; Riegner, 
2007; Zhang & Daugherty, 2009; Henning-Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, 
& Gremle, 2004). In general, word-of-mouth (WOM) is a critical 
component of marketing (Brown & Reigen, 1987; Buttle, 1998) with 
user-generated reviews perceived as more credible and less biased 
than company-generated advertising (Dellarocas, 2003; Ha, 2006; 
Keller, 2007; Phelps, Lewis, Mobilio, Perry, & Ramman, 2004). 
In fact, new customer acquisition (Doyle, 1998), increased sales 
(Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006), and product-use decisions (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 1995; Godes & Mayzlin, 2004) have all been directly 
linked to WOM communication. Marketers now have the opportuni-
ty to initiate and influence WOM unlike ever before on a large scale 
quickly and efficiently. Subsequently, interest has grown regarding 
the conditions that dictate whether or not consumers pay attention to 
WOM (Daugherty and Hoffman in press).
One area of consumer attention that is broadly affected by these 
changes pertains to structural differences in message presentation, 
including the strategic use of image versus text-based elements. In 
traditional offline contexts, where advertising is driven by corporate 
marketing, image-based elements have been shown to capture at-
tention more than text (e.g., Pieters & Wedel, 2004). However, this 
may not always be the case in social media contexts where product 
reviews are consumer-driven, creating an element of uncertainty re-
garding message valence. In particular, the emergence of negative 
word-of-mouth (NWOM) introduces the possibility of product re-
views being harmful as opposed to promotional. 
To further explore these dynamics, we first review the exist-
ing literature regarding consumer attention to structural elements of 
eWOM. We then provide a theoretical rationale for presuming that 
a more complex relationship unfolds in a social media environment 
where product information is consumer-generated. A series of test-
able hypotheses are presented, and an eye-tracking study is under-
taken to better understand how visual elements, message valence 
and brand type interact to influence consumer attention within social 
media. Implications and managerial recommendations are then dis-
cussed on the basis of our findings.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Two prevailing paradigms are used to study how consumers at-
tend to structural elements of advertising. One paradigm is concerned 
with optimizing the effectiveness of ad component presentation. Fac-
tors such as size or location are manipulated to maximize the impact 
of text or image on attention. For instance, Kroeber-Riel and Bar-
ton (1980) manipulated the positioning of text based elements and 
found that locating text at the top of an ad leads to better information 
acquisition. A similar approach was taken by Garcia, Ponsada, and 
Estebaranz (2000), who found that image positioning matters, but 
only when pre-existing product involvement is low. Other studies 
have considered text and image elements together, manipulating the 
use of color and graphics (Lohse, 1997) or size and location (Dreze 
& Hussherr, 2003) to determine the type of presentation that is most 
likely to capture attention.
A second approach has sought to compare the effectiveness of 
images and text in capturing consumer attention. Pieters and Wedel 
(2004), for instance, found that attention to pictorial elements of ads 
is superior to text-based elements regardless of manipulations in size. 
In an earlier study, these authors determined that attention fixation 
to brand and pictorial elements of ads led to better memory of the 
brand, whereas text fixations did not. To date, a long line of research 
has established the relative superiority of images in evoking attention 
(e.g., Rossiter, 1981; Singh, Lessig, Kim, Gupta, & Hocutt, 2000). 
Social media has changed the manner in which consumers are 
exposed to product-related information. Specifically, it is now pos-
sible for products to be linked to multiple different images and tex-
tual reviews by eWOM generators, rather than a select handful of 
marketer-driven formats. To our knowledge however, a comparative 
integrated paradigm has yet to be adopted within the unique context 
of consumer-generated content. One major difference in this venue 
is the greater propensity for consumer-generated message elements 
to vary in the extent to which they endorse a brand. Nevertheless, 
without accounting for more complex dynamics (as we do below) we 
suspect that image-based elements will continue to appear as if they 
capture more attention amongst social media users than text-based 
elements. 
Qualifying Attention to Structural Elements: Brand 
Luxury
Brands are frequently distinguished in terms of having either 
utilitarian or hedonic value (Sen & Lerman, 2007). Utilitarian brands 
are evaluated by consumers in terms of their usefulness or practical-
ity (Strahilevitz & Meyers, 1998) while hedonic brands are judged in 
terms of the extent to which they satisfy consumer wants (Hirschman 
& Holbrook, 1982). Research has shown that assessments of utilitar-
ian brands are cognitively-driven and rooted in objective information 
about specific product features (Drolet, Simonson, & Tversky, 2000; 
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Park & Moon, 2003). In contrast, hedonic assessments are grounded 
in emotional assessments of subjective content, particularly as con-
sumer involvement increases (Park & Moon, 2003).
A notable feature of consumer-generated content such as 
eWOM is its subjective basis. A series of experiments conducted 
by Sen and Lerman (2007) shed light on this phenomenon. In these 
studies, consumers were asked to read a series of textual, web-based 
product reviews for utilitarian and hedonic products. For hedonic 
products, negative reviews were attributed to the subjective bias of 
consumer reviewers. In contrast, unfavorable reviews of utilitarian 
products were attributed to product characteristics.  
Integrating these insights, we see that consumers a) utilize sub-
jective content to form their judgments of hedonic products and b) 
believe that consumer-generated content regarding these products is 
more subjective. Thus, it stands to reason that consumer-generated 
text will evoke more attention in the case of hedonic products as 
opposed to utilitarian products. In the word-of-mouth literature, the 
utilitarian/hedonic distinction is often talked about in terms of luxury 
versus non-luxury brands (e.g., Berry, 1994; Patrick & Haugtvedt, 
2009). In particular, luxury brands are often identified in terms of 
their hedonic attributes, while non-luxury brands are framed in terms 
of their utilitarian functionality. We adopt the luxury/non-luxury dis-
tinction here and suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Attention to image versus text-based elements 
of eWOM will be qualified by the brand. Spe-
cifically, consumers will pay more attention to 
eWOM for a) image-based elements of non-lux-
ury brands and b) text-based elements of luxury 
brands.
Further Qualifying Attention to Structural Elements: 
Word-of-Mouth Type
As mentioned previously, consumer-generated eWOM may 
include evaluative judgments (Buttle, 1998; Carl, 2008), non-eval-
uative information sharing (Richins & Root-Shaffer, 1988), and 
communal “buzz” (Dye, 2000). In contrast to traditional modes of 
advertising, eWOM is believed to be particularly influential due to 
its naturalistic source (Keller, 2007), the speed with which it is trans-
mitted (Jurvetson, 2000; Mohr, 2001), and the ease with which it is 
retrieved (Bakos, 1997; Hoffman & Novak, 1997). Further distinc-
tion is drawn between positive word-of-mouth (PWOM), or favor-
able reviews of products and services, and negative word-of-mouth 
(NWOM), or unfavorable reviews (see Luo, 2009). Meanwhile, neu-
tral word-of-mouth has an informational tone, yet can still be persua-
sive by virtue of facilitating consumer awareness. 
Sen and Lerman (2007) note that consumers possess an atten-
tional bias towards negative eWOM (see also Ahulwia & Shiv, 1997). 
This is because the relative scarcity of negative informational cues 
(in comparison to positive and neutral) makes them more salient, 
engendering increased attention (see Zajonc, 1968). These authors 
subsequently demonstrate that subjects engaged more with negative 
reviews of hedonic (luxury) as opposed to utilitarian (non-luxury) 
products. It appears that this was due to the fact that negative reviews 
of luxury products were more expectation-inconsistent (and thus, at-
tributed to rater biases) than negative reviews of utilitarian products, 
which were feasible, and thus attributed to product characteristics. 
Notably, the reviews presented to subjects were predominantly text-
related. However, Sen and Lerman (2007) neither measured atten-
tion directly (i.e., behaviorally) nor included product images, which 
are frequently utilized by consumers in a social media context. Based 
on these findings, we suggest the following three-way interaction 
will occur:
Hypothesis 2: Attention to image versus text-based elements of 
eWOM will be qualified by message type. Spe-
cifically, consumers will pay more attention to 
eWOM text elements for luxury brands contain-
ing negative word-of-mouth (NWOM).
METHOD
To test these hypotheses, a within-subjects 2 x 3 x 2 factorial 
design experiment was conducted (see Table 1). Consumer atten-
tion was measured using eye-movement tracking across a series of 
consumer-generated eWOM social media pages with structural ele-
ments (text vs: image), message valence (negative vs: positive vs: 
neutral) and brand type (luxury vs: non-luxury) serving as the inde-
pendent variables. Consumer research on attention typically utilizes 
Table 1: Results of 2 (Brand Luxury) x 3 (Word-of-Mouth Type) x 2 (Text/Image) Within-Subjects Factorial ANOVA for 
Restaurants .
Source
Type III sum of 
squares df Mean square F Sig.
Main Effects
Brand Luxury 24140.19 1 24140.19     3.22 .084
WOM Type 2464485.47 2 1230592.74   56.09 <.001**
Text/Image 105010.71 1 105010.71     3.08 .090
Interactions (2-Way)
Luxury x WOM Type 214653.58 2 107326.79     8.31 .001**
Luxury x Text/Image 212809.33 1 212809.33   27.54 <.001**
WOM Type x Text/Image 39119.05 2 19559.53     2.06 .137
Interaction (3-Way)
Luxury x WOM type x Text/Image 106449.26 2 53224.63     7.81 .001**
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a within-subject design (e.g., Lohse, 1997; Pieters & Wedel, 2004) as 
a means of ascertaining differences in attention to various categories 
of stimuli by the average consumer.
Participants . A total of twenty-eight undergraduates enrolled 
at a Midwestern university in the US took part in this study. This 
sample was chosen based on research suggesting that eWOM is most 
likely to impact the purchase decisions of 15-24 year-olds (Wallace, 
Walker, Lopez, & Jones, 2011).
Stimuli . We constructed a series of web-pages containing 
consumer-generated product reviews using the popular social media 
platform Pinterest. This platform functions as a virtual pin board, en-
abling users to search the internet for images, “pin” them to thematic 
“boards” or pages, and add any comments they may have about the 
images they post. Other Pinterest users have access to these boards, 
and are free to “re-pin” the images and comments that they like. 
Pinterest stands apart from other social media platforms by juxtapos-
ing images and text. Furthermore, one of its explicit emphases is 
consumer-driven eWOM, as evidenced by a recent survey (Boticca.
com, 2012) indicating that consumers referred to product websites 
from Pinterest spent an average of $180. Facebook users, in contrast, 
spend an average of $85. 
Numerous product categories were considered for this experi-
ment. We chose to use restaurants based on recent evidence (Harris 
Interactive, 2006; cf. Allsop, Bassett, & Hoskins, 2007) that eWOM 
pertaining to restaurants is sought out and provided online more than 
any other product category. Specific representatives of luxury and 
non-luxury restaurants were chosen on the basis of previous research 
recommendations for studying the luxury/non-luxury distinction 
(see Arora, 2012). In this instance, Hyde Park Prime Steakhouse was 
selected to represent the luxury (hedonic) category, while Applebees 
was selected as a non-luxury (utilitarian) counterpart offering a com-
parable type of cuisine.
Separate product pages were constructed and pre-tested using 
Pinterest for each brand and designed to be viewed on a single com-
puter screen, eliminating the need for subjects to scroll or navigate 
to other locations. The text for the positive, negative, and neutral 
eWOM stimuli were adapted from actual social media content and 
combined with product images corresponding with standard con-
sumer-generated eWOM on Pinterest. Images chosen by consum-
ers to coincide with product reviews included restaurant logos, the 
interior/exterior design of the restaurant, staff representatives, and 
prepared meals. Eight image/text pairs were selected for each of the 
two brand pages, resulting in a total of 16 image/text pairs that were 
randomized in order to minimize the influence of order effects. A 
pilot study (n = 56) was done to validate the brand type and mes-
sage valence stimuli. Paired comparison t-tests indicated significant 
mean differences between the luxury ratings of Applebees and Hyde 
Park Prime Steakhouse (mApplebees = 2.73, mHydePark = 5.69, t = 9.86). 
For message valence, subjects were asked to evaluate the 16 text/
image pairs and rate the extent to which they represent a) positive, 
b) negative, and c) neutral (e.g., restaurant hours, location) word-of-
mouth using a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = not at all positive, 7 = 
very positive). Within-subject ANOVA results indicated that partici-
pants viewed PWOM combinations as more positive in nature than 
negative or neutral (F2, 22 = 256.09, p < .001). Consistent results were 
found for the negative (F2, 22 = 182.75, p < .001) and neutral (F2, 14 = 
47.14, p < .001) text/image pairs. 
Dependent Measure . Consumer attention was measured as the 
dependent variable and operationally defined as the total number of 
times participants fixated on pre-identified Areas of Interest (AOIs). 
Fixation frequency was measured using the Multi-Analysis of Psy-
chophysiological and Performance Signals (MAPPS) eye-tracking 
system produced by eyesDx. To pinpoint consumer attention, each 
restaurant page was coded in terms of 16 AOIs (8 images, 8 text 
elements). Once relevant AOIs are identified, the eye-tracking soft-
ware monitors and records participant eye movement and fixation 
frequency within the AOIs and data is subsequently aggregated for 
analysis.
Procedure . Subjects first completed a brief online survey de-
signed to collect background information on each participant. Next, 
a script was read to participants introducing the eye-tracking soft-
ware followed by an eye-movement calibration exercise. Calibration 
is an important step in eye-tracking research in that it syncs partici-
pant eye movements with the monitoring equipment (see Hornof & 
Halverson, 2002). Subjects were then instructed that the purpose of 
the study was to record their evaluation of a series of consumer-gen-
erated brand-related Pinterest pages. Participants proceeded to view 
the stimulus pages for two minutes per restaurant, with a ten second 
interval between pages. Following this phase of the experiment, sub-
jects completed another brief online survey and were thanked for 
their participation.
RESULTS
The sample consisted of 7 males (25%) and 21 females (75%) 
with an average age of 24.9. Samples of 20-30 participants are fairly 
typical for eye-tracking, which a) are less susceptible to human error/
bias due to their physiological basis and b) produce a large number of 
within-subjects data points (i.e., several thousand). Consistent with 
the pre-test, subjects rated Hyde Park Prime Steakhouse as more 
luxurious than Applebee’s (mApplebees = 1.43; mHydePark = 4.25; t = 7.20, 
p < .01). To rule out any brand preference bias, we assessed brand 
attitudes using a 7-item scale developed by Shamdasani, Stanaland, 
and Tan (2001). Differences in attitudes towards the two brands were 
non-significant (t = 0.309, p = .760). 
Hypothesis Testing . Hypothesis 1 predicts a significant two-
way interaction of structural elements and brand luxury. In particu-
lar, subjects were expected to fixate more frequently on a) the image-
based elements of non-luxury brands and b) the text-based elements 
of luxury brands. A statistically significant interaction was found (F1, 
27 = 27.54, p < .001). More specifically, participants paid more atten-
tion to image-based (m = 236.64 fixations) as opposed to text-based 
(m = 150.95 fixations) elements of non-luxury restaurant reviews. 
In contrast, attention to text-based elements (m = 218.24 fixations) 
was greater than attention to image-based elements (m = 203.26 fixa-
tions) for reviews of the luxury restaurant. Thus, hypothesis 2 was 
supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicts a significant three-way interaction of 
structural elements, brand luxury, and word-of-mouth type. Atten-
tion to text was expected to be pronounced for luxury brands that 
were evaluated with negative word-of-mouth. The results indicated a 
statistically significant three-way interaction (F2, 54 = 7.81, p = .001), 
such that attention to the text-based elements of luxury restaurant 
NWOM (m = 350.32 fixations) was greater than attention to the im-
age-based elements of this condition (m = 256.86 fixations). In con-
trast, mean levels of attention to image-based elements as opposed to 
text-based elements was higher in each of the remaining conditions, 
as Figure 1 illustrates. Thus, hypothesis 3 was supported.
DISCUSSION
Consumer attention to structural aspects of eWOM is especially 
important within a social media context, where image and text-based 
elements of products differ and compete to get noticed. With the aid 
of behavioral eye-tracking, we have demonstrated empirically that 
notable attention-based differences do exist as a function of struc-
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tural elements, brand type and message valence for eWOM. More 
specifically, our findings suggest that image-based elements may not 
be the most attended to in every condition. It is important to note 
that two types of findings can support this assertion, since both are 
reflected in our results; a) significantly greater attention to text-based 
elements and b) non-significant differences in attention to images 
versus text.
Our findings also provide support to the notion that consum-
er-generated eWOM should not be ignored by marketers in favor 
of product promotion opportunities that offer more direct control 
(Daugherty & Hoffman, in press; Graham & Havlena, 207; Jepsen, 
2006). Indeed, while numerous suggestions for leveraging eWOM 
have been made to marketing firms (see Mason, 2008) we add to this 
list by suggesting more structure-related strategies. An image-based 
example of this strategy is the recent “Show us your pizza” campaign 
launched by Dominos pizza (Alfs, 2013). Using social media, this 
company encouraged customers to take and post pictures of the piz-
zas that were delivered to them. The results of our study predict that 
positive images of pizzas (a utilitarian, non-luxury product) would 
be more attended to than text-based reviews. The reported success of 
this campaign (Alfs, 2013) appears to support this notion.
Framed in terms of making a difference, our findings have a 
number of intriguing implications. As alluded to above, social me-
dia users that advocate difference-making could be encouraged by 
marketers to communicate their perspective in strategic ways that 
maximize the odds of their content being attended to. For instance, 
difference-making can be framed in hedonic and luxury-based terms 
(e.g., a formal benefit dinner) or in more utilitarian terms (e.g., acts 
of community service). Difference-makers could also be prompted 
to post compelling pictures (image-based stimuli), moving stories 
(text-based stimuli), or both as a function of the difference-making 
activity and how it is perceived (i.e., hedonic or utilitarian). Final-
Figure 1: Three Way Interaction of Brand Luxury, Word-of-Mouth Type, and Text/Image Stimulus
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ly, negative word-of-mouth could be leveraged as a valuable tool 
to bring attention to important issues where difference-making is 
needed. For instance, our findings suggest that writing a negative 
review of luxury items on the basis that their business practices are 
unethical would be attended to more than a negative image of the 
brand. In short, it may be possible to leverage structural attention 
dynamics to optimize the impact of difference-making solicitations 
through social media.
Despite the strength of our findings, some important limitations 
merit mentioning. By using Pinterest as the platform for our study, 
we held constant other structural elements of eWOM presentation 
such as size (Pieters & Wedel, 2004). Additional work is needed to 
assess the unique contribution of these elements to attention within 
a social media environment. Related to this, an important aspect of 
online environments is the ability to navigate between social media 
pages. We limited participant attention to four contrived Pinterest 
pages so that Areas of Interest could be coded, a key component of 
eye-tracking research. Future studies could utilize other approaches 
to coding AOIs that give participants control over what they view. 
CONCLUSION
The growth of social media and eWOM make it more important 
than ever to understand dynamics of consumer attention. As such, 
existing models of eWOM are incomplete without taking into ac-
count the consumer attention process within social media. Although 
much remains to be done, our work provides support for a long-held 
supposition; that communication effectiveness is not just bound by 
the content of a message, but also delivery effectiveness. Presum-
ably, consumers invest their time and energy into generating eWOM 
on social media because they desire to make a difference by influ-
encing product awareness and decisions made by other consumers. 
The managerial implications of our results are immediate as the 
ability to build brand relationships via social media represents the 
future of marketing. We call for additional research designed to aid 
consumers and product marketers alike in utilizing structural aspects 
of eWOM to their fullest potential.
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ABSTRACT
Interest in mindful consumption and its practices has increased 
among consumer researchers in recent years (e.g., Bechwati and 
Baalbaki, 2011; Sheth, Sethia, and Srinivas, 2011) because of a trend 
among consumers showing that many of them have become aware 
of their consumption patterns and their impact on society and nature. 
Many consumers have begun to take more time to consider what—
and whether—to buy and to think harder about the value they get 
from their spending (Salzman, 2010). Instead of constantly accumu-
lating various products and services, some consumers now search 
for a sustainable, self-sufficient way of living in the belief that this 
approach offers true happiness (Salzman, 2010).
To understand mindful consumption, Sheth et al. (2011, p.27) 
define the concept as consciousness in thought and behavior about 
the implications and consequences of consumption. The main ele-
ments of mindful consumption are mindful mindset and mindful be-
havior (Sheth et al., 2011). Mindful mindset comprises a sense of 
caring and thinking about the future and the consequences of one’s 
actions toward oneself, community, and nature, while mindful be-
havior involves behaving and making decisions with the aim of in-
creasing a consumer’s personal, economic, and social well-being to 
an optimal level (Bechwati and Baalbaki, 2011; Sheth et al., 2011). 
As a concept, mindful consumption has been developed to solve 
two main problems of consumption: underconsumption and overcon-
sumption (Sheth et al., 2011). Underconsumption exists when con-
sumers have insufficient purchasing power to meet their basic con-
sumption needs. The majority of the world’s population, particularly 
people in developing countries, often experience underconsumption 
and its negative effect on personal and social well-being. Individuals 
may consume competitively, to the point of fighting among them-
selves, to gain resources for survival. 
In contrast, overconsumption exists when the rich minority of 
the world’s population consumes too much as it exploits resources to 
fulfill its desire to acquire luxury products and services. Sheth et al.’s 
(2011) study focuses mainly on overconsumption in the U.S. that 
is associated with acquisitive, repetitive, and aspirational consump-
tion. They argue that underconsumption is declining as businesses 
increase their attention to enter this untapped market. Nevertheless, 
in developing countries, underconsumption remains a major social 
problem that needs to be addressed. It is possible that the concept 
of mindful consumption can be broadened to examine its practices 
and consequences in order to address the underconsumption prob-
lem. To investigate the mindful consumption process and how the 
relationship between a caring mindset and mindful behavior has an 
effect on solving this problem, we draw on the sufficiency economy 
framework.
Stemming from remarks by Thailand’s His Majesty King Bhu-
mibol Adulyadej, the sufficiency economy is a holistic concept that 
acknowledges interdependency among people, society, and nature. 
It calls for balanced and sustainable development to reduce poverty 
and achieve a healthy community (Sathirathai and Piboolsravut, 
2004). This concept was initially promoted as a means for struggling 
farmers to escape debt traps, achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, 
and sustain for integration into national agricultural markets (Day-
ley, 2008).  At present, the sufficiency economy serves as a guideline 
for living for people at all levels of society: from the family to the 
community and beyond to the nation (Sathirathai and Piboolsravut, 
2004). Sufficiency emphasizes Buddhism’s principle of following 
the middle path, which refers to a person fully satisfied with what 
one has and is at peace with the self. Under this principle, consum-
ing too little or too much for pleasure leads to unhappiness, espe-
cially when consumption cannot fulfill expectations. The sufficiency 
economy is conditioned by basic need, not greed, and restrained by a 
conscious effort to consume moderately (Krongkaew, 2003). 
The sufficiency economy framework comprises three compo-
nents and two underlying conditions (Piboolsravut, 2004). Its first 
component, moderation, involves controlling one’s desires to avoid 
greed for things one does not need. It also refers to feeling compas-
sion and the joy of sharing with others (Calkins, 2008). The sec-
ond component, reasonableness, pertains to considering the cause 
and effect of events and being aware of what one is doing and why 
(Calkins, 2008). The final component, immunization, refers to the 
cultivation of inner resilience to deal with changes in internal and 
external factors. The two underlying conditions for sufficiency are 
(1) acquiring and applying knowledge (local wisdom and/or modern 
technological advancement) in every step with great care, and (2) 
maintaining morality with perseverance, harmlessness, and generos-
ity (Piboolsravut, 2004).
This study sheds the light on mindful consumption (see also 
Sheth et al., 2011) in order to understand how consumers react to the 
underconsumption. We employ the concept of sufficiency economy 
to understand the process of developing mindful consumption and 
identify factors that influence the sense of caring in mindset and 
temperance in behavior. Empirical evidence will demonstrate how 
consumers engage in mindful consumption and how it can help solve 
underconsumption.  
METHOD
The data in this study were collected using qualitative research 
methods. Different data sets were employed to explore the data’s 
richness and achieve full understanding (Wallendorf and Arnould, 
1991). This study used purposive sampling to gain access to infor-
mants who were in sufficiency economy community. Tonyuan Dis-
trict of Suratthani Province, Thailand, was chosen as the place to 
conduct this study because it was cited for best practices as a Suf-
ficiency Economy Community. In 2005, it also won the Green World 
Award from the Green World Foundation. Comprising 12 rural vil-
lages, Tonyuan District was one of the communities in Thailand fac-
ing the poverty issue. For the first data set, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with 20 members of Tonyuan District. Eighteen of them 
were farmers and 17 were male. All of them were married with one 
or two children. Each informant was interviewed for about 30 min-
utes at his or her village home. 
The second data set was conducted using a focus group with 
a district chief and six village chiefs to understand the history of 
Tonyuan District and its community development. Additionally, the 
participated observation technique was employed at the community 
meeting hall and at informants’ houses. The authors wrote a report 
of their interviews and observations as field notes. Their notes con-
tained sequential descriptions of actions and interactions as well as 
context. The three data sets were combined for triangulation. All 
interview data were conducted, transcribed, and analyzed in Thai. 
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Thematic process was employed for data analysis (Attride-Stirling, 
2001). Initially, the authors analyzed the data independently as sug-
gested by Miles and Huberman’s (1994): data transformation, data 
display, conclusion drawing, and verification. Basic themes began 
to appear from the data and these were used to code the transcripts 
for further detailed analysis. The authors reread transcripts, provided 
code, and recoded to complete the iterative process of interpretation 
(Thompson, 1997). 
RESULTS
This study provides empirical evidence to show that the no-
tion of mindful consumption can be expanded to address undercon-
sumption. By employing mindful mindset and behavior through the 
sufficiency economy, consumers can overcome the problems of un-
derconsumption (e.g., difficulties in earning income, unaffordable 
basic necessities, and poor family diet). As found with the Tonyuan 
District informants, engaging in mindful consumption raises aware-
ness of living and consumption patterns. The informants began to 
consciously adopt positive and avoid negative attitudes and behav-
ior as these can affect their personal and collective well-being. This 
study also demonstrates the whole process of developing mindful 
consumption. We strongly believe that practicing mindful consump-
tion is a major contribution to transformative consumer research (see 
also Mick et al., 2012).
Around 90 per cent of Tonyuan District members grow rubber 
trees, oil palm trees, local fruits and vegetables, and work on animal 
farms. The community has practiced His Majesty King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej’s “Sufficiency Economy Philosophy” since 1984. Many 
households in Tonyuan District employ the sufficiency economy in 
their daily lives. They began to adopt this concept to alleviate their 
poverty, whose main cause was low agricultural yield due to out-
breaks of crop pests and the high cost of fertilizers and pesticides. In 
addition, they sometimes experienced poor weather conditions, all of 
which led to their lack of capital and accrual of debt. 
To effect this principle, they began to learn and practice organic 
farming. They had to change their mindset and behavior to produce 
and consume sufficiently within their family and community, which 
is one of Sufficiency Economy characteristics. Furthermore, they 
tried not to buy products and services from outside their commu-
nity. Their interdependency within the community helped reduce 
their spending significantly. Furthermore, when they had excess pro-
duce, they could sell it outside the community to increase their eco-
nomic well-being. To secure itself from debt, the community formed 
many local groups such as a community savings group, local tour-
ism group, grocery shop, and basic healthy volunteer group. Their 
self-sufficiency activities enjoyed such success that the community 
received the Green World Award from the Green World Foundation 
in 2005, and was recognized for its best practices as a Sufficiency 
Economy Community.
As shown in Figure 1, the process of mindful consumption 
consists of four main elements: willingness, training, practicing, and 
showing and sharing. We propose that the sufficiency economy is 
paralleled with mindful consumption when consumers are aware and 
concerned about the impact of their production and consumption 
toward themselves and society (see also Sheth et al., 2011). When 
combined with the investigation of how the community adopted the 
sufficiency economy to maintain their livelihood, this study’s em-
pirical data present the process of mindful consumption. 
Willingness: It is a very basic element, but one of the most im-
portant factors for living in a mindful manner. Informants carefully 
and intentionally integrated the sufficiency economy into their daily 
lives. Recognizing its importance and benefits, they, therefore, were 
willing to participate in the sufficiency economy program. The Dis-
trict Chief mentioned that:
Chief: “…at the initial stage, 30 % of households in Tonyuan 
District volunteered to adopt sufficiency economy models in the 
District. Gaining monetary benefits was not our first priority. 
We actually wanted to improve our quality of life… We focused 
on reducing our cost of living by raising basic vegetables to 
consume within our families. The rest we sell…”  
The following example shows the awareness and familiarity of 
a community member with the sufficiency economy concept:
Dee: “…doing sufficiency economy is like appreciating what 
we naturally do. It is the local wisdom and experience I have 
learned from my family. I help my parents grow vegetables, feed 
pigs and poultry, and collect eggs to use for our meals… We 
don’t follow sufficiency economy as people follow a fashion 
trend. We practice it because it is the way we now live.”
Dee and other informants employed “tacit knowledge” to be-
have mindfully in growing food for their families and community. 
This practice contributes to their healthy and wealthy lives. They can 
consume what they produce and be assured that it is good for health. 
They can increase revenue by selling their excess produce outside 
their community. Dee elaborated on this issue below:
Dee: “…I have been told that brown rice can cure beriberi, so 
I went to the supermarket to buy brown rice to try it. Unbeliev-
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ably, it worked! So I set up a family rice mill to produce brown 
rice for our family. Since then, I don’t need to go to see a doctor 
again… We have a poultry farm, so we can eat our own chick-
ens and duck eggs. When our neighbors saw what I was doing, 
they wanted to start living a self-sufficient life.”
Based on the above findings, we found that another factor driv-
ing consumers to develop mindfulness was their “intrinsic inten-
tion.” We would say that this process is related to the cognitive stage 
in the hierarchy of effect model (Belch and Belch, 2005): awareness 
of the sufficiency economy. It activates consumers’ desire to join the 
practice of the sufficiency economy.
Training: Although agriculture is commonly practiced among 
members in this community, some informants still need to acquire 
skills, knowledge, and experience because they come from differ-
ent backgrounds. Some of them may not deeply understand how to 
conduct organic rice or animal farming; these members needed new 
knowledge and experience as mentioned by the District Chief:
Chief: “…we welcomed all community members to join our suf-
ficiency economy program. They [community members] needed 
to understand the main idea of sufficiency economy and gain 
relevant skills, such as how to plant vegetables and fruits, how 
to feed animals, and so on, including how to farm rice [a staple 
food among Thais]. They needed to learn more…”
Engaging in sufficient economy required members to master 
many skills necessary for running their farms and small businesses. 
Therefore, District Chief built the “Tonyuan Sufficiency Economy 
Learning Center” for supporting and encouraging community mem-
bers to gain various skills. Novices learn particular skills from com-
munity veterans, similar to how experienced members in online 
communities support new members (Pongsakornrungsilp and Schro-
eder, 2011), which strengthens relationships within the community. 
Moreover, Tonyuan District members want to sustain this way of 
living for the next generation. They agreed to create the “Sufficiency 
Economy Apprentice” project. Their caring for their community’s 
future and seeking ways to build its strength show the importance of 
mindful mindset and behavior. One member mentioned that: 
Butt: “…We recruit children of about 12 – 18 years old from 
each village to teach them the principle of sufficiency economy 
and train them how to grow plants and feed animals. They learn 
to become friends to the environment. They then can share our 
local wisdom and notions with future generations.”
Butt and other informants believe that the sufficiency econo-
my’s success needs more than classroom learning; it must include 
real-life experience. The following conversations demonstrate an-
other strategy for passing the sufficiency economy philosophy onto 
the next generation.
R: “Do you teach your children about sufficiency economy?”
Ban: “Yes, I do. We can’t let our kids learn just from what is in 
books or classrooms. They need to learn by doing. For example, 
I asked my boy to help me plant vegetables. I grabbed one wa-
tering can and asked him to grab another. He learned through 
that process. Besides, when he saw those vegetables become 
our home-grown food or when we sold them to local shops, he 
was proud of what he had done.”
R: “So, he enjoys these activities.”
Ban: “Yes, why not? I plant two plots of vegetables. We each 
chose one and set up a mini competition. We watered them daily 
and watched to see which plot grew better. He learned and ab-
sorbed sufficiency economy philosophy naturally.”
As mentioned by Ban, younger generations of Tonyuan District 
residents were trained as “apprentices” to acquire necessary skills 
and knowledge. In this process, it related to the culture capital that 
young consumers gain through domestication by their parents (Bour-
dieu, 1986). This process is relevant to the affective stage in the hier-
archy of effect model (Belch and Belch, 2005), whereby consumers 
perceive the sufficiency economy and may develop their mindset 
and decide to participate. As mentioned by Sheth et al. (2011), young 
community members need to be educated about mindful mindset in 
order to take mindful action. 
Practicing: Learning and training are necessary stages for skill 
and knowledge acquisition. However, sufficiency economy cannot 
be sustained unless participants practice it in real life. Such practice 
helps them gain insight into the sufficiency economy philosophy and 
helps secure them from poverty. The following quote is an example 
of the results of such practice:
R: “What do you learn from your practice?”
Som: “I am happy. I eat the best foods and live the best life. I 
may not be rich, but I have my own land to earn enough to buy 
what I need. 
R: “Are you still buying products or services from outside the 
community?
Som: “Yes, I am. I have the same needs as others, but practicing 
sufficiency economy makes me think harder when I go to buy 
things. I don’t consider just the price. Instead I’m concerned 
whether my consumption will make trouble for others, even 
for myself, my family or my village. For example, I can buy an 
expensive DVD home theater and play it at the loudest sound 
because I’m happy. That is, however, not the principle of the 
sufficiency economy…”   
As mentioned by Som, her mindful consumption benefits both 
her physical and emotional well-being. The more she practices suffi-
ciency economy, the more she is mindful of her behavior. This mind-
ful behavior is similar to how consumers pursue meditation (see also 
Pongsakornrungsilp and Pusaksrikit, 2011): the more consumers 
practice meditation, the more deeply aware they can be of how their 
minds function. Additionally, mindful consumption also helps estab-
lish the relationship within the family and within the community as 
mentioned below. 
Wi: “…My life has changed significantly. I used to rely on 
buying things, but now I prefer doing things myself. When I 
do something, the whole family comes to help. This creates a 
bond among our family members. We also help other commu-
nity members by supporting and sharing what we have, so the 
relationship among community members is very strong.”
Leadership also played an important role in initiating and sup-
porting community activities. The District Chief was a key person 
to take on this role. His focus on reducing the reliance on external 
sources and improving the efficiency of internal sources contributed 
to the Tonyuan District’s sustainable growth. Many district members 
saluted their leader for improving their quality of life. The commu-
nity’s strongly belief and willingness to follow their leader have been 
the main factors to surviving from poverty; therefore, the District 
Chief has gained “symbolic capital” – worthy to be listened to and 
followed (see also Bourdieu, 1986). This helps drive the commu-
nity’s development through the sufficiency economy.
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Showing and Sharing: To promote the sufficiency economy to 
other members, Tonyuan District persuades and educates members 
through employing “Knowledge Management.” Members do not see 
new learners as competitors. They are willing to provide knowledge 
and information so they can build a larger and stronger network. By 
employing techniques of showing and sharing, members mindfully 
think of social benefits rather than personal benefits. 
Wi: “We share knowledge and skills with other members at 
community meetings such as the housewife group meeting, 
Tonyuan District Learning Center meeting, and so on. We also 
share resources across villages… Our network was created to 
serve each other. Even when prices of rubber or palm oil fall, 
it doesn’t affect us because we co-develop unique products for 
each village to sell in the market…”
Pom: “We share knowledge, which we create or develop by our-
selves, with other members interactively at our houses or mar-
kets. By sharing knowledge, we become experts in our field.”    
The following quote is an example of how experienced com-
munity members support other members:
Tan: “…we set up a sufficiency economy network to support 
new participants by showing our skills. For example, I’m good 
at operating a fishery. Members who want to raise fish will 
come and see how I run my business: from building the farm to 
selling the fish.”
R: “Are you worried that they will become your competitors?”
Tan: “No. Many customers still need fish from our community. 
I don’t have to sell them everywhere. Buyers will come to my 
hometown to buy my fish.” 
Reciprocity is another important factor in expanding the con-
cept of mindful consumption. While knowledge providers receive 
recognition for their services from the community, new members 
must reciprocate the knowledge providers by sharing their knowl-
edge with others. Knowledge is not for taking, but for giving. This 
process contributes to the Tonyuan District culture of members shar-
ing all resources with others as found in online communities (see 
also Mathwick et al., 2008).
DISCUSSION
Problems from consumption arise because people’s desires do 
not match what they possess. This study’s findings demonstrate that 
engaging in mindful consumption can solve this problem at personal 
and social levels. When integrating mindful mindset and behavior, 
people become aware of their decisions and tend toward self-reliance 
in order to live harmoniously with nature and within society. Adopt-
ing the sufficiency economy framework into this context, this study 
identified four stages of the mindful consumption process: willing-
ness, training, practice, and showing and sharing. In this study, these 
four stages were shown to alleviate a community’s consumption 
problems such as reducing the cost of living, increasing income, and 
creating a self-sufficient community.
Each stage of the mindful consumption process stresses the 
intent of consumers as they try to investigate their thoughts and 
behavior so they can make mindful decisions for themselves, their 
communities, and the environment. Mindful consumers do not focus 
only on how they can consume comfortably, but also how others 
can consume in a similar manner. Creating and joining useful activi-
ties for the community so other members can become self-reliant is 
one example of mindful consumption at the collective level. In ad-
dition, to expand mindful consumption practice, mindful consumers 
encourage others to show and share their knowledge and experiences 
so their network can be broadened and reach other consumer groups. 
This study, however, has limitations as we focused on a rural 
agricultural community that successfully entered into a sufficiency 
economy program. A future study can examine this process with oth-
er consumer groups to see whether this process holds true. Moreover, 
future research should also investigate the factors that influence and 
motivate mindful consumption. It would be beneficial to study when 
and why consumers mindfully purchase, use, and dispose of prod-
ucts. In addition, the barriers to engage in mindful consumption 
should be examined.
Table 1: The Summary of Empirical Findings
Process Sub-Theme Meaning
Willingness
Way of life Sufficiency economy is not a new issue; it is a way of life that consumers pursue daily.
Intrinsic Intention The mind that drives a consumer to be conscious and would like to join the sufficiency economy program.
Training
Acquiring Knowledge
Community members need to gain new knowledge and experience because practicing 
sufficient economy requires different skills that are necessary for their living and 
running their businesses.
Apprentice Community members persuade and educate new generation to live sufficiently through the apprentice project.
Practicing
Insight Practicing in real life shapes members to become experts and broaden their perspectives on sufficiency economy philosophy. 
Leadership Leaders need to support resources and encourage the community to engage in this practice.
Showing and 
Sharing: 
Knowledge Management Tonyuan District members employ knowledge management to enrich resources.
Reciprocity Tonyuan District members have to learn how to take and give to others through showing and sharing their knowledge.
336 / The Development of the Mindful Consumption Process through the Sufficiency Economy 
REFERENCES
Attride-Stirling, Jennifer (2001), “Thematic networks: An analytic 
tool for qualitative research,” Qualitative Research, 1, 
385–405.
Bechwati, Nadar Naser, and Imad B. Baalbaki, I. (2011), “The 
Power of One in Mindful Consumer  Behavior,” Advances in 
Consumer Research, Vol. 39, eds. Rohini Ahluwalia, Tanya L. 
Chartrand, and Rebecca K. Ratner, Duluth, MN: Association 
for Consumer Research, 752–753.
Belch, George E., and Michael A. Belch (2005), Advertising and 
Promotion: An Integrated Marketing Communication, Eds. 6th, 
Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1986), “The Forms of Capital (R. Nice, Trans),” 
in Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of 
Education, ed. John E. Richardson, New York: Greenword 
Press, 241–258.
Calkins, Peter (2008), “The Sufficiency Economy at the Edges of 
Capitalism,” Faculty of Economics, Chiang Mai University, 
Chiang Mai. http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/en/files/25.
pdf 
Dayley, Robert (2008), “Imagined futures: Sufficiency Economy 
and other visions of rural Thailand,” paper presented at the 
10th International Thai Studies Conference, Thammasat 
University, Thailand.
Krongkaew, Medhi (2003), “The Philosophy of Sufficiency 
Economy,” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, http://
kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue3/article_292.html 
Mathwick, Charla, Caroline Wiertz, and Ko De Ruyter (2008), 
“Social Capital Production in a Virtual P3 Community,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 34(April), 832–849.
Mick, David G., Simone Pettigrew, Cornelia Pechmann, and 
Julie L. Ozanne (2012), Transformative Consumer Research 
for Personal and Collective Well-Being, Ed., New York: 
Routledge.
Miles, Matthew B., and Michael A. Huberman (1994), Qualitative 
Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications.
Piboolsravut, Priyanut (2004), “Sufficiency Economy,” ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, 21(1), 127–134.
Pongsakornrungsilp, Siwarit, and Jonathan E. Schroeder (2011), 
“Understanding Value Co-Creation in Co-Consuming Brand 
Community,” Marketing Theory, 11(3), 303–324.
Pongsakornrungsilp, Siwarit, and Theeranuch Pusaksrikit 
(2011), “Consuming Buddhism: The Persuit of Happiness, 
in Ahluwalia, R., Chartrand, T.L., and Ratner, R.K. (eds.), 
Advances in Consumer Research, Volume 39, Duluth, MN: 
Association for Consumer Research, 374–378.
Salzman, Marian (2010), “10 Trends in Mindful Consumption,” 
Worldwide Knowledge Exchange, http://www.
thenewconsumer.com/2010/10/29/10-trends-in-mindful-
consumption/ 
Sathirathai, Suthawan, and Priyanut Piboolsravut (2004), 
“Sufficiency Economy and a Healthy Community,” paper 
presented at the 3rd IUCN World Conservation Congress, 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
Sheth, Jagdish N., Nirmal K. Sethia, and Shanthi Srinivas (2011), 
“Mindful Consumption: A Customer-Centric Approach to 
Sustainability,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
39, 21–39.
Stückelberger, Christoph (2010), “Sufficiency Economy through 
Ethical Investments and Fair Taxes,” World Public Forum, 
Dialogue of Civilizations Rhodes Forum 2010: Economic 
Panel “Can Capitalism Be Ethical and Sustainable?” http://
www.christophstueckelberger.ch/dokumente_e/sufficiency_
economy_stueckelberger.pdf 
Thompson, Craig J. (1997), “Interpreting consumers: A 
hermeneutical framework for deriving marketing insights 
from the texts of consumers’ consumption stories,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 34 (4), 438–455.
Wallendorf, Melanie, and Eric J. Arnould (1991), “We Gather 
Together: Consumption Rituals of Thanksgiving Day,” Journal 
of Consumer Research, 18(1), 13–31.
337 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Ethical Consumption or Consumption of Ethical Products? An Exploratory Analysis of 
Motivations behind the Purchase of Ethical Products
Lara Spiteri Cornish, University of Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
Ethical consumption has long been considered a direct result 
of positive ethical attitudes and intentions of consumers.  Ethical 
consumers have been classified as those who hold positive attitudes 
and intentions towards ethical concerns such as environmentalism, 
animal issues and human rights infringements, and purchase related 
ethical products (e.g. Vermeir and Verbeke 2008; Carrigan, Szmigin 
and Wright 2004; Auger and Devinney 2007). In the literature, they 
are described as mostly middle-aged with higher income, above-av-
erage education and well-informed about societal concerns (Maig-
nan and Ferrel, 2001; Roberts, 1996; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001). 
Ethical consumption is defined as consumption that is based on deci-
sion making which is strongly influenced by the consumer’s soci-
etal responsibility (Meulenberg 2003).  Research suggests that the 
percentage of people engaging in ethical consumption is on the in-
crease (Co-operative Bank Ethical Consumerism Report 2010; Berry 
and McEachern, 2005; Davis, 2006; Harrison, Newholm, and Shaw 
2005).  Yet extant literature demonstrates that there is a very large 
“attitude-intention-behaviour gap” in ethical consumption whereby 
consumers who hold ethical attitudes and intentions rarely purchase 
ethical products (e.g. Auger and Devinney 2007; Carrigan and At-
talla 2001; Follows and Jobber 2000; Shaw et al 2007).  Indeed, sales 
in this area still represent less than 6% of the overall consumer mar-
ket of some £600bn (Macalister, 2007). 
Authors attempting to bridge the “attitude-intention” gap have 
frequently investigated why consumers do not buy ethically instead 
of why they do (e.g. Bray et al. 2010).  However, we believe that to 
increase the consumption of ethical products, it is essential to un-
derstand the motivations behind such consumption rather than focus 
on the barriers to consumption.  Extant literature speaks about the 
“warm glow” or moral satisfaction that arises from altruistic behav-
iors such as ethical consumption (Andreoni 1990; Kahneman and 
Knetsch 1992).  Yet, ethical products have multiple attributes and 
are likely to be purchased for a diverse and complex set of motiva-
tions in addition to moral satisfaction.  The need to bridge “attitude-
intention” gap is becoming more imperative as more multinationals 
buy into ethical marketing and sell ethical products such as fair-
trade, sustainable or recycled (Haddock, 2005; Beattie, 2006; Will-
man, 2007).  However, this cannot happen unless the motivations 
behind such consumption are better understood.  In the area of ethical 
consumption, theory development is in its early stages and accepted 
frameworks for the decision making of ethical consumption are yet 
to be developed (e.g. Carrignton, Neveille and Whitwell 2010; Starr 
2009; Nicholls and Lee 2006).  In this paper, we aim to further theory 
in this under-examined aspect of consumer behaviour (Newholme 
and Shaw 2007)  by investigating the different motivations behind 
the consumption of ethical products. We then offer recommendations 
as to how this understanding can be used to encourage more ethical 
consumption.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
It has been argued that in more affluent societies, people are 
freed from basic needs and become more responsible for their con-
sumption behaviour (Etzioni, 2004; Dickinson and Carsky, 2005). 
Ethical models of consumer behaviour suggest that the purchase in-
tentions of these people are driven by values, norms and ethics and 
tend to be more socially-aware (e.g. Shaw and Shui 2002; Vermeir 
and Verbeke 2008).  In these scenarios, ethical consumption is moti-
vated by the need for moral self-realisation or self-actualisation and 
to help consumers develop a virtuous identity (Kozinets and Handl-
man, 1998; Langeland,1998; Bamett et al., 2005).  Researchers of-
ten draw from the Theory of Planned Behaviour to better understand 
ethical consumption and assert that attitudes to ethical behaviour are 
antecedent to the purchase of ethical products (Ellen 1994; Shaw and 
Clarke 1999).  However, it is important to note that ethical products 
have multiple attributes (e.g. fair-trade chocolate is often marketed 
as both ethical and of higher quality) and consumers consider more 
than one attribute during the decision-making process (Auger 2010; 
D’Astous et al 1997).  Thus, to better understand ethical consump-
tion, it is essential to investigate which product attributes are most 
salient in the decision-making process.  
During a consumption episode, consumers consider both tan-
gible attributes (e.g. characteristics of products such as quality and 
price) and intangible attributes (e.g. social aspect of the product 
such as how much farmers are paid) (Auger 2010).  An aspect in 
the demand of ethical products is the trade-off between tangible and 
non-tangible product attributes that consumers have to make.  Price, 
quality, convenience and the overall value of the product are main 
buying criteria and consumers display a willingness to buy ethical 
products only if they do not have to compromise on these attributes 
(Roberts 1996: Berger 1993; D’Astous et al 1997). Dupuis (2000) 
argues that food is particularly salient for researchers in ethical con-
sumption because it highlights the inherent selfishness in consumer 
decision-making.  Indeed, research demonstrates that food consump-
tion is almost completely based on value for money, health concerns, 
taste, appearance and convenience, rather than being driven by ethi-
cal motivations such as animal welfare and care for the environment 
(Institute of Grocery Distribution, 2002; Foods Standards Agency, 
2000).  Applying these findings to ethical consumption in general 
would translate into negligible ethical consumption, which is cer-
tainly not the case.  So why do consumers buy ethically? In this pa-
per we investigate whether the multi-attribute nature of many ethical 
products effectively counteracts the “selfishness” of consumers by 
offering added value in terms of health, quality, taste, appearance 
or convenience. We also examine whether this is more relevant for 
ethically-minded consumers who appreciate the non-tangible aspects 
of products.  
METHOD
The aim of this paper was to attain in-depth insight into con-
sumer ethical purchase motivations and a qualitative approach was 
deemed to be appropriate as it allowed a focus on events in their nat-
ural setting and supplied detailed descriptions that provided valuable 
insight (Miles and Huberman 1994; Gray 2004).  We used diary-in-
terviews because they are adept at unearthing consumer motivations, 
and conflicts and better recognize complex details of phenomena 
that are difficult to uncover with other methodologies (Malhotra and 
Birks 2006; Arksey and Knight 1999). 
47 interviews were conducted with consumers residing in the 
West Midlands, UK.  A three-tiered purposive sampling technique 
was used to recruit participants (Gray 2004; Morgan 1997).  First, an 
email shot was sent out to 305 consumers residing in the West-Mid-
lands who had previously registered to participate in general con-
sumer behaviour research via an online research company (Valued 
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Opinions).  These included male and female British citizens of all 
ages (over 18) and all income levels.  These consumers were invited 
to keep online shopping diaries (including online purchases) over 
a period of 3 months.  To encourage truthfulness, these consumers 
were also required to keep all their receipts as proof of purchase.  121 
consumers responded to this email shot and expressed their willing-
ness to participate. Further details were then provided about how the 
online diary worked.  
After 3 months, the diaries were used to calculate the number of 
ethical purchases undertaken by the participants as described in the 
Co-operative Bank Ethical Consumerism Report (2010), i.e., ethical 
food and drink, ethical household products, eco-travel and transport, 
ethical personal and ethical finance. Only 96 diaries were valid and 
the others were dismissed due to missing information. The examina-
tion of the remaining diaries showed that 69 consumers had pur-
chased over 15 ethical products in the period under investigation, 20 
consumers had purchased between 5 and 10 products and the rest had 
purchased less than 5 ethical products. The 69 consumers who had 
purchased the most ethical products were invited for interview.  47 
participants agreed to be interviewed, 27 of whom were female.  The 
respondents were aged between 21 and 63; 25 were higher-income 
(over £30,000 per annum) and 22 were average-income (£20,000 to 
£29,000 per annum) as defined by the Office of National Statistics 
(2009).  The participants also represented a small cross-section of 
cultural and educational backgrounds.
Each interview lasted between 1 and 3 hours.  Diary entries 
were first confirmed against receipts to ensure authenticity of data. 
Participants were then questioned in depth on each of the ethical 
purchases to gain insight into purchase motivations.  The purchases 
were not labelled as ethical at any point in the interviews to allow 
consumers the freedom to express their purchase motivations on 
their own terms. Further, to distract consumers from the real focus 
of the interview, they were interviewed on a number of other non-
ethical products that they purchased. All interviews were transcribed 
and each transcript ran between 10 and 20 single-spaced typed pag-
es.  Transcripts were first read through to note the main emergent 
themes that arose from the interviews (Cozby 2007; Morgan 1997) 
and then subjected to more in-depth thematic analysis supported by 
the use of Nvivo computer software.  The software was used to iden-
tify those themes that provided relevant and significant insights into 
the phenomenon under investigation (ethical products; ethical con-
sumption; consumption motivations; product characteristics such as 
quality, taste, health-benefits, etc.)  The analytical process followed 
the ‘Framework’ model, which generates themes based on five stag-
es, i.e., familiarization, identification, indexing, charting, and map-
ping (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994).  Framework analysis was deemed 
appropriate because it is heavily driven by the original accounts of 
participants, allows amendment throughout the process and is com-
prehensive and rigorous in nature (Archer et al. 2005; Srivastava and 
Thomson 2009). 
DISCUSSION
In their diaries, consumers reported a number of motivations 
behind the consumption of ethical products.  Follow-up interviews 
were conducted to further corroborate diary entries and obtain a 
more in-depth insight into such motivations (See Table 1 below for 
sample quotes).  
Desire for Health. Diary entries frequently emphasised ‘health’ 
as the main motivation behind the consumption of certain ethical 
products.  This was most obvious in food consumption where ethi-
cal foods such as free-range meat and eggs or organically grown 
fruit and vegetables, were purchased not because of their ethical 
credentials but because they were perceived to be healthier.  Heas-
man and Mellentin (2001) believe that many people today are very 
nutritionally-aware and choose foods which allow them control over 
their own health and wellbeing. This came across strongly in the 
interviews and many respondents asserted that organic or free-range 
foods were the obvious choice for people seeking to live longer 
healthier lives.  Extant research has previously considered health 
as a motive for the purchase of organic products but has offered 
conflicting results. While some authors believe health to a strong 
predictor of attitudes and purchase intentions towards organic foods 
(Schifferstein and Oude Ophuis, 1998; Magnusson et al 2003), oth-
ers have refuted such findings (Honkanen et al. 2006; Tarkiainen and 
Sundqvist 2005).  In this paper, we find that not only is health one of 
the primary reasons behind the consumption of organic foods, but it 
is also a primary motivator for the consumption of other ethical prod-
ucts such as free-range eggs and meats, foods which have previously 
been considered to be purchased for ethical reasons (McEachern et 
al. 2007).  Many of the interviewees admitted they were willing to 
pay a premium for these products specifically for health reasons, 
making them an important target market for retailers selling ethical 
products. Further probing revealed that while some of these respon-
dents held positive ethical attitudes, the majority had no interest in 
the ethical credentials of the product.  These consumers did not have 
negative attitudes towards ethical consumption. Instead, they simply 
did not consider the ethical attributes of the product during the deci-
sion-making process. This demonstrate that positive ethical attitudes 
are not necessary for the consumption of ethical products and the 
desire for moral satisfaction, or ‘warm glow’ is not always a primary 
motivation for consumption. Instead, positive attitudes towards other 
tangible attributes of the product might be antecedent to purchase, 
both for ethically and non-ethically minded consumers
Fear of Illness. Among the products that consumers reportedly 
purchased for health, were items that were purchased more out of 
fear of illness, than a desire for wellbeing. While the difference might 
appear subtle, products purchased for health elicited positive discus-
sions about being empowered whereas products purchased to avoid 
disease elicited discussions with a negative undertone of fear and 
distress.  Many participants explained that they were very worried 
about the large number of dangerous chemicals used in a multitude 
of everyday products.  Some spoke of media coverage (e.g. social 
marketing for breast cancer) that illustrated the connection between 
such chemicals and certain types of cancer. These respondents pur-
chased a number of cruelty-free, non-animal based and organic prod-
ucts including foods, make-up and other cosmetics and household 
products (e.g. kitchen sprays), as a means of avoiding contact with 
harmful chemicals.  This is an important finding because while some 
research, albeit scarce, has considered how chemical-free credentials 
can motivate consumption in organic markets (Yee et al. 2005;  Krys-
tallis et al. 2006), these diary-interviews reveal that fear of chemicals 
is stronger than expected and goes beyond the purchase of organic 
food.  Indeed, for some people it appears to be the primary motivat-
ing factor for the purchase of foods, cosmetics and household prod-
ucts, overshadowing ethical motivations.  Many of the interviewees 
whose consumption was motivated by fear expressed no ethical atti-
tudes and some were even unaware that they had purchased products 
which were environmentally-friendly or cruelty-free.  Respondents 
aware of the ethical credentials of the products conveyed moral sat-
isfaction but revealed that these products would have been purchased 
even without these attributes.  This demonstrates that in the con-
sumption of ethical products consumers are often less motivated by 
altruism than by self-interest and this needs to be acknowledged in 
the marketing of ethical products.
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Table 1: Sample Quotes
Desire for Health
‘They (organic fruit and vegetables) have more vitamins than other veg. I think it’s healthier to buy them...(probing) 
Don’t really know that much about farming (chuckles).. I just know they’re healthier.’  (Emily, 28)
“I’ve been getting this (organic meat: pork and chicken) for a while now.  They don’t feed the animals any c*** as 
far as I know and that makes the meat a lot healthier...they cost a lot more but I think health should come first when 
you shop for food.  (probing) Yes animal welfare is important but firstly when you have a family you should look at 
health’  (Stephen, 28)
‘I try to buy the healthiest products around - I do shop around a lot....I avoid processed foods and try to get organic 
because they’re good for you,”  (Mike, 52)
‘My mum once told me they wash vegetables in chlorine and kill all the nutrients, so I now buy organic veg. when I 
can because they have more vitamins in them and they’re better, especially for my kids,”  (Paula, 36)
‘I get it (free-range chicken) because it has less water in it - I think I read somewhere they inject water in meat? So 
I get the better stuff because it’s a lot healthier for you...(probing) Yes I did see clips once of factory farmed chicken 
but I still used to get it cause it’s so much cheaper... (probing) like I said I changed to free-range because of the 
water thing, because it’s healthier. ‘  (James, 29)
Fear of Illness
‘I always buy organic fruit, veg. and meat. I hate all the chemicals they put into food nowadays, and I know that 
most of them can make you really sick, like cancer and such. It’s worth paying the extra money to put good things in 
your body,’ (Simon, 49)
‘I buy (ethical brand) because they have less chemicals... I use this (branded kitchen spray) all the time and I started 
to worry about all the chemicals we were breathing in and touching all the time’ (Tania, 42).
‘It started with fears that aluminium in antiperspirant gives you breast cancer. I know that many women don’t 
care but I do. So I started researching and looking around....finally I realised that the best way was to buy organic 
antiperspirant.... it’s not as good as the ones with aluminium but I still buy it..... well, then I started reading up on all 
the other chemicals that they put in all cosmetics, like sodium laurel sulphate and how bad that is, and I decided to 
switch shower gel too.... finally, decided to get most stuff organic cause they’ve no chemicals’ (Amelia, 34)
‘I once read somewhere that sunscreen can actually cause cancer!...I started to buy organic sunscreens because of 
that...(probing) No didn’t know they were cruelty-free or recycled, if I’m totally honest... yes, I would still buy them if 
they weren’t ethical. I wouldn’t want to risk me or my family getting a serious disease  (Mike, 52)
Desire for Quality
 ‘The yolks of free-range eggs are much more orange and taste better and actually the more expensive they are, 
usually the better they are. They taste much better. (Probing)  Yes I know they’re higher welfare...no, that’s not the 
main reason I get them, I cook a lot and I always look for the best quality ingredients,’ (Tania, 42).
‘I only ever buy corn-fed free range chicken. It’s almost yellow colour and tastes a lot...well, like firmer... than 
regular chicken. It’s better than the cheap stuff.’ (Christine 54).
‘That cream (non-animal based, organic) is the best I’ve tried.  I have tried a lot of them, believe me and that’s really 
good. I recommend it to my friends.....(probing).  No, I didn’t know it was not tested on animals, but that’s a good 
thing right?’ (Christine 54).
 ‘...there’s a reason they cost more (talking about free-range eggs and chicken)...they taste better .. (probing) Yes I 
guess it’s good for the chickens (chuckles) but I would buy them anyway cause they taste better,’ (Brian, 40) 
“I used to always buy ethical make-up and face cream but it was never good enough...(probing) For example, all the 
ethical creams I tried dried up my skin...the mascara was never good enough either,” (Debbie, 37)
Desire for Virtue?
‘I always buy ethical products when I can....mainly stuff to do with animals. I read a lot about how animals are 
treated and it really upsets me. So as far as I can afford I buy ethically....(what products do you buy?) free range 
chicken, pork and eggs; non-animal tested cosmetics....when I bought quilt and pillows I made sure it had no duck-
down in it...it’s horrible what they do to the ducks...’ (Emily, 28)
“I always buy fair-trade coffee in the morning...(probing) To be honest I go to (coffee shop brand) with a number of 
colleagues and they all buy fair-trade so I just go along with it, I guess.” (Mark, 31)
‘My kids hound me to buy free-range eggs because they learnt about it in school.’  (Cindy 36)
‘I know it’s more expensive (non-animal tested mascara) but I still buy it – I saw a photo of a rabbit that had its eyes 
tested on and I never bought another cheap mascara again!’ (Helen, 38).
‘Yes, if they were of good quality, I would consider the ethical version...but I think I’ll always look for the best 
quality I can afford, you know?(Brian, 40).
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Desire for Quality.  Diary entries revealed ‘quality’ to be a very 
strong motivator for the consumption of many ethical products.  In 
the case of food, for example, consumers chose free-range meat and 
eggs, organic fruits and vegetables, fair-trade coffee and chocolate, 
because they perceived them as being of higher quality and better 
tasting.  Other products such as fair-trade clothes (e.g. softer mate-
rial), ethical banking products (e.g. higher interest rates) and cos-
metics (e.g. smoother on the skin) were also regularly purchased 
because they were perceived to be of premium quality.  Research 
demonstrates that consumers often associate quality with certain 
products and subsequently purchase them for this reason (Faiers, 
Cook and Neame 2007).   For instance, organic and free-range are 
often perceived as representing higher quality and therefore better 
taste (Padel and Foster 2005).  Further, the fact that ethical products 
often cost more than equivalent brands also encourages people to 
perceive higher quality and higher prestige (Husic and Cicic 2009). 
Again, both ethically and non-ethically minded consumers bought a 
large number of ethical products because of the tangible attributes of 
the product. Interestingly, some self-proclaimed ethical consumers 
admitted to having bought ethical products in the past but quickly re-
placing them with non-ethical substitutes when these were proven to 
be of lower quality.  Such behaviour was not perceived as unethical 
and some interviewees explained that “all things being equal” (Em-
ily 28) they would always try to choose ethical products as long as 
this did not mean settling for lower quality.  Indeed, these consumers 
placed the blame squarely on the manufacturers and declared that 
they should “up their game” (Amelia, 34) if they want to compete 
effectively with other non-ethical products.  Such comments offer 
new insight into ethical consumption and highlight the sense of en-
titlement that consumers feel when it comes to negotiating between 
tangible and non-tangible product attributes. If the attitude-behav-
iour gap is to be bridged, marketers need to acknowledge that many 
ethically-minded consumers are not willing to concede tangible attri-
butes such as quality.  However, the fact that ethically-minded con-
sumers do try ethical products in the first instance strongly suggests 
that, given comparable tangible attributes, they are likely to choose 
ethical products over non-ethical varieties.  This is optimistic for the 
future of ethical consumption. 
Desire for Virtue?  The discussion above demonstrates that 
marketers need to highlight the tangible aspects of ethical prod-
ucts if they are to bridge the attitude-behaviour gap and also target 
non-ethically minded consumers.  However, this does not mean that 
they should undersell the ethical credentials of their products.  First, 
whereas the majority of consumers expressed non-ethical motiva-
tions for the purchase of ethical products, a few did genuinely buy 
these products because they are more socially-aware.  Second, the 
interviews did uncover that the  non-tangible aspects of ethical prod-
ucts are sometimes used to help consumers decide between homo-
geneous products, i.e., the ethical credentials were an added value 
that motivated product selection. Finally, the interviews revealed 
that interpersonal relationships can be a strong motivator for ethi-
cal consumption and that some consumers purchase these products 
for social assimilation, concern for social norms, or to appease sig-
nificant others.  A number of interviewees, for example, disclosed 
that their children pestered them to purchase ethical products after 
learning about ethical concerns in school.  Others admitted that they 
purchased fair-trade products (especially coffee in public places) due 
to a ‘bandwagon’ effect and a desire to fit in. Hence, while ethical at-
tributes might not be wholly responsible for consumers buying ethi-
cally, when combined with other tangible attributes they might tip 
the balance in favour of more ethical consumption.  
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we offer further insight into motivations behinds 
ethical consumption.  First, we demonstrate that consumers negoti-
ate between many tangible and non-tangible attributes during their 
consumption scenario and ethical credentials are often not the prior-
ity for many consumers.  Indeed, even for ethically-minded consum-
ers who actively seek out ethical products, tangible aspects such as 
quality and health  are often non-negotiable and might result in non-
consumption. This means that marketers cannot hope to encourage 
consumption of ethical products if these do not compare favourably 
with other products on the market.  Conversely, the positive tangible 
attributes of many ethical products regularly encourages consump-
tion even among non-ethically minded individuals, thus creating a 
whole new segment for these products. 
Vermeir and Verbeke (2004, p.8) attest that consumption is often 
a consequence of “the need to save money and time, to give priority 
to health (i.e. security, certainty, protection, stability), to feel part of 
a social group (i.e. following social norms), to distinguish from oth-
ers, to fulfil the need to try out new technologies or to look for the 
most easy and comfortable way of living”.  Similarly, we reveal that 
in addition to ethical reasons, desire for health, fear of illness and 
desire for quality are the main motivations behind the consumption 
of many ethical products.  Many such products offer multiple attri-
butes which consumers value very highly and these encourage both 
ethically- and non-ethically minded people to consume them.  In the 
past decade, for example, consumers have become more sophisti-
cated and savvy in terms of their consumption and have developed 
a deeper understanding of the mass-production of foods and other 
products and the role that chemicals play in such processes (Heas-
man and Mellentin 2001). This has motivated many consumers to 
choose products which are produced, stored and processed without 
synthetic chemicals (Lockie et al. 2002; Padel and Foster 2005).  In-
deed, many consumers purchase ethical products because these offer 
superior quality and health benefits when compared to alternatives. 
This means that the tangible attributes of ethical products, if market-
ed carefully, can motivate both ethically-minded and non-ethically 
minded consumers to purchase them.  Thus, by understanding the 
motivations behind ethical consumption, and developing market-
ing communications that emphasise both tangible and non-tangible 
product attributes, retailers can establish and cultivate whole new 
markets for ethical products.   
We conclude by raising the questions as to whether researchers 
in the field should continue to focus on bridging the attitude-behav-
iour gap or alternatively concentrate more on how they can increase 
ethical consumption.  This would shift the focus from ethically-
minded consumers who do not consume ethically, to non-ethically-
minded consumers who do. By freeing themselves from boundaries 
which delineate which consumers should be investigated, research-
ers might be better able to help marketers develop strategies which 
target different kinds of consumers who have different motivations 
to buy ethical products.  This might require researchers to consider 
whether they feel it is important that consumers buy ethical prod-
ucts for exclusively ethical reasons, or simply that people buy ethical 
products.
Limitations and Future Research: This study is mainly explor-
atory and limited by the qualitative nature of the enquiry.   How-
ever, the aim was to gain an in-depth insight into why consumers 
purchase ethical products and we felt that diary-interviews would 
be the best route to achieve this. While the findings cannot be gen-
eralized across the population, they provide some valuable insights 
which further our understanding of ethical consumption and can be 
used by marketers to encourage more ethical consumption. While 
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care has been taken to avoid social-desirability bias (e.g. interviewer 
discussed different types of products not just ethical ones with par-
ticipants), in-depth interviews are susceptible to such bias and this is 
acknowledged as a limitation of the study.  Further research should 
attempt to validate our findings by undertaking larger-scale quantita-
tive research.  We believe that experimental design would lend itself 
well to this type of research and would be an effective follow-up to 
this investigation. 
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ABSTRACT
Does anger reflect deep meaning of attachment and integration? 
In an effort to explicate the above notion and to capture the rapidly 
evolving consumer behaviour in the digital virtual terrain, the paper 
investigates the responses of fans to a break-out phenomenal from 
Japan, the virtual celebrity Hatsune Miku (HM) to a controversial 
report from CBS news (see Johnson, 2012). The meteoric rise to 
fame of HM, a Crypton Media-produced Vocaloid character which 
resembles a 16-year girl, is demonstrated by the sales of total HM 
brand goods reaching 10 billion yen (approximately $104 million 
USD), and by more than 350,000 vocaloid videos on YouTube and 
92,600 such videos on Niconico douga - a Japanese YouTube-like 
site (Wikia, 2012; Santos 2011). On one side, the responses from fans 
to inaccurate claims by CBS news are replete with furious, cynical, 
and sarcastic comments that not only defend the credibility of HM, 
but also brutally criticize the validity of the proposed “fake-ness” of 
HM.  Such comments even go beyond attacking the author of the 
article, and retaliate with attacks on America as a nation in response 
to a perceived attack on Japan within the article itself. On the other 
side, the responses unveil the deep adoration and love of fans to HM 
and the meaning, the aestheticism, and the values that HM gives to 
these fans and co-creators globally. 
With the ignited deep anger from HM fans due to the CBS re-
port opening an unprecedented view of the “inner thoughts” of HM 
from “her” fans, this paper contributes to the domains of virtualized 
consumption and consumer emotion by exploring HM fans’ respons-
es, extracting a number of key concepts and themes, and examining 
the link between them, including her real-ness and desired experien-
tial rewards that the fans claim to truly enjoy.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Virtualized consumption
Enjoying HM can be seen as a form of virtualised consumption 
(see Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010) that signifies the experien-
tial pleasures it brings to consumers neither from materialised con-
sumption nor a tangible encounter. Such virtualized consumer expe-
riences with objects that hold limited material existence challenge 
classical theories of consumption based on rational or utilitarian 
needs (Firat and Dholakia 1998). Similarly Kline, Dyer-Witheford 
& de Peuter (2003) proposed that virtualised consumption represent 
the latest stage in an ongoing, subtle transformation of consumption 
practices from utilitarian emphasis to one of pursuing aesthetic, emo-
tional, symbolic and experiential value. As such, as consumer culture 
increasingly moves away from the material, the experiential orienta-
tion places individual consumers as the main creative power who 
in turn reconfigures the process, output and the types of consump-
tion practices. Hence, virtualised consumption can be seen as rooted 
in experiential consumption theory that signifies feeling, fun and 
fantasy as essential elements of experiential consumption making 
it distinct from utilitarian consumption (Holbrook and Hirschman 
1982). Similarly related work (e.g. Baudrillard, 1970, Campbell, 
1987, Featherstone, 1992; Lee, 1993) conceptualize consumption as 
a symbolic, aesthetic, imaginary experience. 
Adopting three characteristics from the literature, this paper 
conceptualizes the virtualized consumption as a consumption char-
acterized by a hybridized experience, stimulatory-actualizing-ex-
perimenting nature, and co-creative harmony between provider and 
consumer.
Hybridized Experience
Digital virtualised consumption can be seen as a hybridization 
of the material and the virtual that allows individual consumer to 
enjoy the hybridized experience that Burbules (2004, 163) refers to 
as “both material and imaginary,” or what Shields (2000, 2003) terms 
as “liminal,” meaning “in between”. This hybridization process op-
erates when there is a complementing state between the actualizing 
potential of the material with the idealizations of the virtual (Shields 
2000, 2003; Burbules 2004). The rich and salient experiential oppor-
tunities and stimuli available in the digital virtual product obviously 
attract individuals to buy, try and explore a whole new array of ex-
otic “ideal” functionalities (digital capacities) based on their desired 
abstract ideas. Putting this into the context of HM, while the stimuli 
and features from the digital software (e.g. HM vocalizing synthe-
sizer) provides the contextual hybridized experiential environment, 
conceptually enjoyable virtual consumption possesses essential  pro-
cessing characteristics as explained in the following section. 
Stimulatory – experimenting – actualizing essence 
The hybridized state of this virtualized consumption experi-
ence conceptually operates when there is stimulating–experiment-
ing–actualizing process within the experience (e.g. Denegri-Knott 
& Molesworth, 2010), and this determines how an individual con-
sumer encounters and enjoys virtual rewards. Enjoyable virtualized 
consumption is simultaneously (1) Stimulating – activating their cre-
ative virtual capabilities; (2) Experimenting – prompting consumers 
in such a liquidity to explore, speculate, and combine different avail-
able features; and (3) Actualizing – enabling consumers to bring their 
dreams into the ideal end result. 
In the case of HM, the hybridized state of virtualized consump-
tion, indicates harmony between marketers (the providers) and the 
market (consumers) that enable consumers individually and in con-
nection with like-minded consumers to co-create, co-develop and 
share the final experiential products innovatively and harmoniously 
(see also Bauman 1988; Lee 1993). Additionally, the emergence of 
HM highlights how the market now provides not only the source ma-
terial for the imaginary consumption and the activities for enjoying it 
(e.g. the music production and the performance), but also the creative 
power that enable consumers to generate their desired aesthetic ex-
periential experience different from other creators. Conceptually the 
three processing aspects of hybridized-virtualized experience might 
be related to the complex, inductive inference processes of anthropo-
morphism: acquisition-activation-application, and the corresponding 
determinants: Sociality-Effectance-Elicited agent knowledge (Epley, 
Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). The hybridized-virtual experience of HM 
does take place in the agentic, anthropomorphic environment that 
leads to complex, rich and salient essence of its socio-psychological 
aspects. 
Virtualized consumption process and consumer emotion
The creative, fantasy-laden process of developing such virtual 
experiences provides rich and salient space for in-depth involve-
ment of the emotions of the engaged individuals (e.g. Holbrook and 
Hirschman 1982). Not only do such emotions colorize the personal 
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process of virtual production, but the emotional connection built 
through this process become deeper and more intense because the 
individuals who co-create virtual characters become personally con-
nected to their creations and profoundly treasure these characters 
as if they were their own flesh and blood. This connection between 
virtual consumption and the emotions that arise from this process is 
fundamental for the contribution of this paper.
METHOD
The authors analyzed all 159 comments posted on the CB-
SNews website in the 12 months between Johnson’s April 2012 
“World’s Fakest” article was published and March, 2013. In order to 
better understand the comments that were posted, we also observed 
other corresponding online sources, such as youtube, facebook, ni-
conico douga, and mikubook.com which in combination provided us 
with rich consumer data and information to enable our analysis of 
their views, opinions, feelings, emotions, thoughts, ideas and expec-
tations. In this regard, our paper employed an exploratory analytical 
approach that combined related perspectives not only from consum-
ers’ point of view. Despite the fact that demographic details were 
not provided in a straightforward manner, some of them could be 
identified within the contents of their comments. More importantly, 
the freedom that individuals had in expressing their personal views 
provided valuable insights into the nature, meaning and symbolic 
values of HM, that would have been extremely difficult to collect in 
a more structured environment.
We chose to employ a Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) approach to this research study be-
cause Grounded Theory requires focused data collection and analy-
sis prior to theory development.  Because this is the first academic 
study of Hatsune Miku or other Vocaloid characters, such a grounded 
approach was deemed appropriate. By approaching the data in this 
way, we were able to examine the responses and focus on the pro-
found emotions, thoughts and aspirations by repeatedly reviewing 
the entirety of individual responses, their wordings, capital letters 
and punctuations used. After inputting all HM’s fan comments into 
a qualitative data analysis software package, we then scanned the 
whole data for coding and search key themes and concepts. We used 
these to organize and code all comments to arrive at a structured 
list of core constructs outlined below and generate a summary map. 
As a large number of respondents are Japanese, unsurprisingly their 
responses contained some Japanese words, which also helped us to 
approach the meaning of HM to fans.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
With more than 172 mentions within the entire set of responses, 
the word “fake” (and fakest) was a powerful influence to ignite the 
anger of HM fans. This key word – fake – are so important that we 
use them as the pivotal starting point to identify and classify the 
strengths and types of anger from HM fans and link these to their 
unveiled insights of HM. We analyzed and interpreted the relative 
strength of anger levels by examining the intensity of emotions ex-
posed in the responses and classified these into strong and moderate 
intensity categories. We also analyzed the types of anger expressed 
into positive and negative categories based on the concepts expressed 
by individual fans. We re-categorized the contents of responses into 
two broad anger meta-constructs of “the positivity”: the meaning, 
the aestheticism, and the values that HM gives to these fans; and 
“the negativity”: criticisms and accusations towards the report, the 
journalist and America at large. In doing all these, we also attempted 
to explore and identity anthropomorphic representation and mean-
ing, including simple metaphoric statement but with strong intense. 
At the end, from our interpretive process, a clear framework emerged 
to identify and link the two core meta-constructs: (1) anger, and (2) 
love/adoration.  
Positive Anger
Within the positivity anger meta-construct, three major con-
structs were identified followed by eight linked concepts. 
Positivity anger construct 1: “Real”-ness 
The positive construct of real-ness comes at strong anger in-
tensity. When the CBS journalist argued that HM is fake, or in fact 
the “fake-est” star (Johnson, 2012), the majority of fans responded 
strongly that they did not only disagree but strongly felt that label-
ling HM as fake was completely misleading. 
“She’s a real singer for me!! and she is IMMORTAL!” (Mikuo-
san)
“… it is a real voice, a real talent and a REAL PERSON” 
(MRWALRUS)
Within this construct, it was also suggested that that HM’s 
real-ness was connected to Japan’s cultural and religious heritage: 
‘souled idolation ontology’ – in which everything has a soul.
... I’m a native Japanese in Japan. To come to the point, you are 
totally ignorant on Japanese culture and thinking. We have a 
special affection for human-shaped objects under the influence 
of Shinto culture. In Shinto everything and anything in the uni-
verse, both animate and inanimate, even the artificial material, 
has its own “soul” or “spirit” in it….This can be one of the 
reasons why Japanese people love virtual idols. I hope my poor 
explanation would be an access to better insight on Japanese 
culture (Damesuke, Japan)
Both Johnson’s CBS article and the fan responses confirm that 
HM is more than a computer program or hologram, and is in fact 
a powerful “star” and idol.  Her fans lovingly call her “Uta Hime” 
which can be literally translated into English as “Princess of Song”. 
Praising HM as Princess of Song goes beyond ordinary pop star sta-
tus.
“Whatever, guys. Ya’ll don’t know nothin. She’s utahime and 
that’s that.” (FX9095)
“Miku is not a pop star she is a utahime” (YONOP)
Positive anger construct 2: “human” celebrities are “more” 
fake 
This positive anger construct emerged at moderate anger in-
tensity demonstrated by a more moderate emotional tone. This con-
struct exhibits a disagreement with labelling HM as fake and rebuts 
that there are so many “real” celebrities who behaves fake or pretend 
to be someone else. These respondents further argue that HM has 
nothing deceptive – she is genuine. HM has tapped into a deep and 
resonant chord with her creators and fans that unveils the latent de-
sire to exhibit no pretence – no deception life. The adorable genuine 
kind of life “she” has garnered is evident in many fan comments and 
is energizing.
“The world is filled with fake celebrities, pretending to be 
something they are not, remade by image consultants, keeping 
up appearances with a polished veneer.  Hatsune Miku is none 
of these things. She is exactly what she appears to be, with no 
pretence or deception. She is the sum total of the hopes and 
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dreams and creative energy of her legions of adoring fans, and 
can be nothing else. She is quite possibly the most genuine ce-
lebrity to ever grace the earth.”(Erik_Romero)
Positive anger construct 3:  Acceptance to the “un-real-
ness” being of HM
The un-real-ness construct emerged at a moderate intensity lev-
el of anger. This construct also highlights the creative and innovative 
nature of HM, as many fans defended HM in terms of the creativity 
and innovativeness that this Vocaloid technology and database en-
able. HM is seen as one of the superb achievements of  Japan. HM 
is obviously about music and the enablement of musical expression, 
giving artists the ability to put a “voice” to their music without the 
need for a physical singer.
“Everybody who loves miku and other Vocaloids already know 
they are not real people but also know that they’re part of a real 
program, a real instrument that an artist can use to create a 
fabulous new things.” (SUZUMIYA_KAI)
In addition to the creative-innovative side of HM, one extra 
construct of special note emerged related to the attention placed upon 
the co-creative business model that is at the heart of HM.  The ho-
lographic image of HM has performed multiple sold-out concerts in 
her home country and in many countries around the world. Projected 
on a screen and supported by a live band, Miku sings and dances ac-
cording to the direction of programmers who “designed” the concert 
in advance. 
“The point is that Hatsune Miku isn’t actually a pop star at all if 
you want to analyze her, she is the product of her fans, literally. 
Her songs are made by individual artists, her appearance is as 
fans illustrate her. The only thing which belongs to her is her 
voice, and that is by Saki Fujita … She is much greater than a 
person. We call her an idol or a goddess specifically because 
she is less an individual than an collective abstraction. She is 
Hatsune Miku, and nothing else (Kakisho)”
The un-real-ness construct also pointed to real productions that 
HM participates in, but is unharmed by this participation. HM was 
celebrated for her innocent life both within Johnson’s CBS article, 
and within the fan responses to it. 
“So she’s not real as we know it, because she’s a program. How-
ever It’s a really neat thing to go see if you’ve ever seen one 
of their shows. She also endorses products just like any other 
celebrity. The only thing she can’t do is go out and ruin her life, 
or get hooked on drugs, and end up in rehab. (Dish12)
Negative Anger
Within the “negativity” anger meta-construct, all with strong 
anger intensity, three constructs were identified.
Negativity anger construct 1: Offensive
A majority of the fan comments included at least some shade 
of anger or frustration in their response. The passion within such 
responses can be best shown in the following two comments:  
“I was literally flipping tables when I read this, I’m a die-hard vo-
caloid fan, and I thought only Fox news was bullsh*t.” (ANI-MAN)
“THINK BEFORE YOU ******* WRITE A ARTICLE!! I’ve al-
ready gotten some Miku haters on my youtube channel because 
of this.” (Hatsunemikufan_101)
Negative anger construct 2:  Mocking
Because many of the proposed “facts” within the article were in 
fact not true (i.e. HM “is a hologram….more accurately she is a digi-
tal avatar.”), and the author openly stated that she used Wikipedia as 
her main source of research, many fan responses mocked the author 
and CBS in terms of their credibility.
“CBS needs to do some research. Yeah I wouldn’t called looking 
on Wikipedia ‘research’ for a multi billion dollar company.” 
(LUCCHINI2)
“If CBS wants to bash on Miku and the Vocaloids, then by all 
means, you might as well glorify Jersey Shore and encourage 
teenagers to quit school to get drugged up and pregnant. I com-
mend you, CBS.” (XYINXYANGXYOUKAIX)
Negative anger construct 3:  America-bashing
As the content of Johnson’s original article positioned HM as 
different, strange and something purely Japanese, many responses 
took offense to this and turned to anti-American sentiment in return:
“How wonderful is it that other countries in the world actually 
have the ability to create something wonderful and 10th Genera-
tion for entertainment compared to your drug Fu***ed society.” 
(IGNORANT_JOURNALISTS_SUCK)
Non-Fans’ positivity construct: Sympathy – Solidarity
We also found non-fans’ comments and repeatedly throughout 
the commentary by HM fans, the concept of a larger group or com-
munity, in its most positive, collaborative sense was mentioned and 
often celebrated. 
“I may not be a hardcore fan of Miku like my other friends, 
but even then I feel like this article just shoved at me a bunch 
of narrow-minded critiques said with no thought at all. I 
can’t even imagine the anger this article has caused to Miku’s 
fans.”(NinjaAutobot101)
“Even if the person does so or not, it doesn’t change that you 
have offended millions of people over the world.” (Sakura772)
As a summary, figure 1 entails all identified construct into one 
conceptual map.
Figure 1:  Conceptual Map of HM
Note: Utahime means Princess of Song 
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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
Our analysis brings to several key categorical findings. First 
HM is “real” because it represents the collective creativity of artists, 
illustrators, business entities and fans. Second, the co-production 
nature enhances on how strongly HM truly comes alive inside her 
fans. Third, the creative capability enables those individuals without 
music composition capabilities to join this new consumption culture. 
Fourth, HM is simultaneously stimulating, actualizing, experiment-
ing and collaborating. HM is stimulating because it gives the desired 
freedom for consumers using resources and experiences so that they 
can obtain an (representative) ability to sing. In terms of actualizing, 
consumers actualize their latent desire in the form of songs they like 
others to listen and not yet expressed in any other manner. Lyrics, 
types of music and dancing style performance are the productions 
where consumers may enact their dreams of musicality and singing 
realms. Consumers actualize ideally possible imaginings or fantasies, 
like being a great composer or a choreographer that possess the abil-
ity to compose a fantastic song and to create a singing performance. 
Regarding experimenting, consumers enjoy experimentally explor-
ing and combining different features available, including adopting 
different kinds of music, lyrics and voices, even possible for unable 
music individuals. All these give consumers some sort of status in 
HM society. These also give consumers space for expressing their 
esteem (personal values) like being a serious musician and choreog-
rapher. Fifth, exploring the anthropomorphic essence and perspec-
tive, there emerges from the fans the supreme perception of HM as 
Uta Hime (Princess of Song) without fail, supreme representation of 
HM as the symbol of innovation confirming Japan dominating US, 
and supreme protoplasmic, integrated consciousness between HM 
fans and HM as their created darling. The first and the latter definite-
ly contain much emotive elements, especially love and adoration. 
More specifically, the personification (or humanization) of HM into 
her fans reflects the harmonized dispositional, situational, develop-
mental and cultural integration of HM as the fans’ anthropomorphic 
agent, cognitively – ability of the fans to express and perform the 
elicited HM knowledge - and motivationally – strongly motivated to 
explain the complex stimuli of HM effectively (termed as effectance, 
Epley et al 2007) and strongly motivated to socially defend HM and 
her fandom community with respect to her realness authenticity and 
contribution (termed as sociality, Epley et al 2007).     
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings imply that virtual consumption enables profound 
emotional connection between co-creating consumers and their vir-
tual character, perhaps due to the co-creation nature of HM that in-
dividual consumer may take significant role in final production of 
HM. Taking further the discussions above, with the summary map 
implying anger related to love and adoration when the anger has 
positive perspectives and arguments defendable to criticism, there 
remains interesting gaps. First, from anthropomorphic domain, does 
the success of HM as a powerful (even spiritual) agent of individual 
existence and social connection reflect a lack of human connection 
in the society? Also, in the future, research examining more socio-
cultural values within the virtual co-creating consumption like HM 
can be worthwhile, for instance to comprehend the souled idolation 
ontology or the desirable no-pretence life principle.   
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ABSTRACT
The role of marketing in the global rise of obesity to children 
has been the subject of heated debates in the past decade. In this pa-
per we review recent studies to contribute to the debate surrounding 
further regulation of advertising.
‘Polemic and Panic’ Around Advertising and Childhood 
Obesity
Much of the public debate focuses singularly on advertising, 
exemplified by claims of concerned participants portraying adver-
tising to children as “by its very nature, exploitive” (Kunkel et al. 
2004, 11) and as “inherently misleading” (Graff, Kunkel, and Mer-
min 2012, 392). There are frequent calls for “governmental action to 
protect young children from commercial exploitation” (Kunkel et al. 
2004, 23), including recent calls for stronger regulation, or a com-
plete ban of advertising in the UK and Canada (Joseph 2013; CBC 
News 2013). While much of the public debate often includes differ-
ent promotional, pricing and distribution tactics, traditional media 
“advertising seems to have been effectively scapegoated as the vil-
lain of the piece” (Young 2003, 25).
The industry has responded that advertising bans are counter-
productive, have no effect on obesity levels and result in “serious 
social, cultural and economic ramifications”, such as “reduced sales, 
job cuts, decreased consumer choice, stifled innovation and barriers 
to competition and market entry” (World Federation of Advertisers 
2013). 
Policy reactions inevitably vary by country (see Young 2010 for 
a more extensive discussion). In the US, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion started to regulate advertising to children since the 1970s, cou-
pled with industry self-regulation. Some countries, such as Sweden 
and Quebec, have banned all media advertising to children, while 
others, for example the UK, have banned only certain types of ad-
vertising (such as those for foods high in fat, sugar and salt) during 
programs aimed primarily at children. 
Academic Contribution
Mirroring the passionate public discussion, the academic debate 
surrounding the effect that food advertising has on childhood obesity 
has been similarly polarized. Cautiously, Young et al. (1996) con-
cluded in an early review of the evidence relating to the effect of ad-
vertising on the rising obesity levels among children, that advertising 
is only one of many factors influencing children’s food consumption.
Taking the opposite view, Hastings et al. (2003) conclude that 
current food promotion, alongside television consumption, “signifi-
cantly influences children’s food behavior and diet independently of 
other factors” (p.18). Similar to Hastings et al. (2003), later reviews, 
such as a report by the Institute of Medicine (2006), a report by the 
British regulator Ofcom (2004) and a further report by Livingstone 
and Helsper (2004) all conclude that the direct effect of advertising 
is moderate, but harmful.
The contradictory conclusions can be explained, at least in 
part, by the selection criteria for inclusion of studies: Young et al. 
(1996) excluded experimental or laboratory based studies, arguing 
that these types of studies are too far removed from reality. Hastings 
et al. (2003) and the later reports for Ofcom (2004), the Institute of 
Medicine (2006) and Livingstone and Helsper (2004) on the other 
hand, draw their conclusions mainly based on experimental studies. 
These later reports argue that overall television-viewing habits must 
be taken into account when considering the impact of advertising 
exposure, i.e. they equate high television viewing with high exposure 
to food advertising and resultant obesity. 
The equation of high-television-viewing with a direct advertis-
ing effect, however, is challenged by Desrochers and Holt (2007). 
Based on US data, they show that obesity levels among children 
have risen dramatically in the last 20 years, in line with television-
viewing and total exposure to television advertising. Nevertheless, 
children’s exposure to food advertisements decreased over the same 
time. Moreover, in 1977 children were exposed to more advertising 
for cereals and desserts and sweets than in 2004. It is safe to say, that 
the presented arguments remain controversial and much contested.
The point on which both sides agreed, however, is that too little 
is known regarding the size of the direct effect of advertising itself. 
For example, the Hastings et al. (2003) report only one study ex-
amining a direct relationship between advertising and snacking fre-
quency (i.e. not merely a link between television viewing in total 
and food choice). The study (Bolton 1983) is, however, almost 20 
years old, and therefore may no longer adequately represent today’s 
media consumption patterns. Bolton (1983) concludes that “long-run 
effects of television food advertising are detected, but their impact is 
found to be very small in comparison with that of other effects” (p. 
173). The study quantifies the effect of television food advertising as 
explaining 2% of the observed variance in snacking behavior among 
children. For comparison, parental snacking frequency explained 
29% of the variance in children’s snacking behavior. 
Because of the lack of evidence regarding a direct link between 
advertising and obesity in children, both sides in the argument draw 
conclusions on the basis of a narrative evaluation, relying on circum-
stantial evidence regarding food promotions, largely relying on ex-
perimental data, or arguing on the basis of a link between television 
viewing and obesity levels. 
In the past few years, several researchers have attempted to ex-
amine the link between advertising exposure and food choice. How-
ever, this research has not been systematically reviewed or entered 
the public policy debate. 
The current debate is, therefore, often based on data that rarely 
explicitly address the directly attributable effect that advertising has 
on consumption, leaving the industry to conclude “it is not possible 
to draw any meaningful conclusions on the impact [of advertising] 
on longer-term dietary and health variables” (World Federation of 
Advertisers 2006, 3). With the majority of regulatory efforts and 
public discourse being directed towards regulating (or even banning) 
media advertising, the question is, whether this effort is misdirected.
This paper contributes to the debate by analyzing studies from 
different fields that have attempted to examine the direct link be-
tween advertising and food choice, establishing what the size of the 
effect of advertising on childhood obesity is likely to be, based on 
the available evidence. In doing so, we investigate two interrelated 
research questions: 
RQ1: Based on recent evidence, what is the reported effect of 
advertising on food choice? 
RQ2: Does the study design effect the outcome?
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METHODOLOGY
To address both questions, we conduct a meta-analysis of recent 
studies (conducted in the past 10 years). To identify studies for inclu-
sion in the meta-analysis, we conducted a keyword search using the 
terms children, advertising and effect or effectiveness using Busi-
ness Source Elite, Emerald and Google Scholar, following the rec-
ommendations by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), and similar to steps 
taken in earlier meta-analyses published in the marketing literature. 
In order to include only studies that were conducted recently, we 
limited the inclusion to peer-reviewed studies published in the last 
twelve years (2000-2012). 
The search resulted in 15 studies from the business, health and 
psychology fields. As this study aims to examine the direct effect 
of advertising on consumption, only studies which gave empirical 
evidence of direct advertising effectiveness on food choice were 
included. Studies which measured other marketing effectiveness 
measures, such as advertising recall, brand awareness, or brand pref-
erence amongst children were excluded. Of the 15 studies, 6 were 
removed because they relied on general media exposure rather than 
advertising exposure, one because it solely measured recall of spe-
cific advertising elements (Maher, et al. 2006) and one (Dhar and 
Baylis 2011) because it was based on data from 1984 to 1992.
The remaining manuscripts (marked by asterisks in the refer-
ences) were included in the meta-analysis, covering a total sample 
size of 17,431. In cases where the studies did not provide all the 
details required to calculate effect sizes, we contacted the authors to 
obtain the relevant details. The ages of the children studied ranged 
from 3-12 years old, and all studies included both male and female 
children.
Most studies reported single effects, i.e. effect of advertising 
on a single food or drink item, with the exception of a study by An-
dreyeva et al. (2011), which reported four effect sizes. Because of 
the multiple effect sizes reported by Andreyeva et al. (2011), 10 ef-
fect sizes were used for the meta-analysis. In order to consider a 
weight for the multiple measures for this study, each sample size was 
weighted by the ratio 0.25 to the number of effect sizes reported, as 
suggested by Hunter and Schmidt (2004). All other studies, which 
reported a single measure for the dependent variable, were weighted 
1.0.
We selected the correlation coefficient (r) effect size for the 
analysis. Consequently, numbers closer to 1 indicate a strong, posi-
tive effect of advertising, while numbers closer to 0 indicate no ef-
fect. Numbers closer to -1 would indicate a negative effect. 
RESULTS
The resultant meta-analytic correlations (applying the random-
effects model) are given in Table 1.  
Table 1: Meta-analytic Correlations 
Type of Study
Number 
of 
Studies
N r CIUpper CILower
RQ1 Combined 10 17431 0.160 0.376 -0.056
RQ2 Experimental 4 611 0.456 0.487 0.425Observational 6 11820 0.012 0.013 0.011
In order to answer RQ1 the result, taking into account all stud-
ies irrespective of study type, shows that advertising has a small, 
but significant effect on children. The mean for all studies is r = 
0.160, with 95% confidence intervals (CI) between CIUpper = 0.376 
and CILower = -0.056 for all studies. According to Cohen (1977) this 
effect is considered small. This finding is therefore similar to the 
finding of Bolton (1983), and adds further evidence that any direct 
effect of advertising, independent of being short- or long-term, is at 
best limited.
In order to answer RQ2, we also calculated the meta-analytic 
correlations for the different types of studies included i.e. if there 
are differences in reported effect sizes between experimental and ob-
servational studies. . We classified as experimental all studies which 
evaluated children’s food choices following advertising exposure by 
means of an experimental setup, while observational studies were 
those that calculated advertising effects based on market data in con-
junction with advertising exposure data. The results show that the 
study design clearly has an influence on the reported outcome, with 
the difference between reported effect sizes significant (z = 59.20, 
p < 0.005). 
As can be seen from Table 1, only experimental studies showed 
significant effects, while observational studies failed to demonstrate 
any effect. However, only two experimental studies reported a mod-
erate effect above 0.3 (Cohen, 1977). Conversely, all observational 
studies report effect sizes well below the threshold of a small effect 
size (between 0.021 and 0.002). 
DISCUSSION
The results from the meta-analysis suggests that media adver-
tising alone may have only a very small effect in the short term, 
for example, immediately after watching an advertisement, such as 
in a laboratory experiment.  Therefore, there is still no persuasive 
evidence to support any long term, direct effect of advertising on 
children’s food choices. Further, the experimental studies find sig-
nificant effects which may, in turn, influence policy, yet their results 
are not consistent with the ‘reality’ exhibited in the observational 
data studies. This provides additional support for Young’s (1996) ra-
tionale to remove experimental studies. 
This finding has important consequences regarding the current 
calls for more regulation, or even bans of advertising. These initia-
tives are likely to be misdirected as they will have only a very limited 
impact. This does not mean, of course, that marketing has no role to 
play in addressing obesity among children. However, by singularly 
focusing on advertising as a potential remedy, advocates may be di-
verting the regulatory effort away from areas that matter more in the 
fight against obesity. 
For researchers, there are several areas that would benefit from 
more attention. First, it is clear that more research is needed regard-
ing the direct impact of advertising on consumption. Further, the 
relatively limited data available that is not experiment based also 
opens up avenues for future research to more clearly determine long-
term effects. 
A second issue is that academics should be clear that television 
advertising is unlikely to be the sole culprit, and they can play a lead-
ing role by advancing knowledge, and examining the need for regu-
lation in areas other than traditional media advertising. For example, 
we know that playing advergames has an effect on preferences for 
products (Mallinckrodt and Mizerski 2007), yet this area is a virtu-
ally unregulated. Likewise, food pricing has been shown to influ-
ence consumption significantly (cf. Wansink and Payne 2012) but, 
again, receives only marginal attention in the debate about regula-
tion. Moreover, more work is urgently needed comparing advertising 
effects with effects of other promotional tools. 
Finally, since no marketing campaign is based on television 
advertising exclusively, the impact of coordinated forms of commu-
nications needs to be investigated and included in the debate. There 
are already some studies of the effects of other marketing techniques, 
but they are often ‘siloed’, studying only the effects of the technique 
348 / Childhood Obesity: Is Advertising The Culprit?
under consideration and missing the opportunity for looking at the 
wider picture. Although the effects confirmed in this study may be 
small, such effects may be significant and cumulative over a longer 
period of time, especially if these are compounded by simultaneous 
media use (Schultz, Block, and Raman 2012; Bardhi, Rohm, and 
Sultan 2010) and exposure to multiple promotional vehicles. In a 
unique study, brand recognition and packaging have been found to 
have a significant influence on children (Levin and Levin 2010. 
But the buck does not stop with academia and policy mak-
ers: The industry itself needs to ask itself what effect their behavior 
has on the debate. Specifically, as the public debate often conflates 
behavior in regulated and unregulated areas, several studies have 
shown less than exemplary behavior by some industry members, 
particularly regarding promotions using new media forms (e.g. Dahl, 
Eagle, and Baez 2009; Quilliam et al. 2011). A failure from industry 
members to show commendable behavior in all areas is likely to fuel 
further calls for the imposition of greater restrictions on marketing 
for all members.
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ABSTRACT
Vintage is not a new concept. Second-hand markets and the sell-
ing and trading of clothing, bric-a-brac and unwanted goods have 
been a constant presence throughout consumer history. Previous re-
search around this concept has been explored in the CCT literature 
from flea markets (Belk et al, 1988; Sherry, 1990), to the notion of 
thrift shopping (Bardhi 2003; Bardhi and Arnould 2003), and alter-
native spaces of consumption (Belk et al. 1991; Roux and Korchia 
2006; McGrath et al. 1993).   For CCT researchers, markets are seen 
as social and cultural constructs, with the marketplace unpacked in 
terms of the collective efforts to sustain and perform such market-
places (Arnould and Thompson 2005; Geiger et al. 2012). To con-
tribute to such previous work we theorise the vintagescape as a form 
of cultural politics in action and movement.  Considering vintage as 
a socially and culturally malleable frame, it is useful to theorise vin-
tage and its associated practices in terms of their potential for move-
ment, that is, enacted strategically by both buyers and sellers to bring 
forth a marketspace which fuses a mythical idealised past with a fast 
paced consumer present.  
Theorising Vintage Practices and Performances
To suggest that vintage practices bring forth movement may 
strike the reader as a truism or too marginal a contribution for an 
advance in consumer research.  However, such an approach takes 
us to the central theme of our paper, the contemporary character of 
what Bourdieu in Outline to a Theory of Practice (2010, orig. 1977: 
7) refers to as the ‘dialectics of strategies’ whereby the urgencies of 
time must be included as a central constituent of everyday practices. 
Such a sense of time takes a number of forms but makes explicit 
the ways that practices are structured temporally.  Notions of tempo 
and rhythm take us closer to this sense of being-in-the world, where 
practices must be understood as unfolding within particular parcels 
of temporal invigoration.  Such an assertion on the time-like qualities 
of everyday practices bring us closer to the notion of the vintages-
cape as an ensemble of practices orchestrated and oriented around 
notions of time.  Our turn to movement makes explicit the routines 
and conventions, which are revealed by taking on, board this aspect 
of practices.  We are not alone in this sensibility to contexts.  For ex-
ample, Nash (2000) calls attention to the notion that “dance is taught, 
scripted, performed and watched” and that performativity is not just 
a singular act, but also a repetition of assumed norms. It is through 
this constructed space that an understanding of vintage practices as 
a “structured movement system” (Kaeppler, 1985) begins to emerge; 
what Williams would prefer to visualise as a ‘structure of feeling’. 
To theorise time as significant to the constitution of practices 
forces us to also consider the value of particular consumption spaces. 
For Warde (2005) and Appaduari (1986), the link between spaces, 
objects and practices is of central importance.  In a similar fashion, 
De Certeau (1995) considers space as “an intersection of moving 
bodies” and of it being a practiced settlement.  Hereby understand-
ing of everyday practices is enriched through understanding consum-
ers as moving entities in time and space, through which notions of 
fixed structures are questioned, and a more nuanced appreciation of 
agency begins to emerge, perhaps best thought of in terms of the 
ability to “negotiate movements within those structures” (McDonald 
2004: 200). In focusing on this performative enactment of vintage, 
it can be seen to be a social entity grounded in the temporalities and 
spatialities of commodity journeys, with vintage as the outcome of 
this embodiment and consumer action (Gregson and Crewe, 2002).
Our final ingredient for an appreciation of everyday practices is 
that of objects and artefacts, how they are used in practice and “the 
intermediation work they perform” (Nicolini, 2013: 220).  For as 
Nicolini makes explicit:  “Practices only exist to the extent that they 
are enacted and re-enacted.  Focusing on practices is thus taking the 
social and material doing (of something: [where] doing is never ob-
jectless.” (Ibid: 221). Unlike the ‘Diderot effect’ (McCracken 1988) 
in which a change in one object leads to multiple transformations 
with the whole set, Hui (2012) argues in her study of mobile practice 
networks that previously discarded things are reclaimed easily when 
mobilities change. Focusing on these moments of travel, consump-
tion therefore can be suggested to occur during performances in re-
lation to objects of practice that are used thus forming ‘symbiotic 
chains’ (Lury, 1997: 77). When consumption is understood as part of 
social practices the movement of the objects and how this movement 
shapes the moments of consumption, sensitivity to time and space 
become critical.  As with all recipes other ingredients can be added, 
but ours is forged on the notion of considering practices within time 
and space, through a turn to objects. 
METHOD
This paper draws insights from the context of the Glasgow, UK 
vintage marketplace. This ethnographic research explores the prac-
tices between consumers, spaces and objects in the enactment of the 
vintagescape. With a particular focus on the transient, ‘pop-up’ mar-
kets that unfold across the city, the findings reflect two years absorbed 
in the vintage scene. With the researcher performing as ‘bricoleur’ 
and taking inspiration from Schroeder’s (2004) ‘image economy’, 
the photographs allowed a focus on the modes of visual enactment of 
vintage. A researcher diary complemented and enhanced our appre-
ciation of this context through sensitizing us to the reflexive aspects 
of the lived experience of meaning in motion in the marketplace. The 
researcher in this way gained access to the market through attending 
regularly and building relationships with key characters of the scene. 
Twenty-five ethnographic interviews (McCracken, 1988 b) were 
used to gain an emic perspective of vintage practices. The interview 
data supplemented the observational data and provided practitioner 
perspectives on the actions and practices of ‘performing vintage’ in 
the marketplace. Our findings are organized around two themes: The 
Vintage Marketspace in Action and Organization; and ‘Looks’ and 
the Performance of Inclusion.
The Vintage Marketspace in Action and Organization
The first motif we explore is that of marketspace as revealed 
through action and organization. The afternoon of the market can 
be seen as a continual shift between time, space and actors, with a 
changing rhythm and tempo that marks the passage of the day. This 
time-space dynamic nods to Giddens (1979: 3) in that the dichotomy 
is inscribed in all social interactions. To start with there is an air of 
urgency as vendors arrive. The most pressing demands at this time 
are the practices of setting up the table, unloading stock and securing 
the transport of such stock to the venue.  Having moved such stuff, 
vendors busy themselves in dealing with the urgencies of time and 
their calculations over spatial display:
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“Vendors arrive to be shown to a rectangular wooden table, a 
lamp and a chair. From these objects they have to create their own 
area that showcases their wares and establishes themselves as dif-
ferent from their close neighbours. The unpacking and setting up 
process seems to be crucial in the cultivation of a vintage look. The 
more seasoned vendors arrive early and with a careful system un-
pack daintily embroidered table clothes dressing the wooden table as 
they go, cake stands, hat boxes, weathered suitcases all revealed to 
store treasures and present them to the awaiting crowd.” (Fieldnote, 
February 12th 2012).
The setting up one’s table to best display stock is itself an art of 
practicising, an exercise in staging and performance through objects. 
Vendors place objects to best display their items, sometimes con-
structing a front and back stage through the layering of the table to 
best attract the attention of mobile customers, and thereby encourage 
them to linger (see figure 1):
“You start to learn what makes your stall attractive, sometimes 
it is through trial and error or being inspired by seeing how some-
one has put their stall together. We try really hard to make it easy to 
see the stock but also to get across some of our personality, so it is 
never going to be too ‘done’ it will always be a bit like a dressing up 
box…” (Charlie)
For this seller, the table provides a ‘showcase’ but also creates 
an opportunity to present the consumer (and themselves) with a space 
for play and experimentation. With an almost child-like reverence of 
‘the dressing up box’ the objects of the stall are used strategically to 
produce forms of invitation to explore and stage a personality for the 
interaction beyond the confines of what may be understood as main-
stream selling. Building on Holt’s (1995) consumption as play typol-
ogy, within the vintagescape play and the unveiling of difference are 
bound by the financial rewards to be gained by the seller for creating 
such an immersive space. This communicative staging in the ‘look’ 
of the table and ones’ self is rehearsed and refined by the seller in 
the course of their career in the marketspace through the practice of 
organising their stall and ‘prepping’ for the event. In the subtle and 
unspoken cycle of production and destruction, this active process is 
critical in creating acceptance in the market. This links to Entwistle’s 
(2000) work, as the staging of the space allows for the enactment of 
fashion capital in the marketscape (Bourdieu 1984, 1985). Vintage 
here should not be understood as an end result or fixed vantage point 
but as a continual and ongoing process of improvisation in which 
competences are developed through play and performance. The mar-
ket offers a space for engaging with objects, a stage for play with 
the material and exploring the boundaries of the marketscape to trial 
more “episodic selves’ (Stafford 2007). 
Once the vintage sale commences an air of expectation and an-
ticipation can be felt.  To start with there is an air of urgency as 
vendors arrive and final preparations are made to ‘look’ and ‘feel’ 
of the organization of items.  The market day itself is punctuated by 
moments of action and inaction:
“The day ebbs and flows as consumers enter and move through 
the space. Throughout the day this rhythm changes as the audience 
alters: inner members of the collective arrive early and eagerly an-
ticipate rummaging for “treasures”, with the Sunday strollers of 
mid-afternoon creating a more relaxed and less exclusive scene, with 
newspapers tucked under arms and hushed tones of ‘don’t touch’ to 
children. The crescendo of the day falls mid-afternoon as the sounds 
of consumers’ chat hums in the air, the beats of the 1960s pop music 
Figure 1
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sets the tempo, with long conversations between stall holders and 
consumers ensuing in which the past is continually invoked as a ref-
erence point for understanding and interaction to hurried exchanges 
in which objects are inspected and paid for. As the end of the day 
approaches the pace slows, stallholders chat to one another about 
their ‘take’ for the afternoon and attentions turn to carefully packing 
and organising and the act of deconstructing the stall” (Fieldnote, 
15th April 2012).
As a transient marketplace the ‘vintage look’ has to be created 
and staged on every occasion. Market routines and conventions pro-
duce a creative environment in which values of independence and 
othering from conventional market selling are emphasized: 
“We are quite laid back about it, people want to tailor the space 
to their own needs and to highlight their own stuff that they are sell-
ing, it isn’t really something we dictate. I would say we are pretty 
flexible and are really here to oversee and help if anything comes 
up.” (Elena)
The material conditions and aesthetics along with the presenta-
tion of the objects, establish an atmosphere of something organic and 
without strict boundaries that is often contrasted with market norms. 
Elena’s quote encapsulates the idea that the physical environment 
of the market is haphazard and is a product of its temporal nature. 
By achieving ‘the look’ and through calculations over objects to 
bring and discuss, the market becomes a showcase for oneself. The 
construction of this market ‘look’ adds credibility to both seller and 
consumer and this co-creation has implications for the construction 
of value. This transformation was achieved through the management 
and organization of objects for producing a feeling of acceptance and 
belonging. The focus on stylisation of the space highlights the fluid-
ity of value, that far from being fixed, it is constructed anew within 
the market space.  
This notion of the staging of the marketplace has been de-
veloped in consumption literature around the language of Sherry’s 
“brandscape” (1998), Ger and Belk’s (1996) “consumptionscape” 
and Arsel and Thompson’s (2004) “hegemonic brandscape”. These 
accounts explore the relationship between consumers and the envi-
ronment but often underplay the active role of objects in such mar-
ketscapes. In applying a material culture focus to the vintagescape, 
the networks of materiality are instead highlighted (Arsel and Bean 
2013: Borgerson 2005: Miller 2005) which allow us to unpack the 
particular aesthetics of the vintage scene, but also the modes of 
presentation, illumination and action made material through such a 
frame of interaction.
Vintage Marketspace ‘Looks’ and the Performance of 
Inclusion
The second motif we explore is that of ‘Vintage Marketspace 
‘Looks’ and the Performance of Inclusion’. The shared social space 
of the market creates the backdrop to the exchange and shapes con-
sumer’s encounters allowing them to interact with others of a similar 
taste and mindset. The marketspace is a communal setting, which is 
enlivened by the social bonds of the collective. When asked why the 
markets were important Lisa explains:
“What I think about is selling that object, discussing with the 
customer about the item, building a relationship with them and 
thinking about what new lease of life they will give it… I love those 
interactions…I have made so many friends in this line of work and 
Table 1
Motif Overview Data
Marketspace revealed 
through action and 
organisation
Highlights the network 
of materiality of the 
marketspace, which is bound 
in time and space and is 
enacted by practitioners. 
1. “Vendors arrive to be shown to a rectangular wooden table, a lamp and 
a chair. From these objects they have to create their own area that show-
cases their wares and establishes themselves as different from their close 
neighbours. The unpacking and setting up process seems to be crucial in 
the cultivation of a vintage look. The more seasoned vendors arrive early 
and with a careful system unpack daintily embroidered table clothes dressing 
the wooden table as they go, cake stands, hat boxes, weathered suitcases all 
revealed to store treasures and present them to the awaiting crowd.” (Field-
note, February 12th 2012).
2. “You start to learn what makes your stall attractive, sometimes it is through 
trial and error or being inspired by seeing how someone has put their stall to-
gether. We try really hard to make it easy to see the stock but also to get across 
some of our personality, so it is never going to be too ‘done’ it will always be 
a bit like a dressing up box…” (Charlie, August 4th 2012).
3. “We are quite laid back about it, people want to tailor the space to their 
own needs and to highlight their own stuff that they are selling, it isn’t really 
something we dictate. I would say we are pretty flexible and are really here 
to oversee and help if anything comes up” (Elena, one of the Granny Would 
be Proud organisers).
Vintage ‘looks’ and 
a performance of 
inclusion
A communicative staging 
of the vintage ‘look,’ which 
is a practiced performance, 
through which the social 
role of the marketspace is 
illuminated.
1. What I think about is selling that object, discussing with the customer about 
the item, building a relationship with them and thinking about what new lease 
of life they will give it… I love those interactions…I have made so many 
friends in this line of work and I always thought that I was alone in how I 
valued vintage stuff over new things…”(Lisa, August 26th 2012).
2. “I expect someone to acknowledge that I have entered their space, it almost 
feels like quite a private space, whether that’s with a nod or a smile or start-
ing to make chat, but it almost feels like you need their permission to touch 
things and through saying hello it feels like you get the go-ahead.”
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I always thought that I was alone in how I valued vintage stuff over 
new things…” 
When asked about the vintage scene she comments that the 
markets allow for a marketplace to be created that isn’t just about 
profit but is about the people. This social role of the market and the 
physical proximity of the marketspace enforce the relational nature 
of the exchange and in turn enlivened a stronger feeling of commu-
nity. For the sellers, the undertaking of their business involves this 
‘hanging out’ and absorption of the scene. Much of the knowledge 
distribution in the collective was dependent on ‘being there’; within 
the face-to-face interactions of the marketplace.  Such knowledge 
was in turn integrated as second nature into their practices and per-
formances. 
As Hanna (1979) draws distinctions between competence (in-
ternalised rules for dancing) and performance (what someone does 
on the basis of knowing such rules) and creator (choreographer) and 
imitator (Hanna et al., 1979; 315), rules of etiquette in the market-
place were brought to the foreground. As Jess spoke of the etiquette 
of the vintage scene: that it should be “work”, “a little bit scary” 
and “not overly accessible to outsiders.” This language of exclusiv-
ity and drawing boundaries between insiders and outsiders in the 
collective conveyed the knowledge needed to adequately partake in 
the vintagescape. The stall table again acted as a main focal point for 
consumers: the interaction, accepted behaviour and vendor reaction, 
as Jess explains: 
“I expect someone to acknowledge that I have entered their 
space, it almost feels like quite a private space, whether that’s with 
a nod or a smile or starting to make chat, but it almost feels like you 
need their permission to touch things and through saying hello it 
feels like you get the go-ahead.” 
This excerpt portrays the created space around the table as a 
private area, almost as a homely sphere that has established practices 
that must be acknowledged before progression can be made. The 
consumer acts as willing participant to be led through the process 
by a knowledgeable tutor, they seek acceptance to continue onto the 
next step of being able to interact with both the objects and the pos-
sible exchange. 
CONCLUSION
For L.P. Hartley in his 1950s classic The Go-Between, ‘the past 
is a foreign country’; such nostalgic resonances abound in troubled 
times, but the notion of a go-between is useful to theorise the value of 
practices for bringing a sense of rhythm and tempo to the everyday. 
Practices as we have sought to reveal are an invaluable perspective 
for capturing the sense that actions unfold in space and time; and it 
is through such a practice turn that we capture a sensitivity to the 
vintagescape, as Lury and Lash suggest, as a “space of intensities” 
(2007: 15).  As marketspace, the vintage frame works through a logic 
of difference; such difference is not merely understood as a form of 
badging or representation but as an embodied urge for difference, 
which most reveals itself through the temporal and spatial character 
of consumption.  Not simply a place of signs, but of embodied actors 
working to produce a form of worlding which desires a particular 
parcel of time and space, which sometimes dances to a different beat 
than might be found on the perhaps your average high street, shop-
ping mall or the movement of virtual worlds. 
The Vintagescape as we have sought to reveal is marked out 
by an ensemble of practices, which speak of a form of longing for 
alternative worlds.  But such realms do not simply happen by ac-
cident rather they must be practiced into being.  Here markets are 
best understood as practical outcomes (Araujo et al., 2010: 5), as 
accomplishments through which vendors and consumers make ma-
terial their values, ethics and politics.  Objects and spaces are thus 
crucial for an adequate understanding of the practice, etiquette of 
performance and boundaries of the marketplace in this constantly 
shifting marketspace. The shared collective acknowledgement of the 
parameters and accepted understandings of vintage elevates goods 
from simply second-hand to revered objects. Through practices ven-
dors and consumers adopt carefully played roles in re-enchanting 
objects with new lives (Parsons, 2006: 189). 
Adopting the practice perspective thus reorientates our disci-
plinary field of vision as researchers foregrounding vintage con-
sumption as a communal form of togetherness whereby the recla-
mation of collective moments of interaction and sociality are made 
possible.  Extending the theoretical perspective of marketspace prac-
tices and central to the Vintagescape is its ability to reposition our 
understanding of the unfolding character of practices in time and 
space.  Notions of tempo and rhythm as expressed through Vintage 
and its associated motifs take us closer to this sense of being-in-
the world, where practices must be understood as unfolding within 
particular parcels of temporal invigoration.  Such an assertion on 
the time-like qualities of everyday practices bring us closer to the 
notion of the vintagescape as an ensemble of practices orchestrated 
and oriented around notions of time and space through which making 
difference reveals itself as practice-based.  
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ABSTRACT
Social conflict is an important and inevitable part of human re-
lations (Coser 1972 [1956]; Simmel 2006 [1908]). It is commonly 
defined as an interaction relationship between two or more parties 
that pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible goals (Kriesberg 
1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957). As such, social conflict is a 
core social mechanism to (re-)vitalize, (de-)stabilize, and cure any-
thing from interpersonal to international social relations (Bonacker 
2005; Coser 1957; Dahrendorf 1958). 
Social conflict also emerges in consumption contexts, and often 
with considerable consequences. Consider, for example, the group of 
fur-trade protesters that occupied the entrance of Burberry’s London 
flagship store last autumn to blame the corporation for its “bloody fur 
trade” (caft.co.uk); imagine critical consumers spitting at Hummer 
SUVS to protest against the consumption of “gas-burning monsters” 
(fuh2.com); or think of Apple computer enthusiasts being denounced 
by Internet authors as “skinny-jeans wearing Hipsters” and “sick-
ened Yuppies” (stupidedia.org).
Consumer culture research has approached such conflict dy-
namics from multiple perspectives in studies about consumer move-
ments (Dameron 1941), consumer boycotts (Friedman 1985; Garrett 
1987; Simon 2011), consumer resistance (Fournier 1998; Herrmann 
1993; Holt 2002; Peñaloza and Price 1993; Rumbo 2002; Ulver-
Sneistrup, Askegaard, and Kristensen 2011), consumer emancipation 
(Kozinets 2002; Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne, and 
Shapiro 1994), marketplace drama (Giesler 2008), liberatory post-
modern consumption (Firat and Venkatesh 1995), new social move-
ments (Kozinets and Handelman 2004), or anti-consumption (Cher-
rier 2009; Lee, Fernandez, and Hyman 2009; Portwood-Stacer 2012; 
Varman and Belk 2009). These and many other studies commonly 
focus on conflicts arising from power imbalances between produc-
ers and consumers, and often focus on cases of proactive consumer 
emancipation or heroic resistance.
However, as Honneth (1992), Simmel (2006 [1908]) and our in-
troductory examples of conflicts circling around the (anti-)consump-
tion of brands such as Hummer and Apple show, social conflict is not 
limited to courageous individuals fighting against (class) domina-
tion, suppression, or corporate exploitation. Social conflict also, and 
potentially even more so, emerges in mundane interactions between 
humans that strive for individualization and differentiation (Sim-
mel 2006 [1908]). More recently, consumer culture theorists have 
begun to address these low profile types of social conflict. Authors 
explored, for example, competition and conflict in brand communi-
ties (de Valck 2007; Ewing, Wagstaff, and Powell 2013; Hickman 
and Ward 2007; Luedicke 2006; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), studied 
how consumers fight for consumerist morals (Luedicke, Thompson, 
and Giesler 2010), and explained how consumers defend their field-
dependent cultural capital (Arsel and Thompson 2011).
The growth of consumption-related social conflict research 
implies that conflict may be one of the important forces that shape 
contemporary practices of consumption. In this state of theoretical 
development, a systematic reflection and theoretical consolidation of 
existing research may proof useful for structuring and advancing this 
inspiring field of inquiry. 
To contribute to this goal, we first review the classical writings 
on social conflict in sociology that set conflict research in our field 
into a broader theoretical perspective. We then use insights from this 
first step to propose a conceptual framework particularly suited for 
analyzing social conflicts in consumption contexts. Finally, we en-
gage this framework for exploring if–and how so–consumption con-
flicts are socio-culturally patterned. With this three-partite research 
we hope to contribute a useful next step for advancing theory on 
social conflict in consumption contexts.
RESEARCH METHOD AND PROCEDURE
We followed a three-step research procedure. First, we traced 
sociological thinking from Marx and Engel’s (2009 [1848]) first 
works on class struggle, to Simmel’s (2006 [1908]) thoughts on “St-
reit”, to Hirschman’s (1994) analyses of social conflicts in market 
societies. From these authors we distilled the common conceptual 
markers of social conflict.
Second, based on these theoretical insights we developed a 
conceptualization and analytical framework particularly suited for 
studying social conflicts in consumption contexts. We refer to this 
specific type of conflict as “consumption-mediated social conflict.”
Third, we identified 27 consumer culture research studies that 
are broadly related to consumption-mediated social conflict research 
by means of electronic keyword search (key words: Consumer 
Movement, Consumer Activism, Consumer Boycott, Consumer 
Resistance, Consumer Emancipation, Anti-Consumption, Conflict) 
(mainly) in the Journal of Consumer Research and the Advances of 
Consumer Research. After a careful review, 13 of these studies re-
mained that explicitly address consumption-mediated social conflict 
as defined by our conceptual framework (Arsel and Thompson 2011; 
Dobscha 1998; Giesler 2008; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Luedicke et al. 
2010; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Rumbo 2002; Schouten and McAl-
exander 1995; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson, Rindfleisch, 
and Arsel 2006; Üstüner and Holt 2007; Varman and Belk 2009). 
We performed a pattern analysis on the conflict-related data that are 
presented in these 13 studies to identify similar compositions of con-
flict parties, conflict objects, conflict behaviors, and consumption-
mediators. These procedures yield the conceptually synthesized and 
meta-theoretical findings (MacInnis 2011) that we present next.
FINDINGS
The Sociology of Conflict
The sociology of conflict must be considered a quite mature 
field of research. Social conflict theory has emerged at the end of 
the nineteenth and the early twentieth century through the writings 
of Hobbes, Marx, Weber, and Simmel (Bonacker 2005) and has ex-
perienced a second wave of interest in the 1950’s and 1960’s through 
Bernard (1957, 1965), Dahrendorf (1958), and Coser (1957, 1972 
[1956]). These theorists made inspiring and convincing efforts to 
advance more holistic theories of social conflict. A third wave of 
conflict research has evolved during the 1990’s and is still rolling. 
Hirschman (1994), Huntington (1997), and Dubiel (1998), for ex-
ample, reflect on the types, roles, and (potentially detrimental) con-
sequences of social conflicts in Western democracies induced by in-
dividualization, mobilization, migration, and the expansion of mass 
media communication. Conflict research, today, no longer aims at 
building one integrative theory of social conflict, but acknowledges 
that conflict is interdisciplinary and dependent on specific theoretical 
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perspectives such as politics, sociology, social-psychology, anthro-
pology (Bonacker 2005), and, as we will argue, consumption.
Social conflict is commonly conceptualized as an interaction 
relationship between two or more parties that pursue mutually exclu-
sive or incompatible goals (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Sny-
der 1957; Simmel 2006 [1908]). From the sociological literature we 
can distill three key conceptual markers that qualify a relationship 
as conflictual; that is conflict parties (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack 
and Snyder 1957; Williams 1970), a conflict object (Aubert 1963; 
Hirschman 1994; Kriesberg 1973, 2007), and an interactive conflict 
behavior (Coser 1972 [1956]; Gamson 1968; Kriesberg 1973, 2007; 
Tyrell 1976; Williams 1970). 
Conflict Parties. Social conflict requires two or more con-
flict parties with at least a minimum of mutual visibility and con-
tact (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957; Simmel 2006 
[1908]). Conflict has the tendency to occur between two, rather than 
multiple, opponents. This bipolarization tendency is ascribed to the 
high degree of attention and energy that must be directed towards an 
opponent (Mack and Snyder 1957; Tyrell 1976). The opponents can 
also be, and often are, groups rather than individuals. Conflict groups 
differentiate themselves and their mutually exclusive or incompat-
ible goals through fostering group boundaries. This occurs through 
sanctions in form of social rewards and punishments (Mack 1965, 
394). Visibility and contact are necessary for conflicts to emerge, 
but do not have to be “face-to-face” (Mack and Snyder 1957, 218).
Conflict Object. To emerge, social conflict requires a conflict 
object that typically either has the form of a scarce material resource, 
or concerns incompatible norms or values (Aubert 1963; Hirschman 
1994; Kriesberg 1973, 2007). Sociologists differentiate conflict ob-
jects with regards to their underlying goals (Aubert 1963; Kriesberg 
1973, 2007). When a conflict revolves around the (re-)distribution of 
scarce resources such as money, power, prestige, or sexual achieve-
ments, conflict parties pursue the same goal (e.g. receiving/keeping 
power, money, prestige). Conflict parties have a consensus. When 
social conflicts, in contrast, arise from parties’ different views on the 
application, standardization, or evaluation of social norms, values, or 
attitudes, then these parties seek different goals (Aubert 1963; Kries-
berg 1973, 2007). Conflict parties have a dissent. A conflict that is 
based on ideological incompatibilities is typically more difficult to 
resolve peacefully than a conflict in which parties pursue the same 
goal. That is why sociologists tend to consider ideological conflicts 
as more destructive (Hirschman 1994; Huntington 1997).
Interactive Conflict Behavior. Where parties pursue mutually 
exclusive or incompatible goals, interactive conflict behaviors some-
times follow, and a conflict emerges (Gamson 1968; Williams 1970; 
Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Coser 1972 [1956]; Tyrell 1976). According 
to Kriesberg (1973, 2007) one party induces another party to change 
its behavior, adjust its opinion, or leave its position by coercing, per-
suading, or rewarding the other party. Coercion refers to behaviors 
that “injure or threaten to injure” the opposing party (Kriesberg 2007, 
96). Persuasion refers to one party convincing the opposing conflict 
party to comply with the persuader’s interests because (according to 
the persuader) both parties share the same interests (Kriesberg 1973, 
2007). Rewarding conflict behavior refers to positive sanctions. A 
conflict party pursues its interest by rewarding the opposing party 
for compliance rather than punishing it for not doing so (coercion).
A Theoretical Framework of Social Conflict in 
Consumption Contexts
Building on the theoretical knowledge about the sociology of 
conflict, we next outline a theoretical framework that is tailored for 
analyzing social conflicts in consumption contexts. For our purpos-
es, we define consumption-mediated social conflict as an interaction 
relationship between two or more (groups of) market participants 
that have mutually exclusive or incompatible goals regarding certain 
consumption resources and ideologies.
Based on this conceptual extension we can argue that consump-
tion-mediated social conflict is present in empirical cases in which 
we are able to identify conflict parties, a conflict object, interactive 
conflict behavior, and a consumption-mediator. For a given party, 
a consumption-mediator can, for example, be a controversial prod-
uct, a transgressive advertising campaign, an illegitimate corporate 
behavior, or an unwanted consumption practice. The consumption-
mediator is central to the conflict as it brings out the underlying con-
flict object and gives rise to interactive behaviors aimed at resolving 
the underlying resource scarcities or ideological incompatibilities. 
Except in very specific contexts, the consumption-mediator is 
typically not the focal object of the conflict (e.g. who of the two 
parties will get the thing that both want), but rather a proxy for a 
larger conflict object regarding scarce resources and incompatible 
ideologies.
Consumption resources such as power, money, or natural re-
sources are typically scarce, but also divisible. Conflict parties strive 
to possess (or access) these resources and ideally resolve the conflict 
by distributing it more fairly. The conflict about Hummer driving, for 
instance, is not about who owns the Hummer, but how other scarce 
resources such as fresh air, oil, and road security are distributed. 
Consumption ideologies such as moral views towards certain life-
styles or consumption practices, in contrast, are not scarce and they 
cannot be precisely quantified. Because ideological conflict objects 
cannot be re-distributed for settling a conflict, parties often struggle 
with bearing incompatible socio-cultural beliefs.
Three Patterns of Social Conflict in Consumption 
Contexts
Our literature analysis and conceptual synthesis of the 13 stud-
ies that address–according to our conceptualization–consumption-
mediated social conflict reveals three prevalent consumption con-
flict patterns that we term emancipatory, ideology-advocating, and 
authenticity-protecting conflict. A conflict pattern is defined by a 
reasonably similar constellation of conflict parties, objects, interac-
tive behaviors, and consumption-mediators. Table 1 summarizes the 
markers of the three conflict patterns.
Emancipatory Conflict. The first, and most frequently studied, 
type of consumption-mediated social conflict is marked by conflict 
parties seeking to emancipate from, or regain power in, market rela-
tions (Dobscha 1998; Giesler 2008; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Rumbo 
2002; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson et al. 2006; Varman and 
Belk 2009). This type of conflict has been investigated under labels 
such as consumer resistance, consumer emancipation, and anti-con-
sumption and we refer to it as an emancipatory conflict.
Emancipatory conflict tends to emerge between (groups of) dis-
content consumers/ activists and corporate market agents. The con-
flict unfolds when consumers feel dominated or exploited by market 
forces and presumably unethical corporations. These conflicts are 
typically animated by two related conflict objects. The first is a con-
sensual object, which is typically market power. That is, consumers 
reach for regaining independence and self-control from corporations 
that they consider too powerful. This consensual conflict object is in-
formed by a dissentual object, which refers to the participating con-
sumers’ and producers’ different moral positions in the marketplace 
(e.g. desirability of commercial vs. communal interests in the mar-
ket). Interactive conflict behaviors that occur in this type of conflict 
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tend to be both violent and non-violent coercion. The consumption-
mediator is typically a company or its products, brands, or styles. 
To illustrate this description, consider Varman and Belk’s (2009) 
study of the anti-Coca-Cola movement in India. These authors ad-
dress a full-fledged emancipatory conflict between anti-Coca-Cola 
activists and the Coca-Cola corporation (conflict parties). Conflict 
parties fight over scarce resources such as water, selling prices of the 
products, wages, number of jobs, and power/ freedom from Western 
corporatism (consensual conflict object). This consensual conflict 
object is further informed by an ideological conflict object. Conflict 
parties have incompatible moral views about Western consumerism 
and the nationalist Indian ideology of “swadeshi” (Varman and Belk 
2009, 686) (dissentual conflict object). Activists distribute anti-Coke 
pamphlets and booklets, and organize public protests (non-violent 
behavior), whereas Coca-Cola engages in rather violent responses 
such as quelling protests or letting off workers involved in the move-
ment. The Coca-Cola corporation is the consumption-mediator of 
this conflict that would not arise without the company’s activities.
Ideology-Advocating Conflict. Consumer culture researchers 
have revealed another type of social conflict that revolves around 
moral-ideological incompatibilities between (groups of) consum-
ers. In this pattern, conflict parties defend a personal consumption 
ideology against various consumer adversaries (Kozinets 2001; 
Luedicke et al. 2010; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Üstüner and Holt 
2007; Varman and Belk 2009). We refer to this conflict pattern as 
ideology-advocating conflict.
 Ideology-advocating conflict arises between pro- and antago-
nists of particular consumption practices that are central to the pro-
tagonists’ identity, but dependent on a contested moral worldview. 
The key conflict object that animates this type of conflict is a dis-
sent about the legitimacy of certain consumption (-lifestyles) (Kates 
2004). The conflict parties typically pursue their opposing goals by 
means of coercive and persuasive behaviors. The consumption-me-
diator is a controversial consumption object or practice, whereas the 
conflict object is the ideology.
As an example, consider Luedicke et al.’s (2010) study of the 
opposing moral worldviews surrounding the Hummer brand of ve-
hicles. The conflict arises between consumers that like and hate 
Hummer trucks (conflict parties). They fight over incompatible con-
sumption ideologies (dissentual conflict object) that, in turn, rely on 
two different interpretations of the national ideology of “American 
exceptionalism” (Luedicke et al. 2010, 1020). Interactive conflict 
behavior observed in this context ranges from violent coercion (e.g. 
vandalism), to non-violent coercion (e.g. rude gestures, ridiculing 
practices), to persuasion. Hummer owners and antagonists use both 
the Hummer and the Prius brand as mediators to negotiate legitimate 
vehicle choices and consumption practices. However, the consump-
tion-mediators only make visible and manifest their opposing con-
sumer ideologies.
Authenticity-Protecting Conflict. The third conflict pattern that 
permeates consumer cultural conflict research concerns conflict that 
revolves around a consumption object or practice that (groups of) 
consumers share. In this pattern, consumers fight about how this ob-
ject is (not) supposed to be consumed. Thus, consumers protect those 
parts of their identity that are tied to the consumption object (Arsel 
and Thompson 2011; Kozinets 2001; Schouten and McAlexander 
1995). We refer to this conflict pattern as authenticity-protecting 
conflict. 
Authenticity-protecting conflict is particularly evident within 
consumer communities and subcultures. These conflicts tend to 
unfold when consumers lay opposing claims to ownership on the 
same consumption object or practice or when community members 
use different criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of consump-
tion within the community. In particular consumers who consider 
themselves core-members of a community tend to protect their field-
dependent identity investments against undesirable associations with 
inauthentic people and practices (Arsel and Thompson 2011). The 
conflict object is the dissent between (groups of) consumers about 
what constitutes an authentic/legitimate consumption practice for a 
consumption object. The dissent is grounded in incompatible atti-
tudes towards the specific consumption object or practice, differenc-
es in tastes, or different lifestyles. The interactive conflict behavior 
tends to manifest in both violent and non-violent coercion. The con-
sumption object/practice that consumers share is the consumption-
mediator.
Schouten and McAlexander’s (1995) study of the Harley Da-
vidson subculture of consumption depicts an authenticity-protecting 
conflict. These authors show how hard-core bikers, sometimes ag-
gressively, defend their Harley Davidson motorcycles and subcultur-
al meanings against “rich urban bikers” (Schouten and McAlexander 
1995, 49) that they consider inauthentic free-riders on the Harley 
rebel brand myth. The conflict emerges between core-members of 
Table 1: Three Patterns of Consumption-Mediated Social Conflict
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the Harley Davidson subculture, the so called “outlaws” (Schouten 
and McAlexander 1995, 44), and those members who occupy a more 
peripheral or newcomer status in the Harley Davidson hierarchy 
(conflict parties). Conflict parties struggle about incompatible ideas 
about how to pursue an authentic Harley Davidson consumption 
(life-) style (dissentual conflict object). Facing the thread of diluting 
identity investments and resolving authenticity of their subcultural 
consumption, outlaws sometimes draw on violent coercion practices 
such as motorcycle thefts and physical violence against other bik-
ers (interactive conflict behavior). The Harley Davidson brand and 
its manifestations operate as consumption-mediators in this conflict 
pattern.
DISCUSSION
This study offers a conceptual synthesis of sociological con-
flict theories, a conceptualization of “consumption-mediated social 
conflict” tailored to the analytical requirements of consumer culture 
research, and a preliminary answer to the question if consumption-
mediated conflicts are socio-culturally patterned. We hope that these 
reflections contribute four relevant insights to consumer research lit-
erature on social conflict.
First, we show that three conceptual markers–two or more con-
flict parties, a conflict object, and interactive conflict behaviors–are 
useful for characterizing a relationship as conflictual. We argue that 
for a specific conflict to fall into the domain of consumer research, 
the interactive behaviors must have been induced by a consumption-
mediator (e.g. a controversial product or consumption practice) and 
emerge between two or more market participants with mutually ex-
clusive or incompatible goals regarding specific resources scarcities 
or ideological incompatibilities that the consumption-mediator rep-
resents.  
Second, our interpretive literature analysis and conceptual 
synthesis of 13 consumer culture studies reveals that social conflict 
in consumption contexts tends to unfold in three distinct patterns 
that we label emancipatory, ideology-advocating, and authenticity-
protecting conflict. Emancipatory conflict emerges when consumers 
feel dominated or exploited by firms or by broader, intangible mar-
ket forces. Ideology-advocating conflict, in turn, tends to arise be-
tween consumers that try to enforce incompatible ideological views 
of legitimate consumption objects and practices. And authenticity-
protecting conflict emerges between consumers that lay opposing 
claims to ownership on the same consumption object or practice.
Third, our review suggests that consumption has become one 
focal site for social conflict in cultural realms in which both indi-
vidual and group identity construction draws largely on consumption 
practices (Arnould and Thompson 2005). Even though the consump-
tion-mediator is most often a material object (e.g. a product), exist-
ing studies rarely report about consumers fighting over the legitimate 
owner of a desirable object (except on Black Friday in the U.S.). 
Instead, these consumption-mediators tend to spark conflicts about 
much broader cultural and material issues that the consumption ob-
ject represents. For example, American Hummer SUV owners are 
frequently criticized for contributing disproportionately to resource 
depletion and American oil dependency, but not for purchasing a 
vehicle that someone else should own (Luedicke et al. 2010). This 
intricate and ubiquitous overlap of physical, cultural, and ideological 
matters turns consumption-mediators into prominent provocateurs of 
social conflicts in consumer cultures. 
Lastly, we found that consumer (culture) theory on social con-
flict has over time moved from exploring conflicts that are based 
on resource scarcities (e.g. Dameron 1941; Herrmann 1993) to-
wards conflicts that are induced by ideological or identity-relevant 
incompatibilities (e.g. Arsel and Thompson 2011; Luedicke et al. 
2010; Üstüner and Holt 2007). This development is only natural in 
social contexts in which a “capitalism-friendly social reality” pre-
vails (Paulson and O’Guinn 2012, 50) and cultural/identity-based 
consumption is generally on the rise (Cross 2000). Considering the 
ideological conflicts’ potential for destructiveness (Hirschman 1994; 
Huntington 1997) the investigation of their sources, interactions, and 
outcomes in consumption contexts appears worthwhile.
Our theoretical investigation of social conflicts in consump-
tion contexts illuminates some potentially important paths for future 
research. For instance, little research has been conducted on social 
conflicts arising in service consumption contexts (e.g. in contexts 
of entertainment or tourism industries), or resulting from existen-
tial social threats and anxieties (e.g. in contexts of migration or ac-
culturation). Migration dynamics, for instance, have the potential 
to irritate consumers’ sense of security or identity and thus produce 
conflicts that might differ in type from the emancipatory, ideology-
advocating, or authenticity-protecting conflicts. Identifying conflict 
patterns is only a first step on the way of gaining knowledge about 
consumption-mediated social conflict. Further research will have 
to explore to which extent certain consumption contexts, objects, 
or parties lean towards provoking more than one conflict pattern 
(e.g. Kozinets 2001; Giesler 2008; Adams and Raisborough 2010); 
which conflict patterns are problematic (or productive) for consum-
ers, marketers, and society; which consequences these conflicts have 
for parties involved; and how conflicts can proactively be used for 
progressive social change.
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ABSTRACT
“Although prostitution may involve an immoral exploitation 
of human beings (Hirschman 1991; Truong 1990), and sex slavery 
certainly does so (Aisbett and Malan 1993; Hornblower 1993; Sher-
rill 1993), the patronage of prostitutes is plausibly the oldest form 
of consumer behavior. Nevertheless, prostitution has been studied to 
a very limited degree by consumer researchers (Ostergaard 1993)” 
(Belk, 1994). 
The growth of sex work reflects the power of increasingly glo-
balized flows of capital, policy, directives and information to draw 
places that were once “off the map” into very closer networks of 
commodified trade and exchange. Men’s and women’s experiences 
of tourism have been understood very differently, especially their 
experiences of sex tourism. This is partly due to a rather commonly 
held assumption about sex tourism that suggests western men trav-
el to foreign countries to engage in sexual relations with (younger, 
Other) local women (Cohen, 1982; 1986; Enloe, 1989; Cohen, 1993; 
Seabrook, 1997; Phillip and Dann, 1998; Jeffreys, 2003). There has 
been some acknowledgement that western women can also engage 
in sexual relationships with foreign men as part of their holiday ex-
perience. However, discussions around women who engage in simi-
lar sexual activities have been much more debated within the social 
sciences and strikingly absent from our field -although research on 
gender in consumer research is established and its dissemination 
widespread through ACR and ACR gender conferences. 
Why do foreign women go “crazy” about local men? This is a 
question much heard among tourists and local townspeople during 
my long ethnography in the Dominican Republic. This question in 
itself contains a set of assumptions about the incongruence of situ-
ations where female sexuality might be seen as unusual and even 
problematic. In this research, I try to map the plural female consumer 
representations and lived experiences of heterosexual desires outside 
their cultural group and mediated by the global tourism industry, es-
pecially in the context of a third world country where local men are 
definitely seen as questionable sexual partners for foreign women. 
This is to move from the biological deterministic explanation of fe-
male sexuality to material and social conceptualization of sexuality- 
a construct much lacking investigation in consumer research.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Travel and gender
Travel has been historically constructed as a masculine activity 
(Kaplan, 1996; Mills, 1991, Smith, 2001). Masculinity has been even 
a necessity to be socially allowed to travel, while femininity was con-
nected to domesticity and home (Enloe, 2000). Discourses of mascu-
linity have been the basis of the cultural logic of travel (Smith, 2001). 
Then the “male” gendering of travel had important implications for 
women, impeding them to travel and making it difficult for the ones 
who do travel (Wolff, 1993). Since the 19th Century, travel echoed 
modernity and the “freeing of women”, bourgeois women who trav-
eled eschewed romance and sexually explicit behaviors to uphold so-
cial respectability (Smith, 2001). During the 21st century, represen-
tations of men traveling far from home without family became of a 
masculine gender ideology. But since, the number of females equals 
or even surpasses the male travelers (Harris and Wilson, 2007), it is 
claimed in particular within global feminist discourses, that women’s 
travel is therefore an inherent form of empowerment (Kaplan, 1995).
Sex tourism and gender
Sanchez Taylor argues that ‘The stereotypical image of the “sex 
tourist” is that of the Western man who travels to Thailand or the 
Philippines in order to pay for sex with Go Go bar/brothel prosti-
tutes’ (2001, p749). This stereotypical masculine traveler, this male 
sex tourist, is seen in much of the literature on sex tourism practices, 
academic and journalistic accounts of sex tourism. It tends to focus 
on the western men who travels to sun-drenched foreign locales to 
engage in sexual relations with Other women. While there has been 
some debate in the literature about issues such as intentionality and 
the nature of sexual relationships with regards to male sex tourism 
(Ryan and Kinder, 1996; Oppermann, 1999) and some important 
contributions on issues related to power and privilege (Crick, 1989; 
O’Connell Davidson, 1996; Pettman, 1997; Kempadoo, 1998; Cabe-
zas, 2004), by and large sex tourism is often seen as an extension of 
prostitution, where men are configured as ‘users’ of prostitutes. 
Elsrud (2001) suggests that female tourists are empowered 
by their risky encounters in developing countries, and their under-
standing of the ‘third world’ and the subalterns that occupy these 
risky spaces as ‘primitive’ or ‘poor’ (2001, p598). Indeed, this un-
derstanding of Others in tourism is often a problematic area within 
tourism studies (Sanchez Taylor, 2000; Gibson, 2001; Wilson, 2004). 
Sanchez Taylor (2000) argues that consuming difference is a criti-
cal component of the tourist experience, and that exotic Others are 
positioned as markers of cultural authenticity. Consuming difference 
means that local people are often positioned as authentic tourist ob-
jects, and their bodies become a way for tourists to consume the dif-
ference that is such an important part of the tourist experience. 
The consumer element of the sex tourism experience is also a 
point of intersection with wider tourism processes, as the exotic Oth-
er becomes the object of the tourist gaze (Desmond, 1997; Bishop 
and Robinson, 1998; Edmondson, 2001; Urry, 2002). The desire for 
the exotic Other is a common tourist trope, and the importance of 
consuming difference enters into tourism discourses. The bodies of 
young Caribbeans men in particular have become situated as the suit-
able objects of the tourist gaze and Ryan and Hall argue that ‘...it is 
of little surprise that because of the marginality of location, peoples 
and the exoticism ascribed to those people, sex tourism has become 
a sustainable force at the commencement of the twenty-first century’ 
(Ryan and Hall, 2001, p13).
The Gendered Sex Tourist Gaze
The ways in which (gendered) tourists consume particular spac-
es/places through particular modes reveals something about the na-
ture of host/guest interactions. Tourism literature acknowledges that 
travelers (both male and female) are often situated as visual consum-
ers, as powerful watchers of the different/exotic Other (Urry, 2002; 
Shellhorn and Perkins, 2004; Maoz, 2005). Chi (1997) suggests that 
tourism is the scopophilia of modern consciousness, with the ‘eye’/
seeing taking precedence over other forms of touristic understand-
ing. When people are on holiday they often ‘look at the environment 
with interest and curiosity...we gaze at what we encounter’; the gaze 
is both socially organized and systematized (Urry, 2002, p1). Indeed, 
part of being a modern day tourist means that one gazes upon a vari-
ety of scenes, people, and places that are ‘out of the ordinary’ (Urry, 
2002: 1). 
The gaze focuses on local features that are marked off as un-
usual, or different to everyday, quotidian encounters and revolves 
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around the collection of signs and symbols. Tourists often search for 
the authentic or the real as part of their travels and they (visually) 
consume these authentic scenes with the tourist gaze (Urry, 2002). 
Men and women do not have equal access to space as some spaces 
are ‘off-limits’ to women, particularly sexualized spaces (Hubbard et 
al, 2008; Hubbard and Whowell, 2008). Women and men often use 
and consume space differently as part of their tourism practices, and 
their use of space may well impact upon the types of activities they 
engage in, the types of spaces they visit, and the types of Others they 
come across. Wearing et al (2010) suggest that tourists and hosts co-
create tourist spaces and imbue particular sites/sights with meaning, 
and that within these tourist spaces women are able to create their 
own meanings and interpretations of tourist sites as they engage in 
feminized tourism practices. 
Women’s experiences of travel have been reconceptualized 
within this gendered framework, and the tourism practices of women 
(particularly solo female travelers) have been seen as journeys of lib-
eration and independence from traditional feminine roles (Kinnaird 
and Hall, 2000; Elsrud, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Wearing et al, 2010). 
Western women seem to be empowered by their travel experiences, 
and their journeys in some ways allow them to redefine their gender 
identity for themselves (Gibson, 2001; Elsrud, 2001).
METHOD
Understandings of sex tourism (for both men and women) often 
focus on the physical nature of the sexual interactions between a 
‘couple’, i.e. a sex tourist and a local sex worker. However, defining 
sex tourism as the consummation of ‘commercial sexual relations’ 
is problematic and further ‘...is an overt simplification and arguably 
excludes many other cases and settings’ (Oppermann, 1999, p252). 
This paper engages in a wider conversation in consumer research 
about how sexuality and gender are constructed, produced, per-
formed and embodied by particular consumers and social actors in 
specific contexts of tourism. 
In thinking about sexual subjectivity, the author is concerned 
about how consumption processes, in this case tourism and related 
desires are lived through the body and thus are enacted through emo-
tions, affect, senses, and bodies marked by gender, race, class and 
nationality.
More specifically, this research focuses on how people’s in-
timate relations and subjectivities are shaped by global, local, and 
transnational processes. I am interested in the lived experiences and 
“negotiation” of gender, sexuality, and intimacy, bound up with race 
and class, in the context of human movement across borders, moder-
nity, late capitalism and multiculturalism. How do people decipher 
and grapple with different and often competing cultural gender and 
sexuality norms?  How does human sociality and subjectivity change 
through travel? In what ways are local sexual cultures affected by 
global tourism? 
This research is part of a larger fieldwork- A total of 6 months 
ethnography in the Dominican Republic (Punta Cana and Sosuà) 
over 5 years (2006-2011), involving participant observation in tour-
istic places (hotels, discos, tours) with westerns tourists, western 
residents and with locals and immigrants (Haitians). In-depth in-
terview following McCracken (1988) recommendations were also 
carried out with all the set of actors involved in the field (Domini-
cans, Haitians, Tourists, Foreign residents, Male and female in each 
case with a wide range of backgrounds and ages), they lasted 1 to 3 
hours were recorded, transcribed. The 21 long interviews with west-
ern female tourists and a few residents inform more specifically this 
paper (see Table 1). The author stayed in contact with informants 
over phone and social media allowing for presenting the preliminary 
results to those women and updating their situation to date regarding 
the Dominican Republic and their intimate relationships therefore to 
increase the validity of the research. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Relationships lived as Transgression
 My informants’ stories convey how transnational sex was made 
meaningful through cultural assumptions and tacit rules about sexual 
propriety and intimate sociality. Sexual relationships between for-
eign women and local men were played out in diverse arrangements, 
from one-night or weekend affairs and casual vacation flings to long-
term transnational back-and-forth relationships together with some, 
but not many, marriages, as well as other configurations. What char-
acterizes most of the stories is a feeling of instant intimacy that wom-
en interpret romantically while local men interpret it more  pragmati-
cally - although most of the informants report that they are romantic: 
“Here it is all different from home, because very quickly you 
share all the domestic aspects and problems with your man, from 
the very start of the relationship, the dating process does not really 
exist…I like it because you feel close to your partner rapidly and you 
feel important in your partner’s life but you get confused about what 
stage of the relationship you are in” (Nathalie, 34, France, Police 
Officer)
 “ Many stories report the disappointment of foreign women 
due to a misunderstanding…I mean everyone comes with her own 
background and it is part of the experience to try and make it work 
despite the problems, it is not because the man tells’ you you are the 
woman of my life’ it means you are all life long may be just a few 
days and in his perspective this is fine…” (Helen, 25, Canada, Insur-
ance Employee)
There were many tensions and contradictions in women’s nar-
ratives since, for the women, sharing intimacy with Dominicans was 
a cultural transgression in terms of social position, skin color... For 
instance, the level of the men’s formal education (often they had not 
finished high school) was a problem for some women with univer-
sity backgrounds. Although the relationship was going very well in 
many aspects, suddenly realizing that reading a book or writing for-
Table 1: Female tourists interviewed
Name Age Nationality Occupation
Nathalie 34 French Police officer
Lara 23 Italian Student
Carolina 22 German Student
Helen 25 Canadian Insurance employee
Patricia 27 Canadian Doctor
Meline 24 French Public Relations in Ad agency
Irina 23 Poland Engineer
Natalia 24 Poland Financial services
Pat’ 26 USA Decoration shop owner
Marie 27 France Barmaid
Chiara 23 Italy Museum Guide
Nadia 24 France Aerobics teacher 
Joy 23 UK Salesperson
Carolyn 26 UK Primary school teacher
Ines 24 Spain Barmaid
Lucia 22 Spain Student
Amandine 23 France Works in a disco
Linda 25 Spain Hairdresser
Stephanie 23 USA Fast food Cashier
Erika 37 Germany High school teacher
Serena 41 Italy Works in the tourism industry
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mal documents was a problem for the partner, was quoted as raising 
tension and doubts in women about the viability of their romance: 
“I remember when…S looked like a young child trying to de-
cipher my car rental contract, I realized how far apart we were…
I mean so far I was admiring his ability to manage everything so 
smartly and …and I assumed reading was not an issue…you know, it 
is not easy…” (Chiara, 23, Italy, Museum Guide)
Such disparities created boundaries, which were exciting to 
cross but also created conflicting feelings in terms of Western het-
eronormative discourses about hierarchies of preferred intimate 
partners. Another major transgression that emerged from the field 
is racial or ethnical. From my earliest conversations, I gathered that 
many people viewed these relationships as completely unrestrained, 
attributing ‘Caribbean culture’ and ‘black male sexual prowess’ as 
the impetus that ‘drove’ foreign women to behave in ‘unusually li-
bidinous’ ways. There is a prevalent binary construction of black 
Afro-Caribbean men as lascivious, and white North American and 
European women as sexually predatory. Many informants stated 
how the skin color of their partner was a problem for their family 
and friends in their home country, who immediately considered the 
relationships in terms of stereotypes, considering them merely in 
terms of the “sexual nature of the local men.” 
Therefore, even in Sosua or Punta Cana, sexual relations be-
tween tourist women and local men appear as both ‘rampant’ and 
‘escondido’ (hidden). A palpable local discourse frames sexual rela-
tions between local men and tourist women as overabundant, un-
checked, uncontrollable, ‘wild,’ mutual erotic desire. At the same 
time, this discourse is muffled, in order to downplay the presence 
of such relationships, in part because women’s sexuality is more 
generally hidden in Latino nations, (Arroba, 2001) and because the 
relationships are viewed by many as scandalous. For complicated 
reasons, tourist women are also protective of local men’s sexual in-
fidelities. Many also remain discreet to circumvent the reaction of a 
jealous boyfriend. Foreign women as sexual subjects are scrutinized 
perhaps even more closely than Dominican women, and stereotyped 
as ‘promiscuous’ by local surveillance mediated through religious 
beliefs and cultural moral discourses about femininity, masculinity, 
and sexuality. For these intricate reasons, sexual secrecy pervades 
the social-sexual contours of the island.
However, believe systems about gendered expressions of de-
sire and intimacy are never fixed and the cosmopolitan and global 
context offers opportunities for defining new types of relationships:
“Before I came here, I was really different, for me there were 
some criteria for choosing my partners that were way too strict, I 
don’t know, he has to behave like and like that, but now it is dif-
ferent, I have gained more experience and I have learned that here 
people live things differently, what matters is being happy together 
no matter the standards, if my partner is a bit younger, is it such a 
problem as long as we are happy together? Today is today and to-
morrow is another day but at last I am happy!”
Women refer to those experiences as times when their identity 
changed, especially those who get involved in long-term interaction 
with Dominicans who speak about “identity transformation”. Some 
women choose to have casual sex with locals on a regular basis; it is 
often after being extremely disappointed in a previous relationship. 
Although, a number of women choose to have casual sex with locals 
without too much commitment, playing secrecy games and covering 
men’s infidelity, they often deny they use strategies regarding their 
intimate relationships on the island. For instance, most of the women 
will confess that their relationship with local men “just happened” 
that they did not plan to have sexual relationships during their stay 
on the island. 
Women strategizing about their sexual encounters…
However digging deeper into their narratives, some signs like 
systematically bringing condoms when visiting the Dominican Re-
public or confiding that they had felt intuitively that if they stayed 
longer on the island “they knew they would be sexually active” con-
tradict their initial statement of being “surprised” by the relation-
ships. It is the standard female sexuality, built on an absolute ne-
cessity of connecting sex with feelings that prompts them to justify 
these relationships as totally surprising and unplanned. According 
to my informants they always start very romantically – so as to con-
form to social expectations. So it is very rare for women to voice, as 
men do, the fact that they also come to the Dominican Republic to 
have sexual encounters with locals, knowing that as westerners their 
economic capital will lead them to obtain sex easily. However, one 
of my informants crossed the line after the third interview, when I 
met her again unexpectedly during one of my stays in Sosùa. She 
admitted that after several stays on the island, in this place she knew 
exactly how to attract the right sexual partner when she went to the 
disco. Knowing that Dominicans are unfaithful, and that “they use 
white girls to obtain sex and money, why should I not play their 
game? So I use them as well but I give just enough, for example two 
or three drinks at the disco, for them to think I am like all the Euro-
pean girls and then they are adorable as they know how to be very 
sweet at the start of the relationship…and once I have what I want I 
am the who stops the relationship before it turns into the nightmare 
of cheating and money issues…”.  And my informant adds “you 
know Dominican girls, they do the same, so No I don’t feel bad, is it 
sex tourism? I don’t know, it’s just adult relationships, I don’t force 
anyone”. In this discourse, I hear a sort of acculturation in terms of 
Dominican relationships starting at the disco, pretending or feeling 
love, expecting one of the partners to take care of the other and pay 
for them as a sign of interest…and also, a clear conscience of the 
use of economic and skin capital as mediators of sexual pleasure just 
like male sex travelers…However, it is quite controversial to depict 
women as potential exploiters of under-classed populations in third 
world countries for their own pleasure.
This controversy is due to a number of factors: firstly there are 
arguments within feminism about the extent to which women are 
victims vs. agentic/capable of exploiting, which can also be seen in 
broader debates around prostitution (Segal and MacIntosh, 1993; 
Raymond, 1995; Barry, 1996; Chapkis, 1997; Jeffreys, 1997; Nagle, 
1997; Campbell and O’Neill, 2006; O’Connell Davidson, 2006). 
Secondly because sex tourism is often defined in such a narrow way 
- as directly related to prostitute use and commercial sexual rela-
tionships, this has made it much more difficult to talk about female 
sex tourism as a phenomenon because women are not generally as-
sociated with using prostitutes, nor are they generally connected to 
commercial sexual exchanges (Ryan and Hall, 2001). Research into 
female sex tourism is still a disputed area; situating women’s posi-
tion within the sex tourist spectrum is not straightforward, and prob-
lems arise within academic discourses around sex tourism on how to 
define what exactly constitutes sex tourist behavior, and further what 
defines sex tourism practices. 
In contrast to male sex tourists who are often understood to 
be exploiting local women, the actions of female sex tourists have 
sometimes been presented in a more benevolent, but also a more 
contradictory way. They are sometimes seen as rather innocent ‘ro-
mance tourists’ (Meisch, 1995; Pruitt and LaFont, 1995; Dahles and 
Bras, 1999), or even understood as romantic dupes being exploited 
by local men (Jeffreys, 2003). Although those narratives appear 
clearly in the data, the research supports some critique of this rather 
essentialist understanding of western female tourists’ sexual behav-
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iors (de Albuquerque, 1998; Herold et al, 2001; Kempadoo, 2001; 
Ryan and Hall, 2001; Frohlick, 2008). The results provide a much 
more complex picture of the phenomenon under study. 
More specifically, this research provides a critique of this un-
derstanding of women’s interactions with local men, and suggests 
that female ‘romance tourists’ should not be simply understood as 
women « who buy meals and gifts for their local sexual partners and 
are enjoying a “romance”, not using a prostitute » (Erika, Resident in 
Punta Cana, German, English Instructor, 37). Tourist women are of-
ten seen as ‘passive innocents, “used” by local men who are actively 
seeking money, a ticket off the island and maybe love, as well as 
sexual experience. My data supports the argument that sex tourism 
is not simply about male patriarchal privilege and female power-
lessness. Rather, the findings support that female tourists’ sexual-
economic relationships with local men are predicated upon the same 
global economic and social inequalities that underpin the phenom-
enon of male sex tourism. The fact that parallels between male and 
female sex tourism are overlooked reflects and reproduces weak-
nesses in existing theoretical and commonsense understandings of 
gendered power, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and sex tourism.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of sex tourism- a thematic much missing in con-
sumer research-  takes gendered relations into account, but also pro-
vides a critical reflection about other types of power - economic, 
social, racial, and class - that are often obscured by focusing so ex-
clusively on the power/gender dyad. Analyses of tourism often look 
at issues relating to racial and global inequalities, and there has been 
some evidence to suggest that the processes that govern tourism and 
sex tourism are intrinsically related (Bishop and Robinson, 1998; 
Ryan and Hall, 2001). However much of the analysis of sex tourism 
practices still relies on gendered understandings of sex and sexual 
relationships, rather than exploring the other inequalities that might 
exist between hosts and guests of any gender.
A more nuanced picture begins to emerge around the set of is-
sues that underlies women’s sexual engagement with local men if 
we begin to understand women tourists also: ‘as being motivated by 
racist sexual stereotypes and using sex tourism to bolster their privi-
leged race and class status’ (Jeffreys, 2003, p25). By employing this 
understanding it is possible to analyze female sex tourism without 
focusing exclusively on gender injustices, and instead other crucial 
structural inequalities such as race and class can also be included.
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INTRODUCTION
Mega-sporting events like the Olympic Games, the Soccer 
World Cup finals, or the Super Bowl have become high-profile glob-
al consumption phenomena that attract the attention of massive spec-
tator crowds. In the case of the Olympic Games, every four years, 
hundreds of thousands spectators gather for about two weeks to 
experience thrilling sporting competitions, entertaining side-shows, 
and how the “fastest-highest-strongest” from more than 200 coun-
tries compete for Olympic gold (Toohey and Veal 2007). 
For spectators, the Olympic Games offer a unique consumption 
experience that exhibits characteristics of skill, spectacle, and festive 
performance (Arnould 2007). The staging of sports skill performance 
in a naturalistic setting offers the passive consumer a spectatorial 
product. Yet, the Games also produce elements of spectacular per-
formance through the extravagant presentation of moral values and 
fantastic environments. Also, consumers become integral parts of the 
festive performance; they co-create the atmospheric arena and pro-
duce cultural narratives (Arnould 2007). What participants of this 
study call a “once-in-a-lifetime” experience, resembles an extraordi-
nary consumption experience in its various exceptional social inter-
actions and “intense, positive, [and] intrinsically enjoyable” activi-
ties (Arnould and Price 1993, 25).
While this unique positioning has set the Olympics apart from 
other sports events, this popular spectacle is also vulnerable to public 
criticism and controversial media debates (Toohey and Veal 2007). 
On the one hand, critical cultural analysts mark an intensifying com-
mercialization displayed by celebrations of consumption in Olympic 
Parks and streets (Tomlinson 2005) or financial pressures on athlete 
performances (Rahman and Lockwood 2011). On the other hand, 
they praise the Games as a cultural epicenter, exhibiting authentic 
athletic performances, accumulating cultural resources, further-
ing social cohesion and peace promotion, and encouraging active 
healthy lifestyles (Maguire et al. 2008; Papanikolaou 2012; Rahman 
and Lockwood 2011).
Evidently, these spectacularized mega-sporting events offer 
the spectators experiences laden with opposing meanings—or para-
doxes (Luscher, Lewis, and Ingram 2006; Mick and Fournier 1998; 
O’Driscoll 2008)—that are negotiated in discourse. Research on 
extraordinary consumption experiences and consumption of spec-
tacular and festive environments has acknowledged before that dia-
lectical elements of staged spectacles create tensions and competing 
discourses (Holt 2002; Kozinets 2002; Kozinets et al. 2004; Tumbat 
and Belk 2011). This study applies a paradox perspective that em-
phasizes the interdependencies of opposing elements in discourse 
rather than interpreting them as contradictions. Adopting a paradox 
perspective allows to accept paradoxes as critical components of 
consumer discourse on consumption experiences. 
This study reviews theoretical perspectives on paradoxes and 
empirically examines how paradoxes, crystallizing in the narratives 
of spectators of the London Olympic Games 2012, both dispute and 
enrich the Olympic experience. We detail the characteristics and dy-
namics of four paradoxes and discuss their contribution to unique 
consumption experiences.
THEORY
Nature and dynamics of paradoxes
The notion of paradox revolves around the idea of two oppos-
ing elements appearing simultaneously (Mick and Fournier 1998; 
O’Driscoll 2008). Unlike a dialectic approach that tends to polarize 
into either/or propositions, a paradox perspective uses both/and con-
structs (Lewis 2000; Westenholz 1993). It goes beyond dialectical 
thinking and adds to it in two ways. 
First, a paradox theory not only highlights the simultane-
ity of the elements, but also their unity when taken together (Der-
rida [1976] 1997; Lewis 2000; O’Driscoll 2008). Thus, it guides 
researchers to investigate both ends simultaneously and pay atten-
tion to their interdependences (Lewis 2000). It is the unity with the 
counterpart—Derrida ([1976] 1997) calls it “supplementarity”—that 
helps to better understand the phenomenon. The opposing element 
helps to delineate, and at the same time complements the element 
itself. A paradoxes approach opens a new way of thinking in that it 
suggests to look at the counterpart, consider how the elements over-
lap and interact and, eventually, cannot be separated.
Second, a paradox perspective brings a dynamic component to 
the phenomenon under study. Paradoxes can paralyze (Burkean log-
ic, as cited in Czarniawska 1997), lead to reinforcing cycles which 
enforce tensions, or virtuous cycles which enable change, transfor-
mation, or creativity (Cameron and Quinn 1988; Lewis 2000; Ropo 
and Hunt 1995; Smith and Berg 1987; Smith and Lewis 2011)—thus, 
paradoxes ask for a reaction and initiate action, even if this action 
is suppression or acceptance of the paradox. Especially organiza-
tion theorists, like Cameron and Quinn (1988), praise paradoxes as 
a “powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and 
change, aiding understandings of divergent perspectives and disrup-
tive experiences” (Lewis 2000, 760). Literature suggests several 
strategies on an individual, group, and organizational level that al-
low for a successful “management” of paradoxes in order to turn 
them into opportunities rather than threats. Among others, research-
ers list accepting (Lewis 2000; Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Schnei-
der 1990), confronting (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987; Vince 
and Broussine 1996), and transcendence (Lewis 2000)/paradoxical 
thinking (Westenholz 1993)/reframing (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 
1987; Westenholz 1993). Only recently, Smith and Lewis (2011) 
detail the evolution of paradox in a dynamic equilibrium model of 
organizing, in which they regard tensions as inherently present and 
depict their cyclical responses to the paradox as a “constant motion 
across opposing forces” (386). Several authors propose not to re-
solve, but rather to embrace paradoxes (Czarniawska 2001; Firat and 
Venkatesh 1995; Handy 1994; Lewis 2000; Smith and Lewis 2011; 
Westenholz 1993).
Paradoxes in Marketing and Experience Literature
In marketing and consumer literature, some researchers apply 
related concepts, such as dialectical tensions (Thompson and Hay-
tko 1997), contradictions (e.g., cultural contradictions Holt 2004), 
or ambivalence (Otnes, Lowrey, and Shrum 1997); others use the 
term paradox in diverse contexts and with different foci. The au-
thenticity paradox, for example, is about the contradictions involved 
in communicating and creating authenticity through advertisement 
(Stern 1994). The expression “staged authenticity,” coined by Mac-
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Cannell (1973) and further used in tourism literature (Wang 1999), 
describes this paradox. In their study on reality television Rose and 
Wood (2005) are also concerned with authenticity; however, they 
reveal a paradox between the real and the fantastic. In their paper on 
the technology paradox, Mick and Fournier (1998) conceptualize the 
postmodern paradox and detail individual responses (in form of cop-
ing strategies) to them. Others point at the paradox that lies within 
modern communication technologies (Christensen 2000; Sproull 
and Kiesler 1992), arguing that modern technologies not only fur-
ther, but also constrain interactive communication. Caruana, Crane, 
and Fitchett (2008) discuss the paradox of consumer independence 
and find that consumers mediate the tension between the “myth 
of the independent traveler” (269) searching for the authentic and 
the mass-mediated, commercialized tourist destinations. Newholm 
and Hopkinson (2011) investigate the paradox of the construction 
of individuality when participating in mainstream consumption. 
Ulver-Sneistrup, Askegaard, and Kristensen (2011) investigate the 
paradox of consuming while at the same time exhibiting mundane 
brand resistance. They find that consumers legitimate bad consump-
tion by “embracing myths of craftsmanship” (215). Overall, while 
paradoxes are widely used in literature, the notion of paradox is not 
systematically defined, or used; the paradox mostly serves to denote 
variants of contradictions in different consumption contexts that in-
dividual consumers are concerned with.
Research on extraordinary consumption experiences investigate 
opposing structures in extreme situations (Arnould and Price 1993; 
Kozinets 2002; Tumbat and Belk 2011). Tumbat and Belk (2011), 
in their research of the Mount Everest experience, approach their 
data with a Turnerian structure/anti-structure perspective and find 
that participants “negotiate” both ends of the dialectic “in their pur-
suit of extraordinary consumption experiences” (Tumbat and Belk 
2011, 57). This finding points at the co-existence of both ends and, 
ultimately, towards the existence of a paradoxical structure. Whereas 
Tumbat and Belk (2011), in response to an overly positive framing 
of consumption experiences in consumer research literature, criti-
cally interpret their findings as marketplace tensions and duality of 
elements/concepts, this study aims to uncover the dynamics and in-
terdependence of this duality.
METHODOLGY
To get insights on the nature and dynamics of paradoxes of the 
Olympic experience, we applied an interpretive approach consist-
ing of participant observation and narrative elements. One of the 
authors participated as spectator at various Olympic events before 
and during the Olympic Summer Games 2012 in London. Covering 
an observation period of one month, we kept detailed written field 
notes, took over 400 photographs, and engaged with dozens of spec-
tators. Additionally, we conducted 17 semi-structured interviews of 
20-60 minutes with spectators. We recruited participants at Olympic 
venues and conducted the interviews after sporting competitions or 
other events. To include multiple perspectives we chose to recruit 
both national residents of Great Britain, and international spectators, 
making up half of the interviewees.  Prior to, during, and after the 
event we collected photographs, on- and offline articles, and other 
relevant data on the Olympic experience. We analyzed data accord-
ing to constant comparative method (Charmaz 2006). In several 
circles of reflection, we identified mixed messages (O’Conner 1995; 
Lewis 2000) that mark inconsistencies across the data.
FINDINGS
Our data on the Olympic experience exhibits four recurring 
paradoxes, “union and disunion,” “repletion and void,” “the real and 
the staged,” and “the spirit and the rational.” They are not mutually 
exclusive but complementary in forming a comprehensive narrative 
framing of the Olympic experience. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
identified paradoxes, discursive themes, and dynamics.
Table 1: Paradoxes, discursive themes, and dynamics in the context of the Olympic experience
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Union and Disunion
The (dis-)union paradox is most pervasive across the data 
and manifests itself in various ways. Spectators mainly recognize 
the uniting element of the Olympic Games. Helene (31, German), 
for example, explains that to her, the Olympic experience is “about 
coming together and to stand for something which unites everyone” 
and Maaike (40, Dutch) describes how a commonality among the 
spectators creates bonds. However, union simultaneously creates 
disunion—especially at the Olympic Games: Whenever a union or 
group of people forms, this group also always creates boundaries, 
which have a disuniting effect. At the Games, these group boundar-
ies are extremely volatile and temporary, as commonalities uniting 
various groups change rapidly: Data shows that the “I” of spectators 
often changes into a “we” that sometimes stand for a group of spec-
tators supporting the same athlete, a nation, all participants of the 
event, or even humankind. This volatility of union becomes evident 
in the case of Helene, who later explains that “it is also about show-
ing commitment…commitment to maybe your home country.” The 
competitive nature of the Games only contributes to the formation 
of group boundaries and thus, fosters as well union and disunion. 
Stefanie (26, US American) refers to this paradox of simultane-
ous union and competition when she says that it “feel[s] like [the 
Olympic Games are] the only thing that you see that unites the entire 
world in a healthy and competitive way.”
What we can also witness at the Olympic Games, is an under-
dog effect (Paharia et al. 2011); a solidarization with the less “privi-
leged”. Spectators reported how amazed they were by the relentless 
support offered to those athletes that were far from winning one of 
the precious medals. So, paradoxically, the fact that only an incred-
ibly small number of athletes win does not necessarily create dis-
union, but union among and with those who never win a medal. 
We find that the paradox of union and disunion is similar to 
paradoxes of belonging, which denote the complex relation between 
the individual self and group membership (Smith and Berg 1987; 
Lewis 2000); our findings exhibit processes of shifting boundaries 
and temporary and fluid constructs of groups. People are constantly 
searching for commonalities with others, quickly trying to become 
a member of a group—before group boundaries are shifted again. 
These processes, that we like to put under the heading of solidar-
ization, resonate with Maffesoli’s ideas (2007), when he recognizes 
mechanisms of solidarity to be at work in the rituals and partici-
pation around sporting idols and other archetypes. The “collective 
sensibility” (Maffesoli 1996, 18) emergent in this process leads to a 
common sentiment of belonging to an open, yet unstable emotional 
community. Also, our data supports the idea that international sport-
ing events act as a “global nationalistic forum” (Lee and Maguire 
2009, 6) as they both reinforce passionate nationalistic expressions, 
and simultaneously promote cosmopolitan identification between 
nations (Barnard et al. 2006; Maguire, et al. 2008).
Repletion and Void
“Once it is finished, you know, it will feel like an empty void” 
(Catherine, 44, British).
The Olympic Games are oriented towards a dense spatial and 
temporal aggregation. Spectators are keen for these sparse moments 
to come and, as soon as they are there, they need to be ready and 
seize them as intensely as they can, “soaking up the atmosphere” and 
enjoying peak moments. This repletion of the Olympic Games is also 
marked by a joining of the modern and innovative with heritage and 
tradition. The Games simultaneously mirror the past and create the 
future, when traditional elements of the Games, such as the opening 
ceremony, are held in newly built stadiums and are realized with the 
help of cutting-edge technology. Paradoxically, spectators not only 
recognize this repletion, but also a nothingness of the Olympic expe-
rience. For Helene (31, German), for example, the Olympic experi-
ence is “everything and nothing” and for Catherine (44, British), the 
event’s inevitable perishability seems to be omnipresent: “There is 
nothing to look forward to. I mean we have done it. It’s finished, it’s 
over, and it’s like empty.” In this verbatim, Catherine, using present 
tense, drags her expectations of the future into her perception of the 
present.
Discourse reveals an interesting interdependence of repletion 
and void. Andy (30, Austrian) refers to one facet of this interde-
pendence when he explains that, if time in between the events were 
shorter, his desire for the upcoming event would be diminished. De-
sire for the experience, a “primarily positive” feeling (Belk, Ger, and 
Askegaard 2003, 343), grows in times of void; repletion can only be 
experienced together with void, and vice versa. The spatiotemporal 
distancing from the everyday mundane life in the Olympic expe-
rience, reminiscent of Maclaran and Brown’s “sense of displace” 
(2005, 320), is pervaded by a critical awareness of nothingness, 
which—paradoxically—enriches it. Simultaneously, repletion eas-
ily leads to saturation, which further leads to boredom (Prisching 
2008). Also, the awareness of the void leads to the wish to capture 
moments of repletion, visible in picture-taking and the collection of 
manifestations, in order to conserve them for times of void. Thus, the 
paradox of repletion and void initiates processes of preserving the 
moment and delineating the experience from the mundane that are 
able to powerfully vitalize and energize the extraordinariness of the 
Olympic experience in a continuous oscillatory circle. 
The Real and the Staged
“Ah, it was amazing, you know. If you [sat] at home you would 
never underSTAND how that, how it was. I mean, it’s only pos-
sible for yourself [to understand]…how amazing that moment 
IS” (Brian, 58, British)
Spectators of the Olympic Games consider themselves to be in 
an exclusive position; they are the insiders experiencing the vibrant 
atmosphere and spectacular environment. Not sitting behind their 
screens, they expect to experience the immediate. They are aware 
of the staged setting, reflect upon it, and want to look backstage in 
order to get a glimpse of the truly real (Goffman [1959] 1973; Holt 
2002). However, they are not always satisfied with what they find. 
Paradoxically, some spectators explain that, being at the live event, 
they feel much more detached than sitting behind their TV sets and 
watching close-ups and slow motions. The media offers proximity to 
the event through a focus on the spectacular and provides a diversity 
of options. In other cases, the media forms expectations that cannot 
be met in reality. A special paradoxical example in this context is 
the hero. Pauline’s (34, British) example of how she “started cut-
ting out all the stories from the papers about, oh, on ‘this athlete is 
doing incredible work to get out here, because they have fought this 
disease’…” shows how heroes are created by the media. However, 
in real life, athletes may not be able live up to their fictional portray-
als—which makes the truest hero the fictional hero (Goethals and 
Allison 2012).
Our findings of the real and the staged suggest that the staged 
induces the real and vice versa. Without the hype generated by the 
mediation of the staged, no such desire for the real could be ini-
tiated. And of course, without an immediate real, there is nothing 
to be mediated. However, just like Rose and Wood (2005), we find 
that consumers negotiate both elements of the paradox. Through this 
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negotiation process, they widen their perspectives; hence, making 
out of one experience hundreds of thousands possible variants to 
be explored and choices to be made for the consumers’ conquest of 
truth. Also, the paradox of the mediated real(ity) spurs a process of 
searching proximity. The constant search for the next piece of the 
puzzle, stimulated by media reports and word-of-mouth, creates a 
rather adventurous desire of “exploring” and going “right into the 
middle of it”.
The Spirit and the Rational
Every four years, the Olympic Games need to live up to a prom-
ise of moral values (Toohey and Veal 2007), revive a shared Olympic 
spirit, and make both values and spirit tangible to the senses (Prisch-
ing 2008). The spirit side to the Games is highlighted by many spec-
tators, Max (45, British) explains that “there certainly is something 
very magical” about the Olympic Games, “something a lot bigger, 
certainly hard to describe.” He very much idealizes the atmosphere 
and imagines what it would be like, if it were spread: “Save that 
in a bottle, and give it to the rest of the world when having a prob-
lem—all the problems are gone.” While idealizations are prominent 
in the discourse, spectators also evaluate the Olympic Games from a 
very rational viewpoint. They repeatedly refer to the obligations and 
duties of the host country and critically reflect on the costs and ben-
efits of the investments taken. Alexandros (70, Greek) evaluates the 
Olympic Games from both perspectives and comes to the conclusion 
that they should disseminate universalistic ideals and messages, such 
as internationalism, cosmopolitanism, environmentalism or fair-play 
(Maguire et al. 2008), and, at the same time, need to be embedded in 
the present economic and commercial system. In other words, they 
need to satisfy the spirit as well as the rational element. In a sense, 
spectators want to experience the traditional, antique sports-myth of 
the Olympic Games; however, they are also aware of the commer-
cialized elements tainting this myth. Afraid of being disappointed, 
the paradox of the rational and the spirit leads to a continuous evalu-
ation of investments and “returns on investment” by spectators and 
the host country. When spectators are referring to the inspiring ele-
ments and the perfect “show” of the Olympic Games, they are try-
ing to legitimize the sometimes commercial nature of the experience 
towards themselves and others.
The negotiation process between the idealized and the rational 
in the Olympic experience is reminiscent of processes of authen-
tication in commercial contexts (Alexander 2009; Newholm and 
Hopkins 2009). Rahman and Lockwood (2011) for example, iden-
tify a paradox of commercialization in the context of the Olympic 
Games and find that the representation of the athletes as amateurs 
aims to legitimize the Games and maintain authenticity. We find that 
the discourse on the Olympic spirit authenticates the Games yet, not 
without its counterpart, the rational. In today’s commercialized soci-
ety, the Olympic Games gain legitimized space exactly through the 
rational; a space necessary for the spirit to prosper. While the rational 
legitimizes the spirit, the spirit authenticates the rational. 
DISCUSSION
The Olympic Games offer a unique experience comprised of 
paradoxical juxtapositions of competing yet, interdependent ele-
ments. Our empirical analysis of spectator discourse on the Olympic 
experience has revealed paradoxes of “union and disunion,” “void 
and repletion,” “the staged and the real,” and “the spirit and the ra-
tional”. These two sides of the gold medal exist simultaneously in 
this unique consumption experience of skill, spectacular, and festive 
performance. Their interdependencies become visible as we flip the 
medal and look at the other side of the same.
Paradoxes spark dynamics of constant negotiation processes 
of the respective opposing elements and shed light on the “‘other’, 
the ‘unrepresentable’ and the unfamiliar” (Caputo 1997, as cited in 
Dholakia and Venkatesh 2006, 132). However, none of the prevail-
ing paradoxes are resolved in discourse; rather, they trigger dynamic 
processes. The constant motion across temporary uniting and dis-
uniting discourses reveals the latent grounds of a variety of social 
solidarities; the interplay of discourses on repletion and void intensi-
fies and energizes the extraordinary character of the spectacle; the 
dense juxtaposition of discourses on the real and the staged exponen-
tiates perspectives in the conquest for possible truths; and finally, the 
complementary discourses about the rational and the spirit initiate an 
authentication of the commercial foundation of the Olympic Games. 
Until now, consumer research has mostly directed its attention 
to either overly positive, communal, enchanting characterizations of 
consumption experiences, or anti-structural characteristics and dia-
lectical tensions in extraordinary experiences. Corroborating Tumbat 
and Belk (2011), we find negotiation processes and add to their re-
search in specifying their underlying dynamics. 
While we have investigated the nature and dynamics of para-
doxes during the Olympic Games, we encourage further research 
to go beyond that restricted time frame. A longitudinal perspective 
would enable researchers to explore potentially vicious or virtuous 
cycles over time and thus characterize and understand the evolution 
of paradoxes. 
Adopting a paradox perspective on a discursive level opens new 
perspectives for further disentangling the complexities of extraor-
dinary consumption experiences and sheds light to the flip side of 
the same gold medal. It enriches our understanding of paradoxes in 
consumer discourse as important ingredients of unique consumption 
experiences.
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ABSTRACT
Even though advertising creativity has shown to be of impor-
tance for advertising effectiveness little research has tested it in re-
lation to other marketing strategies. This paper explores the effects 
of advertising creativity (high/low) at different price levels (high/
medium/low). The results suggest that creativity has greatest impact 
at low price levels.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate the impact of perceived advertising 
creativity and price information on advertising effectiveness. More 
specifically, we investigate if the effects of ad creativity found in 
previous research hold up when price information is communicated 
in the same advertisement. In so doing we combine advertising 
creativity research (e.g., Sasser and Koslow 2008) with the literature 
on soft-sell vs. hard-sell in advertising (e.g., Okazaki, Mueller, and 
Taylor 2010), thereby contributing novel perspectives to both sets of 
literature.
Advertising creativity is at the heart of the advertising industry. 
The effects of advertising creativity on brands are fairly well 
documented (for a review see Sasser and Koslow 2008). Creative 
advertisements, defined as ads that consumers perceive as novel yet 
relevant, have been shown to enhance advertising effectiveness in 
two ways: directly by signaling effort and ability on behalf of the 
sender (e.g., Dahlén, Rosengren, and Törn 2008; Rosengren and 
Dahlén, 2012) and indirectly by enhancing ad processing (e.g., 
Smith, Chen, and Yang 2008; Till and Back 2005). More specifically, 
the direct (signaling) effects occur as consumers interpret advertising 
creativity as a sign of product and brand quality whereas the indirect 
effects occur based on enhanced processing having a positive effect 
primarily on brand awareness and knowledge. Less research has, 
however, been conducted with regards to the effects of advertising 
creativity on sales. In fact, when purchase intentions have been 
included (as indicators of potential sales effects) the results are 
inconsistent (Smith et al. 2008). As a consequence, although the 
signaling and processing effects of advertising creativity have 
received rather consistent empirical support, any purchase effects of 
ad creativity are less known.
In part, this can be explained based on the common distinction 
made by both researchers and practitioners between hard-sell and 
soft-sell advertising (e.g., Okazaki et al. 2010). The distinction 
reflects what seems to be a common belief that advertising can be 
crafted either to boost sales or to build a brand. Hard-sell advertising 
typically encourages a quick sale, usually boosted by different price 
promotions, whereas soft-sell advertising focuses on building brand 
with more subtle and indirect creative solutions (Okazaki et al. 2010). 
Given this distinction it is not surprising that advertising creativity 
research has mainly focused on branding rather than purchase effects. 
Advertising creativity has thus mainly been investigated in terms of 
soft-sell and consequently no price information has been included 
in the ads used to study its effects. In this research we are interested 
in whether the effects of advertising creativity hold up when price 
information is included.
In the current study we make two contributions to advertising 
creativity research. First, we add price as a factor in more or less 
creative advertisements and second, we study purchase effects 
in addition to the previously documented signaling and branding 
effects. Our research thereby answers calls for more research on the 
potential moderating effects of advertising creativity (e.g., Yang and 
Smith 2009; Sasser and Koslow 2008). It also offers a first step to 
test advertising creativity in relation to price promotions and thus 
pit two long-standing advertising strategies against each other (Yang 
and Smith 2009).
SIGNAL EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE
Research on marketing signals shows that the very employment 
of various marketing elements, such as warranties (long-lasting) 
or advertising investments (high confidence), sends signals that 
consumers use in evaluating and selecting products (e.g., Boulding 
and Kirmani 1993; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Kirmani and Wright 
1989). The logic is that consumers implicitly associate certain 
marketing behaviors with a corresponding level of quality. Given 
that it might be hard to evaluate products up front, such signals are 
thus used to form opinions about brands and their offers.
Both advertising creativity and price have been found to function 
as marketing signals. When it comes to advertising, research has 
shown that advertising that consumers perceive as more expensive or 
“better” than average increases quality perceptions by signaling that 
the advertiser thinks the product is worth a greater effort (Ambler and 
Hollier 2004; Dahlén et al. 2008; Kirmani and Rao 2000). Making an 
effort in advertising implies that quality must be high; otherwise the 
firm would not recoup the expenditures.
When it comes to price, Rao and Monroe (1989) find a 
statistically significant relationship between product price and 
perceived quality. However, although a higher price typically signals 
higher quality (due to the consumer inferring from the higher price 
that the brand trades off current volume in exchange for future repeat 
purchases) they also point out that the strength of this relationship is 
highly dependent on the product itself. Later research has also found 
limited empirical evidence for price as a signal of quality (Gerstner 
1985; Kirchler, Fischer, and Holzl 2010). In fact, this latter research 
suggests that the price signal functions primarily in expensive 
categories. In low involvement, non-expensive categories the effect 
is not as pronounced or even non-existent.
In the current study we are investigating the effects of ad 
creativity and price in a low involvement setting. Thus in line with 
previous research on advertising creativity (Dahlén et al. 2008) and 
price (Gerstner 1985; Kirchler et al. 2010), we hypothesize that 
creativity will be a more potent advertising signal than price:
Hypothesis 1a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising cre-
ativity will have a signaling effect. More specifi-
cally, higher advertising creativity will lead to 
higher perceptions of product quality than lower 
advertising creativity.
Hypothesis 1b: In a low-involvement setting, price will not have 
a signaling effect. More specifically, there will 
be no difference in perceptions of product qual-
ity for different price levels.
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BRANDING EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE
Advertising creativity influences brand attitudes indirectly both 
by increased processing and ad liking (e.g., Smith et al. 2008) and 
by signaling higher quality with regard to the brand (e.g., Dahlén 
et al 2008). More specifically, consumers use their perceptions of 
creativity as a signal that the brand has put more effort and expense 
behind its ad and therefore consumers are likely to perceive the 
brand itself as of higher quality (e.g., Dahlén et al. 2008). Thus we 
expect advertising creativity to have a positive branding effect.
Research on price promotions usually measures the effect 
price reductions have on choice, perceived value, or perceptions of 
product quality (Yi and Yoo 2011). Very few studies have measured 
the effects on brand perceptions. One exception is Yi and Yoo (2011) 
who show that monetary sales promotions have a negative effect on 
brand perceptions in the long run. One reason might be that lowering 
prices signals that a brand produces weaker products (or else they 
would not have made a price reduction).
However, we believe that any negative effects on brand 
perceptions caused by a lower price might depend on the level of 
creativity in the advertisement. As consumers use different signals 
we think that under the low creativity condition a price reduction has 
a negative effect on brand evaluation, while in the high creativity 
condition it has a positive one. The reasoning stems from Darke 
and Chung (2005), who show that consumers might make negative 
inferences about a brand unless they have other assurances of its 
value. One such assurance could be creativity. Thus a lower price 
could (in the absence of other signals of assurance such as ad 
creativity) be taken as a signal of brand weakness, while under 
the creative condition (a signal of brand strength) it might have a 
positive effect on brand perceptions as consumers might reason that 
they get both a high quality product and the brand at a bargain price. 
Consequently, advertising creativity will have a greater branding 
effect at lower price points when the price in itself does not work as 
an assurance of brand and product quality.
In line with this reasoning we hypothesize that advertising 
creativity has a positive branding effect and that there is an interaction 
effect between creativity and price, which moderates the effect price 
has on brand perceptions.
Hypothesis 2a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising cre-
ativity will have a branding effect. More specifi-
cally, higher advertising creativity will lead to 
higher brand attitudes than lower advertising 
creativity.
Hypothesis 2b: In a low-involvement setting, there will be an 
interaction effect between price and advertis-
ing creativity. More specifically, lower price will 
have a positive effect on brand attitude under 
the high advertising creativity condition, but no 
effect under the low advertising creativity condi-
tion.
PURCHASE EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE
The studied effect of advertising creativity on purchase 
intentions has resulted in mixed conclusions (Smith et al. 2008). 
One explanation might be found in the above reasoning about how 
consumers use different signals to form an opinion and expectations 
about a brand. As creativity signals product quality and brand quality 
it is reasonable to believe that creativity should also have a positive 
effect on purchase effects. However, at a high price point consumers 
might draw the conclusion that the brand is more premium and thus 
they might expect a more creative advertisement. Consequently, if 
consumers are exposed to a higher price, advertising creativity might 
not be of such importance in their purchasing decisions. However, at 
a low price this signal of brand premium does not exist and consumers 
are left to form their opinions using other signals, making the 
creativity in the ad stand out more and thus having a stronger impact 
on the consumers’ purchase decisions. Thus we expect advertising 
creativity to have an effect on purchase intentions, but expect it to be 
significantly stronger at lower price ranges. Furthermore, although 
price cannot be expected to influence quality (hypothesis 1b) and 
have a mixed effect on brand attitude (hypothesis 2b), it should affect 
purchase intentions positively in the short term as consumers should 
be more prone to buy at a lower price. This has also been found in 
previous studies (see Yi and Yoo 2011 for a table of the relevant 
studies).
Thus, we hypothesize that advertising creativity and price 
will have a purchase effect. In addition, we argue that there is an 
interaction between creativity and price which implies that the 
effect of advertising creativity will be strongest at a low price point. 
More specifically, although a low price will be attractive in terms of 
purchase, it will not bring any quality or branding benefits. Given 
that advertising creativity has been found to have such benefits, we 
would expect the effects of creativity to be most important at low 
price points.
Hypothesis 3a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising cre-
ativity will have a purchase effect. More spe-
cifically, higher advertising creativity will lead 
to higher brand purchase intentions than lower 
advertising creativity.
Hypothesis 3b: In a low-involvement setting, price will have a 
purchase effect. More specifically, a lower price 
will lead to higher brand purchase intentions 
than a higher price.
Hypothesis 3c: In a low-involvement setting, there will be an 
interaction effect between price and advertising 
creativity. More specifically, advertising creativ-
ity will have a stronger effect on purchase inten-
tions at lower rather than higher prices.
METHOD
The hypotheses were tested in an experimental study using 
a 2 (high/low creativity) * 3 (high/medium/low price) design. In 
addition, to avoid idiosyncratic effects two product categories were 
used.
We chose two different low-involvement products (chewing 
gum and bottled water) for the study. The reason is that we wanted the 
respondents to be familiar with the category and to have a preexisting 
knowledge of the reference price, something that is helped by using a 
frequently purchased item. In a pretest, 31 respondents of the target 
population rated their price perceptions (1 = very cheap – 7 = very 
expensive) for various prices in both categories. Three price levels 
corresponding to low (mean approx. 2.0), normal (mean approx. 
4.0), and high (mean approx. 6.0) price points were identified in each 
category.
To make sure that preexisting knowledge of the brands 
did not interfere we used unknown (foreign) brands. We then 
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let a professional advertising producer develop two new print 
advertisements (low and high creativity) for each brand. A pretest 
with 33 respondents of the target population rated the creativity (1 
= not at all creative – 7 = very creative) of the low and high creative 
solutions. To measure creativity we thus relied on the judgment of 
both an advertising professional and a sample of consumers. There 
was a significant difference between the low and high version for 
both bottled water (low mean = 2.21, high mean = 3.70, p < .01) 
and chewing gum (low mean = 2.48, high mean = 4.78, p < .01). We 
then included the three different price levels in the advertisement, 
summing up to six different conditions for each category. Both 
categories were collapsed and analyzed together.
Participants for the main study were recruited by intercept at 
a metropolitan commuter train station. The location was selected to 
enable a broad variety of ages, genders, and backgrounds. Also, print 
advertising is commonly present in this environment, which makes 
it suitable for our study.
Incomplete questionnaires and participants who had no 
familiarity (based on previous purchase behavior) with the product 
categories were excluded from our analysis. We also ensured that 
respondents in both creative conditions actually perceived the ads as 
more (less) creative. That led to 259 complete questionnaires over the 
six conditions, with cell sizes ranging from 33-53. The respondents 
were between 16 and 74 years old (mean 33) and 67 percent were 
women. The female overrepresentation was not intentional, but 
rather a consequence of women being more prone to respond, 
something that is common in this kind of research. We included both 
age and gender as covariates in our analysis to check for possible 
bias. We also measured category familiarity with the question “How 
often do you purchase a brand in this product category” with a four-
point scale ranging from “once a week” to “less than once a month”. 
We also included this variable as covariate in our analysis.
Product quality was measured in terms of respondents’ 
agreement with the statement “I consider the [product] to be of high 
quality” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Brand attitudes 
were measured using three items measured on 7-point semantic 
differential:  dislike/like, bad/good, and negative/positive impression 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .92). Purchase intentions were measured in 
terms of respondents’ agreement with the statement “I want to buy 
[brand]” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We also added 
control questions for advertising creativity and price perception (in 
the same way as in the pretests) in order to test the stimuli. Thus 
we used consumers own perceptions of creativity and price levels to 
define and control our stimuli.
RESULTS
We first checked the data to ensure that the stimuli conditions 
were fulfilled. A t-test showed that there was a significant difference 
between the high and low advertising creativity conditions (Mhigh 
creativity = 5.09, Mlow creativity = 2.21, p < .01). A one-way ANOVA also 
confirmed significant differences between the three price conditions 
(Mhigh price = 4.77, Mmedium price = 3.79, Mlow price = 2.69, p < .01 for all 
differences).
To test our hypotheses we ran a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) on product quality, brand attitude, and 
purchase intentions with our manipulations as factors. To control 
for confounding effects we included category familiarity, age, 
and gender as covariates. See table 1. The overall results revealed 
significant main effects for both advertising creativity F(3,224) = 
9.97,Wilks’ lambda = .88, p < .01 and price level F(6,448) = 2.43, 
Wilks’ lambda = .93, p < .05.
Hypothesis 1a states that in a low-involvement setting 
advertising creativity will function as a signal of product quality. 
This is confirmed by the data as advertising creativity has a positive 
effect on product quality (Mhigh creativity = 4.57, Mlow creativity = 4.09, F = 
9.49, p < .01). Hypothesis 1b states that in a low-involvement setting 
price will not function as a signal of quality. This is also supported 
by the data (Mhigh price = 4.22, Mmedium price = 4.29, Mhigh price = 4.47, F = 
.86, ns).
Hypothesis 2a states that in a low-involvement setting, higher 
advertising creativity will lead to better brand attitudes then lower 
advertising creativity. This is supported by the data as advertising 
creativity has a significant positive effect on brand attitude (Mhigh 
creativity = 4.99, Mlow creativity = 4.25, F = 30.11, p < .01). Hypothesis 2b 
states that in a low-involvement setting, there will be an interaction 
effect between price and advertising creativity and that lower 
price will have a positive effect on brand attitude under the high 
ad creativity condition, but no effect under the low ad creativity 
condition. The interaction effect found support in the MANOVA 
analysis (F = 3.05, p < .05). We then split the data between the high 
and low creativity conditions and ran a one-way ANOVA to test price 
on brand attitude in each condition. The hypotheses were supported 
as price was shown to have a positive effect on brand attitude under 
the high advertising creativity condition (F = 4.69, p < .01) and no 
significant effect under the low advertising creativity condition (F 
= .66, ns).
Hypothesis 3a states that in a low-involvement setting higher 
advertising creativity will lead to higher brand purchase intentions 
than lower advertising creativity. This is confirmed by the data as 
advertising creativity has a positive effect on purchase intentions 
(Mhigh creativity = 3.89, Mlow creativity = 3.31, F = 7.75, p < .01). Hypothesis 
3b states that in a low-involvement setting a lower price will lead 
to higher brand purchase intentions than a higher price. This is 
also supported by the data (Mhigh price = 3.31, Mmedium price = 3.51, Mhigh 
price = 3.99, F = 3.67, p < .05). Hypothesis 3c states that in a low-
involvement setting, there will be an interaction effect between 
price and advertising creativity and advertising creativity will have 
a stronger effect on purchase intentions at lower rather than higher 
prices. Both a visual observation and the data points in this direction 
but we did not find significant support for this (F = 2.05, ns).
DISCUSSION
This paper set out to investigate the effects of perceived 
advertising creativity and price information in advertising. More 
specifically, we investigated the signaling, branding, and purchase 
effects of advertising creativity at different price points. In line 
with our hypotheses, advertising creativity was found to have 
positive effects on perceived product quality, brand attitudes, and 
brand purchase intentions regardless of price level. In line with 
our expectations price level also was found to affect brand attitude 
(in the high creativity condition) and brand purchase intentions. 
Furthermore, the results give support to our proposition that ad 
creativity is most important at a low price point as indicated by a 
significant interaction effect on brand attitude.
The current study contributes to research on marketing signals 
(e.g., Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Kirmani 
and Wright 1989) by showing that advertising creativity is a more 
potent signal of brand quality than price in a low involvement setting. 
Price thus seems to have little effect on perceived product quality in 
a low-involvement advertising setting. This is in line with previous 
research (Gerstner 1985; Kirchler et al. 2010). However, our research 
shows that at the same time, price has an impact on brand attitude 
and purchase intentions, especially under a high creativity condition. 
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This has managerial implications as marketers have to be aware about 
the signals they provide to the consumers. Apparently, consumers 
use both price and ad creativity in order to make judgments about the 
product and the brand. Future research should explore these results 
further and potentially add other marketing signals such as brand 
name (Erdem and Swait 1998) or advertising expenditures (Kirmani 
and Rao 2000) to advance knowledge further.
This research also adds to the literature on hard- vs. soft-sell 
advertising appeals, which has been debated in the advertising 
industry for over a century and has gained new attention recently 
(e.g., Modig, Dahlén and Colliander forthcoming; Okazaki et al. 
2010). It sheds some light on the possible managerial dilemma of 
choosing between a creative and a sales-focused advertisement. 
The results suggest that marketers might have to pay even more 
attention to the creative design of their ads when offering a price 
reduction. This notion challenges the traditional distinction between 
price promotion (hard) and creativity (soft) and has implications for 
advertising practice. Creativity might be even more important when 
employed on an advertisement with low price. This might explain 
why previous research has found conflicting results when measuring 
advertising creativity’s impact on purchase intentions (Smith et al. 
2008). The distinction between high and low price, as well as high 
and low involvement and brand position (budget vs. premium), could 
be included in future advertising research in order to shed more light 
on these results.
This paper is one step in the pursuit to investigate the combined 
effects of different marketing signals in advertising. The findings 
correspond with recent research on adverting signals that shows that 
consumers’ perceptions of how much effort and expense a brand puts 
into its advertising influence their attitude to and interest in the brand 
(Modig, Dahlén and Colliander forthcoming). Both these findings 
and the results from the current study suggest that brands that focus 
too much on hard-sell advertising might harm the brand equity in the 
long run. By pitting advertising creativity against price promotions 
this research suggests that the best strategy both to increase sales and 
to keep brand equity might not be to choose between the two, but to 
combine them.
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INTRODUCTION
“What a frenzy for a girl from the shires, in her sensible shoes 
and ladder-less tights. On anyone else, her sober style might seem 
inconsequential – certainly to those in the creative, crazy world of 
high fashion. But on Kate, because she is the saviour perhaps of our 
monarchy as well as our style industry, even so-so clothes can seem 
delectable” (Spencer 2011).
Kate Middleton, formally known as the Duchess of Cambridge, 
is the newest member of the British Royal Family and the subject 
of increasing media attention. Various headlines present her as a 
style icon who can singlehandedly secure a future for British fashion 
retailers. If we take Rojek’s (2001, 10) simple equation that “celebrity 
= impact on public consciousness”, then there is little doubt that Kate 
Middleton has reached celebrity-like status. Instantaneous sell outs, 
inundated websites and waiting lists are just some of the benefits 
brands can expect when Kate decides to step out in one of their 
offerings. This phenomenon is known as the ‘Kate effect’. Drawing 
on the ‘Kate effect’ as the context for our discussion, we focus on the 
following research question: what is the role of fashion in supporting 
the transformation from ordinary person to extraordinary celebrity? 
Previous studies on celebrity culture have focused on Hollywood 
Stars (Wohlfeil 2013), artists (Schroeder 2005; Kerrigan et al. 2011), 
sports personalities (LaVoie 2012), or popular music celebrities 
(Peñaloza 2004; Hewer and Hamilton 2012) and therefore provide 
the “after they were famous” perspective. In contrast, we seek to 
analyze the transformations necessary in the movement towards 
‘extraordinary’ status and how such forms of cultural authority must 
still rest upon populist foundations.
THEORISING THE CELEBRITY SYSTEM
The culture industries continue to manufacture consumer needs 
and desires by constructing cultural frames that are represented and 
disseminated through various media outlets for mass consumption 
(Turner 2004). Celebrity is an effective vehicle through which these 
cultural frames are transmitted (Peñaloza 2004; Brownlie and Hewer 
2007). Celebrities are commodities, ‘things’ manufactured for mass 
consumption (Cashmore and Parker 2003) and many of the meanings 
and associations embedded in the celebrity brand are shaped by the 
very power structures that govern our society (Baudrillard 1981). 
Whilst traditional media outlets remain authors and distributers 
of cultural meanings constructed by underlying governmental or 
commercial powers (Turner 2004), new media or what Marshall 
(2010) refers to as ‘self-presentational media’ i.e. Facebook, Twitter, 
You-Tube, Flickr etc., has the ability to mediate the manufacture of 
cultural phenomena to not only “serve incumbent economic social 
interests” but also to “empower insurgent interests” (Deighton and 
Kornfeld 2010). New media outlets therefore enable commonplace 
individuals to achieve instantaneous fame as they disseminate 
constructed interpretations to position their own observations and 
actions, or, those of others, as being somewhat ‘extraordinary’ 
(Deighton and Kornfeld 2010; Arsel and Zhao 2010; McQuarrie 
et al. 2013). In this way, the mundane aspects of everyday life are 
celebritized to create new social and cultural systems of meaning 
that, in some instances, benefit ‘ordinary’ individuals by providing 
them with social influence and/or economic gain. The economic and 
social forces leveraged to craft this new found fame also profit from 
the perceived creation of a democratic system in which consumers 
become creators of new marketplace meanings when, in actual fact, 
consumers are empowered by the very media channels assembled 
and sustained by the media system.
 Transforming the ‘ordinary’ into the ‘extraordinary’ is not 
necessarily a new phenomenon. Previous research has considered 
how already famous celebrities reach even greater heights. 
O’Guinn’s (1991) Touching Greatness phenomenon unveiled the 
ways in which consumers interpret and negotiate celebrity meanings 
and associations projected in popular media outlets and award sacred 
and ethereal characteristics to Barry Manilow an individual who 
they perceive to be their ‘messiah’. Other studies view celebrity as a 
cultural agent for channeling a particular social lifestyle into the lived 
experience of ordinary individuals through mass media advertising 
(Powell and Prasad 2010). They focus on how celebrities like 
Madonna leverage their extraordinarily influential celebrity status to 
epitomize otherwise underrepresented taboo marketplace beliefs and 
transform them into accepted, ‘ordinary’ cultural practices (Peñaloza 
2004; Brownlie and Hewer 2007). 
Celebrity studies do not, as of yet, offer a complete taxonomy 
of fame as the parameters for distinguishing different celebrity 
classifications are somewhat borderless (Pringle and Benet 2005). 
Rojek (2001) has been criticized for his simplistic categorization 
of celebrity status as: ascribed (inherited through blood relation or 
marriage), achieved (through open competition) or attributed (by 
the media). Turner (2004) suggests that Rojek fails to consider the 
importance of wider societal interests that influence the consumption 
of celebrity. Nevertheless, his typology has informed sociological 
and consumer based approaches to the study of celebrity. 
Otnes, Crosby and Maclaren (2010) draw on ‘ascribed’ celebrity 
in their study of service personnel’s perceptions of the way in which 
various British Royal Family (BRF) members are portrayed as 
‘celebrities’. Their findings reveal that service personnel position the 
BRF brand as a human brand that is entwined in the shared historical 
and contemporary fabric of our culture. Balmer (2011) suggests that, 
like corporate brands, the monarchy’s sense of value resides in the 
brand communities’ attachment to and sense of identity derived from 
the brand. This places the BRF firmly ‘above’ the status of ordinary 
celebrity (Otnes et al. 2010). However, this “above celebrity” status 
does not stop media interest. One need only think of the worldwide 
fascination with Princess Diana “whose body, emotions and intimate 
relationships were under continual scrutiny…she literally lived on 
a faultline between the public and the private” (Lumby 2006, 541). 
Similar to Kate Middleton, Diana was also a global fashion icon, and 
was often referred to as the fashion princess (Hanmer and Graham 
1988). The evolution of her style over the years was a source of 
constant media attention from the buzz surrounding her wedding 
dress to the famous feature in Vanity Fair magazine in 1997 that 
showcased a collection of images (including the front cover) taken 
by celebrity fashion photographer, Mario Testino.
The fashions celebrities adorn impact on the ways in which 
cultural beliefs are disseminated in the media (Barron 2007). 
For example, since the early 90’s Kate Moss’ ‘grungy’ style has 
continued to challenge and revolutionize the ways in which feminine 
cultural ideals are constructed in the media (Entwistle 2002; 
Schroeder 2006). Fashion tastes and trends often signify underlying 
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cultural and temporal ideological tensions between individuals 
and society (Thompson and Haytko, 1997). Subgroups such as 
‘metrosexual males’ or ‘fatshionistas’ act as cultural reference 
points for identifying, negotiating and challenging social-standing, 
gendered identity, and tensions between social constraint and 
personal emancipation (Thompson and Haytko 1997; Rinallo 2006; 
Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Fashion and celebrity are, therefore, 
interchangeably entwined in our kitsch culture (Rojek 2001). 
METHOD
This study takes a bottom-up perspective that considers how 
fashion choices can facilitate celebrity status. We examine media 
talk on Kate Middleton’s appropriation of fashion to understand the 
process through which fashion transforms an ‘ordinary’ individual 
into something ‘extraordinary’. This is achieved through an 
interpretive content analysis (Krippendorff 2012) of articles, images 
and text within contemporary popular women’s monthly lifestyle 
magazine Cosmopolitan UK. From November 2010 to July 2012, 
35 articles and 56 images of Kate were examined. This time frame 
incorporates the social, cultural, political and historical significance 
of the hype before William and Kate’s ‘fairy-tale wedding’ (April 
2011) as well as Kate’s media portrayal in the lead up to the Queen’s 
Diamond Jubilee (June 2012) and the London 2012 Olympics (July 
2012). Each issue was reviewed sequentially, moving back and forth 
between issues. Both text and images in articles and advertisements 
were analyzed. As print copies of Cosmopolitan UK are published 
and consumed monthly, to maintain the richness, depth and breadth 
of understanding of the happenings and goings-on at and around 
momentous events, the constant stream of updates on the Hearst 
International Cosmopolitan UK online article archive was explored 
simultaneously in the same way.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Like other celebrities (Cashmore and Parker, 2003) Kate 
Middleton’s public persona is manufactured behind the scenes by a 
team of highly influential tactically selected cultural intermediaries. 
This team includes a former US ambassador, SAS commander, and 
well-known publicists. The meanings and associations embedded 
in Kate’s persona are, as Baudrillard (1981) suggests, produced and 
controlled by the various actors and institutional forces that exist 
within the culture industries. At the same time, such meanings and 
associations are negotiated by those institutions who disseminate 
contemporary fashion trends and tastes and, ultimately, by the 
individuals who decide to emulate these suggested practices. In 
this way, the “interchangeability” of the meanings embodied by the 
celebrity (Marshall, 1997, 12) - here Kate Middleton as a normal 
girl, fashion icon, and celebrity princess - are continually negotiated 
by Cosmopolitan magazine who through the process of ‘meaning 
transfer’ (McCracken 1989) attach and detach these meanings to add 
value to and ‘humanize desire’ (Rojek, 2001) for the brands that Kate 
wears:
“Doesn’t purple look marvelous with a bronzed glow? Here’s 
Kate looking sensational in her purple Issa dress, up-do and 
chic, black accessories. Block colour looks fabulous on K-Mid-
dy” (Cosmopolitan Online July 2011)
Here we witness how Cosmopolitan gains a discursive voice 
and power of influence over popular consumer fashion tastes and 
trends (Marshall 1997) through the use of colloquial language, 
Cosmopolitan subtly endorse Kate Middleton’s fashion choices. 
Through such utterances the media position themselves to be like the 
aspiring consumer or adoring ‘fan’ in order to secure consumer buy-in 
around the celebrity brand. Whilst Rojek (2001, 190) acknowledges 
that “one of the most significant developments in the growth of 
capitalist society was the reduction in the balance of power between 
the monarch and society in favour of the latter”, like new media 
(Deighton and Kornfeld 2010; Marshall 2010), traditional print 
magazine Cosmopolitan, shifts towards celebritizing the ordinary 
and mundane aspects of Kate’s fashion to make her relatable to and 
within ‘reach’ of the consumer masses. This creates an opportunity 
for consumers to participate in the Duchess’ lifestyle, and thereby 
acquire their own cultural capital through the consumption of brands 
and goods that are infused with her ‘royal’ aura. At the same time, 
as British Royal Family members are perceived by BRF service 
providers to be ‘above’ the status of celebrity as their royal roles are 
entwined in historical and contemporary fabric of society (Otnes et 
al. 2010), the process through which an ‘ordinary’ girl is transformed 
to an ‘extraordinary’ celebrity princess fit for purpose can be 
witnessed through Cosmopolitan’s strategic talk around the fashions 
and brands that Kate Middleton ‘selects’ as her mentors prepare 
her for her emergent royal role. A role, that Balmer et al. (2006) 
suggest, involves supporting the societal and cultural welfare of the 
commonwealth. Throughout this transition process, from November 
2010 to July 2012, we identify ‘five’ faces of the celebrity princess 
brand: “Girl Next Door Kate”, “Fairy-tale Princess Kate”, “Humble 
Kate”, “Regal Kate”, and “The People’s Kate” (Appendix A). Such 
transformations mark the passage of the celebrity princess brand and 
the way that media, brand and retail interests feed off such changes.
“Girl Next Door Kate”
From October 2010 until the day of the royal wedding, St. 
Catherine’s day April 29th 2011, Kate’s apparel choices depict her 
as the cute, innocent, fun-loving girl next door. Her relaxed off-
duty looks signify her youthful femininity as she appears relaxed 
and carefree, making personal visits to high street stores. Pre-
honeymoon, Kate visits Warehouse, Kings Road, London where she 
acquired a: 
“lace trim blouse, feather print asymmetric dress, tropical bird 
print sundress and bright bandeau frill frock” (Cosmopolitan 
Online April 2011). 
Celebrity culture is closely connected to the aestheticization of 
everyday life (Rojek, 2001) and fashion is central to this process; 
here we see Kate offering consumers styles that they can easily 
participate in. 
As the royal wedding drew closer, in March 2011 the Charlotte 
Todd dress – which has so little fabric to it that it was originally 
intended as a skirt – worn by Kate a fashion show at St. Andrews 
University sold for £78, 000. This action secured Kate’s status as 
an ‘achieved’ iconic fashion celebrity. This is because the dress 
worn in her first public appearance, in the making of Kate, is given 
a financial value that far exceeds its production value. Celebrity 
objects are believed to possess ‘contagion’ or rather aspects of the 
personalities and characteristics of the stars that owned them and 
this often enhances their value (Newman et al. 2011). In this way, 
Kate’s dress became a symbolic, historic artifact that signifies the 
beginnings of both Kate and William’s relationship and a young, 
relatively normal girl’s emergence into the public eye as a potential 
future monarch and highly influential contemporary fashion icon. 
The purchase of the dress signifies the end of “Girl Next Door Kate” 
and the beginning of something much greater. 
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“Fairy-Tale Princess Kate”
The royal wedding is a watershed moment in the transition from 
an ‘ordinary’ to ‘extraordinary’ celebrity brand. Kate, ‘a normal girl’, 
has her dream wedding and makes a life commitment to her ‘true’ 
love and is simultaneously elevated to royal celebrity on the global 
fashion stage: 
“When Kate Middleton got out of the car in that Sarah Burton 
for Alexander McQueen wedding dress the world gasped with 
sheer delight. She couldn’t have looked more beautiful, not even 
if she tried” (Cosmo Online April 2011). 
Cosmo talk here presents the Duchess’ choices as ‘effortlessly 
sophisticated and individualistic’, which is aggrandized by ‘her’ 
decision to remain true to her heritage by wearing British couture 
design: 
“[the gown] was demure but so stylish - with lace sleeves and 
a modest train…The 2m70cm train, the lace appliqué sleeved 
bodice and the [1936 vintage] tiara-secured veil were all the 
right side of sexy and sophisticated.” (Cosmo Online April 
2011). 
The royal wedding is undoubtedly a media spectacle and 
the idealized images of the ‘fairy-tale princess’ captures global 
attention perhaps because she embodies “wishes and fantasies that 
are ubiquitous in popular culture” (Rojek 2001, 110). The birth of 
“Fairy-tale Princess Kate” also has a dramatic impact on the fortunes 
of the British high-street: 
“Kate Middleton’s wedding frock was the lacy creation that 
launched a billion girls’ dress dreams” (Cosmo Online June 
2011). 
With consumers coveting the gown, budget high-street retailers 
such as Peacocks are quick off to the mark to profit from such 
attention offering an affordable Kate Middleton inspired alternative: 
“Since the royal wedding, we [Peacocks] have seen a 
new trend for sweetheart necklines and lace in our occasion 
wear.  Catherine’s dress had elements that translated well 
for our customers, the classic neckline with the overlay of 
lace, and full skirt, were not only classically beautiful but 
also flattering for a womanly figure” Antonella Bettley 
Head of Peacocks Ladieswear (Cosmo Online June 2011). 
Consumers inspired by Kate in their fashion choices, appear to 
be appropriating her image and brand selections via more affordable 
high-street options. The manufacture of celebrity inspired goods, as 
Cashmore and Parker (2003) suggest therefore, permits consumers 
to acquire an otherwise unattainable slice of the celebrity dream and 
envisioned good life at knockdown prices.
“Humble Kate”
Post Royal Wedding, from June 2011, Kate returned to dressing 
as a “normal” late-twenty to early-thirty-something girl, consulting 
and seeking inspiration from the British high-street. Undoubtedly, 
the Duchesses’ most famous and “Humble Kate” piece of high-street 
attire for the Canadian and US Tour in July 2011 was the camel Shola 
Reiss dress. Kate wore this to meet Michelle Obama, who is often 
photographed wearing affordable mass-market high street brands 
because she simply ‘likes them’ (Yermack 2011). Acting as a UK 
royal ambassador at such an important meeting with a central and 
influential political and public figure and well-established fashionista, 
Kate shocked the rest of the world by wearing a British mid-range, 
high-street designer. This meeting is significant, and symbolizes 
a key moment in Kate’s initiation from ‘normal girl’ to celebrity 
fashion icon. As the two influential fashion figures crossed paths 
their fashion styles were compared across the global mediascape 
launching Kate into the ‘spotlight’ as a potential successor to 
Michelle’s iconic fashion status. The ‘charisma’ possessed by both 
personalities, affords them “supernatural, superhuman or at least 
superficially exceptional qualities” (Weber 1968, 329), this enables 
them to offer value, order and stability in a society where social 
standing is no longer necessarily as relevant (Prasad and Powell 
2010). They re-enforce their leadership as ‘agents of change’ by 
challenging the traditional notion of fashion ‘hegemony’ as they 
allow the masses to easily replicate their affordable fashions, and in 
doing so, acquire cultural capital through the consumption of these 
goods.
Kate through her brand choices remains humble, and, the 
brand, rather than distancing itself, seeks to cultivate an ideology 
that it is the: ‘same as the rest of us’. Unlike celebrities that engage 
in conspicuous consumption, Humble Kate retains her populist 
credentials through a penchant for thrifting and brand eclecticism.
“Regal Kate”
Such populist credentials however nestle against another side to 
the celebrity brand, that of ‘Regal Kate’. With Remembrance Sunday 
November 2011 marking a watershed moment in the transformation 
of the brand as a sophisticated, more mature, more tailored, and 
high-fashion couture look is cultivated for Kate’s new royal role. 
As 2012 beckoned, with the Royal Jubilee, the Order of the Garter 
Royal Procession and the Olympics; the Duchess stepped up to 
dress the part. At the Diamond Jubilee Pageant in June 2012, “Regal 
Kate” is discussed as looking “ravishing in red”, with a tailored, 
scarlet pleated Alexander McQueen dress, headpiece and nude heels 
chosen to represent this new style and look; and, at the Order of 
the Garter Royal Procession – the senior and oldest British order 
of chivalry founded by Edward III in 1348 – in June 2012, Kate’s 
fashion credentials are once again the talk of Cosmo. A pale yellow 
Alexander McQueen dress coat is chosen, coupled with “a regal 
looking hat by esteemed milliner Jane Corbett” (Cosmo Online July 
2012). The brand is a heady concoction of luxury adorned.
This sophisticated ‘Regal Kate look’ thus combines talented 
couture British designers with elegant fashion forward headpieces 
crafted by skilled British milliners. Acting in her royal role, Kate’s 
decision to wear British Couture designer and local millinery pieces 
not only re-fashioned her own brand, but also boosted the trade of 
artists, heritage and creative industries, as consumer fashion “moved 
on” from fascinators “to bigger headpieces and hats” (Cosmo Print 
July 2012). While the regal attire worn by Kate is far-removed from 
the flamboyant and rather unpractical clothing worn by other female 
celebrities, her ‘choices’ are clearly designed to demonstrate how 
she possesses the social and cultural competence demanded of her 
position.
“The People’s Kate”
But cultural authority now rests on less secure foundations 
than the poles of attraction of yesteryear.  Royalty and its traditional 
basis of authority must now be supplemented with more populist 
appeals. As Kate fulfills her royal role attending and endorsing 
social and cultural events throughout 2012, the Duchess dresses in 
particular mid to high level high-street fashion brands. From her 
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 381
role as ambassador for the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics, 
to her charity visit with children in the countryside, Kate dresses 
glamorously, but arguably, in a way that is still affordable and 
within reach of the ‘average’ consumer. For example, fulfilling her 
royal role as ambassador, in March 2012, Kate welcomed the Great 
Britain Olympic women’s hockey team in London and revisited 
her schoolgirl days at Marlborough, as she played hockey in a grey 
hoodie, trainers and skinny coral Zara jeans. Weber (1978) observes 
that consumers desire to emulate the elite, by consuming the same 
goods as them, even if in the form of more affordable substitutes. 
Kate’s attire launched the 2012 spring coral jean trend - a look 
emulated by millions and sales of Asda coral jeans, an even more 
affordable alternative, increased by 471% (Hall, 2012). 
“The People’s Kate” as a brand tries hard to flag up that despite 
its’ riches and fame it remains “like the rest of us”, as it recycles 
staple fashion items. Kate Middleton thus becomes a champion of 
LK Bennett nude heels, as she appears in six of the 56 photographs 
analyzed throughout 2011-2012. The Duchess’ first, formal public 
speech at the East Anglia Children’s Hospice in Ipswich on the 19th 
March 2012 is probably her most well-known re-usage of an item 
of fashion apparel - a momentous and significant event, at which 
the Duchess finds her voice. In this moment the Duchess’ decision 
to wear a royal blue Trina style Reiss dress, which was first worn in 
2008, and then replicated by mum Carole at Royal Ascot in 2010, 
symbolizes Brand Kate as just like any ‘normal’ girl, who, wracked 
with nerves, seeks the comfort and security of a tried and tested 
fashion piece as sealed with the approval of mum. By wearing this 
dress, Kate not only reconnects with ‘humble’ roots but also, more 
importantly for the brand’s fortunes, we witness how she  becomes 
an example of achieved celebrityhood in action, a celebrity princess 
fashionista and precious commodity manufactured to fulfill a royal 
role and public duty. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends Rojek’s (2001, 10) work on how celebrities 
influence fashion tastes and trends by adopting a bottom-up approach 
that instead charts the emergence of a celebrity princess brand 
through fashion and brand choices. Cultural authority can no longer 
rest simply on royal foundations. Here we witness how fashion 
and brand selection are harnessed to re-fashion Kate as governing 
stock. Building on existing research (Peñaloza 2004; Brownlie 
and Hewer 2007; Powell and Prasad 2010), we illustrate the way 
in which media discourses, through their praising commentaries, 
construct a particular lifestyle and ensemble of marketplace myths 
which draw upon the discourses of celebrity, fashion and branding. 
Specifically, the processes through which a celebrity’s appropriation 
of fashion transforms the celebrity brand from being ‘ordinary’ 
‘just like us’ to something extraordinary which rests on the myth of 
being: ‘just like us’. Such a transformation is achieved during critical 
moments in which finding difference through consumption practices 
is paramount. Lastly, we build on Otnes et al.’s (2010) work on 
the British Royal Family (BRF), and their suggestions that BRF 
members are above ordinary celebrity as their roles are entwined 
in the social and historical fabric of our society by exploring how 
the British Royal Family brand sustains and reinvigorates its appeals 
through marrying itself with the ‘Kate effect’. 
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“When Kate Middleton got out of the car in that 
Sarah Burton for Alexander McQueen wedding dress 
the world gasped with sheer delight. She couldn’t 
have looked more beautiful, not even if she tried”
 “While not all of us can afford a bespoke wedding 
gown by a top designer, never fear, high street fave 
Peacocks have been quick to create their own Kate 
Middleton inspired piece.”
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People’s 
Kate”
The making of the 
celebrity princess 
brand: from 
November 2010 
– July 2012 and 
beyond…
“Didn’t Kate Middleton look absolutely gorgeous 
when she swapped her usual elegant dressed-up 
style for the sports luxe trend? Our fave Royal 
fashionista donned a pair of coral skinnies, trainers 
and a marl grey hoody when she played a game of 
hockey with Team GB... and we loved it! This look 
definitely proved that Kate can work any trend and 
any occasion.”
Despite riches and fame, performing her new 
royal role, Kate is positioned to remain “like the 
rest of us”. Royalty and its traditional basis of 
authority is supplemented with more populist 
appeals.
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ABSTRACT
The concept of potential is central to a number of decisions, 
ranging from organizational hiring, to athletic recruiting, to the 
evaluation of artistic performances.  While potential may often be 
valued for its future payoffs, the present studies investigate whether 
people value potential even when making decisions about goods and 
experiences that can only be consumed in the present. Experiment 
1 demonstrates that potential makes people more likely to consume 
inferior performances in the present (e.g., attending a ‘mediocre’ 
art exhibit). Experiment 2 demonstrates that this effect is due to the 
ability to imagine the person’s performance in the future, such that 
merely moving the performance into the past negates the effect of 
potential. And Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect of potential 
only holds when valuation is tied to abstract, hedonic dimensions 
(e.g., watching a film), but not when valuation is tied to concrete, 
utilitarian dimensions (e.g., getting one’s car repaired). 
Potential: The Valuation of Imagined Future 
Achievement
Assessments of potential play an important role in many kinds 
of decisions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions focus not only 
on objective measures of past performance, but also on how can-
didates are likely to perform in the future. In hiring and promotion 
decisions within organizations, it is common to classify candidates 
based on their likelihood for future success. And a critical factor in 
athletic recruiting is the degree to which a player is likely to im-
prove (Berri & Simmons, 2011; Kuzmits & Adams, 2008; Massey & 
Thaler, 2005; Quinn, Geier & Burkovitz, 2007). 
While some research suggests that the bias towards future per-
formance is so robust that it can dominate objective criteria (e.g., 
Massey & Thaler, 2005), in many cases, the valuation of potential is 
understandable—the recruitment of exceptional, one-of-a-kind talent 
is attractive to any organization. Moreover, identifying individuals 
with potential may present a “great buy” for organizations, as they 
are able to hire individuals at a fraction of their future value. 
More puzzling is a class of consumption decisions for which 
potential seems relevant, and yet there is little ability to “profit” 
from the future success of those individuals.  For example, there are 
many videos on YouTube of prodigious children singing, dancing, or 
playing instruments, and these videos tend to be more popular than 
similar (and often superior) performances by adults.1 Why do people 
choose to spend their time watching performances by children when 
they could instead watch better performances by adults?
One explanation might be novelty. Perhaps it is novel or unex-
pected to watch children play pieces of music that are typically as-
sociated with adults. Another explanation may be the inherent ‘cute-
ness’ of the performance; or, perhaps the popularity of such videos 
stems from a sense of ‘awe’ (Rudd, Vohs & Aaker, 2012) or even re-
ligious wonder as viewers speculate about the origins of such talent. 
While the appeal of YouTube videos per se is likely multiply 
determined, here we suggest that this type of phenomenon is impor-
tantly related to considerations of potential.  Specifically, we pro-
pose that consistent with a literature on ‘conceptual consumption,’ 
1 A sample of 240 videos of children and adults performing the 
same song indicated that the child performances had, on average, 10 times as 
many views (Mviews=478,455; Median=13,029) as the adults (Mviews=43,908; 
Median=4,830); t(238)=2.68, p=.008.
individuals consume not only the item or performance in question, 
but also their ideas about it (Ariely & Norton, 2009). In the case of 
child prodigies, those concepts may include imagining the child’s su-
perior performance in the future—e.g., “If the child is this good now, 
imagine what they will be like as an adult.”  In turn, the positivity 
associated with imagined future achievements provides a source of 
value in the present. Therefore, we suggest that prodigious or early-
emerging talent may lead people to imagine an individual’s future 
achievements, and the act of imagining those future achievements 
may increase one’s likelihood of consuming goods or experiences 
that are associated with that individual. 
To date, relatively little research has focused on potential or 
“pre-peak” consumption. Research on NFL drafts has found that 
teams tend to overvalue the potential of rookies relative to known 
performance of players on their current roster (Massey & Thaler, 
2006). Another recent paper (Huang & Bargh, 2008) examined “pre-
peak” consumption in the domain of mating goals and found that 
participants primed with mating goals showed a preference for fruit 
that was earlier in the ripeness cycle. There is also some support for 
the notion that ambiguity of information can have positive effects 
in person perception. For example, both Norton, Frost and Ariely 
(2007) and Bargh, McKenna and Fitzsimmons (2002) found that 
when people are given less (rather than more) information about so-
cial targets, they tend to ‘fill in’ social information about that person 
in an idealized, overly positive way. 
To our knowledge, however, previous research has not exam-
ined whether beliefs about potential influence decisions about goods 
and experiences that can only be experienced in the present. This is 
important because it helps to dissociate effects of potential that are 
related to “future payoffs”  (e.g., purchasing the artwork of a talented 
child artist in the hopes that it will appreciate in value) from those 
that are unrelated to future rewards (e.g., attending an exhibition of a 
talented child artist). Therefore, the goal of the present studies was to 
examine contexts where an individual’s future performance offers no 
direct benefits to test whether merely imagining better performance 
in the future increases consumption of things that are experienced in 
the present.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
Experiment 1 demonstrates that potential makes people more 
likely to consume even inferior performances in the present. Experi-
ment 2 demonstrates that this effect is due to the ability to project 
performance in the future, such that merely moving the performance 
into the past negates the effect of potential. Experiment 3 demon-
strates that the effect of potential only holds when valuation is tied 
to abstract, hedonic dimensions, but not when valuation is tied to 
concrete, utilitarian dimensions.
Experiment 1: Consuming Inferior Performances
The goal of the first experiment was to test whether people are 
willing to consume inferior performances in the present based on 
beliefs about an individual’s potential. 
METHOD
Participants were 111 adults (Mage = 30.4, 41% female), who 
were recruited from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $.50 
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(USD). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 3 between-
subjects conditions. 
We presented participants with two paintings: One ‘superior’ 
painting (a pretest indicated a mean liking of 5.4 on a 7-point scale), 
and one ‘inferior’ painting (Mliking = 3.5 out of 7; t(55) = 8.13, p < 
.001).2  Between participants we varied the biographical informa-
tion about the artists’ ages. The superior painting was always said 
to have been created by an adult (age 42), and across conditions we 
varied whether the inferior painting was said to have been created by 
a child (age 7) or another adult (age 37).3  A third control condition 
was included in which the artists’ ages were not mentioned.  We then 
asked participants how much they liked each painting (1=not at all, 
7=very much) and their interest in attending the artists’ respective 
exhibitions, coded as 1= superior painting and 7= inferior painting. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Liking of the superior painting did not change across conditions 
(Ms=5.69, 5.82 and 5.41), p=.24. However, liking of the ‘inferior’ 
painting increased when it was said to have been created by a child 
(M=4.65, SD=1.69) compared to when it was created by an adult 
(M=3.53, SD=1.38), t(77)=3.22, p=.002, or the artists’ ages were not 
mentioned (M=3.72, SD=1.44), t(69)=2.44, p=.017. Analogously, 
participants reported that they were significantly more likely to at-
tend the ‘inferior’ art exhibition when the painting was created by a 
child (M=3.97, SD=1.74), compared to when both artists were adults 
(M=2.83, SD=1.71), t(77)=2.96, p=.004, or when no age information 
was provided (M=2.41, SD=1.34), t(69)=4.18, p<.001. 
These results suggest that beliefs about potential per se can in-
crease the evaluation of goods in the present, which is consistent 
with the notion that such items may be positively associated with 
the person’s imagined future achievements. In turn, this can make 
people more likely to consume even inferior goods/experiences. 
Experiment 2: Consuming the Future, Now
The results from the first experiment suggest that consider-
ations of potential may lead people to consume inferior performanc-
es in the present. However, it may instead be that artwork produced 
by children is simply more novel, rare, or ‘awe inspiring.’ Or, one 
might argue that this effect could be interpreted as a preference for 
natural talent over learned skill (Tsay & Banaji, 2011). Therefore, the 
goal of Experiment 2 was to provide a second test of the theory that 
addressed these potential alternatives.
We hypothesized that if the effects observed in Experiment 
1 result from imagining the individual’s future achievement, then 
reducing the ability to project achievements into the future should 
attenuate the effect.  To test this hypothesis, participants in Experi-
ment 2 were asked to evaluate a book of poetry. Between subjects we 
varied the age of the poet as well as whether the book was published 
recently (one week ago) or in the past (20 years ago). If participants 
merely have a preference for things created by children (for whatever 
reason), then they should express greater interest in the 9-year olds’ 
book regardless of whether it was published in the present versus the 
past. However, our prediction was that merely moving the publica-
tion of the book into the past should reduce the ability to imagine 
the poet’s future performance, and thus, the preference toward the 
child’s poetry.  In this experiment, we also directly asked about the 
perceived potential of the poet with the expectation that ratings of 
potential should mediate willingness to purchase the poet’s book.
2  None of the pretest participants recognized the “superior” paint-
ing, or identified the artist who made it.
3  The names of the artists and the side on which each painting 
appeared were counterbalanced across participants.
METHOD
Participants were 106 adults (Mage = 35.1, 45% female), re-
cruited from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $.50 (USD). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 
(age) X 2 (present vs. past) between-subjects design. 
Participants were asked to read a brief vignette about a book 
of poetry (see Appendix). Between participants we varied the age 
of the artist (9 vs. 39) and when the book was published (one week 
vs. 20 years ago). After reading the vignette, participants were asked 
to indicate their general interest in reading the book (1=not at all 
interested; 7=very interested) as well as how likely they were to pur-
chase it (1=not at all likely; 7=very likely). Participants also indi-
cated how much potential they thought the poet had (1=none at all; 
7=very much). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 (age) X 2 (time framing) ANOVA revealed a significant 
two-interaction, F(1,102)=7.83, p=.006. As predicted, when the book 
was recently released, participants were more interested in reading 
the 9-year-old’s book (M=5.71, SD=1.32) than the 39-year-old’s 
book (M=3.77, SD=1.41), t(51)=5.11, p<.001. By contrast, when the 
book was released 20 years in the past, participants were equally in-
terested in reading the 9-year-old’s book (M=4.76, SD=1.28) as they 
were the 39-year-old’s book (M=4.30, SD=1.34), p=.22.
Participants’ willingness to purchase the book followed an iden-
tical pattern. An analogous 2 (age) X 2 (time framing) ANOVA re-
vealed a significant two-way interaction, F(3,102) = 3.97, p=. 049. 
As predicted, when the book was recently released, participants 
were reported that they were more likely to purchase the 9-year-
old’s book (M=5.19, SD=1.62) than the 39-year-old’s book (M=3.18, 
SD=1.26), t(51)=4.87, p<.001. By contrast, when the book was re-
leased 20 years in the past, participants reported that they were only 
marginally more likely to purchase the 9-year-old’s book (M=4.27, 
SD=1.44) than they were the 39-year-old’s book (M=3.45, SD=1.64), 
t(51)=1.92, p=.06. Thus, for ratings of purchase intent, moving the 
performance into the past did significantly reduce the influence of 
potential, though it did not completely attenuate the effect.
We then conducted a bootstrap mediation analysis to determine 
whether in the “present” conditions (one week ago) ratings of poten-
tial mediated the effect of the poet’s age on willingness to purchase 
the book. This analysis indicated that there was a significant indirect 
effect of poet’s age on willingness to purchase their book, b=.33, 
SE=.14 (95%CI=.01 to .67).
Experiment 3: Hedonic and Utilitarian Domains
We propose that the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 
resulted from imagining the individual’s future achievements. Con-
sistent with this, Experiment 2 found that the ability to project into 
the future plays a key role in the valuation of potential. 
In Experiment 3 we examined the role of imagining those fu-
ture achievements. Specifically, we reasoned that the effect of poten-
tial should hold for domains where value is abstract and subjective 
(such as artwork or poetry) but not in domains where value is more 
concrete and objective (such as tool-making). To test this, we asked 
participants to read short vignettes about both young vs. older indi-
viduals who offered goods/services in either hedonic or utilitarian 
domains. We predicted that for hedonic goods/services, participants 
should show greater interest in the products of young (vs. older) peo-
ple, while in utilitarian domains that preference should be attenuated.
In addition, this experiment helps to address yet another alter-
native explanation which may account for the previous findings. It 
may be that people value potential because of a sort of “bragging 
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right” associated with discovering talent before others. This alter-
ative, however, predicts that there should be no difference in the 
valuation of potential across domains.  
METHOD
Participants were 206 adults (Mage=33.2, 52% female), recruited 
from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $.50 (USD). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2(age) 
X 2(domain) between-subjects design. Participants read about either 
4 hedonic products/services (watching a television show written by 
the person, watching a movie directed by the person, listening to 
music produced by the person, reading a book written by the person) 
or 4 utilitarian products/services (taking pain medication made by 
the person, having your car serviced by the person, having your boat 
serviced by the person, having a tool repaired by the person). In all 
cases, the products/services were described as high quality and hav-
ing received recognition (e.g., a major television network had agreed 
to make a show written by the person).  Between-subjects we also 
varied the age of the person to be either under 15-years-old (youth 
condition) or over 40-years-old (adult condition). 
Following each vignette, participants reported their likelihood 
of purchasing/consuming the product or service described (1=not at 
all likely, 7=very likely). The specific wordings of these items varied 
for each item. Participants also indicated how much potential they 
thought the individual had (1=none at all; 7=very much) as well as 
how good they expected the person would be at their trade 10 years 
in the future (1=worst, 10=best). This latter measure directly tested 
whether people are imagining the future growth of the individual. 
Both measures of potential were included to a test specific serial 
mediation model where beliefs about high potential lead to a predic-
tion about better future performance which in turn leads to increased 
valuation. 
Finally, we were concerned that one additional difference be-
tween the hedonic and utilitarian items may be that people think that 
performance increases with age in utilitarian domains more so than 
in hedonic ones.  To address this, at the end of the survey participants 
indicated for each of the 8 products/services (e.g., script writing), 
the extent to which they thought (in general) ability increased as a 
function of age.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 (age) X 2 (domain) ANOVA revealed a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1, 202)=5.56, p=.02. As predicted, when the domain 
was hedonic, participants indicated they were more likely to pur-
chase/consume the young person’s good/service (M=5.07, SD=1.21) 
compared to the adult’s (M=4.55, SD=1.23, t(106)=2.21, p=.03. 
However, when the domain was utilitarian, participants showed a 
slight preference for the adult (M=4.59, SD=1.39), over the young 
person (M=4.25, SD=1.39), though this difference was not statisti-
cally significant, p=.23, ns. 
We then conducted a serial bootstrap mediation analysis to de-
termine whether the effect of age on valuation was mediated through 
the indirect effects of potential and predictions about future ability. 
We examined the hedonic and utilitarian items separately. This analy-
sis indicated that full serial mediation model (age→potential→future 
performance→valuation) was statistically significant for the hedonic 
domain items, (95%CI=.06 to .31), but not for the utilitarian domain 
items (95%CI= -.05 to .22).
Finally, for all of the products/services examined, people 
thought that in general, ability improved with age (all Ms were sig-
nificantly greater that the midpoint, ps < .001) and there was no dif-
ference between the hedonic and utilitarian items. 
The results from this study were consistent with the prediction 
that when value is tied to hedonic dimensions, potential has a posi-
tive effect on consumption. However, when value is predominantly 
tied to utilitarian dimensions, and a product’s imagined components 
play less of a role, the effect of potential is attenuated.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three experiments investigated the concept of potential and 
specifically, the notion that people are willing to consume certain 
goods or services in the present based on an individual’s imagined 
future achievements. Experiment 1 demonstrated that potential leads 
people to consume even inferior performances in the present. Ex-
periment 2 demonstrated that the ability to project achievements into 
the future plays a key role in preferences based on potential; simply 
indicating that a young poet’s book had come out 20 years ago (as 
opposed to one week ago) significantly reduced the effect of po-
tential. And, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effect of potential 
obtains in hedonic domains, where value is associated with abstract, 
subjective dimensions, but not in utilitarian domains where value is 
concrete and objective.
One interesting avenue for further research may be to investi-
gate the situations in which imagining the future either increases or 
decreases valuation. For example, it is well known that people inflate 
their predicted happiness for future positive events (e.g., Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003; Wood & Bettman, 2007), and that they are overly op-
timistic about the future state of the world (Weinstein, 1980). There-
fore, it may be that thinking about the future always increases value. 
Alternatively, it may be that imagining the future only has positive 
effects for entities that are associated with ‘growth.’  For example, 
it seems difficult to imagine that thinking about a new and better 
iPhone would make the current iPhone more valuable—perhaps it is 
quite the opposite.
In sum, the goal of the present paper was to examine the con-
cept of potential and its role in immediate consumption decisions. 
Our preference for potential is likely multiply determined, drawing 
from our ability to profit from it in the future, novelty, a sense of 
awe, a preference toward innate skill or natural talent, and perhaps 
reputational benefits associated with “discovering” talent. Neverthe-
less, the present studies demonstrate that even when you eliminate 
the relevance of these factors, there remains a clear preference for 
potential that is tied to imagining the future achievements of indi-
viduals. Critically, we find that this conceptual aspect of potential 
exerts an influence on consumption decisions that are only experi-
enced in the present, which provides empirical support not only for 
the existence of potential effects free from their payoffs in the future, 
but also for the notion of concepts per se can provide an important 
source of value. 
APPENDIX
Stimuli from Experiment 2
When poet Jason Allen White first published a book of poetry 
one week (twenty years) ago he was a 9 (39) years old. Upon publi-
cation, the book penned by the Philadelphia native immediately met 
with acclaim from the local press and has gone on to achieve more 
widespread recognition. One simply needs to read a few pages in 
this brilliant book to understand the staggering writing skills he pos-
sesses. 
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ABSTRACT
Academics and stand up comics alike have noted the sometimes 
extraordinary divergence of retrospective evaluations from an actual 
experience. Academics, for their part, have presented ample evidence 
for experiences ranging from spring break vacations (Kemp, Burt, & 
Furneaux, 2008; Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener, 2003), trips to 
Disneyland (Sutton, 1992), and bike trips across California (Mitchell, 
Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997). For these experiences and 
others, the bulk of research suggests that changes in evaluations are 
directional; people have a “rosy view” of their past (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Wirtz & Kruger, 2002). There are exceptions, however. Wirtz 
et al. (2003) reported an increase in negative affect from online to 
retrospective reports, although overall evaluations did improve. 
Anecdotally, people also exaggerate negative aspects of experiences, 
sacrificing accuracy for entertainment value. Any theory attempting 
to explain these shifting evaluations of vacations must account for 
how the fish you caught grows larger over time, the local food more 
savory, and the already staggeringly incompetent mountain guide 
even less adroit.
There are several lines of research how memories and their 
associated affect change over time. Evidence from attitudes research 
suggests that evaluations could become polarized (e.g. Tesser, 1975; 
Srull & Wyer, 1981) or diluted (e.g. Linville, 1982; Millar & Tesser, 
1985; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) over time as a result of many factors 
ranging from the complexity of the topic to the need for justification. 
A substantial body of work also deals with how people feel before 
or after an experience and retrospective evaluations may be based 
on current feelings (Ross, McFarland, & Decourville, 1989). Wilson 
and Gilbert’s (2003, 2008) AREA (Attend, React, Explain, and 
Adapt) contends that people react emotionally only to self-relevant 
events that they do not understand. Taylor’s (1991) mobilization-
minimization account suggests that people will have strong initial 
reactions to negative experiences, but that their impact will fade with 
time. Research derived from Pennebaker’s (1997) clinical work has 
demonstrated that writing about a traumatic experience will reduce 
negative feelings upon later recall of the experience. Walker and 
colleagues (e.g. Skowronski & Thompson, 2003; Walker, Vogl, & 
Thompson, 1997) have extended this finding to recall of everyday 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences and demonstrated an asymmetry 
they labeled the Fading Affect Bias. Negative affect associated with 
unpleasant experiences fades faster than positive affect associated 
with positive experiences. Further, the authors suggest that the 
Fading Affect Bias is driven by social recall – talking about an 
experience with peers (Skowronski et al., 2004). Just as the feelings 
evoked by memories can change, so too can the actual contents 
recalled. Cognitively focused psychologists have demonstrated that 
depending on how a story is told, the details of that story may change 
when recalled later (Dudokovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; Huston 
& Marsh, 2005; Marsh & Tversky, 2000). When participants write 
about a scenario from one perspective, their memories will reflect 
that perspective’s bias. Finally, research on motivated retrieval in self 
deception suggests that details recalled can change depending on the 
desires of the person reminiscing (e.g. Kunda,1987, 1990; Klein & 
Kunda, 1992). 
In this paper we focus on the interplay between three of the 
above lines of research to clarify the role of detailed recall in creating 
retrospective evaluations that diverge from online experience. 
The Fading Affect Bias illustrates the power of social retellings, 
motivated retrieval provides a mechanism through which bias can 
enter recollections, and perspective taking demonstrates that biased 
recall will change later memories. We contend that when people 
recall past experiences in detail they selectively retrieve certain 
components of the experience. When people are later asked to 
evaluate an experience, their evaluations are colored by the earlier 
selective retrieval. Our desire to be seen by our peers as wise, 
interesting people who do fun things combined with the frequency of 
social detailed recall ensures that the color is usually “rosy”. 
Motivated retrieval, perspective taking, and the Fading 
Affect Bias happily converge to provide an account for changes in 
retrospective evaluations through detailed recall. The Fading Affect 
Bias provides direction for how memories will change over time, 
perspective taking provides a mechanism through which memories 
can change, and motivations provide the perspective, suggest the 
moderating role of ambiguity, and a reason for the typical “rosy view” 
phenomenon. We present three experiments. In Experiment 1, we 
demonstrate that detailed recall can improve retrospective evaluations. 
In Experiment 2, we reverse the effect and suggest a role for selective 
retrieval of pleasant or unpleasant components, rather than a change 
in the construal of those components. Finally, Experiment 3 tests the 
motivational account against competing interpretations by changing 
participants’ motivations during detailed recall.
EXPERIMENT 1
Firms habitually ask customers to recall their consumption 
experience by administering surveys. We asked participants to 
provide a description of a complex experience: their last trip by 
airplane. Participants also provided ratings on pleasantness and 
satisfaction for the best and worst moments of the experience, as 
well as the overall experience. We anticipated that ratings for the 
components of the experience would follow the pattern of the Fading 
Affect Bias. Participants who spend longer retelling the story of their 
trip should rate the (presumably unpleasant) worst moment of their 
trip as more pleasant, but the (presumably pleasant) best moment of 
their trip should receive similar ratings from both groups. The Fading 
Affect Bias literature does not provide predictions for the impact 
of detailed recall on complex experiences with both pleasant and 
unpleasant moments, but if the worst moments improve with detailed 
recall and the best moments remain constant with recall, the overall 
experience should become retrospectively more pleasant.
METHOD
Participants. Twenty-four students enrolled in an introduction 
to marketing course completed the experiment for partial course 
credit.
Materials & Procedure. All participants were asked to provide 
the basic information: the month and year when they last took a trip 
by airplane, as well as the departure and destination airports. Eleven 
of the participants were then asked to “describe very briefly the last 
time you took a trip in an airplane. Begin with your arrival at the 
starting airport and end with your departure from the destination 
airport. You have 2 minutes to write your description of the trip, try 
to use all of the time.” The remaining thirteen participants received 
identical instructions, with the exceptions that they were asked to 
“describe in as much detail as possible” and were given 15 minutes 
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to provide their descriptions. After completing their descriptions, all 
participants were asked to rate the pleasantness of the trip on a -3 
to 3 (very unpleasant to very pleasant) scale and their satisfaction 
with the trip on a 1 to 7 (not at all satisfied to completely satisfied) 
scale. Participants provided ratings on both of these scales for the 
overall experience, the best moment of the experience, and the worst 
moment of the experience. 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The ratings were submitted to a 2 (Minutes writing, between 
subjects) X 3 (Component, within subjects) mixed ANOVA. 
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, so we can 
assume that differences between groups in the recalled pleasantness 
of and satisfaction with the flights were caused by the manipulations. 
Spending more time describing the past airplane trip made the 
trip retrospectively more pleasant, F(1,22) = 5.175, p = .033, and 
marginally more satisfying, F(1,22) = 3.211, p = .087. The longer 
descriptions had their intended effect; Delta would be well advised 
to get me to describe my trip if they want to keep my business. Not 
surprisingly, the overall experience, best moment, and worst moment 
differed in their retrospective pleasantness, F(1,22) = 39.10, p < 
.0005, and rated satisfaction, F(1,22) = 34.43, p < .0005. However 
the interaction between the length of the description and moment did 
not reach significance, p > .1. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that detailed recall can result in 
improved retrospective evaluations, but the source of the effect is 
uncertain. Participants who extensively recalled the flight may have 
selectively retrieved a greater number of pleasant components of 
their experience, changed their construal of the components they 
did retrieve, or retrieved components from a larger experience (i.e. 
their whole trip rather than just the flight). In order to test the effects 
of detailed recall in a more constrained setting, we restricted recall 
to a single component of a flight experience, either pleasant or 
unpleasant.
METHOD
Participants. Seventy eight undergraduate marketing students 
participated for partial credit in their introductory course.
Materials & Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were 
first asked to describe some basic information about the last flight 
they had taken, including their destination, airline, and the recency 
of the flight. Participants were then asked to list a single aspect – 
either pleasant or unpleasant depending on condition – of their most 
recent flight. On the next page of the questionnaire, participants were 
asked to provide a detailed description of either the aspect they had 
just listed or a product they had purchased recently (control). After 
finishing the description, participants completed several unrelated 
studies for approximately 40 minutes. Finally, they rated the 
pleasantness (1 very unpleasant – 7 very pleasant), enjoyableness (1 
not at all enjoyable – 7 very enjoyable), and their satisfaction (1 very 
dissatisfied – 7 very satisfied) with both the aspect of the flight they 
had listed and the flight overall.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The evaluations were combined into two scales, evaluation 
of the aspect (α = .97) and of the flight overall (α = .92). The two 
scales were submitted to a 2 (aspect valence) X 2 (recall aspect/
describe product) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). 
Not surprisingly, when participants were asked to list a pleasant 
aspect they evaluated that aspect more positively than when they 
were asked to list an unpleasant aspect (F(1, 74) = 93.0, p < .0005). 
The valence of the aspect listed also had a marginally significant 
effect on participants’ evaluation of the overall flight, but only in the 
detailed recall condition. Participants who recalled a pleasant aspect 
in detail (M = 5.2) evaluated the overall flight more positively than 
participants who recalled a negative aspect in detail (M = 4.4) (F(1, 
74) = 4.1, p < .1). When participants wrote about a product they 
had recently bought, the difference between recalling the pleasant 
(M = 4.8) and unpleasant (M = 4.7) aspect was not significant, p > 
.2. There were no significant effects of condition on either scale, all 
ps > .2. Experiment 2 demonstrated that rehearsing components of 
an experience will slant the overall evaluation towards the valence 
of those components. Perhaps more importantly, Experiment 2 
showed that the valences of specific aspects of an experience are 
at least somewhat resistant to change during detailed recall. This 
could be because of participants’ low motivation to see unpleasant 
components of their flight – such as cramped seats – in a more 
pleasant light, conflicting motivations to take the rosy view of the 
aspect or demonstrate how well they were following the instructions 
by choosing a truly unpleasant aspect, or the lack of ambiguity in the 
aspects chosen.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 relied on participants’ innate motivation 
to take the rosy view of an experience. In Experiment 3, we provide 
participants with explicit motives during recall in order to provide 
another demonstration of how recall can change retrospective 
evaluations and examine some alternatives to the motivational 
account. In particular, Gilbert and Wilson’s (2003, 2008) AREA 
model of affective adaptation suggests that recall with a focus on 
explanation should reduce the intensity of all affect associated with 
an experience, while the motivational account predicts a strong 
reduction in negative affect for unpleasant experiences, particularly 
when social pressure is salient.
METHOD
Participants. Four hundred and five participants were recruited 
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participants were 
compensated $0.25 for an average of 14 minutes participation 
in a survey advertised as taking between 15 and 20 minutes. 137 
participants were excluded from the analysis for failing to read the 
body text of a test question or for failing to describe an experience. 
Excluding these participants did not change the direction of the 
results.
Materials & Procedure. Participants were asked to list a single 
experience from their lives that happened in that last three months, 
lasted between one hour and 24 hours, that they were present at (e.g. 
not a news story), and that was either overall positive, negative, or 
mixed in valence. Participants in the detailed recall conditions were 
then asked to describe this experience and told that their descriptions 
would be evaluated by a judge later. The fictional judge’s criteria 
varied by condition. He would evaluate participants for how “fun and 
interesting you would be as a friend”, how “successful at explaining 
things you would be as a teacher”, or how “reliable you would be as 
a witness”. After providing their descriptions, participants listened 
to and rated a series of four 40 second sound clips that served as a 
buffer between the description and the evaluations of the experience. 
Finally, participants asked to evaluate the experience they had 
described earlier for its pleasantness, the extent to which they 
enjoyed it, and their satisfaction (1 not at all – 7 very). Participants 
were instructed that their evaluations were for control purposes only 
and that they would not be viewed by the judges.
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Participants’ ratings of the described experience were combined 
into a single scale (α = .941). This scale was submitted to a 4 (detailed 
recall: none, friend, teacher, witness) X 3 (Experience valence: 
positive, negative, mixed) between subjects ANOVA. As expected, 
there was a main effect of valence, with participants evaluating a 
negative experience (M = 2.4) less positively than a mixed (M = 
4.8) or positive (M = 5.8) experience (F(2,256) = 89.7, p < .0005). 
Neither the interaction nor the main effect of detailed recall was 
significant, ps > .1. We also executed three planned contrasts. For the 
negative experience, participants who recalled believing they would 
be evaluated as a friend evaluated the experience more positively (M 
= 2.9) than participants in the control condition (M = 2.0) (F(1, 256 
= 5.82, p < .05). The planned contrast for the AREA model failed 
to reach significance however, with participants who believed they 
would be judged on the quality of their explanation not seeing an 
increase in evaluation in the negative condition and a decrease in the 
evaluation in the positive condition over the control participants, p > 
.1. Finally, when all detailed recall conditions were pooled, they did 
not produce a significant improvement in evaluations over the control 
condition, p > .1. The results of Experiment 3 show a remarkable 
correspondence to the Fading Affect Bias, but for retrospective 
evaluations rather than evoked affect. To test for selective retrieval of 
positive aspects of the experience, participants written descriptions 
were coded by two raters blind to the experiment’s hypotheses. 
Participants with a social motive during detailed recall listed more 
positive aspects compared to negative aspects (Mpositive – negative =  0.76) 
than participants with accuracy (Mpositive – negative =  -0.73)  or explanation 
(Mpositive – negative =  -0.61) motives, all ps < .05. Negative experiences 
are improved by detailed recall, but only when that detailed recall 
takes place with the goal of appearing fun and interesting as a friend 
- a goal that is doubtless very common in everyday recall.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
I have presented evidence that detailed recall – particularly 
social detailed recall – has the power to improve retrospective 
evaluations of experiences, adding a rosy tint to experiences 
that initially seemed negative. Experiment 1 provided an initial 
demonstration of the effect in the context of evaluations of a past 
trip by airplane. Experiment 2 clarified that individual components 
of an experience are unlikely to be reconstrued with detailed recall, 
but that an overall evaluation is influenced by the components that 
are recalled, positive or negative. Next, Experiment 3 demonstrated 
that detailed recall with the motive of seeming “fun and interesting” 
improves evaluations for initially negative experiences, mimicking 
the results from the Fading Affect Bias. 
This paper presents empirical evidence for the influence of 
detailed recall on retrospective evaluations, drawing its predictions 
from the intersection of past work on the Fading Affect Bias, 
perspective taking, and motivated retrieval. These three lines 
of research complement each other to produce predictions for 
the plasticity of memory with broad theoretical and managerial 
relevance. For example, in order to encourage pleasant memories 
of the experiences they provide, firms might combine satisfaction 
surveys with social media. Consumers who believe that their 
satisfaction report will be seen by their peers are likely to list more 
positive aspects of the experience. The positive aspects listed will 
have a double benefit to the firm: (1) improving retrospective 
evaluations of the consumer and (2) increasing the positivity of word 
of mouth disseminated by the consumer.
Table 1 . Summary of Studies
Study 1 Study 2 Study3
Description
Participants write about their most 
recent flight on an airplane and then 
rate the retrospective pleasantness 
of the flight.
Participants write about one aspect 
of their most recent flight on an 
airplane and then rate the retrospective 
pleasantness of both the aspect and the 
flight overall.
Participants write about an 
autobiographical event and rate its 
retrospective pleasantness.
IV Time Writing (2 min/15 min)
Time writing (detailed description/
no description) X Valence of aspect 
described (pleasant/unpleasant)
Type of description (none / social 
motive / accuracy motive / explanation 
motive) X Valence of event (pleasant / 
unpleasant / mixed)
Primary DV
Pleasantness & Satisfaction for 
whole flight, best moment, and 
worst moment.
Pleasantness, Satisfaction & Enjoyment 
for whole flight and the aspect 
described.
Pleasantness, Satisfaction & Enjoyment 
for the experience.
Result
Evaluations of the whole flight and 
worst moment were higher when 
participants wrote for 15 min.
Describing negative aspects in detail 
produced poorer overall evaluations 
and rehearsing positive aspects in detail 
produced better overall evaluations. 
Detailed descriptions did not influence 
evaluations of the aspects themselves.
Describing unpleasant experiences 
with a social motive improved overall 
retrospective evaluations of the 
unpleasant experiences. Other types 
of detailed recall were ineffective in 
changing overall evaluations.
Participants with a social motive listed 
more positive than negative aspects 
when describing their experience.
Implication
Detailed recall improves 
retrospective evaluations by making 
the worst moments better.
Individual aspects of an experience do 
not change in valence with detailed 
recall. Overall evaluations change to fit 
the aspects recalled.
Social detailed recall encourages recall 
of the positive aspects of unpleasant 
experiences, resulting in improved 
retrospective evaluations.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumers prefer to maintain a balance in how they spend mon-
ey and time among different categories because both are critical but 
limited resources (Wertenbroch and Dhar 2000; Sheldon, Cummins, 
and Kamble 2010). However, with longer working hours, imbalance 
lifestyles are endemic and precious minutes remain for other activi-
ties such as exercising, cleaning, and socializing with family (Kahne-
man, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone 2004). Not only do con-
sumers spend more or less resources between different categories for 
self but they also allocate more or less money and time on categories 
for self vs. friends and family. For example, instead of buying gifts 
for others, 32 % of holiday shoppers said they would rather spend 
money on themselves (White, 2012). 
The current research investigates the influence of two types of 
spending imbalances of time and money on happiness and spending 
reallocation decisions: 1) within-self imbalance in which a consumer, 
for example, spends more time watching TV by self but less on ex-
ercising or traveling; and 2) self-others imbalance in which a con-
sumer, for example, spends more money buying clothes for self but 
less on buying gifts for family. Prior research alludes to the idea of 
within-self imbalanced spending of money and how consumers deal 
with it by either spending less in the same category (Heath and Soll 
1996) or categorizing the expense in a loose fashion (Cheema and 
Soman 2006). The growing research in time versus money has docu-
mented several differences between these two critical resources such 
as ambiguity in cost consideration (Okada and Hoch 2005; Soman 
2001; Soster, Monga, and Bearden 2010), mindsets in goal of spend-
ing (Devoe and House 2012; Liu and Aaker 2008), and personal con-
nection with the product (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). We contribute 
to prior research by showing the influences of self-others imbalanced 
spending on happiness, reallocation to, and substitution in favor of 
underspent categories are different from those of within-self imbal-
anced spending and how those effects differ for time versus money. 
These are important issues to investigate because consumers spend 
time and money on activities and things that they believe will make 
them happy but imbalanced spending can sabotage their happiness. 
Prior research has established that in comparison to time, 
money is more tangible (Okada and Hoch 2005) and involves less 
heuristic decision making (Saini and Monga 2008). Those primed 
with money choose to spend more time on work (Mogilner 2010) 
and behave more functionally (Vohs et al. 2012). More importantly, 
thinking about money evokes a self-sufficiency mindset in which 
people prefer to be monetarily independent of others and expect oth-
ers to not depend upon them and desire unambiguous satisfaction 
from spending money (Liu and Aaker 2007; Vohs, Mead, and Goode 
2006). In contrast, thinking about time activates an emotional ori-
entation which encourages people to focus upon the experiences of 
social connection (Mogilner 2010; Schwarz and Clore 1996). Those 
primed with time choose to spend more time with friends and family 
(Mogilner 2010) and savor happiness through charitable donations 
(Liu and Aaker 2007). This suggests that self-others (within-self) im-
balance should be more bothersome for time (money) than for money 
(time).  
Hypothesis 1: Within-self imbalanced spending will result in 
greater unhappiness for money than for time  
Hypothesis 2: Self-others imbalanced spending will result in 
greater unhappiness for time than for money  
STUDY 1: IMBALANCED SPENDING AND 
HAPPINESS
We tested above hypotheses in a 2 (resource: time, money) X 2 
(imbalance type: within-self, self-others) between-subjects design in 
which 127 undergraduates were asked to imagine a scenario in which 
they recently graduated with a $30,000 job and spent their discre-
tionary money (time) (in imbalanced fashion) among different listed 
categories (see Appendix A). Next to their imbalanced spending dis-
tribution, subjects were shown the (balanced) spending distribution 
of an average consumer in their age group as per the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) data. We identified spending categories and 
calibrated balanced distribution from the U.S. BLS data (2010) and 
journal articles (Cheema and Soman 2006; Kahneman et al. 2004). 
For the sake of brevity, the detailed procedure adopted to generate 
the four imbalanced spending distributions is included in Appendix 
A. After exposure to the distributions, participants reported their hap-
piness on four 7-point items (happy—unhappy; satisfied—dissatis-
fied; excited—less excited; pleased—less pleased; Van Boven and 
Gilovich 2003, α = .95) and rated how balanced they thought their 
spending distribution was on two 7-point items (balanced—imbal-
anced; even—uneven, α = .92).
Appendix A
The detailed procedure we adopted to generate the within-self 
imbalanced and self-others imbalanced spending distribution is as 
follows:
i) We identified the distinct spending categories and spending 
allocations from prior research (Cheema and Soman 2006) and from 
the (BLS or) Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010) site. This became the 
within-self balanced distribution.
ii) Using within self balanced distribution, we conducted a pre-
test (n = 36) which revealed that subjects believed 80% of discretion-
ary spending on self and subject felt 20% on others represented an 
ideal self-other spending distribution. 
iii) The allocation with 80% for self and 20% for others became 
the self-others balanced distribution. The 20% spending on others 
was allocated on two plausible categories (e.g., electronics and enter-
tainment monetary expenses for friends/family as gifts).
iv) We calculated the standard deviation of two balanced distri-
butions (e.g., 4.8 for money at self-others balanced condition).
v) Both within-self imbalance and self-others imbalance distri-
bution were developed by increasing the standard deviation of the 
balanced distributions (in iv) by 50% (e.g., 7.2 for money at self-
others imbalanced condition). 
vi) A similar approach was followed to generate within self im-
balance and self-other imbalance for time condition. We ensured that 
the two imbalance categories remained as close as possible to those 
in money condition.
Manipulation checks confirmed that participants found their 
“scenario” spending distribution to be more imbalanced than the 
one from BLS (p < .00; not listing the means for sake of brevity). 
More importantly, their scenario spending distribution was rated to 
be equivalently imbalanced for both resources (within-self imbal-
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Manipulation of Study 1
Spending Money Condition
# Description of expenses
Within-self Self-others
B ImB B ImB
1 Dining out (dinners at restaurants, pizza deliveries, beers and foods at bars, etc.) 22% 15% 18% 21%
2 Clothes and accessories(pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.) 13% 9% 10% 12%
3 Entertainment(going to movies, concerts, games, etc.) 18% 35% 14% 17%
4 Exercise and gym(golf, yoga, fitness camp, etc.) 11% 8% 9% 10%
5 Consumer electronics(tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.) 6% 12% 5% 6%
6 Home leisure(satellite TV/ cable, CDs/ downloads, video games, books, etc.) 8% 6% 6% 8%
7 Travel and vacation 22% 15% 18% 21%
8 Pay for the entertainment expenses of your friends/ family as special treats (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.) 12% 3%
9 Pay consumer electronics as gifts for your friends/ family (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.) 8% 2%
Total amount of money 100% 100% 100% 100%
Standard Deviation 6.5 9.8 4.8 7.2
Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
Spending Time Condition
# Description of activities
Within-self Self-others
B ImB B ImB
1 Resting(napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc) 11% 8% 9% 11%
2 Volunteering 6% 4% 5% 6%
3 Watching TV 28% 36% 22% 26%
4 Surfing on web 11% 8% 9% 11%
5 Out of home entertainment(going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 22% 29% 17% 21%
6 Health and self-maintenance(exercising, eating, washing, etc) 17% 11% 14% 17%
7 Spirituality or religion(meditation or spiritual/ religious duties) 6% 4% 4% 5%
8 Watching TV with your friends/ family 8% 1%
9 Out of home entertainment with your friends/ family (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 12% 2%
Total amount of time 100% 100% 100% 100%
Standard Deviation 8.5 12.8 5.6 8.7
Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
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TABLE 1
Summary of Mean Numbers Across Studies 
Self-others Imbalance Within-self Imbalance
Money Time Money Time
Study 1
Happiness 3.75 2.24** 3.31 3.19
Study 2
Happiness 4.54 3.33** 4.15 4.9
Reallocation (%) 150 800** 27 26
Substitution (%) 35 76.7** 48 48
Easy to make decision 4.91 6.3**
Study 3
Happiness Self 4.48 3.56** 4.61 4.51
Joe 4.55 3.58** 4.38 4.68
Reallocation (%) 115 450** 28 62
Substitution (%) 22 78** 60 66
Self-sufficiency 4.62 3.38** 4.43 3.42**
Social connection 5.08 5.81** 4.86 6.06**
Study 4
Self-others imbalance only
More Resource Less Resource
Money
($2,320)
Time
(270 hrs)
Money
($1,160)
Time
(135 hrs)
Reallocation (%) 204 334** 207 350**
Self-sufficiency 4.08 3.57** 4.09 3.45**
Social connection 5.08 6.17** 5.35 6.00**
Study 5 
Within-self imbalance only
Money Time 
No others Others salient No others Others salient
Happiness 4.54 3.07** 4.02 3.79
Bothersome 3.84 4.96** 4.63 4.69
Reallocation (%) 18 29* 72 67
Note.* = significant at .1 level; **=significant at .05 level
ance:  = 2.50 vs. = 2.50; t(1, 59) = .00, n.s.; self-other imbalance:  = 
2.29 vs. = 2.77; t(1, 64) = -1.62, n.s.). Analysis revealed a significant 
interaction of resource x imbalance type (F(1, 123) = 8.25, p < .05). 
As expected, subjects were more unhappy for self-others imbalanced 
spending involving time than for money ( = 2.24 vs.  = 3.75; t(1, 64) 
= -4.43, p < .05). Thus, H2 is supported. However, H1 was not sup-
ported because for within-self imbalance, there was no difference in 
the reported unhappiness for money and time ( = 3.19 vs.  = 3.31; 
t(1, 59) = -.43, n.s). 
STUDY 2: SPENDING IMBALANCE AND 
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Study 2 was conducted to i) test the robustness of Study 1 re-
sults by using different focal categories to create imbalanced distri-
butions (e.g., clothes and accessories in place of consumer electron-
ics) but having the same standard deviations as Study 1; ii) examine 
the influence of imbalance spending on two downstream corrective 
actions – extent to which subjects reallocated their current (imbal-
anced) spending and whether they would substitute spending their 
remaining discretionary resource (e.g., $80) from an overspent cat-
egory to an underspent category; and iii) test the mediation of these 
effects by happiness. Thus, we further hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: To correct within-self imbalanced spending, 
consumers will (3a) reallocate resource to the 
underspent category and (3b) substitute re-
source from the specific overspent category to 
the underspent category to a greater extent for 
money than for time
Hypothesis 4: To correct self-others imbalanced spending, 
consumers will (4a) reallocate resource to the 
underspent category for others and (4b) substi-
tute resource from the specific overspent catego-
ry for self to the underspent category for others 
to a greater extent for time than for money
Hypothesis 5a: The effects of within-self spending imbalances of 
time and money on resource reallocations (H3a) 
is mediated by happiness
Hypothesis 5b: The effects of self-others spending imbalances of 
time and money on resource reallocations (H4a) 
is mediated by happiness
Ninety-five undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 (re-
source: time, money) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-others) 
between subjects experiment. We used the same procedure as in 
Study 1 but added three new measures of reallocation, substitution, 
and ease of making substitution decision (five 7-point items -- easy; 
quick; time consuming; conflict; confident, α = .95). Operationaliza-
tion of reallocation percentage is best explained with an example. 
If a participant reallocated 65% of total discretionary expenditure 
to the combined five (underspent) categories which were earlier al-
located 53% (in the imbalanced distribution), then reallocation per-
centage is 65-53/53 = 22% For substitution, we asked subjects to 
imagine that their budget for discretionary money (time) was almost 
used up (e.g., only $75 left) and they encounter several scenarios in 
each of which they need to make a choice between one overspent 
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item and the other underspent item. Substitution ratio is assessed by 
calculating the percentage of people who chose the underspent item. 
Manipulation checks confirmed imbalanced spending of time 
and money were perceived to be comparable, reasonable, and believ-
able (not listing the means for sake of brevity). Analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between resource x imbalance type (F(1, 91) 
= 14.43,  p < .01). Consistent with Study 1 results, subjects felt more 
unhappy for self-others imbalance involving time than money (= 
3.33 vs. = 4.53; t(1, 48)= -3.58, p < .01). Further, H4a and H4b are 
supported because subjects reallocated to the underspent categories 
for others to a much greater extent in time vs. money condition ( = 
800% vs. = 150% increase; t(1, 48) = 6.95, p < .01). Similarly, chi-
square analysis revealed greater percentage of participants substitut-
ing in time vs. money condition ( = 77% vs.  = 35%;χ2 = 15.75, p < 
.05). Moreover, substitution decisions were much easier to make for 
time than for money when facing self-others imbalance condition ( = 
6.3 vs.  = 4.91; t(1, 48) = 4.71, p < .01). Similar to Study 1, within-
self imbalance results were insignificant and did not support H1 (and 
H3) (see Table 1 for details). 
Mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) of reallocation in 
self-other imbalanced spending (H4a) revealed that happiness is the 
mediator driving reallocation results (Sobel z = -3.21, p < .05, see 
Figure 1), supporting H5b (no need to test mediation in H5a because 
H3a is insignificant). The effect of imbalanced spending of time (vs. 
money) on reallocation was reduced (from β = -6.55 to β = -4.63, p 
< .01) when happiness was included in the regression but happiness 
continued to be a significant predictor (β = -1.58, p < .01). The 95% 
bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect excluded 
zero [-3.56, -.72] indicating a significant indirect effect (Preacher 
and Hayes 2008).  
STUDY 3: PROCESSESS AND SOCIAL 
DESIRABILITY EXPLANATION
Results from previous studies show that spending time (vs. 
money) in the self-others imbalance condition makes people feel 
more unhappy, resulting in greater corrective actions of reallocation 
and substitution. However, the influence of within-self imbalanced 
spending does not differ between time and money (we identify and 
empirically provide evidence for a possible explanation for insig-
nificant H1 and H3 in Study 5). Study 3 was conducted to i) rule 
out the social desirability explanation of whether consumers real-
located money to categories for others because not doing so would 
make them look bad; so, we compared the outcomes between two 
groups, one asked to make reallocations imagining themselves in the 
scenario (consistent with the first two studies) and the other asked to 
imagine that their friend Joe/Jane was involved in that scenario; ii) 
check robustness of results from Studies 1 and 2 by using absolute 
numbers (i.e., $ dollars and hours) instead of percentages in spending 
distributions (Appendix B); and iii) explore whether self-sufficiency 
and social connection ratings are consistent with our findings. We 
developed a 6-items self-sufficiency scale based on the presented 
ideas in Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) e.g., “I find it difficult to 
allow others to depend on me for money (time);” 1= strongly dis-
agree; 7 = strongly agree; α = .67) and a 4-items social connection 
scale based on the presented ideas in Mogilner (2010) e.g., “For me, 
spending money (time) on family/friends helps me connect with 
them,” 1= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree; α = .75).
One hundred and seventy-eight undergraduates participated in a 
2 (resource: money, time) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-oth-
ers) X 2 (target person: self, Joe) between-subjects design with the 
same procedure as in previous two studies. The insignificant three-
way interaction on dependent variables rules out social desirability 
explanation (F(1, 170) = .42, n.s.), thus, we collapsed the data from 
two target persons conditions in the analysis. Consistent with find-
ings from first two studies, results support H2 and H4 but not H1 and 
H3 (see Table 1 for details). Similar to Study 2 results and consistent 
with H5b, happiness is the mediator driving self-others imbalanced 
reallocation result (Sobel z = -2.8, p < .05) with indirect effect that 
was significantly different from zero (95% confidence interval [CI] 
= -1.44, -.01). Finally, process measure results are theoretically con-
sistent with our findings in that subjects felt more self-sufficient for 
money than time ( = 4.89 vs.  = 3.52; t (1, 46) = -4.01, p < .01). In 
contrast, they felt more socially connected for time than money ( = 
6.07 vs.  = 4.83; t (1, 46) = 4.8, p < .01). 
STUDY4: MORE VS . LESS RESOURCES IN SELF-
OTHERS IMBALANCED SPENDING
Is it possible that consumers reallocated more time but less 
money to categories for others in the self-others imbalanced condi-
tion in Studies 1-3 because subjects were constrained by how much 
FIGURE 1 Study 2: Mediation Test
Note. ** = significant at the .01 level
Coding: time = 0, money =1
The β in parenthesis is the effect of time/money on reallocation after adding happiness in the regression equation. (Sobel z = -3.21, p= 0.00 < .05)
β = 1.2 **
Self-others Imbalanced  
Spending in 
Time/Money
Happiness
β = 2.39 **
β = -6.55 **
(β = -4.63 **)
Rellocation
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Appendix B
Manipulation of Study 3
Spending Money Condition
# Description of expenses
Within-self Self-others
B ImB B ImB
1 Dining out (dinners at restaurants, pizza deliveries, beers and foods at bars, etc.) $270 $190 $210 $250
2 Clothes and accessories(pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.) $150 $100 $120 $140
3 Entertainment(going to movies, concerts, games, etc.) $200 $410 $160 $190
4 Exercise and gym(golf, yoga, fitness camp, etc.) $120 $80 $100 $120
5 Consumer electronics(tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.) $70 $150 $60 $70
6 Home leisure(satellite TV/ cable, CDs/ downloads, video games, books, etc.) $90 $50 $70 $90
7 Travel and vacation $260 $180 $210 $240
8 Pay for the entertainment expenses of your friends/ family as special treats (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.) $140 $40
9 Pay consumer electronics as gifts for your friends/ family (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.) $90 $20
Total amount of money $1160 $1160 $1160 $1160
Standard Deviation 6.5 9.8 4.8 7.2
Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
Spending Time Condition
# Description of activities
Within-self Self-others
B ImB B ImB
1 Resting(napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc) 30 hrs 20 hrs 25 hrs 30 hrs
2 Volunteering 15 hrs 10 hrs 15 hrs 10 hrs
3 Watching TV 75 hrs 95 hrs 60 hrs 70 hrs
4 Surfing on web 30 hrs 20 hrs 25 hrs 30 hrs
5 Out of home entertainment(going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 60 hrs 80 hrs 45 hrs 60 hrs
6 Health and self-maintenance(exercising, eating, washing, etc) 45 hrs 30 hrs 40 hrs 44 hrs
7 Spirituality or religion(meditation or spiritual/ religious duties) 15 hrs 15 hrs 10 hrs 15 hrs
8 Watching TV with your friends/ family 20 hrs 4 hrs
9 Out of home entertainment with your friends/ family (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 30 hrs 7 hrs
Total amount of time 270 hrs 270 hrs 270 hrs 270 hrs
Standard Deviation 8.5 12.7 5.6 8.7
Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
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money they earn (i.e., $30,000) but no such constraint operated for 
time (i.e., everyone has 24 hours)? To test this alternative expla-
nation, we tested our hypotheses by doubling the income subjects 
earned (from $30,000 to 60,000) but had only ½ the discretionary 
time available (from 270 hours/month to 135 hours/month) com-
pared to in Studies 1-3. 
We randomly assigned 103 students into one of the four be-
tween-subjects experimental conditions involving 2 (resource: mon-
ey, time) x 2 (amount: more, less). We followed the same procedure 
as in previous studies. Participants completed the same self-suffi-
ciency (α = .68) and social connection (α = .76) scale items after 
the reallocation task. Results revealed the predicted main effect of 
resource (F(1, 102) = 21.12, p < .01) but insignificant main effect 
for amount and interaction (p > .1). More specifically, participants 
engaged in greater reallocation to underspent categories for others 
in time than in money condition ( = 334% vs.  = 207%; t(1, 50) 
= -3.53, p < .01). Planned contrasts revealed that participants kept 
reallocating less toward underspent categories for others even when 
the amount of money was doubled ( = 334% vs.  = 204%; t(1, 52) = 
-3.12, p < .01). Equally important is the finding that participants con-
tinued reallocating more even when the amount of time was reduced 
by half ( = 350% vs.  = 204%; t(1, 52) = -3.07, p < .01). 
Regardless of the amount of resources, participants in the mon-
ey condition continued feeling higher self-sufficiency than those in 
the time condition ( = 3.51; F(1, 101) = 9.83, p < .01). Similarly, 
those in the time condition reported higher social connection than 
those in the money condition ( = 5.24; F(1, 101) = 12.15, p < .01) 
regardless the amount of resources (see Table 1 for details). Thus, we 
can rule out the explanation “having less money and more time” for 
the greater reallocation of time (vs. money) to underspent categories 
for others in the self-others imbalanced condition in Studies 2 and 3. 
The mechanisms underlying these results seem to be the same i.e., 
money is associated with self-sufficiency but time is associated with 
social connection.
STUDY 5: DOES IMBALANCE MATTER IN WITHIN-
SELF IMBALANCED SPENDING?
In this study, we investigate why we don’t find support for H1 
and H3 i.e., why consumers are not reallocating more money (vs. 
time) in within-self imbalanced condition. Could it be that consum-
ers lack motivation to correct (i.e., don’t care about) the imbalance 
spending in money? It is not that consumers don’t notice the imbal-
ance (our manipulation checks in all studies support that they ac-
knowledge the imbalance) but they might think “It is all on me so I 
don’t care.” 
We tested this proposition by making the within-imbalance 
more salient by subtly introducing a constraint. More specifically, 
consumers in both (money) conditions were shown the balanced 
(BLS) and their current (imbalanced) distributions across five cat-
egories (please see Appendix C). However, in one condition, the last 
or the fifth category was labeled as “remaining categories including 
spending on gym” whereas in the other condition the last category 
was labeled as “remaining categories including spending on gym and 
on friends and family”. We predicted that subtly introducing others 
in the latter condition would make participants more aware of “less 
money” available for self and thus, become more aware of how their 
spending among different categories on self was less balanced result-
ing in to greater reallocation to fix the imbalance. We did not expect 
this to occur in the time condition because evoking time fosters so-
cial connection thinking.  
Nighty-eight undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 
(resource: time, money) X 2 (salient: others absent, others present) 
between-subjects experiment. Following the same procedure as in 
previous studies, participants reported their reallocations, happiness, 
and how bothersome the imbalance made them feel. A 2 (resource) 
x 2 (salient) ANOVA on the extent of participants’ reallocations re-
vealed the predicted (moderately) significant interaction (F(1, 94) = 
2.87, p < .1). Planned contrasts revealed that there is no difference 
between two conditions of time (= 67% vs. = 72%; t(1, 48)= .48, 
n.s.). In contrast and more importantly, money participants in the 
others-present condition engaged in greater reallocation than in the 
others-absent condition (= 18%; t(1, 46)= -1.85, p = .07). Consistent 
with these results, we found that participants in the money-others 
present condition were more bothered and felt more unhappy than 
those in money-others absent condition. These differences were in-
significant in the time condition (see Table 1 for details). Again, hap-
piness is the mediator driving reallocation results (Sobel z = 2.28, p 
< .05). The effect of imbalanced spending of money on reallocation 
in others-present (vs. others-absent) condition was reduced (from β 
= .116 to β = .042, n.s.) when happiness was included in the regres-
sion; however, happiness continued to be a significant predictor (β 
= -.05, p < .05). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings from five studies show that self-others spending 
imbalance (i.e., spend more on themselves than on others) is per-
ceived to be more serious and reacted to accordingly when spending 
time, as compared to spending money. Consumers will feel more un-
happy (Study 1) and, as a result, engage in a greater amount of time 
versus money) reallocation to as well as substitution in favor of un-
derspent others (Study 2 and 3). This effect appears to be driven by 
the social connection and self-sufficiency mindsets that consumers 
possess when spending time and money, respectively (Studies 3 and 
4). Further, these findings cannot be explained by social desirability 
(Study 3) or the amount of resources that individuals have (Study 
4). People genuinely do not want to allocate more money (vs. time) 
on others, even when they are capable to do so, like when doubled 
their current salary. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that consumers feel 
less unhappy and less bothersome by spending money in the con-
text of within-self imbalance (i.e., spend more on some categories 
by oneself but less on other categories) if the thought of “spending 
on others” does not pop up in their heads. The same effects will not 
affect spending time as much simply because connection with others 
already exists in people’s mind.
These findings support the growing research suggesting that 
spending time versus money elicits two distinct mindsets (Liu and 
Aaker 2008; Mogilner and Aaker 2009; Mogilner 2010; Vohs, et 
al. 2006) and extend it by identifying the downstream effects while 
considering imbalanced spending. One insight gained is that time 
and money spent in a self-others imbalanced fashion will lead to 
negative emotion and that motivate individuals to take actions to cor-
rect that imbalance. Moreover, this research provided evidence for 
this mechanism by directly measuring these two mindsets; that is, 
money-evoked self-sufficiency and time-evoked social connection. 
Of important, these two mechanisms affect consumers’ behaviors 
regardless of the amount of resource constraints and the influence 
of social norm. In fact, making people think about spending imbal-
ance between self and others encourages their pro-social behaviors 
(more for time than for money) Notably, the current research only 
focuses on others involving close social relationship so that explor-
ing the boundary condition of current effects on distant others (e.g., 
colleagues or strangers) is a promising avenue.  
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Appendix C
Manipulation of Study 5 
Spending money condition
# Description of discretionary expenses BLSAllocation 
Your 
Current
Allocation
1 Entertainment(going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 18% 35%
2 Consumer electronics(tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, computer accessories, etc.) 6% 12%
3 Clothes and accessories(pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.) 22% 15%
4 Travel and vacation 22% 15%
5 Remaining categories, including gym [and spending on friends/family] 32% 23%
Total amount of money 100% 100%
Note. [ ] showed only at others salient condition
Spending time condition
# Description of discretionary activities BLSAllocation 
Your 
Current
Allocation
1 Out of home entertainment(going to movies, concerts, game, etc.) 22% 29%
2 Watching TV 28% 36%
3 Health and self-maintenance (exercising, eating, washing, etc) 17% 11%
4 Resting (napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc) 11% 8%
5 Remaining categories including surfing internet [and spending with friends/family] 22% 16%
Total amount of time 100% 100%
Note. [ ] showed only at others salient condition
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ABSTRACT
While consumers often shop in outlets with large product as-
sortments, having no prior experience or knowledge to predict a 
product’s efficacy can pose a significant challenge at the point of 
purchase. Indeed, the functionality of most consumer goods tends to 
be a bit of a black box, at least until consumed. Imagine a consumer 
trying to select a new face cream. The majority of the ingredients may 
as well be illegible, and the promotional campaigns, brand aware-
ness, and product claims tend to sit on par with several competing 
products in the same category. So which product does the consumer 
choose? This is where consumers make heuristic judgments. They 
infer quality from price and visual aesthetics. According to Proctor 
& Gamble (P&G) shoppers make up their mind about a product in 
three to seven seconds, just the time it takes to note a product on a 
store shelf. P&G refers to this time lapse as the “first-moment-of-
truth.”1 Hence, companies like P&G spend considerable resources to 
enhance the appeal of product packaging. 
Indeed, the role of package aesthetics in enhancing product 
preference is well-documented (Bloch 1995; Townsend, Montoya 
and Calantone 2011, Berkowitz 1987, Hertenstein, Platt and Very-
zer 2004). When consumers are faced with a choice between two 
products of equal price and equivalent function, they tend to prefer 
the more attractive option (Kotler and Rath 1984). Hence, it is not 
surprising that in the absence of prior use or knowledge of the prod-
uct, consumers will make initial impressions based on package aes-
thetics (Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow and Young 2009). However, 
one cannot help but question why this happens. Most day-to-day 
purchases are not just for hedonic gain, but utilitarian value. Given 
the sheer efficiency of the first-moment-of-truth heuristic, it would 
be surprising if the judgment had absolutely nothing to do with the 
product’s functionality, particularly given the strong relationship be-
tween form and function (Berkowitz 1987; Hertenstein et al. 2004). 
In exploring this question, we make several advances. First, we 
demonstrate that while consumers show preferences for more ap-
pealing packaging in general, their belief in the product’s efficacy 
seems to be a function of their level of awareness of the category 
and the product’s aesthetic appeal. Specifically, consumers who have 
limited knowledge of a category tend to judge how well a product 
will function based on how pretty its packaging is. Second, we dem-
onstrate that these inferences translate into predictable and meaning-
ful differences in purchase intent and choice. Finally, we go one-step 
further by showing that this effect is most pronounced in what we 
refer to as credence categories (products that promote outcomes that 
cannot be objectively evaluated). Hence, the story comes together to 
illustrate that with little knowledge to the contrary, consumers tend 
to assume that the beauty products work better if the product’s pack-
aging is congruent with its positioning. Hence, the first-moment-of-
truth heuristic may have more to do with beliefs in efficacy than with 
aesthetic preference.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Researchers have devoted considerable attention to models of 
processing that impact purchase intent (Bloch 1995, Park, Lennon 
and Stoel 2005, Orth and Malkewitz 2008, Deng and Kahn 2009, 
1 See Adverblog http://www.adverblog.com/2005/09/25/pg-and-
the-first-moment-of-truth/. Accessed on December 30, 2012.
Chandon and Orbabayeva 2009). It is well-documented that aesthet-
ics in package design can augment product preference (Hoegg, Alba 
and Dahl 2010). Without prior knowledge, consumers use aesthetic 
cues to inform purchase intent (Raghubir and Greenleaf 2006). It 
has also been shown that aesthetic information plays a critical role 
in product trials (Childers and Jiang 2008, Wyer, Hung and Jiang 
2008). Prior research has addressed several aspects of package de-
sign that influence purchase intension including packaging size (Do 
Vale, Pieters and Zeelenberg 2008), location (Deng and Kahn, 2009), 
color (Folkes and Matta 2004; Yang and Raghubir 2005), shape (Ra-
ghubir and Krishna 1999), graphics (Bone and France 2001), and 
feel (Eriksson and Larsson 2011, Krishna 2006). In the absence of 
any other information, or when prior information about a new brand 
is missing (Postrel 2003, Horsky and Honea 2009), visual informa-
tion of a product or package (color, design, graphics, etc.) serves to 
set consumption expectations and make purchase decisions (Bloch 
1995, Di Muro and Noseworthy 2013, Kotler and Rath 1984, Nose-
worthy and Goode 2011, Sujan 1985). Yet, when a consumer knows 
how a product functions, the symbolic, ergonomic and functional 
value as communicated by design (Hoegg and Alba 2011) becomes 
redundant. While research in this area has focused on the influence 
of package aesthetics on satisfaction, product usage, and consump-
tion perception (Shiv et. al. 2005), the effect of package appeal in 
determining efficacy of an unknown product has not been studied.
Past research categorizes products on store shelves in terms of 
how easy or difficult it is to evaluate the utility of the product (Hsieh, 
Chiu and Chiang 2005). Products that consumers have no object 
way to evaluate are termed credence goods (Lovelock 2008, Brush 
and Artz 1999, Klein 1998). The two other types of products are 
search and experience products. Search products are those that the 
consumer can obtain multiple levels of information on, upon which 
they would base evaluations. The experience products are those that 
consumers evaluate based on actual consumption experience (Darby 
and Karni 1973, Zeithaml 1988). Examples of credence products are 
beauty products whose utility is hard to evaluate. Despite evidence 
that packaging influences claim receptivity for credence goods, there 
is little empirical work examining how variations in packaging form 
affect the desirability of credence goods. The promise of “beauty in 
a bottle” is a compelling proposition to any consumer. We contend 
that, in the absence of opportunities for consumers to make quality 
evaluations, aesthetics in packaging cues the semantic link between 
the category and functional efficacy of beauty. We show that a key 
determinant of a product’s success is its efficacy or perceived prod-
uct effectiveness, particularly when prior knowledge is either absent 
or low.
Brand awareness usually cues expectations of how the product 
will function when prior usage or trial is absent (Hoyer and Brown, 
1990). Nedungadi and Hutchinson (1985) define awareness as the 
ability to bring a brand to mind. Awareness serves as a heuristic when 
consumers lack time or prior usage experience. Horsky and Honea 
(2009) note that in cases of inferior product quality, packaging bi-
ases a positive response to hedonic product experience in which con-
sumers were more likely to accept credence claims (products whose 
utility impact was difficult for consumers to ascertain). Consumers 
show a marked preference for a high-awareness brand even when 
there were known differences in quality and price (Macdonald and 
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Sharp, 2000). Nedungadi and Hutchinson (1985) note that any new 
information about a category is usually generalized asymmetrically 
between more- and less-known brands.
We contend, however, that in the absence of consumer aware-
ness, the aesthetics of the product or the beauty-in-a-bottle promise 
serves as the first-moment-of-truth heuristic. This hypothesis is test-
ed in study 1. Our hypothesis is that, in the absence of any other cues 
to a brand’s functionality, consumers look to packaging information 
to form purchase inferences, and this is mainly due to functional in-
ferences based on appeal. Study 2 demonstrates that awareness or 
expertise in the category moderates this effect as consumers use the 
beauty-in-a-bottle heuristic only for low-awareness products. Study 
3 is a field experiment that demonstrates the robustness of this effect 
across a variety of brands in the beauty and household category. The 
hypotheses tested are summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 1: In the absence of any other cues to a brand’s 
functionality, consumers look to packaging in-
formation to form purchase inferences and indi-
cate a higher preference for more aesthetically 
pleasing packaging.
Hypothesis 2: Expertise in the category moderates the above 
effect as consumers use the beauty-in-a-bottle 
only in case of low awareness products to make 
functional inferences.
Hypothesis 3: The beauty-in-a-bottle effect is moderated by 
product category and only informs products in 
the beauty category.
 STUDY 1
Design and Procedures. Participants (N = 75, 58% females; 
Mage = 36.5) were recruited via Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing web-
site, Mechanical Turk, to complete a brief (10 min) questionnaire on 
“product preferences” in exchange for a nominal fee ($0.20; see Pao-
lacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis [2010] for a validation of Mechanical 
Turk as a data source). Participants were told that we were interested 
in their shopping preferences, and were asked to imagine shopping 
in a store for a bottle of lotion. After simulating the scenario, par-
ticipants were instructed that they would be asked to indicate their 
preferences for a fictitious lotion product whose package form was 
varied to be either high or low on appeal. 
The operationalization of low and high appeal followed a simi-
lar procedure described in Noseworthy and Trudel (2011) to establish 
variations in product form. First, we compiled various images of the 
product category. A pretest (n = 66) then determined whether partici-
pants perceived the selected containers as more (less) appealing than 
their general expectations for the category. The packaging with the 
highest and lowest appeal ratings were then carried forward into the 
study. After viewing the target product, participants’ purchase inten-
tions were capture by asking them to indicate, “if you were shopping 
for lotion, how likely is it that you would purchase this product,” (an-
chored: 1 = not likely at all; 7 = very likely). Following this, product 
effectiveness was captured by asking participants to indicate, “how 
well think the product will works” (anchored: 1 = very poorly; 7 = 
very well). The task concluded with basic demographic questions.
Results and Discussion. Not surprisingly, participants were 
more willing to purchase the more appealing product (M = 3.74) than 
the less appealing product (M = 2.55; t(73) = 2.72, p < .01). Criti-
cally, participants were also more likely to believe that the product 
with in a more appealing package functioned better (M = 4.53) than 
the product in the less appealing package (M = 3.66; t(73) = 2.23, p < 
.02). Participants’ judgments of product efficacy fully mediated the 
effect that appeal had on purchase intent (Sobel z = 1.68, p < .05). 
The results of this study not only replicate previous studies on the 
effect of package appeal on purchase intent (Chandon et. al. 2009), 
but extend these findings to illustrate that package appeal informs 
efficacy in determining purchase intent. If we are truly tapping an 
efficacy heuristic, then we should be able to test this by delineating 
conditions where the heuristic would be rendered irrelevant. Study 2 
was designed for this specific purpose. 
STUDY 2
Design and Procedures. Participants (N  = 129; 64.3% females; 
Mage = 46.3) were recruited via Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing web-
site. Participants were randomly assigned one of four conditions in a 
2 (form appeal: high vs. low) × 2 (product awareness: low vs. high) 
between-subjects factorial design. Participants were asked to imag-
ine shopping in a store for a bottle of shampoo. After simulating the 
scenario, participants were then instructed that they would be asked 
to indicate their preferences for specific products. As before we cap-
tured purchase intention and perceptions of product effectiveness. 
The product form manipulation followed study 1. In addition to rat-
ing the appeal of various package form manipulations, participants 
were asked to list and rate the familiarity of brand names (anchored: 
1 = not very familiar; 5 = very familiar). The list included fictitious 
and well-known brands in the category. The brand names with the 
highest and lowest means ratings were carried forward into the study. 
All other measures remained consistent with study 1.
Results and Discussion. An analysis of variance with purchase 
intent as the key dependent measure, yielded a significant aware-
ness × appeal interaction (F(1, 125) = 4.35, p < .05). Simple effects 
confirmed that when awareness was high, participants did not show 
a significant difference in purchase intent between the more appeal-
ing (M = 3.27) and less appealing product (M = 3.51; F < 1). How-
ever, when awareness was low, participants preferred the product 
with the more appealing packaging (M = 3.06) over the product in 
the less appealing packaging (M = 2.12; F(1, 125) = 5.35, p < .05). 
To determine whether perceived efficacy once again accounted for 
the increased desirability of less aware products, we conducted a 
moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker and Hayes 2007; 
Model 2). As predicted, perceived efficacy mediated the positive re-
lationship between appeal and purchase intension when the product 
had a low awareness (B = .86, SE = .29, z = 2.96, p < .005) but not 
when brand awareness was high (z = -.18, p = .85). This finding 
supports the prediction that when awareness is low consumers use 
heuristics such as package design to determine product preferences, 
as consumers make efficacy inferences based on the appeal of the 
product, but when it comes to high awareness products, the heuristic 
is rendered irrelevant. Hence, consistent with literature on expertise, 
product awareness washed the heuristic. This raises the distinct pos-
sibility that this heuristic, like many others, is domain specific. That 
is, the link between beauty and efficacy might only exist for a cre-
dence good that is promoting beauty, as opposed to functional utility. 
Study 3 was designed to test this prediction, and also to check the 
robustness of our findings. 
STUDY 3
This study uses a unique data set detailing 146 brand names 
of beauty and household products. It includes information about the 
products featured including images of the actual images of products 
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used in store. In this study the objective was to evaluate the role that 
category plays in the beauty-in-a-bottle heuristic. We predicted that 
the link between beauty and efficacy exists only for products for 
which it is hard to ascertain functionality or utility ahead of time. 
BrandSpark International, in collaboration with SSI, conducted 
a nationwide online survey of over 50,000 American consumers (age 
18+) who are involved in household shopping and provided the data 
for our study. The survey was weighted by gender, age and region 
to conform to US MRI data and reflect the principal shopper. Of the 
individuals who participated in the nationwide survey 57,492 indi-
viduals (10.6% male and 89.4% female) participated in an additional 
survey that evaluated preferences to products that were either in the 
beauty (credence) or household (experience) categories. A total of 
106 images of beauty products and household products were ob-
tained from individual brand representatives who were Brandsparks 
clients. Images were all clients’ representations of the actual prod-
uct package as used in store with the product against a white back-
ground. All images used were shown the using the same approximate 
size and with clear resolution. 
Independent Measures. Each respondent saw one image with 
the product description and then answered a series of questions such 
as: How appealing is the package to you? Prior to this survey were 
you aware of this product? Have you or have you not purchased this 
product before? Approximately how many times have you purchased 
the product? The first time you purchased this product, please indi-
cate what had the most influence on your decision to buy the prod-
uct? How much does the packaging of this product encourage you 
to purchase this product?  Respondents would then see a different 
product and repeat the series of question for the product presented. 
When repeated observations are collected on a set of individuals and 
the measurement occasions are not identical, such as measuring ap-
peal, purchase intent and awareness of individual products, Rauden-
bush (2004) recommend treating multiple observations as nested 
within persons. We chose full maximum likelihood as the estima-
tion method to compare the model fits across three nested models 
(Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon 2002).  In our model, each indi-
vidual’s appeal rating is nested within products. We used hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM; Raudenbush, Byrk and Congdon 2002) to 
deal with multilevel data as it allows for simultaneous estimation of 
the relationship of variables at two levels, using iterative maximum 
likelihood estimation. We estimated a main effect model, an interac-
tion model with main effects, and second and third order interaction 
with a random intercept and finally an interaction model with main 
effects, second and third order interaction with a random intercept 
and appeal. This final model allowed for individual variation in the 
level of product appeal.
Results and Discussions. The parameter estimates for all three 
models are contained in Table 2. Note that we report unstandardized 
coefficients. Model 3 had the smallest fit indices (AIC=1081349), 
suggesting a good fitting, parsimonious model. Given the sample 
size, we assumed this to be a reliable (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 
2000). We found an effect of package appeal (γ01 = 1.93, t = 157.82, 
p < .001), awareness (γ02  = .25, t = 16.15, p < .001) and a marginal 
effect of category (γ03 = -.02, t = -1.75, p = .08). These main effects 
were qualified by a significant three way interaction (γ07  = -.0.13, t 
= -6.56, p < .001). In addition, a spotlight analysis at two standard 
deviations above and below the mean for appeal, and awareness 
were computed for beauty vs. household products. Consumers in 
the household category showed increased preference for high appeal 
package regardless of whether the awareness was high (M low appeal = 
2.15 vs. M high appeal = 5.64) or low (M low appeal = 1.58 vs. M high appeal = 
4.75). In contrast, while consumers in the beauty category showed 
a similar preference in a low awareness condition (M low appeal = 1.73 
vs. M high appeal= 5.12) the effect of package appeal did not matter in 
the high awareness condition (M low appeal = 3.81 vs. M high appeal = 3.81). 
This field study highlights the schematic concept of beauty or pack-
age aesthetics being important when awareness of a product is low 
and which is more the case for credence goods. For products asso-
ciated with the beauty category, we find that package appeal plays 
a critical role in the absence of brand cues to the quality or other 
characteristics of the product. A summary of findings are in table 1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our research contributes to the literature on product aesthetics 
by showing how consumers use inferences based on package appeal 
to determine preferences of other heuristics to base preferences. Re-
search has shown package form to play a critical role in persuasion 
tactics that marketers use by varying shape, visual graphics, materi-
als, and proportions (Bloch 1995). Product form takes on multiple 
roles in communicating to the consumer (Hoegg and Alba 2011), 
including attention, schematic mapping of product category, basic 
arousal, and usage-related and functional meaning. In this research, 
we demonstrate that inferences regarding performance are gener-
ated purely based on package appeal when considering products for 
which utility and hence functional value are difficult to evaluate. We 
also show that these inferences are critical in driving trial for prod-
ucts that are hard for consumers to evaluate, even after they have 
consumed or used them (credence goods). Thus, we contribute to 
existing knowledge in this area by evaluating the influence of appeal 
in consumer preferences for products that require expertise and are 
challenging to evaluate. 
This research illuminates the nuances of inferences that con-
sumers make based on appeal. We demonstrate that, although prod-
ucts in appealing packaging are preferred in general, it is only when 
there is a lack of expertise or awareness in a category that appeal 
cues functional inferences. Further, studies 1 and 2 show the utility 
of this heuristic with credence goods, such as those in the beauty 
category, wherein it is difficult to determine an objective means of 
evaluation. Finally, by combining empirical analyses of multiple 
brands across different product types, we bolster the generalizabil-
ity of the results while highlighting the differences in implications 
for credence versus experience products. By drawing on the product 
aesthetics literature, including findings from statistical analyses of 
field survey data and controlled experiments, we further enhance our 
contribution to theory and marketing practice.
Certain limitations to this research should be considered. In 
studying credence goods, our research has focused on the beauty 
category, because the appeal metaphorically maps to the concept 
of beauty and hence to the “beauty-in-a-bottle” metaphor. This 
heuristic is certainly applicable to other areas of product aesthetics 
in which the limitations of credence goods or functionality of the 
product are difficult to evaluate. Further, while study 3 is useful in 
determining the limiting conditions of this phenomenon, future stud-
ies could explore the role that perceptions of efficacy play in differ-
ent categories of credence goods. Future studies could also benefit 
by examining the moderating role of product awareness caused by 
lack of expertise, cross-cultural differences, gender differences, and 
cross-generational differences.  
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The Means to Justify the End: How the Way in Which Decisions to Intervene Are 
Communicated to Users Can Combat Cyber Harassment in Social Media
Tom van Laer, ESCP Europe Business School, UK
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Cyber harassment does not only have harmful effects for social 
network sites, because victims tend to exit the service (Avery 2010; 
Martin and Smith 2008), but the emotional distress brought on by 
the online aggression has also caused victims to take their own lives 
(Parker 2012). At the same time, social media users are often upset 
when network providers intervene with the network and deem such 
an intrusion an unjust occurrence (Brunk 2012; Davis 2007; Pruitt 
2003). The general aim of this paper is to answer the call for “making 
a difference” research that the Association for Consumer Research 
North American Conference 2013 has put out. Our intention has been 
to explore how the aforementioned catch-22 can be resolved through 
framing the ways in which decisions to intervene are communicated 
to users. This work expands on existing persuasion and victim iden-
tification effects.
First, we contend that a decision to intervene based on a story 
has a more positive effect on user perception that the decision is just 
than an analytical, factual format. We further distinguish two main 
components of identity: personal and social (Dollinger et al. 1996; 
Reid and Deaux 1996). We explore whether the effect of the story 
over the analytical format holds across both components. 
Second, we further understanding of the mechanism underly-
ing the presentation format effect. We examine whether the narrative 
transportation that people experience may lead to a justice perception 
that the story events imply.
Third, we move beyond the prediction that presentation format 
will be associated with justice perception by exploring an intrain-
dividual moderator that influences this relationship. The current re-
search investigates why self-referencing may lead to either less or 
more positive justice perceptions under the framework of the story 
and analytical presentation format.
Study 1
Method
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether identity viola-
tion and presentation format of a decision to intervene interact in 
their effect on justice perception. Both identity violation and pre-
sentation format were manipulated. The study had a randomized 2 
(identity violation: personal or social) × 2 (presentation format: story 
or analytical) full-factorial design. 
Participants. Participants were 124 graduate business students.
Materials, Procedure, and Measures. Upon entering the labora-
tory, participants were informed that they would be asked to take part 
in a study aimed at understanding a decision the network provider 
of the business school’s social network site was in the process of 
making. Specifically, they were told a major issue at the school was 
how the network provider planned to limit cyber harassment on the 
site. Participants were told they would be asked to read a fictitious 
wall post from the network provider about how he planned to handle 
the cyber harassment situation. After the introduction into the study, 
the participants saw on a computer screen a fictitious wall post on 
the school’s social network site signed by “Patrick Franken, network 
provider” with an e-mail address of the school’s ICT service desk. 
There were four conditions: Story presentation format & personal 
identity violation, story presentation format & social identity viola-
tion, analytical presentation format & personal identity violation, and 
analytical presentation format & social identity violation. After read-
ing the wall post, participants responded to narrative transportation 
(Green and Brock 2000) (α=.89) and informational justice percep-
tion (Colquitt 2001) (α=.89) measures.
Results
Tests of simple effects on the adjusted means indicated that, in 
the personal identity violation condition, the difference in informa-
tional justice perception was significant for presentation format (see 
Table 1). In the social identity violation condition, there was no effect 
for presentation format (mean difference = .04, SE = .31, p = .901).
Table 1: Informational Justice Perception for  
Different Experimental Groups
Story format
M (SD)
Analytical 
format
M (SD)
Study 1
Personal identity violation 4.82 (1.21) 3.38 (1.29)
Social identity violation 4.86 (1.14) 4.82 (1.05)
Study 2
Encouraged self-referencing 5.55 (.95) 2.64 (1.01)
Not encouraged self-referencing 4.86 (1.04) 3.53 (1.13)
We bootstrapped the indirect effects of presentation format on 
informational justice perception. Narrative transportation mediated 
the relationship between presentation format and informational jus-
tice perception (point estimate = .42, bias corrected and accelerated 
95% CI = .15 ± .76).
Study 2
Method
We examined the interaction between the format in which the 
decision is presented to users and whether the decision encourages 
self-referencing. Both presentation format and self-referencing strat-
egy were manipulated. Study 2 was a randomized 2 (presentation 
format: story or analytical) × 2 (self-referencing: encouraged or not 
encouraged) full-factorial design.
Participants. Participants were 233 graduate business students.
Materials, Procedure, and Measures. This experiment was 
based on the same introduction as Study 1. A fictitious wall post on 
a computer screen followed the study introduction. The wall post 
began with the opening statement as in Study 1. The next part of 
the wall post introduced the presentation format manipulations. Self-
referencing was encouraged through the use of “imagine” and “you” 
instead of “victim.” Following the manipulations, information was 
provided about the decision that the network provider made. After 
reading the wall post, participants were instructed to respond to a 
series of scales regarding the wall post they had read. The scales 
included narrative transportation (α=.89) and informational justice 
perception (α=.79) measures.
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Results
There was a main effect of presentation format (F(1, 222) = 235.97 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .515), qualified by an interaction between presentation 
format and self-referencing (F(1, 222) = 33.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .131). 
Tests of simple effects on the adjusted means indicated that, in both 
the story and the analytical presentation format condition, the dif-
ference in informational justice perception was significant for self-
referencing (see Table 1). 
Discussion
Results from two experiments provide support for the proposed 
effect of presentation format. Further, the findings lend support for 
narrative transportation as an underlying mechanism for the effect. 
In addition, the findings from Study 2 suggest that decisions to in-
tervene are more likely to be perceived as just when they are based 
on a story and encourage a self-referencing strategy. In summary, we 
extend research on the dilemma between one user’s right to freely 
construct an online identity and another user’s right to protection 
from cyber harassment by assessing decisions to intervene across 
identity violations, examining the role of presentation format, and 
examining self-referencing strategy as an explanatory factor. We 
suggest extending this research by studying prior real-life situations 
where social network sites have intervened.
REFERENCES
Avery, Jill (2010), “Gender Bender Brand Hijacks and Consumer 
Revolt: The Porsche Cayenne Story,” in Consumer Behavior: 
Human Pursuit of Happiness in the World of Goods, ed. Jill 
Avery, Sharon Beatty, Morris B. Holbrook, Robert V. Kozinets 
and Banwari Mittal, Cincinnati, OH: Open Mentis, 645-49.
Brunk, Katja H. (2012), “Un/Ethical Company and Brand 
Perceptions: Conceptualising and Operationalising Consumer 
Meanings,” Journal of Business Ethics, 111 (4), 551-65.
Colquitt, Jason A. (2001), “On the Dimensionality of 
Organizational Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (3), 386-400.
Davis, Wendy (2007), “Facebook Pulls in Beacon Program 
Again,” in Online Media Daily, New York, NY: MediaPost 
Communications.
Dollinger, Stephen J., Lea Ann Preston, Sonia Pagany O’Brien, and 
David L. DiLalla (1996), “Individuality and Relatedness of the 
Self: An Autophotographic Study,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 71 (6), 1268-78.
Green, Melanie C. and Timothy C. Brock (2000), “The Role of 
Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79 (5), 701-21.
Martin, Kelly D. and N. Craig Smith (2008), “Commercializing 
Social Interaction: The Ethics of Stealth Marketing,” Journal 
of Public Policy & Marketing, 27 (1), 45-56.
Parker, Ian (2012), “The Story of a Suicide: A Gay Freshman and 
the Online World,” in The New Yorker.
Pruitt, Scarlet (2003), “Friendster: A New Twist on Wired 
Contacts,” in PCWorld, Vol. Software >> Browsers & Add-
Ons IDG Consumer & SMB.
Reid, Anne and Kay Deaux (1996), “Relationship between Social 
and Personal Identities: Segregation or Integration,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (6), 1084-91.
407 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Retail Shopper Confusion: An Explanation of Avoidance Behavior at the Point-of-Sale
Marion Garaus, University of Vienna, Austria
UdoWagner, University of Vienna, Austria
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Most store environmental literature focuses on how to gener-
ate positive consumer responses by manipulating in-store elements, 
rather than considering the potentially negative impact of the store 
environment on consumer behaviors. Yet shoppers may perceive an 
overly arousing store environment negatively (Kaltcheva and Weitz 
2006). Machleit and Eroglu (2000) claim that two-dimensional mea-
sures of negative effects (i.e., positive vs. negativefail to capture the 
broad spectrum of feasible emotions evoked by a store environment. 
In response to their call to investigate specific emotions to predict 
consumers’ in-store responses, we introduce and empirically inves-
tigate a new construct, retail shopper confusion (RSC), defined as a 
negative feeling that makes it difficult for consumers to select and in-
terpret store environmental stimuli. It might be a facet of the general 
confusion construct that can arise in shopping situations (Walsh and 
Mitchell 2010), when product similarity, overload, and ambiguity 
drive confusion (Walsh, Hennig-Thurau, and Mitchell 2007). Even 
beyond products, the store environment (e.g., signage, Bitner 1992; 
visual merchandising, Mitchell and Papavassiliou 1997) can trigger 
similar confusion. Thus far, only social factors have been considered 
as drivers of store environmental confusion (Schweizer, Kotouc, and 
Wagner 2006). The influences of design and ambient factors on shop-
per confusion have not been investigated. To address this research 
gap, we examine antecedents and consequences of RSC and develop 
a measurement instrument for assessing RSC.
The RSC model is based on the environmental psychological 
model (Mehrabian and Russell 1974): The store environment evokes 
RSC, which leads to avoidance behavior. To identify RSC anteced-
ents, we classify the store environment into ambient, design, and so-
cial factors (Baker 1987) but exclude social factors, because RSC 
is caused by the store environment. It is not the mere existence of 
these factors but their specific properties—variety, novelty, complex-
ity, and conflict (Berlyne 1960)—that evoke confusion. In line with 
Bitner (1992), we assume that confused shoppers experience high 
arousal but low dominance and feel unpleasant. Because RSC evokes 
negative perceptions, shoppers react with avoidance: low search, pa-
tronage, and repeat shopping, little time spent, and few unplanned 
expenditures (Donovan and Rossiter 1982).
A three-study design tests the conceptual RSC model. Study 1 
is explorative, using expert interviews and descriptive techniques to 
identify RSC causes. Variety, novelty, complexity, and conflict be-
tween ambient (acoustic stimuli, lighting, scent, temperature) and 
design (e.g., aisles, architecture, colors, materials, technology, visual 
merchandising) factors all trigger RSC. By way of illustration, many 
different light sources (variety), new or unexpected light (novelty), a 
complex lighting system (complexity) or inappropriate lighting (con-
flict) cause RSC. Complexity and conflict create more pronounced 
confusion potential, unlike product-related consumer confusion, for 
which variety and novelty are the dominant drivers. A preliminary 
explanation for this result is the far more frequent variations for 
product packages than for store designs (see Table 1).
Study 2 follows the suggestions of Walsh et al. (2007) to devel-
op a scale assessing RSC through accompanying feelings. Explor-
atory and confirmatory factor analyses reveal a three-factor solution, 
consisting of helplessness, inefficiency, and irritation. A Chi Square 
difference test with the one-factor model provides further empirical 
support for our model. We find strong evidence of convergent validi-
ty contrasting the RSC scale against the pleasure-arousal-dominance 
scale (Mehrabian and Russell 1974). Two independent samples fur-
ther validate the RSC scale (see Table 1).
The third study investigates five consequences of RSC with a 
causal research design. Respondents, randomly assigned to experi-
mental groups, confirm all but one of the hypothesized RSC conse-
quences: Confused shoppers do not strive for information or explore 
the store in depth; seek to escape from the confusing environment, 
which reduces their patronage intentions and time spent in the store; 
and try to avoid confusion in the future, resulting in lower repeat 
shopping intentions. However, they do not spend less money spon-
taneously than non-confused shoppers, which may be a factor of the 
analyzed product category: Grocery shopping typically is character-
ized by relatively urgent demand, so even confused customers might 
buy substitutes of necessary items (see Tables 1-3).
Table 1: Results of Study 1: Causes of RSC
Variety Novelty Complexity Conflict
Design Factors M SD M SD M SD M SD
Aisles 3.40 1.36 3.29 1.32 3.85 1.19 3.59 1.24
Architecture 3.18 1.29 3.07 1.31 3.71 1.24 2.73 1.30
Colors 2.28 1.25 2.35 1.21 2.78 1.32 2.81 1.33
Customer Flow 3.50 1.31 3.09 1.12 3.84 1.21 3.61 1.17
Materials 2.09 1.18 2.22 1.13 2.60 1.22 2.99 1.41
Shelving and Storage 2.65 1.26 2.67 1.24 3.71 1.31 3.54 1.41
Signage 3.01 1.32 2.74 1.28 3.30 1.35 3.50 1.41
Space Allocation 3.03 1.30 3.36 1.25 3.41 1.22 3.55 1.26
Technology 2.80 1.37 3.12 1.38 3.03 1.35 3.61 1.32
Visual Merchandising 3.12 1.30 2.54 1.22 3.61 1.25 3.75 1.30
Ambient Factors M SD M SD M SD M SD
Acoustic Stimuli 2.95 1.38 2.57 1.28 3.44 1.35 3.32 1.46
Lighting 2.31 1.31 2.37 1.25 2.55 1.26 2.69 1.35
Scent 2.48 1.29 2.45 1.22 2.93 1.39 2.94 1.43
Temperature 2.80 1.41 2.91 1.37 3.21 1.44 2.78 1.45
Note: shaded cells highlight means greater than 3.50
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The store environment contributes to confusion evoked in shop-
ping situations. Therefore, researchers and marketers must address 
not only product-related confusion causes but also environmental 
confusion drivers. Study 1 demonstrates that specific ambient and 
design factors trigger RSC; complexity and conflict are the main 
causes of environmental confusion. The development of a reliable, 
valid RSC scale enables assessments of confusion in empirical stud-
ies and periodic inspections of a store’s confusion potential. The 
many undesirable RSC consequences highlight the importance of 
avoiding confusing store designs. Some limitations should be ad-
dressed in further studies, such as supplementing the study 3 results 
with field experiments or considering other (e.g., more hedonic) 
product categories.
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Table 2: Results of Study 2: Measurement of RSC
Dimension Item Factor loadings
Item to total 
orrelation
Cronbach’s 
alpha
Construct 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted
Retail shopper confusion scale
Helplessness
Helpless .75 .69
.84 .84 .47
Lost .71 .65
Awkward .70 .63
Baffled .67 .66
Weak .64 .59
Overstrained .64 .58
Inefficiency
Efficient .70 .58
.76 .75 .43Careful .68 .57Productive .63 .52
High-performing .64 .53
Irritation
Annoyed .72 .55
.76 .79 .56Irritated .64 .51
Nerved .64 .56
Table 3: Results of Study 3: Consequences of RSC
Confusing Non-Confusing ANOVA
Manipulation check (based upon RSC scale) 3.82 .62 1.77 .68 129.18 .000*
Consequences M SD M SD F p
In-store search 2.33 .92 3.30 .91 14.44 .000*
Repeat shopping intentions 1.57 .75 3.97 .90 109.93 .000*
Store patronage intentions 1.30 .67 3.44 1.00 83.34 .000*
Time spent in store 1.61 .73 2.56 .78 20.63 .000*
Unplanned expenditures 2.81 1.27 3.16 1.11 1.08 .300
* p < .01.
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Commitment To Virtuous Behaviors - How Self-Control Shapes Commitment To Near 
Versus Distant Behaviors 
Danit Ein-Gar, Tel Aviv University, Israel
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Virtuous behaviors are behaviors that people believe they ought 
to do, but might find them difficult (Ein-Gar, Goldenberg, & Sagiv, 
2013; Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). Understanding 
the effectiveness of requests to commit to virtuous behaviors is im-
portant theoretically and practically.
Past research suggests that activation of distant future mindset 
should encourage individuals to be more self-controlled, goal-driven 
in their behavior (e.g. Dhar & Kim, 2007; Fujita et al., 2006). Fur-
thermore research on choice between “should” and “want” shows 
that when the execution of the choice is in the distant future, people 
make more “should” (i.e., virtuous) choices than when execution 
of the choice is in the near future (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 
2010; Rogers & Bazerman, 2008).
This research suggests that contrary to past findings, consum-
ers may be less likely to commit to a distant- (as opposed to a near-) 
virtuous behavior. 
Temporal-construal-theory has laid the notion that distant future 
is construed more abstract while the near future is construed more 
concrete (Liberman, Sagristano & Trope 2002; Trope & Liberman, 
2003). In line with this notion, in the distant future, one’s schedule 
is construed abstractly, while in the near future, one’s schedule is 
construed more concrete.
Research on information processing suggests that abstract in-
formation makes people more optimistic regarding the outcome of 
their actions (Chan, Sengupta & Mukhopadhyay 2013). Thus, when 
individuals’ schedule is abstract, they might optimistically believe 
they will find spare time for a given action, and hence be more likely 
to commit to it. Conversely, research has shown that concrete infor-
mation provides more confidence of prediction (Camerer & Weber, 
1992). Thus, when individuals’ schedules are concrete, they may be 
more certain of finding the necessary time to carry out the action, and 
hence might be more likely to commit. 
This paper offers to reconcile these seemingly contradicting hy-
potheses by suggesting that commitment preference is dependent on 
one’s level of self-control.  
It is argued that low self-control consumers prefer committing 
to the distant future, not only because they are more likely to procras-
tinate, but also because in the future time is vague and this vagueness 
makes them feel more confident they will find the time to complete 
their commitment. High self-control consumers prefer committing to 
the near future hand, not only because they want to “check things off 
their list” but also because the near future is concrete and this gives 
them a sense of certainty that they will be able to identify the neces-
sary spare time.  
Study 1: Demonstrated the effect for commitment to pro-envi-
ronmental behavior. Student participants (n=60, Mage=24) completed 
a self-control scale (DSC; α =.85; Ein-Gar et al., 2013; Ein-Gar & 
Steinhart, 2011), a filler task and then read about consumption of 
green products. Next, participants reported their willingness to hand 
out flyers encouraging consumption of green products, either the 
next semester (near-condition) or the next summer vacation (distant-
condition). As expected low self-control participants were more will-
ing to hand out flyers in the distant-future while high self-control par-
ticipants showed greater preference in the near future (F(1,57) =10.11, 
p<.02).
Study 2: Tested the effect for pro-social behavior, when self-
control is manipulated rather than measured. Adult participants 
(n=122, Mage=28) were asked to recall an event in which they had 
overcome temptations, (high self-control condition) or had yielded to 
their temptations (low self-control condition). Next, participants read 
about a pro-bono project in which volunteers spend time with under-
privileged children. The project was expected to take place either 
next month (near-condition) or in 6 months (distant-condition). Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the number of hours they would be 
willing to volunteer. Low self-control participants volunteered more 
hours in the distant-future. High self-control participants volunteered 
more hours in the near-future (F(1,118) =14.08, p<.01). 
Study 3: Unravels the underlying effect of time availability cer-
tainty while testing commitment to a behavior with a personal bene-
fit. Adult participants (n=386, Mage=32) completed the DSC scale (α 
= .90) and were then offered to join a 10-session coaching program 
for attaining a financially goal either in two weeks (near condition) or 
four months (distant condition). Participants were asked to indicate 
their intention to commit to a 10-meeting program and to indicate 
how certain there are they would find the necessary time to uphold 
their commitment. Low-self-control participants were more willing 
to commit in the near- condition while high-self-control participants 
reported greater commitment intentions in the distant-condition 
(F(1,382) = 9.95, p < .01). Moderated mediation analyses showed that 
commitment was positively mediated by time availability certainty 
for low self-control participants (95% CI: 0.014 to 0.419) and was 
negatively mediated for high self-control participants (95% CI: 
-0.488 to -.02). 
REFERENCES
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in 
modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 325–370.
Chan, E., Sengupta, J., & Mukhopadhyay, A. (2013). The 
antecedents of anticipatory purchase: Reconciling the two 
routes to optimism. Journal of Consumer Research, 23 (1), 
90-105.
Dhar, R., & Kim, E. Y. (2007). Seeing the forest or the trees: 
Implications of construal level theory for consumer choice. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17(2), 96–100. 
Ein-Gar, D., & Steinhart, Y. (2011). The sprinter effect: When 
self-control and involvement stand in the way of sequential 
performance. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21, 240–255.
Ein-Gar, D., Goldenberg, J., & Sagiv, L. (2012). The role of 
consumer self-control in the consumption of virtue products. 
International Journal of Research Marketing, 29, 123-133.
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). 
Construal level and self-control. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 90(3), 351–367.
Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect 
of temporal distance on level of mental construal. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 38(6), 523–534.
Milkman, K. L., Rogers, T., & Bazerman, M. H. (2010). I’ll have 
the ice cream soon and the vegetables later. A study of online 
grocery purchases and order lead time. Marketing Letters, 
21(1), 17-35. 
410 / Commitment To Virtuous Behaviors - How Self-Control Shapes Commitment To Near Versus Distant Behaviors 
Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Kalyanaraman, S. (1999). Mixing 
virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the 
diversification heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 12, 257-273.
Rogers, T. & Bazerman, M. H. (2008). Future lock-in: Future 
implementation increases selection of “should” choices. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
106(1), 1-20. 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. 
Psychological Review, 110(3), 403–421. 
411 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Embodied Cognition and Social Consumption: Self-Regulating Temperature through 
Social Products and Behaviors
Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee, Colorado State University, USA
Jeff D. Rotman, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A recent surge of psychology research examines an essential 
link between physiological experiences and social perceptions, 
behavior, and judgments (Williams & Bargh, 2008; Bargh & 
Shalev, 2012).These results are consistent with the emerging field of 
embodied cognition that argues that our metaphorical understanding 
of concepts are grounded in, and can be influenced by, the physical 
experiences of our environment (Wilson, 2002). Much of the extant 
embodied cognition literature in this domain focuses on the link 
between physical warmth or coldness and its relation to social 
relationships. For instance, physical warmth positively influences 
social perceptions, social trust, and social proximity (Ijzerman & 
Semin, 2009; Kang et al., 2011; Williams & Bargh, 2008), while 
feeling lonely (i.e., social exclusion) relates to perceptions of 
physical coldness or desire for warm remedies (Ijzerman & Semin, 
2010). That is, experiencing physical warmth relates to interpersonal 
affection whereas experiencing physical coldness relates to exclusion 
and self-centeredness (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In addition, this 
link is bidirectional in nature (Lee & Schwarz, 2012); physiological 
experiences affect social affiliation as much as social experiences 
affect physiological reactions. 
Four experiments examine the relationship between physical 
temperature, social warmth, and consumption experiences. 
Specifically, we demonstrate that certain consumptive behaviors 
(consumptive experiences and products whose attributes are 
interpersonal in nature) serve as a self-regulatory mechanism. Further, 
we show that this relationship is bi-directional in nature, in that 
experiencing a socially consumptive behavior leads to preferences 
for a temperature-regulating physical object, whereas consuming 
a cold or warm product induces a physical temperature change 
that leads to a preference for a self-regulating social consumption 
experience.
The results of experiment 1 suggest that social consumption 
setting affect perceptions of ambient temperature. Specifically, eating 
a meal alone (a low social consumption setting) led individuals to 
underestimate the actual ambient temperature of the room, while 
eating a meal with another individual (a high social consumption 
setting) led individuals to overestimate the actual ambient 
temperature in the room.
The results of experiment 2 provide two important findings. 
First, it demonstrate that a social product serve as a substitute for 
social interactions. Secondly, although previous research (Zhong 
& Leonardelli, 2008) demonstrates that social exclusion leads 
individuals to prefer hot drinks, ostensibly in attempt to warm 
oneself, this research is the first to demonstrate that those who 
interact socially prefer cold drinks, seemingly in order to cool 
themselves down.  Physiological research has long known the threats 
of overheating and the importance of cooling (Sutton, 1909; Caruso 
et al., 1992) and there is reason to believe that individuals feel the 
need to cool off in social situations as well.  Shyness, or the tendency 
to avoid social situations (Pilkonis, 1977), is a universal emotional 
state (Henderson, Zimbardo, & Carducci 2010).  Similarly, social 
anxiety represents a discomfort in social interaction, thus motivating 
individuals to “cool off” when situations becomes uncomfortable. 
As such, the results of experiment 2 confirm our predictions that 
individuals interacting with a social alarm clock desired a cold drink, 
whereas those that did not interact with the social product preferred 
the hot drink.  
The results of experiment 3 provide convergent evidence that 
social products serve as a proxy for social interactions and that 
the relationship between social interactions and temperature is bi-
directional. Furthermore the results of experiment 3 support the idea 
that those individuals who feel warm become less interested in social 
interactions, whereas those who feel cold are more likely to seek 
such interactions.
The results of experiment 4 provide additional evidence that 
individuals self-regulate their temperature to combat both warm 
and cold situations through consumption behaviors.  Specifically 
the results demonstrate that individuals who feel cold desire 
consumption that included others, whereas those who were warm 
desired lone consumption.  
Past marketing studies related to temperature primarily focus 
on retailers’ “servicescape”, specifically on how temperature affects 
ambient experiences (Hoffman and Turley 2002). For example, 
consumers perceive temperature in on-the-ground department stores 
as more stable than underground department stores (Chun and Tamura 
1998). While these studies reveal the important role of temperature 
in consumer experiences, researchers lack the understanding of how 
temperature relates to social consumption contexts (i.e., consuming 
alone vs. consuming with others) or with social products (e.g., 
interactive features such as Siri in iPhones). 
Our contribution is summarized by three statements. First, 
physiological experiences affect social consumption behavior 
as much as social consumption affects physiological reactions, 
confirming the bi-directional relationship of the socio-physio link. 
Second, instead of warmth promoting interpersonal affection and 
coldness promoting isolation, we find that people seek to achieve 
balance (e.g., desiring interactive products when cold and isolation 
when hot). This suggests that when one feels cold, people have 
increased social affiliative motives; when one feels hot, people seek 
relatively more social isolation. Third, and most importantly, we 
extend this framework into consumption scenarios and development 
of social products, providing managerial implications for marketers. 
The findings benefit marketers in multiple ways. First, it is 
important for marketers to control environmental settings (e.g., 
room temperature) to initiate relational behavior. For example, 
it is often considered that live speed dating sites should operate 
in “warm and cozy rooms” to increase interpersonal affection for 
potential candidates. In contrast, we suggest that colder rooms may 
encourage individuals to desire social remedies, such as developing 
interpersonal relations, in order to self-regulate their physical 
coldness. This research is also relevant to marketers seeking to 
develop social products. For instance, an arcade (which may have 
many interactive games) may benefit from keeping their gaming 
area cooler to assist consumers in balancing their bodily system or 
retail stores trying to sell social products (i.e., interactive toys) may 
encourage individuals to seek out social products by keeping their 
stores cooler.  On the other hand, retail stores trying to sell more 
non-social products (e.g. a bookstore) may benefit from keeping their 
area warmer.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Previous research has revealed the significance of money cues 
on people’s behaviors and thoughts in diverse domains: People 
primed with money, compared with the control participants, per-
sisted longer before requesting others’ help, reduced their time or 
money for others, and preferred to work or play alone (Vohs, Mead, 
& Goode, 2006). Reminders of money also alleviate people’s so-
cial distress and physical pain (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). 
One recent investigation highlighted that reminders of money also 
influence how people would respond to social influence attempts 
(Liu, Smeesters, & Vohs, 2012). Liu et al. (2012) demonstrated that 
people subtly primed with money did not conform to recommenda-
tion because they perceived social influence as a threat to their au-
tonomy. Building on this investigation in the psychology of money, 
we propose that the effect of money priming on persuasion can be 
moderated by the degree of freedom in one’s choice. Those who are 
reminded of money are likely to react to the social influence and 
behave in opposition to the agent’s intent. We predict that suggesting 
an opinion with some degree of decisional freedom, such as a recom-
mendation for a subcategory or a group, would mitigate the effect of 
money priming. Because recommending a subcategory of a category 
provides a certain amount of freedom in decision-making, it would 
not necessarily lead people to feel social influence as a threat. Hence, 
people who receive a subcategory recommendation are more likely to 
conform or comply with the opinion, even if they are money-primed.
We conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis. In Ex-
periment 1, participants were told that they would be involved in two 
unrelated studies. The first task was introduced as a survey. Through 
this procedure, we primed the concept of money or non-money (con-
trol group) by employing two different questionnaires: In the money 
priming condition, participants were told to estimate the appropriate 
amount of money in each hypothetical situation, and in the non-mon-
ey-priming condition, participants were told to decide how much 
time they would spend with others such as loved ones and family.
Participants then carry out the second task, reading about a 
situation in which they imagined that they had to decide which cof-
fee beans to purchase. We manipulated each subcategory to include 
two products. There were two subcategories (i.e. a coffee bean’s 
geographical region; 1) Africa and 2) Central America) and four 
products (i.e. a fictitious product; 1) Semplice, 2) Appassionato, 3) 
Grazioso, and 4) Vivace). ‘Semplice’ and ‘Appassionato’ belonged to 
the subcategory of ‘Africa,’ and ‘Grazioso’ and ‘Vivace’ were in the 
‘Central America’ subcategory. 
Participants then received either a recommendation for a sub-
category (i.e. Central America) or a recommendation for a product 
(i.e. Grazioso) from a seemingly influential source of knowledge and 
experience (i.e., a power blogger). The degree of freedom in one’s 
choice was manipulated via different types of recommendations for 
purchase; the subcategory recommendation was employed as a ma-
nipulation of high-level of freedom because people could still choose 
what they liked even after being given a recommendation. However, 
the product recommendation was deemed as a social influence with 
a low-level of freedom because the recommendation explicitly told 
people what they should select. Finally, we measured which option 
money-primed and non-money-primed participants chose.
Eighty-seven undergraduates and MBA students (44 males, 43 
females) participated in Experiment 1 in exchange for course credits. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime: 
money vs. non-money) x 2 (recommendation: subcategory vs. prod-
uct) between-subjects design. The results of experiment 1replicated 
previous finding that reminders of money in combination with prod-
uct recommendation (i.e., low-level of choice freedom) would elicit 
reactance in participants’ choice. However, when the recommenda-
tion was a subcategory, participants were more likely to follow the 
expert’s recommendation even when participants were primed with 
money. Participants who were not primed with money followed the 
expert’s recommendation regardless of the type of recommendation.
In experiment 2, we tested whether this phenomenon would ex-
ist even with only one product in each subcategory. That is, when 
choosing a subcategory and choosing a product results in no differ-
ence, would consumers still feel reactance from a product recom-
mendation and choose the option not recommended? We named this 
phenomenon an illusory category effect because there was no sub-
stantial difference between choosing a subcategory and choosing a 
product. 
Eighty-six undergraduates participated in experiment 2. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the same conditions of a 2 (prime: 
money vs. non-money) x 2 (recommendation: subcategory vs. prod-
uct) between-subjects design as in experiment 1. The procedure em-
ployed in experiment 2 was similar to that of experiment 1, but in 
this experiment we employed the wine category. We employed two 
subcategories (i.e. wine’s place of origin; 1) Bourgogne in France 
and 2) Piemonte in Italy) and two products (i.e. wine label; 1) Jo-
seph Drouhin Gevrey Chambertin and 2) Pio Cesare Barolo). As 
explained above, each subcategory had only one product; Joseph 
Drouhin Gevrey Chambertin in a category of Bourgogne, France 
and Pio Cesare Barolo in a category of Piemonte, Italy. Participants 
then received either a subcategory recommendation (i.e. Piemonte in 
Italy) or a product recommendation (i.e. Pio cesare Barolo) from an 
agent (i.e. a manager of the liquor store).
As predicted, the agent’s recommendation for a specific prod-
uct along with the money prime exerted a backfiring effect on par-
ticipants’ final choice and purchase likelihood: When activated by 
the money cues, an agent’s influence attempt decreased the likeli-
hood of choosing the recommended option. Specifically, participants 
who received a product recommendation tended to choose the op-
tion that was not recommended, whereas those who were provided 
with a subcategory recommendation were not affected by the agent’s 
recommendation. When participants were not primed with money, 
participants in the subcategory recommendation and the product 
recommendation condition showed no difference in terms of choice 
proportion of the recommended option.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer choices are typically presented in a sequence, and 
the presentation order has been observed to have an effect on choice 
where items first (primacy effect) and last (recency effect) in the 
sequence are preferred (e.g., Li and Epley 2009; Mantonakis et al. 
2009; Sulmont-Rosse et al. 2008;).  However, the procedures used in 
these experiments may not accurately reflect what occurs in an actual 
retail environment.  Sales associates may disrupt a consumer’s evalu-
ation process by asking them to evaluate an option between samples 
(i.e., step-by-step procedure) or ask the consumer to compare a cur-
rent sample to a previously sampled item (i.e., pairwise-comparison 
procedure). Results from two studies show that these common se-
quence presentation procedures may impact the possibility of order 
effects, with high and low product knowledge acting as boundary 
conditions for this effect. 
Theory Development
It is believed that high and low product category knowledge 
consumers will have different preferred strategies (i.e., consumer 
scripts) for evaluating and making decisions from a sequence of op-
tions within a respective product category.  Low product category 
knowledge consumers are suspected to engage in more simple deci-
sion strategies (Simon 1955), such as creating a global evaluation 
for each item before making a choice (i.e., step-by-step procedure). 
Conversely, consumers with high product category knowledge are 
believed to be more likely compare between samples, choosing a fa-
vourite and comparing each proceeding sample to that favourite (i.e., 
pairwise-comparison procedure; Mantonakis et al. 2009).
As described by script theory (Schank and Abelson 1977), 
engaging in behaviour that is congruent with a consumer script 
puts the individual on autopilot, not requiring much elaboration 
to make sense of the situation (Hsu and Chiang 2011; Shoemaker 
1996).  When sampling a sequence of items with low elaboration 
it is predicted that a consumer will revert back to a heuristic style 
of decision-making (e.g. “first-is-best” Sulmont-Rosse et al. 2008; 
or “saving-the-best-for-last” Li and Epley 2009) that could result in 
order effects.  However, when these scripts become disrupted (i.e., 
not allowing participants to follow their natural consumer script), it 
will require more elaboration and effort on the part of the consumer 
to try to make sense of the situation (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). 
This increased elaboration devoted to understanding the situation is 
believed to reduce reliance on decisions heuristics and the order ef-
fects that would result.
From this, order effects are suspected to exist for low (but not 
high) product category knowledge consumers during a step-by-step 
evaluation procedure because this is how they naturally make deci-
sions and it does no disrupt their consumer script.  Conversely, order 
effects are suspected to exist for high (but not low) product category 
knowledge consumers during a pairwise-comparison procedure be-
cause this is how they naturally make decisions and it does not dis-
rupt their consumer script.
Overview of Studies
To test this, participants tasted 5 samples of wine and were either 
asked to rate each wine on a ten-point scale between tastings (Study 
1: step-by-step procedure), or asked to compare each new sample to 
a previously picked favourite (Study 2: pairwise-comparison proce-
dure).  What the participants did not know was that each sample was 
the same wine poured from the same bottle. The experimental focal 
point was the final wine choice after testing each sample. 
Chi-square tests were used to verify that the observed end-of-
sequence choice for each sequence length was reliably different from 
uniform probability.  Since each sample was the same wine from the 
same bottle, each sample should rationally have an equal probability 
of being chosen as the favourite.  
In analyzing the results of the step-by-step procedure, chi-
square results were only found to be significantly different from uni-
form probability for low (but not high) wine knowledge participants 
χ2(4, N=29) = 21.17, prep=.87).  As wine knowledge increased, sam-
ples first and last in the sequence had a decreased likelihood of being 
chosen (β = -.48, p < .05). Conversely, in analyzing the results of the 
pairwise-comparison procedure, chi-square results were only found 
to be significantly different from uniform probability for high (but 
not low) wine knowledge consumers (χ2(1, N=20) = 9.5, prep=.87). 
Figure 1: Sequence Position and Choice Probabilities Graph
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This time, as wine knowledge increased the samples first and last in 
the sequence had a greater probability of being chosen (β = .58, p < 
.05; see figure 1 and table 1).
Conclusion
High and low product category knowledge consumers are be-
lieved to evaluate and choose an item from a sequence differently. 
Where low knowledge consumers naturally engage in a step-by-step 
procedure, and high knowledge consumers naturally follow a pair-
wise-comparison procedure.  Results show when the presentation 
of the sequence is congruent to how they would naturally evaluate 
and make a choice, then the situation will require little elaboration 
and order effects will result.  However, when the presentation of the 
sequence disrupts how they would naturally evaluate and make a 
choice, the situation requires more elaboration and the probability of 
order effects dissipate.
REFERENCES
Hsu, Tsuen-Ho and Chu-Yin Chiang (2011), “Script Comparisons 
During Service Encounters in Fast-Food Chains,” Tourism and 
Hospitality Research, 11 (1), 19-29.
Hughson, Angus L. and Robert A. Boakes (2001), “Perceptual and 
Cognitive Aspects of Wine Experts,” Australian Journal of 
Psychology, 53 (2), 103. 
Li, Ye and Nicholas Epley (2009), “When the Best Appears to be 
Saved For Last: Serial Position Effects on Choice,” Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 22 (4), 378. 
Mantonakis, Antonia, Pauline Rodero, Isabelle Lesschaeve, and 
Reid Hastie (2009), “Order in Choice: Effects of Serial 
Position on Preferences,” Psychological Science, 20 (11), 
1309. 
Meyers-Levy, Joan and Alice M. Tybout (1989), “Schema 
Congruity as a Basis for Product Evaluation,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 16 (June), 39-54.
Schank, Roger C. and Robert P. Abelson (1977), Scripts, Plans, 
Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge 
Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Shoemaker, Stowe (1996), “Scripts: Precursor of Consumer 
Expectations,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration 
Quarterly, 37 (1), 42-53.
Simon, Herbet A. (1955), “A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99-118.
Sulmont-Rosse, Claire, Claire Chabanet, Sylvie Issanchou, and E.P. 
Köster (2008), “Impact of the Arousal Potential of Uncommon 
Drinks on the Repeated Exposure Effect,” Food Quality and 
Preference, 19 (4), 412.
Table 1: Sequence Position and Choice Probabilities
Sequence 
Procedure Wine Knowledge
Order Position and the Probability of Being Chosen Chi-Square
1 2 3 4 5
Step-by-Step
(Study 1)
High 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.05 0.14 8.00
Low 0.52 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.17 21.17*
Pairwise-
Comparison 
(Study 2)
High 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.40 9.50*
Low 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.33
* Chi-Square > Chi-Theoretical
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Cobrand-harm Crises and Consumers Attributions of Responsibility
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Although product-harm crises are addressed in solo-brand con-
texts (e.g., Lei, Dawar, & Gürhan-Canli 2012) and cobranding re-
search is growing, consumer response to negative cobrand events is 
not well understood. To address this gap, we focus on how consum-
ers assign responsibility for retail cobrand performance (e.g., Chili’s 
Baby Back Ribs with Shiner Bock Beer BBQ Sauce, Cuisinart 
products made for Williams-Sonoma) in both a neutral and negative 
product-harm context. 
Attribution theory explains how individuals assign credit or 
blame for observed performance (Folkes 1988). In retail cobrands, 
customers may identify as the source of good or bad performance 
the product brand, retailer, both brands jointly, or neither brand due 
to some extraneous factor. We propose that consumers’ perception 
of cobrand integration affects attributions of responsibility for prod-
uct performance. Cobrand integration is how tightly the partnering 
brands are fused together in form, function, and service delivery. In 
low integration, consumers will perceive each brand’s contribution 
to the offering as relatively distinct (e.g., Disney toys in a McDon-
ald’s Happy Meal). In high integration, each partner’s contribution to 
the offering is intertwined (e.g., Dairy Queen Oreo Blizzard). In high 
integration, we expect that joint responsibility will increase because 
the offering’s utility is dependent on both brands. For low-integration 
offerings, consumers are expected to attribute performance responsi-
bility largely to the product brand. As joint responsibility increases, 
consumer perceptions of the product brand’s responsibility are ex-
pected to decrease and retailer responsibility to remain unchanged 
due to different roles played by retailers versus product brands (e.g., 
retailers gather an assortment of product brands). 
Brand strength can affect responses to cobrands (e.g., Simonin 
& Ruth 1998). Based on research on attribution, branding, and re-
tailing, we hypothesize that a strong versus weak product (retailer) 
brand will increase product (retailer) brand responsibility and that 
as product brand strength increases, consumers’ attributions of joint 
responsibility will decrease. In contrast, an increase in retailer brand 
strength will not affect consumers’ attributions of joint responsibility 
or product brand responsibility.
In neutral contexts (e.g., cobrand announcements), a pilot 
study which used real brands in a coffee shop and bookstore sce-
nario showed that consumers are sensitive to cobrand integration: 
as expected, as cobrand integration increased, joint responsibility 
increased, product brand responsibility decreased, and  retailer re-
sponsibility was unchanged.  
Extending the theorizing and pilot study findings into a nega-
tive cobrand-harm event, we expect that the relationship of cobrand 
integration to joint, product brand, and retailer responsibility attri-
butions will hold. Product brand strength and retail brand strength 
are expected to affect the same responsibility attributions but will 
reverse signs because of the shift to blame assessments (e.g., strength 
insulates brands from harm; Gürhan-Canli & Maheswaran 1998). We 
also examine subtyping judgments, or the extent to which a nega-
tive event is considered an exception because it is inconsistent with 
the brand’s existing schema. In solo-brand product-harm contexts, 
subtyping occurs more often for strong brands, because consumers 
have high expectations of the brands’ performance and quality (Lei 
et al. 2012). Because brand strength contains a signal about quality 
and, by implication, likelihood of a negative event, a cobrand-harm 
event will be perceived as more of an exception to the schema of 
a strong versus weak brand. These effects are expected to be more 
(less) evident in high (low) integration because a high-integration 
(low-integration) cobrand will be less (more) similar than the brand’s 
parent product and its original schema. In sum, consumers may con-
sider a brand at fault for the cobrand-harm event, but not incorporate 
that information into brand beliefs because it is considered outside of 
the brand’s typical behavior. 
We designed two experiments to test the effects of integration 
and brand strength in a cobrand-harm context. The first experiment 
manipulated integration and product brand strength and the second 
manipulated retailer brand strength and integration. Participants read 
information about a new cobrand involving a Greek yogurt brand 
and a restaurant retailer and were told that after eating the yogurt 
some customers became ill. The results showed that higher integra-
tion increased joint blame attributions but did not reduce consumers’ 
attribution of blame to the product brand, suggesting that integration 
is not protective for a product brand when a cobrand-harm event oc-
curs. Further, as expected, consumers perceived the negative event as 
more of an exception for a strong product brand, especially in high 
integration. 
In the second experiment, when retail brand strength informa-
tion was available and a cobrand-harm event occurred, a stronger 
(weaker) retail brand lowered (increased) joint blame. Further, as ex-
pected consumers tapped into retail brand strength to make subtyp-
ing judgments, especially in high integration.   
Our research extends previous research by considering multiple 
players in product-harm crises. While cobrand integration affects 
responsibility judgments, consumers rely on a strong versus weak 
brand to determine whether the event is an exception for both brands, 
the product brand, and the retailer. Our results indicate that consum-
ers are more likely to “excuse” the brand for a crisis when the brand 
is strong and in a high-integration partnership. In high integration, 
both partners share rewards that come with good performance and 
risks associated with bad performance. Moreover, for high-integra-
tion cobrands, consumers are less likely to single out product brands 
for credit for good performance or shield them from blame for bad 
performance. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Studies have documented consumers’ everyday purchase-be-
havior as being influenced by the interest of others. Directionally 
mixed findings exist on the effect of others on one’s purchase be-
havior. On the one hand, ample evidence suggests the interest of 
others has a positive influence on product evaluations. Conversely, 
under certain conditions, research has shown the interest of others 
diminishes product sales, consistent with what Hellofs and Jacobson 
(1999) have termed a “loss of exclusivity.” Here consumers report-
edly feel worse about the product and possibly about themselves 
through loss of image when the brand they are using expands to the 
interest of the general populace.
The current research aims to shed light on these seemingly con-
flicting effects of others on product interest, by considering whether 
the product is categorized as functional (i.e., when its evaluation is 
based on performance) or self-expressive (i.e., when its evaluation is 
based on the extent to which it reflects one’s personal tastes). Spe-
cifically, we suggest the interest of others increases attitudinal posi-
tive responses for functional products but negatively affects these 
same variables for self-expressive products, while decision regret is 
reduced for the former products and increased for the latter. Regret 
represents the unfavorable but important consequences of decisions, 
and studies have found it has a significant impact on consumer be-
havior. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Evaluation of a functional product increases and 
regret decreases under the condition of many 
versus few interested others. 
Hypothesis 2: Evaluation of a self-expressive product decreas-
es and regret increases under the condition of 
many versus few interested others.
Additionally, we examine a possible underlying process, via 
perceived product-quality, which is derived from both the interest 
of others and product type. The effect of others on product quality 
evaluations and purchase intention has strong foundations in past 
research. 
Finally, we offer boundary conditions for the proposed effect 
of others. We postulate that the effect should be attenuated when the 
brand is known by its quality reputation (e.g., Rolex) or when a clear 
explicit indication about product quality is available (e.g., via Con-
sumer Reports), or in the case of interested others with favorable 
characteristics. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: In the presence of an additional trusted external 
quality signal, product-type will not moderate 
the effect of others.
Hypothesis 4: The interest of many others will increase rather 
than decrease evaluations of a self-expressive 
product when these others are desirable by na-
ture.
Five studies were carried out to confirm our expectations. The 
first study explored in the context of online auctions the impact of 
product type and the interest of others on actual purchases. Its find-
ings confirm the dual effect of others on actual purchases. Specifi-
cally, when we offered a self-expressive (functional) keychain, par-
ticipants were willing to bid higher (lower) when few rather than 
many-others had already purchased the product. 
The second study further shows that perceived-quality evalu-
ation mediated the interactive effect of others and product-type on 
purchase-intention. Thus, when one is purchasing a functional (self-
expressive) product, the interest of many-others increases (decreas-
es) perceived quality evaluation and consequently the bid placed. 
The third study replicates and extends the prior studies, with two 
major differences: (a) we included a condition in which product qual-
ity is explicitly presented through Consumer Reports’ ratings, and (b) 
we conducted the study outside the context of online auctions. The 
findings of the third study when Consumer Reports information was 
absent, replicated the results of studies 1 and 2. However, the effect 
of others was attenuated in the presence of Consumer Reports rec-
ommendations. In the latter case, buyers relied more strongly on the 
recommendations than on the number of others as a quality signal, 
and therefore ratings did not differ as a function of the number of 
others for either product. 
The fourth study highlights another possible boundary condi-
tion for the effect of others, based on the degree of brand prestige. We 
assume prestige brands, such as Gucci, are known by their quality. 
Therefore, the presence of a prestige brand name is likely to play a 
similar role as the presence of an explicit quality signal. This study 
focuses only on self-expressive products, wristwatches, which by 
their nature are visible to others and make a statement about one’s 
tastes and characteristics. The findings of the fourth study show that 
consumers trust the brand name as a reliable indicator of product 
quality and do not need to search elsewhere for quality confirmation 
information.
In study 5, we demonstrate that the interest of many others in a 
product may be attenuated as a function of the social characteristics 
of these other bidders. Essentially we show that the unfavorable ef-
fect of interested others on a self-expressive product can be reversed 
when those interested in the product have positively perceived char-
acteristics. Specifically, when the bidder views the interested others 
favorably, the interest of these desirable others may increase rather 
than decrease the subjective product value. 
The differential effect of others has significant managerial im-
plications. For example, a functional product, which is not yet popu-
lar, such as a new, recently launched product, should be positioned in 
self-expressive terms, if possible, to increase its appeal. Alternatively, 
when the same product becomes popular and many others express 
interest in it, describing it in functional terms would be better; thus the 
number of interested others would strengthen its perceived quality. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Firms develop product lines in order to meet the needs of con-
sumers with different tastes.  Products are then marketed along what-
ever specific attribute that firms—and their consumers—view as the 
determinant of quality; consumers are presumed to choose the prod-
uct based on this dimension. In this research we argue that the firm’s 
product line can influence the extent to which consumers weight this 
prominent product attribute because it creates a decision context 
that can influence choice by triggering different decision strategies. 
In particular, we discuss one characteristic of the decision context 
that exerts a strong influence on choice: The presence or absence of 
dominance relationships between any of the options in the choice set.
We focus on decisions between two target alternatives that pres-
ent a trade-off between two attributes, one of which is more promi-
nent than the other. Normatively consumers should assign greater 
weight to the more prominent attribute relative to its less prominent 
counterpart. This implies that they should be more likely to choose 
the alternative that rates higher on the most prominent attribute than 
the alternative that scores higher on the least important attribute, ce-
teris paribus. However, we hypothesize that when the two target op-
tions are dominated by and/or dominate other (“decoy”) options in the 
choice set, consumers are more likely to evaluate the options in the set 
based on dominance relationships rather than attribute prominence. 
Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) suggest that individuals solve a 
decision problem using a three-stage process. First, the decision-mak-
er ascertains the presence of dominance relationships in the choice 
set. Second, if no dominance relationships are found, the decision-
maker assesses whether one of the options has a “decisive advantage” 
relative to the others. Finally, if there is no decisive advantage, the 
individual solves the problem through a lexicographic strategy, where 
the option scoring high on the prominent attribute is preferred.  In es-
sence, the decision-maker assesses attribute importance only as a last 
resort, after failing to identify dominance relationships or the pres-
ence of a decisive advantage. 
Building on this model, we expect the decision-maker to first 
express a stronger preference for the dominating alternative and a 
weaker preference for the dominated alternative relative to all the 
other options when making judgments within a set including the 
former alongside the two target alternatives presenting the trade-off. 
Further, to make an assessment of preference regarding the two tar-
get alternatives still requires an assessment of attribute prominence. 
However, we argue that the decision-maker’s initial strategy of using 
the dominance cue in this problem may persist even when he con-
structs his preference for these two options.  We draw our prediction 
from research on various fields indicating that people remain overly 
faithful to an initially-adopted strategy even when the problem con-
text changes and a different strategy would be more sensible or ap-
propriate (e.g. Levav, Reinholtz and Lin, 2012; Luchins, 1942).
We conducted six experiments. In Study 1 we randomly assigned 
consumers to either a two-option set where they face a decision be-
tween two options that present a trade-off in two attributes one of 
which is more prominent than the other, or to a four-option set where 
a symmetrically dominating and a symmetrically dominated decoy 
are inserted. We found that relative preference for the option scoring 
high on the prominent attribute is higher in the two-option condition 
than in the four-option condition. In Study 2 we addressed the alter-
native explanation that after identifying the best option (dominating 
decoy) in the four option set, participants simply become indifferent 
between the two focal options. We addressed this possibility by in-
cluding an additional condition in which the dominating decoy is an 
unavailable, phantom option. We replicated our effect; relative pref-
erence for the option scoring high on the prominent attribute dropped 
significantly even when the dominating decoy was not available for 
choice. Study 3 provided further evidence against this account by 
using only a dominated decoy. In Study 4 we demonstrated that our 
effect is robust across both compensatory (i.e., scale) and non-com-
pensatory (i.e., rank order) response modes. We randomly assigned 
participants to one of four conditions in a 2 (number of options: two 
vs. four) by 2 (response mode: scale vs. rank) between-participants 
design, and observed a significant effect of number of options across 
both modes. Our data showed that, regardless of the elicitation mode, 
relative preference for the option scoring high on the prominent at-
tribute decreased as a result of adding dominance cues. In Study 5 we 
provided evidence supporting the proposed mechanism; we moder-
ated our effect by manipulating the salience of a prominence strategy. 
Specifically, we asked half of our sample to respond to an attribute 
importance measure prior to preference expression, and showed that 
these respondents were more likely to prefer the option scoring high 
on the prominent attribute over the option scoring high on the non-
prominent attribute in the presence of dominating and dominated 
decoy options compared to participants who answered the attribute 
importance question after declaring their preference. We found that 
the responses to the attribute importance question are similar across 
all conditions, suggesting that prominence judgments do not change 
as the result of the dominance relationships.  Rather, it appears that 
the use of attribute prominence as an input to preferences varies de-
pending upon the choice set. Finally, in Study 6 participants made 
two successive choices.  We manipulated whether the initial choice 
primes consideration of attribute prominence by having respondents 
either choose from a two-option set followed by a choice from a 
four-option set in a similar domain or choose from a four-option set 
followed by another four-option set in a similar domain.  We found 
that people who chose between two options in the first decision were 
more likely to use a prominence strategy in the second decision rela-
tive to their counterparts who chose between four options in both 
decisions. Our findings represent a violation of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives axiom because if one option is preferred over 
another, then the same should hold regardless of the presence of any 
additional options.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Time perception is an integral part of daily life experience. 
However, people often have difficulty in estimating how long an ex-
perience lasts (Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse & Sackett, 2010). 
Numerous factors can influence duration estimates (Ornstein, 1969; 
Vroon, 1970; Ahn, Liu & Soman, 2009). In the present research, 
we investigated whether individuals’ estimates of a task’s duration 
depend on whether they monitor their progress retrospectively (in 
terms of the amount of work they have completed) or prospectively 
(in terms of the amount remaining).
Across four studies, we found that when people are asked to es-
timate the duration of a task shortly before completing it or immedi-
ately afterwards, they make shorter estimates when they have moni-
tored their progress prospectively than when they have monitored it 
retrospectively. When they estimate the task’s duration shortly after 
beginning it, however, they make longer estimates of its duration in 
the former case. We attempt to explain why this is the case.
In the first experiment, participants performed a figure rec-
ognition test similar to that employed by Kim and Markus (1999). 
However, participants were interrupted after two minutes under the 
pretext that the time for the experiment was running short. Partici-
pants then completed a questionnaire, the first item of which asked 
them either to report the number of questions they had completed be-
fore being interrupted (thereby inducing a retrospective focus) or the 
number of questions they had not yet completed (inducing a forward 
focus). Finally, participants estimated (a) how long they felt it took 
to complete the test (in minutes), (b) how difficult they found the 
test to be, and (c) how favorably they felt about the test. Responses 
to the last two items were made along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). 
As expected, participants estimated that the task had lasted a 
shorter time when they had thought about the number of items they 
still had to complete than when they had thought of the number they 
had already completed. Furthermore, participants’ focus on complet-
ed or uncompleted items had no effect on participants’ perceptions of 
task difficulty or the favorableness of their reactions to it. 
In the second experiment, participants performed the same 
figure recognition task employed previously. In this case, however, 
participants’ disposition to focus on the number of items completed 
or the number to be done as manipulated by providing a “progress 
bar”, shown at the bottom of the page following each set of 6 items. 
In retrospective focus conditions, the bar indicated the proportion 
of items they had already completed, while in the forward-looking 
focus condition, the bar indicated the proportion they still had to do. 
After completing the test, they responded to the three questions used 
in Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the results of the two experiments 
were very similar. 
In the first two experiments, participants estimated the duration 
of the task either after the task was completed (in Experiment 2) or 
very near to the end (in Experiment 1). According to our conceptual-
ization, however, different results should occur when people estimate 
the task’s duration shortly after beginning it.
Experiment 3 therefore employed a 2 (progress monitoring: ret-
rospective vs. forward-looking) × 2 (point of interruption: 1-min vs. 
2- min) between-subject design. Participants performed the same fig-
ure recognition task employed in the first two studies, and their retro-
spective or forward focus was manipulated by providing a “progress 
bar” similar to that employed in Experiment 2. However, they were 
interrupted after either 1 minute or 2 minutes under the pretext that 
the time for the experiment was running short. Participants’ time es-
timates were then assessed. More importantly, they indicated which 
point they had primarily focused on when monitoring their progress 
along a scale from 1 (primarily the start point) to 7 (primarily the 
endpoint).
As expected, participants reported focusing to a greater extent 
on the end point in forward-focus conditions than in the retrospec-
tive-focus conditions. Interestingly, we found participants who were 
interrupted near the end of the task (i.e., 2-min interruption) per-
ceived less time when they had a forward focus than they had a ret-
rospective focus. In contrast, participants who were interrupted near 
the beginning of the task showed a reversed time estimates. 
In the final experiment, we conducted a field survey recruiting 
respondents through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Respondents were 
told to imagine that they were attending an ascending auction that 
would last for 7 days. We manipulated both the point that partici-
pants entered the auction and their temporal focus. Specifically, some 
participants were told to imagine that the day of their participation 
was the first day of the auction whereas others were told that it was 
the final day. In each case, this information was framed either in a 
retrospective or a prospective manner.
After reviewing the information, respondents announced their 
own bid and then reported their feelings about the online auction, 
in which we measured how long the auction period seemed to them, 
how difficult they felt of winning the auction, as well as their esti-
mates of the total number of bidders to the end of the auction.
Results found that participants perceived the auction to be sub-
jectively shorter when the auction time was framed prospectively 
than when it was framed retrospectively, and this difference did not 
depend on whether participants entered the auction on the first day 
or the last day. In addition, participants made higher bids in forward-
framing conditions than in retrospective-framing conditions, per-
ceived that it was relatively less difficult to win the auction, and ex-
pected the number of bidders to be relatively smaller. 
To sum up, we hypothesized in the present research that time 
duration could be subjectively undermined when a forward (vs. ret-
rospective) focus is employed. We empirically validated the hypoth-
esis in three lab experiments (Experiment 1-3), and a field survey 
under an online-auction scenario (Experiment 4). Furthermore, we 
found the proposed effect would only occur when people had already 
completed a task, or progressed to the end of the task. If they were 
very near to the beginning of the task, the effect would be reversed.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many consumer decisions (e.g., apartment choice, airline ticket 
choice) may be structured as either a single-stage or a two-stage de-
cision process (Beach 1993). That is, consumers either (i) directly 
choose an option (single-stage decision), or (ii) shortlist some op-
tions, and then choose from this shortlist (two-stage decision). This 
research demonstrates that two-stage decisions systematically in-
crease preference for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options. 
A regulatory focus account explains this effect. Drawing on past 
work, we argue that screening helps to eliminate inferior alternatives 
that are below a minimum standard (Beach 1993, Ge, Haübl and El-
rod 2012), and thus partially addresses prevention goals. This, in turn 
has an effect on the continued activation of prevention focus, such 
that prevention focus decreases post-screening. Prior work has found 
that advancing prevention objectives leads to deactivation of vigi-
lance concerns in subsequent tasks (Förster et al. 2001, Van-Dijk and 
Kluger 2004). Consequently, this shift in regulatory focus can impact 
consumers’ preferences during the final choice. In general, a consum-
er’s operant regulatory focus has been shown to impact her relative 
focus on hedonic versus utilitarian attributes. Specifically, relatively 
lesser prevention focus has been shown to increase preference for 
options that are superior on hedonic characteristics (Chernev 2004). 
Therefore, we formally predict:
Hypothesis 1:  In two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage deci-
sions), consumers will have relatively lesser pre-
vention focus during the final choice. 
Hypothesis 2:  In two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage deci-
sions), consumers will (relatively) prefer hedon-
ic (vs. utilitarian) options.
Hypothesis 3:  Differences in hedonic choice share between 
single-stage and two-stage decisions will be me-
diated by differences in prevention focus during 
the final choice.
Multiple studies across different decision contexts and different 
shortlisting mechanisms illustrate the hypothesized effect on choice 
shares and support the proposed regulatory focus mechanism under-
lying this effect. In Study 1’s scenario, participants chose amongst 
four apartments, of which two pretested as hedonic and two pretested 
as utilitarian. Participants were significantly more likely to pick a he-
donic apartment when asked to choose in a two-stage format (60.5%) 
than in a single-stage format (36.8%; binomial z = 2.13, p < .05). 
Choice share differences between these conditions were fully medi-
ated by differences in prevention focus; a reduction in prevention 
focus in the second stage of the two-stage condition led to increased 
hedonic choice share during final choice. Other process measures 
from Study 1 (e.g. measures for degree of choice conflict) were in-
consistent with competing explanations for this effect.
In Study 2, using the same apartment scenario, right before the 
final choice, participants were diverted into an unrelated task de-
signed to measure regulatory focus: the RAT. This task was set up to 
involve a tradeoff between attempting more questions to earn more 
points versus attempting fewer questions in order to avoid penalties. 
Participants attempted significantly more questions in the two-stage 
decision condition (M = 6.59) than the single-stage decision condi-
tion (M = 5.38; t(75) = 2.00, p < .05), indicative of reduced preven-
tion focus. This result is consistent with Study 1’s direct measures of 
regulatory focus along with past research on how regulatory focus 
impacts tradeoffs involving errors of omission and commission (Hig-
gins 1997).
Studies 3, 4A, and 4B replicated Study 1’s results in (i) an air-
line ticket choice scenario, (ii) a tradeoff between granola bars and 
ice cream, and (iii) a tradeoff between fruit salad and cake. These 
studies demonstrate that the proposed effect holds in choice settings 
with various choice set sizes (e.g., Study 1 – 4 options, Study 3 – 54 
options, Study 4A – 16 options, Study 4B – 4 options). Additionally, 
the effect even held when attribute information was not explicitly 
provided. These studies also provided process evidence that were in-
consistent with competing explanations, including ‘licensing’ (Mo-
nin and Miller 2001) and ‘balancing’ (Dhar and Simonson, 1999). 
Study 5 examined a choice amongst mTurk tasks with a 2 
(single-stage vs. two-stage) x 2 (control vs. prevention prime ma-
nipulation prior to final choice) between-subjects design. The control 
condition replicated Study 1’s results; choice share for the hedonic 
mTurk task was significantly higher in the two-stage condition (M 
= 50.79% vs. M = 33.33%, binomial z = 2.81, p < .05). However, 
under a prevention prime, choice share for the hedonic option was 
reduced in the two-stage condition, resulting in similar preference for 
the utilitarian option in both choice process conditions (M = 33.33% 
vs. M = 30%); binomial z < 1, p > .5).
This research documents a novel effect: two-stage decisions (vs. 
single-stage decisions), lead to a relatively greater preference for he-
donic (vs. utilitarian) options. Using studies that involve both media-
tion and moderation, this research provides convergent evidence for 
the proposed regulatory focus mechanism that drives this effect. This 
paper makes two key contributions, connecting work on decision 
processes, regulatory focus, and hedonic versus utilitarian choices. 
First, this research finds that differences in the structure of the deci-
sion process can endogenously influence decision makers’ regulatory 
focus during final choice. In contrast, in most previous research, the 
drivers of regulatory focus were exogenous and operated at the start 
of a decision (Zhou and Pham 2004). Second, this research dem-
onstrates that differences in the structure of the decision impacts 
hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs. Past work on two-stage decisions has 
only shown how screening influences information processing, such 
as relatively lesser weighting of (i) information presented pre-screen-
ing (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006, Ge et al. 2012) or 
(ii) attributes participants have already used to screen (Larson and 
Hamilton 2012). Past research has not found any effects of screening 
that differ by the type of attributes (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) con-
sidered during decision making. Marketers may employ our findings 
to impact consumers’ choices by structuring the decision process in a 
way that increases preference for particular target options.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Study Domain Hedonic choice share** Comments 
1 Apartments Mtwo-stage = 60.5%Msingle-stage = 36.8%
-Demonstrates that effect is mediated by differences in prevention 
focus 
1 (replicated) Apartments Mtwo-stage = 70.0%Msingle-stage = 43.3%
-Involves a small choice set
-Composition of shortlisted set and process measures do not support 
“balancing” or “licensing” alternative accounts 
3 Airline tickets 
Ticket price
Mtwo-stage = $440
Msingle-stage = $390
-Involves a large choice set
-Hedonic attributes were explicitly higher-priced 
4A Snacks (Granola bars vs. Ice Cream) 
Mtwo-stage = 71.8%
Msingle-stage = 48.4%
-Involves an intermediate-size choice set
-Composition of shortlisted set and process measures do not support 
“balancing” or “licensing” alternative accounts 
4B Snacks (Desserts) Mtwo-stage = 88.4%Msingle-stage = 57.5%
-Differences in hedonic preference occurred despite no differences 
on utilitarian levels between options 
-No explicit attribute information was provided to participants 
5 mTurk tasks 
Control condition
Mtwo-stage = 50.79%
Msingle-stage = 33.33%
-Involves a different screening mechanism
-Demonstrates that differences in choice share are moderated by pre-
vention focus prime
-Participant profile very different from undergraduates/ paid subject 
pool participants 
** Differences significant at p <.05 levels 
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Towards an Integrative Theory of Anchoring: Evidence For a Selective Accessibility 
Mechanism Across Anchor Types
Sophie Chaxel, McGill University, Canada
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
For a decade, anchoring has been thought to be the product 
of two distinct processes: (a) the underadjustment associated with 
the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, when individuals provide 
their own anchors; and (b) selective accessibility, when an experi-
ment provides an anchor. Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010) 
challenged this distinction by demonstrating that the anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic may underlie all anchoring phenomena. The 
present research uses procedural priming to demonstrate that selec-
tive accessibility may also account for most anchoring phenomena. 
Therefore, and in accordance with the integrative theory of anchor-
ing (ITA) proposed by Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010), the 
present findings show that the dichotomy conceptualizing selective 
accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment as two distinct processes 
may be an over-simplification and that both should likely be thought 
of and studied as interacting processes.
Study 1 compares the impact of selective accessibility on the 
processing of self-generated anchors and experimenter-provided an-
chors, when the direction of adjustment is known. To prime selective 
accessibility, the experimental procedure used by Mussweiler (2002) 
was replicated. Three hundred participants (75 in each cell) were re-
cruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design of the study was a 
2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-gen-
erated vs. provided) between-subject design. Following the priming 
task, the participants were then asked to answer a single numerical 
estimation question. Half of the participants were asked (Epley and 
Gilovich, 2001): “What is the freezing point of pure alcohol (in de-
grees F)?” The other half of the participants answered the following 
question (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997): “In what year did Einstein 
visit the USA for the first time?” They were also given the following 
indication: “Tip: It is after 1910.” In the former, the self-generated 
anchor was 32F, and the direction of adjustment was straightforward. 
In the latter, both the anchor and the direction of adjustment were 
provided by the experimenter. Participants’ responses were submit-
ted to a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: 
self-generated vs. provided) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This 
analysis yielded a significant main effect of priming (F (1,287) = 
4.90, p <.05). All the other effects were nonsignificant (p > 0.15). 
Study 1 contributes to demonstrating that selective accessibility 
may drive anchoring not only in the case of experimenter-provided 
anchors, but also in the case of self-generated anchors. Study 2 aims 
at replicating the results of Study 1, not only varying the source of the 
standard of comparison, but also the direction of adjustment. A total 
of 401 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 
design of the study was 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 
(type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (direction of adjust-
ment: high certainty vs. low certainty). The participants’ responses 
were submitted to a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type 
of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (direction of adjustment: 
high certainty vs. low certainty) ANOVA. This analysis yielded a sig-
nificant main effect of priming (F (1,399) = 4.66, p <.05). All other 
effects were nonsignificant (p > 0.15). Participants who were primed 
with similarities overall gave answers that were closer to the anchor, 
independent of the knowledge of the direction to adjust. 
Study 2 therefore not only replicates the main effect obtained 
in Study 1, but also demonstrates that the main effect holds indepen-
dent of the knowledge of the direction of adjustment. In addition, it 
contributes to dismiss a potential competing explanation, i.e., partici-
pants primed with differences worked harder on the estimation than 
those primed with similarities.
The essence of the argument for the ITA comes from the role 
played by the effort in the anchoring process. According to Simmons, 
LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010), as adjustment-and-anchoring is always 
at play in anchoring, more effort will always lead to a reduction of 
the anchoring bias, as long as the direction of adjustment is known 
by the participant. Therefore, Study 3 aimed at investigating whether 
effort would actually interact with selective accessibility. If the ITA 
is correct, then participants who work harder should show less bias 
when the adjustment direction is known, despite the priming of se-
lective accessibility. A total of 400 participants (50 in each cell) were 
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design of the study was 
a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-
generated vs. provided) × 2 (effort: control vs. low) between-subject 
design. To manipulate effort, half of the participants were made 
cognitively busy by having to memorize two strings of eight letters, 
one before each anchoring question (Gilbert, 2002; Kruger, 1999, 
Epley & Gilovich, 2006). The other half of the participants did not 
undergo this manipulation and solely answered the anchoring ques-
tions. Results confirmed a main effect of priming condition that the 
participants focusing on differences were less biased (Mdiff = .10 vs. 
Msimilarities = -0.08, F(1,387) = 4.96,  p<.05). Yet, importantly, the 
ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction effect between Priming 
and Load, indicating that participants who were under cognitive load 
actually were not influenced by priming (F(1,387) = 4.12, p<.05). 
Therefore, and in agreement with results from the ITA, impos-
ing a cognitive load for people who were certain about the direction 
of adjustment decreased the anchor-estimate gap. Through the three 
studies, this paper demonstrates that a selective accessibility process 
may be underlying the anchoring bias, not only in the case of exper-
imenter-provided anchors, but also in the case of self-generated an-
chors, independent of the knowledge of the direction of adjustment. 
In addition, effort mitigates the results of the selective accessibility 
priming when the direction of adjustment is known. These findings 
are in accordance with the ITA, in which selective accessibility and 
anchoring-and-adjustment would operate together instead of acting 
separately.
Table 1: Summary of Results
Design Results
Study 1
2 (priming: similarities vs. 
differences) × 2 (type of anchor: 
self-generated vs. provided) 
between-subject design
Priming selective 
accessibility impacts 
anchoring across 
contexts
Study 2
2 (priming: similarities vs. 
differences) × 2 (type of anchor: 
self-generated vs. provided) × 
2 (direction of adjustment: high 
certainty vs. low certainty).
Priming selective 
accessibility impacts 
anchoring across 
contexts
Study 3
2 (priming: similarities vs. 
differences) × 2 (type of anchor: 
self-generated vs. provided) × 2 
(effort: control vs. low)
Imposing a 
cognitive load 
increases the 
anchoring bias 
across anchor types
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Loss Aversion Attenuates Under Time Pressure
Eugene Y. Chan, University of Toronto, Canada
Najam U. Saqib, Qatar University, Doha-Qatar
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It is well-established that people under time pressure make de-
cisions that are of inferior quality. But are there situations in which 
time pressure might improve decision quality? Prior research has 
suggested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular con-
texts – can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of 
arousal can improve performance in a variety of domains, as sug-
gested by the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffen-
bacher 1994; Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which 
effortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such 
as unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006).
Drawing on three elements in prospect theory (reference depen-
dence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity; Camerer 2000; Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we posit that 
loss aversion attenuates under time pressure – that is, people under 
time pressure no longer consider the hedonic impact of losses to be 
greater than that of gains, but roughly to be more equal, relative to 
those under no such constraints. This is because people consider time 
to be a resource, and the loss of time under time pressure is a loss 
of resource, placing them on the locally-convex portion of the value 
function. From this point, the hedonic impact of any further loss di-
minishes, relative to decisions from the status quo. In other words, 
loss aversion attenuates. 
This proposition thus relies on the critical assumption that peo-
ple consider time to be a resource. Thankfully, for our purposes, this 
assumption is well-supported – at least for Western cultures. That 
time is a resource that people can “lose” is consistent with the Prot-
estant ethic that “time is money”. Some people may see time as a 
holder of endless possibilities and opportunities, but most others see 
time as something that they can not slow down, stop, or turn back. 
Time thus is a resource that people must structure, with a lack of 
structure meaning a loss of a valued resource with high opportunity 
costs (Bockstael, Strand, and Hannemann 1987; Casey, Vukina, and 
Danielson 1995; Cesario 1976; Larson 1993; Shaw 1992).
In Experiment 1, we find that the endowment affect – a typical 
demonstration of loss aversion – attenuates under time pressure. That 
is, although sellers typically place a higher valuation on a transaction 
item than buyers, we find that this disparity in valuation disappears 
under time pressure. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because 
sellers under time pressure place less of an emphasis on the positive 
aspects of the transaction item under time pressure. In Experiment 2, 
we find that people under time pressure are less risk-averse to gam-
bles involving both a chance of winning and losing, relative to those 
under no such constraints.
Meanwhile, that loss a version attenuates under time pressure 
assumes that people integrate the loss of time under time pressure 
with any subsequent loss. According to the hedonic editing rules and 
mental accounting (Thaler 1999; Thaler and Johnson 1990), people 
do not integrate losses when the losses occur on different days. Ex-
periment 3 demonstrates that loss aversion attenuates under time 
pressure – but only when the loss of time under time pressure and the 
subsequent loss occurs on the same day.
In Experiment 4, we draw on the fact that people in Western 
cultures are more likely to be monochronic in that they see time as 
a resource that must be structured, relative to those in non-Western 
cultures that are more likely to be polychronic  in that they see time 
as continuous that does not require structure. Thus, if loss aversion 
attenuates under time pressure because people loss time as a resource 
under time pressure, this effect should be stronger for monochronic 
people than polychronic ones. Experiment 5 uses the Time Struc-
ture Questionnaire (Bond and Feather 1988) to show support for 
these propositions. We also note that both Experiments 3 and 4 dem-
onstrate that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure because 
people perceive the hedonic impact of losses to be less under time 
pressure than under no such constraints, with no influence of time 
pressure on the hedonic impact of gains.
The four experiments provide support for our proposition that 
loss aversion attenuates under time pressure. This provides an in-
triguing implication that is counter-intuitive to everyday assumptions 
about the influence of time pressure. But using a value function-
based explanation, we show that our effect is actually consistent with 
the tenets of prospect theory. We note that prior research has sug-
gested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular contexts 
– can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of arousal 
can improve performance in a variety of domains, as suggested by 
the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffenbacher 
1994; Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which ef-
fortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such as 
unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006). A cognitive load can also increase 
normative behaviours by disrupting the pursuit of biased self-rel-
evant goals (Drolet and Luce 2004) or by reducing uncertainty to 
engender rationality (Goldsmith and Amir 2012). Thus, to the extent 
that time pressure is a form of stress, these findings suggest that it 
may improve decision quality at least in certain instances.
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Strategies to Cope with Social Identity Threats: Defending the Self without Sabotaging 
Self-Control
Hristina Dzhogleva, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Nicole Verrochi Coleman, University of Pittsburgh, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often encounter situations when important aspects 
of their identities are negatively evaluated and threatened. Imagine 
a sports fan who watches his beloved team lose to an objectively 
“worse” opponent. Or consider the experience of a college student 
majoring in business who reads that business students perform worse 
academically than engineering students. Situations such as these 
abound in the lives of consumers, devaluing key elements of their 
social identities, and causing them to seek effective ways to cope 
with these threats to the self. 
Social identity threats cause aversive psychological conse-
quences (Baumgardner 1990), which motivate consumers to repair 
their self-worth (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Unfortunately, coping with 
social identity threats negatively impacts consumers’ self-control and 
hinders their ability to act in accord with long-term goals (Inzlicht 
and Kang 2010; Inzlicht, McKay, and Aronson 2006). While the det-
rimental impact of social identity threats on self-control has been 
demonstrated, there are few insights as to whether different coping 
strategies are equally costly to self-control. An interesting question, 
then, is whether certain strategies are more damaging to consumers’ 
self-control than others. Might some strategies allow consumers to 
restore their self-worth following social identity threat without sig-
nificantly undermining self-control?
The present research addresses this question and examines the 
impact of two strategies for coping with social identity threats on 
consumers’ self-control. Specifically, we study two social creativ-
ity strategies, which seek “positive distinctiveness for the in-group 
by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation” 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986). 
The first coping strategy is referred to as superior self-aspects 
and involves “comparing the in-group to the out-group on some 
new dimension” on which the in-group is better (Tajfel and Turner 
1986). Lalonde (1992) showed that hockey teams at the bottom of 
the league emphasized that top teams tended to play “dirty”; thus, 
those threatened hockey players changed the comparison dimension 
from game performance to ethical sportsmanship in order to restore 
their positive self-view. In practical terms, this strategy implies that 
the consumer ignores or downplays the threatened self-aspect and 
instead accentuates other positive self-aspects on which they are su-
perior to the contrasting out-group. For instance, a sports fan who 
reads that fans of his favorite team are considered “ruder and more 
ignorant” than other fans might think, “we may not be polite, but we 
are more loyal and enthusiastic fans than them.” 
The second strategy involves “changing the out-group with 
which the in-group is compared” to avoid using a higher-status out-
group as a comparison point, and instead use an out-group that per-
forms worse on the threatened identity dimension (Tajfel and Turner 
1979; 1986). Rosenberg and Simmons (1972) provide evidence of 
this, finding that when African-Americans made self-comparisons 
to other African-Americans their self-esteem was higher than when 
Caucasians were used as a comparative frame of reference. In es-
sence, this strategy (referred to as inferior others) suggests that 
consumers remain focused on the poor-performance dimension, but 
selectively think about other groups that perform even worse on that 
dimension. For example, the threatened NFL fan might acknowledge 
the crassness of his hometown fans but bring to mind fans of other 
teams who are even worse, thinking “Steelers fans might not be po-
lite, but at least they aren’t as rude as Eagles fans—they have no 
decency at all!” 
While other strategies for coping with social identity threats 
have been proposed, such as individual mobility or social competi-
tion (Tajfel and Turner 1986), we focus on the two social creativity 
strategies for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, these 
two strategies are similar as they both involve cognitive processes 
aimed at changing elements of the comparative situation to restore 
the positive social identity. Practically, both strategies offer subtle 
and easily implementable cognitive forms of coping with social iden-
tity threats, which could be executed in almost any identity threaten-
ing situation and are more frequently used by consumers than other 
strategies (confirmed by a pilot study available from the authors). 
We propose that a threat to a specific dimension of an individ-
ual’s social identity will activate and make this aspect of the self 
more accessible. Past research demonstrates that identity threatening 
situations lead to increased identity salience and stronger in-group 
identification (Christian et al. 1976; Forehand, Deshpandé, and Reed 
2002). Furthermore, due to spreading activation (Anderson 1983), 
the activation of the threatened aspect of the self will lead to activa-
tion and increased accessibility of other aspects of consumers’ self-
concept (Kleine et al. 1993; Markus 1977). In sum, after the experi-
ence of a social identity threat, an individual’s self-knowledge (i.e., 
all traits defining one’s identity) becomes accessible and active for 
use in further processing (Carver 1975; Macrae, Bodenhausen, and 
Milne 1998).
Once the social identity threat has registered with the consumer 
and activated his self-knowledge, he is motivated to cope with the 
threat and repair his social identity using one of the two strategies. 
The inferior others strategy requires individuals to think about out-
groups that perform worse on the threatened dimension, creating a 
favorable intergroup comparison between the second-rate out-group 
and the in-group. This implies that implementing the inferior others 
coping strategy shifts thoughts from active self-knowledge to rela-
tively inactive others-knowledge. Specifically, previous research has 
found that when the self becomes the focus of attention, individu-
als are particularly likely to behave in accordance with internal self-
traits (Carver 1975; Macrae et al. 1998). Therefore, shifting away 
from active self-knowledge requires effortful, controlled processing 
(Greenberg et al. 1994) which depletes self-regulatory resources and 
increases self-control failures in subsequent situations (Ellis and 
Ashbrook 1989; Gailliot et al. 2006; Wegner et al. 1987). Thus, we 
propose that using the inferior others coping strategy requires con-
sumers to effortfully shift their thoughts from the active self to the 
inactive others, reducing their self-regulatory resources and leading 
to subsequent self-control failures. In contrast, the superior self-as-
pects strategy requires individuals to highlight other positive dimen-
sions of the self, remaining focused on accessible concepts. As the 
social identity threat has activated both the threatened self-dimension 
and broader self-aspects, we predict that this coping strategy will not 
consume a significant amount of self-regulatory resources.1 Thus:
1  While both strategies involve changing one element of the comparison 
situation, we propose that changing the comparison attribute ( superior self-
aspects strategy) is easier for consumers than changing the comparison group 
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Hypothesis 1: Individuals using the superior self-aspects strat-
egy to cope with a social identity threat will ex-
hibit better self-control subsequently than those 
using the inferior others strategy.
We further predict that these differences in self-control occur 
because:
Hypothesis 2: A social identity threat will heighten the acces-
sibility of self-knowledge.
Hypothesis 3: The shift in thoughts  from accessible self-
knowledge to inaccessible out-groups knowl-
edge, required by the inferior others strategy 
will consume self-regulatory resources; in con-
trast,  the superior self-aspects strategy will not 
require self-regulatory resources to enact since 
it involves retaining the thoughts on the acces-
sible self.
We test our predictions in one field study and seven experi-
ments. Select studies are described in greater detail below.
Field Study
To take advantage of a naturally-occurring social identity 
threat, we conducted the study following two painful losses of the lo-
cal NFL team (Team X). We intercepted participants at the entrance 
of a coffee shop and asked them to participate in a short study in 
exchange for $2. Respondents (n = 37, 37% female) were individu-
als who were fans of Team X and who had watched the game. The 
study used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group 
design. To make the social identity threat salient, a poster invited 
participation in a survey about the “loss of Team X last night” and 
displayed the game score. In part 1 of the survey, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two coping strategies and were 
asked to complete five sentences in response to Team X’s loss. Par-
ticipants in the superior self-aspects condition completed sentences 
beginning with: “Yesterday Team X made more mistakes than Team 
Y, but Team X were still better than Team Y at…” Respondents in 
the inferior others condition filled out five sentences beginning with: 
“Yesterday Team X made more mistakes than Team Y, but at least 
they did not mess up as badly as…” Participants could fill out as 
many sentences as they wanted (M = 4, no condition effects, p = 
.37). Participants then entered the café to make their purchases, after 
which they were asked to return and complete another survey. In 
part 2, participants answered demographic questions, provided their 
receipts, and received payment.
A one-way MANOVA on the total grams of fat and calories in 
participants’ purchases (r = .846, p < .0001) revealed a significant 
main effect of the strategy condition (multivariate F(2, 34) = 3.19, p 
= .05). The purchases of individuals in the inferior others condition 
contained more fat and calories (Mfat = 16.52g; Mcal = 463) than those 
of respondents in the superior self-aspects condition (Mfat = 8.87g; 
Mcal = 287; F(1, 35) = 5.19, p = .03 and F(1, 35) = 6.46, p = .02). 
This field study provides evidence in support of H1 and shows 
that participants who used the superior self-aspects strategy made 
healthier food choices than those using the inferior others strategy. 
We note that these results were replicated in a lab experiment with a 
threat to participants’ business student identity; individuals who used 
(inferior others strategy) since consumers’ self-knowledge has been activated 
by the identity threat.
the former strategy consumed fewer M&Ms (M = 20.13g) than those 
who used the latter (M = 38.25g, F(1, 41) = 5.25, p = .03).
Experiment 1 examines whether the effects of the two strate-
gies on consumers’ self-control would emerge when both the social 
identity threat and strategy prompts are embedded in an advertising 
stimulus. Furthermore, in contrast to the field study which was con-
ducted only with individuals who identified highly with the threat-
ened in-group (only fans of Team X were recruited), the sample in 
the next study was more diverse and the extent to which participants 
identified themselves with the threatened in-group varied. Since past 
research demonstrates that social identity threats mainly affect those 
that identify closely with the threatened in-group (Ellemers et al. 
2002), we anticipated that the predicted effects would emerge only 
for individuals with strong in-group identification but not for those 
with weak identification, for whom the social identity threat is less 
relevant (Maass et al. 2003). 
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior 
others) group design with participants’ in-group identification as 
a second continuously-measured factor. Participants (n = 47, 39% 
female) were college students, who completed two ostensibly un-
related tasks. First, participants rated their identification with NFL 
fans on a four-item scale (e.g., “I see myself as an NFL fan,” α = 
.95; Hogg and Hains 1996). They then evaluated and gave feedback 
about a NFL-related print ad designed by local high-school students. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of two ads. Both 
ads contained the social identity threat: “People say football fans are 
more obnoxious, loud, and annoying than baseball fans.” Further-
more, each ad cued the use of one of the two strategies. The text of 
the superior self-aspects strategy ad read: “But c’mon! We know that 
they are plenty of positive sides to football fans too…Just think of a 
few of those: 1… 2… 3…”; while the text of the inferior others strat-
egy ad was: “But c’mon! We know that they are plenty of fans that 
are more crude than you…Just think of a few of those: 1… 2… 3…” 
In a subsequent “unrelated” task participants imagined that they 
would receive a snack for their participation and indicated their pref-
erence for different snacks on a 7-point scale (1 = “Not At All” and 
7 = “Very Much So”. The list included both unhealthy (e.g., potato 
chips) and healthy (e.g., apple) options (Laran 2010). Participants 
also indicated their snack choice. 
The coping strategy/ad condition was contrast coded (-1 = in-
ferior others; 1 = superior self-aspects) and participants’ strength of 
identification with NFL fans was mean-centered (M = 4.85, SD = 
1.76). A significant interaction of NFL fan identity and coping strat-
egy was revealed on both the appeal of unhealthy snacks (b = -.33, 
t(43) = -2.64, p = .01) and the snack choice (1 = healthy; 0 = un-
healthy snack; b = .44, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.03, p = .04). For participants 
who identified strongly as “NFL fans” (+1 SD), those exposed to 
the superior self-aspects strategy ad found the unhealthy snacks less 
appealing (b = -.77, t(43) = -2.69, p = .01) and were more likely to 
choose a healthy snack than participants who saw the inferior oth-
ers strategy ad  (b = .88, exp(b) = 2.41, Wald χ2 (1) = 3.43, p = .06). 
Participants who identified weakly with NFL fans (-1 SD) had no 
difference in self-control based on the strategy condition (p’s > .22). 
The results of Experiment 2 provide convergent evidence for 
our theoretical propositions. However, in contrast to the previous 
experiments which used relatively strong manipulations of the so-
cial identity threat and coping strategy, this study embedded both 
the threat and strategies in adverting stimuli, demonstrating that our 
proposed effects even occur in practical situations and thus can ben-
efit marketers as well. The next two studies provide evidence of the 
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underlying process: Experiment 2 shows that a social identity threat 
increases the accessibility of the self (H2); Experiment 3 shows that 
accessibility of out-group knowledge is driving the detrimental ef-
fects of the inferior others strategy (H3). 
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 utilized a 2 group (threat vs. control) design. 
Participants (n = 69, 59% female) were business students at a large 
university. Participants in the threat condition were asked to read 
an article which contained the social identity threat (the article dis-
cussed how business students perform worse academically than en-
gineering students), while respondents in the control condition read 
an article from National Geographic. Then all participants indicated 
their agreement with seven items (α = .83) assessing self-knowledge 
activation on a 7-point scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = 
“Strongly Agree” (e.g., “The traits that describe “who I am” are vivid 
in my mind now.”). Respondents also indicated the extent to which 
their self was activated using a visual measure in which different 
degrees of self-activation were signified by figures with increasing 
percentages of highlighting. Finally, participants rated their agree-
ment with two private self-awareness items (α = .68; e.g., “While 
imagining the scenario, I was generally very aware of myself, my 
own perspective and attitudes;” Matheson and Zanna 1988). 
Two one-way ANOVAs conducted on the two activation of self 
measures revealed that participants in the threat condition (Mscale = 
5.11, Mvisual = 4.44) experienced greater self-activation than those in 
the control condition (Mscale = 3.37, Mvisual = 3.88; F(1, 66) = 60.30, p 
< .0001 and F(1, 67) = 7.04, p < .01). A separate one-way ANOVA 
run on the private self-awareness index also showed that participants 
in the threat condition possessed greater self-awareness (M = 4.15) 
than those in the control condition (M = 3.39; F(1, 66) = 9.73, p < 
.01). 
Experiment 2 shows that experiencing a social identity threat 
activates individuals’ self-knowledge, providing support for the first 
link in the proposed process (H2). The next experiment seeks to un-
derstand whether activating others-knowledge will reduce the regu-
latory costs of the inferior others strategy and thus provide support 
for H3.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior 
others) x 2 (Accessibility: self, others) between-subjects design. Par-
ticipants (n = 73, 62% female) were business students at a large pub-
lic university. Accessibility of the self and others was manipulated 
with a procedure from Gardner et al. (1999); participants in the self-
accessibility condition read a paragraph and counted the first-person 
pronouns (e.g., “I”, “me”) while those in the others-accessibility 
condition read a similar paragraph and counted the other-people pro-
nouns (e.g., “they”, “them”). 
The social identity threat was manipulated using an article that 
discussed how business students perform worse academically than 
engineering students. After reading the article, participants were 
assigned to one of the two coping strategies and asked to imagine 
how they would respond to the criticisms of business students pre-
sented in the article. In both conditions participants completed five 
sentences designed to cue the coping strategy:  superior self-aspects 
condition (“I might not be as intelligent as the engineering students 
but I am…”) and inferior others condition (“I might not be as intelli-
gent as the engineering students but at least I am not as unintelligent 
as…”). The effectiveness of both manipulations was confirmed in 
separate pretests. Finally, participants were presented with the self-
control scenario and asked to indicate their likelihood of purchasing 
an attractive but unnecessary item while shopping in the mall. 
A two-way ANOVA on participants’ likelihood to indulge 
showed a significant interaction of the accessibility and coping strat-
egy conditions (F(1, 69) = 6.87, p = .01). When the self was made 
accessible, results replicated our previous findings such that partici-
pants who used the inferior others strategy (Msuperior self = 7.20) were 
more likely to indulge than those who used the superior self-aspects 
one (Minferior others = 5.29; F(1, 69) = 5.55, p = .02). However, when 
others-related concepts were made accessible, there was no differ-
ence in the likelihood to indulge of participants in the two strategy 
conditions (Msuperior self =6.27 vs. Minferior others = 5.18, p = .18). Finally, 
the negative impact of the inferior others strategy on self-control was 
significantly reduced in the others-accessibility condition relative to 
the self-accessibility condition (F(1, 69) = 6.28, p = .01); there was 
no difference in the self-control of participants using the superior 
self-aspects strategy between the two accessibility conditions (p = 
.23).
Experiment 3 provides evidence that accessibility is the process 
by which the two coping strategies impact consumers’ self-control 
(H3). When the accessibility of the self was heightened prior to the 
threat, our previous results replicated: individuals using the superior 
self-aspects strategy exhibited less self-control subsequently than 
those relying on the inferior others strategy. However, increasing the 
accessibility of others-related concepts significantly diminished the 
detrimental impact of the inferior others strategy on self-control. An-
other study also replicated these findings using a different manipula-
tion of the accessibility of out-groups-related concepts. 
General Discussion
The primary objective of this research was to compare two 
strategies for coping with social identity threats and their impact on 
consumers’ self-control. Our results demonstrate that the superior 
self-aspects strategy has a less detrimental impact on subsequent 
self-control than does the inferior others strategy.2 These effects 
hold using both real consumption and scenario-based measures of 
self-control in two important domains for consumers: eating and 
spending. Most importantly, our effects are robust even in real world 
settings, in situations involving naturally occurring social identity 
threats (loss of the favorite NFL team), and when both the social 
identity threat and strategies are embedded in advertising stimuli. 
Furthermore, the differential cost of the two coping strategies on 
self-control is noteworthy given their equal effectiveness at restoring 
the positive view of the self after a social identity threat.3 Finally, 
we examine the process underlying these differences: experiencing 
a social identity threat increases the accessibility of the self and as 
a result the inferior others strategy impedes self-control because its 
implementation requires a shift of thoughts from accessible self-
concepts to inaccessible out-groups-related concepts, which taxes 
individuals’ self-regulatory resources.
The current research has significant practical implications for 
consumers, practitioners, and marketers. While our findings have 
implications for general consumer well-being, we believe that our 
work will be particularly beneficial to both individuals struggling 
with various self-control problems (e.g., obesity, credit card debt), as 
well as practitioners who wish to design effective interventions for 
overcoming such problems. For instance, it is possible that one of the 
2  We rule out mood and self-affirmation as alternative explanations of 
these effects; more details available from the authors.
3  Effectiveness of the strategies was measured in three studies not re-
ported here; results consistently show that the two coping strategies were 
equally effective at restoring the self after a social identity threat. 
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reasons why many people often fail at their attempts to start eating 
healthily is because they often encounter identity threats and cope 
with them in a sub-optimal way, which inevitably sabotages their 
self-control progress. Since such identity threats are common in con-
sumers’ lives, it is essential for consumers to know not only that cop-
ing with such experiences can undermine their self-regulation, but 
also that there are ways to cope without damaging their self-control. 
Finally, given that our effects are robust in real world settings, 
we believe marketers might benefit from our findings as well. For 
instance, marketers of both healthy and unhealthy foods may want 
to target consumers with specific social identities (e.g., sports fans, 
stay-at-home moms) and tailor their advertising messages in a way 
that prompts them to indulge or exercise self-control and thus in-
crease the sales of their products. Moreover, marketers of sports team 
apparel and fan gear might be able to induce consumers to splurge on 
expensive items by embedding a social identity threat in marketing 
communication materials along with cues to use the inferior others 
strategy as a way to cope with the presented threat.
Taken together, this research makes contributions to the social 
identity and self-control literatures. First, existing work shows that 
coping with social identity threats depletes one’s self-regulatory re-
sources (Inzlicht and Kang 2010; Inzlicht et al. 2006). We extend 
this research by showing that the negative impact of coping with 
social identity threats on self-control depends on the specific cop-
ing strategy that individuals use. Second, we highlight differences 
that exist among the various strategies for coping with social identity 
threats. Beginning with Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986), researchers 
have studied the ways in which individuals cope with threats to their 
identities, from changing consumption (Gao et al. 2009), to changing 
evaluations of the threatened group (Doosje et al. 1995), to resisting 
the negative feedback and engaging in self-affirmation (Steele 1988; 
von Hippel et al. 2005). However, previous work has examined each 
coping strategy in isolation, focusing on its effectiveness at repair-
ing the self, but none of its costs. This conceptual isolation has, to 
a certain degree, limited our understanding of the differences and 
similarities among the strategies, as well as their potential advan-
tages and disadvantages. The present work moves toward addressing 
this gap by focusing on two coping strategies, examining their dif-
ferences and similarities, and illuminating the process through which 
these differences occur. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Brand attachment has been defined as the strength of the bond 
connecting the consumer to the brand (Thomson, MacInnis and 
Park 2005). Consumers who feel strong attachment to a brand will 
be more loyal and less price sensitive. Because of its relevance to 
marketers, factors that increase brand attachment have become an 
important focus of research (Lastovicka and Sirianni 2011; Park et al. 
2010; Thomson et al. 2005). Most of the research to date has demon-
strated that the attachment process develops over time as consumers 
have numerous experiences with the brand. However, day- to-day 
life is filled with affective experiences that may not be directly as-
sociated with a particular brand but still involve them to some degree 
(e.g., fear caused by the horror movie and the brand of potato chips). 
Although not the cause of the experienced emotion, it stands to rea-
son that the brand attachment process could potentially be influenced 
by these experiences. Prior research in  affect transfer (MacKenzie, 
Lutz, & Belch, 1986) has demonstrated that the experience of nega-
tive affect can transfer to unrelated objects such as a brand. This 
transfer can lower brand attitudes and evaluations (Goldberg and 
Gorn 1987). This concern has led marketers to avoid associated their 
brand with negative content (e.g., timing of advertisements within 
T.V. shows or placement of products within movies).  
However, literature on social psychology suggests that some 
negative experiences, specifically fear, are unifying; causing people 
to seek out affiliation with others. (Schachter 1959; Sarnoff and 
Zimbardo 1961). In some situations, these “others” could be brands. 
Consumers have been known to treat brands as if they were peo-
ple and form relationships with and expectations of them (Fournier 
1998). Therefore, it is possible that fearful experiences may have a 
positive impact on brand attachment. 
First, we show that incidental fear experienced in the presence 
of a brand can facilitate initial emotional brand attachment. Second, 
we provide evidence that this attachment occurs due to a percep-
tion that the brand and the consumer shared the emotional experience 
(affiliation). As such our work provides some of the first empirical 
evidence that brand relationships are not merely metaphorical, but 
that people can make psychological, personal connections to brands. 
Third, we advance understanding of the construct of brand attach-
ment. We demonstrate that while initial emotional brand attachment 
(Thomson et al. 2005) can be facilitated by fear, broader, more cogni-
tive brand attachment (Park et al. 2010) is not immediately enhanced. 
However, we also show that the initial feeling of emotional brand 
attachment can, over time, leads to the development of broader brand 
attachment. 
In Study1, we experimentally tested whether fear increased 
brand attachment. In addition, study 1 tested perceived affiliation 
with the brand as the underlying mechanism for the studied relation-
ship. Using movies to prime an emotional experience (Andrade and 
Cohen 2005), participants were told that they would be completing 
two unrelated studies: a movie experience and a brand experience 
study. For the movie experience study, participants watched clips 
from one of four movie genres (action, comedy, horror, and drama). 
Prior to beginning, participants were given the unknown brand to try 
out prior to the brand study. Participants answered questions about 
emotional brand attachment (Thomson et al. 2005) and perceived 
shared experience (affiliation). Analysis revealed that participants in 
the fear condition felt more attached to the brand than those in any of 
the other conditions. In addition, fear participants reported a higher 
perceived shared experience with the brand during the experience. 
This perceived shared experience significantly mediated the impact 
of emotion type on brand attachment. 
In Study 2, we further tested perceived affiliation as the under-
lying mechanism by showing that when affiliation is satiated, fear 
did not significantly increase emotional brand attachment. In this 
study, we primed participants through a word search to either feel 
affiliated or not (Jiang et al. 2010). Once primed, participants com-
pleted the movie and brand experience study as outlined in study 2 
with the exception of only using horror and action clips. This study 
finds that only when participants did not feel affiliated did fear lead 
to significantly higher emotional brand attachment. 
Finally, Study 3 examined the potential long-term impact of 
fear on behavioral outcomes such as broader, more cognitive brand 
attachment. We predicted that while emotional brand attachment 
(Thomson et al. 2005) could occur immediately (Time 1), broader 
brand attachment (Park et al. 2010) would only emerge at a lat-
er time (Time 2). Using a longitudinal design, participants went 
through the procedure from study1 at Time 1, with the exception 
of measuring both emotional and broader brand attachment. Af-
ter completing the initial study, participants were given samples 
of a brand of chips to take home to try and answered a question-
naire about brand attachment and loyalty three days later (Time 2). 
Results revealed that those participants who underwent the initial 
fearful experience not only felt higher emotional brand attachment 
at both Time 1 and Time 2, but only showed higher broader brand 
attachment at Time 2. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Art plays an important cultural role by acting as a medium of 
communication for important sources of information. Given this 
role, it is not surprising that art has permeated consumption specific 
contexts like advertising (Hetsroni and Tukachinsky 2005), product 
decoration and even bolstering brands such as the iconic use of mod-
ern artists to promote Absolut Vodka (Lewis 1996).
While the use of art is commonplace in the modern Western 
world, there has been little empirical research on the impact of art on 
the consumer experiences (e.g., Hagtvedt and Patrick 2008a, 2008b, 
2011).  The few studies focused on how representational artwork 
(i.e., the artwork depicts something that is easily recognizable by 
most people) influence consumer perceptions and product evalua-
tions. Yet, little is known about how other forms of artwork, such 
as abstract art, might influence consumer behavior. Considering that 
abstract art is used in marketing practice, the current research seeks 
to extend our understanding of how artwork can influence consumer 
information processing and judgments. 
The current research seeks to explore the impact of abstract art 
on consumer processing. In particular, we examine different circum-
stances in which abstract art is  detrimental and beneficial for product 
evaluations and consumer experiences. Building off research on ver-
balization (Wilson and Schooler 1991; Yamada 2009), we demon-
strate that using abstract (vs. representational) art is beneficial when 
a brand or product evokes negative emotions which are low in un-
certainty (e.g., sadness as induced by funeral homes). This happens 
because the disfluency caused by processing abstract art provides 
consumers with the opportunity to emotionally distance themselves 
from the negative context of the product and, thus, accept the in-
formation about the product. In contrast, we demonstrate how the 
use of abstract (vs. representational) art is detrimental when a brand 
or product evokes negative emotions high in uncertainty (e.g., fear 
as induced by a drunk-and-driving ad). This is because uncertainty 
appraisals lead consumers to seek out ways to decrease their level 
of uncertainty. However, due to its perceptual disfluency, abstract 
art does not allow consumers to reduce uncertainty, thus leading to 
lower evaluations. Representational art, however, has concrete ele-
ments for the consumers to anchor thoughts and has the potential to 
lead to a greater reduction in uncertainty and subsequently higher 
evaluations. 
In study 1, we hypothesize that when abstract art is paired 
with a sadness evoking negative product, consumers will have 
more favorable attitudes and indicate greater willingness to pay for 
the advertised product. Four stimuli advertisements were created 
showing either a negative product (i.e., a funeral home) or a neu-
tral product (i.e., dog/pet service) and featured either an abstract 
painting or a representational painting. After viewing the adver-
tisements, participants were asked to evaluate the advertisement 
and the product as well as mood-related questions. If abstract art 
provides an emotional buffer against the negativity of the product 
class, we expect consumers viewing the negative product with the 
abstract art to report less negative emotions than those who saw 
the representational art.  The results revealed that participants who 
viewed the sadness-evoking advertisement rated the both the prod-
uct and the advertisement higher when it featured abstract rather 
than representational art. In contrast, participants who saw the neu-
tral product rated the product and advertisement significantly lower 
when it featured abstract rather than representational art. In addi-
tion, for participants in the negative product condition, those who 
saw the abstract art reported fewer negative emotions than those 
who saw the representational art. 
In study 2, we examine the idea that abstract art provides an 
emotional buffer for processing negative products. In particular, we 
purport that abstract art pushes consumer to process information in 
a psychologically distant manner. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we used a 2(art type: abstract v. representational) x 2(psychological 
distance: close v. far) design and primed participants to think either 
in a psychologically close or far manner. If abstract art acts as an 
emotional buffer, only participants who are primed to think in terms 
of close psychological distance should prefer the negative product 
advertisement featuring the abstract art over those featuring repre-
sentational art. Using only the sadness-evoking negative product 
advertisements, participants who were primed to think either in a 
psychologically close or far manner saw advertisements that either 
featured abstract or representational art. As predicted, there was no 
difference in advertisement attitude between participants who saw 
the representational or abstract art when primed for the far psycho-
logical distance. In contrast, only when participants were primed for 
close psychological distance was there an increase in advertisement 
attitude for the abstract art. Finally, an emotional buffer question 
index was shown to mediate the relationship between art type and 
attitude. 
In study 3, we examine a boundary condition to the benefit of 
abstract art for negative products. In particular, we found that abstract 
art is beneficial only for negative emotions that are low in uncertainty 
(e.g., sadness) not for those emotions high in uncertainty (e.g., fear). 
Participants in this study rated advertisements that evoked sadness 
or fear and featured abstract or representational art. Results revealed 
that for sadness advertisements, participants who saw the abstract art 
rated the advertisement higher than representational art. However, 
when the advertisement evoked fear, participants preferred the rep-
resentational art. 
This research makes several contributions to marketing liter-
ature. Foremost, this is the first empirical study of the differential 
impact of abstract art on consumer product perceptions. Second, we 
identify that abstract art itself can motivate far psychological dis-
tance processing, allowing consumers to better comprehend certain 
types of negative products. Finally, we pinpoint a boundary condi-
tion of the beneficial effects of abstract art. Specifically, the disflu-
ency associated with abstract art is detrimental when the negative 
emotional appeal evokes an uncertain emotion (e.g., fear; Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A consistent finding in consumer research is that attitudes to-
ward products, services, and consumption in general can be influ-
enced by other people’s opinions (e.g., Bearden and Etzel 1982). 
Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that power may play an im-
portant role in determining how people respond to social influence 
(Galinsky et al. 2008). This line of research maintains that power 
increases consumers’ reliance on their own attitudes, and leads to 
evaluations that are largely unaffected by the opinions of others. In 
the present research, we propose that while power indeed enhances 
resistance to social influence, it is likely to produce different resis-
tance outcomes, depending on the degree of certainty with which 
consumers hold their attitudes. 
Attitude certainty refers to the subjective sense of conviction 
a person has about his or her attitude. Higher levels of attitude cer-
tainty are associated with reduced motivation to process external 
information (Tiedens and Linton 2001). Because power tends to 
magnify the influence of subjective experiences (Weick and Guinote 
2007), we expect empowered individuals to be particularly sensitive 
to the effect of attitude certainty on motivation to process informa-
tion. Thus, when feeling certain of their own attitudes, empowered 
consumers may be less motivated to process other people’s opinions, 
and as a result, may express evaluations that are uninfluenced by 
those opinions. This “immunizing” effect of power under high atti-
tude certainty is conceivably what Galinsky et al. (2008) observed in 
their study. In contrast, when attitude certainty is low, we expect em-
powered consumers to attend more to other people’s opinions. Ironi-
cally, when attitude certainty is low, empowered consumers are also 
more likely to interpret these unsolicited opinions as undue pressure 
to conform and to express opinions that intentionally oppose those 
expressed by others. 
We propose that this reactance effect arises because the sub-
jective experience of uncertainty weakens empowered consumers’ 
confidence in their own sense of power. This sense that their power 
is in question, in turn, could make empowered consumers more sus-
ceptible to interpreting others’ unsolicited opinions as a threat to their 
freedom to express independent evaluations, which then triggers the 
reactant response (Brehm 1966). 
We tested our predictions in two experimental studies. Study 1 
featured a 2 (power: high vs. control) × 2 (attitude certainty: high vs. 
low) × 3 (feedback: positive vs. negative vs. none) between-subjects 
design. Participants’ sense of power was manipulated using a prim-
ing technique adapted from previous research. Attitude certainty was 
manipulated using direct versus indirect experience with the attitude 
object (puzzles). Participants were asked to indicate their evaluations 
of the puzzles on a feedback sheet containing either 10 positive feed-
backs, 10 negative feedbacks, or no feedback. 
As expected, there was a significant power × feedback × at-
titude certainty three-way interaction (F (2, 190) = 5.46, p < .01). 
Analysis of the low attitude certainty condition yielded a 2 (power) 
× 3 (feedback) interaction (F (2, 190) = 13.26, p < .01). Empowered 
consumers rated the puzzles more positively when exposed to nega-
tive feedback (M = 8.57) than in the baseline condition (M = 7.00, 
t (30) = 3.04, p < .01). They also rated the puzzles more negatively 
in the positive feedback condition (M = 5.02) than in the baseline 
condition (M = 7.00, t (30) = 2.68, p = .01). In contrast, low power 
consumers’ evaluations varied in the same direction as the evalua-
tions of others (F (2, 190) = 6.98, p < .01). There was also a signifi-
cant power × feedback interaction (F (2, 190) = 4.33, p < .01) in the 
high attitude certainty condition. However, the pattern of results was 
different from that in the low attitude certainty condition. Consum-
ers with low power still conformed to the opinions of their peers, 
whereas empowered consumers’ evaluations did not vary across the 
three feedback conditions (M Positive = 7.35, M None = 7.24, and M Negative 
= 6.80, F (2, 190) = .70, p = .50).
Study 2 was similar in design to study 1, but featured three im-
portant differences: (1) the evaluation object was a new product; (2) 
attitude certainty was manipulated by asking participants to generate 
either two or eight arguments in support of their attitude toward the 
product idea; and (3) we also assessed participants’ power certainty 
and their perceived threat to autonomy.
The results for evaluations were consistent with those found in 
study 1. In addition, to assess the proposed mechanism, we tested 
two mediation models. Focusing on empowered consumers, we first 
tested whether power certainty mediates the effect of attitude certain-
ty on perception of threat when the consumer receives unsolicited 
feedback (moderated mediation model). We then tested whether per-
ceived threat to autonomy mediates the interaction effect of power 
certainty × feedback on product evaluations (mediated moderation 
model). Consistent with predictions, the first model indicates that the 
indirect effect of attitude certainty on threat through power certainty 
is significant in the negative feedback condition (95% CI = -2.44 to 
-.99), but not in the no feedback condition (95% CI = -.62 to .43). 
Furthermore, the second model shows that the indirect effect of pow-
er certainty on product attractiveness, through threat is significant in 
the negative feedback condition (95% CI = -.54 to -.22), but not in 
the no feedback condition (95% CI = -.13 to .04). 
This research contributes to the literature on reactance and con-
sumer conformity by delineating the intricate role of power as an 
important determinant of consumers’ response to social influence. It 
also adds to our understanding of the cognitive processes triggered 
by power. For example, prior research indicates that power acts pri-
marily as a determinant of thought confidence. Our studies, however, 
show that power and attitude certainty can have independent as well 
as interactive effects on subsequent cognitions. Thus, while the pow-
erful may generally be more confident in their thoughts, they also 
behave differently when their thoughts are held with more or less 
confidence. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A great deal of research in word-of-mouth (WOM) has aimed 
to understand whether consumers are more likely to share positive 
or negative information (Brown & Reingen 1987; Herr, Kardes, & 
Kim 1991). While some scholars have shown negative can trump 
positive WOM (e.g., Kamins, Folkes, & Pernes 1997), others have 
found positive WOM to prevail (e.g., East, Hammond, &Wright 
2007). Yet, little is known about when consumers are more likely to 
share positive versus negative WOM. 
This research explores the role of interpersonal closeness as 
one factor that can influence consumers’ tendency to share positive 
versus negative information. By interpersonal closeness, we refer 
to the perceived psychological proximity between two individuals 
(Gunia, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009; Miller, Downs, & Prentice 
1998). Such perceived proximity can stem from social similarity 
(Latanè et al. 1995), emotional closeness (i.e., tie strength; Gunia et 
al. 2009), or even spatial and temporal proximity (Liberman, Trope 
& Stephan 2007). For instance, the more two people have strong 
ties, occupy similar roles in society or share particular physical or 
physiological traits, the higher their interpersonal closeness. 
We propose that high interpersonal closeness prompts 
individuals to share more negative information compared to high 
interpersonal closeness. Our hypothesis builds on the idea that 
high interpersonal closeness activates low-level construals while 
low interpersonal closeness activates high-level construals (Trope, 
Liberman, & Wakslak 2007). Key to our theorizing, high-level 
construals increase the focus on positive information, whereas 
low-level construals increase the focus on negative information 
(Eyal et al. 2004; Trope and Liberman 2000; White et al. 2011). 
For instance, Eyal et al. 2004, showed that people tend to focus 
more on the cons (i.e., negative information), relative to the pros 
(i.e., positive information) of a certain an action, when the action 
is close in the future than when it is distant in the future. Thus, we 
hypothesize that low interpersonal closeness activates high-level 
construals, prompting senders to focus more on positive relative to 
negative information, whereas high interpersonal closeness activates 
low-level construals, prompting senders to focus more on positive 
relative to negative information. We tested this hypothesis across 
three experiments.   
Experiment 1 tested our basic hypothesis that senders of a 
WOM message tend to share more negative information, relative to 
positive information, the closer they feel to the message recipient. 
Participants read a review of a camera containing four positive and 
four negative attributes. They were then asked to indicate the name 
of a close or distant other and the nature of the relationship with 
this person. Then, participants were asked to compose a message 
about the camera addressed to the person they indicated. Participants 
included more negative attributes in their message when addressing 
a close recipient than when addressing a distant recipient (p < .01). 
Experiment 2 aimed at providing robustness, while also 
addressing a potential alternative explanation for our effect. In 
particular, individuals might be more motivated to protect close 
rather than distant others. Thus, they might communicate more 
negative relative to positive information to close others in order to 
warn and protect them from unforeseen negative consequences. To 
rule out this explanation, we asked all participants to send a WOM 
message to a friend and varied how far they felt from the message 
recipient to manipulate closeness. Participants read the same review 
as in Experiment 1 and sent a WOM message to a friend located in 
the same city (close condition), a different city (moderate condition) 
or a different country (distant condition). We computed a valence 
index, (number of positive thoughts minus negative thoughts divided 
by total number of thoughts), which revealed that participants wrote 
increasingly more negative messages as the intended recipient was 
geographically closer (p < .01). 
Experiment 3 tested a consequence of this effect: namely, WOM 
messages become less positive across successive transmissions within 
chains of closely tied individuals. In contrast, messages become less 
negative across successive transmissions within chains of loosely 
tied individuals. Participants were placed into a “WOM chain” in 
which each individual acted first as a recipient and then as a sender of 
a message. To start the chain, participants occupying the first position 
in the chain were given a description of a hotel that included three 
positive and three negative features and were told to write a message 
to a friend with the goal of transmitting the information as accurately 
as possible. This yielded an initial set of WOM messages about a 
hotel. Participants in the second position received the message written 
by a participant in position one, and then transmitted it to participant 
in position three, and so on. Key to the experiment, participants in 
position 2 and 3 were assigned to one of two conditions. Specifically, 
individuals assigned to the weak (strong) tie condition were asked to 
imagine the review came from a distant (close) other, and prompted 
to send their review as if they were to write a message to a distant 
(close) other. We counted participants’ positive and negative 
thoughts in each message. Across strong ties, the number of negative 
thoughts was constant (F <1) while the number of positive thoughts 
significantly decreased (p< .01). In contrast, across weak ties, the 
number of positive thoughts was constant (F <1) while the number 
of negative thoughts significantly decreased (p <.001) . These results 
are consistent with our proposition that positive information might be 
more prone to be lost in transmission among chains of strongly tied 
individuals, relative to negative information. In contrast, negative 
information might be more prone to be lost in transmission among 
chains of weakly tied individuals. 
This research provides new insights on WOM diffusion 
by investigating how a central structural feature of WOM 
communication – interpersonal closeness between sender and 
recipient –influence the sharing of positive vs. negative information. 
We show that consumers tend to share more positive information 
with distant compared to close others. Furthermore we demonstrate 
important consequences of how positive versus negative information 
is differentially communicated in weakly versus strongly tied 
networks.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Nowadays, one can buy colorful cake lollipops, shower gels 
made of “magical leaves”, to enter a store selling human size LEGO 
just next to sex toys, and to sleep in hotels offering Batman’s bed-
room… all during the same day. Once settled in the comfort of 
Batman’s couch, television will broadcast wizards’ adventures and 
super heroes saving the world against aliens or monsters on televi-
sion. Considering those movies as anthropological mirrors (Kracauer 
1966/2004; Morin 1956/2005), one can see an imaginary world un-
derlying consumer society where consumers believe in what we have 
been taught to be “unbelievable” or out of what scientists and moder-
nity call disenchanted “rationalization” (Weber 1919/2007). 
Wonderland in Alice’s Adventures (Carroll 1865/1998) is a 
place where one has to think differently and forget about logic or 
natural order of things. Postmodernism is Wonderland and chal-
lenges the ideas of rationalization, reality, or truth. As Levy writes 
(1974/1999, 245), “everywhere yearnings, aspirations, and interper-
sonal relations are laden with magical, superstitious, mystical, and 
religious significance, with private imageries, sentiments”. It is pos-
sible to attend a posthumous show of the murdered rapper Tupac or 
to see Thomas Edison presenting a new technology at an auto show. 
Science is no longer reserved for technical developments, but for il-
lusions and reenchantment. It is a new approach to reality in which 
consumers can fulfill their need for “extravagant expectations” 
(Boorstin 1962/1992), so long as they believe all these illusions and 
accept Wonderland as a serious alternative to what modernism called 
“reality”. Like a child would do.
Consumers can sometimes be seen as children in their way of 
consuming (Belk 2000). One just has to look at the “Harlem Shake” 
meme. And if advertising is already tempting consumers to let the 
inner child out (McDonald’s, Volkswagen, Ford, Mercedes, Subway, 
Haribo…), consumer research has never really paid attention to this 
phenomenon. 
We conducted unobtrusive observation on the internet. The two 
objectives were to make sure consumers feel sometimes like chil-
dren, and to learn what “letting the inner child out” means to them. 
In order to do so, we selected 7741 comments to three Disney offi-
cial messages which appeared on Facebook walls: “What do you do 
first when arriving at Disneyland?” (Disneyland Paris), “When I first 
walk onto Main Street, U.S.A., I feel…” (Disneyland California), and 
“Why do we have to grow up? Walt Disney” (Disneyland California). 
Disney was not suspected of censorship since negative comments 
appeared on walls.
Based on Geertz (1973), data were interpreted using the itera-
tive process of the hermeneutic circle, that is going permanently back 
and forth between the whole and the parts (Schleiermacher 1938). By 
carrying out “a continuous movement between individual transcripts 
and the emerging understanding of the entire set of textual data […] 
Provisional understandings are formed, challenged, revised […] and 
gradually developed in relation to a broader set of theoretical con-
cerns” (Thompson 2005, 237). 
Findings provide evidence of the “Homo puer’s rise”, that is a 
kind of consumer who is neither an adult nor a child–in a modern 
sense, neither a completely rationalized mind nor a polymorphous-
ly perverse mind. He/she is rather someone using consumption as 
a gateway to a fantasy world, in a similar way World of Warcraft 
gamers create and customize their avatars before immersing in a vir-
tual world and role-playing (MacCallum-Stewart and Parsler 2008). 
Homo puer is the result of Prometheus’ reign where Dionysus was 
not allowed: he/she is the adult who has stayed adult for too long, 
and who sees his/her inner child coming out with an unbounded–and 
sometimes destructive–energy. 
By adopting Homo puer’s vision, postmodernism should be 
considered as “liberatory” (Firat and Venkatesh 1995). Consum-
ers act like children do when using transitional objects (Winnicott 
1971/1982) or magic to get what they desire (Ferenczi 1955/1994). 
Consumption appears as a playful tool to customize constructed real-
ities thanks to magic and imaginary. It is now a playground in which 
technological toys react to us, and allow to customize and expand the 
worlds–just like they change the nature of reality–according to our 
desires (Pesce 2000). Consumption has to be seen as a transitional 
phenomenon to “commute” between the several realities. And play is 
the key to such commuting.
What makes the Homo puer a different consumer is that he/
she accepts his/her inner child and cannot live without it anymore. 
Consumer society relies on play, on illusion, and is “governed by a 
form of magical thinking” (Baudrillard 1970/1998, 31). Consump-
tion became magical and made consumer society a Wonderland in 
which only Homo puer can have a fulfilling life.
We are far from the idea of an immature consumer who only 
wants to follow the pleasure principle. Homo puer could actually be 
the future psychological development of individual by representing 
the “higher and [more] complete man”, and a person born from the 
maturity of the adult man rather than an unconscious child one would 
like to remain (Jung 1952/2010, 95). 
At a time when the Marketing Science Institute research priori-
ties for 2012-2014 call for insight into people in their roles as con-
sumers, or designing experiences, we consider this paper to bring a 
new perspective for consumer research and call for further research. 
It should be seen as an attempt to revise existing knowledge: What 
if hedonic consumption (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982) was one 
of the consequences of the Homo puer’s accession to the throne of 
consumption? Anthropomorphism (Aaker 1997; Fournier 1998; Kim 
and McGill 2011), extended self (Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988), thema-
tization (Firat and Ulusoy 2007; Ritzer 2010), desire (Belk, Ger, and 
Askegaard 2003; Campbell 1987; Gould 1991), fantasy (Belk and 
Costa 1998; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Rook 1988), and related 
topics are all about making our imagination richer. And why make 
our imagination richer if we are not able to believe in magic and play 
with this imagination like children do? Consumers are now telling 
about their adventures in Wonderland, especially online. They are 
also redefining the status of adult. More than listening to them, we 
should take part and let our inner child out to really understand what 
being a consumer is when hyperreality makes consumption the key 
to endless possibilities and infinite worlds.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research has established how proximity to goal attainment 
impacts the motivation to pursue that goal. What is relatively un-
known is how the desirability of an extrinsic reward associated with 
goal fulfillment is affected by movement toward the goal. 
This research examines the effect of feelings of movement on 
attractiveness of a reward associated with goal attainment. Specifi-
cally, we show that perceived movement toward a goal results in 
higher valuation of an extrinsic reward. We build on the idea that 
there is a positive emotional response to moving towards a goal 
(Carver and Scheier 1998). Individuals are not generally aware of 
the source of these feelings, and the feelings can be misattributed to 
the reward. The evaluation of the reward is therefore affected by the 
presence and intensity of feelings arising from movement toward the 
goal. We demonstrated this effect by manipulating a sense of move-
ment in various ways. 
In study 1, we manipulated felt movement by endowing some 
participants with progress without them experiencing movement 
toward the goal. Participants engaged in a picture task where they 
had to find differences between two similar pictures. For half of the 
participants, there were 3 differences in the pictures (the unendowed 
condition). For the other half, there were 5 differences, but two of 
them were already marked. So participants found the remaining 3 
differences (the endowed condition). Notice both groups put in the 
same effort to complete the task, but one should feel more movement 
as they complete the entire task themselves rather than just the last 
60% of it. Upon completing the task, participants evaluated the choc-
olate that they were given as a reward. We found that participants in 
the unendowed condition were happier with the chocolate and also 
felt a greater sense of movement. The perceived movement mediated 
the effect of condition on evaluations of the chocolate. 
Study 2 examined whether providing progress marker during 
goal pursuit can influence perceived goal movement. Since progress 
marker helps people to track and confirm their progress, we predict 
that having progress marker increases a sense of movement and the 
value of a reward. In this study, participants performed the picture 
task on a computer. In the progress marker condition, a progress bar 
expanded as participants found each difference, but in the no-prog-
ress marker condition participants did not receive any intermediate 
progress marker. After participants found all the differences, they 
were given one dollar as a reward. As expected, participants in the 
progress marker condition were happier with the reward than those 
in the no-progress marker condition.
Study 3 examines whether a rate of progress influences value of 
a reward. We predict that a high rate of progress will lead to a greater 
feeling of movement and thus result in a higher evaluation of a re-
ward. Participants in this study were asked to solve 5 math problems 
expecting to get candy as a reward. Participants in the fast condition 
were given a calculator and instructed to solve the problems using 
the calculator. Participants in the slow condition were instructed to 
calculate the answers by hand. After finishing the task, participants 
were given the reward. Consistent with our predictions, participants 
in the fast condition valued the candy more than those in the slow 
condition.
We propose that people acquire pleasure from a sense of mov-
ing forward, and misattribute the pleasure to the reward. Once people 
are aware of their true source of feelings, however, they do not misat-
tribute their feelings to other sources (Schwarz and Clore 1983). 
Study 4 directly tests this misattribution mechanism. Participants 
performed a picture task expecting to get a chocolate upon finishing 
the task. In the attribution condition, participants were told that most 
people enjoy making progress toward completing the task. Those 
in the movement condition did not see that sentence. Participants 
in both conditions completed the task, and then rated the chocolate 
they received. Participants in a control condition rated the chocolate 
before they engaged in the task. Results showed that participants in 
the attribution condition valued the chocolate less than the standard 
movement condition but did not rate the chocolate differently from 
the control condition. Once people were aware of the source of their 
feelings, they no longer raised the evaluation of the reward. 
Our evaluation effects (e.g. study 1) are quite different from 
findings about motivation in goal pursuit. Starting closer to the goal 
increases motivation for goal pursuit (the goal gradient effect). How-
ever, we suggest that starting closer to the goal leaves individuals 
with less felt progress as they go through a smaller proportion of the 
goal path, and therefore lower valuation. In this study, we examine 
whether the same manipulation can both increase motivation and de-
crease reward valuation. Participants engaged in a picture task and 
were assigned to 4 conditions; 2 (Progress: endowed/unendowed) 
x 2 (Measure: valuation/motivation). In the unendowed condition, 
there were 3 differences in the pictures, and in the endowed condi-
tion there were 5 differences but 2 of the differences were marked. 
All participants were asked to stop the task before they found the last 
difference. Then, they either evaluated the chocolate or rated their 
motivation to complete the task. We found that participants in the 
unendowed condition valued the chocolate more than those in the en-
dowed condition. However, participants were less motivated to find 
the last difference when they were not endowed with progress. The 
results suggest that endowed progress has different mechanisms for 
affecting motivation and valuation respectively. 
In summary, we find that a variety of factors can influence per-
ceived movement during goal pursuit. A greater sense of movement 
toward a goal induces pleasure, and consumers may misattribute this 
pleasure to the goal-related reward. Consequently, a greater sense of 
movement results in a greater valuation of the reward. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT:
“Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be 
so” (Mill, 1909).
It is often thought that happiness cannot be pursued, but is a 
fortuitous byproduct of engagement in other activities. Indeed, in a 
short-term lab setting, people explicitly asked to maximize their hap-
piness are less happy than those not asked to do so (Schooler et al. 
2003). Such findings may be intuitively appealing as most recognize 
that certain goals cannot be pursued too directly. For example, try-
ing too explicitly to fall asleep can be counter-productive. However, 
most of us also recognize that the likelihood of achieving a goal is 
greater when we accord it higher priority. Thus, a person who con-
sciously (re)arranges aspects of his life so as to get a good night’s 
sleep will sleep better than one who does not. By the same token, it 
stands to reason that individuals who accord higher priority to the 
goal of being happy might make more happiness-enhancing choices, 
thereby becoming happier. 
The main objective of the present research is to test whether, 
results from past research notwithstanding, it is possible to increase 
happiness by explicitly pursuing the goal of happiness. Specifically, 
we examined whether regularly making a happiness goal salient 
through introspection on one’s happiness could increase individu-
als’ happiness levels. Although our manipulation was similar to those 
employed by past research, in that it made a happiness-related goal 
salient, our experimental design differed from those used previous-
ly in an important way: whereas past experiments involved a fixed 
task assigned by the experimenter, our experiment allowed partici-
pants to engage in activities of their own choosing while focusing 
on maximizing their happiness. We predicted that individuals who 
introspected on their happiness would engage in more behaviors con-
gruent with enhancing their happiness and would thus be happier 
than participants that did not regularly introspect on their happiness. 
We tested this prediction in two experiments.
Study 1 tests this using a three group between-participants de-
sign, where a happiness-related query (state-focused vs. behavior-
focused vs. control) was the manipulated factor. All participants 
completed an initial set of questions, including a baseline happiness 
measure. Next, they were told that the experiment would involve 
fifteen minutes of “free time,” during which they could engage in 
the activities of their choice. Prior to beginning their “free time,” 
participants in two experimental conditions (state-focused and be-
havior-focused) were exposed to a manipulation that made the goal 
of happiness salient, by presenting them with a question about their 
happiness and asking them to keep this question in mind. The ques-
tion in the state-focused condition was designed to direct attention 
towards monitoring their current affective state (“How happy are 
you?” Mauss et al. 2011). The question in the behavior-focused con-
dition, in contrast, was aimed at directing focus towards happiness 
goal-directed behavior (“Are you doing your best to be happy?”). 
Those in the control condition were not given any question to keep 
in mind. At the end of the study, participants completed a final set 
of questions, which included the same happiness measure adminis-
tered previously. Our main dependent measure was the change in 
happiness. In line with prior work, we observe that those in the state-
focused condition showed a significant decline in happiness as com-
pared to the control (Mstate-focused=.145, Mcontrol=.453, p<.05). However, 
in line with our predictions we find that those in the behavior-focused 
condition increased their happiness significantly as compared to both 
the state-focused and control conditions (M behavior-focus=.775, p’s<.05). 
In support of our proposed process, we find behavioral change medi-
ates the effect of condition on the change in happiness.
Having demonstrated our predicted effect, it is important to note 
that study 1 shares a limitation common to prior studies on happi-
ness, in that it examines how happiness related goals affect happi-
ness in a short-run, relatively controlled, experimental context. In 
order to better understand the longer term implications for happi-
ness goals, study 2 was designed as a longitudinal field-study in 
which participants were prompted on a daily basis, over the course 
of one week to reflect on their happiness. All participants completed 
standard demographic questions along with the 4-item Subjective 
Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999), which measures 
individuals’ subjective assessment of their global happiness. Partici-
pants in three experimental conditions received a question everyday 
via email (state-focused: “How happy were you today?”; behavior-
focused: “Did you do your best to be happy today?”; control: “What 
day of the week is it?”). The happiness-related query (state-focused 
vs. behavior-focused vs. control) was the manipulated factor. At the 
end of the study, all participants were required to complete the same 
subjective happiness scale administered on day one. After complet-
ing the scale, participants were also asked to describe—in an open-
ended format—how participation in the study changed their behavior 
(if at all) over the course of the experiment. The main dependent 
measure was participants’ change in subjective happiness, relative to 
the baseline measure. 
We observed that the change in subjective happiness scores 
was significantly higher in the behavior-focused condition than in 
the control condition (Mbehavior=0.25; Mcontrol=-0.05, p<.03). there was 
no difference between the behavior-focused and the state- focused 
condition (Mstate =.12; p =.30) or the state-focused condition and the 
control condition (p=.22). Further, those in the behavior-focused 
condition were the most likely to experience an increase in subjective 
happiness (and the least likely to experience a decrease in subjec-
tive happiness) as compared to the other conditions. The relationship 
between condition and happiness change was significant (χ2(4)=4.2; 
p=.04).
A mediation analysis supported the hypothesis that it is a change 
in one’s behavior, and not other factors, which causes an improve-
ment in happiness after completing the experiment. Taken together, 
these findings demonstrate that, in contrast to prior work, happiness 
goals can be effective at improving happiness when they direct focus 
towards one’s behavior and motivate behavioral change, and further 
even happiness monitoring can have positive effects on happiness 
under certain conditions, such as longer durations.
Table 1: Change Scores From Pre To Post Results
Study Behavior condition
State 
Condition
Control 
Condition
Study 1 .775 . 145 .453
Study 2 .25 .12 -.05
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer behavior researchers have documented that individu-
als frequently try to avoid threatening information by engaging in 
compensatory consumption—the increased purchase of or actual 
consumption of goods in response to self-threats (Rucker and Ga-
linsky forthcoming). However, compensatory consumption could 
potentially yield harmful consequences, such as overeating and 
overspending (Tice et al. 2001). Moreover, while compensatory con-
sumption might temporally relieve emotional distress arising from 
self-threats, it can lead to post-consumption guilt (Arnow et al. 1992). 
Here, we introduce a model of threat resolution illuminating 
that individuals might be able to reduce their reliance on post-threat 
compensatory consumption by changing their appraisal of threats 
from harmful to their self-worth (which would lead to defensive re-
sponses to protect their self-worth, e.g., compensatory consumption) 
to benign to self-worth (which would make defensive responses su-
perfluous). We specifically focus on the role of unconditional self-ac-
ceptance (i.e., detaching one’s sense of self-worth from one’s current 
self-assessment: Chamberlain and Hagga 2001; Williams and Lynn 
2010) in shaping threat appraisal, positing that those who practice 
unconditional self-acceptance (vs. those who do not) will tend to 
appraise otherwise threatening information as benign rather than as 
impinging on their self-worth. As such, we posit that these individu-
als will be less likely to try to protect themselves through engaging 
in compensatory consumption and more open to directly facing and 
improving on the threatened dimension.
Study 1 examined how a threat to one’s intelligence would af-
fect consumption of products symbolic of intelligence (but do not 
actually boost intelligence) for individuals who varied in their degree 
of self-acceptance. Also, we sought to establish discriminant validity 
between self-acceptance and self-esteem. 
All participants first completed the self-acceptance subscale 
from the Shortened General Attitude and Belief Scale (used to mea-
sure self-acceptance in Macinnes 2006) and then completed the 
Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. Then, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of two between-subject conditions (intelli-
gence-threat vs. no-threat). Half of the participants experienced a 
threat to their intelligence (via “a game that assesses intelligence”/
negative feedback) while the other half did not experience any threat 
(same game framed as stimuli development/no negative feedback). 
Then, all participants were asked to indicate their willingness-to-pay 
for three intelligence-related products (DV=summed WTP). 
We found that high (+1SD) self-acceptance individuals exhib-
ited less compensatory consumption in response to threat than low 
(-1SD) self-acceptance individuals (p=.002). This relation was re-
versed for self-esteem, such that high self-esteem individuals exhib-
ited greater compensatory consumption in response to threat than 
did low self-esteem individuals (p=.06). This is consistent with the 
previous literature that self-acceptance and self-esteem are related, 
yet distinct constructs. That is, self-acceptance reflects uncondition-
al acceptance of one’s self, and therefore tends to offer protection 
against self-threats whereas self-esteem tends to be conditional on 
one’s successes and failures and hence, may entail a greater likeli-
hood of defensive responding to protect the self than self-acceptance 
(Chamberlain and Hagga 2001). 
In study 2, we manipulated, rather than measured, self-accep-
tance and examined a different form of compensatory consumption 
than in study 1, namely compensatory consumption intended to shift 
attention from the threat (Heatherton et al. 1991) rather than con-
sumption intended to symbolically complete the threatened aspect 
of the self. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-acceptance 
vs. control) x 2 (intelligence-threat vs. no-threat), between-subjects 
design. Participants in the self-acceptance condition read a list of 
“thoughts” that help increase self-acceptance (e.g., “I can accept 
myself whether I win, lose, or draw.”), chose their favorite, and ex-
plained why that particular thought was their favorite and how they 
might apply it to their daily lives. Those in the control condition 
read through a list of daily activities, chose their favorite daily ac-
tivity, and explained why that particular activity was their favorite. 
Then, after experiencing either a threat to their intelligence (differ-
ent manipulation to that of study 1: a “test of intelligence”/negative 
feedback) or no threat (same test framed as stimulus development/
no negative feedback), participants got an opportunity to consume 
M&M’s (DV= # of M&M’s consumed). 
We found that participants in the self-acceptance condition did 
increase their consumption of M&M’s in response to an intelligence 
threat (vs. no-threat condition, p=.23), whereas participants in the 
control condition consumed more M&M’s in response to a threat 
(p=.038), indicating that those who exercised self-acceptance did not 
see the need to increase their consumption as a mean to avoid the 
threatened self. 
Study 3 used a different type of self-threat (a threat to one’s 
power: Rucker and Galinsky 2008) and a different self-acceptance 
exercise to test whether consumers who practice self-acceptance 
would not only reduce their reliance on compensatory consumption 
but would also be more open to directly addressing the self-threat 
by seeking products that could help them improve on the threatened 
dimension.
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-acceptance vs. 
control) x 2 (power-threat vs. no-threat) x 2 (threat-compensatory 
product vs. self-improvement product), between-subjects design. 
Participants in the self-acceptance condition read a short article on 
self-acceptance and wrote about why they believed self-acceptance 
to be important. Those in the control condition wrote about their last 
trip to buy groceries. Then, participants either experienced a threat to 
their sense of power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003) or did 
not experience any threat. Lastly, participants in the threat-compen-
satory product condition indicated their WTP for a magazine sym-
bolic of status (“Elite Traveler”) whereas those in the self-improve-
ment product condition indicated their WTP for a self-improvement 
book (“Power and Influence for Dummies”). 
We again found that self-acceptance reduced participants’ post-
threat WTP for a threat-compensatory product to no-threat level 
(F<1). Furthermore, self-acceptance increased participants’ post-
threat WTP for a self-improvement product (p=.036). This finding 
helps converge on our account that self-acceptance leads to a rela-
tively benign appraisal of threats and allows individuals to directly 
face and improve on the threatened dimension.
In sum, we provide convergent evidence for our model of threat 
resolution that highlights an important role for self-acceptance in 
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shaping how individuals appraise threats, which, in turn, reduces 
their reliance on compensatory consumption but increases their 
openness to facing and addressing threatening information. 
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Table 1
Study Summary of Empirical Results
1
DV: summed WTP
Self-acceptance at -1SD (low self-acceptance): 
Intelligence threat condition (M = $57.18) vs. No threat condition (M = $34.00) 
β = -11.60, t(110) = 2.05, p = .043
Self-acceptance at +1SD (high self-acceptance): 
Intelligence threat condition (M = $14.81) vs. No threat condition (M = $15.03) 
β = -.73, t < 1
Self-esteem at -1SD (low self-esteem): 
Intelligence threat condition (M = $6.31) vs. No threat condition (M = $14.08) 
β = -2.22, t < 1
Self-esteem at +1SD (high self-esteem): 
Intelligence threat condition (M = $37.43) vs. No threat condition (M = $23.94) 
β = -10.23, t(110) = 1.80, p = .075. 
2
DV: number of M&M’s consumed
No-internalization control condition:
Intelligence threat condition (M = 9.68, SD = 6.76) vs. No threat condition (M = 7.34, SD = 5.11), F(1, 203) = 4.34, p = .038.
Self-acceptance condition:
Intelligence threat condition (M = 6.86, SD = 5.27) vs. No threat condition (M = 8.28, SD = 5.84), F(1, 203) = 1.48, p = .23
Within intelligence threat condition:
Self-acceptance condition vs. no-internalization control condition
F(1, 203) = 6.24, p = .01
Within no threat condition:
Self-acceptance condition vs. no-internalization control condition
F < 1
3
DV: WTP
Threat-compensatory product (Elite Traveler)
No-internalization control condition:
Power threat condition (M = $30.80, SD = 39.40) vs. No threat condition (M = $10.76, SD = 22.83), F(1, 274) = 12.00, p 
= .001
Self-acceptance condition:
Power threat condition (M = $14.03, SD = 24.78) vs. No threat condition (M = $17.94, SD = 30.99), F < 1
Self-improvement product (Power and Influence for Dummies)
No-internalization control condition:
Power threat condition (M = $8.05, SD = 8.03) vs. No threat condition (M = $12.38, SD = 16.49), F < 1
Self-acceptance condition:
Power threat condition (M = $19.89, SD = 28.09) vs. No threat condition (M = $7.74, SD = 8.26), F(1, 274) = 4.42, p = .036.
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The Top-Ten Effect: Consumers’ Subjective Perceptions of Rankings
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Lists of ranked items (e.g., Business Week’s top 25 MBA pro-
grams, Car and Driver’s top 10 cars) are ubiquitous in Western cul-
ture. From a consumption standpoint, there is considerable evidence 
that individuals find these lists informative and influential. There-
fore, it is important to know exactly how the information provided in 
ranked lists is interpreted by users. Because a ranking is an ordinal 
scale of measurement, there is no technical reason why an informa-
tion user should interpret items at adjoining ranks as having equal 
differences in the ranked attribute. Yet, in the absence of specific in-
formation about the ranked items, this equidistance seems reasonable 
for the information user to assume. In fact, even academic researchers 
have utilized linear functions that imply equidistance when modeling 
the effects of changes in an organization’s rank on the outcomes and 
policies of the ranked organizations (Monks and Ehrenberg 1999a, b)
In this research, we propose the existence of a cognitive bias 
that overrides the presumption of equidistance between adjacent 
ranks in the interpretation of ranked lists. This bias, which has im-
portant implications for consumer evaluations of items presented in 
a ranked list, emerges due to our tendency to see complex and uncat-
egorized arrays, such as long lists of numbers, in terms of a smaller 
set of categories. A consequence of this tendency to categorize is an 
exaggeration of the perceived differences between items at adjoining 
ranks that cross category boundaries. 
What are the possible categories that might be formed by con-
sumers when processing uncategorized ranked-list information? One 
possibility, supported by research on multidigit numerical processing 
and price-response judgments (Poltrock and Schwartz 1984; Thomas 
and Morwitz 2005), is that individuals see ranked lists in terms of 
categories based on the value of a rank’s leftmost digit. For ranks up 
to 100, such place-value categories would consist of ranks 1-9 (0 as 
the tens digit), ranks 10-19 (1 as the tens digit), ranks 20-29 (2 as the 
tens digit), and so on. An alternative possibility is that individuals see 
ranked lists in terms of categories based on round numbers. In our 
decimal number system, round numbers are those that are multiples 
of 10 (such as 10, 20, 30) and halfway points between these multiples 
(e.g., 5, 15, 25). Support for this possibility is provided by the exten-
sive evidence for the cognitive salience of round numbers (Coup-
land 2010; Dehaene and Mehler 1992; Jansen and Pollmann 2001). 
For ranks up to 100, such round-number categories would consist of 
ranks 1-5 (i.e., the top five), ranks 1-10 (i.e., the top ten), ranks 1-15 
(i.e., the top fifteen), ranks 1-20 (i.e., the top twenty), and so on. 
Across three studies, we provide evidence that information users 
do in fact spontaneously form categories to interpret uncategorized 
ranked lists. Furthermore, we show that round-number categories, 
and not place-value categories, are typically created when consider-
ing ranked lists. We refer to this as the top-ten effect since “top ten” 
lists are among the most prevalent round-number categories.
In Study 1, we used a longitudinal data set with 2,026,975 re-
cords provided by the Graduate Management Admissions Council 
(GMAC), the organization that administers the GMAT exam that is 
typically required prior to business school admission. We conduct-
ed a series of regressions to assess the relationship between yearly 
changes in a school’s rank on the U.S. News & World Report list 
and yearly changes in the number of GMAT score reports that were 
sent to the school by GMAC (a proxy for completed applications). 
We found a significant and direct effect of a positive round-number 
category shift on the year-to-year change in number of GMAT score 
reports sent to a particular school. Whereas traversing a round-num-
ber category boundary (e.g., improving one’s rank from number 21 
to 20) affected the number of GMAT score requests (and presumably, 
the number of subsequent applications) that a school received, place-
value category shifts of similar magnitude (e.g., improving one’s 
rank from number 20 to number 19) had no such effect.
Study 2 shows that evaluations of an identical target differ when 
its position on a ranked list is varied between participants. More spe-
cifically, when judging the math ability of a student with a rank of 
8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 on a list of 28 students, between-round-number-
category rank differences (i.e., 10 vs. 11) exerted greater impact on 
information users’ evaluations of the target than equivalently sized 
within-round-number-category differences (i.e., 8 vs. 9, 11 vs. 12). 
Further, we found no evidence that between-place-value-category 
rank differences (i.e., 9 vs. 10) exerted greater impact on evaluations 
than within-place-value-category rank differences.
In Study 3, we attempted to isolate a psychological mechanism 
underlying the top-ten effect. Given our hypothesis that the effect oc-
curs because round-number categories (e.g., top 10) are cognitively 
accessible to consumers because of their prevalence in everyday 
communication, we made an attempt to eliminate the effect by reduc-
ing the accessibility of round-number categories. We implemented 
this by temporarily increasing the accessibility of ranked lists that 
highlight “sharp numbers” (Dehaene 1997) rather than round ones, 
such as the “top 101” or the “top 49” in a priming task. When the 
cognitive accessibility of round number categories was high, we rep-
licated the effects of prior studies. However, as predicted, when the 
cognitive accessibility of round number categories was low, the top-
ten effect was eliminated.
This research provides converging evidence that information 
users tend to form round-number categories (and not place-value cat-
egories) when presented with an uncategorized ranked list. This ten-
dency to generate round-number categories results in an exaggerated 
difference in evaluations of items that traverse a round-number cat-
egory boundary. Because consumers create mental partitions along 
round-number category boundaries (e.g., top ten), the evaluative dis-
tance between adjacent items on opposite sides of this partition (e.g., 
10 vs. 11) exceeds the distance between adjacent items that fall into 
the same round-number category (e.g., 9 vs. 10). In addition to en-
riching our understanding of categorization and numerical cognition, 
this research has important managerial implications because ranked 
lists are so pervasive in marketing communications.
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Charitable Giving to Controllable Misfortunes: The Role of Deliberation and Victim 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Causal controllability is the degree to which an observer of 
another person’s misfortune perceives that misfortune to be the 
fault or responsibility of the person in need of help. When a person 
encounters another in need of help, the person spontaneously judges 
the causal controllability (Weiner 1985). When the need is caused 
by an uncontrollable circumstance, sympathy is elicited, and the 
perceiver is likely to help the victim; in contrast, when the need is 
caused by a controllable circumstance, anger and blame are evoked, 
and the perceiver is likely to withhold help giving (Weiner 1980). 
Based on this theory, a nonprofit organization’s message is likely to 
be more effective if it communicates uncontrollability of the need. 
However, social causes that nonprofit organizations attempt to aid 
are not always uncontrollable. For example, causes having a mental-
behavioral origin such as drug abuse and obesity are considered 
to be controllable (Weiner, Perry, and Magnusson 1988), and it is 
difficult to solicit donations for those causes because they tend to 
elicit perceivers’ anger and blame toward the victims. How can we 
decrease people’s negative evaluations toward the victim of the 
controllable misfortune and increase people’s willingness to help 
the victim? Drawing on the literature of the identifiable victim effect 
(Small and Loewenstein 2003) and the feeling- versus deliberation-
based mode of processing (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), we 
propose that when a cause is construed as controllable, a charitable 
request that excludes the victim’s personal information and evokes a 
potential donor’s cognitive deliberation will increase donations. 
The identifiable victim effect refers to people’s greater 
helpfulness towards a personalized, single victim compared to 
an abstract, unidentified victim (Small and Loewenstein 2003). 
Research has shown that a perceiver’s affective reaction, whether 
it is sympathy or anger, is stronger toward an identified person (i.e., 
when the victim’s information such as a photo and name is available 
for the perceiver) than toward an unidentified person (Small and 
Loewenstein 2005). In order to lessen a perceiver’s negative reaction 
toward the victim of a controllable misfortune, exclusion of the 
victim’s personal information will result in not only the lesser degree 
of negative reaction, but also an increased opportunity to deliberate 
upon the controllable misfortune. Deliberation will yield the donor’s 
consideration of the misfortune in a broader scope (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004), and the donor’s perception of the misfortune as 
stemming from a societal failure rather than from individual failures 
(Piff et al. 2010), increasing the donor’s concern for welfare of the 
victim and help giving. 
Hypothesis 1: People are more likely to donate to help an un-
identified victim of a controllable misfortune 
than an identified victim of the same misfortune 
when people’s deliberation is high. Victim iden-
tifiability will not affect people’s donation deci-
sions when their deliberation is low. 
Hypothesis 2: Sympathy will mediate the effect of victim identi-
fiability and deliberation on donations to a con-
trollable misfortune.
Study 1 (N=165) tests hypothesis 1, and also replicates the 
finding of Small et al. (2007). Participants first read a fictitious 
donation request from a nonprofit organization that provides medical 
care and support for the victims of severe car accidents. The request 
manipulated the levels of causal controllability, victim identifiability, 
and deliberation. Participants then indicated how much they would 
be willing to donate to the organization. The result of a 2 (victim 
identifiability) x 2 (deliberation) ANOVA predicting a donation 
amount revealed the significant interaction effect both in the low 
controllability condition (F (1, 80) = 3.83, p < .05), and in the high 
controllability condition (F (1, 75) = 4.58, p < .05). The result in 
the low controllability condition replicated that of the Small et al. 
study (2007) such that in the low deliberation condition, participants 
in the high victim identifiability condition donated more than those 
in the low victim identifiability condition (M
high identifiability 
= 2.19, 
M
low identifiability 
= .94, p < .05). Donation did not differ in the high 
deliberation condition (M
high identifiability 
= .94, M
low identifiability
 = 1.17, 
NS). Importantly, the ANOVA result in the high controllability 
condition supported hypothesis 1. In the high deliberation condition, 
participants donated more when the victim identifiability was low 
than when it was high (M
high identifiability 
= .53; M
low identifiability 
= 1.58, p < 
.05). Donation did not differ in the low deliberation condition (Mhigh 
identifiability 
= .52; M
low identifiability 
= .32, NS). Among participants in the 
low victim identifiability condition, participants who read statistics 
donated more than those who did not (p < .05). 
Study 2 (N=83) examines the mediating role of sympathy 
(hypothesis 2). The design and procedure were similar to study 1. 
The differences were that we eliminated the victim’s photo from 
the description of the identifiable victim, measured participants’ 
sympathetic response, and used only the controllable misfortune 
condition. After reading a donation request, participants indicated 
the amount of donation and the extent to which they felt sympathetic 
toward the victim. The same ANOVA as in study 1 revealed 
the significant two-way interaction (F (1, 78) = 5.47, p < .05). 
Supporting hypothesis 2, the bootstrapping mediation analysis 
showed that the conditional indirect effect of victim identifiability 
on donation was significantly mediated by sympathy in the high-
deliberation condition (β = -.38; 95% CI: -.99, -.08), but not in the 
low-deliberation condition. 
Study 3 (N=73) increases validity of the findings in the 
previous studies using the different method to manipulate the degree 
of deliberation. The design and procedure were identical to study 
2, except that the degree of deliberation was manipulated with 
a priming task. We first primed participants’ modes of processing 
information, either deliberation-based or affect-based (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004). Then participants read the donation request, and 
indicated their sympathetic response and donation amount. With the 
same analyses as in study 2, the result supported hypothesis 1 (F (1, 
68) = 8.68, p < .01) and hypothesis 2 (β = -.51; 95% CI: -1.21, -.17). 
This research contributes to the literature of the identifiable victim 
effect by demonstrating the moderating role of causal controllability 
on that effect. Our results show that the conventional belief is only 
true when people perceive the misfortune to be uncontrollable. 
Although deliberation is often discouraged in charitable appeals, 
when it comes to a controllable misfortune, deliberation can 
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effectively lead to sympathy and increases donations. This paper 
also contributes on a practical level to nonprofit organizations that 
support controllable misfortunes by suggesting communication 
methods that reduce the negative evaluations from the perception of 
high controllability without losing the opportunity to communicate 
preventability of the misfortune. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the effect of sensitive disclosures 
on the impressions one will form of others who made similar disclo-
sures. Using both observational and experimental data, we find that, 
paradoxically, people who disclose a questionable behavior judge 
others who did the same more harshly as compared to those who did 
not disclose. This has important consequences especially for users of 
new technologies of information sharing.
Disclosures of sensitive information have become increasingly 
common in social media. In the face of such common disclosures, 
some have argued that social norms about privacy and acceptable 
boundaries of revelation of private information are changing.1 Yet, 
public disclosures are often the starting point people use to form an 
impression about others, as it occurs when employers pre-screen 
job applicants by checking out their online media profiles (Brown 
& Vaughn, 2011). Would changing social norms about what is ap-
propriate to disclose affect how people react to similar disclosures 
made by others?
Since social norms about appropriate online disclosures are 
likely to change over time, information that today is categorized as 
embarrassing or harmful to one’s reputation may not receive as much 
attention in the near future as it does now. So, if most of us were to 
have questionable information about ourselves available on the In-
ternet in a few years from now, similar information about others may 
not negatively affect our impressions about them. This may happen 
for different reasons. First, we may perceive others as similar to us 
because of our shared experience of disclosing personal information. 
Second, we may not judge them negatively since doing so would 
reflect poorly on us too, thus not allowing us to maintain a positive 
self-image. Alternatively, we may recognize the inappropriateness 
of the disclosures but still not express harsh judgments about others 
based on their disclosures so as to avoid being seen as hypocrite.
Contrary to this intuitive prediction, and consistent with cog-
nitive dissonance research (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Novak 
& Lerner, 1968; Taylor & Mettee, 1971), we suggest the opposite: 
questionable disclosures may lead to harsher judgments toward oth-
ers who made similar disclosures. Our prediction also derives from 
recent behavioral ethics research, which found that people make 
harsher judgments of others’ immoral actions after recalling their 
own past immoral behavior than after recalling their own past moral 
behavior (Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012). In our research, be-
sides reflecting on their own past behavior, participants disclose it 
to others. 
We test our prediction in two studies by examining how people 
react to disclosures of others’ questionable behaviors (photos of one 
being drunk or using drugs) when they made similar disclosures 
about themselves. We consider both unprompted (Study 1) and elic-
ited disclosures (Study 2). Both studies were online surveys with par-
ticipants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
In Study 1, we use observational data (self-reported posting 
of sensitive information on online social networks) to test whether 
1  See, for instance, Facebook founder Zuckerberg’s statement at the 
2010 Crunchie Awards (http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/
facebook-privacy) and a report by the Pew Research Center (http://www.
pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Future_Of_Millennials.
pdf). Last accessed on February 9, 2013.
unprompted disclosure of a specific embarrassing behavior corre-
lates negatively with the judgment of others who made similar dis-
closures; whether this effect vanishes when the target person was 
not personally responsible for the disclosure, which was made by 
someone else instead; and whether this effect could be explained 
by cognitive dissonance. We find that people who self-reported that 
their online records included embarrassing material, such as drunken 
photos, would be less likely to hire a qualified job candidate who had 
drunken photos on her social media profile than people who never 
posted such material in the first place. We also find evidence of regret 
(dissonance) as the triggering mechanism.
Since people choose whether or not to disclose certain sensitive 
information, Study 1 does not allow for causal inference about the 
effect of disclosure itself. In order to solve this self-selection issue, 
in Study 2 we manipulated the probability of disclosure experimen-
tally by either providing or not providing strong privacy and con-
fidentiality reassurances to subjects (Frey, 1986; Singer, Hippler & 
Schwarz, 1992), thus making privacy concerns salient or not. Hence, 
employing the same attitudinal measure used in Study 1 and using 
the random assignment to one of the two conditions as an instrument 
for disclosure, we tested, using an instrumental variable approach 
(Angrist, 1990; Angrist, Imbens & Rubin, 1996), whether embarrass-
ing disclosures have a negative effect on impressions about a target 
person who also made similar disclosures. We find that people who 
admitted having tried drugs were less likely to hire a job candidate 
who had posted material related to her drug use on her social media 
profile, as compared to people who did not admit it. 
Our work offers two main contributions. First, we contribute to 
impression formation research by examining the impressions people 
form of others based on their private disclosures. When forming 
impressions of others, one might consider a trait the target person 
possesses or a trait the target person decided to publicly disclose. In 
the former case, people will likely form an impression of the target 
person based on the trait itself; in the latter case, people will form an 
impression based on the disclosed trait. Though people may have no 
particular opinion about a certain trait or behavior of others, the very 
choice of publicly disclosing it may generate a negative impression. 
Therefore, we expect different reactions to information that the target 
person willingly decides to disclose, and information about the target 
that is disclosed by somebody else.
Second, our research makes an empirical contribution to the psy-
chology and consumer research literature by testing our hypotheses 
using instrumental variable estimation, a regression-based approach 
that is particularly useful in cases where experimental manipulations 
leave a margin for non-compliance to participants. Though this ap-
proach is common in economics, it seems underutilized in consumer 
research and related fields.
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The Power to Control Time: How Power Influences How Much Time (You Think) You 
Have
Alice Moon, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Serena Chen, University of California, Berkeley, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Time is commonly described as the “ultimate resource.” Un-
like other resources, such as food or money, time is constantly being 
spent and can never be replaced. Because of the irreplaceable nature 
of time and all of the things that people want to accomplish, people 
often complain that they don’t have enough time, and this time pres-
sure is a substantial stressor. Though power has been defined as con-
trol over resources, time appears to be a unique resource that equal-
izes all people, high and low in power alike.
Although everyone objectively has the same amount of time, 
could power increase individuals’ subjective perceptions of the 
amount of time they have? We propose that power leads people to 
feel as though they have more control over their time, which results 
in more optimistic time-availability assessments. In fact, powerful 
individuals believe they have control over outcomes that they could 
not possibly control, such as the outcome of a die roll (Fast, Gruen-
feld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). If powerful individuals also feel 
they have control over their time, it stands to reason that they may 
also feel they have more time.
While no research has explicitly examined power and perceived 
time availability thus far, a growing literature on power and time-
related phenomena converges with the idea that power may increase 
one’s perception of time. For instance, high-power individuals, com-
pared to low-power individuals, have been found to be especially 
biased in underestimating the amount of time they expect tasks to 
take (Weick & Guinote, 2010). This effect could partly be due to an 
increased sense of available time. That is, if high-power individu-
als feel they have more time, this could result in optimistic predic-
tions about how long tasks will take. Power has also been found to 
decrease temporal discounting (Joshi & Fast, 2013). Because past 
research has indicated that having an expanded time horizon (i.e., 
feeling as though you have more time) leads to less discounting (Za-
uberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009), power could lead to de-
creased temporal discounting partly by way of an increased sense of 
available time. Although each of these studies has identified various 
separate mediators, all of these effects could potentially be cohesive-
ly explained by the underlying mechanism of increased perceived 
time availability.
In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that power in-
creases one’s perceived amount of time, due to increased percep-
tions of control over time. We tested whether perceived control over 
time mediated the power-time link both by measuring the mediator in 
Study 3 and by experimentally manipulating the mediator in Study 4 
to examine its effects on perceived time availability.
Study 1
Study 1 (N = 56) examined the relationship between trait pow-
er and perceived time availability. Higher trait power was signifi-
cantly associated with greater perceived time availability, r(56)=.38, 
p=.004.
Study 2
Participants were asked to visualize themselves in an interview 
scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves as either 
the interviewer (evaluating the outcomes of the interviewee; high-
power role, n = 50) or the interviewee (being evaluated by the in-
terviewer; low-power role, n = 52). Participants were also shown a 
picture of an interview room and asked to imagine themselves in the 
chair that an arrow pointed to (a high-power or low-power chair). Af-
ter this task, participants reported their state perceived time availabil-
ity. As expected, high-power participants felt they had significantly 
more time (M=4.51, SD=0.93) than low-power participants (M=3.98, 
SD=1.01), F(1, 96)=7.10, p=.01.
Study 3
Study 3 (N = 103) aimed to replicate Study 2 using a com-
munity sample (MTurk) and to investigate whether the underlying 
mechanism for the relationship between power and perceived time 
availability is perceived control over time. The procedure and mate-
rials for Study 3 were the same as Study 2 with the addition of a state 
measure of perceived control over time. High-power participants felt 
they had more control over their time (M=4.95, SD=1.06) than low-
power participants (M=4.41, SD=1.18), F(1,94)=5.48, p=.02. Repli-
cating Study 2, high-power participants also felt they had more time 
(M=4.74, SD=1.25) than low-power participants (M=4.16, SD=1.12), 
F(1, 94)=5.64, p=.02.
As hypothesized, perceived control over time fully mediated 
the effect of power condition on perceived time availability. That is, 
the effect of the power condition on perceived time availability was 
no longer significant when taking perceived control over time into 
account, and using bootstrapping indicated that the indirect effect 
was significant. Therefore, Study 3 provided evidence that power 
influences perceived time availability through increased perceived 
control over time.
Study 4
Though Study 3 offered correlational evidence that perceived 
control over time mediated the power-time link, in Study 4, we 
sought to provide experimental evidence for our mediator. There-
fore, we used an experimental casual chain link as suggested by 
Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005). In particular, in Study 3, we found 
that power influenced perceived control over time. In Study 4, we 
manipulated perceived control over time to examine its effects on 
perceived time availability.
Participants were first asked to recall a time in which they had 
(high control condition, n = 44) or did not have (no control condition, 
n = 57) control over their time. Then, participants reported how much 
time they felt they had.  Participants in the high-control condition felt 
they had more time (M=4.69; SD=1.40) than participants in the no-
control condition (M=4.04; SD=1.11), F(1, 99)=6.57, p=.01.
Table 1: Summary of Results
Results
Study 1 Trait power is associated with increased perceived time availability.
Study 2 Manipulating power increases perceived time availability.
Studies 3 & 4 Perceived control over time mediates the power-time link.
Across four studies, we found that power leads to an increased 
sense of available time by boosting powerful individuals’ percep-
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tions of their control over time. Increases in perceived time availabil-
ity has many important implications. In addition to decreased stress, 
greater perceived time availability has been linked to more time 
spent helping others (Darley & Batson, 1973, Rudd et al., 2012), 
consumption of more experiential (vs. material) goods (Rudd et al., 
2012), and increased willingness to commit to future engagements 
(Mogilner, Chance, & Norton, 2012). Given the importance of sub-
jective time availability, future research should examine the implica-
tions of feeling like you have (or don’t have) time.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Introduction
In recent years, consumer animosity has received a lot of 
attention in international marketing literature (for a review, see 
Riefler and Diamantopoulos 2007). The construct is conceptually 
defined as “remnants of antipathy related to previous or ongoing 
military, political or economic events” (Klein, Ettenson, and Morris 
1998, 90) and has been repeatedly found to have a negative effect 
on consumers’ willingness to buy foreign products (e.g., Klein et al. 
1998; Klein 2002; Shimp, Dunn, and Klein 2004). Animosity may 
also adversely impact product evaluations (Ettenson and Klein 2005; 
Rose, Rose, and Shoham 2009; Shoham et al. 2006). Its influence 
has been found to be separate from that of consumer ethnocentrism, 
namely, the “beliefs held by consumers about the appropriateness 
and indeed morality of purchasing foreign-made products” (Shimp 
and Sharma 1987, 280), which has similar effects on foreign product 
buying behavior (for a review, see Shankarmahesh 2006). 
In some purchase settings, there may be a countervailing force to 
animosity, namely nostalgia, reflecting “a preference (general liking, 
positive attitude, or favorable affect) toward objects (people, places, 
or things) that were more common (popular, fashionable, or widely 
circulated) when one was younger (in early adulthood, in adolescence, 
in childhood, or even before birth” (Holbrook and Schindler 1991, 
330). Such settings typically occur when countries that experienced 
painful long-lasting occupation, become independent. For example, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of new countries were 
established where consumers are exposed to products that are closely 
connected with consumers’ youth and past, but at the same time, 
they originate in a (now) foreign and disliked country. Under these 
circumstances, negative attitudes due to animosity may co-exist with 
positive attitudes due to consumer nostalgia and the question arises 
as to which construct has the strongest impact on consumer behavior. 
Against this background, the purpose of the current study 
is to empirically examine consumer animosity and nostalgia as 
countervailing forces on consumer behavior in Lithuania, while 
controlling for the effects of consumer ethnocentrism. Lithuania 
provides a suitable setting for nostalgia and country animosity 
research as the country was occupied by the Soviet Union for five 
decades (1940‟1990) and only regained its independence relatively 
recently. The Russian Federation is thus a target country for negative 
sentiments as it is a legal successor to the Soviet Union and an ex-
controlling state of this union. Russian-made products may give rise 
to nostalgic feelings (as those products are connected with the past), 
but at the same time evoke animosity feelings due to historical events. 
The latter include mass deportation campaigns to Siberia, partisan 
resistance fights, and more recent independence fights (Laurinavičius, 
Motieka, and Statkus 2005). Attitudes towards products made in 
Russian Federation are thus probably simultaneously loaded both 
with (positive) nostalgic memories and (negative) animosity feelings. 
Unlike most previous studies of animosity and nostalgia, the 
focus of the present study is not on intended, but on actual behavior 
(product ownership) as the key outcome variable. More specifically, 
two types of products are considered: nostalgic and non-nostalgic 
products. Both types of products are manufactured and imported 
from the Russian Federation, but originate from different time 
periods. Nostalgic products were already available during Soviet 
times, whereas non-nostalgic products have been launched to the 
market after Lithuania regained independence.
Conceptual Background and Hypotheses
Impact of Consumer Animosity
Animosity is theoretically expected to be negatively related 
to buying products from the offending country, since Lithuanian 
consumers’ animosity feelings are likely to bear on purchasing 
decisions, leading to the avoidance of Russian products. In a prior 
research, product ownership was assessed by Klein et al. (1998), 
who validated their willingness to buy measure with a measure of 
actual ownership of six consumer products (e.g., radios, cameras); 
by Shin (2001), who asked respondents to freely list all products 
of Japanese origin they possess; and by Klein (2002), who asked 
respondents to indicate whether they own a Japanese car. Shoham 
et al. (2006) used a change-in-purchase behavior scale that featured 
six actual product categories produced or marketed by Israeli Arabs, 
while Guido et al. (2010) observed animosity effects on purchases 
on two additional product categories. As all these studies empirically 
confirm that animosity negatively influences actual ownership, we 
also expect that:
Hypothesis 1: Consumer animosity is negatively related to ac-
tual ownership of Russian products.
In their seminal study, Klein et al. (1998) found that animosity 
toward a foreign nation affects negatively the purchase of products 
produced by that country independently of judgments of product 
quality. Thus, consumers may acknowledge the (good) product 
quality stemming from the offending country, but still avoid such 
products because the foreign country concerned has engaged in 
military, political, or economic acts that a consumer finds both 
grievous and difficult to forgive (Klein et al. 1998). While several 
studies subsequently confirmed the non-significant link between 
animosity and product judgment (e.g., Witkowski 2000; Shin 2001; 
Klein 2002), other authors found a direct negative effect of animosity 
on product judgment (e.g., Ettenson and Klein 2005; Mostafa 2010; 
Shoham et al. 2006). Shoham et al. (2006) draw on the principle 
of cognitive consistency theory (Festinger 1957) and balance theory 
(Heider 1958). Researchers argue that consumers who feel heightened 
animosity will seek to restore the balance and be motivated to adapt 
their cognitions (product-quality judgments) downward. Thus, an 
increase in animosity levels will bring about a decrease in product-
quality judgment to maintain the harmony. Moreover,  the impact of 
animosity on product judgment may be country specific (e.g., Japan 
may be a target country of animosity, but, at the same time, it enjoys 
a positive image in terms of quality and workmanship). In the current 
case, we expect that animosity will lead to a denigration of products 
made in the Russian Federation as the latter tends to be associated 
with a poor product quality stereotype. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: Consumer animosity is negatively related to 
product judgment of Russian products
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Impact of Nostalgia
Findings regarding the relationship between nostalgia and 
purchase behavior are mixed. For example, Sierra and McQuitty 
(2007) found that nostalgia positively influences consumers’ 
intentions to purchase nostalgic products, while Ford and Merchant 
(2010) found that appeals for charity that evoke personal nostalgia 
have a positive impact on the charitable-donation intentions of 
consumers. In contrast, Rindfleisch, Freeman, and Burroughs 
(2000) found that nostalgia is a poor predictor of product preference 
and choice for such products as automobiles. Similarly, Lambert-
Pandraud and Laurent (2010) concentrated on actual ownership of 
perfume and found that nostalgia does not offer a strong explanation 
of older consumers’ tendency to use older perfumes. 
The above mixed findings can (at least) partly be explained by 
differences in the level of specificity of the nostalgia scales used. 
Some aforementioned studies used Holbrook’s (1993) general 
nostalgia scale (e.g., Rindfleisch et al. 2000) and linked to specific, 
but not necessarily nostalgic, brands. Other studies focused on 
nostalgic products and also used more product-specific items in their 
nostalgia measure (e.g., Sierra and McQuitty 2007). In the present 
case, since we explicitly consider both nostalgic and non-nostalgic 
products, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3: Nostalgia is positively related to actual purchas-
es of nostalgic Russian products only.
Prior research has not addressed the relationship between 
nostalgia and product judgment. However, bearing in mind that 
nostalgia reflects a “yearning for yesterday” (Davis 1979, 18), 
one could expect that such a state of mind may lead to a harsher 
evaluation of the products of today. In addition, the scale used to 
measure nostalgia (product nostalgia factor) incorporate product 
judgment items (e.g., “They don’t make them like they used to”). 
The consumers who hold attitude that products were better in the old 
days will be more positive towards Soviet products (that originate 
from the old days). We thus hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Nostalgia is positively related to product judg-
ment of nostalgic Russian products only.
Impact of Consumer Ethnocentrism 
As already noted, in the current study, consumer ethnocentrism 
serves as a control variable for the effects of animosity and nostalgia 
on product judgment and ownership. Ethnocentric consumers would 
consider purchasing imported products as being wrong because it 
hurts the domestic economy, causes loss of jobs, and is unpatriotic 
(Shimp and Sharma 1987). Whereas ethnocentrism is strongly linked 
towards preferences for domestic products and negatively related 
towards all foreign products, animosity is country‟specific (Klein 
2002; Klein and Ettenson 1999). A substantial body of research 
shows that consumer ethnocentrism has a significant negative impact 
on product judgment and willingness to buy foreign products (e.g., 
Klein 2002; Netemeyer, Durvasula, and Lichtenstein 1991; Sharma, 
Shimp, and Shin 1995). We, thus, expect that:
Hypothesis 5: Consumer ethnocentrism is negatively related to 
actual ownership of Russian products.
Hypothesis 6: Consumer ethnocentrism is negatively related to 
product judgment of Russian products.
Extant literature has not explicitly addressed the relationship 
among consumer ethnocentrism, animosity and nostalgia. According 
to Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979, for a review 
see Hogg 2006), ethnocentrism is associated with a negative out-
group bias toward foreign products in general and animosity – with 
negative out-group bias towards specific country. To the contrary, 
nostalgia is associated with in-group favoritism (Sierra and McQuitty 
2007) and may assist in connecting with a desirable past and with 
other people who shared the same experience (Kleine, Kleine, and 
Allen 1995). As in our case we research specific country-made 
products and not foreign products in general, the effects of animosity 
and nostalgia may dominate the consumer choices in contrast to 
the consumer ethnocentrism (e.g., consumers might avoid buying 
foreign products in general, but this ethnocentric tendency is weaker 
than country specific animosity and country specific nostalgia). 
Thus, in the case when specific country products are analyzed the 
specific attitudes should dominate general ethnocentric attitudes, 
therefore we propose that:  
Hypothesis 7: Consumer ethnocentrism effects will be weak 
when animosity and nostalgia are also present
Since product judgment is well-known to be positively related 
to product ownership (e.g., Guido et al. 2010; Klein et al. 1998; 
Shoham et al. 2006), we further posit that: 
Hypothesis 8: Product judgment of Russian products is posi-
tively related to actual ownership of Russian 
products.
Method
Data were collected through mall intercepts (Bruwer and 
Haydam 1996) in the biggest shopping mall of Lithuania in Vilnius 
by randomly approaching consumers entering the mall. A total 
of 419 questionnaires were included in the analysis. The sample 
includes almost equal numbers of male and female respondents. Just 
over 12% of the respondents were younger than 19 years of age, 45% 
fell into 20‟29 years age group, 23.2% were between 30‟39 years 
old, 9.8% between 40‟49 and 9.2% were 50+ years old. In terms 
of household income, most respondents fell into three almost equal 
groups (each accounting around 29%), and only the lowest-income 
group was significantly smaller (12% of the sample). Compared 
to Lithuania’s general population, the sample consists of slightly 
younger, urban respondents with a higher income (Lithuanian 
Department of Statistics 2011). 
To operationalize the study constructs, we adapted scales 
that had been validated in previous research. Consumer animosity 
towards Russia was measured with a three-item scale based on Klein 
et al. (1998) and adapted to the Lithuanian context (example item: I 
cannot forgive Russia for the mass deportation campaigns of people 
to Siberia). The scale focused on war animosity which captures the 
most relevant and sensitive aspect of animosity towards Russia in 
the survey country. Nostalgia was measured by four items drawn 
from Holbrook (1993). Consistent with prior research revealing two-
dimensional nature of the scale (Borges and Boulbry 2003; Evans et 
al. 2010; Reisenwitz, Iyer, and Cutler 2004; Rindfleisch et al. 2000; 
Rousseau and Venter 1999, 2000), two of the items captured product 
nostalgia (example item: They don’t make them like they used to) 
and the other two progress nostalgia (example item: Technological 
change will ensure a brighter future). Consumer ethnocentrism was 
measured by the four-items scale used by Klein (2002) which is 
based on Shimp and Sharma’s (1987) original CETSCALE (example 
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item: It is not right to purchase foreign products, because it puts 
Lithuanians out of jobs). Product judgment was measured on a 
three-item scale based on items developed by Klein et al. (1998), 
Darling and Arnold (1988), Wood and Darling (1993) (example 
item: Products made in Russia are of good quality). 
Product ownership was measured by asking respondents 
whether they had bought different Russian convenience goods 
during the last six months. As currently there is not many nostalgic 
products available that had been manufactured during the Soviet 
times, we included three brands that used to be the pride of Soviet 
manufacturing sector (black tea and mineral water). They are still 
manufactured by Russian companies, keeping the old brand names. 
Non-nostalgic products were represented by three brands currently 
manufactured in the Russian Federation but not available during 
Soviet times (dressing and cosmetics). Product ownership was 
measured as sums of all brands purchased in the nostalgic and non-
nostalgic categories respectively. 
Results 
Measurement model
We investigated the dimensionality, reliability and validity of 
our construct measures via a confirmatory factor analysis (Anderson 
and Gerbing 1988). Overall fit was satisfactory (χ² = 252, df = 
85, RMSEA = 0.065, CFI = 0.952, SRMR = 0.041). Composite 
reliabilities of measurement models ranged from .67 to .93, while 
average variance extracted (AVE) values ranged from .51 to .81. All 
AVEs exceeded the squared correlation between each construct with 
all other constructs (Fornell and Larker 1981).
Structural model
To test our hypotheses, we estimated a structural equation 
model with LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2007), which 
produced a satisfactory fit (χ² = 236, df = 85, RMSEA = 0.065, 
CFI = 0.952, SRMR = 0.041). The relevant standardized parameter 
estimates and associated t-values are shown in figure 1. Supporting 
hypothesis 1, country animosity is negatively related to ownership of 
both nostalgic (β = -0.09, p ‟ .10) and non-nostalgic (β = -0.11, p ‟ 
.05) Russian products. Moreover, and consistent with hypothesis 2, 
animosity negatively impacts product judgment (β = -0.40, p ‟ .01). 
In support of hypothesis 3, product nostalgia is positively linked to 
ownership of nostalgic Russian products (β = 0.17, p ‟ .05); however, 
no such effect is observed for progress nostalgia. Moreover, neither 
product nor progress nostalgia are related to product judgment, thus 
offering no support for hypothesis 4. Surprisingly, and in contrast 
to hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6, consumer ethnocentrism reveals 
no significant impact on either product ownership or product 
judgment. As expected, consumer ethnocentrism effects are weak 
when animosity and nostalgia are also present and hypothesis 7 is 
confirmed. Finally, as predicted by hypothesis 8, product judgment 
is positively related to product ownership; this effect holds for both 
nostalgic (β = 0.41, p ‟ .01) and non-nostalgic products (β = 0.42, 
p ‟ .01).  
Discussion and Conclusions
Our findings offer some evidence that consumer nostalgia 
may indeed act as a countervailing force to consumer animosity in 
certain settings. However, it is only product nostalgia that impacts 
consumer behavior and its influence is limited to nostalgic products. 
Indeed, with regard to ownership of the latter, nostalgia is a better 
predictor than consumer animosity; the opposite holds in the case of 
non-nostalgic products ownership of which is affected by animosity 
but not nostalgia. Regarding product judgment, only animosity was 
found to be a significant predictor, as also observed by Ettenson 
and Klein (2005) and Mostafa (2010), among others. Given that 
product judgment also strongly impacts product ownership, it can 
be concluded that consumer animosity has a greater explanatory 
power than either nostalgia or consumer ethnocentrism. Indeed, 
the latter was unexpectedly found to have no significant effects 
on either product judgment or product ownership. In this context, 
some animosity studies found that consumer ethnocentrism is the 
dominant factor in choosing between a domestic good and a foreign 
good (e.g., Klein 2002). The current findings suggest that the relative 
strength of consumer ethnocentrism may be weak, when animosity 
and nostalgia also influence product purchases. 
From a managerial perspective, the study findings have 
implications for advertisers, who normally benefit from positive 
consumer responses to nostalgia (Reisenwitz et al. 2004). Advertisers 
communicating products that strengthen consumers’ nostalgic 
responses should expect that nostalgia can produce a competitive 
advantage only when exploited in appropriate settings. In countries 
where nostalgic memories co-exist with animosity feelings, messages 
from the past should be used cautiously as they may elicit public 
outrage. A recent negative publicity example in Lithuania involves a 
supermarket chain which promoted food products carrying “Soviet” 
as a brand name during the commemoration of victims of the fight 
for independence day. The campaign not only provoked negative 
consumer responses, but also encouraged discussion at the political 
level that brand names with Soviet connotations have to be banned.
Regarding future research, three issues merit attention. First, 
the current study should be replicated in other settings in which 
both animosity and nostalgia may co-exist (e.g., other ex-Soviet 
countries, former Yugoslavia) in order to assess the generalizability 
of our findings. Second, instead of using Holbrook’s (1993) scale 
which captures nostalgia in general, future studies may develop 
scales that focus on some specific former period; this would make 
the measurement of nostalgia more comparable to measures of 
animosity which, by definition, focus on specific events (Riefler 
and Diamantopoulos 2007). Finally, a longitudinal study seeking to 
explicate the development the relationship between animosity and 
nostalgia over time would offer important insights on the dynamics 
of the constructs.
Figure 1: Hypothesis Testing Results
Note: standardized estimates shown (t‟values in brackets)
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All that Glitters is Gold: Conspicuous Sensory Consumption as a Means for Self-Worth 
Restoration
Rishtee Batra, Indian School of Business, India
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Sensory consumption is understood to be consumption of 
products or experiences that engages the senses of the consumer; a 
consumption experience that is processed through one or more of 
the five sensory modalities of taste, vision, sound, smell and touch 
(Krishna 2011). In this research we investigate how consumers can 
use heightened sensory consumption as a means of restoration of 
their feelings of self-worth.
The relationship between need for status or self-esteem, and the 
use of conspicuous consumption as a compensatory mechanism is 
well established (Charles, Hurst and Roussanov 2009; Rucker and 
Galinsky 2008, 2009). In conspicuous consumption, compensatory 
consumption has involved a heightened engagement of only one of 
the five senses, vision (Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2010, 2012). 
In this work we investigate: 1) Do individuals facing self-threat only 
consume conspicuously when products have clear status-enhancing 
visual attributes like brand name and logo, or does this preference for 
visually conspicuous products operate at a more basic sensory level, 
void of contextual status-cues such as brand? 2) Do individuals fac-
ing self-threat also seek more conspicuous consumption along other 
sensory domains? Contrary to the spirit of conspicuous consumption 
which deals with visible consumption in the visual domain, we pro-
pose that a threat to one’s self-worth would result in compensatory 
effects even in consumption experiences which are not publicly vis-
ible, thus proposing that conspicuous sensory consumption- defined 
by us as need for heightened engagement across different sensory 
domains- may be a means for self-worth restoration as well (Sivan-
than and Pettit 2010).  
In a series of four studies, we test whether individuals under 
self-threat indulge in heightened sensory consumption in the domains 
of visual, auditory and haptic consumption. We find that when their 
sense of self-worth is threatened, individuals engage in conspicuous 
or heightened sensory gratification by showing a higher preference 
for more conspicuously designed products and louder volumes of 
music, and exhibiting a higher desire to touch products, even those 
for which touching is not considered instrumental in assessing prod-
uct quality. We also find that engaging in a self-affirmation exercise 
negates the need to indulge in conspicuous sensory consumption. 
Thus, we propose that engaging in conspicuous sensory consumption 
may have a restorative effect on consumers’ feelings of self-worth.
Study 1 investigates the impact of self-threat on compensatory 
consumption in the visual domain, looking at consumers’ choices of 
visually conspicuous, “loud” product designs. Adapted from Han, 
Nunes and Dreze (2010) definition of brand prominence, we define 
“visual conspicuousness” as the extent to which a product attracts 
attention, as reflected in its visual properties, including its material 
composition, the use of prominent colors, sizes, shapes, and other 
conspicuous design elements. 84 students participated in this 2 (Self 
Worth: Low, High) X 2 (Visual Product Conspicuousness: Conspicu-
ous, Discreet) experiment. Self-worth was manipulated by inform-
ing participants that they had performed among the lowest 5% (low 
self-worth) or highest 5% (high self-worth) of all participants in a 
problem-solving activity they completed (Sivanathan and Pettit 
2010).  Participants were told that they would be entered in a lot-
tery to win one of two flash drives (pretested to differ only along a 
composite scale for “visual conspicuousness”, not on other measures 
like attractiveness). Subjects in the low self-worth condition liked 
the visually conspicuous flash drive more than the visually discreet 
flash drive (Mconspicuous=5.07, Mdiscreet=4.14, t=2.27, p<.05), had a high-
er purchase intention (Mconspicuous=4.04, Mdiscreet=3.19, t=1.97; p=.05), 
and were willing to pay a higher amount for it Mconspicuous=655.00, 
Mdiscreet=429.52, t=2.65; p<.05).
In Study 2 we investigated whether low self-worth consumers 
would still prefer visually conspicuous products after being given an 
opportunity to affirm themselves. 71 students participated in this 2 
(Self Worth: Low, High) X 2 (Affirmation: Positive, None) experi-
ment. Self-worth was manipulated as in Study 1, after which the par-
ticipants were asked to either write about the most important value in 
their life (positive affirmation) or the least important value (no affir-
mation; Townsend and Sood, 2012; Sivanathan and Pettit, 2010). All 
participants then evaluated the visually conspicuous flash drive.  For 
participants in the low self-worth condition with positive affirmation, 
evaluation of the conspicuous flash drive along all dependent mea-
sures was significantly lower than those not given an opportunity to 
affirm themselves (attitude: M
no affirmation
=5.25, M
affirmation
=4.11, t=2.68, 
p<.05; purchase intention: M
no affirmation
=5.13, M
affirmation
=3.00, t=3.87, 
p<.05, WTP: M
no affirmation
=631.00, M
affirmation
=338.00, t=3.39, p<.05). 
There were no differences in evaluation measures for any of the other 
conditions.
In Study 3 we investigate whether the desire for more conspicu-
ous consumption under self-threat extends to other sensory domains 
like the auditory. 99 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, 
High) X 2 (Affirmation: Positive, None) experiment. Participants 
were exposed to the same self-threat and self-affirmation manipu-
lations as in Study 2, following which they were asked to listen to 
and evaluate a piece of unfamiliar capella music. The key dependent 
measure was the volume level that participants chose when listen-
ing to the audio clip. Participants who were subjugated to self-threat 
but did not receive an opportunity for self-affirmation listened to the 
music clip at a significantly higher volume than those who were sub-
jugated to self-threat but received an opportunity for self-affirmation 
(M
no affirmation
=5.69, M
affirmation
=4.44, t=2.68, p<.05).  There were no dif-
ferences in volume for any of the other conditions.
Study 4 seeks to extend our findings to a third sensory modal-
ity, that of touch. 92 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, 
High) X 2 (product touchability: low, high) experiment. Following 
the self-threat manipulation, participants completed some measures 
related to general shopping behavior which included latent need for 
touch (Peck and Childers 2003).  After this participants were asked 
to evaluate a new product that would soon be launched in their area, 
which was either a water bottle (low NFT product) or a towel (high 
NFT product). The dependent measure was an index of how much 
they wanted to touch the product before purchase. Desire to touch 
even the low NFT product was significantly higher among partici-
pants subjected to low self-worth than those in the high self-worth 
condition (Mlow self-worth=5.55, Mhigh self-worth =4.06; t=3.16, p<.05).  
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Consumption and the Irish Recession: Tiger Tales of Consumer Abundance and Recession
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In 2007 the global financial crisis led to a collapse of the Irish 
economy and ended the Celtic Tiger years (1995-2007). The reces-
sion took most people by surprise, and affected Irish consumers 
across all social strata and socio-economic backgrounds. While the 
economy had grown on average 5.8% annually (2000-2007), real 
GDP shrunk by 4.8% annually from 2008-2011 (ESRI, 2012). While 
the effects of the recession are well documented on the macro-level, 
little is understood about the impact these have had on consumers’ 
identity and consumption practices. This study addresses this gap. 
Much has been written on impoverished consumers and various 
strategies they have utilised to cope with this (Lewis 1959; Hill and 
Stamey 1990; Hill and Stephens 1997; Lee, Ozanne and Hill 1999, 
Hill 2002; Baker, Gentry and Rittenberg 2005; Hamilton 2009). This 
study builds on this by focusing on consumers who have gone from 
living prosperous lives to their standard of living being negatively 
affected by the collapse of the Irish economy. 
To explore consumers moving from a time of abundance to 
recession the researchers interviewed 12 Irish consumers during 
2012-13. The participants were interviewed about their experiences, 
thoughts and feelings and the impact this had on them, their friends 
and families. Utilizing a phenomenological interviewing practice 
(Thompson, Pollio and Locander 1994), the focus was on eliciting 
accounts of experiences of life and consumption pre-recession and 
during the recession itself. Our participants were Irish citizens (28-63 
years old) and had suffered some form of impact during the recession. 
Data was analysed using the hermeneutic circle method (Thompson, 
Pollio and Locander 1994) which lead to the identification, develop-
ment, and refinement of themes focused on coping strategies. 
In the findings it emerged that during the Celtic Tiger years, 
for many, spending and consumption was an activity that enriched 
their lives, it gave them meaning (Belk, 1988), and helped construct 
their identity (Arnould and Thompson 2005), but transitioning from 
a sense of wealth to a reduction in income led to a number of prob-
lems in what and when our participants could consume and also in 
their identity construction. Similar to existing literature on coping 
(Hamilton, 2009; Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg, 2005; Hill, 2002; 
Hill and Stephens 1997; Hill and Stamey, 1990) we found that par-
ticipants used both emotional and behavioural strategies to cope with 
these changes, and a number of new categories also emerged. It is 
important to stress that each category is not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive, and an emotional coping strategy can impact on behavioural 
responses and vice versa. 
Within the emotional coping strategies there were five types of 
coping that emerged. These included disaffecting, distancing, and 
fantasy (all previously considered in existing literature), and new 
categories of resignation, and remembrance of times past. For ex-
ample, in the emotional coping strategies participants discuss how 
the circumstances they find themselves in were not their fault and 
therefore beyond their control at both the macro and the micro level 
(resignation), which for some helped remove themselves from any 
blame. For example, a number of participants discussed how their 
circumstances would be have  been radically different if they had 
qualified for their jobs a year prior. Other participants coped by remi-
niscing about the the good times they had during the Celtic Tiger 
boom including unique or peak experiences such as exotic holidays 
and weekend breaks, exorbitant nights out, and the purchase of high 
ticket items. Negative aspects were recalled, such as the over con-
sumption and wastefulness participants felt had occurred and the 
detrimental impact the Celtic Tiger had on Irish identity.  For some 
participants, the recognition of this they felt was leading to positive 
changes for themselves and Ireland.  
Within the behavioral coping responses we identified nine dif-
ferent strategies. These included controlling potentially harmful 
behaviour, shedding oneself of reminders of an experience, seeking 
support (social and economic), engaging in deception (all previously 
discussed in existing literature), and new categories of economic cut-
backs, making do with what you have, being creative/innovative, re-
connecting (moving from the material back to the social), self-gifts, 
and understanding vs ignoring. To give a flavour of some of these new 
strategies we outline brief examples below. Participants discussed 
the economic cutbacks they made including changes in where, what, 
when, and how much they consumed. Some discussed the prioritiza-
tion of, and discontinuing the use of certain goods (e.g. insurance, 
cars, groceries). Others mentioned how they had reconnected with 
their social environment by looking for new ways to spend time; in-
stead of going shopping or for lunch they took up sports, began to 
reconnect and spend more time with their extended families and/or 
friends, and/or engaged in local community activities. Finally, some 
participants became innovative or creative in their consumption. For 
instance, one participant bought a sewing machine to refashion and 
rework her clothes, thus extending the life and use of these objects.  
This study shows that going from a brief era of mass consump-
tion and seeming abundance to one of austerity was difficult for par-
ticipants, and the transition was exacerbated because they did not 
have the financial resources to consume their way out of the prob-
lem, as is typical within a consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998). 
Participants utilised a number of emotional and behavioral strate-
gies to cope with new circumstances; sometimes these strategies 
had positive impacts on participants and their emotional well-being, 
other times they did not. While existing literature (briefly mentioned 
above) on impoverished consumers considers various coping strat-
egies, our study includes additional strategies and adds to this lit-
erature by exploring consumers who suddenly find themselves with 
reduced financial resources. Our research focuses on the individual 
coping strategies of participants, and examines these within a wider 
institutional framework – by considering national and international 
events, which had a significant impact on behavior. During the Celtic 
Tiger this was seen through an era of “Consumption on Steroids” 
and was, almost overnight, turned to an “Age of Austerity”, shifting 
to an era of restricted and restrained consumption. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Information is key to decision-making. However, seldom do 
consumers have the time or the ability to interpret information. 
Therefore, they often rely on forecasts that analysts (e.g., market 
researchers) make using this information.  But how do consumers 
evaluate the accuracy of these predictions?
We propose a new cue: the forecast’s probability. We posit that 
when the forecaster makes a prediction (e.g. a 70% or 30% chance 
that a stock will increase in value), people will use the estimate 
(70% or 30%) to assess accuracy. This accuracy attribution occurs 
because people infer from a higher prediction that the forecaster has 
conducted more in depth analyses of the available information when 
calculating the prediction. This arises from a naïve belief that a more 
in depth analysis can increase prediction accuracy. 
Because people infer that a higher (e.g. 70%) prediction re-
flects greater predictability relative to a lower prediction (e.g. 30%), 
individuals will believe that the forecaster has conducted a more 
thorough analysis when making a 70% prediction relative to a 30% 
prediction (H1). If higher (vs. lower) predictions signal that a more 
in-depth analysis has been conducted, then the resulting estimate 
should also be more accurate (H2). Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween prediction estimates and accuracy will be mediated by percep-
tions of depth of information analyses (H3). 
Moreover, if higher predictions increase perceptions of depth 
of analyses and accuracy, then the benefits should extend to the fore-
caster. Thus, an analyst who makes higher predictions should be 
judged as being more reliable and trustworthy (H4). Finally, if lower 
(vs. higher) predictions signal that the forecaster has not conducted 
an in-depth analysis, perceivers may review existing contextual in-
formation carefully themselves, even if this information was includ-
ed when deriving the probability estimates (H5) 
In study 1, we presented a prediction from a basketball expert 
about an upcoming game between two teams, A and B, and manipu-
lated chance to be high or low (N = 162). In the high (low) condition, 
the prediction of team A winning was 70% (30%).  We obtained the 
predicted main effects: the prediction was judged to be more accu-
rate when it was higher (Mhigh-chance = 4.24 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.54, F(1, 
160)=15.27, p < .001). In addition, with higher (vs. lower) predic-
tions, participants perceived the expert as more reliable (Mhigh-chance 
= 4.77 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.13, F(1, 160) = 15.82, p < .001), more trust-
worthy (Mhigh-chance = 4.84 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.35, F(1, 160) = 7.58, p < 
.01), and more knowledgeable (M-high-chance = 5.78 vs. Mlow-chance = 5.28, 
F(1, 160) = 6.96, p < .01). Furthermore, these accuracy perceptions 
mediated the effects of chance on expert evaluations. 
In study 2, we examine the effect of prediction framing on ac-
curacy judgments. We expect that a higher chance of winning (los-
ing) a game will lead to greater accuracy judgments relative to a 
lower chance of losing (winning). We used a 2 chance (high, low) 
x 2 prediction framing (winning, losing) between-subjects design 
(N = 161). The scenario was similar to that of study 1. In the win-
ning (losing) framing condition, the expert predicted the chance of 
team A winning (losing). Replicating previous results, the accuracy 
scale elicited higher responses in the high (vs. low) chance condi-
tion (Mhigh-chance = 4.11 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.34, F(1, 157) = 19.73, p < 
.001). The chance by framing interaction was not significant (NS), 
suggesting that irrespective of framing (winning or losing), accuracy 
was higher when the predicted chance was higher (vs. lower). But, 
consistent with our hypotheses, participants reported that the forecast 
was more accurate when chance was higher versus lower; that is, a 
70% prediction of winning was more accurate than a 30% prediction 
of losing (Mhigh-chance-winning = 4.05 vs. Mlow-chance-losing = 3.36, F(1, 157) = 
8.15, p < .005), and, a 70% chance of losing was more accurate than 
a 30% chance of winning (Mhigh-chance-losing = 4.16 vs. Mlow-chance-winning = 
3.31, F(1, 157) = 11.71, p < .001). 
In study 3, we investigate the role of the forecaster’s depth of in-
formation analyses, and study its effects on outcome expectations. If 
the forecaster’s depth of analyses drives accuracy perceptions, with 
lower (vs. higher) predictions, participants will try to compensate for 
the lack of depth of analyses in the forecaster’s research by reanalyz-
ing contextual details carefully themselves; therefore, we expect the 
contextual background to influence outcome expectations when pre-
dictions are lower. We used a 2 chance (high, low) x 2 market context 
(positive, negative) between-subjects design (N = 94). Participants 
imagined purchasing a company’s stocks; in the positive (negative) 
context, the industry was expected to grow (slow down). After con-
sidering all the pros and the cons, the analyst made predictions about 
the chance that the company would be successful. In the high (low) 
chance condition, the prediction was 70% (30%). When chance was 
higher (vs. lower), the forecaster was perceived to have conducted 
a more in depth analysis (Mhigh-chance = 5.15 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.65, F(1, 
90) = 4.46, p < .05), and the prediction was judged as being more 
accurate (Mhigh-chance = 4.67 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.96, F(1, 90) = 8.76, p < 
.005). In addition, the chance by context interaction was significant 
(F(1, 90) = 5.53, p < .03). While context did not influence success 
expectations in the high chance condition (Mpositive = 4.53 vs. Mnegative 
= 4.37, F(1, 90) = .66, p > .41), when chance was lower, positive 
context led to higher success expectations (Mpositive = 3.76 vs. M negative 
= 2.87, F(1,90) = 15.52,  p < .001). Indeed, such kinds of predictions 
are made in a variety of contexts, such as those relating to sporting 
contests, economic recovery, prospects of new products, Presidential 
elections, and other events. Our finding that the magnitude of the 
prediction (high vs. low) is used to judge its accuracy is likely to 
have important implications for consumer judgments and decision-
making (e.g., which stocks consumers buy, how much they buy, and 
which forecaster they believe in).   
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The marketing literature has traditionally differentiated among 
products, services, and experiences (Nelson 1970, Darby and 
Karni 1973). Given that these types of goods differ in important 
dimensions, it is reasonable to believe that there are also differences 
in the conditions for persuasive advertising. While there is some 
literature on service advertising (Mittal 1999), the specificities of the 
advertising of experience goods are less known. In this research we 
propose that narrative processing is an important component of the 
evaluation of experience goods (EG), and that – as a consequence 
– EG advertising can benefit from the key elements of persuasive 
narratives. Specifically, we examine the importance of consistency 
among the narrative elements. 
The two characteristics of a narrative are that (1) they are 
organized in terms of a temporal dimension, and (2) they consist 
of goal-directed action-outcome sequences (Escalas 2004). EG 
(consider a trip or a restaurant meal) include these characteristics. 
We therefore propose that EG – and information about EG such as 
advertising – are processed narratively. Because one of the necessary 
conditions for a narrative to create meaning is consistency among the 
narrative elements (Cho, Shen, and Wilson 2012; Hall 2003; McKee 
1997), we propose that the narrative elements in an EG ad (copy, 
image) need to be consistent in order for the ad to be persuasive. On 
the other hand, since search goods (SG) are not processed narratively, 
lack of consistency in a SG ad will not have a negative effect.
We use narrative transportation (Green and Brock 2000) as a 
measure for the immersion into the story that the ad is presenting. 
Narrative processing has already been used in consumer research 
(Escalas 2004; Phillips and McQuarrie 2010; Wang and Calder 
2006). For instance, when subjects were asked to imagine themselves 
using the advertised product, narrative transportation mediated 
the favorable effect of that mental simulation on attitudes (Escalas 
2004). We propose that lack of consistency between the copy and the 
image in the EG ad prevents the consumer from being transported, 
and is therefore less persuasive. 
Hypotheses. Our main hypothesis is that the copy and the image 
in an EG ad need to be consistent to be persuasive. The elements 
in the ad need to point to the same narrative. On the other hand, 
consistency is not needed in the advertising of SG, since it is not 
processed narratively. We test this in two experiments. 
Study 1. We focus on movie posters because movies represent 
a prototypical EG (Sood and Drèze 2006). Participants were first 
primed to process information either in a narrative fashion (“transport 
yourself into the narrative”) or in a thoroughly elaborative fashion 
(“consider the reasons why the studio has chosen this specific poster 
design”). Participants were then exposed to two different movie 
posters, sequentially. The elements in the posters (title, image) were 
either consistent or inconsistent with each other (from a pretest). 
Participants then responded to a number of behavioral measures 
capturing their intention to watch the movie and their level of 
narrative transportation and elaboration. As hypothesized, there was 
a significant interaction of type of processing and type of poster, so 
that inconsistency had a negative impact in the narrative processing 
condition, but not in the elaboration condition (F(1, 118) = 6.06, 
p < .05). Also, as hypothesized, bootstrapping analyses revealed 
that narrative transportation mediated the results. Participants who 
evaluated the non-consistent posters narratively were unable to 
transport. The different elements in the poster pointed at different 
stories, and this impeded transportation.
Study 2. Our second study intends to generalize the findings 
from study 1 by (1) comparing the effects of consistency across 
ads for EG versus SG, and (2) not priming any processing style but 
allowing participants to engage the ads naturally. Participants were 
assigned to one of four conditions depending on the type of good 
(EG: restaurant, spa; SG: shampoo, running shoes), and the type 
of ad (picture is consistent with the text versus inconsistent: text 
was kept constant). The pictures were pretested across conditions 
as equally attractive and fitting to the product category. The goods 
were pretested as EG or SG. We collected persuasion and purchase 
intent measures, as well as narrative transportation measures. As 
hypothesized, there was a significant interaction between type of 
good and consistency, so that lack of consistency harmed the EG 
ads but did not affect the SG ads (F(1, 213) = 7.32, p < .05). Also 
as hypothesized, narrative transportation mediated the effect. Again 
consumers are unable to transport in the non-consistent EG ads.
We contribute to consumer research in general and to research in 
advertising in particular by finding an important difference between 
experiences and products that influences the way advertising is 
processed. Because experiences are processed as narratives before 
consumption, the elements in the ad need to be consistent in order 
to be persuasive. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Acquisition of resources is vital for any individual’s survival and 
well-being. Failure to successfully harness resources from the envi-
ronment is a threat and is undesirable. However, consistent access to 
resources is not a trivial task because availability of resources has been 
irregular since the dawn of human evolution (Chakravarthy & Booth, 
2004). Even the modern life is rife with inconsistencies in resource 
availability. Not only does the economy continue to be characterized 
by periods of boom and bust, but there is a considerable inequality 
among people for access to resources at any given time. So, how do 
resource scarcity threats affects consumers’ everyday lives and their 
control beliefs? For example, do they feel that they are in charge of 
their lives during such threats or do they feel that they are helpless? 
Might these beliefs drive their financial impulsivity behaviors? 
Drawing on life history theory, recent work indicates that re-
source scarcity cues lead people to respond in divergent ways as a 
function of their childhood environments (Griskevicius et al., 2013). 
In the present work, we add to this growing body of work by inves-
tigating the effects of resource scarcity on people’s perceptions of 
control. We hypothesize and provide evidence that resource scarcity 
cues lead individuals from relatively poorer childhood backgrounds 
to feel that they have less personal control. Consequently, this psy-
chological sense of decreased control facilitates preference for small-
er sooner rewards and task persistence. 
Conversely, we show that resource scarcity cues lead individu-
als from relatively wealthier childhoods to feel that they have greater 
personal control. This psychological sense of increased control fa-
cilitates their willingness to wait longer for rewards and to persist 
more on a demanding task. 
We conducted three experiments, including a behavioral study 
to test our hypotheses. In Study 1, we examine our basic prediction 
that resource scarcity cues produce different effects on people’s con-
trol beliefs depending on their childhood backgrounds and not their 
current economic conditions. We experimentally manipulated re-
source scarcity by having people read a news article about the recent 
economic recession or a control article. We then examined their be-
liefs regarding the extent to which they thought they were in control 
of their personal finances by responding to six items adapted from an 
established measure on a 7-pt scale (Dew and Xiao, 2011). Results 
revealed that for people who had relatively wealthier childhoods, the 
recession news article increased their sense of personal control. For 
example, under scarcity cues, they believed that they were more in 
control of their spending and saving behaviors. In contrast, among 
individuals who had relatively poorer childhoods, recession cues de-
creased their sense of personal control. Importantly, these beliefs did 
not vary as function of respondents’ current economic conditions.
In Study 2, we had two specific goals – 1) to replicate the results 
of Study 1 by using a different methodology to prime resource scar-
city, and 2) to show that perceptions of personal control mediate the 
relation between resource threats and impulsive financial behavior. 
Resource scarcity was primed by exposing individuals to a slideshow 
of pictures indicative of a recession. Those in neutral condition saw 
pictures of objects frequently found in an office setting. Sense of 
control was measured using the same items as in Study 1. Financial 
impulsivity was assessed using a set of randomly presented lotteries 
(Green & Myerson, 2004; Griskevicius et al., 2013). Results indi-
cated continued support for our initial predictions. Resource scarcity 
cues led individuals from relatively poorer backgrounds to feel a 
diminished sense of control, whereas the same cues led individu-
als from relatively wealthier backgrounds to feel an enhanced sense 
of control. Furthermore, our mediated moderation analyses revealed 
that the influence of resource scarcity cues on people’s impulsive 
behavior indeed seems to be mediated by their personal sense of con-
trol. The results provided evidence of full mediation.
Finally, based on prior work on perceptions of control and persis-
tence (Bandura, 1989), we show that resource scarcity altered the amount 
of effort people were willing to expend on a challenging task. Past re-
search has found that when people perceive that they have low personal 
control, they tend to withdraw, retreat, or otherwise become passive (Skin-
ner, 1996). Therefore, we hypothesized that under conditions of resource 
threat, those who feel a loss of control should not be willing to persist 
on a task at hand. Resource scarcity was manipulated using an episodic 
recall task (Sharma and Alter, 2012). Results revealed that people who 
were raised in poorer environments tended to persist less under resource 
scarcity cues as compared to the neutral condition, just as predicted. 
In summary, the current research substantially extends previous 
work on the effects of resource scarcity on people’s psychologies and 
behaviors. We not only show that scarcity cues produce divergent 
control beliefs in people as a function of their childhood environ-
ments, we also show that these beliefs drive their real-work impul-
sive financial decisions. Finally, we provide evidence that lower task 
persistence in the face of scarcity threats among relatively poorer 
people might be because of a low sense of control. This finding has 
important implications for policy interventions that wish to improve 
the future life conditions among the ones that are the most suscep-
tible to the effects of resource scarcity. Our findings suggest that in-
fusing a sense of personal control among such individuals may help 
in reducing impulsive financial behaviors, and may encourage them 
to persist more leading to greater benefits in real-world arenas such 
as education and professional work. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Introduction and Theoretical Background
From Nintendo’s Wii U to Apple’s rumoured iWatch to Ne-
throne’s office workstation, marketers today are regularly challenged 
to design products that appeal to consumers while simultaneously 
being unique enough to create a distinct brand impression. Research 
has demonstrated that this can be challenging, as a product’s attrac-
tiveness varies with the extent to which it is congruent with the con-
sumer’s product schema. Although a significant amount of research 
in marketing has examined this phenomenon, the results have been 
mixed (e.g., Campbell and Goodstein 2001; Jhang, Grant, and Camp-
bell 2012; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). In this research we con-
tribute to the extant literature by examining the interplay between a 
person’s state of arousal and the schema congruity effect.
Interestingly, the schema congruity effect suggests that an opti-
mal level of arousal could be achieved when an object is just slight-
ly incongruent (moderate incongruity) and thus the individual can 
successfully assimilate it into an existing schema held in memory 
(Mandler, 1982). However, when incongruity levels rise past a cer-
tain threshold (extreme incongruity), a person’s ability to make sense 
of the object diminishes exponentially (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 
1989). At the same time, although it is has been well-established that 
the valence of consumers’ affective states influences choice (Kim et 
al. 2010), only recently has research demonstrated that a person’s 
level of arousal has analogous effects. Specifically, when a consum-
er experiences a pleasant affective state, they prefer more arousing 
products if their current arousal is high and less arousing products if 
their current arousal is low (Di Muro and Murray 2012). Given that 
incongruity increases arousal levels, consumers in a pleasant affec-
tive state who are experiencing high arousal should prefer moderate-
ly incongruent products to congruent products because they misat-
tribute their current arousal onto the product. However, consumers 
in a pleasant affective state who are experiencing low arousal should 
not prefer moderately incongruent products to congruent products 
because they cannot misattribute their current arousal onto the prod-
uct. Thus, if the schema congruity effect is indeed predicated on a 
misattribution of arousal, preference for moderately incongruent 
products should only manifest under high arousal. Our first study 
examines this prediction.
Study 1
Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions 
in a 2 (product congruity: congruent vs. moderately incongruent) × 2 
(arousal:  low vs. high) between-subjects design. The target product 
was a fictitious brand of wristwatch (Dali). 
Procedures and Dependent Measures
Arousal was manipulated using music:   participants were in-
formed they would be listening to a selection of classical music to 
help get them energized (relaxed). Following the arousal manipula-
tion, participants viewed the ad. 
Results
When participants were put in an aroused state, they evaluat-
ed the moderately incongruent wristwatch more favorably than the 
congruent wristwatch. However, when participants were put in a 
relaxed state, evaluations did not differ by the level of congruity. 
A planned contrast confirmed that participants evaluated the moder-
ately incongruent product more favorably when arousal levels were 
high rather than low. 
It should be noted that Mandler (1982) argued that extreme 
incongruity often leads to frustration because the individual is un-
able to assimilate or accommodate the object into an existing schema 
without revamping the schema itself or developing an entirely new 
schema. In such a case, the act of discovery becomes too arous-
ing, resulting in negative evaluations of the target (Meyers-Levy 
and Tybout 1989). This affords a unique means to test our propos-
ition. Where in study 1, an aroused individual appreciated moderate 
incongruity and a relaxed individual did not, study 2 was designed 
to explore whether the opposite will occur in instances of extreme 
incongruity. If the schema congruity effect is truly a misattribution of 
arousal, then putting an individual in a relaxed state should offset the 
tension that results from not being able to accommodate the object. 
Therefore, it is predicted that a relaxed individual will appreciate 
extreme incongruity more so than would an aroused individual, be-
cause there is no arousal overload and thus there is nothing to misat-
tribute to the target. 
Study 2
Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions 
in a 2 (arousal: low vs. high) × 3 (product congruity: congruent vs. 
moderately incongruent vs. extreme incongruity) between-subjects 
design. The target product was soft drinks.
Procedures and Dependent Measures
Several pictures from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1999) were used to manipulate 
physiological arousal. The subsequent procedures were identical to 
study 1.
Results
Pairwise comparisons confirmed that when arousal was high, 
participants evaluated the moderately incongruent soft drink more 
favorably than the congruent soft drink, but evaluated the extremely 
incongruent soft drink less favorably than the congruent soft drink. 
Once again, a planned contrast confirmed that participants evaluat-
ed the moderately incongruent product more favorably when their 
arousal level was high rather than low. However, in support of the 
core prediction, participants evaluated the extremely incongruent 
product more favorably when their arousal level was low rather than 
high.
Contribution
A major contribution of this work is that consumers’ state of 
arousal when examining incongruity will influence whether or not 
the schema congruity effect will manifest. This suggests that the 
schema congruity may indeed result from a misattribution of arous-
al. This is something that has been debated in numerous fields. The 
results demonstrated that consumers preferred moderate incongruity 
when their current level of arousal was high rather than low. This 
finding is consistent with the arousal congruity effect (Di Muro 
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and Murray 2012), whereby a fit is created between an individual’s 
state of arousal and the arousal derived from the act of discovery. 
However, consistent with Mandler’s (1982) prediction that extreme 
incongruity can result in negative evaluations due to arousal over-
load, consumers preferred extreme incongruity when their current 
level of arousal was low rather than high. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Despite the proposition that corporate reputation has an ef-
fect on product brand equity has been voiced by Keller (1993) 
two decades ago, no hypothesis testing has been undertaken. We 
aim to close this research gap by introducing a theoretical model 
based on signaling theory that tests (a) two mediating variables 
(corporate image and product brand value) and (b) three moder-
ating variables (corporate brand visibility, trust, and distribution 
intensity).
Collecting responses from 1176 consumers in China, we cover 
36 consumer brands in three cities. Our survey focused on the brand 
affine population between 18 and 45 years of age. The model was 
analyzed with Mplus, employing structural equation modeling. The 
measurement model was rigorously tested for validity and reliabil-
ity. We also undertook several tests to assess possible biases like a 
hierarchical data structure or effects from certain product groups that 
might be affected differently by already proposed moderators. Fur-
thermore, the model shows excellent fit. 
We were able to confirm the corporate reputation – product 
brand equity relationship and conclude that corporate reputation is 
used as a signal by consumers to add credibility to the product brand 
and reduce uncertainty concerning a product’s brand equity. More 
importantly, our two mediators help to shed light into the black box 
of this connection, as full mediation could be established. To be more 
specific, we show that corporate brand image at least partially acts 
as a filter that makes the reputation, which is more longterm oriented 
and complex, easier accessible for the consumer. Brand value com-
prises the benefits of the brand for the consumer (e.g. functional and/
or social signaling value) and therefore contains the sources of value 
creation. Uncertainty limits the value of the brand for the consumer, 
because she is doubtful to what extend her relevant choice criteria are 
met. The signal of corporate reputation and corporate brand image is 
able to decrease this uncertainty, which raises the benefit of the brand 
for the consumer and then culminates into brand equity, which is the 
assessment of the brand value.
As another important contribution of this research, we were able 
to establish three moderators, which were developed using signaling 
theory. So far, only few moderators for consumer related corporate 
reputation research could be established (Walsh, Bartikowski, and 
Beatty 2012). Our findings confirm the moderating effect of corpo-
rate brand visibility on the corporate reputation – brand equity re-
lationship. Therefore, the physical presence of the corporate brand 
can increase the signaling effect. This is in line with the findings of 
Berens, van Riel, and van Bruggen (2005) who have demonstrated 
that a more visible corporate brand makes the construct of corpo-
rate association more accessible to the consumer than a less visible 
corporate brand. Our findings display an insignificant direct effect 
of corporate brand visibility on product brand equity. This result in-
dicates that the corporate brand’s presence does not automatically 
increase a product’s brand equity. The enhancement of a product’s 
brand equity facilitates only via the transfer of credibility by a sturdy 
corporate reputation. Therefore, a mere presence of a corporate brand 
next to a product brand only has an effect on the product’s brand eq-
uity, if the company brand has already established a reputation in the 
consumer’s eyes. This finding helps to explain two opposite results 
in the literature (Saunders and Guoqun 1997, Laforet 2011) and sug-
gests that future studies investigating the role of parent brands should 
control for corporate reputation.
Furthermore, we were able to establish distribution intensity 
as a moderator. Distribution intensity can increase product brand 
value directly, as it simplifies the buying process. Additionally we 
argue that a dense distribution can raise the receiver’s attention to 
the signal which may increase the perceptibility of the signal (Con-
nelly et al. 2011). We suggest that a higher exposure to the brand 
through an intense distribution improves the consumers’ brand 
recognition and recall ability. This in turn leads to a rise in con-
sumer awareness and extra attention paid to signals for the product 
brand’s quality.
Moreover, we have demonstrated the importance of trust for the 
effect chain. Trust in the brand not only stands for people’s beliefs in 
the credibility and benevolence of a target of trust, but also signifies 
their willingness to use that knowledge as a basis for action (McAl-
lister 1995). It has been demonstrated, that trust reduces consum-
ers’ uncertainty and perceived vulnerability (Moorman, Zaltman, 
and Deshpande 1992). Our results show that trust directly increases 
product brand equity and also has a moderating effect on the product 
brand value – product brand equity relationship. Trust into a brand 
increases the customer’s confidence in the ability of the brand to per-
form its stated function (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) and thus 
decreases the uncertainty about one’s utility perception of the brand. 
Therefore brand value becomes a stronger predictor for brand equity.
We encourage further research in the corporate reputation – 
product brand equity relationship, especially in terms of different 
moderators that might be able to increase the perceptibility of the 
signal, for example advertising.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
From deciding what dessert to order to choosing which airline 
to fly so that one can accrue more mileage points, consumer behavior 
is largely goal driven. Goals can be broadly dichotomized into attain-
ment and maintenance goals: Whereas for attainment goals the actual 
state differs from the desired state (e.g., decrease one’s weight from 
165 to 164 pounds), for maintenance goals the actual and the desired 
states match, and need to remain matched (e.g., keep one’s weight at 
165 pounds or less). Although extant research examined how valu-
ation of one’s labor (Brodscholl et al. 2007), satisfaction (Koo and 
Fishbach 2010), and perceived difficulty (Stamatogiannakis et al. 
2010) differ between the two goal types, it is unclear under what cir-
cumstances consumers are more likely and more motivated to pursue 
each type of goal. It is also unknown whether and how consumers 
with different cultural background may behave differently towards 
the two goal types—an issue that impacts firms’ market segmentation 
and internationalization endeavors. The current research seeks to fill 
these gaps in the literature.
Cultural values are the shared, abstract ideas about what is good 
and desirable in a society (Williams 1970).  An important dimen-
sion of culture is whether individuals value independence vs. inter-
dependence (Markus and Kitayama 1991): Individuals from Eastern 
cultures tend to have interdependent self-construals and uphold such 
values as maintaining harmony and social order. However, those 
from Western cultures tend to have independent self-construals and 
uphold such values as personal achievement and being distinct from 
others. Because independent cultural values often emphasize going 
beyond a current state (e.g., attain higher social status), they are likely 
to increase the appeal of attainment goals (e.g., increase one’s GPA at 
school). In contrast, interdependent cultural values often emphasize 
maintaining the current state (e.g. maintaining existing social order 
and harmony), so they are likely to increase the appeal of mainte-
nance goals (e.g., maintain one’s GPA). Thus, we posit that individu-
als who value independence (interdependence) tend to be more (less) 
motivated to pursue attainment goals. Moreover, the independent and 
interdependent values can coexist within any person (Singelis 1994), 
and their accessibility can be temporarily increased by contextual 
factors (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Maddux et al. 2010). For such 
situationally activated cultural values, we expect to observe the same 
pattern of behaviors.
Whereas independent cultural values emphasize undertaking ac-
tions driven by one’s own will, interdependent cultural values empha-
size sharing the vision of one’s social group (Markus and Schwartz 
2010). Thus, framing an attainment goal as reflecting an individual’s 
own will (and hence highlighting the correspondence with indepen-
dent values) is likely to boost the person’s motivation for that attain-
ment goal. In contrast, framing a maintenance goal as reflecting the 
will of a close social group (and hence highlighting the correspondence 
with interdependent values) is likely to increase motivation to pursue 
that maintenance goal. Therefore, we propose that attainment (main-
tenance) goals tend to be more motivating when they are framed as 
reflecting one’s independent will (the will of one’s close social group). 
We tested our propositions in five studies. Study 1 had a 2 na-
tional culture (USA vs. China) × 2 goal type (attainment vs. main-
tenance) between-participant design. Participants read a goal situ-
ation from two goal domains (exercise and finance) and indicated 
how motivating they found the goal of increasing (vs. maintaining) 
the current level (e.g., exercising more vs. maintaining the exiting 
level of exercising). The results show a significant interaction effect 
(p<.002): attainment (maintenance) goals are more motivating for 
individuals from the USA (China). 
Study 2 used a 2(priming: independence vs. interdependence) ×2 
(goal type: attainment vs. maintenance) between participants design. 
First, we primed independence (interdependence; Brewer and Gard-
ner 1996). Next, participants were asked to think about their favorite 
charity, and indicate the amount they would like to donate to it. Then, 
they reported willingness to pre-commit to donating the same amount 
(maintenance goal), or the same amount plus 1 cent (attainment goal) 
for the next year. As expected, the priming × goal type interaction 
was significant (p<.006). Willingness to pre-commit to an attainment 
(maintenance) goal was higher in the independence (interdependence) 
priming condition. 
Study 3 used a 2×2 mixed design with goal domain (weight 
and GPA goals) as the within-participants factor and goal type (at-
tainment versus maintenance) as the between-participant factor. 
Moreover, we measured participants’ independent vs. interdependent 
tendency (Singelis 1994) and regulatory focus orientation (Higgins 
1997). Replicating previous results, the goal type×cultural tendency 
interaction was significant (p<.002). Controlling for a potential con-
founding variable—regulatory focus, did not affect the findings. 
In study 4, participants were assigned to a 2×2 between partici-
pants design with goal framing (for self vs. for close social group) 
and goal type (attainment vs. maintenance). Half of the participants 
read the attainment goal version of three goal pursuit contexts, and 
the other half read the maintenance goal version. In addition, par-
ticipants in the “for self” condition were told that each goal is pur-
sued following individual (vs. one’s close social group’s) will. As 
predicted, the framing×goal interaction was significant (p<.002). At-
tainment (maintenance) goals were more motivating when they were 
framed as reflecting one’s independent will (the will of one’s close 
social group).
In Study 5, we tracked and analyzed 1,607 consumers’ weight 
goal pursuit behaviors in the field. Compared to individuals who value 
independence (and thus have fewer friends supporting their efforts), 
those who value interdependence (and thus have more friends support-
ing their efforts) were more (less) likely to adopt (p<.001), and more 
(less) motivated to pursue maintenance (attainment) goals (p<.03). 
Taken together, the results of studies provided converging sup-
port for our proposition—cultural values interact with goal types 
to impact motivation for goal pursuit. This research contributes to 
theory and practice. Our work is amongst the first to bridge two im-
portant research streams in consumer behavior—goals and cultures. 
Our results suggest that the two types of goals should be leveraged 
differently across cultures to optimize motivation for goal pursuit. 
Managers, for example, can engineer consumption contexts to ac-
tivate respective cultural values, nudging consumers towards goals 
congruent with firms’ marketing objectives.
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Table 1: Summary of Key Results
Study Independent Variables
Dependent 
variable Significant effects & means
1
National Culture Motivation for 
Goal pursuit in 
7-point scale
Goal type x cultural value (F(1,181) = 9.9, p < .002). Planned contrasts: 
Americans: (Mattainment = 5.89 vs. Mmaintenance = 5.3, F(1,181) = 5.96, p < .02)
Chinese (Mattainment = 5.46 vs. Mmaintenance = 5.85 , F(1,181) = 3.92, p < .05)
Goal type 
Goal pursuit 
Context
2
Primed Cultural 
values
Motivation for 
Goal pursuit in 
7-point scales
Prime × goal type (F(1,121) = 7.84, p < .006).
Planned contrasts:
Interdependence prime: (Mattainment = 3.98 vs. Mmaintenance = 4.90, F(1,121) = 4.67, p < .04). 
Independence prime: (Mattainment = 4.88 vs. Mmaintenance = 4.00, F(1,121) = 3.35, p < .07). Goal type
3
Chronic Cultural 
values
Motivation for 
Goal pursuit in 
7-point scales
Goal type × independent-interdependent score (β = -1.42, t(106) = 3.2, p < .002). 
Spotlights:
Participants high on independence tended to find attainment goals more motivating 
than maintenance goals, although this effect was not significant (β = -.83, t(106) = 1.40, 
p < .20). 
Participants high on interdependence found maintenance goals more motivating than 
attainment goals, (β = 2.13, t(106) = 4.82, p < .001)
NS effects for Regulatory Focus
Goal type
Chronic Regulatory 
Focus
Goal pursuit 
Context
4
Goal Framing
Motivation for 
Goal pursuit in 
7-point scales
Goal type × goal framing (F(1,185) = 9.9, p < .002). 
Planned Contrasts: 
Attainment goals (Mself = 5.04 vs. Mgroup = 4.73, F(1,185) = 4.4, p < .04). 
Maintenance goals (Mself = 4.75 vs. Mgroup = 5.07, F(1,185) = 5.6, p < .02). 
NS effects for Regulatory Focus
Goal type
Chronic Regulatory 
Focus
Goal pursuit 
Context
5a Number of Friends Goal type preference
Individuals with more friends preferred maintenance goals (Mattainment = 1.56 vs. 
Mmaintenance = 4.48, z = 4.94, p < .001).
5b
Number of Friends
Money at stake 
Goal type × number of friends (β = 71.12, t (1603) = 2.18, p < .03).  
Spotlights:
Users with many friends (p > .10).
Users with fewer friends put more money at stake when they had attainment versus a 
maintenance goals (β = -440.2, t (1603) = 2.94, p < .01).
Goal type
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) identify two distinct implicit 
self-theories—entity vs. incremental theory. People who endorse 
entity theory (entity theorists) believe that their personal traits (i.e., 
personality and intelligence) are fixed, while people who endorse in-
cremental theory (incremental theorists) view their personal traits as 
malleable. This line of research has found that individuals can extend 
their implicit self-theories to other people and even to brands/prod-
ucts (e.g. Yorkstone, Nunes, and Matta 2010; Park and John 2010).
Recently, Kwon and Nayakankuppam (working paper) find 
that individuals’ implicit self-theory orientation affects their attitude 
formation processes towards products/brands. Specifically, they find 
that entity theorists form attitudes with lower level of elaboration, 
but the strengths associated with the attitudes are greater, than incre-
mental theorists. These findings are noteworthy because they suggest 
that the link between elaboration and attitude strength could be more 
complicated than the consistent finding in the attitude literature: 
strong attitudes are products of effortful cognitive elaboration (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1984; Petty and Wegener 1999).
In this paper, we examine the underlying mechanism of this 
strong attitude formation without high level of elaboration. We 
propose that, compared to incremental, entity theorists have lower 
thresholds to form strong attitudes: in contrast to incremental, entity 
theorists need smaller amount of information on the target objects 
when forming strong attitudes.
Study 1
Study 1 is a 2 (implicit self-theory: entity vs. incremental) by 
2 (argument quality: strong vs. weak) between-subject design. We 
manipulate an individual’s implicit self-theory orientation using 
the generalized implicit self-theory manipulation technique (Chiu, 
Hong, and Dweck, 1997). We manipulate the argument quality of 
persuasive messages and examine if the level of cognitive elabora-
tion is different between entity and incremental theorists when form-
ing attitudes.
To test the threshold difference, we employed the dual task ex-
periment practice. Participants were asked to complete two different 
tasks simultaneously. However, they were clearly instructed that one 
task is more important than the other. Their primary task was to form 
attitudes towards a new brand based on 10 arguments (all strong or 
all weak arguments depending on the argument quality condition) 
showing on a screen one at a time. The secondary task was to simul-
taneously monitor 10 unrelated statements from an auditory source, 
which served as distractors. After the dual task, participants were 
given true/false questions for every distracting statement (total 10 
questions). 
We predict that both theorists will focus on their primary tasks 
at the beginning. Later on, however, they will switch their focuses 
onto their secondary tasks if only they do not need any additional 
information on the attitude object because they have already formed 
and become certain about the attitudes (i.e. strong attitudes). As a 
result, we anticipate that participants are less likely to correctly re-
member the first few distractors, but more likely to remember the 
last few distractors. We expect that compared to incremental, entity 
theorists will form and become certain about their attitudes earlier 
(i.e. with fewer number of persuasive arguments). As such, they will 
switch their focus from the primary (i.e. processing persuasive argu-
ments) to the secondary task (i.e. monitoring unrelated statements) 
faster than incremental theorists.
The results revealed that the percentages of correct answers for 
the first four (#1, #2, #3, and #4) and the last three (#8, #9, and #10) 
distracting statements were not significantly different between en-
tity and incremental priming. The differences were found only in the 
middle range (#5: F (1, 119) = 5.00, p < .05; #6: F (1, 119) = 14.12, 
p < .001; #7: F (1, 119) = 8.35, p < .005). Entity theorists struggled 
to remember the first four distractors, but successfully remembered 
from the fifth, whereas incremental theorists struggled until seventh 
distractors and successfully remembered from the eighth. These re-
sults reveal that compared to incremental, entity theorists need small-
er amount of information to form and be certain about their attitudes 
(i.e. strong attitudes). In order words, entity theorists have lower 
threshold in forming strong attitudes than incremental theorists.
More importantly, the analysis of the two-way, implicit self-
theory by argument quality interaction demonstrated that only in-
cremental theorists were affected by argument quality manipulation, 
whereas entity theorists were not. The percentages of correct answers 
for entity theorists were not different between strong and weak argu-
ment conditions (i.e. low level of elaboration), while those of incre-
mental theorists are different (i.e. high level of elaboration) under 
question #7 (F (1, 61) = 3.97, p < .05) and #8 (#5: F (1, 61) = 4.09, 
p < .05).
Study 2
We examine whether we can still find the threshold difference 
effect when multiple arguments are presented all together, rather than 
each argument is presented one by one (Study 1). Participants were 
first primed with either entity or incremental theory. They were, then, 
given a print ad displaying 10 persuasive arguments about a novel 
brand and asked to form attitudes towards the brand. Meanwhile, 
their eye fixations were recorded using an eye-tracker. To derive de-
pendent measure, we defined 10 rectangular areas of interest (AOI), 
each of which encompassed each argument.
The results supported our prediction that entity theorists would 
spend less time than incremental theorists to view the print ad 
(MEnt=20.79, MInc=28.99 seconds, F (1, 26) = 5.61, p < .05). More 
importantly, entity theorists fixated on 7.71 AOIs on average, where-
as incremental theorist fixated (i.e. processed) 9.43 AOIs. These 
differences were statistically significant (F (1, 26) = 8.32, p < .01). 
These results illustrate that the threshold difference exists even when 
arguments are presented all together.
Discussion
A consistent finding in the attitude literature is that strong atti-
tudes are products of effortful cognitive elaboration. Recently, how-
ever, researchers suggest that this link could be more complicated. 
Specifically, it is found that entity theorists can form strong attitudes 
with low level of elaboration. The purpose of this study is to unveil 
the way entity theorists can form strong attitudes easily and quickly. 
We suggest that, in contrast to incremental, entity theorists have low-
er thresholds to form strong attitudes. Our findings contribute to both 
the implicit self-theory and attitude strength literature.
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Figure 1 . The percentage of correct answers for true/false 
questions for each distracting statement
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Figure 2 . A Typical Fixation of  
Each Theorist While Forming Attitudes
Entity-Primed
Incremental Primed
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We present a framework that explains how consumers evalu-
ate experiences before consumption, and how this evaluation differs 
from that of products. We suggest that experiences are evaluated 
closer to the self, more vividly, and more in the form of narratives, 
compared to products. We understand experiences as a type of good 
different from products or material possessions. An experience is an 
event or series of events that a consumer lives through, while a prod-
uct is a tangible object, kept in one’s possession (Van Boven and 
Gilovich 2003). Trips, movies, and restaurants are experiences; lap-
tops, shoes, and jewelry are products. We propose that experiences 
are processed differently from products in that they are processed as 
closer to the self, as something more vivid, and more in the form of 
a narrative. 
Self. Consumers perceive experiences rather than possessions to 
be more closely associated with the self (Carter and Gilovich 2012). 
We propose that this closeness to self is already present during con-
sumers’ evaluations of experiences before consumption. We observe 
different consequences of this closeness to the self. For instance, this 
may explain why, while positive experiences are better than posi-
tive products, negative experiences are worse than negative products 
(Nicolao et al. 2009). 
We test our proposition by analyzing the impact of congruency 
between the self and advertising messages. Past research has found 
important effects of matching a message or a product to consumers’ 
self-schemata (Wheeler, Petty, and Bizer 2005). Because experiences 
are a more important part of the self compared to products, we pre-
dict that message/self congruency will be more influential for mes-
sages regarding experiences than for those regarding products. 
Vividness. We propose that when consumers evaluate an experi-
ence, the experience is perceived as more vivid, compared to a prod-
uct. This is because experiential aspects of consumption are multi-
sensorial and can engage the consumer at multiple senses and levels 
(Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; LaSalle and Britton 2003). This can 
explain for instance why when an advertisement for an experiential 
purchase (vacation destination) lacked vividness, it backfired (Petro-
va and Cialdini 2005). 
We test our proposition by looking at the impact that imagining 
the satisfaction that comes with the consumption of the good has on 
attitudes towards the good. Anticipating satisfaction has been used 
as a mechanism to stimulate mental imagery (Shiv and Huber 2000). 
If it is true that experiences are processed more vividly than prod-
ucts, then it follows that imagining consumption should have a more 
positive effect on consumers when they evaluate an experience rather 
than a product. 
Narrative. Finally, we propose that consumers process experi-
ences in the form of narratives. Experiences have the two elements 
necessary for constructing a narrative: sequence of events in time 
(temporality), and the inclusion of decisions that trigger specific con-
sequences (causality) (Escalas 2004). 
To test this proposition we study consistency between the nar-
rative elements in an ad. Narrative consistency is a necessary con-
dition for a story to create meaning and be persuasive (Cho, Shen, 
and Wilson 2012; McKee 1997). If it is true that consumers process 
experiences as narratives, then the elements of an ad (image, copy) 
for an experience need to be consistent for the ad to be persuasive. 
Study 1
Procedure
Our design and procedure was a replication of Wheeler et al. 
2005. We created four types of messages by manipulating the mes-
sage frame (impulsive vs. cautious) and the good being promoted 
(experience vs. product). All participants read one advertisement, 
according to condition. After reading the ad participants rated how 
attractive and desirable the purchase was, how likely they were to 
buy it, and how likely they were to recommend it to others. After a 
filler task, participants responded to the impulsivity scale by Eysenck 
et al. (1985). 
Results
As hypothesized there was a significant interaction so that the 
effect of congruency was stronger for experiences than for products. 
Attitudes towards congruent experiences were better than those to-
wards congruent products, and attitudes towards incongruent expe-
riences were worse than those towards incongruent products (F(1, 
176) = 8.43, p < .01). The same was true for behavioral intentions.
Study 2
Procedure
All participants evaluated a choice between a product and an 
experience. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions with 
decision goal (choice vs. anticipated satisfaction) as the factor. Par-
ticipants in the choice condition read “Please evaluate the following 
two alternatives carefully and make your choice.” Participants in the 
anticipating satisfaction condition were asked to “take a moment to 
really imagine what the options would be like”. Next, respondents 
rated each alternative on a 7-point attractiveness scale 
Results
As expected, pre-planned contrasts confirm that participants 
perceive the products in the choice set to be equally attractive re-
gardless of condition (F(1, 375) = .009, p > .10), while, on the other 
hand, they perceive the experiences as more attractive when they are 
asked to anticipate satisfaction than when they are asked to choose 
(F(1, 375) = 6.82, p < .01). 
Study 3
Procedure
Participants saw an ad for an experience or a product, and the 
copy in the ad was either consistent or inconsistent with the picture. 
All pictures across the four stimuli were pretested as equally fitting 
for an ad in that category, equally persuasive, and equally vivid. Par-
ticipants evaluated two consecutive ads and reported their attitude 
towards the brand and towards the ad, and reported also their inten-
tion to purchase the good. 
Results
As hypothesized, there was a significant interaction between 
type of good and consistency, so that consistency positively influ-
enced the experiences but did not affect the products (F(1, 213) = 
7.32, p < .05). Consumers were unable to transport in the non-con-
sistent experience ads, and this negatively influenced their attitudes 
and their intended behavior.
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General Discussion
We have presented a framework to understand how experiences 
are processed differently from products, prior to consumption. Given 
the recent interest in experiential purchases (Van Boven and Gilov-
ich 2003), and given that most consumer and marketing research so 
far has disproportionately focused on material purchases (Holbrook 
and Hirschman 1982; Sun et al. 2012), this framework is relevant 
and timely. 
Table 1. Summary of results across studies.
Study 1 Experience Product
DV: average of 
attitudes towards the 
good advertised  
(from 1 to 7)
Congruent messages 5.23 4.64
Incongruent messages 3.12 3.73
DV: average of 
intentions towards the 
good advertised  
(from 1 to 7)
Congruent messages 5.14 4.11
Incongruent messages 3.36 3.68
Study 2 Experience Product
DV: how attractive the 
good is (from 1 to 7)
Choice only 5.09 5.35
Anticipation of 
satisfaction 5.57 5.36
Study 3 Consistent Non consistent
DV: average of attitude 
towards the good and 
purchase intention 
(from 0 to 100)
Ads for experiences 68 52
Ads for products 59 57
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The Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility Efforts on the Moral Behavior of 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Prior research has focused on firm level outcomes associated 
with corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts, or a company’s 
activities and status related to its perceived societal or stakeholder 
obligations (Brown and Dacin 1997), such as financial performance 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003).  However, there is little re-
search, with the exception of cause-related marketing, that focuses 
on consumer level outcomes associated with CSR practices such as 
its effects on prosocial (e.g., donations) and antisocial consumer be-
havior (e.g., cheating).  This research will seek to answer when does 
a firm’s prosocial behavior, defined as actions taken for the benefit 
of others, and antisocial behavior, defined as actions that are self-
serving and do not benefit others, motivate vicarious prosocial and 
antisocial behaviors in consumers?
Kouchaki (2011) finds that individuals can expand their mor-
al self-concept to include psychologically close others, resulting 
in vicarious moral licensing effects. Accordingly, we propose that 
for consumers who use brands to expand the self (Aron and Aron 
1996), prosocial firm behavior can signal sufficient progress toward 
the consumer’s goal of being a moral person and motivate antiso-
cial consumer behavior while antisocial firm behavior can signal a 
lack of goal progress and motivate prosocial consumer behavior.  We 
present three experiments to demonstrate that a firm’s CSR behavior 
vicariously impacts consumer’s moral behavior, but only for those 
who include the CSR brand in the self.   
In experiment 1, 53 student participants completed a modified 
version of the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (Aron, Aron, and 
Smollan 1992) to measure the level of overlap between the self and 
Nike (referred henceforth as IOS), read a fictional Associated Press 
article about Nike to manipulate prosocial or antisocial CSR behav-
ior, and completed a dependent variable task in which participants 
solved 10 GRE questions in 10 minutes with the opportunity to cheat 
for higher payoffs.  This was followed by manipulation checks, 
which confirmed the morality/ethicality of the Nike stories, and con-
trol measures.
The dependent variable was actual time (i.e., survey timer) mi-
nus participant’s stated time (i.e., self-timed stopwatch) spent on the 
math task.  A greater discrepancy indicates more cheating.  A general 
linear model (GLM) indicated a significant interaction between firm 
behavior and the mean-centered IOS measure.  A spotlight analy-
sis indicated that higher IOS participants exposed to prosocial firm 
behavior cheated more in comparison to higher (lower) IOS partici-
pants exposed to antisocial (prosocial) firm behavior while higher 
IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior cheated less 
than lower IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior. 
There was no significant time difference for lower IOS participants 
exposed to either CSR behavior condition. 
Experiment 1 provides initial support that firm’s CSR behavior 
can influence consumer’s moral behavior. We conducted a follow-up 
study to replicate the results of experiment 1 using a prosocial depen-
dent variable while including a control condition to distinguish the 
licensing effect from the cleansing effect.
In experiment 2, 126 student participants followed a similar 
procedure as experiment 1 except an added control condition (i.e., 
apparel manufacturing industry’s decision to join the sustainable co-
alition) and a dictator game dependent variable task in which partici-
pants were asked to send between 0-10 entries for a gift card to an-
other individual in the same study who initially received zero entries 
in order to measure generosity. 
A GLM with number of entries sent in the dictator game as the 
dependent variable indicated a significant interaction between firm 
behavior and the mean-centered IOS measure.  A spotlight analy-
sis indicated that higher IOS participants exposed to prosocial firm 
behavior were less prosocial in comparison to higher IOS partici-
pants exposed to antisocial firm behavior or the control condition 
and in comparison to lower IOS participants exposed to prosocial 
firm behavior.  However, higher IOS participants exposed to antiso-
cial firm behavior were more prosocial than higher IOS participants 
exposed to the control condition and were more prosocial than lower 
IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior.  There was no 
significant difference in the number of entries given by lower IOS 
participants exposed to any of the three CSR behavior conditions. 
Experiment 2 shows that higher IOS consumers exposed to 
prosocial (antisocial) firm behavior conduct less (more) prosocial 
behavior in comparison to the control condition, which reflects a 
true drop (boost) in generosity.  We conducted a follow-up study to 
replicate prior findings using a new brand and CSR scenario and to 
alleviate the negative spillover effects from prosocial firm behavior 
by measuring hypocrisy in participants.   
In experiment 3, 83 student participants completed the IOS 
measure, read a fictional Associated Press article about Apple’s pro-
gram to donate Apple devices to low-income schools districts, and 
completed a hypocrisy measure in which participants were asked, 
“In general, customers do not often donate to low-income school dis-
tricts.  Is this true for your household?”.  This was followed by the 
same dictator game dependent variable task as in experiment 2.    
A GLM with number of entries sent in the dictator game as the 
dependent variable indicated a significant interaction between the 
hypocrisy conditions and the mean-centered IOS measure.  A spot-
light analysis indicated that higher IOS participants with hypocrisy 
present were more prosocial (i.e., gave more entries) in comparison 
to higher and lower IOS participants with hypocrisy absent while 
higher IOS participants with hypocrisy absent were less prosocial in 
comparison to lower IOS participants with hypocrisy absent.  Lastly, 
there was no significant difference in the number of entries given by 
lower IOS participants with hypocrisy present or absent. 
Table 1: Summary of Findings
Experiment Firm Behavior IOS Consumer Behavior
Experiment 1+2 Prosocial or Antisocial Low No Difference
Experiment 1+2 Prosocial High More Cheating/Less Giving
Experiment 1+2 Antisocial High Less Cheating/More Giving
Experiment 3
Prosocial with 
Hypocrisy Present or 
Absent
Low No Difference
Experiment 3 Prosocial with Hypocrisy Present High More Giving
Experiment 3 Prosocial with Hypocrisy Absent High Less Giving
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Three experiments demonstrate that higher IOS participants ex-
posed to prosocial (antisocial) firm behavior cheated more (less) and 
were less (more) generous in comparison to lower IOS participants 
unless hypocrisy was present, which reversed the effects from pro-
social firm behavior.  
These findings raise doubts and boundary conditions as to the 
assumption that CSR efforts may lead to consumer well-being (Bhat-
tacharya and Sen 2004).  We suggest further research to formally 
test the process explanation of these findings and to demonstrate 
additional methods to alleviate the negatives spillover effects from 
prosocial firm behavior.    
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Substitutes are goods that can replace one another by satisfying, 
at least partly, the same consumers’ needs (Nicholson 1998). When 
a desired product is not available or its price is deemed too high, 
consumers may look for and switch to a substitute. Substitutes can 
be classified as within-category and cross-category substitutes based 
on whether they belong to the same or a different product category 
as the target product. Within-category substitutes are often less de-
sired than the target as they are not the consumer’s preferred choice 
(i.e., the target), but—by definition—share many features with the 
target and satisfy the same consumer needs. Store brand potato chips, 
for example, would be a within-category substitute for Lay’s potato 
chips. However, substitution can occur across product categories, 
too, where the cross-category substitute satisfies a higher level con-
sumer need as the target. For example, Rold Gold pretzels are not 
potato chips but they satisfy a consumer’s craving for snacks, so pret-
zels are a cross-category substitute for Lay’s potato chips. 
Although cross-category substitution is common (Park and 
Gupta 2011), surprisingly little research has examined how cross-
category substitutes influence consumption experiences. In the cur-
rent research, we examine how the consumption of cross-category 
versus within-category substitutes influences craving for and con-
sumption of the desired target food. Specifically, we show that al-
though consumers prefer within-category substitutes over cross-
category substitutes when the target is not available, consuming a 
cross-category substitute actually satisfies consumers’ needs better 
than within-category substitutes. 
Study 1 tested consumers’ preference for a within-category sub-
stitute and a cross-category substitute to satisfy their craving for the 
target. Participants first sampled one piece of a target chocolate (Rit-
ters Sports Hazelnut chocolate), which whetted participants’ appetite 
for the target food (Wadhwa, Shiv, and Nowlis 2008), and indicated 
how much they craved for another piece of the target chocolate. 
Participants then chose between a within-category substitute (store-
brand chocolate) and a cross-category substitute (granola bar) to 
satisfy their craving for the target chocolate by consuming a larger 
amount of their chosen substitute. 72.7% chose the within-category 
substitute. Logistic regression showed that the more participants 
craved the target after initial exposure, the more they were likely to 
choose the within-category substitute. 
In Study 2, we examined whether participants in Study 1 were 
correct in predicting that consuming the within-category rather than 
the cross-category substitute would be more effective in satisfying 
their craving for the target food. As in the previous study, participants 
first sampled one piece of the target chocolate. They then consumed 
one of three foods: the same target (Ritters chocolate), a within-cat-
egory substitute (store-brand chocolate), or a cross-category substi-
tute (granola bar) before consuming the target ad libitum. We found 
that participants who had eaten the within-category substitute sub-
sequently ate more of the target than those who had eaten the cross-
category substitute and those who had eaten the target again (the 
latter two conditions did not differ in terms of amount consumed). 
The results of Study 2 suggest that although consumers believe a 
within- rather than a cross-category substitute would better satisfy 
their craving for the target, a cross-category substitute actually sat-
isfies consumers’ craving for the target better than the within-cross 
category substitute.
Study 3 examines the role of comparison between the target and 
the substitute in the substitution effects. Participants consumed either 
a within- or cross-category substitute which is as good as the target or 
inferior to the target before consuming the target ad libitum. Among 
those who had consumed the within-category substitute, participants 
who had consumed the inferior substitute subsequently consumed 
more target than those who had consumed the substitute which was 
as good as the target. However, the amount of target consumed was 
not different between those who had consumed the cross-category 
substitute. The results suggest that substitution effect occurs because 
the within-category substitute is compared to the target food result-
ing in a contrast effect, but no such contrast arises when the cross-
category substitute is compared to the target food. 
In summary, we demonstrate that although consumers prefer 
within-category substitutes, the consumption of cross-category sub-
stitutes can be more effective in reducing craving for the target food. 
Such substitution effects are driven by contrast between the target 
and the substitute, which occurs only within the same category, but 
not across different categories.
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The Effect of Perceived Elevation on Consumer Risk-Taking
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We frequently use directional words such as “up” or “down” 
to talk about the concepts related to power. Sentences such as “he 
is at the height of his power” or “he fell from power” show the as-
sociation between up and being powerful or down and being power-
less. Likewise, throughout history and in our everyday life, we often 
observe that powerful people are in higher vertical positions. Kings’ 
or leaders’ thrones are located in higher positions, CEOs’ offices are 
in top floors of buildings, winners stand on the top of a podium, and 
more affluent people live in top floors of residential buildings or in 
houses on hills. Research has also shown that individuals high in 
dominance favor vertical locations in visual space (Moeller, Robin-
son, and Zabelina 2008). Moreover, standing on a higher elevation is 
a major signifier of social dominance and control (Schwartz, Tesser, 
and Powell 1982) and leads others to infer that an individual has 
power (Schubert 2005). All these examples show the strong asso-
ciation between physical elevation, psychological concept of power, 
and perceptions of control and suggest that the concept of power 
might be grounded in an experience of being in a high vertical posi-
tion. However, no study has yet directly tested this notion. In this 
research, we investigate how being in a high vertical position would 
affect consumer judgments and decision making.
Past research has provided empirical evidence of the associa-
tion between vertical schema and the perception of power, in which 
powerful individuals are perceived in higher vertical positions than 
powerless ones (Giessner and Schubert 2007; Moeller et al. 2008; 
Schubert 2005). For example, Giessner and Schubert (2007) found 
that participants presented with an organizational chart used the 
length of the line between the first and second levels in the orga-
nizational chart to judge a leader’s power. Although prior research 
has firmly established the link between vertical position and power, 
we think the reverse relationship is plausible and being in a high 
versus low vertical position can drive one’s own perceived power 
and people located in a higher elevation think of themselves as more 
powerful than those located in a lower elevation. We rely on theories 
of grounded cognition to support this argument.
According to theories of grounded cognition, individuals’ bodi-
ly states, situated actions, and mental simulations can shape different 
aspects of cognition such as thoughts, ideas, affects, and concepts 
(Barsalou 2008; Krishna 2012). For example, research has shown 
that if someone is asked to nod or shake his/her head while listening 
to a persuasive message with a strong argument, the message will be 
more persuasive for the person with head nodding compared to head 
shaking (Briñol and Petty 2003). Using the logic of the “grounded 
cognition” theory, we expect that expressions of high vertical posi-
tions, captured by visual sense, provide mental simulation of being 
powerful and in control and thus lead to an enhanced sense of power 
since the link between power and elevation has been established in 
human mind. 
Furthermore, power has usually been defined in terms of social 
influence and control, and the powerful person is seen as the one who 
has the “potential to influence others in psychologically meaningful 
ways” (French and Raven 1959) by means of controlling valuable 
resources and administrating rewards and punishments (Fiske 1993; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003). Occupying high vertical 
positions usually helps individuals to look over objects and people 
at lower elevations and feel in control compared to a person located 
in a low vertical position. The sense of control makes individuals to 
be optimistic in risky situations and enhances risk-taking tendencies 
(Anderson and Galinsky 2006; Fast et al. 2009). Thus, we expect 
that being in a high vertical position increases risk-taking tendencies 
because the scene observed by a person located in a high elevation 
stimulates power and gives the person an illusory sense of control. 
We ran three studies to test the proposed effects of elevation on pow-
er, control, and risk-taking.
The first study investigated the effect of elevation on activa-
tion of power-related thoughts. In this study, we used panoramic 
pictures taken from high or low vertical positions to manipulate the 
perception of being in a high or low elevation. Next, we used a word 
recognition task as an implicit method to measure activation of pow-
er-related thoughts. Results show that people in the high elevation 
condition recognized more power-related words correctly than those 
in the low elevation condition. 
In the second study, we examined the influence of elevation 
on risk-taking across different dependent variables. In Study 2a, we 
used a behavioral measure of risk-taking (i.e., Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task). Results show that a sense of high elevation leads to el-
evated risk-taking tendencies as participants in the high elevation 
condition pumped the balloon more than those in the low elevation 
condition. Study 2b investigated the effect of elevation on a con-
sumption decision involving risk. Results show that participants in 
the high elevation condition evaluated the risky options (i.e., perish-
able grocery items that are close to their expiration date) more favor-
ably than those in the low elevation condition. 
Study 3 was designed to test our proposed underlying mecha-
nism for the effect of elevation on risk-taking. We posit that an il-
lusory sense of control is the underlying mechanism for the effect 
of elevation on risk-taking because being in a high elevation gives 
individuals a sense of control. In Study 3, we showed that partici-
pants who observed the high elevation picture had a higher sense of 
control over uncontrollable outcomes and showed higher risk-taking 
tendencies compared to those observing the low elevation picture. 
The results also confirm that the effect of elevation on risk-taking is 
mediated by an illusory sense of control.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Service recovery plays a strategic role in today’s competitive 
marketplace. To assure the effectiveness of service recovery, schol-
ars have been debating whether companies should provide recovery 
efforts that are customized for the individual or standardized for the 
group (Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch 1980; Hoffman and Kelley 
2000; Messé and Watts 1983; Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999). The 
present research builds upon this stream of work by examining the 
distinction between individualized and group service recovery. 
Prior research thus far has examined the impact of service recov-
ery on firm-customer relationships—but the impact of firm-customer 
relationships on service recovery has received surprisingly little at-
tention. Given the pervasiveness of status difference in human social 
systems and the popularity of stratified customer loyalty programs in 
the service industry (the number of loyalty memberships in the U.S. 
is 2.09 billion and the average U.S. household has enrolled in more 
than 18 customer loyalty programs, Colloquy 2011), customers may 
be expected to hold higher status than others, either inside the buyer-
seller relationship (e.g., elite loyalty members vs. ‘ordinary’ mem-
bers) or outside of it (e.g., socio-economic status). Nonetheless, the 
effects of status on service recovery and firm-customer relationship 
has remained virtually unexplored. The present research examines 
how status—an important and under-investigated factor that may 
play an important role in firm-customer relationships—affects cus-
tomers’ response to a firm’s recovery efforts.
Status refers to the prestige, respect, and admiration an actor en-
joys in the eyes of others (Anderson et al. 2006; Magee and Galinsky 
2008). Status affects people’s perceptions, judgments, and behaviors 
(Berger et al. 1977; Pettit and Sivanathan 2012; Ridgeway and Berg-
er 1986). On the one hand, research on competitive altruism suggests 
that activating status motives will lead people to choose self-sacrifice 
to signal altruism and their ability to bear costs (Griskevicius, Ty-
bur, and Van den Bergh 2010; Roberts 1998; Van Vugt, Roberts, and 
Hardy 2007). Accordingly, high-status (vs. low-status) consumers 
may respond more favorably to group (vs. individualized) recovery 
following a service failure. On the other hand, power is a close corre-
late of status and reflects an individual’s control over resources rela-
tive to others (French and Raven 1959; Magee and Galinsky 2008). 
Previous research shows that states of relatively high power foster 
an agentic orientation, whereas states of relatively low power foster 
a communal orientation (Rucker et al. 2012). Accordingly, this theo-
rizing leads to a competing hypothesis -- high (low) status consum-
ers may (due to power) respond more favorably to individualized 
(group) recovery that reflects this self (other) perspective. 
The present research investigates the following question: how 
does status affect consumer response to service recovery efforts by 
firms? A series of empirical studies investigate how consumers with 
varying levels of status respond to individualized and standardized 
recovery efforts following a service failure. To illustrate:  Study 1 
was a 2 (Recovery: individualized, group) X 2 (Status: elite, regular 
loyalty status) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to 
imagine themselves as a high (low) status member of an airline com-
pany’s loyalty program who had a negative service encounter and 
received individualized (group) recovery as a response to the failure. 
Results indicate that high-status participants were more satisfied with 
the airline company’s group recovery response than with individu-
alized recovery response (Mgroup=5.75, SD=1.08; Mindividualized=4.61, 
SD=1.32; F (1, 77) = 5.28, p < .05, η2=0.05). Satisfaction did not dif-
fer by type of recovery for low status participants (F < 1). Likewise, 
for recovery perceptions, high status participants perceived the group 
recovery more favorably than individualized recovery response 
(Mgroup=3.88, Mindividualized=3.41, F (1, 77) = 3.63, p = .06, η
2=0.04). 
Recovery perceptions did not differ for low-status participants (F < 
1). Analyses support mediation of status and recovery effects via re-
covery perceptions.  
Subsequent studies follow up on this preliminary result by ex-
amining: i) how status affects consumer choice of individualized and 
group recovery options; and ii) how status affects fairness and satis-
faction when consumers receive better, equivalent, or worse recovery 
than another customer who differs in status. Evidence thus far sug-
gests that consumer status moderates the impact of service recovery 
on customer satisfaction following a service failure via differential 
fairness concerns. Together, these findings reveal how status plays an 
important role in firm-customer relationships and provide guidance 
for companies’ service recovery practices. 
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The Inverse Power of Praise: How Pro-Social Marketing Messages Influence Consumer 
Behavior
Maryam Kouchaki, Harvard University, USA
Ata Jami, University of Central Florida, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Each year companies spend billions of dollars on corporate so-
cial responsibility (CSR) programs (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009) and 
highlight these activities in their advertisements to establish a posi-
tive perception in their customers’ minds. Past research has mainly 
investigated how socially responsible initiatives and/or corporate 
social marketing (CSM) affect consumers’ attitudes, behaviors, and 
decisions connected to the company (Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and 
Braig 2004; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). However, little is known 
about how these messages and their framing affect consumer behav-
ior in general.
Companies can use different framings for their CSM messages. 
Most companies describe their support of social and environmental 
causes and ask consumers for their help. One the other hand, some 
companies such as Starbucks choose another direction and give 
credit to their customers and praise them for their help in support 
of the company’s environmental causes: “You are a pioneer in using 
recycled cups. Everything we do, you do. Your business lets Star-
bucks do business in a way that’s better for the planet. Like leading 
the way in cup technology with the first U.S. hot cups made with 
10% post-consumer recycled fiber, and cup sleeves that use 60%. 
Starbucks is working on a cup that’s 100% recyclable too, it’s what 
we can do, because of what you do. Good for you.” We call the fram-
ing of this message a customer-praise framing; and the framing of 
a message, in which a company acknowledges its support of social 
and environmental causes without praising its customers directly, a 
company-praise framing.
Here we argue that CSM messages alluding to customers’ 
good deeds (i.e., customer-praise; expressions such as the Starbucks 
message mentioned earlier) that signal goal progress and enhance 
consumers’ self-concept (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005; Khan and Dhar 
2006), increase the likelihood of involvement in subsequent self-
interested and self-indulgent behaviors.
People love to be praised and admired. Past research has shown 
that people response positively to praising messages and these mes-
sages can influence motivation (e.g., Harackiewicz 1979) and alter 
the way people receiving praise see themselves (e.g., Delin and Bau-
meister 1994; Jussim et al. 1992; Kim, Diekmann, and Tenbrunsel 
2003). Besides, it has been shown that prior actions can liberate 
an individual to behave in a way that is not in line with the actions 
(Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Monin and Miller 
2001). Using these two bodies of literature, we argued that exposure 
to praising messages (i.e., messages alluding to individuals’ good 
deeds) can provide individuals with credentials that can license their 
subsequent self-interested and self-indulgent behaviors. Also, we be-
lieve that the perceived self-relevance and sincerity of the message, 
and the receiver’s values toward what he/she is praised for, moderate 
the effect of customer-praise message on subsequent self-interested 
behaviors. We ran a series of studies to test our propositions and the 
results consistently demonstrate that messages praising customers 
increase subsequent less altruistic behaviors.
Study 1 provided empirical support for our main hypothesis and 
showed that participants behaved less altruistically and more self-in-
dulgently after they were exposed to customer-praise messages com-
pared to company-praise or no-praise messages. Specifically, Study 
1showed the effect of praise on subsequent behavior using a behav-
ioral measure where individuals had self-interest, a dictator game. 
Moreover, this study compared a customer-praise message with a 
no-praise condition and showed that exposure to the customer-praise 
message led to subsequent self-interested behavior compared to both 
no-praise and company-praise conditions. In addition, consistent 
with the priming literature, exposure to a company-praise message 
led to less self-interested behavior compared to no-praise. 
Study 2 investigated a boundary condition of the effect of prais-
ing messages, the role of praise self-relevance. We manipulated 
self-relevance by providing information indicating whether the par-
ticipant is a potential target of the message. The results of this study 
showed that unless individuals are explicitly informed that they are 
not a target of praise, praising messages lead to self-indulgent behav-
ior. In other words, only when participants received clear feedback 
that they were not the target, praise did not lead to self-indulgent 
behavior (i.e., selecting the luxury product more frequently). This 
finding confirms that the effect of praise on subsequent self-indulgent 
behavior is moderated by self-relevancy of praise. 
Study 3 examined the moderating effect of a different character-
istic of praise, perceived insincerity of praise, on the proposed licens-
ing effects. We manipulated the perceived sincerity of the message 
by asking participants to read an article in a presumably unrelated 
task. In the insincere condition participants read an article (adapted 
from Campbell and Kirmani 2000) on companies’ charitable dona-
tions which discussed how some companies give donations to chari-
ties to receive tax deductions and to improve customer relations as a 
form of persuasion (i.e., having ulterior motives for CSR activities). 
In the sincere condition, participants read an article on employee 
communication and company performance (the article did not have 
any information about the company’s ulterior motives for CSR ac-
tivities). The results demonstrated that the information asserting the 
insincerity of the praising message (i.e., presence of ulterior motives 
for CSR activities) neutralized the licensing effect of the customer-
praise message. 
Lastly, in Study 4 we investigated the moderating role of an 
individual difference, specifically environmental values, on the re-
lationship between a pro-environmental praising message and self-
interested behaviors. We measured participants’ pro-environmental 
values and showed that those with lower score on environmental val-
ues showed the licensing effect of praising messages. But, for those 
with stronger pro-environmental values, the praising message did not 
lead to the licensing effect.
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Focusing on Desirability versus Feasibility: The Influence of Fit between Goal Progress 
and Construal Level on Subsequent Self-Regulation
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
According to control theory (Carver and Scheier 1990), high 
goal progress induces a sense of goal attainment and signals that less 
effort is needed. Thus, people tend to decrease their effort when per-
ceiving sufficient goal progress. However, other work indicates that 
people tend to disengage from a focal goal when facing adversity 
in the course of goal pursuit because lack of progress indicates that 
continued investments in effort are unlikely to pay off in the end 
(Schmidt et al. 2009). Furthermore, expectancy value theories of mo-
tivation postulate a curvilinear relationship between goal expectancy 
and motivation, with motivation being lowest at low and high levels 
of goal expectancy respectively (Atkinson 1957; Louro et al. 2007). 
Combined, these studies led to seemingly inconsistent predictions 
about how goal progress will affect motivation, raising questions 
about how high (low) goal progress can lead to both increased and 
decreased motivation as well as how to best motivate people. 
Theories of mental construal posit that any action can be or-
ganized in a cognitive hierarchy, from low-level identities pertain-
ing to how one acts to high-level identities pertaining to why one 
acts (Trope et al. 2007; Vallacher and Wegner 1987). Furthermore, 
action identification theory advocates the existence of an optimal 
level of identification, whereby identification level shifts in order to 
perform or maintain actions effectively (Houser-Marko and Sheldon 
2008). More specifically, it proposes that when an action is difficult, 
complex, or unfamiliar, conscious concern shifts to the details of the 
action (i.e., low-level identifications) (Vallacher and Wegner 1989). 
Similarly, we predict that people perceiving low progress may pay 
more attention to specific means or sub-acts required to effectively 
achieve their goals (a lower level of construal), whereas people per-
ceiving high progress may consider the general meaning or value of 
their goal (a higher level of construal). Formally, we hypothesize that 
greater perceived goal progress leads to higher levels of construal 
than lesser perceived goal progress.
Research based on regulatory engagement theory (Higgins 
2006; Higgins et al. 2008) suggests that valuations of goals are af-
fected by actors’ consideration of whether the process of goal pursuit 
is the proper or right way to pursue the goal. Valuations are particu-
larly affected by intensifying the force of attraction toward the goal. 
Earlier, we predicted that people would consider their goal pursuit at 
different levels depending on goal progress. If goal progress drives 
people’s attention to different aspects of goal pursuit (why vs. how), 
then there will be a more and less appropriate manner in which peo-
ple consider pursuing their goals. More precisely, we anticipate that 
people perceiving greater progress may think of their goal pursuit 
at an abstract, superordinate level, whereas people perceiving lesser 
progress may think of their goal pursuit in a concrete, subordinate 
manner. Following the notion that fit effects (appropriateness) in-
crease goal engagement and the valuation of goals, we expect that 
thinking of goal pursuit in an appropriate manner will in turn influ-
ence engagement and subsequent self-regulation.  
Studies 1 and 2 tested the relationship between goal progress 
and construal level. Study 1 employed a social comparison to induce 
different levels of goal progress and examined its influence on con-
strual level using a classification task (Liberman et al. 2002), where 
participants were asked to classify objects into categories. As we 
predicted, participants in the high progress condition classified ob-
jects in more inclusive ways using fewer categories (M = 5.16) than 
participants in the low progress condition (M = 6.13; F(1,75) = 5.32, 
p < .05). In study 2, we manipulated perceived goal progress using 
low versus high standards (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). To examine 
whether different levels of perceived goal progress draw people’s 
attention to different aspects of goal pursuit, we asked participants to 
list thoughts that came to their mind as they considered the pursuit of 
their fitness goals. Supporting our hypothesis, participants in the high 
progress condition listed a larger proportion of “why” thoughts (M 
=.626) than “how” thoughts (M = .374). Conversely, participants in 
the low progress condition generated a greater proportion of “how” 
thoughts (M = .630) compared to “why” thoughts (M = .370; F(77) 
= 6.78, p < .05). 
Studies 3 and 4 examined how the fit between goal progress 
and construal level influences motivation. Study 3 induced different 
levels of goal progress using high versus low standards with which 
participants could compare their progress toward academic goals. 
We then asked participants to consider how or why they pursue their 
academic goals. Results showed that participants in the high progress 
condition planned to spend more time studying after abstract (vs. 
concrete) thinking (Mwhy = 4.30, Mhow= 3.41). Conversely, partici-
pants in the low progress condition planned to spend more time after 
concrete (vs. abstract) thinking (Mhow = 4.56, Mwhy = 3.68; F(1, 95) 
= 5.30, p < .05). Study 4 replicated the motivational influence of fit 
in another goal domain and demonstrated the underlying process of 
the fit effects. We used social comparisons to manipulate goal prog-
ress and asked participants to think about how or why they should 
achieve their money management goals. We found that participants 
in the high progress condition intended to spend less money eating 
out with friends when they thought about their pursuit of money man-
agement goals in abstract terms rather than in concrete terms (Mwhy = 
3.62, Mhow = 4.70), whereas participants in the low progress condition 
planned to spend less money eating out when they construed their 
goal pursuit in a concrete manner rather than in an abstract manner 
(Mhow = 3.27, Mwhy = 4.64; F(1, 88) = 6.56, p < .05). Furthermore, we 
found engagement (e.g., “feeling motivated”) partially mediates the 
influence of fit on self-regulation.
From a theoretical perspective, this research extends our knowl-
edge of how perceived goal progress influences individuals’ mental 
construal. Our findings also provide an answer to the question of 
how to motivate or persuade people based on the relationship be-
tween goal progress and construal level. Our findings suggest that if 
an advertising campaign primarily focuses on those who have made 
sufficient progress toward their goals, it would be better to employ 
concrete (vs. abstract) construals. However, if the campaign targets 
people who have made sufficient progress, abstract (vs. concrete) 
construals would be more effective.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Materialism, defined as a focus on the acquisition and posses-
sion of material objects, is described as an essential component of the 
social value system of societies (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002). 
Previous research appears to paint a uniformed portrait of materi-
alism, suggesting that it has universally negative consequences for 
one’s pursuit of happiness. In the current research, we argue that cul-
ture has a significant moderating role in how materialism affects in-
dividuals’ subjective well-being. Specifically, we discuss and explore 
how American and Chinese cultures differ in the cultured interpreta-
tions of materialistic values and how this might lead to a culturally 
bound relationship between materialism and subjective well-being. 
Cultured Materialism
This salience of the negative aspects of materialism in Amer-
ica may have originated from several distinct aspects of American 
culture. For example, having a democratic political culture with a 
great deal of civil liberties such as free press (The Economist, 2011), 
allows for many outlets of self-expression beyond the acquisition 
of material possessions. The American culture also endorses an 
independent self-construal (Lee, Aaker, and Gardner 2000), which 
places less emphasis on acquiring possessions as a means to social 
comparison (Aaker and Schmitt 2001; White and Lehman 2005). In 
contrast to American culture, China’s authoritarian rule and limited 
free press (The Economist, 2011) may cause materialism to function 
as an important instrument for self-expression because of a paucity 
of other outlets. Also, an interdependent self-construal within the 
Chinese culture (Lee et al. 2000) and a strong motivation to “save 
face”(Ahuvia and Wong 1995) might enhance the need to acquire 
materialistic possessions for social comparison (Aaker & Schmitt, 
2001; White & Lehman, 2005). 
As initial evidence supporting our hypothesis, qualitative work 
by Ger and Belk (1996) suggests that Americans are more likely 
to view materialism as excessive or as a weakness, whereas other 
countries, such as Romania, are more likely to view materialism as 
empowering and allowing for an expression of personal control and 
freedom. Eastman et al. (1997) found that Chinese are more likely 
than Americans to view possessions as important markers of success 
and obtaining possessions as a means to happiness. 
Based on our theorizing and these past findings, we hypothesize 
that materialism has negative associations in American culture and, as 
a consequence, the priming of materialism has a negative influence on 
subjective well-being in American culture. In contrast, we hypothe-
size that materialism has positive associations in Chinese culture and, 
as a consequence, the priming of materialism may have a novel and 
positive influence on subjective well-being in Chinese culture.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether cross-cultural differences exist 
in how people interpret the concept of materialism. Specifically, we 
tested whether people in the US and China differ on whether they 
view materialistic individuals positively or negatively. 
Method
The design of the study is a 3 (Materialism: pro-materialism 
vs. neutral vs. anti-materialism) × 2 (Culture: American vs. Chinese) 
between-subject design (N = 290). Participants were asked to evalu-
ate an anonymous survey taker. In the pro-materialism condition, the 
survey taker showed a strong endorsement towards materialism. In 
the anti-materialism condition, the survey taker showed a negative 
attitude towards materialism. In the neutral condition, the survey 
taker showed a neutral attitude towards materialism. 
Results and Discussion
A 2-way ANOVA revealed a significant materialism prime × 
culture interaction on evaluation, F (2, 284) = 31.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.18. US participants evaluated the survey taker in the anti-material-
ism condition more favorably compared with the neutral condition, p 
= .008, which in turn was evaluated more favorably compared with 
the pro-materialism condition, p < .001. For Chinese participants, 
a contrasting pattern of results was observed such that the survey 
taker in the anti-materialism condition was evaluated less favorably 
compared with the neutral condition and the pro-materialism condi-
tion, p = .005. 
Experiment 2 
In the current experiment we explored the effect of material-
ism on subjective well-being in a Chinese population with measures 
closely replicating Bauer et al. (2012) for the purpose of comparison. 
Method
The design of the study is a 2 cell (Materialism prime: material-
ism vs. control) between-subject design (N = 46). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the materialism prime 
condition, participants viewed 20 pictures of luxury products. In the 
control condition, participants viewed 20 pictures of nature and daily 
objects such as flowers. Participants were then asked to indicate how 
they felt at the moment on a series of emotions. The measures exactly 
replicated Experiment 1 in Bauer et al. (2012), which included anxi-
ety, depression, and self-dissatisfaction.
Results and Discussion
Central to our hypothesis, and in contrast from Bauer et al. 
(2012), participants in the materialism prime reported lower anxi-
ety, lower depression, and lower self-dissatisfaction compared to the 
control condition (ps < .087).  
Experiment 3
The current experiment tested for cross-cultural differences in 
how materialism affects subjective well-being by utilizing the same 
stimuli and procedures in American and Chinese cultures.
Method
The design of the current study is a 2 (Prime: materialism vs. 
control) × 2 (Culture: American vs. Chinese) between-subject de-
sign. One hundred and four US participants and 90 Chinese partici-
pants were recruited. The procedures of the current experiment are 
similar to those of Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion
Central to our hypothesis, a significant prime × culture inter-
action on anxiety was found, p = .001. American participants rated 
themselves as more anxious in the materialism condition compared 
with the control condition, p = .01, replicating Bauer et al. (2012). 
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In contrast, Chinese participants rated themselves less anxious in the 
materialism condition compared with control, p = .04. Similar pat-
terns were found on depression and self-dissatisfaction measures.
General Discussion
The current research provides evidence that the conceptualiza-
tion of materialism, and therefore its effects on subjective well-being, 
are culturally bound. Contrary to the existing literature that might lead 
one to uniformly conclude that materialism is a negative contributor 
to subjective well-being, the current findings show that materialism 
can be beneficial to subjective well-being if the culture prescribed as-
sociations to materialism is positive, as with Chinese culture. 
Table 1: Summary of results from 3 reported experiments
Experiment Results
1
American participants evaluated anti-materialistic 
others more favorably compared to pro-materialistic 
others. In contrast, Chinese participants evaluated 
anti-materialistic others less favorably compared to 
anti-materialistic others.
2
After being primed with materialism, Chinese par-
ticipants felt less anxious, less depressed, and less 
self-dissatisfied, a contrasting pattern from past re-
search that utilized an American population.
3
After being primed with materialism, American par-
ticipants’ level of anxiety, depression, and self-dis-
satisfaction increased compared to control. In con-
trast, replicating Experiment 2, Chinese participants’ 
level of anxiety, depression, and self-dissatisfaction 
decreased after being primed with materialism.
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Figure 1: Rating of anxiety (panel 1), depression (panel 2), and 
self-dissatisfaction (panel 3) as a function of materialism prime 
and culture, Experiment 3 .
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Nowadays, people are confronted with an overload of choice 
alternatives. However, having a lot of options does not necessarily 
increase consumer satisfaction (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Es-
pecially people who are motivated to make the best possible choice 
(i.e., maximizers), can experience feelings of stress when they have 
a lot of alternatives, and are more likely to regret their choice after-
wards (Schwartz et al. 2002). We suggest that difficulties to choose 
a product might arise from difficulties to form one’s opinion about 
products. When people have a hard time to know how much they 
like something, they might consequently encounter difficulties to 
choose the product they would like best. Current research suggests 
that people can have a hard time to form their opinion in general. 
Whether they have to evaluate a new product, a new neighbor or a 
new taste, some people find it hard to make up their mind. In current 
paper, we develop a scale to measure individual differences in the 
extent to which people have difficulties to evaluate. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that current evaluation difficulty scale is able to predict 
several personality measures and behavioral outcomes, including ac-
tual taste evaluations.
In a first study, 349 American citizens participated. Exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for reducing the initial item pool 
of 32 items. Items that violated standard criteria, such as a corrected 
item-to-total correlations above .30, were deleted from the factor so-
lution. Results from EFA and the scree plot indicated a one-factor 
solution for the evaluation difficulty construct. Moreover, we found 
that evaluation difficulty relates to several dispositions as expected 
from the literature. For instance, we found a negative relationship 
with Jarvis and Petty’s (1996) need to evaluate scale (r = -.28) and a 
positive relationship with Schwartz’s (2002) maximization scale (r = 
.33). Thus, the more difficulties one encounters to evaluate, the less 
likely one is to engage in evaluative behavior, and the more one will 
experience difficulties to choose a product. 
To confirm current findings and to finalize the evaluation dif-
ficulty scale measure, we ran a second study in which 476 Ameri-
cans participated. The final EFA resulted in a one-factor solution 
with 6 items including one reversed item. The evaluation difficulty 
construct explained 68.96% of the variance, and had an internal con-
sistency of .83. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) showed that this 
6-item one-factor model fits extremely well with the data: Χ²/df = 
1.242, p = .264; RMSEA = .026; RMR = .032; TLI = .995; GFI = .99. 
In addition, we measured several related constructs to test nomologi-
cal validity. Evaluation difficulty correlated with sixteen out of nine-
teen related personality measures. For instance, results showed that 
people experience less evaluation difficulty when they have a ten-
dency to look for social information, think about complex problems, 
and trust their gut feeling. On the other hand, people who do have 
a hard time to evaluate, display more decision difficulty, have less 
self-esteem, and are less optimistic. Additionally, we tested group 
known validity of current scale. We found that people experience less 
difficulties to evaluate as they get older (F(2,340) = 11.67, p < .001). 
Current results suggest that people improve their abilities to evaluate 
as they gain more experience during their lives.
To replicate previous findings and to test the predictive validity 
of our 6-item scale, we ran a study in which 210 Americans partici-
pated. The scale explained 68.59% of the variance and internal con-
sistency was .84 in current sample. Moreover, results showed high 
predictive validity of the scale. First, we found that the scale predict-
ed 15 behavioral items (r = .17 to .68) such as “I always choose the 
same flavor of ice cream”. Second, results showed the scale is related 
to several consumer behavior scales. People who have difficulties 
to evaluate are loyal customers (r = .20), are no variety seekers (r 
= -.37) and have no inclination to express their uniqueness through 
consuming products that are not used by the general public (r =.32). 
Third, people who scored high on the evaluation difficulty scale ex-
plicitly stated they had a hard time to evaluate the quality of two 
books for which we provided a short description (r =.30). 
To test whether evaluation difficulty could predict actual be-
havior, we conducted another study in which 90 Belgian students 
participated. First, participants completed the evaluation difficulty 
scale (α=.80) as part of a larger questionnaire. Second, participants 
were told that they were randomly assigned to evaluate one of two 
concealed brands of chocolates. The chocolates were actually iden-
tical, but were presented in either a beautiful or an ugly box. Af-
terwards, participants had to indicate how delicious the chocolate 
was on a 10-point scale (0=very bad, 10=very delicious). The results 
showed that evaluation difficulty and the type of box had no main 
effect on the evaluation of the chocolates. More importantly, we did 
found a marginally significant interaction effect between evaluation 
difficulty and the type of box on the taste evaluation of the choco-
lates (F(1,88)=3.98, p = .070). People who have a hard time to make 
an evaluation in general, evaluated the same chocolates to be bet-
ter when the box of chocolates was beautiful (M = 3.53) compared 
to when the box was ugly (M = 3.05). In contrast, people who do 
not experience difficulties to evaluate did not make a different taste 
evaluation for a beautiful (M = 3.22) versus an ugly (M = 3.36) box 
of chocolates. As such, these results suggest that people who experi-
ence evaluation difficulty, might transfer the quality of an irrelevant 
attribute such as package design to the quality of the product in itself. 
Taken together, these results indicate that current scale is highly pre-
dictive for various types of behavior.
The current research constructed a valid and reliable evaluation 
difficulty scale with one factor and 6 items that relates to various 
personality and behavioral measures. Moreover, we found that the 
constructed scale is able to predict actual taste evaluations. Future 
research will be conducted to further investigate how difficulties to 
evaluate affect (consumer) behavior.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The study highlights an emerging market – the life history 
business – which enables people to preserve individual and family 
memory. These services are developing as their target clientele – the 
elderly and the baby boomers – are becoming aware of their own 
death and that of their close friends and family. It must be noted that 
there are two different types of biographic services: guidance ser-
vices relating to learning methods and know-how, and co-production 
services involving the services of a personal historian who constructs 
the biography based on discussions with the consumer. The aim of 
this research is to test the influence that legacy motivations and their 
antecedents have on writing behavior and consumer intention to par-
take in these biographical services.
Our reflection and past research led us to specify the motiva-
tions and antecedents to the writing of an autobiography. Six motiva-
tions are specified and measured: Flattering the ego (the willingness 
of the individual to make known certain aspects of his/her person 
and life course) ; Mending the ego (the individual feels the need to 
go over a period of his/her past in order to unburden him/herself) 
; Sharing (willingness to exchange and the search for interaction); 
Being remembered (the issue of being remembered by family and 
friends after death); Transmitting (transmission, often to the young-
est members of the family, of elements or facts the individual deems 
important), and  Bearing witness (desire to preserve some elements 
from generation to generation, the life story heritage). The two ante-
cedents for legacy writing refer to the concepts of reminiscence that 
contribute to identity construction (reminder of the autobiographical 
memory, the pleasure of looking back over ones past) and of gen-
erativity that contributes to identity preservation (the desire to sym-
bolically extend existence beyond death, and worries about future 
generations). 
The models to be tested take into account all of the hypotheses 
that cover antecedents, legacy writing motivations and behavioral 
intentions (table 1). We used measuring instruments that had been 
tested previously and validated in the literature: the Life-Story Writ-
ing Motivations Scale (Guillemot and Urien 2010), the Reminiscence 
Functions Scale (RFS – Webster 1997) and the Loyola Generative 
Scale (LGS – McAdams and de StAubin 1992, adapted by Urien and 
Kilbourne 2011). We measure intent to consume biographic services 
by using concrete and unique mono-item measurements representing 
guidance and co-production services. Data were collected in France 
on a sample of 392 people aged between 60 and 92 years and pro-
cessed with Structural Equation Modeling.
Our study empirically confirms: 
(a) Firstly that these motivations are based on the capacity for 
structured reminiscence (the individual uses his/her past to crystal-
lize important dimensions of the person and to confront existential 
questions about the end of life) and a direction towards the next gen-
eration (which is based on the memory that the individual is going to 
leave and on aspects that the individual wishes to transmit). The ex-
plained variables of motivations range from 40 to 45% for flattering 
the ego, mending the ego, being remembered, sharing and only 17% 
and 24% respectively for transmitting and bearing witness. 
Table 1: Path Coefficient and Hypothesis Testing
Structural Path Coefficient Z-Value Result
H1a: Flattering the ego à guidance biographic services -.05 -.89 Not supported
H1b: Mending the ego à guidance biographic services .11 1.91 Not supported
H1c: Being remembered à guidance biographic services -.10 -1.71 Not supported
H1d: Sharing à guidance biographic services .28 3.47* Supported
H1e: Transmitting à guidance biographic services .16 2.10* Supported
H1f: Bearing witness à guidance biographic services .12 1.52 Not supported
H2a: Flattering the ego à co-production biographic services .11 1.90 Not supported
H2b: Mending the ego à co-production biographic services .20 3.14* Supported
H2c: Being remembered àco-production biographic services -.07 -1.09 Not supported
H2d: Sharing à co-production biographic services .15 2.04* Supported
H2e: Transmitting à co-production biographic services .14 2.23* Supported
H2f: Bearing witness à co-production biographic services .09 1.12 Not supported
H3a: Reminisence Identity à Flattering the ego .29 4.07* Supported
H3b: Reminiscence Identity à Mending the ego .43 6.47* Supported
H3c: Reminisence Identity à Sharing .55 7.37* Supported
H4a: Reminisence Death preparation à Being remembered .31 5.57* Supported
H4b: Reminisence Death preparation à Transmitting .25 4.12* Supported
H4c: Reminisence Death preparation à Bearing witness .29 4.57* Supported
H5a: Generativity Passing on à Sharing .24 3.20* Supported
H5b: Generativity Passing on à Transmitting .31 4.16* Supported
H5c: Generativity Passing on à Bearing witness .36 4.92* Supported
H6a: Generativity Posterity à : Flattering the ego .48 5.41* Supported
H6b: Generativity Posterity à Mending the ego .48 5.22* Supported
H6c: Generativity Posterity à Being remembered .48 6.11* Supported
Statistics significant at the 5% level are marked with *
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(b) Secondly, if the life story can be said to be a multidimen-
sional concept, then only some motivations appear to be decisive on 
biographic services consumption. An individual that wishes to write 
an autobiography who is guided by a will to flatter the ego and to 
bear witness does not seem to be very attracted by biographic ser-
vices because everything points to the fact that writing alone – with 
one’s own words – reflects a personal skill. It must also be noted 
that the influence of the transmitting motivation evokes inter-genera-
tional exchange whereas that of sharing relates to intra-generational 
exchange. The influence of the motivation mending the ego on the 
intent to consume co-production services may seem more surpris-
ing. Nevertheless, according to Rimé’s theory of the Social Sharing 
of Emotion (2005) when a person tries to communicate traumatic 
events that he/she has lived through, it is not so much to offload this 
grief, but more to find a social support for his/her emotions. Hence 
the motivations sharing and mending the ego would have the same 
functions: the former enables the strengthening of relationships by 
mobilizing positive emotions and the latter by negative emotions.
The results of this study will enable service providers to improve 
their offers and will lead to a more in-depth understanding of con-
sumption behavior linked to the transmission and preservation of the 
self in end of life. This study contributes indeed to studies on the pres-
ervation of the self and intergenerational transmission (Belk 1988; 
Curasi, 2006; Price et al. 2000; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). To 
date, research has studied the symbolic preservation and transmission 
of the self through “special” objects in which individuals invest a part 
of their identity. It is striking to consider that the symbolic functions 
these special objects possess at the end of life have certain elements 
in common with legacy writing motivations that have been identi-
fied in this study. The special, valuable object of recognition (for ex-
ample, a trophy would be the sign of a reasonably successful sporting 
“career”), enables the recollection of life moments, the witnessing of 
particular events (for example a ring or a piece of jewellery that sym-
bolizes a particular interpersonal relationship). When this object is 
offered as a present or as a legacy to someone who will know how to 
preserve its meaning, for the giving individual, it is a means of being 
remembered. It also has a therapeutic value and serves, in particular, 
as a point of anchorage and stability. Finally, it enables the transmis-
sion of individual and family values and it is a vehicle for intergen-
erational sharing and transmitting. The main difference between the 
special object and the life story is that for the former, these significant 
differences are symbolic, whilst for the latter, they explicitly express 
the very heart of the life story, whether it be filmed, recorded or writ-
ten. Hence the importance of biographic services which provide the 
necessary tools for storing the “meaningful”.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
It is well-recognized that people consume in ways that estab-
lish and express their self-identities (Belk 1988; Fournier 1998; Mc-
Cracken 1989). We investigated if wearing, choosing, and receiving 
consumer goods also affects people’s identity. Recent studies sug-
gest that consumption influences the way in which people perceive 
themselves (Chao and Chiou 2011, Gino, Norton, and Ariely 2010). 
For instance, women felt more glamorous after using a Victoria’s 
Secret shopping bag than after using a bag from a less appealing 
brand (Park and John 2010). We build on and extend these findings 
by revealing that consumption may not only influence people’s self-
perception but may also affect their social identities. 
The crucial discrepancies are that self-perception effects involve 
dimensional changes on particular traits (attractiveness, intelligence) 
that all people possess to some extent, whereas social identity effects 
of consumption would imply categorical changes in people’s self-
views as members of particular social groups to which they either 
belong to or not. Furthermore, consumption effects on social identity 
would not only involve a change in self-perception but also imply 
changes in the perception others who are members of a particular 
social group. As such, the present studies suggest that the effects of 
consumption on the self are more profound that currently recognized. 
The hypothesis that consumption affects social-identity is con-
sistent with social psychological research on social identity forma-
tion (Tajfel and Turner 1979), which demonstrated that people infer 
group-memberships from cues that establish similarities between 
individuals. Even very subtle and apparently trivial similarity cues 
can be sufficient to make people feel more affiliated with-, hold more 
positive attitudes towards-, and favor apparent in-group members 
(Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 2002). However, research on social-
identity formation has not previously considered if self-categoriza-
tion processes will also affect people’s tendencies to affiliate with 
members of a negatively valenced out-group. As such, the present 
research also extends basic insights into social psychological pro-
cesses of social identity formation. 
In three studies, we tested the hypothesis that consumption 
would affect people’s social identities. In each study, participants 
received a consumer product that was associated with a negatively 
valenced group to which they did not belong. Study 1 revealed that 
customers felt more connected with smokers after receiving an ash-
tray as a gift in a grocery store than after receiving no gift, regard-
less of the number of smokers in their social environment. Receiving 
an ashtray did not result in greater connectedness with other social 
groups (vegetarians, street kids, and Catholics). 
Study 2 replicated and extended findings from Study 1 by show-
ing that wearing a bag that was associated with another negative 
out-group (Moroccans) during a lab experiment resulted in greater 
connectedness with the target group compared to a control condition 
that wore a bag that was not specifically associated with a particular 
social group. Moreover, wearing a bag associated with the out-group 
also resulted in less negative implicit attitudes towards the out-group. 
These effects were particularly pronounced after participants were 
exposed to a social exclusion manipulation. This is consistent with 
findings showing that people are especially sensitive to the symbolic 
meaning of consumer goods after relevant aspects of their self-iden-
tity are threatened (Escalas and Bettman 2005; Gao et al. 2008; Mor-
rison and Johnson 2011; Rindfleish et al. 2008). Again, the experi-
mental manipulations did not affect identification with other social 
groups. 
Study 3 revealed that wearing a bracelet that was associated with 
the negative out-group of gothic people resulted in behavioral effects 
suggesting social-identification with the out-group. Specifically, par-
ticipants sat closer to a confederate whose appearance matched the 
bracelet they were wearing (gothic vs. normal), indicating greater 
affiliation, and were more likely to help the matching confederate, 
indicating in-group favoritism.
Table 1: Summary of Results
Study 1
Ashtrays
Study 2
Bags
Study 3
Bracelets
Control Experimental
Control Experimental Control Experimental
Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion NormalConfederate
Gothic
Confederate
Normal
Confederate
Gothic
Confederate
Affiliation
1.71
(0.78)
2.13
(1.04)
23.58
(16.64)
31.42
(19.80)
22.50
(21.38)
40.72
(26.81)
1.89
(0.58)
2.29
(0.83)
2.24
(1.03)
1.92
(0.49)
Attitude Na -.43(0.31)
-.49
(0.24)
-.28
(0.24)
-.22
(0.25) na na
Favoritism Na na na 70% 30% 29.4% 70.6%
Note. Participants in the Experimental conditions received a consumer product that was associated with the target out group. Participants in the Control 
conditions did not receive a product (study 1) or received a similar product that was not associated with a particular social group (studies 2 and 3). Affiliation 
was assessed through participant ratings in studies 1 (scale: 1-5), and 2 (scale (0-100), and through proximity in seat distance (scale: 1-4) in study 3. Attitude 
was assessed by IAT scores (D). Favoritism was assessed as percentage of helping behavior.
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In sum, the present findings support the hypothesis that con-
sumption may influence the social-identities of consumers. We do 
not believe that this is the result of priming effects, by which certain 
consumer goods increase the accessibility and therefore the judg-
ments about the associated social groups. In Study 1, a priming effect 
would have resulted in an interaction between the manipulation and 
the number of smokers in the participants’ social environments, such 
that the effects of receiving an ashtray would have been stronger for 
people who know many smokers. We did not find such an interac-
tion. Moreover, a priming effect cannot account for the interaction 
with the exclusion manipulation in Study 2 and would have produced 
a main effect of receiving the Moroccan bag. Finally, the effects on 
in-group favoritism as reported in Study 3 cannot be explained from 
mere accessibility effects but rather imply a motivational process. 
We believe our results are more readily understood as the con-
sequence of social identity threats. However, receiving products that 
are associated with a negatively valenced out-group and social ex-
clusion are both threats to people’s social identities that would nor-
mally result in a greater tendency to be accepted by the in-group, 
thus would hinder affiliation with the out-group. On the one hand, 
it could be that each manipulation presented a situational constraint 
on the effects of the other, such that social exclusion by the in-group 
constrained the tendency to affiliate with that group that resulted 
from the identity threat of receiving a product associated with an 
out-group. Similarly, the product may have directed the affiliation 
tendencies resulting from social exclusion towards the associated so-
cial group. On the other hand, it might also be the case that receiving 
a product and being socially excluded constituted threats to different 
self-identity motives (Lee & Shrum, 2012).  
The key limitation to the present findings is the low effect sizes 
observed across the studies, which we believe can be partly account-
ed for by the subtle nature of the manipulations and the fact that the 
present studies constituted a very conservative test of our hypothesis 
as we investigated the effects of consumption on social-identification 
with negatively valenced out-groups. In spite of these impairments 
to a strong effect size, our results were highly consistent and estab-
lished the power of consumer goods to influence self- and social-
identity formation, which may bear important social implications for 
intergroup relations and prejudice. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The ego depletion model posits that the ability to exert self-
control relies on a limited resource of the self (Baumeister, Brat-
slavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998). Consistent with this model, nu-
merous studies have found that exerting self-control in an initial task 
reduces ability to control oneself in subsequent tasks (c.f. Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis 2010). Nonetheless, recent findings 
(e.g., Agrawal and Wan 2009; Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, and Alexander 
2010) suggest that initial acts of self-control do not always impair 
subsequent self-control. In fact, self-regulatory failure due to deple-
tion may depend on how people interpret their experience of deple-
tion. Our research builds on these recent findings by proposing that 
the experience of depletion may act as a source of information that 
lowers self-control. Hence, effects of depletion on self-control can be 
enhanced or reduced by altering the extent to which people rely on its 
experience as a source of information.
We propose that when resources are depleted, the feeling of 
depletion (e.g., tired, exhaustion) serves as a source of information 
that resources are low. The self-control system then reduces subse-
quent self-control to conserve its limited resources. Thus, the feeling 
of depletion can affect self-control independently from the amount 
of depleted resources. If so, the influence of prior self-control on 
subsequent self-control should depend on how credible feelings of 
depletion are perceived to be for judgment and how intensely peo-
ple experience feelings. Hence, we hypothesized that discrediting 
the informational value of the feeling of depletion would diminish 
the standard depletion effect. We also hypothesized that the more 
(or less) intense the feelings of depletion the greater (or lower) the 
depletion effect. We tested these hypotheses in three experiments us-
ing a standard depletion paradigm in which participants engage in an 
initial task that either requires them to inhibit a behavior or not, and 
perform a subsequent task that requires self-control resources. 
We investigated our first hypothesis in experiment 1. Partici-
pants (N=221) were asked to retype a passage as quickly as they 
can within five minutes. Those in the depletion condition were given 
additional instructions to refrain from using the letter “e” and space 
bar. Next, half of the participants were exposed to a discrediting 
manipulation in which they were asked to rate the extent to which 
their current feelings were affected by the typing task. Other par-
ticipants did not see this question. All participants were then given 
10 unsolvable anagrams to solve. Persistence on this task was mea-
sured using the time they spent trying to solve these anagrams. A 
significant two-way interaction between depletion and discrediting 
emerged (F(1,206)=5.90, p<.05). The standard ego depletion effect 
was replicated in the no-discredit condition: depleted participants 
spent less time on the anagrams (M=154.07sec) than non-depleted 
participants (M=214.82sec; F(1,206)=7.74, p<.01). Consistent with 
our prediction, there was no difference in time spent between de-
pleted (M=200.40sec) and non-depleted participants (M=188.41sec) 
in the discredit condition (F(1,206)=.34, p=.56). 
Experiment 2 tested the same hypothesis using a different de-
pendent measure. After completing the same depletion and discred-
iting manipulations from experiment 1, participants (N=149) were 
given a limited amount of time to solve IQ problems. Performance 
on this task was operationalized as the number of correct responses 
each participant provided. Similar to Experiment 1, the interaction 
between depletion and discrediting was significant (F(1,141)=4.33, 
p<.05). In the no-discredit condition, depleted participants did poorer 
(M=4.91) than non-depleted participants (M=5.80; F(1,141)=3.90, 
p=.05). However, in the discredit condition, there was no difference 
in performance between depleted (M=5.47) and non-depleted partici-
pants (M=5.03; F(1,141)=.95, p=.33). 
Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the standard ego depletion ef-
fect and showed that it weakens when perceived credibility of the 
feeling of depletion is reduced. In experiment 3, we tested whether 
depleted individuals who are more prone to experience intense feel-
ings would exhibit the standard ego depletion effect more strongly. 
This experiment also tested our proposed mechanism in a marketing 
context. Prior research has shown that preference for compromise 
options decreases under depletion because the process of deliberat-
ing trade-offs that favor different options is more demanding on self-
regulatory resources than choosing extreme options which typically 
involves a simple decision rule based on one criterion (e.g., highest 
quality, etc.; Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, and Baumeister 2009). We 
predicted that the reduction in compromise effect would be stronger 
(weaker) among depleted individuals who are more (less) prone to 
experience intense feelings. 
Participants (N=87) completed the same depletion manipula-
tion from the previous experiments followed by a choice task among 
portable grills. They were asked to choose between three models: 
one option was superior on cooking area but inferior on weight; an-
other option was superior on weight but inferior on cooking area; the 
middle option was medium on these two attributes. Then they filled 
out the Affect Intensity measure which reflects chronic differences 
in the strength with which people experience feelings (Larsen and 
Diener 1987). Consistent with our prediction, there was a significant 
interaction between depletion and affect intensity on choice of the 
middle option (β=-2.74,Wald=6.16, p<.05). Among participants with 
high chronic affect intensity, those who were depleted compromised 
less than those who were not depleted (β=-2.36,Wald=9.05, p<.005). 
However, among participants with low chronic affect intensity, this 
difference was not significant (β=.32,Wald=.22, p=.64). 
We provided evidence for the proposed depletion-as-informa-
tion hypothesis by manipulating and measuring people’s reliance on 
the feeling of depletion as a source of information in three experi-
ments. These results indicate that the experience of depletion plays 
an essential role of giving feedback to the self-control system that 
Table 1: Results across Experiments
Experiment 1:  
Mean Time Spent on Unsolvable Anagrams (sec)
Depletion No Depletion
No Discredit 154.07 214.82
Discredit 200.40 188.41
Experiment 2:  
Mean Number of Correct Responses on IQ Test
Depletion No Depletion
No Discredit 4.91 5.80
Discredit 5.47 5.03
Experiment 3:  
Percentage of Participants Who Chose Middle Option
Depletion No Depletion
High Affect Intensity 28.6% 78.3%
Low Affect Intensity 60% 50%
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resources are low and that one should minimize self-regulatory ef-
fort. Future research should investigate whether the current effects 
would hold up in cases of severe ego depletion where subjective 
factors may not be sufficient to overcome actual depletion (Vohs, 
Baumeister and Schmeichel 2012). Considering how ego depletion 
can be implicated in a wide variety of maladaptive behaviors (e.g., 
impulsive purchases, excessive eating, etc.), insights from the cur-
rent research could help to identify strategies to mitigate the effects 
of depletion on self-control in a systematic way.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
To be successful, innovations should be perceived as novel and 
different from existing alternatives (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997, He-
nard and Szymanski 2001). The handful of studies that explored the 
antecedents of novelty focused on either firm characteristics and new 
product development strategies (Sethi et al. 2012; Sethi et al. 2001) 
or consumer categorization processes (Selinger et al. 2006). With 
respect to launching new products, research shows the merits and 
increasing popularity of introducing products as brand extensions 
(e.g., Aaker and Keller 1990; Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Stahl et 
al. 2012). For innovations introduced as extensions, an element that 
may heavily determine extension newness perceptions, is the brand 
used to introduce it. In this research, we explore the impact of par-
ent brand typicality on extension newness perceptions. The strong 
category anchoring of long-established, typical brands like Jeep has 
been shown to create a unique advantage relative to other brands 
(Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989). However, it has also been argued to 
present a possible innovation disadvantage (Aaker and Keller 1990; 
Farquhar et al. 1992), as it intuitively may make people think inside 
the box. Yet, we counter-intuitively predict that brand typicality may 
help rather than hinder novelty perceptions. 
In particular, we examine whether the type of dominant associa-
tions a brand evokes might affect the perceived novelty of its new 
products. We distinguish between types of brand association based 
on their level of abstraction: concrete attribute-based associations 
(i.e., physical product features) versus abstract associations (i.e., not 
directly related to physical product features). We argue that typical 
brands (i.e., brands strongly associated with a specific category and 
core category attributes) evoke more concrete  attribute-based asso-
ciations, whereas less typical brands (i.e., brands not strongly associ-
ated with a specific category) tend to evoke relatively more abstract 
associations. We argue that both types of brand associations affect 
perceived novelty differently. 
Since novelty perceptions are relative judgments, they require 
a context against which novelty is assessed. Therefore, novelty of 
a new product is most likely assessed against the context of exist-
ing alternative products. Brands – by activating certain associations 
in consumers’ minds – might influence this comparison context. We 
posit that attribute-based associations evoked by typical brands pro-
vide consumers with a concrete context of existing product features. 
This context allows a direct comparison between the new product’s 
features and existing ones. This might draw attention to which fea-
tures of the new product are new and different from existing ones, 
which might increase newness perceptions. For less typical brands 
we do not expect such effect as they are less likely to carry concrete 
attribute-based associations. Four empirical studies offer converging 
support for our predictions.
A first experiment (N=42) was designed to test the assumption 
that typical brands evoke more attribute-based associations com-
pared to less typical brands. In this experiment, participants were 
confronted with either a typical or a less typical brand from two 
product categories. We asked participants to list which associations 
were triggered by these brands. Subsequent analyses confirmed that 
typical brands trigger a larger number of attribute-based associations 
Table 1: Overview of the Experiments
Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Impact of 
typicality 
on novelty 
(regression coeff.)
Perceived novelty (mean) as a function of brand typicality
(Perceived novelty was measured using a 4-item, 7 pt. scale; 
a higher score signals higher perceived novelty)
Close extensions Distant extensions Consistent manipulations Inconsistent manipulations
Brand typicality Brand typicality Brand typicality Brand typicality
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low High Low High
Photo 
Camera .151 (t = 2.87)*
5.30 
(1.71)**
6.04 
(1.19)** 5.57 (1.18) 5.48 (1.51)
Chocolate .169 (t = 2.97)**
SUV .211 (t = 4.22)* 3.49 (1.65)*
4.30 
(1.01)*
4.62 
(1.32)*
4.36 
(1.43)
4.35 
(1.17)
4.41 
(1.23)
4.06 
(1.46)**
4.90 
(1.36)** 4.31 (1.39) 3.91 (1.50)
Beer 3.48 (1.60)*
4.06 
(1.20)*
4.61 
(1.49)*
4.63 
(1.33)
4.60 
(1.11)
4.89 
(1.29)
Ketchup 4.39 (1.31)*
5.31 
(1.17)*
5.59 
(1.22)*
3.88 
(1.15)
3.98 
(1.36)
3.79 
(1.58)
Note.—Experiment 1 reveals that brands scoring high (low) on typicality tend to carry more concrete attribute-related (abstract non-attribute related) brand 
associations. These results were omitted from this table for reasons of clarity. Experiment 2 uses a regression model to test the impact of brand typicality on 
perceived novelty of new products. For all product categories tested, perceived novelty is significantly, positively influenced by brand typicality. Experiment 
3 uses ANOVA to test the impact of brand typicality on perceived novelty of new products. The mean scores on perceived novelty for each condition are 
presented in the table. The data shows that brand typicality significantly increases perceived novelty for extensions into similar, but not to dissimilar, product 
categories. Experiment 4 uses an additional manipulation that affects perceived novelty: construal level. The table presents the mean perceived novelty score 
under each experimental condition. ANOVA was used to test their significance. Results show that when both the type of brand (typicality low or high) and 
construal level (concrete or abstract) affect perceived novelty in a consistent direction, the effect of typicality persists. If not, both effects level each other out.  
* significant at p<.001 significance level                ** significant at p<.01 significance level                *** significant at p<.05 significance level
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compared to less typical brands. The total number of non-attribute-
based associations shows the expected opposite pattern. The dif-
ferences were even stronger when we focused on the top-of-mind 
associations: attribute-based associations (M Typical = 1.30, SD = 
.57 versus M Less Typical = 0.65, SD = .47; z = -3.556, p < .001); 
abstract associations (M Typical = 0.67, SD = .57, M Less Typical) = 
1.24, SD = .45, z = -3.256, p < .001).
The goal of the second experiment was to establish the link 
between brand typicality and perceived newness of new products 
introduced by that brand. To test this, we ran an online experiment 
among 1047 participants in which each participant rated the nov-
elty of a new product introduced by either a brand low, medium, or 
high in typicality. We tested our predictions across three different 
product categories for generalizability. A regression analysis showed 
that typical brands increase novelty perceptions of new products (β = 
.214 (t = 7.080, p < .001)). We observed this effect of brand typical-
ity on perceived novelty of new products in each product category 
tested.
A third study (N=1030) tests a boundary condition of the ef-
fect found in study 2. In particular, we find that the effect of typical 
brands on perceived novelty is limited to new products introduced 
in the brand’s core category (i.e., close extensions) as opposed to 
dissimilar product categories (i.e., distant extensions). This finding 
offers additional support for the notion that brand associations drive 
novelty perceptions. Attribute-based associations (physical product 
features) are only useful in assessing the novelty of a new product 
if they can be used as a comparison point. This is true for new prod-
ucts introduced into the brand’s own category (e.g., Jeep introduces 
a new type of 4x4), but not for dissimilar new products (e.g., Jeep 
introduces a new type of city scooter). We documented this boundary 
condition across three product categories. 
A final study (N=231) aims for convergence by influencing 
novelty perception through an additional manipulation: construal 
level. Previous research found that individuals with a concrete (ab-
stract) mindset tend to focus on dissimilarities (similarities) between 
objects, which might also affect perceived novelty of new products. 
Experiment 4 combines a construal level and brand typicality ma-
nipulation to test their joint effects. Across two product categories, 
we find that both factors affect perceived novelty, as expected. In 
particular, we show that when both manipulations drive novelty per-
ceptions in consistent directions, the effect of typicality on perceived 
novelty remains significant, whereas inconsistent manipulations 
level each other out.
This research demonstrates, for the first time, that brands can 
influence extension newness perceptions. Specifically, we show that 
a new product launched using a brand that is typical for the category 
is perceived as more novel than it would be if launched by a less typi-
cal brand. We also provide evidence for the underlying mechanism. 
We argue that attribute-based brand associations make people focus 
on dissimilarities, and as such facilitate novelty perceptions. This 
insight has considerable business value, as it shows that managers 
can influence the perceived novelty of an innovation by carefully 
considering the brand to launch it.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The rising conflict between the growing sensitivity towards en-
vironmental concerns while living in a material world has interested 
consumer researchers and policy makers for some time. To date, 
the literature on materialism and sustainability is not encouraging 
regarding the possibility to reconcile sustainable and materialistic 
consumption. The few existing studies on this topic suggest that 
materialism and environmentally responsible behavior are mutually 
incompatible (Banerjee and McKeage 1994; Kilbourne and Pickett 
2008). However, Burroughs’ (2010) notion that green products might 
have taken over from prestige goods (extravagant, expensive, large) 
as the new status products as well as research that showed that green 
products are status-relevant when consumed in public (Griskevicius, 
Tybur, and van den Bergh 2010) point to a new understanding of 
sustainable consumption. Besides typically considered altruistic mo-
tives, green products may in addition serve to pursue egoistic goals 
such as enhancing status. This lends support on the assumption that 
green products can serve as enviable material possessions. It is less 
clear, however, why this might be the case. 
To date, researchers tend to agree that material possessions have 
to be more expensive than other products and have to be socially vis-
ible (Richins 1994). However, considering the importance of posses-
sions for identity purposes as well as their influence on the respective 
social environment (Solomon, 1983), the reduction of material pos-
sessions to costly goods only is subject to debate. Regardless of the 
relative price, ideal material products need to be desired and valued 
by the targeted social environment. As such, greater value is often 
related to greater scarcity of objects (Fromkin 1970), which signals 
that the number of potential co-owners is limited. We extend this 
reasoning and contend that scarcity can also apply to experiences 
or personality traits that are associated with certain products or con-
sumption activities. 
Specifically, we argue that materialists may appreciate the as-
sociations of rare personality traits that can be attributed to buyers of 
green products. As materialists are particularly apt to scarce product 
features, this increases attractiveness of green products. Although 
sustainability has become an important issue in today’s societies, 
not many individuals are willing to incur the costs of self-sacrifice 
– in terms of money, quality, or time – for the sake of others (Bur-
roughs and Rindfleisch 2011). Public campaigns that try to promote 
a sustainable lifestyle underline this need for a change in consumer 
behavior. In doing so, these campaigns subconsciously help to signal 
materialists that sustainable behavior is still rather rare. Therefore, 
associated personality traits of sustainable consumption, such as 
being caring, helpful, or ethical may become desirable personality 
traits that materialists want to communicate to others. In other words, 
choosing a green product option over a non-green product option 
may serve in terms of differentiating oneself from other members 
of the same social class or to demonstrate belongingness to some 
intellectual elite.
The aim of our study was to show that under certain conditions 
– when green personality traits are perceived to be rare – materialism 
and sustainability are not at odds. One hundred and forty-four stu-
dents (54.2 % male, mean age = 20.5) at a large Texan public univer-
sity took part in this study for partial course credit. We employed a 2 
(scarcity, control) x 2 (green personality traits, control) between-sub-
ject design. We measured materialism using Richins’ (2004) 9-item 
Material Value Short Scale (α =.81). We used the scrambled sentence 
test to prime scarcity and a memory task to prime green personality 
traits. Prior to this study, we pretested those personality traits (e.g., 
caring, helpful, ethical) with a separate group of 49 students to en-
sure that these traits are most often associated with green consump-
tion. After the two manipulations and a filler task, participants were 
asked to imagine a situation in which they are out shopping to buy a) 
coffee and b) a new TV set. For each product category they were pre-
sented with two different options (green, non-green), each described 
by three product features. Notably, both options were identical in 
terms of price and two product features. The third attribute was either 
a green or non-green attribute. 
Considering that on a bipolar 9-point rating scale a mean of 5 
indicates an equal attractiveness of both the green and non-green 
product option, our results indicate two different scenarios for ‘green 
scarcity,’ depending on the product category. With regard to the TV 
set, priming of green personality traits alone revealed a strong prefer-
ence for the non-green option among materialists. However, a com-
bined priming (green personality traits and scarcity) increased the 
desirability of the green option. For coffee, the perceived scarcity 
of green personality traits increased the desirability of the green op-
tion among materialists, while low-materialists and materialists in 
the neutral condition were rather indifferent. Notably, the preference 
towards the green product option was even higher than that of low-
materialists. 
Taken together, results of our study lend support on our con-
tention that materialists prefer green products when consumption of 
these products entails scarce personality features of the consumer. 
Specifically, the perceived scarcity of personality attributes lead ma-
terialist to evaluate the green option more positively, while there was 
no such effect for low materialists.
Our research has important implications for policy makers and 
companies alike. While much effort has been made to change con-
sumer behavior towards a more sustainable lifestyle (e.g., recycling, 
buying green, reuse things), the notion that some consumers are rather 
motivated by perceived scarce personality traits (e.g., communicat-
ing that one is caring or altruistic) may help to foster a more sustain-
able lifestyle in a quite unconventional way. That is, even consumers 
that care less about the environment can be targeted and inspired to 
increase green consumption by means of communicating the rarity of 
certain personality traits. This insight helps to present green products 
in a more attractive way (for this highly materialistic segment) by ad-
dressing other than solely altruistic needs or normative expectations. 
Regardless of the consumers’ motives for sustainable consumption 
(altruism or striving for materialistic goals), the positive consequenc-
es for nature and environment cannot be neglected. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A basic tenet of rational choice theory is that people choose 
the outcome that produces the highest subjective expected utility 
(Savage, 1954; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).  Decades of 
research in psychology shows that judgments of utility are in fact 
malleable, and that choice is affected by the decision context (Slovic, 
1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In the present work we argue 
that the malleability of people’s preferences extends to the context 
in which an outcome is reached.  Thus, people’s choices can be in-
fluenced simply by how they are going to attain an outcome, inde-
pendent of what the actual outcome is.  We call the utility that peo-
ple gain (or lose) from the process of how an outcome is obtained, 
“choice utility,” which is distinct from outcome utility and which can 
either enhance or detract from the overall attractiveness of an option.
We focus on two normatively equivalent processes for obtain-
ing the same outcome: action and inaction. Drawing on research in 
philosophy, morality, the law, and psychology, we argue that these 
two processes are not equivalent in people’s minds even if they lead 
to an identical outcome.  In particular, moral and legal philosophers 
have debated the distinction between outcomes obtained through 
action and inaction extensively.  The question most commonly ad-
dressed in this research is whether action is equivalent to inaction 
in cases where both yield an identical outcome.  For instance, moral 
philosophers argue that people cannot be held morally responsible 
for inactions (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985).  Legal scholars argue that 
because there is no behavior involved, it can be assumed that inac-
tions do not cause any change in the physical environment relative 
to actions (Duttwiller, 2006). Further, to hold someone as liable for 
the commission of a crime can only be based on an omission if the 
omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense, 
or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law 
(LaFave and Scott, 1986). Similarly, substantial research in psychol-
ogy indicates a distinction between action and inaction in various 
types of judgments, both in the moral domain (e.g. Sugarman, 1986) 
and in non-moral decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Land-
man, 1987).
Building on these insights we develop our theory of choice util-
ity. Our theory predicts that when people detect a difference in the 
utility between two options so that preference uncertainty is low, 
they prefer to obtain the additional utility given by the high utility 
option through action rather than inaction.  Thus, the choice share of 
a high utility option will be lower when it is framed as an inaction 
than as an action.  In contrast, when people have difficulty detect-
ing a difference in the utility between two options so that preference 
uncertainty is high, the inaction frame functions as a tie-breaking 
mechanism that makes either option framed as an inaction appear 
more attractive.  Thus, the choice share of either option framed as an 
inaction will be greater than when it is framed as an action.
We provide empirical support for the existence of choice util-
ity in six studies. In our first two studies studies we demonstrate the 
effect of choice utility on decisions made in the context of classic 
problems from judgment and decision-making literature. The context 
of Study 1 is the Asian Disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981). The context of Study 2 is money illusion (Shafir, Diamond, 
and Tversky, 1997). We chose these problems because their results 
have been replicated in previous research and, therefore, we can eas-
ily predict what participants’ predominant choices will be. In these 
studies we randomly assign participants to either the classic ver-
sions of the problems, or to a condition where one of the two options 
is framed as the result of inaction. We find that preference for the 
predominant response (e.g., certain option for gain frame and risky 
option for loss frame in Study 1) significantly decreases when that 
option is framed as inaction. We find no significant effect when the 
infrequent response (e.g. risky option for gain frame and certain op-
tion for loss frame in Study 1) is framed as inaction.
Studies 3a and 3b further replicate the effect of choice utility 
(Part A) in a different decision problem (the disjunction effect: Tver-
sky and Shafir, 1992), but also demonstrate the predicted fluctuations 
in the relative utility of the two outcomes as the result of framing 
the option with the highest utility as the result of inaction (Part B). 
Participants in Study 3b perceive the difference in the relative attrac-
tiveness of the two outcomes to be higher when both result from ac-
tion compared to when the predominant option results from inaction, 
while the infrequent option results from action. Moreover, framing 
the infrequent option as inaction yields no effect. Studies 4 and 5 
demonstrate the effect of choice utility in decisions with high dif-
ficulty. We show that people prefer inaction when there is difficulty 
in choosing, similar to a default effect. Participants in Study 4 choose 
between seven risky gains. We find that inaction increased preference 
for all options except one. In Study 5 we examine choice utility in the 
context of the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber, Payne and Puto, 
1982; Simonson 1989). We replicate the attraction effect when there 
is no inaction frame. We further find that preference for the asym-
metrically dominating option decreases when it is framed in terms 
of inaction (i.e., when preference uncertainty was low). Moreover, 
preference for that very same option marginally increases when it 
is framed as inaction, but it is not dominating (i.e., when preference 
uncertainty was high). Changes in attribute weights mediated these 
effects. Our findings have important implications for default effects 
and choice architecture, particularly in contexts where preference 
uncertainty is low. In such cases, preference for a given option seen 
as superior in terms of utility may be harmed as a result of making it 
attainable through inaction. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Multiple-study articles are the norm in behavioral research and 
the number of studies per article is increasing [Schimmack, 2012]. 
Since review practices dictate that all studies demonstrate statistical 
significance [Simmons et al., 2011], authors may feel obligated to 
run studies until they get a sufficient number of statistically signifi-
cant results and then report only the statistically significant ones; this 
leads to a form of publication bias known as the file drawer problem 
[Rosenthal, 1979]. Indeed, given the modest power typical of studies 
in behavioral research [Cohen, 1962, 1992], papers where all studies 
ran pass this “statistical significance filter” [Gelman and Weakliem, 
2009] are generally unrealistic. Furthermore, application of this filter 
guarantees upwardly biased effect size estimates–a bias that is ex-
acerbated when the true effect size is small as well as when the size 
α of the test (i.e., the threshold p-value) is low. In effect, then, the 
standards of the field are self-defeating. While these observations are 
not new or even unique to our field [Sterling, 1959], recent work sug-
gests that publication bias is indeed a problem in psychology journals 
[Simmons et al., 2011, John et al., 2012].
Many of these problems are directly due to the focus placed 
on sharp null hypothesis testing (and the concomitant p-values). In-
deed, there are many well-known criticisms of statistical significance 
[Krantz, 1999] including the arbitrariness of the standard α = 0.05 
level (“Surely, God loves the 0.06 nearly as much as the 0.05.”; Ros-
now and Rosenthal [1989]) and the fact that statistical significance 
is not the same as practical importance. In addition to these common 
criticisms, the dichotomization of results into “significant” and “non-
significant” frequently leads to the dismissal of whatever differences 
are observed in practice, thereby cutting off potentially fruitful lines 
of future research.
Following Cohen’s maxim that “the primary product of a re-
search inquiry is one or more measures of effect size, not p-values” 
[Cohen, 1990, p. 1310], we suggest an increased focus on effect size 
estimation and a de-emphasis of the de facto requirement of statisti-
cal significance for all studies in a given paper. In particular, we hold 
that many promising research projects are shelved at an early stage 
when pilot studies fail to attain statistical significance–even when 
the results are directionally in line with theory. Consequently, re-
searchers may be unnecessarily dropping illuminating projects (and 
journals rejecting deserving papers) by applying the statistical sig-
nificance filter.
If a sufficiently large number of experiments studying a common 
phenomenon demonstrate a consistent pattern of results yet each fails 
to generate a p-value less than the “magic number” of 0.05, it stands 
to reason that the effect is real and that the lack of significance is due 
to the modest power of studies in psychology [Cohen, 1962, 1992]. 
Further, since the experiments study a common phenomenon, it seems 
natural to combine the information from the various studies into a 
single summary estimate; such a summary estimate is more reliable 
than any of the separate single study estimates and provides a succinct 
measure of the results. Second, this summary effect size estimate cou-
pled with a measure of its uncertainty is a direct indicator of replica-
bility for future studies in the domain of interest. Third, because effect 
sizes can be easily understood by non-specialists, they allow for easy 
comparison across related subfields of consumer research. Finally, 
consumer psychology can progress faster and more effectively when 
researchers focus on quantifying the effects of constructs rather than 
solely on demonstrating systematic deviations from null hypotheses 
of zero effect. Although establishing non-null effects is an important 
first step in testing theories, the significance of a finding should not 
depend solely on inferential statistics [Campbell, 1982].
Despite these strong arguments in favor of effect size estima-
tion, a focus on effect size estimates has not been broadly practiced. 
Indeed, papers rarely report effect sizes even when authors are asked 
to do so [La Greca, 2005]. In view of the trend towards multiple-
study publications, we propose that authors provide a meta-analytic 
summary of their experiments (as meta-analysis can be helpful with 
as few as two studies [Valentine et al., 2009]) and report these results 
as part of the discussion of their findings. This would directly pro-
vide a summary effect size estimate thereby conveying the benefits 
discussed in the prior paragraph.
To facilitate the meta-analysis of a research paper, we have 
developed an easy-to-use website that allows authors to input the 
details of their study design and summary statistics and to receive es-
timates and uncertainty intervals for the individual studies as well as 
an overall summary. To power this website, we build on prior work 
[Cooper and Hedges, 1994, Cooper et al., 2009] to introduce novel 
meta-analytic methodology that is uniquely tailored to the effect-
size analysis of mixed factorial studies and which allows for both 
repeated measures studies and for studies with different dependent 
variables (i.e., different operationalizations of the same underlying 
construct). By analyzing three recent consumer psychology papers 
(each of which reports multiple experiments), we show that this ap-
proach offers five major informational benefits:
i. A concise quantitative paper summary with effect size 
estimates of both main and interaction effects as well as 
confidence intervals (see Table 1).
ii. Improved single-study effect size estimates with smaller 
confidence intervals.
iii. A visual effect summary of each study separately and all 
studies combined. 
iv. A measure about the variability of the effects across stud-
ies and conditions that is useful for assessing the need for 
methodological and other moderating factors as potential 
sources of this variation.
v. A prospective power analysis for main and interaction ef-
fects based on all conducted studies.
Table 1: Meta-analysis Summary Output for Recent Papers .
Paper Effect 2 .5% 25 .0% 50 .0% 75 .0% 97 .5%
Bos et al. [2011] Immediacy -0.83 -0.41 -0.52 -0.63 -0.20
Lammers et al. 
[2008] 
Legitimacy 0.11 0.28 0.37 0.46 0.63
Power 0.27 0.44 0.53 0.62 0.79
Interaction -1.18 -0.94 -0.81 -0.69 -0.44
Sleeth-Keppler 
and Wheeler 
[2011] 
Context -1.45 -1.23 -1.12 -1.01 -0.79
Target -0.86 -0.66 -0.55 -0.44 -0.24
Interaction 0.64 0.93 1.08 1.23 1.52
The median is the estimate and a 95% confidence interval is formed from 
the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles. Our methodology also returns quantile 
estimates for the individual studies as well as a unique graphical display.
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Because these informational gains are obtained by providing 
merely summary information about experimental conditions (i.e., 
means, standard deviations, and sample sizes), we are optimistic that 
our proposal will be viewed as beneficial by many researchers.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Sometimes we are exposed to other people performing 
difficult activities with high levels of mastery. In such situations, 
the performer has perfect control over the activity, and every 
element of the execution flows naturally and apparently effortlessly. 
We hypothesize and test in a series of experiments that observing 
masterful performances of others at difficult activities will increase 
one’s perceptions of self-efficacy at those same activities. 
In general, people are not accurate at predicting their own ability 
and are susceptible to systematic errors at this type of task (Billeter 
et al., 2011). Projection biases (Loewenstein et al., 2003), self-
enhancement motives (DeNisi & Shaw, 1977), or excessive focus on 
one’s own vs. others’ abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) may keep 
people from forming accurate predictions. The lack of accuracy at 
evaluating personal skills and at predicting individual performance 
suggests that contextual information, such as the performance of 
a third person, may affect people’s predictions. Indeed, observing 
the performances of others is a source of information used to judge 
self-efficacy, that is, one’s perceived ability to perform an activity 
(Bandura, 1977; Gist & Mitchell, 1993). 
Research on contrast effect would predict that exposure to 
an expert mastering an activity negatively affects one’s perceived 
ability to successfully perform the same activity, because the expert’s 
superior ability becomes a new standard of comparison against 
which personal ability is compared (Herr et al., 1983; Sherif & 
Hovland, 1961). Therefore, one’s ability will be judged as lower than 
if it were assessed without being exposed to the high mastery of the 
expert. In addition, research on social comparisons would expect that 
exposure to high mastery makes other people’s ability more salient, 
thus reducing the focus on one’s own ability that is typical for many 
self-assessments (Kruger, 1999). Such increased salience of others’ 
ability could mitigate the better-than-average effect (i.e., the tendency 
to judge ourselves as better than others at relatively easy activities) or 
exacerbate the worse-than-average effect (i.e., the tendency to judge 
ourselves as worse than others at relatively difficult activities), thus 
resulting in diminished self-assessments.
However, we posit that exposure to an expert mastering an 
activity may have a positive effect on one’s perceived ability to 
perform that activity. By definition, mastery involves high control 
over the activity performed (White, 1959; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; 
Kubovy, 1999). The high level of control exhibited by the performer 
confers an apparent ease to the activity, which may be interpreted 
as actual ease (Song & Schwarz, 2008). More in general, seeing 
others perform challenging activities without adverse consequences 
can generate expectations in observers that they too will improve if 
they intensify and persist in their efforts (Bandura & Barab, 1973). 
These findings have been attributed to the powerful motivational 
effects of individuals’ need for control (deCharms, 1968; Rotter, 
1966). Research has shown that a sense of competence and mastery 
over one’s own environment leads to perception of personal control 
(Bandura, 1989; White, 1959), and that individuals tend to seek 
control (Brehm, 1966), even in trivial or illusory forms (Langer, 
1975). 
We hypothesize that observing a performance conducted with 
high mastery allows to vicariously satisfy one’s need for control. 
The exertion of control apparent in the high mastery performance 
may transfer to the observers, and trigger the belief that they would 
also be able to exert that same level of control on the activity. As 
a consequence, such vicarious control would raise observers’ 
expectations on their own ability to perform the activity, resulting 
in inflated assessments. We also hypothesize that this effect will be 
stronger for individuals that are more similar to the expert performer 
being observed, because such similarity would increase the personal 
relevance of vicariously derived information (Kazdin, 1974; Schunk, 
1989). 
Study 1 shows that exposure to the masterful performance of a 
fairly complex yoga pose positively affects participants’ assessment 
of their own ability to perform the same pose. Participants exposed 
to the masterful performance reported higher ability to perform the 
pose than participants just exposed to the instructions and a picture 
of the pose. 
Study 2 manipulates the level of mastery of the performance 
of the same yoga pose (high vs. low) and measures its effects on 
participants’ predicted ability to perform the same pose. We also 
measured to what extent participants felt in control while watching 
the performance, and, as a potentially alternative mediator, the 
perceived difficulty of the pose. Participants exposed to the high-
mastery performance evaluated themselves as more likely to be 
able to perform the yoga pose than participants exposed to the low-
mastery performance. In addition, perceived control mediated the 
effect of exposure to mastery on predicted ability, but the perceived 
difficulty of the pose did not. 
Study 3 tests whether the dissimilarity between the observed 
expert and the self prevents the occurrence of the effect of exposure 
to mastery. Participants were first asked whether they watched the 
London 2012 100m men Olympic final (i.e., a highly masterful 
sport performance). Then, they indicated in how many seconds 
they thought they could run 100m, our measure of predicted ability. 
Finally, as a measure of their similarity to the Olympian athletes, 
participants reported their level of fitness. A significant interaction 
between exposure to mastery and level of fitness revealed that 
the effect of exposure to mastery was significant for high-fitness 
participants but not for low-fitness participants, signaling that the 
similarity between the performer and the observer moderates the 
effect of exposure to mastery on perceived self-efficacy. 
Our results demonstrate that exposure to mastery results in 
enhanced self-efficacy, as individuals exposed to a highly masterful 
performance overestimate their own ability to perform the same 
activity. This effect appears to be due to the experience of a form 
of vicarious control while observing the masterful performance. 
Supporting the proposed explanation, this effect is moderated by 
the similarity between the individual and the actor. These results 
provide initial evidence on the conditions under which exposure to 
expert performance may enhance intentions to perform activities 
or purchase products that require skills and practice in order to be 
appropriately used (Thompson et al., 2005; Murray & Haubl, 2007; 
Burson, 2007).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Individuals frequently utilize the behavior of others as a guide 
for their own (Baumeister, Hutton, and Tice 1989). As a result, con-
sumers often model their own opinions and behavior – including 
brand preference and choice – on the observed behavior of others 
(Bearden and Etzel 1982; Bearden and Rose 1990). Extensive evi-
dence of such modeling behavior is found in the eating domain; re-
search shows that individuals vary the quantity of food they consume 
based on the behavior of their eating companions, eating more when 
others eat more and less when others eat less (Herman, Roth, and 
Polivy 2003). 
We build on the modeling literature by exploring the manner 
in which individuals make social consumption choices when the 
behavior of others is unknown. In such cases, individuals lack an 
observable standard upon which to model their own behavior and 
are thus likely to search for cues from the consumption context that 
suggest how others are likely to behave. We posit that one such cue 
is the contextual positioning of the brand or venue in which the 
consumption episode takes place. We predict that in the absence of 
information about others’ behavior, individuals rely on contextual 
cues like a brand’s positioning to establish expectations for others’ 
consumption. For example, when others’ food choices are unknown, 
consumers may look to the venue’s health positioning to infer the 
behavior of others, such that at a less healthy venue they will expect 
less healthful food choices and behaviors and at a healthier venue 
they will expect more healthful food choices and behaviors. We posit 
that these expectations will, in turn, serve as standards for behavior 
in social settings. Importantly, we do not expect to observe this effect 
in the absence of others, as individuals are free from the evaluative 
concerns that drive them to behave in line with social expectations. 
To test these predictions, our first study manipulated contex-
tual positioning by asking participants to imagine eating at either a 
deli (healthy) or a diner (unhealthy). We manipulated the presence 
of others by asking participants to consider a scenario where they 
were either eating with or without others. Participants were given 
no information regarding the choices of others, such that the explicit 
consumption behaviors of others were absent. They were asked to 
choose between a more versus less healthful menu option: apple slic-
es versus french fries. In line with our predictions, when participants 
patronized the unhealthy diner, eating with versus without others in-
creased the likelihood of selecting the less healthful option. When 
participants patronized the healthy deli, eating with versus without 
others increased the likelihood of making the healthful choice. 
In our second study, we test a key assumption underlying our 
theorizing; specifically that contextual positioning serves as a cue re-
garding the behavior of others when consumption episodes are social 
yet the behavior of others is unknown (vs. known). If this is correct, 
then when the behavior of others is known, we would not expect to 
observe the effect observed in our previous study. To test this, we ma-
nipulated contextual positioning using fictitious venues with descrip-
tive venue names that varied in terms of their level of implied health-
fulness: Greasyspoon Café (unhealthy) and Garden Café (healthy). 
In addition, we manipulated knowledge about the consumption of 
others (i.e., eating with others whose choices are unknown, known to 
be healthful, or known to be unhealthful). As predicted, when eating 
at the unhealthy restaurant, participants predicted that they would 
consume more calories when eating with others whose choices were 
unknown compared to known to be healthful, or inconsistent with 
the venue; similarly, individuals estimated that they would consume 
more calories when eating with others whose choices were known 
to be unhealthy, or consistent with the venue, versus healthful, or 
inconsistent. When eating at the healthy restaurant, individuals pre-
dicted that they would consume fewer calories when eating with oth-
ers whose choices were unknown compared to eating with others 
whose choices were known to be less healthy, or inconsistent with 
the venue; similarly, participants estimated that they would consume 
fewer calories when eating with others whose choices were known 
to be healthy, or consistent with the venue, versus unhealthy, or in-
consistent. 
In our final study we measure the salience of contextual posi-
tioning to assess the extent to which thoughts related to positioning 
mediate the relationship between positioning, the presence of others, 
and choice. In this study, we utilized restaurant pair that includes 
venues that specialize in a similar cuisine, but vary in terms of their 
perceived healthfulness as demonstrated in a pretest: KFC (unhealthy 
positioning) and Chick-Fil-A (healthy positioning). Participants were 
asked to write down their thoughts about the food venues, which 
were independently coded as relating to taste and/or health, and then 
made a choice between a healthy (steamed vegetables) and unhealthy 
(fried vegetables) option. We show that when participants patronized 
the unhealthy restaurant, eating with (vs. without) others increased 
thoughts about taste. When the consumption venue was positioned 
as healthy, eating with (vs. without) others led to increased thoughts 
about health. Our choice outcomes replicated those of study 1 and, 
moreover, while thoughts about taste mediated the relationship be-
tween the presence of others and choice at the unhealthy venue, 
thoughts about health mediated this relationship at the healthy venue. 
This research demonstrates that individuals look to cues from 
the consumption context to serve as standards for their behavior 
when they consume with others whose behavior is unknown. The 
results of three studies provide support for our predictions that the 
social context created by the presence versus absence of others and 
contextual cues based on the positioning of the venue in which con-
sumption takes place jointly impact consumption behavior. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Extant research suggests that individuals will give in to indul-
gence when they perceive sufficient progress toward a regulatory 
goal (Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ra-
manathan 2008). For example, if a dieter feels as though she has 
abstained from eating unhealthy food for a long enough time, she 
may feel that it is permissible to eat an unhealthy food item. That is, 
given that sufficient progress toward the dieting goal has been made, 
the dieter may then switch to pursuing an indulgence goal, licens-
ing herself to eat something tasty but unhealthy (Fishbach and Dhar 
2005; Laran 2010)
This body of research assumes that consumers accurately re-
member past progress toward a goal. However, a large body of 
research on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) demonstrates that 
people are prone to distort their memories in a motivated manner in 
order to make themselves feel better about decisions made (Croyle et 
al. 2006; Mather et al. 2000). In line with such findings, we contend 
that, when faced with an opportunity to indulge, consumers may be 
motivated to distort their memories to fabricate progress toward a 
pertinent self-regulatory goal, allowing themselves to indulge in the 
present. Further, because such a situation is more likely to arise in the 
case of competing goals, we predict that those who are high in impul-
sivity, who chronically have indulgence goals (Ramanathan and Me-
non 2006) and thus, often experience conflicts between short-term 
pleasure versus long-term self-regulatory goals (Mukhopadhyay et 
al. 2008), are more likely to employ such memory distortions than 
those who are low in impulsivity. 
Our first study employed a 2 (impulsivity: low vs. high, mea-
sured) X 2 (indulgence opportunity: present vs. absent) between-sub-
jects design. Participants were first asked to imagine themselves in a 
shopping scenario in which they spent money despite a savings goal. 
After filler activity, participants in the indulgence opportunity pres-
ent condition were told that soon they will be asked to indicate their 
willingness to purchase a desirable pair of shoes, but first they would 
need to answer questions about the earlier shopping scenario. In the 
indulgence opportunity absent condition, participants were merely 
asked about the previous shopping scenario. Next, participants indi-
cated their perceptions of how much they spent earlier and their will-
ingness to pay for a desirable pair of shoes. The results showed that 
in terms of WTP, the slope of impulsivity was not significant when 
the indulgence opportunity was absent, while the slope of impulsiv-
ity was significant and positive when the indulgence opportunity was 
present. Additionally, perceptions of how much was spent in the ini-
tial shopping scenario mediated this interaction.
In the second study our aim was to rule out a post-indulgence 
justification account and provide support for our proposed pre-indul-
gence goal-conflict process. The study employed a 2 (impulsivity: 
low vs. high; measured) X 3 (question order: before second opportu-
nity to indulge vs. after second opportunity to indulge vs. indulgence 
opportunity absent; manipulated) between-subjects design. Partici-
pants were first given candies, asked to rate those candies, and com-
pleted Puri’s (1996) impulsivity scale. After filler activity, all par-
ticipants were primed with health goals using a sentence completion 
activity, then faced one of the question order conditions. In the ques-
tions after (before) condition, participants were told that they would 
be receiving M&Ms, but estimated the caloric content of the candies 
consumed earlier after (before) being presented with the candies. In 
the indulgence opportunity absent condition, participants were not 
presented with M&Ms.  The results showed that in the questions be-
fore condition, as impulsivity increased estimates of the caloric con-
tent of the first set of candies decreased. However, impulsivity did 
not have an effect in either the questions after condition or the indul-
gence opportunity absent conditions. Additionally, impulsive partici-
pants gave lower calorie estimates in the questions before condition 
versus both the questions after condition and the indulgence oppor-
tunity absent condition. The estimates of non-impulsive participants 
were not significantly influenced by our manipulation. These results 
support our proposed goal-conflict process and cast doubt upon a 
dissonance reduction account as memory distortion only occurred in 
the questions before (but not after) condition.
In the third study, we provide further evidence for our process 
by delineating whether motivation or cognition drives the effects 
we observe. To do so a 2 (impulsivity: low vs. high; measured) X 
2 (framing of first consumption: non-indulgent vs. indulgent; ma-
nipulated) X 2 (dieting tendency: high vs. low; measured) between-
subjects design was used. Participants first rated a yogurt covered 
raisin in a task that was labeled either “Yogurt raisin rating task” or 
“Candy rating task”. After filler activity, participants were told that 
they would be rating candies a second time, but were first asked to in-
dicate perceived temporal distance between the present and the time 
that they ate the first snack (“The time between now and the time 
at which you consumed the snack seems: 1-Like an instant, 7-Like 
an eternity”). These temporal perceptions served as the dependent 
variable. Finally, participants completed Puri’s (1996) impulsivity 
scale and the cognitive behavioral dieting scale (Martz, Sturgis, and 
Gustafson 1996). The results showed that the slope of impulsivity 
was not significant when the yogurt covered raisins were framed as 
non-indulgent, while the slope of impulsivity was significant and 
positive when the yogurt covered raisins were framed as indulgent. 
Additionally, impulsive participants perceived the first candy con-
sumption as more temporally distant when the yogurt was framed 
as indulgent versus non-indulgent, non-impulsive participants’ time 
perceptions were not significantly influenced by framing. Finally, in 
line with our goal-conflict account, the interactive effect of health 
framing and impulsivity in the case of dieters behaved much like the 
interactive effect of opportunity to indulge and impulsivity in prior 
studies in which participants were primed with self-regulatory goals, 
providing support for the significant role of goal conflict in the ef-
fects we observe. 
Across three studies we demonstrated that impulsive individu-
als tend to distort memories of past indulgences when faced with an 
opportunity to indulge in the present. Our findings suggest that they 
do so in order to license indulgent behavior.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Change blindness, the term referring to the phenomenon in 
which individuals fail to notice even substantial disruptions between 
an original stimulus and a subsequent altered version of that stimu-
lus, is a well-researched and documented effect (for a review see 
Simons and Rinsink, 2005).  Although the majority of change blind-
ness studies have focused on substantial visual differences, such as 
adding or removing features to an image or the infamous “invisible 
gorilla” task in which someone in a gorilla suit walks across a room 
while others toss a ball in the foreground (Simons and Chabris, 
1999), recent research has shown that even gradual changes (e.g., 
slowly fading an item out of a picture) go undetected by participants 
(Simons, Franconeri, and Reimer, 2000).  Humans, it seems, are of-
ten consciously oblivious to change regardless of whether or not the 
disruption is instant or gradual.
However, despite this rich an interesting literature on change 
blindness, very little research has explored the consequences of 
change blindness and, to date, only one article has considered conse-
quences of change blindness on consumer behavior (Shapiro and Je-
spire, 2013).  In that study, the researchers found that moving a logo 
to a different location on an advertisement led to increased prefer-
ence for the advertisement compared to a control condition in which 
the logo remained in the same location.  Given the ever-increasing 
demands on consumer attention and the common lay belief of con-
sumers that they can selectively attend to only the marketing messag-
es they want, the purpose of the current research is to explore further 
consequences of change blindness in consumer contexts, specifically 
with respect to subjective ratings.
To motivate the current research, we draw upon a recent find-
ing within the change blindness literature regarding “visual sens-
ing,” which is described as the feeling of change in the absence of a 
consciously perceived visual experience of change (Rensink, 2004). 
Integrating this finding with the vast literature on constructed pref-
erence–the idea that consumers often create their preferences on 
the spot based on often irrelevant, misattributed contextual factors 
(Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman, 2004; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz 
and Clore, 1996)–we propose the “Dynamic Transference” effect in 
which exposing participants to a subtle experience of change will 
result in participants misattributing that feeling of change to subse-
quent, unrelated tasks, such as subjective rating tasks.  Furthermore, 
following dynamic constructivist theory, we propose that this misat-
tributed influence holds only for subjective ratings (architectural, for 
which no set answers yet exist), and not for objective ratings (ar-
chaeological, for which there are definitive answers; Gregory, Lich-
tenstein, and Slovic, 1993).
In study 1, participants completed a 10-question, free-response 
survey about their Starbucks habits (e.g., “What do you typically or-
der when you go to Starbucks?”). Each question appeared on a sepa-
rate screen, and above each question was a picture of a cup of Star-
bucks hot chocolate that either decreased in size by 10%, increased 
in size by 10%, or stayed the same size (control) in each frame (note: 
across all five studies no participant reported conscious acknowl-
edgement of the change manipulation in funneled debriefing). Per 
our theoretical explanation, we collapsed the increasing/decreasing 
conditions into one Dynamic Transference (DT) condition. Results 
showed that participants in the DT condition were more likely to 
buy hot chocolate and rate the quality and intensity of Starbucks hot 
chocolate higher than the control group.
Study 2 was identical to study 1 except a North Face jacket 
replaced the Starbucks cup. After the North Face survey, participants 
rated five winter-related products (North Face jacket relevant) and 
five non-winter-related products (North Face jacket irrelevant), to 
see if relevance of the objects evaluated mattered. We also asked par-
ticipants about a relevant, timely topic–Christmas. Results showed 
Table 1: Summary of Results
Study 1: Starbucks Likelihood of Purchasing Hot Chocolate MDT = 5.24, SDDT = 2.72MControl = 3.67, SDControl = 2.48
F(1,79) = 6.70, p < .01
Study 1: Starbucks Perceived Intensity of Hot Chocolate Flavor
MDT = 6.37, SDDT = 1.36 
MControl = 5.50, SDControl = 1.57
F(1,79) = 6.95, p < .01
Study 1: Starbucks Perceived Quality of Hot Chocolate MDT = 6.65, SDDT = 1.60 MControl = 5.20, SDControl = 1.79
F(1,79) = 14.17, p < .001
Study 2: North Face Liking of Relevant North Face Products MDT = 4.48, SDDT = 1.38MControl = 4.10, SDControl = 1.51
F(1, 166) = 2.77, p = .10
Study 2: North Face Estimated Spending on Christmas Gifts MDT = 4.35, SDDT = 1.89MControl = 3.79, SDControl = 1.71
F(1,166) = 3.54, p = .06
Study 3: Nike Print Ad Average Liking of Products MDT = 5.39, SDDT = .53MDT = 5.13, SDDT = .51
F(1, 91) = 5.09, p < .03
Study 4: Sea World Commercial How Much You Care About Sea Life MDT = 4.84, SDDT = 1.01MControl = 4.35, SDControl = 1.35
F(1, 149) = 4.93, p < .03
Study 4: Sea World Commercial What Do You Think of Anheuser-Busch MDT = 4.84, SDDT = .94MControl = 4.46, SDControl = 1.12
F(1,149) = 4.10, p < .05
Note: As predicted, participants in the Dynamic Transference (DT) condition provided higher ratings than  
participants in the control (no experience of change) condition.
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that DT participants rated products higher overall, with ratings being 
highest for winter-related product ratings (suggesting relevance mat-
tered). DT participants also reported they would spend more money 
and expected to receive more presents at Christmas.
In study 3, participants completed a 10-question survey regard-
ing footwear, but instead of varying product size, the color saturation 
of a print ad on the screen decreased/increased by 10% or stayed the 
same on each consecutive screen. Participants then rated 21 random-
ly-presented items, none relevant to footwear. DT again influenced 
results: participants in the DT condition liked the products more 
compared to control. Studies 2 and 3 suggest DT affects subjective 
ratings, in general, but is implicitly applied more towards relevant 
items when such items are included.
In study 4, participants watched a 60-second commercial for 
SeaWorld from the early 1990s.  The commercial demonstrated Sea-
World’s role in saving sea life and mentioned Anheuser-Busch (Sea-
World’s former parent company). The commercial’s color saturation 
either increased from 0% or decreased from 200% in 20% intervals 
every six seconds or remained constant. Participants then responded 
to a series of seven questions, five objective (e.g., “How much more 
expensive are Anheuser-Busch products on average compared to 20 
years ago?”) and two subjective (e.g., “How much do you care about 
sea life?” and “What do you think of Anheuser-Busch as a compa-
ny?”). Results showed that DT affected subjective, but not objective, 
responses: DT participants said they cared more about sea life and 
thought more highly of Anheuser-Busch as a company.
Four studies demonstrate how subtle experiences of change are 
misattributed to subjective preferences, in both relevant and irrel-
evant contexts, bolstering the extent to which individuals like prod-
ucts, perceive quality, and intend to spend. The findings contribute to 
both the constructed preference and metacognitive experience litera-
tures by illustrating 1) how experiences beyond those of fluency sub-
tly influence preferences, 2) how the objective/subjective nature of a 
task lends itself to less/more influence from situational experiences.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Research has long acknowledged the importance of identity in 
shaping and predicting individuals’ motivations, attitudes, and be-
haviors (e.g., Aaker and Akutsu 2009; Belk 1988; Oyserman 2009a, 
2009b; Reed 2004). Despite its importance, few studies have exam-
ined the concept of identity in the context of prosocial behaviors. 
Further, these studies have mainly conceptualized it as a generic do-
nor/volunteer and moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002; Reed and 
Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and 
Ross 2009). In this research, using blood donation as a pro-social con-
text, we question the uni-dimensional representation of donor identity, 
and subsequently uncover its multi-dimensionality. Doing so not only 
offers a new and unique way to understand donor identity, but also 
helps us to understand why donors have different motives, beliefs, 
attitudes, and emotions towards donation. This has implications gen-
erally for the understanding of prosocial identity, as well as specific 
strategic implications for donor recruitment and retention. 
Identities are used to gain self-understanding and to be under-
stood by others in a social context (Markus 1977; Reeds et al. 2012; 
Vignoles, Schwartz, and Luyckz 2011). A more focused conceptual-
ization of the role of identity in shaping and predicting motivations, 
attitudes, and behaviors has been provided by Oyserman (2009a, 
2009b) in the identity-based motivation (IBM) model. In the context 
of prosocial behaviors, identity has been studied from a role-identity 
perspective, where continuous participation in prosocial activities 
leads to an internalization of the role, which then becomes a part 
of the self (Callero, Howard, and Piliavin 1987; Grube and Piliavin 
2000; Lee, Piliavin and Callero 1999; Piliavin, Grube, and Callero 
2002). Within consumer research, it has been found that people with 
a moral identity are more likely to have favorable attitudes towards 
charitable requests (Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 
2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Specific to blood donation, 
Armitage and Conner (2006) found that identifying oneself as a do-
nor is associated with blood donation intentions. 
Although this body of research has established the applicability 
of using an identity lens to explore prosocial behavior (e.g., blood 
donation), its conceptualization of identity as a uni-dimensional con-
cept fails to fully capture the differences between donors in terms of 
their attitude and behavior. Further, the donation literature has main-
ly characterized donation as giving and often uses the terms inter-
changeably (Aaker and Akutsu 2009), implying that a donor identity 
is akin to a giver identity. By definition, however, identity is expected 
to differ among people as it reflects how people subjectively perceive 
who they are as a result of their individual traits, characteristics, and 
social roles (Belk 1988; Callero 1985; Reed et al. 2012). Therefore, 
we argue that the presumption that donation is uni-dimensional, or 
solely akin to giving, is worthy of further exploration.   
Thirty-eight in-depth interviews were conducted with donors at 
a large central blood collection center, two mobile collection units, 
or the donors’ home or workplace in a large city in Australia. The au-
dio-taped interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using 
the constant comparison method (Glaser and Strauss 1976). Seven 
key themes were identified which were labeled: motive for donating; 
public versus private identity; perceptions of personal costs of donat-
ing; expectations of reciprocity; emotional consequences of donat-
ing/not donating; role model influence; and payback. These themes 
were then used to look for distinct patterns of sentiment polarity and 
amplification that may define a unique donor identity.
Four donor identities with distinct profiles emerged from the 
analysis. We label these identities the Life Saver, the Community 
Carer, the Practical Helper and the Extraordinaire (see Table 1 for de-
scriptions). Specifically, Life Savers donate to help and save the lives 
of individuals; they like others to know about their donor identity, 
appreciate small token incentives, and feel pride and happiness after 
a donation. Community Carers donate to give back and contribute to 
the community; they prefer to keep their donor identity private, do 
not care for recognition or token incentives, feel happy and a sense of 
well-being after a donation, but can be deterred by the personal costs 
of making a donation. Practical Helpers donate because they recog-
nize there is a need for blood and that they can do it; they do not care 
for token incentives, feel little emotion after a donation, and down-
play any personal costs of making a donation. Extraordinaires do-
nate to show they are special; they love others to know that they are 
a donor and appreciate recognition and token incentives. Although 
they are similar to Life Savers in feeling pride and happiness after a 
donation, they are very resistant to donation deferrals
We also conducted seven interviews with non-donors and com-
pared them to donors. Based on the result of this negative-case analy-
sis, we discovered a distinct, fifth identity perceived by non-donors, 
which we label the Sacrificer (see Table 1). Specifically, Sacrificers 
are seen to sacrifice blood, strength, time, and effort, and endure sig-
nificant discomfort for the benefits of others; they do not care for rec-
ognition or any form of incentives, feel a quiet sense of satisfaction 
after a donation, and accept the personal costs that may be incurred 
in donating. 
In conclusion, we believe that our research fundamentally re-
fines the concept of donor identity by putting forward a multi-di-
mensional view which represents blood donors’ self-identity and 
non-donors’ perceptions of donors. Specifically, we find that above 
and beyond the generic donor or moral identity, donor identity can 
be subdivided into four types – Life Savers, Community Carers, 
Practical Helpers, and Extraordinaires – and one perceived identity 
by non-donors, Sacrificers. Theoretically, this typology not only of-
fers a new and unique way to understand donors, but also helps us 
understand why donors differ in their motives, desire for privacy, 
attitude towards personal costs, and attraction to incentives. It also 
gives us insights in how non-donors view blood donors, especially in 
terms of the high perceived sacrifices that they are assumed to make. 
Practically, our findings will help organizations such as blood collec-
tion agencies better target their recruitment and retention strategies 
to the different identities. This also opens up a potentially promising 
and untapped avenue for the more effective management of donation 
behaviors.
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Table 1: Donor Identity Descriptions
The Life Saver
These types of donors donate blood to help and save the lives of 
individuals. They are focused upon the one-to-one relationship 
between the donor and the recipient. These donors feel pride, 
happiness and a sense of well-being following a donation as they 
have given something special. They like others to know that they are 
a blood donor and they appreciate the small tokens (badges, stickers, 
key-rings, diary) the Blood Service gives them to display this. They 
are disappointed, but accepting when they are unable to donate for 
some reason. They typically began donating through someone’s 
influence, and they encourage others to donate.
The Community Carer
These types of donors donate blood because they want to give 
back and contribute to the community. They are focused upon the 
effective working of the blood supply system, both for the benefit of 
community members who are in need, and in case they themselves 
are in need sometime in the future. They view blood donation as 
a private act and do not actively tell or try to recruit others. These 
donors are very aware of the personal costs (e.g., time, effort, 
and physical discomfort involved) of making a donation and will 
stop donating if it exceed their threshold. They do not care for 
recognition or token incentives given by the Blood Service for their 
donation. Their initial donation was typically influenced by a role 
model and they feel happiness and well-being following a donation.
The Practical Helper
These types of donors have a very practical view about blood 
donation. They donate blood simply because they know there is 
a need for it and that they can do it. These donors downplay any 
personal costs (e.g., time, effort, and physical discomfort involved) 
that may be incurred in donating. They feel little emotion following 
a donation or if they are unable to donate for some reason. They also 
do not care for the small tokens that the Blood Service may offer 
them and do not actively recruit donors.
The Extraordinaire
These types of donors donate blood because they feel they are 
stronger, healthier or possess a blood type that is unique compared 
to most people; in other words, they feel special. Alternatively, 
they believe blood donors are rare and thus special compared to the 
general population. They love others to know that they are a blood 
donor and appreciate any recognition or tokens they receive from 
the Blood Service, especially if it allows them to advertise blood 
donation to others. These donors feel pride, happiness and a sense 
of well-being following a donation and get very upset when they are 
unable to donate.
The Sacrificers 
These types of donors are seen to sacrifice blood, strength, time, effort, and endure significant discomfort for the benefits of others. They 
do not desire any form of (tangible or intangible) rewards or acknowledgement as this would likely diminish their offering. They are 
also not sensitive to the high costs they endure in making the donation as they perceive these as necessary for their choice of this type of 
donation. Whilst not elated they do gain a quiet sense satisfaction from donating.
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Beat Competitors or Beat Yourself: Differential Effects of Goal Focuses on Players’ 
Motivation in Different Stages of Competitive Goal Pursuit
Eunjoo Han, The University of Texas at Austin, USA
Ying Zhang, The University of Texas at Austin, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many goal strivings take place in competitive settings, and pay-
ing attention to rivalry and competitors’ performance is generally 
expected to elicit increased motivation from players (Deci, Betley, 
Jahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981). The present research questions if this 
belief always holds. We propose that in competitive goal pursuit fo-
cusing on a competition aspect of the goal would elicit higher moti-
vation before the competition begins (i.e., the “pre-initiation stage”). 
Once the actual competition is initiated (i.e., the “post-initiation 
stage”), however, individuals are assumed to be better motivated by 
focusing on the fixed performance standard to achieve, rather than 
competitors’ progress on the goal. 
The goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002) and the 
literature on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer 1993; 1999) give 
support to our hypothesis in the post-initiation stage. Individuals per-
form better when pursuing a specific, concrete goal as it facilitates 
an accurate assessment on goal attainability; people do not benefit 
from an abstract goal during pursuit as it does not offer an external 
referent that serves as a source of feedback on their progress (Locke 
& Latham, 1990). A specific goal, by contrast, provides unequivocal 
feedback on one’s performance, allowing people to easily monitor 
their progress. Studies also suggest that implementation intentions 
should be formulated for successful goal accomplishment during 
pursuit, which increases consistency between intentions and behav-
iors by activating “if-then” goals (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). 
We make an opposite prediction in the pre-initiation stage. Be-
fore starting the actual competition, the level of goal commitment 
may not be high enough to ensure individuals’ high motivation. 
Thus, in the pre-initiation stage it is critical to process whether the 
goal is worth pursuing and establish goal commitment for motiva-
tion. The caveat to having a fixed performance standard in this stage 
is that it lowers an individuals’ focus to an implementation level. 
Moreover, goal desirability would be reduced because focusing on 
the fixed performance standard with no reference to the competition 
misses out on the outcome of pursuit, and therefore, diminishes the 
value of the goal. 
In the first study, participants were invited to a competitive puz-
zle game and were encouraged to outperform other participants. It 
was designed as 2 (goal focuses: competition vs. fixed performance 
standard) X 2 (goal stage: pre- vs. post-initiation), and we assessed 
participants’ motivation by the time they persisted with each of these 
partially unsolvable puzzles. We found the hypothesized interaction 
on motivation: In the pre-initiation stage conditions, participants 
who aimed to achieve higher scores than competitors (vs. the fixed 
performance standard) persisted longer in puzzles. In the post-ini-
tiation stage, conversely, participants who sought to meet the fixed 
performance standard (vs. achieve higher scores than others) spent 
more time in the competitive puzzle game. 
Study 2 tested whether the proposed mechanism holds in the 
level of performance. We invited participants to a competitive ana-
gram quiz and encouraged them to win this anagram competition 
by getting more correct answers than their competitors. We again 
manipulated the goal focus and goal stage as done in Study 1 and 
assessed participants’ performance by the number of correct answers 
submitted. We found the hypothesized interaction on performance: In 
the pre-initiation stage, participants who focused on achieving higher 
scores than others (vs. the fixed performance standard) showed high-
er performances. In the post-initiation stage, conversely, those who 
aimed at the fixed performance standard (vs. rivalry – earning higher 
scores than others) showed better performance. 
Study 3 aimed to investigate the role of goal desirability and 
attainability on individuals’ motivation and performance in the two 
different goal stages. While replicating findings of previous studies, 
we also explored the dynamic levels of motivation and performance 
across three different sessions in each of these two goal stages. 
Participants were invited to the online game competition and were 
encouraged to play the same game as many times as they wanted 
across three sessions in order to get the higher average score than 
others. The experimental procedure was identical to the prior stud-
ies. This study replicated the hypothesized effects of goal focuses on 
people’s overall level of motivation and performance in each goal 
stage. Follow-up studies revealed that people felt the higher level of 
goal attainability and desirability when participants focused on the 
competition aspect of the goal (vs. performance standard) in the pre-
initiation stage and the fixed performance standard (vs. rivalry and 
competition) in the post-initiation stage. As participants move onto 
the following sessions (i.e., from 1 to 2, and 2 to 3) in each goal stage, 
we found that those who focused on rivalry and competition (vs. the 
fixed performance standard) in the pre-initiation stage showed higher 
levels of goal attainability and desirability during pursuit, and the 
results revealed the identical pattern among those who focused on 
the performance standard (vs. competition) in the post-initiation 
stage. The level of goal desirability and attainability positively ex-
plained the level of motivation during pursuit. Follow-up analysis 
revealed that those who paid attention to the competition aspect of 
the goal in the pre-initiation stage and the fixed performance in the 
post-initiation stage were better concentrated on the given competi-
tive task. We also found that those who aimed at the fixed perfor-
mance standard (vs. rivalry and competition) in the post-initiation 
stage felt less exhausted at the end of the game in the post-initiation 
stage. We, however, did not find the identical pattern of results in the 
pre-initiation stage: The different goal focuses did not differentially 
affect individuals’ exhaustion before the actual competition started. 
In sum, this research is expected to make theoretical contri-
butions by uniting contrasting views on the roles of a competitive 
mindset in motivation and goal-oriented behaviors. The study find-
ings also convey implications to marketing practitioners, especially 
when consumers’ competitive goal- relevant behaviors are involved 
in their purchase decision making – e.g., consumers’ reactions to 
marketing tactics that encourage consumers to win the limited num-
ber of deals or gifts for purchase.
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Table 1: Summary of Results
Study Effect Stats P-value
Study 1 
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on motivation F(1, 163) = 9.44 p = .00
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t(82) = -1.99 p < .05
Planned contrast – post-initiation t(81) = 2.42 p < .05
Study 2
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on performance F(1,168) = 8.45 p = .00
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t(77) = -2.08 p < .05
Planned contrast – post-initiation t(90) = 2.10 p < .05
Study 3
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on motivation F(1, 133) = 13.09 p = .00
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t(66) = -2.26 p < .05
Planned contrast – post-initiation t(67) = 2.87 p = .00
Dynamics of motivation – pre-initiation 
Stage1: t(66) = -.59
Stage2: t(66) = -3.10
Stage3: t(66) = -2.32
Stage1: ns
Stage2: p = .00
Stage3: p < .05
Dynamics of motivation – post-initiation
Stage1: t(67) = 2.32
Stage2: t (67) = 2.42
Stage3: t (67) = 1.94
Stage1: p < .05
Stage2: p < .05
Stage3: p < .05
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on performance F (1, 133) = 8.45 p = .00
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t (66) = -2.26 p < .05
Planned contrast – post-initiation t (67) = 2.04 p < .05
Dynamics of performance – pre-initiation 
Stage1: t (66) = -.05
Stage2: t (66) = -2.14
Stage3: t (66) = -2.13
Stage1: ns
Stage2: ns
Stage3: p < .05
Dynamics of performance – post-initiation
Stage1: t (67) = 1.33
Stage2: t (67) = 1.67
Stage3: t (67) = 2.26
Stage1: ns
Stage2: ns
Stage3: p < .05
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the overall level of goal desirability F (1, 133) = 28.91 p = .00
The effect of goal desirability on motivation B = .05, t (133) = 3.89 p = .00
Dynamics of goal desirability – pre-initiation 
Stage 0 (before starting): t (66) = -2.51
Stage1: t (66) = -3.79
Stage2: t (66) = -3.13
Stage3: t (66) = -3.62
Stage0: p = .00
Stage1: p = .00
Stage2: p = .00
Stage3: p = .00
Dynamics of goal desirability – post-initiation
Stage 0 (before starting): t (67) = 1.66
Stage1: t (67) = 3.76
Stage2: t (67) = 4.26
Stage3: t (67) = 4.47
Stage0: ns
Stage1: p = .00
Stage2: p = .00
Stage3: p = .00
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the overall level of goal attainability F(1, 133) = 16.31 p = .00
The effect of goal attainability on motivation B = .05, t (133) = 2.87 p = .00
Dynamics of goal attainability – pre-initiation 
Stage 0 (before starting): t (66) = -2.51
Stage1: t (66) = -3.89
Stage2: t (66) = -2.18
Stage3: t (66) = -2.61
Stage0: p < .05
Stage1: p = .00
Stage2: p = .00
Stage3: p < .05
Dynamics of goal attainability – post-initiation
Stage 0 (before starting): t (67) = .81
Stage1: t (67) = 1.97
Stage2: t (67) = 3.10
Stage3: t (67) = 2.62
Stage0: ns
Stage1: p = .05
Stage2: p = .00
Stage3: p < .05
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the concentration level F(1, 133) = 18.04 p = .00
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t (66) = -2.83 p = .00
Planned contrast – post-initiation t (67) = 3.23 p = .00
The effect of concentration on motivation B =.43, t (133) =3.57 p = .00
Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the exhaustion level F(1,133) = 6.11 p < .05
Planned contrast – pre-initiation t (66) = 1.46 ns
Planned contrast – post-initiation t (67) = 2.03 p < .05
The effect of exhaustion on motivation B= -.04, t (133) = -2.34 p < .05
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What to Get and What to Give Up: Effectiveness of Promotion vs . Prevention Messages in 
Acquisition vs . Forfeiture Decision Tasks
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In the current research, our main goal is to investigate the rela-
tive effectiveness of promotion- versus prevention-focused messages 
for different decision tasks and in the context of different type of 
products. For this purpose, we bridge multiple theoretical perspec-
tives, including the literatures on regulatory focus and regulatory 
fit (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001; Higgins 1998), behavioral decision 
theory (e.g., Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1990), hedonic versus utilitarian products (e.g., Hirschman 
and Holbrook 1982), and message processing mode (e.g., MacInnis 
and Price 1987; Thompson and Hamilton 2006).
In developing our conceptual framework, we first link decision 
tasks such as acquisition and forfeiture to different goal orienta-
tions such as seeking gains versus avoiding losses (e.g., Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Next, we 
consider the implications of the various types of products that can 
be involved in acquisition and forfeiture decisions. We distinguish 
between hedonic products, whose consumption produces sensory 
enjoyment and pleasure, and utilitarian products that offer functional 
benefits and are meant to solve consumers’ problems (Babin, Darden, 
and Griffin 1994). We then examine how advertising messages can 
be framed in terms of regulatory focus so as to be either promotion- 
or prevention-focused (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001). We subsequently 
discuss the concept of regulatory fit, which suggests persuasive mes-
sages are more effective when the message frame is compatible with 
the goal of the individual (e.g., Lee and Aaker 2004). We then bring 
these issues together to develop our hypotheses regarding the relative 
effectiveness of promotion- versus prevention-focused messages. An 
additional consideration we bring into the discussion is whether the 
individual processes the message mainly in an imagery-based mode 
or an analytical mode (e.g., Thompson and Hamilton 2006).
Key hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Provided the ad message structure is conducive 
to imagery-based processing, 
Hypothesis 1a: For hedonic products/attributes, promotion-fo-
cused messages will be relatively more effective 
than prevention-focused messages in acquisition 
tasks than in forfeiture tasks.
Hypothesis 1b: For utilitarian products/attributes, promotion-
focused and prevention-focused messages will 
be equally effective in acquisition and forfeiture 
tasks.
Hypothesis 2: Provided the ad message structure is conducive 
to analytical processing, 
Hypothesis 2a: For utilitarian products/attributes, prevention-
focused messages will be relatively more effec-
tive than promotion-focused messages in forfei-
ture tasks than in acquisition tasks.
We report three studies designed to test our hypotheses. The first 
two studies focus on messages designed to be conducive to imagery-
based processing (Thompson and Hamilton 2006) so as to test H1. 
In study 1, we manipulate the hedonic vs. utilitarian variable at the 
level of product categories, while in study 2 we extend the findings 
by holding product category constant and operationalizing the vari-
able in terms of the type of product attributes featured in the different 
messages. Finally, in study 3 we test H2 by focusing on messages 
designed to be conducive to analytical processing.
Study 1 (N=121) was a between-subjects, 2 (decision task: ac-
quisition vs. forfeiture) X 2 (product type: hedonic vs. utilitarian). 
Participants read one of two decision task scenarios and then they 
were exposed to two advertising messages (aimed to evoke imagery-
based processing) for two different “brands” in the same product cat-
egory. Analyses results showed a significant decision task by product 
type interaction (F (1, 117) = 3.8, p < .05). Follow-up comparisons of 
means confirmed that in the case of hedonic products, the acquisition 
(vs. forfeiture) condition led to a significantly higher relative prefer-
ence for the brand that was advertised with the promotion-focused 
message (M = 2.57 vs. 3.88; t (60) = 2.52, p = .01; H1a). However, 
in the case of utilitarian products, there was no difference in relative 
brand preferences between the acquisition and forfeiture conditions 
(M = 3.12 and 3.2, respectively; p > .8; H1b). 
Study 2 (N = 89) method was identical to study 1, except that 
the hedonic versus utilitarian variable was operationalized not at the 
product category level, but by manipulating the type of product attri-
butes featured in the message arguments. Once again, results yielded 
a reliable decision task by attribute type interaction (F (1, 85) = 8.27, 
p < .01). Follow-up comparisons of means confirmed: In the case 
of hedonic attributes, the acquisition (vs. forfeiture) condition led to 
a significantly higher relative preference for the promotion-focused 
message (M = 2.62 vs. 3.72; t (44) = 2.6, p = .01; H1a); but in the 
case of utilitarian attributes, there was no significant difference in 
message preferences between the acquisition and forfeiture condi-
tions (M = 4.76 and 5.36, respectively; p > .1; H1b).
In study 3 (N=194), we examine H2 in the context of messages 
conducive to analytical processing. As in study 1, the hedonic versus 
utilitarian variable was operationalized at the product category level. 
The study method was identical to study 1, except the messages in 
this study were specifically designed to be conducive to data driven, 
analytical processing (see Thompson and Hamilton 2006). Results 
confirmed a statistically significant interaction between the two inde-
pendent variables (F (1, 190) = 4.1, p < .05). Follow-up analyses ful-
ly supported our predictions in H2. Forfeiture (vs. acquisition) condi-
tion led to a significantly higher relative preference for the brand that 
was advertised with the prevention-focused message (p < .05; H2a). 
No such difference in relative brand preferences existed between the 
forfeiture and acquisition conditions (p > .5; H2b).  
The focus of this paper has been to examine the relative effec-
tiveness of advertising messages that vary in regulatory foci in the 
context of different decision tasks, dissimilar types of products, and 
diverse modes of message processing. The results of the three studies 
fully supported our predictions and show, in brief, that promotion-
focused messages are relatively more effective than prevention-
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focused messages in acquisition decisions, provided the ad is for a 
hedonic product and the message structure cues imagery-based pro-
cessing. The opposite is true in terms of message effectiveness in for-
feiture decisions, but only in the case of utilitarian products featured 
in messages conducive to analytical processing.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT  
Experiencing variety is central to our well-being (Morales et 
al. 2005; Rolls et al. 1981; Schwartz 2004). Given its central role, 
how accurate can we tell whether there is greater or smaller variety 
in different assortments? Would superficial and obviously irrelevant 
factors such as the font readability of the printed assortment informa-
tion influence our perceptions of variety? If yes, in which direction 
does it influence our variety perceptions?
On the perceptual level, a list of items printed in different font 
styles are essentially presenting the same number of options and thus 
should not alter our variety perceptions. Yet, at a metacognitive level, 
font styles that differ in readability will affect the ease in process-
ing the information. It has been documented that people often rely 
on feeling as information when making judgments (Schwarz 2004). 
Likewise, it is possible for the feeling of ease in reading to affect our 
variety judgments. While there are reasons to believe that readability 
will affect our variety perceptions, it may alter perceived variety in 
opposite ways depending on how people use the feeling as informa-
tion. 
Readability may decrease perceived variety. In other words, 
people see an assortment as more various when the information is 
less readable. For years, research has repeatedly demonstrated a 
correlation between great variety in an assortment and subjective 
difficulty in making choices from the assortment (Chernev 2006; 
Chernev and Hamilton 2009; Iyengar and Leppers 2000). With re-
peated experiences of subjective choice difficulty in face of an as-
sortment with great variety, people may form a lay belief linking 
variety to choice difficulty such that ‘the more variety there is in an 
assortment, the more difficult it is for me to make choices from the 
assortment’ (i.e., a difficulty-variety naive belief). As an association 
gets strengthened over time, it is possible that thoughts about either 
component will automatically activate the other component (Wyer 
2004, 2007), such that feeling of choice difficulty will trigger the 
feeling of ‘high variety’. 
While choice difficulty may stem from the actual variety of an 
assortment, it may also come from factors that are irrelevant to the 
actual assortment size. For example, Novemsky and his colleagues’ 
(2007) research shows that difficulty engendered by reading prod-
uct specifications in difficult-to-read fonts could already result in 
heightened choice difficulty. In the current context of investigation, it 
can be predicted that when people make choices from an assortment 
that is difficult-to-read, the increased subjective choice difficulty will 
trigger the feeling of ‘high variety’ via the difficulty-variety naive 
belief. That is, the poorer the readability of the font styles is, the more 
difficult it is to process the assortment information and make choices 
from it, which in turn will trigger an illusion of higher variety. 
On the contrary, one may also expect high readability to increase 
perceived variety. First, ease in processing is hedonically positive 
(Winkielman et al. 2003). Since variety is regarded as a positive at-
tribute (Morales et al. 2005; Rolls et al. 1981), assortment presented 
in easy-to-read fonts should appear more varied. Second, a decision 
may appear more important when its information is harder to process 
(Sela and Berger 2012). The heightened importance may motivate 
people to expand their consideration set so as to find the best option, 
and this need for a larger set will then contrast with the current as-
sortment size and make the assortment appear smaller. Thus, read-
ability may enhance perceived variety.
We conducted three experiments to test whether readability 
of assortment information will alter variety perception, and if so, 
whether it will increase or decrease perceived variety. We also exam-
ined the mechanism underlying this potential effect.
In experiment 1, participants were presented with an assortment 
of candy printed in an easy-to-read or a difficult-to-read font. The 
participants judged there to be a greater variety of flavors when the 
candy assortment was presented in a difficult-to-read font (M = 5.89) 
than in an easy-to-read font (M = 5.41; t(76) = 2.23, p < .05). This 
finding provided initial evidence for the prediction that difficult-to-
read fonts could increase variety perception.
Experiment 2 was aimed to examine the difficulty-variety na-
ive belief drove the readability effect. Participants were shown an 
assortment of sushi. Naive belief strength was measured and font 
readability was manipulated by varying the font colors. It was 
demonstrated that the illusion of variety only emerged for those who 
strongly believed in the difficulty-variety naive belief (β = .56, t(98) 
= 3.32, p < .005), and it was absent when the difficulty-variety naive 
belief was not strongly subscribed to (p > .9).
Experiment 3 was conducted to demonstrate that the illusion 
of variety would only transpire when the choice difficulty-variety 
naive belief was applicable. In situations where one does not have 
to make a choice, the belief that “choice difficulty indicates high va-
riety” would become inapplicable. This should eliminate the effect 
of readability on variety perceptions. Experiment 3 employed a 2 
(task: impression vs. choice) by 2 (font readability: easy vs. diffi-
cult) between-subjects design. Participants were presented with the 
same sushi assortment as in experiment 2, but only half of them were 
asked to make choices from it. The other half was required to form 
an impression of the assortment. It was revealed that there was a sig-
nificant interaction effect of task and readability on perceived variety 
(F(1, 109) = 7.87, p < .01). The simple main effect of readability was 
only evident in the choice condition (Measy = 5.05, Mdifficult = 6.28; 
t(111) = 3.38, p < .005) but not in the impression condition (Measy = 
6.02, M
difficult
 = 5.79; t(111) = 0.63, p > .50). 
Through three experiments, the illusion of variety was 
supported. It was also shown that the difficulty-variety naive belief 
drove this effect. Our enquiry into the role of readability in variety 
judgment adds to the growing body of research that uncovers the 
positive side of perceptual difficulty. We believe that marketers may 
also control consumers’ subjective experience by altering the aes-
thetic features of an assortment and consequently influence consum-
ers’ perceived variety. 
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Tens, Hundreds or Thousands? How Nutritional Information Numerosity Nonconsciously 
Affects Unhealthy Food Choices
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Obesity is a growing problem in many areas around the globe. 
It is particularly an issue in the United States where nearly two-thirds 
of the population is overweight or obese (Flegal et al., 2012). In re-
sponse to this epidemic, both government and industry organizations 
have initiated programs to make nutritional information more avail-
able to consumers. The underlying assumption behind these efforts is 
that by giving consumers more information they will make healthier 
food choices. However, the results of these initial efforts appear to 
be inconclusive (Elbel et al., 2009). Thus, a greater understanding of 
how nutritional information influences food consumption is neces-
sary.
When consumers read the nutritional content of a food item, 
they are often confronted with numbers in variety of different unit 
sizes. For instance, a food’s fat content is often a single digit or a 
double digit number, whereas caloric content can be as large as a four 
digit number. In Europe, energy content (i.e., joules) can be as large 
as a five digit number. With both types of information, consumers 
often try to limit the quantity consumed to stay within a desired daily 
limit. However, it is possible that the unit size of nutritional content 
can influence how healthy consumers perceive a food item to be? 
In this research, we examine how the unit size (i.e., numerosity) 
of unhealthy foods’ nutritional content nonconsciously influences 
food perception and choice. We propose that because people im-
plicitly associate smaller numbers with smaller magnitudes (Bagchi 
and Davis 2012), consumers perceive nutritional content that they 
are trying to limit (e.g., calories, fat) as less threatening when it is 
presented as a smaller number. This makes them pay less attention 
to liming their consumption, which leads them to judge unhealthy 
foods to be healthier. As a result, they are more likely to choose to eat 
unhealthy foods when the nutritional content they are trying to limit 
is presented in smaller digits compared to larger digits. Additionally, 
we argue that this effect primarily emerges in consumers with a high 
body mass index (BMI) because they are most concerned about lim-
iting their quantity consumed to stay within their daily limits.
These predictions are examined is five studies. In study 1, we 
presented consumers with the nutritional content for four different 
unhealthy food items (cookie, pizza, hamburger, pound cake). The 
nutritional information was presented in three different unit sizes 
(two digits [fat]; three digits [calories]; four digits [joules]).  Across 
the three different sizes, for each type of food, the value of the nutri-
tional content was set so that it comprised an equal proportion of the 
average consumers’ recommended daily limit. As expected, when the 
unit size decreased from four digits to two digits, people with rela-
tively high BMIs judged the food items to be healthier. No difference 
was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs.
In study 2, to rule out the possibility that our results were due to 
beliefs people have about the different types of nutritional informa-
tion, we presented participants with unfamiliar nutritional content. 
Specifically, we told participants that the purpose of the study was to 
develop a new nutritional scoring system called the FSCORE, which 
was similar to calories and fat.  They were then shown two relatively 
unhealthy foods (cookie and hamburger) with their corresponding 
FSCORE. The unit size of the FSCORE was manipulated so that 
they were presented in two digit, three digit or four digit numbers. 
Consistent with the findings of study 1, participants with higher 
BMIs judged the food to be healthier when the scoring system was in 
smaller digits compared to when it was in larger digits. No difference 
was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs.
In study 3a, we examined whether differences in unit size would 
influence food consumption. We presented consumers with a cookie 
using the same scoring system as study 2. The units were either small 
(two digits) or large (four digits). After evaluating the cookie, par-
ticipants were told to imagine that they were considering a snack and 
to indicate their likelihood of selecting the cookie or an apple.  As 
expected, participants with higher BMIs were more likely to choose 
the cookie when the units were smaller compared to when they were 
larger. No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low 
BMIs. Study 3b was identical to study 3a, except participants were 
asked to indicate their likelihood of eating a soft pretzel as a snack. 
The results replicated those of study 3a.
The purpose of study 4 was to demonstrate the process. We had 
people evaluate an unhealthy food item (i.e. a cookie) using the same 
procedure as study 2 while we tracked what information they were 
paying attention to using an eye tracking system. The results showed 
that participants with higher BMIs paid less attention to their daily 
limit when the units were smaller.  Additionally, those with higher 
BMIs judged the food item to be healthier when the units were small-
er.  No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low 
BMIs. Importantly, the decrease in attention paid to the daily limit 
mediated the effect of unit size on participants’ judgments of how 
healthy they perceived the cookie to be.
A variety of factors, both physical and motivational, have been 
shown to influence whether overweight people make good food 
choices. This current research suggests that perceptional factors may 
also influence overweight people’s ability to eat healthier.  People 
with high BMIs perceive an unhealthy food item to be healthier when 
its nutritional content is presented in smaller numbers, which make 
them more likely to eat the unhealthy food. The implication from this 
research is that policy makers must not only focus on the amount of 
information that is made available to consumers, but also the charac-
teristics of the information. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many websites allow consumers to upload their own pictures 
to the site, providing an appealing means for consumers to visualize 
product benefits. This is helpful in online shopping contexts and for 
sellers of experience goods. 
The visualization literature suggests that such product visualiza-
tion tools should have positive effects. Using imagination while pro-
cessing product information or advertisements, results in more posi-
tive product evaluations and purchase intentions (Babin and Burns 
1997; Bone and Ellen 1992; and Escalas 2004; Gregory et al. 1982; 
Keller and Block 1997; Keller and McGill 1994; Krishnamurthy and 
Sujan 1999; McGill and Anand 1989). A subjective sense of ease 
in imagining product benefits also leads to more positive consumer 
attitudes (Dahl and Hoeffler 2004; Petrova and Cialdini 2005; Zhao, 
Hoeffler and Dahl 2007). Additionally, the product customization 
literature shows that customizing enables closer fit with consumer 
needs (Arora et al. 2008; Franke et al. 2009) and an “I designed it 
myself” effect (Franke et al. 2010; Moreau and Herd 2010). Product 
visualization tools that allow product images to be customized to in-
dividual consumers might have similar effects. 
However, we argue that product visualization may have negative 
effects. Although visually pairing the product with the self can create 
associative self anchoring (Gawronski et al. 2007), which has been 
shown to have positive results, evoking the self also invites greater 
scrutiny. Stimuli that elicit self-consciousness can intensify affective 
responses (Scheier and Carver 1977; Scheier and Carver 1985). Thus 
negative responses to an image of the self with the product could 
transfer to the product, negatively affecting consumer outcomes.  
In three experiments, we advance the visualization literature by 
demonstrating that vivid and easily generated product imagery may 
not lead to positive outcomes. Linking products to the self can elicit 
self-scrutiny, leading to negative outcomes. We uncover a boundary 
condition to these effects by demonstrating that when one’s own im-
age is less salient, negative effects of self-scrutiny may be dampened. 
Experiment 1 employed a commercial online service for mak-
ing collages from digital pictures. One hundred and nine undergrad-
uate students participated for course credit. We employed a single 
factor (visualization: personal versus standard) between-subjects 
design. Each participant completed a travel planning scenario for 
an impending spring break vacation. Half of participants (standard 
group) saw a screen with 36 images of a beach vacation. The other 
half (personal group) uploaded six images of themselves from online 
sources, which were displayed in addition to 30 beach vacation im-
ages (note that any self-image was acceptable, as the object was to 
juxtapose self-images with vacation images). An online survey con-
taining dependent measures and covariates followed.  
Primary dependent measures for this study were attitude to-
ward the vacation and purchase likelihood. We conducted a one-way 
ANOVA with attitude as dependent measure, visualization (personal 
vs. standard) as predictor and measured covariates (Mpersonal = 16.06, 
Mstandard= 17.5; F(1, 108) = 4.74, p<.05). This supports our hypoth-
esis. Website relevance was used as a covariate and showed a signifi-
cant positive effect (F(1, 108) = 115.4, p<.001). A similar ANOVA 
showed lower vacation purchase intention in the personal condition 
(Mpersonal = 4.31, Mstandard = 5.11; F(1, 108) = 5.19, p<.03).
In Experiment 2, we assessed the role of self-scrutiny in person-
alized visualization. This experiment employed the same design as 
Experiment 1, with the addition of a five-item scale measuring self-
scrutiny adapted from Scheier and Carver (1985). Forty-two students 
participated for course credit.
We conducted a one-way ANOVA with attitude as dependent 
measure, visualization type as predictor and measured covariates. 
Analyses revealed a significant effect for the predictor (F (1, 39) = 
4.12, p<.05). Replicating Experiment 1, participants in the personal 
condition reported lower attitudes (Mpersonal = 5.71, Mstandard = 5.96; 
p<.05). A similar ANOVA with self-scrutiny as dependent measure 
also revealed a significant effect for the predictor (F(1, 39) = 5.62, 
p<.03). Consistent with our expectations, the personal group reported 
higher levels of self-scrutiny (Mpersonal = 4.44, Mstandard = 3.96; p<.03). 
A model with self-scrutiny mediating the relationship between visu-
alization type and attitude was not supported. 
In Experiment 3, we attempt to mitigate self-scrutiny’s effects 
by reducing the salience of participants’ images. The high-salience 
condition is identical to that in our previous experiments, and we thus 
expect negative effects to replicate. In the low-salience condition, 
participants have 54 images with which to form a collage. In this 
condition, self-scrutiny should be reduced among consumers who 
upload their own pictures because they are less prominent among the 
larger number of photos.  
Experiment 3 utilized a 2 (visualization: personal vs. standard) 
x 2 (image salience: low vs. high) between-subjects full-factorial 
design. Sixty-nine students participated for course credit. We con-
ducted a two-factor ANOVA with visualization and image salience 
as factors, attitude toward the vacation as dependent measure, and 
involvement and motivation as covariates. Our analyses revealed no 
main effect of visualization (Fs < 1) but a significant main effect 
for image salience (F (1, 63) = 5.13, p<.03). A two-way interaction 
qualified these main effects (F (1, 63) = 4.47, p<.04). Involvement 
and motivation were positive and significant as covariates (p<.01). 
Consistent with experiments 1 and 2, planned contrasts revealed that 
when image salience was high, participants in the personal group had 
less positive attitudes (Mhigh_personal = 4.58, Mhigh_standard = 4.75; t = 1.46, 
p<.07). However, when image salience was low (more images), this 
pattern reversed (Mlow_personal=5.01, Mlow_standard = 4.86; t = 1.54, p<.07).
Our findings have important implications for both marketing 
theory and practice. We demonstrate that visualization of product ben-
efits does not universally lead to positive consumer outcomes. While 
using one’s own image provides a vivid and easy means of visualiza-
tion, the integration of the self into the product image also elicits self-
scrutiny, and its attendant negative affect may transfer to product at-
titudes and purchase intentions. Thus, our research not only provides 
an important substantive finding for the visualization literature, it also 
offers an important warning for firms. One limitation of this work is 
that we examine a single product context; thus, future research should 
consider additional product types (i.e. glasses, hats). 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Over 30% of all the food produced in the US is wasted (US EPA 
2010). The average US household generates food waste that costs 
up to $2,275 annually (Bloom 2011). Food waste presents a signifi-
cant environmental concern, but a dearth of studies has investigated 
the psychology of food waste. To our knowledge, no prior study has 
examined how food types affect the perception of food waste. We 
propose that consumers deal with food waste with a varying degree 
of cognitive and affective reactions, depending on the types of food 
wasted (virtue and vice, Wertenbroch 1998) and food consumption 
goals (taste and health). Having a better understanding of how con-
sumers perceive food waste and related feelings will help reduce 
food waste and help consumers improve their food consumption de-
cisions both before the purchase and after the consumption. 
According to Sen and Block (2009), valuation goals are acti-
vated in the pre-purchase stage, while consumption goals are more 
salient in the post-purchase stage. Valuation goals reside in the 
avoidance regulatory system (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999) character-
ized by more reason and long-term-orientation, while consumption 
goals are in the approach regulatory system characterized by desire 
for sensory pleasure and immediate gratification. When consumers 
make food purchases, valuation goals and avoidance motivations are 
more active; hence, they tend to put more weight on long-term health 
benefits than immediate sensory pleasure, often preferring virtues to 
vices. When the food consumption is imminent in the post-decision 
stage, on the other hand, consumers tend to prefer vices to virtues 
to fulfill their consumption goals and approach motivations that are 
guided by sensory pleasure and immediate gratification. Time dis-
counting theory and the immediacy effect suggest that people prefer 
delayed virtues but immediate vices, because the vices offer a larger 
reward in the present (Reed et al., 1999). Thus, the preference of vic-
es over virtues in the post-decision stage is fortified by the tendency 
to prefer immediate vices and delayed virtues since only imminent 
food consumption remains in this stage. The liking of vices in the 
post-decision stage should translate into stronger waste perceptions 
of vices than virtues. In summary, we hypothesize that consumers 
will feel more wasteful when discarding unconsumed vices than vir-
tues. We demonstrate that consumers perceive a higher level of food 
waste in vices than virtues (Study 1) and anticipate that they are less 
likely to waste vices than virtues (Study 2). In Study 3 we explore 
a condition that moderates the effect of food types on waste percep-
tions and show that having a sense of taste goal progress eliminates 
the differential waste perceptions between vices and virtues.
In Study 1 we offer an initial test of whether waste perceptions 
vary between two food types. Participants received a scenario in 
which they purchased either a vice or a virtue. In both scenarios, 
sometime after the purchase they found they had to discard the food 
item as it was past its expiration date. Participants then rated how 
wasteful they felt about the discarded food. We found that partici-
pants felt more wasteful about the unconsumed vice than the uncon-
sumed virtue. 
In Study 2 we examine whether the differential waste percep-
tions identified in Study 1 will transfer into differential anticipation 
of food waste. We hypothesize that people will predict higher likeli-
hood of waste of virtues than vices. The logic is that waste aversion 
should be stronger for food items that induce stronger waste percep-
tions when discarded. Since unconsumed vices (vs. virtues) induce 
stronger waste perceptions, people should be more reluctant to waste 
vices than virtues, which should be reflected in their prediction of 
food waste. Participants were asked to imagine they purchased three 
vice items or three virtue items. Then, they evaluated how likely 
they were to waste at least some portion of each food item. Results 
showed that participants in the vice (vs. virtue) condition predicted 
lower likelihood of waste. This finding suggests that people are less 
willing to waste vices than virtues, presumably because waste aver-
sion is stronger for vices than virtues.
In Study 3 we explore the psychological mechanism underly-
ing the vice-virtue perceptual difference. Fishbach and Dhar (2005) 
argue that consumer choices are driven by multiple goals, and having 
a sense of progress in one goal liberates consumers to pursue another 
goal. Building on this finding, we hypothesize that increasing one’s 
sense of consumption (i.e., taste) goal progress will decrease the per-
son’s waste perceptions of vices, thereby reducing the differential 
waste perceptions between vices and virtues. We used a 2 (goal: taste 
goal vs. no goal) X 2 (food: vice and virtue) design with food waste 
perceptions as dependent variable. Participants in the taste goal con-
dition received consumption goal manipulation while participants in 
the no goal condition did not. Results showed that in the no goal con-
dition, waste perceptions of unused vices (vs. virtues) were stronger, 
but in the taste goal condition, there was no such difference. This 
Table 1: Summary of Study Results
Food Type
DV Vice Virtue
Study 1 Food Waste perceptions 6.23 5.25
Study 2 Food waste likelihood 7.05 10.23
Study 3
Vice Virtue Scenario Perspective Goal Type
Food Waste perceptions
5.15 4.65
Self
No goal
4.75 5.15 Consumption goal
5.29 4.55
Third-person
No goal
4.99 5.30 Consumption goal
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finding suggests that the differential food waste perceptions between 
vices and virtues are driven by consumption goal that is more sa-
lient in the post-purchase stage and resulting preference of vices to 
virtues.
The present research extends prior research on the psychology 
of waste by advancing our understanding of the relationship between 
food categories and waste perceptions of unconsumed food. It also 
explores the impact of this relationship on food waste aversion. We 
showed that consumers feel more wasteful when discarding uncon-
sumed vices than virtues, and they are more reluctant to waste vices 
than virtues. Yet, the differential food waste perceptions fade away 
when consumers have a sense of consumption goal progress. 
Our findings suggest the possibility that consumers buy more 
virtues than needed as they do not strongly feel wasteful when they 
discard unconsumed virtues. On the other hand, waste aversion may 
be one reason why people consume vices beyond satiation. Salience 
of waste during consumption of vices and resulting waste aversion 
in the form of consumption beyond satiation may have detrimental 
effects on consumer satisfaction and welfare as they may suffer from 
overconsumption of vice foods.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consuming media narratives has been an interest of socio-cul-
tural branding, consumer culture theory, and literary theory scholars 
(e.g., Brown 2005; Brown, Kozinets, and Sherry 2003, Scott 1994). 
Over the years, both within marketing and consumer behavior, stud-
ies have explored individual or communal entertainment-consump-
tion experiences and consumers’ media-related meaning-making 
practices. This study contributes to the extant literature by exploring 
the consumption of transmedia narratives.
Developing Jenkins’ (2006) notion of “transmedia storytelling” 
(20) and translating it to the realm of consumer behavior, transme-
dia consumption is herein defined as the consumption of diverse, dis-
persed narrative elements across multiple media for the purpose of 
co-creating unified and meaningful story consumption experiences. 
We consider transmedia storytelling and its consumption to be direct 
consequences of the combined and intensifying socio-cultural, techno-
logical, and economic changes that affect the ways marketers produce 
and consumers experience media and entertainment (Dena 2004). 
Within the highly fragmented contemporary marketscape, 
transmedia storytelling creates value for consumers by facilitating 
participation and proliferating potential touchpoints where brand 
engagement can occur. Also, it generates economic prospects for 
producers by fostering synergy, reducing costs, and expanding the 
audience base. Adapting and extending the idea of transmedia sto-
rytelling by grounding it in consumer culture theory, we initiate the 
study of transmedia consumption experiences (hereafter, “TCE”), 
exploring two related research questions: “What constitutes TCE? 
and How do consumers co-create a unified and meaningful consump-
tion experience with transmedia franchises?”
Differing from many popular Hollywood marketing strategies 
(e.g., sequels, story adaptations from one platform to the other, prod-
uct placements), transmedia is characterized by and relies upon three 
interconnected elements that in turn help produce the effects that 
drive its consumption: (1) media coordination, (2) world-building, 
and (3) negative capability. On the production side, transmedia is 
not simply about redistributing the same content across different me-
dia, but it represents a systematic and coordinated dispersal of narra-
tives across platforms that support each other. Media coordination in 
transmedia franchises seeks to create a universe composed of inter-
related characters and stories as in Star Wars (Brown et al. 2003) or 
American Girl (Diamond et al. 2009). Jenkins (2006) calls this “act 
of creating compelling environments that cannot be fully explored or 
exhausted in a single platform” as  “world-building” (116). Consum-
ers are encouraged to explore across these expanded story worlds 
via some strategically and intentionally placed gaps and mysteries 
in the narrative that are called negative capability (Long 2007). This 
exploration and exhaustion, we hold to be acts of consumption; as 
they transcend single “media” platforms, they become transmedia 
consumption. 
Exploring this consumption side, these unique characteristics of 
transmedia demand not only consumers’ involvement, but also their 
motivation, affection, and engagement. TCE are practices through 
which intertextual, connected, and multiple media vehicle-dispersed 
commercial narratives are consumed. We explore how consumers 
engage with these interrelated marketing narratives across a set of 
media platforms, but because of space restrictions, focus on one 
emergent key practice – “patching.” This practice describes a unique 
and customized consumer perspective, as people co-create their own 
versions of a particular transmedia world.
To understand the lived, complex, and rich phenomena of TCE, 
we adopt a qualitative research approach. We collected data in three 
transmedia contexts, Obama For America, the Coca-Cola Happiness 
Factory, and the Lost franchise (an ABC show)—all understood as 
transmedia narratives by transmedia experts. This study draws upon 
data collected from in-depth interviews, netnography (Kozinets 
2002), and participant observation in these three contexts. Our data 
set helps us identify issues and meanings that are shared and that 
resonate among consumers. 
Our findings reveal how consumers weave together disparate 
media elements into a single narrative stream. Although consumers 
interact with interrelated transmedia narratives and the worlds they 
depict, they do not necessarily engage with every media platform 
that producers disperse the story. Patching describes this idiosyn-
cratic and unique world-consuming process. Unlike Jenkins’ world-
building concept, our findings reveal consumers engage in these nar-
rative worlds by fixing them together.  The process of “patching” 
describes a unique and customized consumer perspective that entails 
uniting, joining, and affixing story elements together to produce nar-
ratives whose elements are drawn from different media platforms. 
Our analysis reveals that patching involves four permeating 
types of practices: mapping, dipping, digging, and stitching. Con-
sumers identify the elements of the transmediated Lost, Obama, or 
CocaCola worlds, interpret them, and then re-construct their own 
individually-tailored versions of each world by stitching multiple 
stories together. Mapping details consumers’ explorations of the ter-
rain to establish and learn the elements, features, and details of that 
particular transmedia universe. Dipping is a limited consumption of 
the secondary texts or media via reading recaps, synopsis from blogs, 
forums, or Wikipedia, or through other personal resources. Digging, 
on the other hand, refers to consumers’ first-hand experiences with 
the secondary texts and intertextual popular titles to find clues, inter-
pret mysteries, and make sense of the transmediated world. Stitch-
ing describes how consumers put clues together and make their own 
versions of transmedia worlds from them. To create a cohesive and 
meaningful experience in a transmedia universe where stories are 
dispersed across multiple platforms, consumers rely on these narra-
tive consumption practices. 
Our paper offers four important implications to help spur con-
sumer research in this area. First, by formulating the idea of TCE 
as an “experience,” we suggest transmedia consumption is broader 
than the consumption of entertainment-related narratives like read-
ing, playing, or watching. Secondly, we place the consumer front 
and center within transmedia research, by focusing on naturalisti-
cally-embedded practices of “world-consuming” to complement the 
producer-focused “world-building” of prior research (Long 2007). 
Third, we discover and discuss individualized practices of “world-
consuming” in which a complex narrative universe encourages con-
sumers to develop idiosyncratic narrative experiences and custom-
ized brand practices (Schau, Muñiz, and Arnould 2009). Fourth, we 
detail four important interrelated practices that guide the individual 
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construction of a new narrative universe and foster deeper engage-
ment with media narratives: mapping, dipping, digging, and stitch-
ing. As the text is woven into a variety of different forms, these meta-
phors help guide our understanding and further research into this 
increasingly important area of media and brand consumption. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Results
Patching
Mapping
Awareness of the 
existence of the 
secondary texts
I think Lost is definitely… probably on purpose connected with all the other forms of media. 
It cannot be just a TV [show]. It would be too difficult to keep up. Or they would have made 
much simpler. The books didn’t mean as much or the Easter eggs and the representation 
wouldn’t have been there.  There is no way they could do that. Maybe they could but 
probably… most people knew what that meant aren’t watching TV. [laughs] (Larry)
Dipping
Reading the recaps, 
synopsis of the 
secondary texts 
from other resources 
like forums, blogs, 
or hyperlinks (e.g., 
consuming without 
playing)
I read the first one (ARG) that was about what was going with Dharma and the Vanzetti 
equation and all that stuff. And then I played … I didn’t complete but I played pieces of 
Where is 815. The second one. …..I was so busy at the time that I appreciated being able 
to read a recap. …For Lost at that point everybody was very thirsty for answers. And there 
seems to be some information in ARG about the Vanzetti equation and those numbers. And 
so I appreciated being able to get those answers. Same way I appreciate to be able to get 
to the next episode when I was going through season 1. It is the same kind of connection 
to the next one. So I liked being able to read the recap on the first one. I liked playing the 
second one but now I didn’t have the time to do both. So, other people were figuring out 
stuff out before I was even catching up. Then because I was so religiously reading Lostpedia 
every source I can get to anyway. Enough solutions were being provided as the game went 
along that I played some and then I ran across some solutions anyway. I was like” ok, screw 
it, I am gonna read it over”. ARGs are the … when I have time for, I think, it’s the best 
marketing tool ever. What I did, I appreciated reading it afterwards. (John)
Digging
Consume the 
secondary texts, play 
ARGs, read books, 
etc. and try to solve 
mysteries and find 
extra information
If this IS differential calculus, which I understand to be the math of momentum under the 
laws of motion (in relation to physics), then that might help draw a connection somewhere.... 
Though, the hint could be VERY broad in regards to what it’s “referring” to (meaning, 
which field of study) I think it gives us a revealing insight...
Quote:  “In physics, the derivative of the displacement of a moving body with respect 
to time is the velocity of the body, and the derivative of velocity with respect to time is 
acceleration.”
Keep an ear out for any names popping up like Liebniz, Lagrange, Newton, or Euler as 
they were major contributors to the study of calculus. There’s also a “Jacobian Matrix” 
in calculus which makes me wonder (though, it’s a bit of a different TYPE of calculus)
(Paperknives, ARG: Find 815, 2008)
“This is what my science professors would call misleading. 1) It’s not possible that 
no jobs were created during the period from 2008 and 2009; 2) The chart excludes 
the unemployment rate which grew from 3 to 9% in the same period of time; 3) given 
what is said in my comment 2 -- what exactly is a negative job creation if it IS NOT an 
unemployment rate?” (OFA, Facebook, 2012)
Stitching
Combine all the 
info from the 
consumption of 
secondary texts, 
make an overarching 
analysis
The rule of thumb for ancillary stuff like this is thus: The characters themselves are not 
important or canon to the show, the information they uncover however is. Here’s an example: 
In Find815, there’s a long character arc about someone who finds the fake 815 crash with 
underwater probes.  In the show, this event/information is canon.  We see the probes even.  
But the person behind them is not the same. The character wasn’t there or important, the 
information revealed through him was, and was included.  See what I mean? Some stuff from 
the ARGs actually has been referenced to in the show.  In “The Constant” we see Widmore 
buying a book, and the auctioneer says it was from a man “Magnus Hanso” and contained 
information on the Black Rock.  Previously, this information was only referred to in TLE. But 
mostly, the information won’t make it in episodes, but it is however canon to the mythology.  
They do these ARGs for the reason of getting out info or plot details that can’t be fit into the 
show itself well. (Garmonbozey, ARG The Lost Experience, 2009)
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Consumer Responses to Simultaneous Changes in Price and Quantity: Do Direction and 
Magnitude Matter?
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers are generally sensitive and averse to price increases 
but in order to maintain profitability, it may be unavoidable for a 
firm to increase prices of its products, for example due to inflation 
or increasing costs. When required to increase prices, marketers of 
packaged groceries generally rely on either of two tactics: (1) they 
raise the retail price without altering the package size; or (2) they 
reduce the package size without changing the retail price (Gourville 
and Koehler 2004, Kachersky 2011).  Both tactics essentially result 
in a higher effective price, or unit price, of a product. 
Now imagine a situation where the price and size of a product 
vary simultaneously and in the same direction, that is, the price in-
creases but the volume also increases, or the price decreases but the 
volume also decreases. In such a situation, would volume changes 
mitigate against price changes in their effects on consumer price at-
titudes? Even more, consider if the magnitude of the price movement 
differs from the magnitude of the size movement. In such a situation 
the change in unit price may be in an opposite direction to the change 
in retail price. For example, retail price decreases of 10% combined 
with size decreases of 15% would result in an increase in unit price 
of (1-10%)/(1-15%) – 1, is 6%; conversely a retail price increase 
of 10% combined with a volume increase of 15% results in a unit 
price decrease of 1- (1+10%)/(1+15%), is 4%. Would consumers be 
able to cognitively detect and interpret the differences in changes in 
price and volume, and consequently, would they respond negatively 
(positively) to such a situation where the ‘effective price change’ of a 
product is in contrast to its prima facie price change? 
By answering these questions, we identify a condition in retail 
pricing, which we term “Simultaneous changes in Price and Quan-
tity” (SPQ), that has not been addressed in the literature yet. Draw-
ing on anchoring and adjustment theory, we predict that consumers 
respond to simultaneous decreases in price and quantity (D-SPQ) 
more positively than to simultaneous increases in price and quantity 
(I-SPQ), regardless of the magnitude of changes that reflect corre-
sponding change in effective price (i.e., unit cost).
SPQ situations create a relatively complex judgment and de-
cision environment, where consumers are most likely to encounter 
difficulties in calculating the effective change in unit cost. In such 
an instance consumers are inclined to use heuristics, such as anchor-
ing, to simplify their decision making. Since price (as economic loss) 
is more salient than quantity when consumers evaluate a purchase, 
price is more susceptible to the anchoring effect. 
Such a bias is consistent with another research stream into de-
nominator neglect, which suggests that numerators may outweigh 
corresponding denominators in judgment and decision making by 
individuals (Raghubir and Srivastava 2002). For packaged grocer-
ies, consumers can derive the value-for-money (VFM) of a purchase 
by calculating the ratio of retail price over quantity of units product 
obtained (Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993), and it is nor-
mal for consumers to compare the VFM or unit prices (if explicitly 
presented) of alternatives, rather than counting on the ratio of quan-
tity over price. 
In addition, compared to retail prices, unit prices provide a more 
accurate measure of the “real cost” of packages and should be pre-
ferred as a cue in price cognition. However, consumers have been 
found unable to accurately calculate unit prices in retail contexts 
(Friedman 1972), consequently their behaviours are influenced by 
the presence of unit price. The explicit presence of unit price infor-
mation therefore is expected to eliminate the bias caused by insensi-
tivity to quantity than price and unveils the effective change in VFM. 
Two experimental studies (Study 1 and Study 2) concerning a 
shopping comparison task over two time periods provide convergent 
evidence that regardless of the magnitude of change, there is an effect 
of the direction of change on consumer price attitudes. Consumers 
generally prefer situations where product packages become smaller 
in size and correspondingly lower in price, over those where prod-
uct packages become larger in size, with corresponding increases in 
price. Therefore there is a bias towards the retail price, regardless of 
the directional consistency between retail price change and unit price 
change. In Study 1 we also observe a mediation effect of simultane-
ous changes through perceptions of value-for-money and expensive-
ness on attitudes.   
In Study 2 we find these effects are moderated by the presence 
of unit price information. Specifically, the effect of simultaneous 
changes on attitudes does not persist when unit price is made avail-
able, because consumers tend to rely on unit price changes to make 
their judgements. Such empirical evidence rules out the alternative 
explanation that consumers are more concerned with total payment 
amounts, and thus look at retail prices only, or prefer smaller sizes to 
avoid waste. In study 3, we demonstrate another manifestation of the 
proposed effect by showing that unit prices framed as “$ per 100 ml” 
lead to a less competitive store price image than unit prices framed 
as “$ per liter” do. It provides evidence that insensitivity to quantity 
change relative to price change can be initiated not only by numeric 
anchoring but also by semantic anchoring.
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Can Sensory Stimulation Decrease Rumination? An Exploration of the Influence of Senses 
on Repeated Mental Simulation
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Struggling to assemble an Ikea product, failing to make a pur-
chase on a website, seeing a recently bought product break down, 
sitting in the waiting room at the doctor’s office, waiting at the super-
market are only but a few of the multiple occasions for rumination. 
Although seemingly harmless, rumination is a key concept for the 
understanding of cognitive functioning (Denson, 2012; Gomez and 
Debenedetti, 2010) especially because it partially or fully mediates 
the effect of negative emotions on consumer behavior (Porath, Ma-
cInnis, and Folkes, 2010; Strizhakova, Tsarenko, and Ruth, 2012). 
But little research has investigated the means of reducing it (Strizha-
kova, Tsarenko, and Ruth, 2012). Two empirical studies show that an 
arousing visual ambiance (study 1) and a combination of scent and 
music (study 2) reduce the intensity of rumination.
Rumination and sensory stimulation
Rumination is a maladaptive form of cognitive processing of 
emotions that follow stress and manifests itself in repetitive, aver-
sive and intrusive thought patterns, whose content focuses on the 
stressor (Denson, 2012; Joormann, Levens, and Gotlib, 2011; Pronk 
et al., 2010). It is a form of repeated mental simulation (Brigard et 
al, 2013). This implies that the person relives the stressing event 
long after it was experienced and with physiological, cognitive and 
emotional responses of the same intensity than if it were really ex-
perienced (Bushman et al., 2005; Joormann, Levens, and Gotlib, 
2011). Moreover, rumination is a circular, self-perpetuating process 
(Denson, 2012; Gomez and Debenedetti, 2010; Ottaviani, Shapiro, 
and Fitzgerald, 2011)DBP: the physiological arousal that follows the 
re-appearance of negative thoughts results in negative emotions that 
maintain physiological arousal (Gerin et al, 2006; Ottaviani, Shapiro, 
and Fitzgerald, 2011)DBP; difficulties in manipulating information 
in working memory and a deficit in executive control maintains the 
cognitive focus on the source of rumination (Joormann et al., 2011; 
Whitmer and Banich, 2007). In sum, when in a ruminative state, 
people tend to ruminate further. But how do you stop or decrease the 
intensity of rumination?
Results of research on the role of distraction are not conclusive 
and don’t document the process by which distraction would decrease 
rumination (especially regarding attention switching). Recent re-
search suggest that a way to reduce rumination is to reinforce execu-
tive functioning (Denson, 2012; Pronk et al., 2010). Executive func-
tioning is a set of cognitive control processes that regulate behavior, 
thoughts and feelings (Pronk et al., 2010). Stimulation of the areas 
involved in executive functioning reinforces the capacity to regulate 
thoughts and diminish rumination. As areas involved in executive 
functioning are located in the frontal lobe and overlap those involved 
in emotion (Pronk et al., 2010), and as stimulation of visual, olfac-
tory and auditory senses has physiological, cognitive and emotional 
consequences (e.g. Krishna, 2012)and past research has examined 
the main effects of many pleasant ambient stimuli such as music and 
scent. To further our theoretical understanding, we extend the notion 
of Gestalt to consumers\u2019 perceptions of retail environments 
and demonstrated that consumers perceive Services- capes holisti-
cally. Specifically, we suggest that the arousing quality of ambient 
stimuli is one dimension along which holistic evaluations occur, and 
that pleasant ambient stimuli are perceived more positively when 
their arousing qualities match rather than mismatch. We manipulat-
ed scent and music in a 3 (no music, pleasant low arousal and high 
arousal music, our central hypothesis is that an increase in pleasant 
sensory stimulation decreases the intensity of rumination.
Two empirical studies took place in the context of hospital vis-
its. Stimulation was manipulated by adding sensory stimuli in the 
environment. 
Study 1: Visual ambiance and rumination 
One hundred and forty one students were randomly assigned to 
one of two visual conditions as part of an assignment in a market re-
search course. Visual conditions were pictures of the waiting rooms 
of two hospitals (vivid colors versus neutral and uniform shades of 
green-white).
Results of two ANOVAs and an ANCOVA show that as visual 
stimulation increases the emotional quality of the environment im-
proves and the intensity of rumination decreases. Moreover, the fact 
that the influence of the visual conditions loses its significance when 
the emotional quality of the environment is introduced as a covariate 
suggests that the influence of visual ambiance on rumination is the 
result of an emotional activation.  
Study 2: Music, scents and rumination
A field experiment was conducted in a hospital specialized in 
articulatory pathologies and rheumatisms. A 2 (pleasant fast tempo 
music versus no music) by 2 (pleasant relaxing scent versus no scent) 
full factorial design was used. One hundred and twenty six people 
participated. 
Music and the interaction between music and scent influence 
the emotional quality of the environment and rumination. The emo-
tional quality of the environment has a negative impact on rumina-
tion, and music and the interaction of music and scent decreases 
rumination. Unexpectedly, the condition with the lowest emotional 
environmental quality (scent and music) is associated with the lowest 
level of rumination while the emotional quality of the environment is 
negatively associated with rumination (low emotional quality leads 
to higher intensity of rumination). This result is discussed below.
Discussion
The results of our first study suggest that an arousing visual 
ambiance with bright colors decreases rumination, and that this hap-
pens because of a change in emotional perception. The results of our 
second study are less clear-cut. The impact of adding music or scent 
only is low and it is the co-presence of scent and music that leads to 
a decrease in rumination. Moreover, when music and scent are pres-
ent the emotional quality is lower than in other cases. There seem 
to be two opposite processes working at the same time. While the 
emotional quality of the environment has a negative impact on rumi-
nation (high emotional quality entails a low level of rumination), the 
low emotional environment (scent and music) shows a lower level 
of rumination. Contrary to previous findings (Mattila and Wirtz, 
2001; Morin et al., 2007) these results suggest that the impact of 
individual sensory stimuli of the environment is not mediated by the 
emotional quality of the global environment and on the contrary the 
effects of the global environment and of individual stimuli seem to 
act in opposite directions. This research proposes that two processes 
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are involved in the influence of sensory stimulation on rumination: 
firstly emotional activation improves executive functioning which 
decreases rumination and accounts for the impact of the emotional 
quality of environment; secondly direct physiological processing of 
sensory information shifts resources away from internal self-focus 
to the external world and ‘forces’ or ‘helps’ cognitive and emotional 
switching. 
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What a Feeling! Touching Sexually Laden Stimuli Makes Women Seek Rewards
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Previous literature seems to have established that women’s eco-
nomic decision making, contrary to men’s, is virtually insensitive 
to the presence of sexual cues. For instance, while men are more 
impatient for monetary rewards (Wilson & Daly, 2003), take more fi-
nancial risk (Baker & Maner, 2008) and spend more on conspicuous 
consumer goods (Griskevicius et al., 2007) when visually exposed 
to a sexually attractive member of the opposite sex, the same studies 
show that women’s economic decisions remain unaffected after hav-
ing been primed with potential mates.
In the present paper, we argue that the specificity of the sexual 
primes used so far (i.e., mostly visual ones) may have caused wom-
en’s unresponsiveness to sexual cues when engaging in economic 
decision-making. We will use other types of sex cues than the ones 
that have been used previously to study the effect of sexual cues on 
women’s economic decisions. Specifically, we show in three experi-
ments that touching sexually laden stimuli changes women’s finan-
cial decisions. 
Actively touching objects or stimuli seems to have an especially 
strong influence on preferences and decisions (Peck & Shu, 2009). 
For instance, Peck and Wiggins (2006) found that adding a touch ele-
ment such as a sample of fabric on a pamphlet requesting donations 
to a local charity organization increased the impact of the message as 
measured by the time and money people wanted to spend on the or-
ganization. Peck and Shu (2009) showed that the endowment effect 
also occurs by merely touching -rather than actually possessing- a 
product. These findings are explained by the suggestion that touch 
facilitates a person’s affective reaction towards a stimulus. That is, 
the affective qualities of stimuli seem to be transmitted efficiently 
when the product is touched. Derived from previously observed 
effects of sex cues on economic decision making in men (Van den 
Bergh, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2008), we predict that touching sexually 
laden stimuli will lead to a craving for monetary rewards (Study 1) 
and a decline in monetary loss aversion (Study 2) in female consum-
ers. We further expect that these effects will not occur if women are 
prevented from touching the sexually laden stimulus (Study 3). 
In the first experiment, we asked female participants to evalu-
ate either boxer shorts (“sex cue condition”) or a T-shirt (“control 
condition”) on eight dimensions (such as quality, fabrics,…). Next, 
they engaged in a delay discounting task and indicated the amount 
of money they would require in one week [two weeks/one month] 
to make them indifferent between receiving €15 now and receiving 
this other amount later. We hypothesized that women who touched 
boxer shorts rather than a T-shirt would require a larger amount to 
compensate for the delay. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found 
that touching boxer shorts rather than a T-shirt led to a craving for 
monetary rewards in women. These results are in line with the find-
ings of Van den Bergh et al. (2008) who have shown that touching 
a bra rather than a T-shirt increases delay discounting for monetary 
rewards in men. 
In the second study, we investigated the breadth of this sexu-
al priming effect. Similar to the manipulation in experiment 1, we 
asked participants to evaluate either boxer shorts or a T-shirt. Next, 
loss aversion (i.e., the pain of losing a specific amount / the pleasure 
of acquiring an equal sized amount) for both money and food was 
measured (Li et al., 2012). The denominator of the loss aversion ratio 
captures one’s craving for monetary rewards (see DV Study 1). Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the amount of money [truffles] they 
would be willing to risk losing in a dice gamble (i.e., ‘‘If the eyes in-
dicate one, two or three, you win €5 [200gr], if the eyes indicate four, 
five or six you lose €___ [___gr]’’) (Harinck et al., 2007). Based on 
this data, loss aversion could be determined for both rewards. Con-
sistent with the findings of the first study, results show that touching 
boxer shorts rather than a T-shirt erodes women’s loss aversion for 
both money and food. 
In the third study, we explicitly manipulated whether women 
could touch the sexually laden stimulus. That is, participants were 
either asked to rate a pair of boxer shorts put in front of them to 
touch or put in a fully transparent cubicle of Plexiglas. Subsequently, 
women’s impatience for monetary rewards was measured using the 
same DV as in study 1. Our analysis revealed that women’s monetary 
craving increased when the sexually laden stimulus was touched. 
In sum, in line with previous findings obtained in men, we 
showed that touching boxer shorts led to a monetary craving and an 
erosion of loss aversion for both money and food in women. We are 
the first to show that priming women with sexually-laden cues affects 
women’s financial decisions (in a similar way as men’s). These find-
ings may seem surprising from an evolutionary psychological per-
spective (Buss, 1989). Specifically, whereas sexual motives should 
instigate men to show off their (financial) resources, women should 
Table 1: Overview
STUDY 1 STUDY 2
Area Under the 
discounting Curve
LN
(Loss Aversion Money)
LN
(Loss Aversion Food)
Control 
Condition 0.87 (0.13) 0.58 (0.14) 0.45(0.18)
Sex Cue 
Condition 0.78 (0.15) 0.06 (0.15) -0.11 (0.19)
Test F(1, 40) = 5.00, p < .05 F(1, 48)= 6.22, p = .02 F(1, 48)= 4.37, p = .04
STUDY 3
Area Under the 
discounting Curve
Visual Sex Cue 
Condition 0.84 (0.03)
Tactile Sex 
Cue Condition 0.72 (0.03)
Test F(1,39) = 5.97,p < .05
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primarily invest in physical attractiveness (e.g., by dieting). One po-
tential explanation for our findings is that women primed with sex 
cues want to acquire money to spend it on beauty products (Wilson 
and Daly, 2003). Another possibility however is that money, besides 
being a means to gain access to various resources, is regarded a pri-
mary reward or reinforcer in itself, and that being effectively primed 
with sex makes consumers (both men and women) more susceptible 
to any type of reward. Our findings with respect to food-related de-
cisions are consistent with this second interpretation. The second 
interpretation is also consistent with the existence of a “general re-
ward circuitry” in the brain (Van den Bergh et al., 2008). Specifi-
cally, drive states that are activated by one type of cue (e.g., sex) 
can be satiated by rewards from seemingly unrelated domains (e.g., 
money and food) because various rewards are processed similarly. 
Hence, if touching sexually laden cues activates the reward circuitry 
of women, financial and food-related decisions are affected. We call 
upon future research shedding more light on these issues.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine that a consumer goes on an online supermarket web-
site: in one occasion he is presented with a large variety of clothes 
or books, while on another occasion, and he is presented with very 
few varieties. Then, he clicks into digital product category and sees 
a newly launched product, wireless speaker. Would the number of 
varieties in unrelated clothing or book domain displayed on the main 
page influence this consumer’s purchase decision about the new 
speaker? Could incidental exposure to high variety prior to making 
an unrelated choice make the consumer more likely to accept new 
products? Although it may seem that such exposure to high variety in 
unrelated categories should have no significant impact on subsequent 
new product evaluation, this dissertation proposes otherwise. 
Previous research has demonstrated that consumers’ decisions 
are affected by how they perceive or interpret the variety of an assort-
ment (Berger, Draganska and Simonson 2007; Hoch, Bradlow, and 
Wansink 1999; Kahn and Wansink 2004). Most of variety research 
focuses on the conscious information processing associated with va-
riety in assortment choice. However, some recent research has dem-
onstrated more subtle influences of the different categories or assort-
ment structure on consumer behaviors (Mogilner and Iyengar 2008; 
Ülkümen, Chakravarti, and Morwitz 2010). For example, Ülkümen 
and her colleagues find that consumers exposed to narrow (versus 
broad) categories adopt different information processing styles and 
consider both salient and non-salient pieces of information in unre-
lated decisions. Building on this stream of research, we focus on the 
exposure to high variety impacts how consumers process informa-
tion and their subsequent evaluations for new products. 
In the manifestation of the experiments, we define variety as 
the number of distinct objects. Across five studies, we find that the 
exposure to high variety increases consumers’ cognitive flexibility, 
and consequently enhances their evaluations of new products. Study 
1a showed that exposure to high variety induced cognitive flexibility 
represented by increased category inclusiveness. Study 1b showed 
that exposure to high variety enhanced cognitive flexibility through 
another manifestation of cognitive flexibility, namely, associative 
links. 
Study 2 provided evidence that exposure to high variety pro-
motes favorableness toward new products. Furthermore, increased 
cognitive flexibility lead to an emphasis on improvements of the new 
feature, and more thoughts about new feature benefits of the new 
product.
Study 3 provided further mediation data that exposure to high 
variety promotes favorableness toward new products through in-
creased cognitive flexibility. Study 3 also extended the generalizabil-
ity of the results by testing the effect of exposure to high variety in 
another new product area—brand extensions. For the low-fit brand 
extensions, consumers exposed to high variety, due to boosts in cog-
nitive flexibility, will be able to find more and ambiguous ways to 
link the parent brand and the extension. Thus fit perception will be 
higher and consequently extension evaluations will be more favor-
able for consumers exposed to high variety than for those exposed to 
low variety. We would expect no differences to emerge for high-fit 
brand extensions, where the connection between parent brand and 
the extension product is highly accessible, and cognitive flexibility 
is of little help. The results of Study 3 conformed to our predictions. 
In Study 4, we explored another boundary condition, namely, 
ad message persuasiveness of new products. The new products can 
be advertised in a direct, easy-to-comprehend way, where specific 
attributes are presented, or in an indirect, hard-to-comprehend way, 
where the relationship between the focal product and other images 
are remotely related and require substantial relational processing. 
Consumers exposed to high variety, who are more cognitively flex-
ible, should be up to the heightened challenge of understanding indi-
rect ad messages and form favorable ad attitudes. On the other hand, 
consumers exposed to low variety, who are less cognitively flexible, 
should have difficulty seeing the relationship between the seemingly 
irrelevant images. For direct ad messages, in contrast, images are 
directly related to each other and the product, and minimal relational 
processing is necessary. Thus, for direct ad messages, consumers ex-
posed to both high and low variety will find the ad message easy to 
comprehend and form similar ad attitudes. The results of Study 4 
were consistent with these predictions.
Table 1: Mean Typicality Ratings as a Function of Exposure to 
Variety (Study 1a)
Experimental conditions
Exemplars Exposure to High Variety
Exposure to 
High Variety Control
Strong 6.78 6.66 6.76
Moderate 5.32 5.30 5.29
Weak 3.63 2.63 2.85
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater category inclusiveness.
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APPENDIX A
Picture used in Exposure to High Variety (example, Study 1-4)
Picture used in Exposure to Low Variety (example, Study 1-4)
Picture used in Exposure to High Quantity (example, Study 1b)
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In recent decades, many countries have witnessed a rapid in-
crease of ethnic and cultural diversity within their population and 
understanding minority consumers has become a priority for market-
ers. Standard approaches have emerged in the area of so-called ethnic 
marketing. In terms of media planning, advertisers attempt to reach 
consumers when their ethnic identity is most salient. In terms of copy 
writing, targeted ads typically feature spokespeople or models with 
the same ethnic background as the target. Spokespeople who are eth-
nically similar to the distinctive target group are thought to have a 
positive impact on advertisement. Both of these strategies assume 
that ethnic groups are homogeneous. Yet, not all minority consumers 
identify with their host and heritage cultures to the same degree. We 
argue that generational status is one of the most important factors 
that determine the effectiveness of these standard minority targeting 
approaches. In this paper, we demonstrate the importance of taking 
into account consumers’ generational status for the effectiveness of 
minority targeting practices. Through two studies, we show that gen-
erational status constitutes an important boundary condition for the 
two standard paradigms described above. 
Through increased identity salience, ethnic identity primes have 
been shown to affect responses to targeted advertisements (e.g. Fore-
hand and Deshpandé, 2001; Forehand et al., 2002). We argue that this 
effect is stronger for second-generation minority consumers, who are 
more likely than their parents to identify as biculturals. For the bicul-
tural, ethnic identity is situational, in the sense that the salience of an 
identity is affected by the situation in which choices are made (Stay-
man and Deshpandé, 1989). Therefore, we expect ethnic identity 
primes to have a more positive impact on evaluations of targeted ads 
in second-generation than in first-generation minority consumers. 
Participants in study 1 were 106 consumers of Chinese heritage 
living in the Netherlands (52 were first-generation Chinese immi-
grants while 54 were born in the Netherlands to Chinese parents). 
Participants were given a booklet containing print ads and randomly 
assigned either to the ethnic prime or the control condition. The tar-
get telecom ad featured a Chinese model. In the ethnic prime condi-
tion, this ad was preceded in the booklet by a travel ad featuring 
Chinese cultural symbols. The control condition featured no culture-
specific images. For the target ad, we measured respondents’ attitude 
towards, and identification with, the (Chinese) model. Participants 
also answered demographic and ethnicity-related questions. 
The analysis showed a significant interaction between ethnic 
prime and generational status (F(2, 101) = 15.56, p < .001) on atti-
tude towards the spokesperson: while there was a significant effect of 
ethnic prime for both second generation (F(1, 102) = 69.18, p < .001; 
ethnic prime: M = 5.15, SD = 0.58; control (no prime): M = 3.40, SD 
= 0.96) and first generation participants (F(1, 102) = 6.94, p = .01; 
ethnic prime: M = 5.19, SD = 0.54; control (no prime): M = 4.62, SD 
= 0.94), the effect was significantly smaller in the latter case. Similar 
results were found for identification with the ethnic model. In other 
words, the positive effect of previous exposure to ethnic symbols 
ad responses was significantly larger among second generation than 
among first generation ethnic consumers.
Several studies have looked at the impact of spokespeople of 
the same ethnicity on distinctive consumers’ attitudes towards the 
brand and ad (e.g. Aaker, Brumbaugh, and Grier, 2000; Antioco et 
al., 2012). We argue that this strategy is significantly more effective 
when targeting first generation minority consumers than when tar-
geting second-generation minority consumers. We predict that this 
effect of generational status on the effectiveness of the strategy is 
mediated by the strength of identification with the heritage culture.
Participants in study 2 were 270 individuals of Turkish heritage 
living in the Netherlands (143 were first-generation Turkish immi-
grants while 127 were born in the Netherlands to Turkish parents). 
Respondents rated an ad for a charity, the charity itself, their will-
ingness to support it, and the spokesperson. In the otherwise identi-
cal ad, the spokesperson’s name was manipulated to sound either 
Turkish (“Ali Oztürk”) or Dutch (“Frank de Jong”). Participants also 
completed the Vancouver Acculturation Index (Ryder et al., 2001) to 
measure identification with ethnic and host culture.
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between genera-
tional status and spokesperson heritage on attitude towards the ad 
(F(1, 266) = 8.24, p = .004). The effect of spokesperson ethnicity 
was significant for first-generation participants (F(1, 266) = 5.27, p = 
.022; Turkish spokesperson: M = 4.26, SD = 1.17; Dutch spokesper-
son: M = 3.84, SD = 1.04) but only marginally significant for second-
generation participants (F(1, 266) = 3.17, p = .076; Turkish spokes-
person: M = 3.46, SD = 1.06; Dutch spokesperson: M = 3.80, SD = 
1.08). The analysis revealed similar effects for attitude towards the 
organization, attitude towards the spokesperson and willingness to 
support. A mediation analysis with strength of ethnic identification as 
a mediator revealed a significant main effect of generational status on 
identification (mediator variable model: b = -0.30, SE = 0.04, t(265) = 
-7.11, p < .001), along with a significant identification*spokesperson 
heritage interaction effect (dependent variable model: b = 1.37, SE = 
0.34, t(265) = 4.00, p = .0001). After adding the mediator, the effect 
of generational status on attitude in the latter model was no longer 
significant (b = -0.24, SE = 0.14, t(265) = -1.70, p = .09). A bootstrap 
analysis of indirect effect confirmed a significant mediation effect 
(95% confidence interval: -0.17 < C.I. < -0.15). The findings confirm 
that there is an effect of generational status on response to same-
ethnicity spokespeople - an effect mediated by the strength of identi-
fication with the heritage culture. 
In today’s multicultural societies, ethnic targeting is an increas-
ingly important tool for marketers. Few standard approaches to the 
targeting of ethnic minorities have emerged in recent years but our 
studies show that the effects of such practices on minority consumers 
are not homogeneous. Specifically, the findings show that generation-
al status (first vs. second generation) constitutes an important bound-
ary condition for the two most popular ethnic targeting strategies.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The role of emotions displayed by customer contact employ-
ees for customer emotions has received increasing attention in recent 
consumer behavior literature. Several studies find that customers 
tend to catch positive (Howard and Gengler 2001; Luong 2005; Pugh 
2001) and negative emotions (Barsade 2002; Dallimore, Sparks, and 
Butcher 2007; Du, Fan, and Feng 2011) experienced by frontline 
employees––a phenomenon referred to as emotional contagion (Hat-
field, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). While the majority of research 
in this area has focused on which emotions are caught by customers 
(e.g., happy service display; Howard and Gengler 2001), fairly little 
is known about boundary conditions of emotional contagion.
Against this background, we explore how customers catch nega-
tive emotions of employees and how customers’ attributions for these 
negative emotions impact the extent of emotional contagion. Specifi-
cally, we propose that the extent of emotional contagion depends on 
whether customers can attribute causes for the negative emotional 
display as uncontrollable by the customer contact employee.
The present research integrates two literature streams: emo-
tional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994) and attribution theory (Weiner 
1985). The emotional contagion literature focuses on a specific type 
of social influence and proposes that “a person or group influences 
the emotions or behavior of another person or group through the 
conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral 
attitudes” (Schoenewolf 1990, p. 50). This interpersonal influence 
results from individuals’ tendency to catch facial expressions, vocal-
izations, postures, and movements of another individual automati-
cally (Hatfield et al. 1994). However, research on negative emotional 
contagion is still in its infancy and provides mixed results. While 
some studies find evidence for successful interpersonal catch of emo-
tions, others fail to provide evidence for the occurrence of emotional 
contagion effects (e.g., Caughlin, Huston, and Houts 2000; Hennig-
Thurau et al. 2006).
On the basis of attribution theory, we argue that customers’ at-
tribution of uncontrollability for the emotions’ cause may moderate 
the contagion of frontline employees’ negative emotional display on 
customers (Weiner 1985). Attribution theory (Weiner 1985) states 
that people seek for causal explanations for actions and behaviors 
of others and adjust their own response accordingly (Harvey and 
Martinko 2009). The theory rests on the assumption that cognitions 
determine how far particular stimuli result in emotional or behavioral 
responses (Weiner 2000). In the context of employee-customer in-
teractions, attribution theory suggests that if customers can attribute 
the negative emotions displayed by an employee to uncontrollable 
causes, negative emotional contagion to the customer should be less 
likely since these may experience sympathy, offer help, and forgive 
(Weiner 1985). Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: Attribution of uncontrollability moderates the re-
lationship between a customer contact employee’s 
negative emotional display and customers’ nega-
tive emotion in a way that when customers can at-
tribute uncontrollability of causes, negative emo-
tional contagion is less pronounced than when 
customers cannot attribute uncontrollability.
We use a typical customer service interaction in a hardware 
store as our context (Merrilees and Miller 2001). Holding actual 
service level constant and controlling for customers’ susceptibility 
to catching strong negative emotions and gender, we investigate the 
impact of a frontline employee’s stress display as a type of negative 
emotion on customers’ stress as the dependent variable. A total of 
one hundred and ninety-six persons participated in this experiment 
(42.9% male; mean age = 33.50). We employed a 2 (stress display 
of customer contact employee: display vs. no display) x 2 (external 
stressor: provided vs. not provided) between-subjects design, where 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios. 
In line with prior research on emotional contagion (e.g., Dallimore, 
Sparks, and Butcher 2007; Du, Fan, and Feng 2011), we used vid-
eotaped scenarios as stimulus material and produced four videotapes 
that provided the manipulation of the frontline employee’s stress 
display and the existence of an external stressor. In particular, we 
employed a scenario role-play-based experimental design (Du et al. 
2011). To provide a realistic-looking setting and to minimize con-
founding effects, we implemented several steps to standardize cen-
tral aspects of the scenarios (e.g., Dallimore, Sparks, and Butcher 
2007; Grandey et al. 2005), including a professional cinematogra-
pher filming the stimulus material in a local hardware store operating 
nationwide and a professional actor playing the frontline employee. 
Different pretests and manipulation checks ensured the effectiveness 
of videotapes to represent realistic manipulations of an employee-
customer interaction. 
Results of a 2 x 2 ANCOVA reveal a significant main effect 
for the customer contact employee’s stress display. Participants who 
experienced stress display of the frontline employee tended to re-
port higher levels of customer stress as compared to participants who 
were not in the stress display condition. We found no main effect for 
the external stressor manipulation. Thus, customer stress did not sim-
ply occur as a result of the external circumstances where a stressor 
was provided. Importantly, the main effect of stress display was qual-
ified by a significant interaction with external stressor provision. As 
expected, when participants were exposed to the stress display condi-
tion, those participants who were provided with an external stressor 
reported a significantly lower stress level than participants who were 
not exposed to such information. In the no stress display condition, 
the external stressor provision did not cause different levels of cus-
tomer stress. These results thus provide support for our hypothesis.
These results make an important theoretical contribution to the 
emotional contagion literature. This study is the first to provide a the-
oretically and empirically sound explanation for the existing mixed 
findings on emotional contagion. Relying on attribution theory, 
which suggests that cognitions determine the degree to which par-
ticular stimuli result in emotional or behavioral responses (Weiner 
1985), we show that the strength of emotional contagion depends on 
whether the customer has access to information about the uncontrol-
lability of the cause of the employee’s negative emotional display. 
Further, we provide a deeper understanding of the effect of 
cause uncontrollability. We show that the effect of customer contact 
employees’ negative emotional display is significantly lower in situ-
ations where customers can attribute uncontrollability of affect to ex-
ternal causes than in situations where customers have no access to 
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information on affect cause. This finding provides further evidence 
for the applicability of the fundamental attribution error in customer-
employee relationships (Harvey and Weary 1984), which suggests 
that customers attribute greater control to the customer contact em-
ployee when no explanation is provided for the display of negative 
emotion.
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Does Living in New York City Make People Happy with Their Leisure Life?
Yan Zhang, National University of Singapore, Singapore
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Social and economic development has been accompanied by an 
increase in the variety of leisure activities available, ranging from 
sports and arts to countryside recreation and gaming. Making these 
options accessible to the public is a central concern of policy mak-
ers (Crawford, Jackson and Godbey 1991; Wade 1985) who assume 
that making more leisure choices available to the public contributes 
positively to their happiness and well-being.  In fact, however, this 
assumption may not be valid.
We focus our research on three questions. First, do large city 
residents actually engage in a wider range of leisure activities than 
someone living in a small town? Second, are big city residents happi-
er about their leisure activities? Third, do people’s lay theories about 
the answers to these questions correspond to reality? 
Theoretically, these three questions can help us understand how 
option variety affects consumption and happiness outside of labora-
tories. Intuitively, the variety of options available could affect satis-
faction for at least two reasons. First, a large choice set is likely to 
increase choice freedom and flexibility. Second, it could increase the 
actual consumption of a wide range of options 
Research on the effects of variety on affect (Diehl and Poynor 
2010; Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008) has focused on the sat-
isfaction that people experience at the time they make a decision and 
has not examined the effect of variety on long term satisfaction and 
happiness. This limitation has two consequences. First, only one con-
sumption experience is typically provided. Therefore, the research 
does not indicate the effect of variety experiences on judgments over 
a period of time. Even if multiple consumption experiences were 
provided in a single experimental session (see Ratner, Kahn, and 
Kahneman 1999), satiation could greatly undermine people’s con-
sumption experience. When consumption experiences are separated 
in time, this factor does not come into play. Second, participants in 
an experimental setting are often implicitly or explicitly expected to 
consider all available options. Outside the laboratory, however, some 
available options are likely to be ignored and thus do not generate 
happiness. In other words, laboratories studies may confound the ef-
fect of available options with the effect of considered options. 
An understanding of the effect of variety on long term happiness 
requires a paradigm that measures multiple consumption experiences 
over a period of time without implicit demands to consider every op-
tion available. To accomplish this, we examined whether and how va-
riety affects happiness in a real world setting. In doing so, we consid-
ered variation in three factors: the set of leisure activities a consumer 
has access to (the available set), the set that a consumer considers in 
deciding what activities to choose (the consideration set), and set of 
activities in which a consumer actually engages (the consumption set). 
First, habits have powerful influences on decisions (Neal, 
Wood, and Quinn 2006). Because habits are highly accessible in 
memory, people may repeatedly choose the same activities without 
giving other options much consideration. As a result, having a large 
or small variety of options available may have limited impact on the 
size of consumption set. City residents develop a routine that they 
perform repeatedly unless an unexpected situation stimulates them to 
try something new. Consequently, having more leisure options avail-
able does not necessarily means consuming more leisure options.
Second, trying out new leisure activities is often associated with 
high cost. Such costs of time and money become especially promi-
nent when the actual leisure time is approaching, leading people to 
opt eventually for the usual and familiar activities. 
In contrast, consideration set size is predicted to have a positive 
impact on consumption set size. The size of a consideration set posi-
tively affects purchase likelihood and consumption (Nedungadi 1990; 
Rortveit and Olson 2007; Shocker et al 1991). Furthermore, adding a 
new option to a consideration set increases its chances of being chosen 
(Nedungadi 1990; Rortveit and Olson 2007; Shocker et al 1991). 
We conducted three experiments with American residents in or-
der to answer the above questions. In study 1, participants reported 
their happiness about leisure and then reported their city size. Study 
2 replicated the procedure of study 1, and also made participants to 
report their available set size or the consideration set size (between-
participants). Study 3 manipulated consideration set size to establish 
the causal role of consideration set in affecting consumption set and 
happiness. Across the three studies, we found that contrary to the 
common belief that having a wider range of leisure activities avail-
able leads people to engage in a wider range of activities and to feel 
more satisfied, we find that the size of a city (and consequently the 
diversity of leisure activities available) does not affect the variety 
of activities in which residents engage or the happiness they derive 
from these activities. Instead, happiness is largely determined by the 
diversity of activities that people perform, independently of the num-
ber they have available. The variety of activities that people consider 
when they decide on an activity influences the diversity of activities 
in which they actually engage and this, in turn, affect their happiness.
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Regulatory Congruence Effects in Two-sided Advertising
Erlinde Cornelis, Ghent University, Belgium
Veroline Cauberghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Patrick De Pelsmacker, University of Antwerp, Belgium
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Although consumer attitudes generally support the fair trade 
concept, consumers also perceive certain disadvantages to fair 
trade products (e.g., higher price) (De Pelsmacker et al. 2006). 
Hence, consumers trade-off between the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of fair trade products. This study investigates the 
effectiveness of message framing in two-sided fair trade advertising. 
Two-sided advertisements offer both sides of an issue or product, but 
actually still favor one side (Hovland 1951). By incorporating pro 
and contra arguments into a two-sided message, the advertisement 
becomes more complex than a conventional one-sided message. 
Due to its complexity, a two-sided message requires more attention 
of consumers to process the message content (Crowley and Hoyer 
1994; Eisend 2007). 
Up to now, the processing of two-sided advertising has mainly 
been considered to be central (instead of peripheral) (cf. the elaboration 
likelihood model, Cacioppo and Petty 1984). However, both routes 
of persuasion can occur for two-sided messages, depending on 
certain moderating variables (Eisend 2007). Florack et al. (2009) 
suggest that the processing depth of a two-sided message depends 
on receivers’ self-regulatory focus. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins 
1997) proposes two basic motivational systems: a promotion focus 
(i.e., hopes, wishes, and the maximization of positive results) and a 
prevention focus (i.e., responsibilities, duties, and the minimization 
of negative results). Similarly, an advertisement can be framed 
as either being more promotion focused (i.e., by emphasizing the 
achievement of positive results) or more prevention focused (i.e., by 
emphasizing the avoidance of negative results). When the message 
frame matches (versus mismatches) the individual’s self-regulatory 
focus, regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) occurs.
Florack et al. (2009) showed that consumers differing in their 
predominant self-regulatory focus process two-sided messages in 
different ways. Prevention focused consumers tend to process the 
content of a two-sided message more thoroughly than promotion 
focused consumers do (Florack et al. 2009). However, Florack et al. 
(2009) did not take into account the message frame, so they could 
not test for regulatory (in)congruence effects in two-sided messages. 
Previous literature has shown that processing depth impacts 
regulatory congruence effects: congruence effects only occur when 
processing depth is rather low (Wang and Lee 2002; Briley and 
Aaker 2006), or when involvement and motivation to process are 
low (Aaker and Lee 2006). In the case of more central processing, 
no regulatory congruence effects have been reported (Wang and Lee 
2002; Briley and Aaker 2006). 
So, if consumers’ self-regulatory focus impacts how a two-sided 
message is processed (Florack et al. 2009), then will these individual 
differences in processing depth of two-sided messages also lead to 
different preferences for regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) 
in two-sided advertising? We address this research question in two 
experiments. We investigate whether consumers’ self-regulatory 
focus impacts regulatory congruence effects in two-sided advertising 
messages. Furthermore, we address the mechanisms underlying 
these regulatory congruence effects by means of two explanations: 
processing fluency (study 1) and processing depth (study 2).
Study 1 investigates regulatory congruence effects in two-
sided messages. In a 2-level between-subjects factorial experimental 
design, we manipulated the message’s frame (prevention versus 
promotion) and measured respondents’ chronic self-regulatory focus 
(prevention versus promotion). The results of the first experiment 
show that in two-sided messages, the effect of regulatory congruence 
depends on consumers’ self-regulatory focus. A congruence effect 
was only found for promotion focused consumers, not for prevention 
focused consumers. This congruence effect for promotion focused 
consumers was mediated by processing fluency. 
Study 2 elaborates on the results of the first study by clarifying 
the absence of a congruence effect in two-sided messages found 
for prevention focused consumers. More precisely, our second 
experiment tests whether this non-effect can be explained by the 
deeper processing of the message content by prevention focused 
consumers. It is likely that prevention focused consumers’ tendency 
to process a two-sided message centrally eliminates the need for 
processing fluency, and hence, eliminates congruence effects in two-
sided messages. If limited processing depth is indeed a necessary 
condition for regulatory congruence effects to occur, then it should 
be possible to demonstrate a regulatory congruence effect  among 
prevention focused consumers when processing depth is low (i.e., 
peripheral processing), and conversely, no regulatory congruence 
effect should occur when processing depth is high (i.e., central 
processing). We set up a second experiment to test the role of 
processing depth on the effectiveness of regulatory congruent two-
sided messages in prevention focused consumers. 
The results of the second study show that processing depth 
influences regulatory congruence effects in two-sided messages 
for prevention focused consumers. Under peripheral processing, 
prevention focused consumers prefer two-sided messages that are 
congruent with their self-regulatory focus. Under central processing, 
on the other hand, a regulatory incongruence effect occurs. 
The theoretical added value of this research is twofold. (1) We 
combine the research stream on two-sided messages with literature 
on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), in order to fill an 
important research gap. To date, it remains unclear whether, in two-
sided messages, regulatory congruence will be more effective than 
regulatory incongruence. If two-sided messages are more centrally 
processed, no regulatory congruence effect is expected. But on the 
other hand, if a two-sided message is more peripherally processed, a 
regulatory congruence effect is likely to occur. If, indeed, consumers’ 
self-regulatory focus plays a role in determining how a two-sided 
message is processed (prevention focused consumers: centrally; 
promotion focused consumers: peripherally), then it is theoretically 
relevant to test the influence of consumers’ self-regulatory focus on 
the effectiveness of regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) in 
two-sided messages. (2) Additionally, our study goes beyond prior 
research in that it clarifies the underlying processes of the regulatory 
congruence effect by addressing two crucial mediating variables 
(e.g., processing fluency and processing depth). 
Practically, the present study provides useful insights for 
advertisers to develop fair trade campaigns, but also for public policy 
makers or nongovernmental or non-profit organizations.
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A Selfless or Selfish Act: The Incidental Effect of Direction of Comparison on Prosocial 
Behavior
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We propose that incidental direction of comparison is an im-
portant predictor of prosocial behavior. Direction of comparison can 
be downward or upward (being better or worse off than a compari-
son target, respectively). We argue that even when the comparison 
is incidental to the charitable appeal, downward (vs. upward) com-
parisons will cause individuals to be persuaded more by appeals that 
highlight benefits to others (vs. the self) by influencing their accep-
tance of personal responsibility. Specifically, by being in a relatively 
better position, those making downward comparisons may feel that 
they do not need to devote their resources entirely to themselves. In 
contrast, if those making upward (vs. downward) comparisons are 
more motivated to improve their relative position, then they should 
be less receptive to acting altruistically. Thus, we predict that indi-
viduals making downward (vs. upward) comparisons will be more 
willing to help others (H1). Furthermore, we argue that H1 will be 
supported regardless of whether (1) the comparison target is others 
or oneself at a different point in time, or (2) the compared resource 
(money) differs from the requested resource (time). 
Although most charitable appeals highlight benefits to others 
(White and Peloza 2009), we predict that H1 will be moderated by 
whether the charitable appeal emphasizes benefits to others or the 
self (H2). If downward (vs. upward) comparisons cause individu-
als to be more willing to accept responsibility for others, then they 
should be more receptive to other- than self-benefit appeals. 
Finally, we propose that because downward comparisons should 
reduce self-improvement motives, individuals making downward 
comparisons should be more willing to accept personal responsibility 
for others, as requested in an other-benefit appeal. In contrast, when 
comparing upward, individuals should be more motivated to improve 
themselves, thereby causing them to be less likely to accept personal 
responsibility for others. As a result, they will help only when a ben-
efit to the self is highlighted in the appeal. Thus, we predict that per-
sonal responsibility for others will mediate the effects of direction of 
comparison on receptiveness to other-benefit appeals (H3). 
In study 1, we analyzed secondary data gathered from the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment and Giving USA (2012)’s 
Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year of 2011. As predicted in 
H1, regressing comparison on change in donations yielded a signifi-
cant model (R2 = .35, F(1, 31) = 16.45, p < .001), and adding other 
variables (e.g., disposable income, expected interest rate changes 
did not significantly improve the model ( R2 = .07, F(4, 25) < 
1). Thus, we found the change in amount donated increased as more 
people made downward (vs. upward) comparisons. Because the re-
sults are correlational, we further tested our hypotheses in two lab 
experiments.
In study 2, 81 participants from a large university in the United 
Kingdom were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (compari-
son: downward vs. upward) x 2 (appeal: self- vs. other-benefit) ex-
perimental design. For the comparison manipulation, similar to prior 
research (Becker 2012), those in the upward (downward) condition 
read an article stating that those in the top (bottom) 10% income 
bracket are getting richer (poorer). Alongside the article was a ban-
ner ad that highlighted benefits to others or the self of volunteering 
(White and Peloza 2009).  Participants then reported how much they 
would donate from their payment for participation and possible win-
nings from a raffle. They were also asked if they wanted to opt into 
an email distribution list to learn about local volunteering opportuni-
ties. Supporting H2, a comparison x appeal interaction was signifi-
cant (F(1, 73) = 6.36, p < .05). When the other-help appeal was used, 
those in the downward (vs. upward) condition donated more money 
(Ms = £14.68 vs. £9.37, F(1, 73) = 4.20, p < .05), whereas when the 
self-benefit appeal was used, there was no significant difference in 
the amount donated (Ms = £13.85 vs. £14.45, F(1, 73) < 1). Results 
for opt-in to an e-mail list were significant as well.
In Study 3, 233 participants recruited from Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (comparison: 
downward vs. upward) x 2 (target: intrapersonal vs. interpersonal) x 
2 (appeal: self-benefit vs. other-benefit) experimental design. Partici-
pants described a person who is (interpersonal) or time when they 
were (intrapersonal) better or worse off than they currently are. They 
then read a cancer research ad that highlighted benefits to the self 
or others (Nelson and Brunel 2000). Supporting H2, comparison x 
appeal significantly affected the total amount donated (F(1, 221) = 
10.87, p = .001) and the number of times participants planned to 
volunteer in the next six months (F(1, 224) = 5.61, p < .05). When the 
other-help appeal was used, those in the downward (vs. upward) con-
dition donated more money ($7.31 vs. $5.02, F(1, 221) = 3.71, p = 
.05). When the self-benefit appeal was used, those in the upward (vs. 
downward) condition donated more money ($7.78 vs. $5.02, F(1, 
221) = 8.02, p = .005). When the other-help appeal was used, those 
in the downward (vs. upward) condition intended to spend more time 
volunteering (3.16 vs. 2.52, F(1, 224) = 4.98, p < .05). Finally, con-
sistent with H3, when participants viewed the other-benefit appeal, 
felt responsibility to care for others mediated the effect of compari-
son on monetary donations (effect = .42, 95% confidence interval, or 
CI: .03 to 1.15), and volunteering intentions (effect = .27, 95% CI: 
.08 to .54). However, with the self-benefit appeal, felt responsibility 
did not explain monetary donations (effect = .06, 95% CI: -.23 to .53) 
or volunteering intentions (effect = .02, 95% CI: -.18 to .22). None 
of the effects were significantly moderated by target or whether the 
comparison involved money.
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence directly 
demonstrating that downward comparisons can positively influence 
people’s willingness to help, and this is due to concerns with the 
welfare of a collective rather than the self. We also contribute to the 
literature on the effectiveness of other- versus self-benefit appeals 
by introducing direction of comparison as an important moderator.
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The Generative Consumer Can Make a Difference
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The concept of generativity, that is the adults’ preoccupation 
for the well-being of the next generations, has recently generated 
interest in the field of marketing (e.g., Urien and Kilbourne 2011), 
with research having mainly focused on philanthropy and pro-social 
behaviors related to ethics and the environment.
In the “real world,” however, generativity is nowadays used 
more and more as a positioning strategy for brands, products, and 
labels (e.g., Swiss luxury watchmaker Patek Philippe). In this regard, 
Lacroix and Ouellet (2008) found a positive relationship between 
an individual’s level of generativity and his/her Aad, Ap, and IB for 
products positioned as generative. Though, a main limitation of their 
exploratory work was the use of the Loyola Generativity Scale (Mc-
Adams and de St. Aubin 1992), which yielded poor reliability and 
applicability to a general consumer research context. Moreover, Van 
Hiel et al. (2006) considered that stagnation, an integral part of the 
Loyola Generativity Scale of McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992), 
should instead be treated as a distinct concept altogether.   
In order to better measure and assess generativity in a wider 
consumption context, we propose to develop a scale specifically ded-
icated to consumer generativity. We believe this measurement scale 
would help academics, marketers, governments, and scores of ad-
ditional stakeholders understand further the potential power of gen-
erativity whenever targeting messages toward generative consumers.
To develop the consumer generativity scale, we first generated 
some 81 original items, which we submitted to five expert judges. 
Out of this original list, 45 were eliminated for redundancy or low 
applicability, leaving 36 items. A first data collection was then orga-
nized in order to run an exploratory factor analysis. We asked respon-
dents to evaluate themselves on all 36 items using a seven-point scale 
(totally agree/disagree). The survey was administered to American 
citizens through a web-based panel, and a total of 152 question-
naires were completed. After purification, results of the generalized 
chi-square factorial analysis with varimax rotation suggested a two-
factor, 11-item scale (αdimension1 = .912; αdimension2 = .867). 
The decision to retain two factors seemed coherent in light of 
the literature on generativity. Indeed, an examination of each dimen-
sion revealed a similar structure to that originally proposed by Kotre 
(1984) and McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) — that is, a first di-
mension consisting of agentic generativity, or a desire for symbolic 
immortality (e.g., “I buy useful products to help make sure I am re-
membered by those who survive me”), and a second dimension con-
sisting of communal generativity, or the need to be needed (e.g., “I 
buy things next generations will eventually benefit from”).
To establish discriminant validity and reliability of the scale, 
we used various measures of neighbouring concepts (e.g., socially 
responsible consumption). All scales were assessed using a seven-
point scale (totally agree/disagree). We then conducted a new data 
collection through the same web platform using a different sample 
(American citizens). A total of 443 complete and valid questionnaires 
were obtained. We then performed a confirmatory factor analysis on 
our data, and after rejecting different model scenarios, we ended up 
with a reviewed model yielding good fit indices:  χ2 (8) = 23.633 
(p < .005), RMR =.055, SRMR=.025, RMSEA=.066, CFI = .992, 
TLI=.985, GFI=.984, AGFI = .958. A second-order, 6-item model of 
consumer generativity thus provided the best possible fit to the data, 
with 1 factor expressing communal generativity (3 items), and 1 fac-
tor expressing agentic generativity (3 items). 
Reliability of the scale was also satisfactory: α = .92 for the 
communal dimension of generativity, and α = .88 for the agentic di-
mension. Following Fornell and Larker’s (1981) method, convergent 
validity presented adequate indicators (.79 for communal generativ-
ity, and .72 for agentic generativity), and discriminant and nomologi-
cal validity were also confirmed using the various concepts we had 
included in our questionnaire (e.g., long-term orientation).
In order to assess the predictive validity of the scale, we per-
formed a third data collection using a new sample. The design of 
the survey included the selection of pretested products perceived as 
intrinsically generative from a communal or agentic point of view: a 
research foundation for infantile diseases (the most communal-gen-
erative), a registered education savings plan (the most agentic-gener-
ative), and an espresso coffee machine (neutral on both dimensions). 
We then developed three fictitious brands and advertisements for 
each product category. These ads were all identical in their structure, 
and a generative slogan was included in order to assign a generative 
positioning to the product. For each ad, we measured the following 
dependant variables: attitude toward the ad (Aad), attitude toward the 
product (Ap), and buying intention. The survey was administered to 
American citizens via the same web platform, which generated a fi-
nal sample of 187 questionnaires. Using data from the new consumer 
generativity scale, we then split respondents as either high- or low-
generativity consumers following a median split for each of the two 
consumer generativity dimensions. In the case of products positioned 
as generative, our results showed that highly generative consumers 
on a communal or agentic level developed more favourable Aad, Ap 
and BI than did those whose level of generativity was below the me-
dian (except for Aad of the agentic generative consumer concerning 
the foundation). Also, by running analyses of variance (ANOVAs), 
we found that consumers with children were more generative on a 
communal level than those without. In addition, married or in-couple 
consumers, as well as consumers with higher family incomes were 
more generative in both communal and agentic ways than those who 
were single or had lower incomes. Moreover, in line with McAdams 
and de St. Aubin (1992), we found that fathers were more generative 
than mothers.
This research contributed to our understanding of the concept 
of generativity by developing a more appropriate scale for its mea-
surement within a consumption context as opposed to a more gener-
ally social one. It also confirmed the ability of the scale to predict 
attitudes and behaviors. It thus demonstrated to be relevant the use 
of a generative positioning strategy when targeting generative con-
sumers.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer information presents risks in several formats; for ex-
ample, using absolute risk estimates such as 10% or ranges such as 
5-15%.  While these two sets of statistical likelihoods might appear 
similar, do they convey the same meaning to the consumers who read 
them? Given both are commonly used, a greater understanding of 
their differential impact on behaviour is warranted.  
Risk is “a negatively-valenced assessment that an unfavorable 
event will occur” (Menon, Raghubir, and Agrawal 2008, p. 981) and 
involves some degree of uncertainty (Conchar et al. 2004).  Lay-
people base risk estimates on two key dimensions; namely, the de-
gree to which risks are perceived as uncontrollable and the degree to 
which they are perceived as uncertain or unknown (Fischhoff et al. 
1978; Slovic 1987).  Risks viewed as less controllable or less certain 
are judged as more severe, and reframing a risk as less controllable 
increases risk estimates (Lin, Lin, and Raghubir 2003).  
Little research exists on the mechanisms underlying uncertain-
ty’s effect on risk-perceptions.  Studies looking at abstract decision-
making under uncertain conditions suggest ambiguous uncertainty 
(providing a risk range) leads to more cautious choice behaviour, 
pointing to a potential benefit of framing risks as ambiguously uncer-
tain (Ghosh and Ray 1997; Khan and Sarin 1988).  We propose that 
this approach may be ineffective in encouraging self-focused change, 
with risk ranges decreasing perceived message confidence.  Given 
that confident witnesses are viewed as more credible and impact-
ful, and confident experts are more apt to have their advice followed 
(Sniezek and Van Swol 2001; Tenney et al. 2007), we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Reframing a risk as more (or less) ambiguously 
uncertain will decrease (increase) overall mes-
sage persuasiveness, leading to lower (higher) 
intentions. 
One potential moderator of this phenomenon is baseline op-
timism level.  Individuals high in optimism expect positive things 
to happen to them (Scheier, Carver, and Bridges 1994), suggesting 
risk-prevention campaigns may appear irrelevant, be processed su-
perficially, and be unaffected by risk frame. Individuals low in op-
timism assume negative outcomes are likely (Scheier et al. 1994), 
suggesting greater message risk-message scrutiny.  In the case of 
higher scrutiny, risk ranges may appear less confident and be more 
easily discounted.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with low levels of optimism should 
be less persuaded by ambiguously uncertain 
messages than unambiguously uncertain mes-
sages, whereas individuals with high levels of 
optimism should not be affected by risk frame.
Study 1 (N=59, 44% male) recruited participants during flu sea-
son from an undergraduate population for course credit. A two-way 
(risk uncertainty: ambiguous vs. unambiguous) between-subjects 
randomized design was used.  Participants evaluated a fictitious 
poster on influenza and the flu vaccine, and posters were identical 
save for the manipulation itself.  The ambiguously uncertain condi-
tion presented risk as a range whereas the unambiguously uncertain 
condition presented risk as an absolute (Ghosh and Ray 1997).  Spe-
cifically, the following appeared in the ambiguously uncertain (un-
ambiguously uncertain) conditions: “30 - 70% (50%) of all under-
graduates will get the flu this season”.  The main dependent variable 
measured was a dichotomous “yes / no” question on whether par-
ticipants would like to receive additional flu prevention information. 
There were no between-group differences in ability to identify 
the value or range shown in the poster (χ2 (1) = 2.284; p = NS).  There 
was a significant between-group difference in requests to receive flu-
prevention information.  An independent samples t-test revealed that 
participants presented with specific risk statistics were significantly 
more likely to request additional information (57%) than were those 
presented with risk ranges (29%; t(55) = 2.27, p=.03), demonstrating 
that framing risk as an absolute was more effective than framing as 
a range.    
Study 2 (N=33, 57% male) participants were recruited in the 
same manner as in study 1 with participation just prior to spring 
break.  Study design mirrored study 1.  Participants completed the 
Revised Life Orientation Test (r-LOT; Scheier et al. 1994), a six-item 
scale assessing optimism.  After a filler task, participants evaluated 
one of two versions of a fictitious health poster; this study context 
was Hepatitis A and B and the traveller’s vaccine. The ambiguously 
uncertain (unambiguously uncertain) wording read “without immu-
nization, you have a 30—70% (50%) risk of infection”.  The main 
dependent variable was likelihood of talking to a doctor about the 
vaccine, measured on a 1-7 likelihood scale.
There were no between-group differences in ability to identify 
the risk statistic seen (χ2 (1) = 1.231; p = NS).  The six items as-
sociated with the r-LOT test were evaluated; one item was dropped 
due to poor item-total correlation, and the remaining five averaged 
to form an optimism score index (α=.80). A regression analysis was 
run with a dummy variable for condition (ambiguous uncertainty = 
1; unambiguous uncertainty = -1), the continuous optimism score 
mean-centred, and the interaction of the two as the predictor vari-
ables. Participants’ likelihood of talking to a doctor served as the 
dependent variable. Results showed a marginally significant main ef-
fect of ambiguity framing (β= -.48, t(29) = -1.76, p = .088), with un-
ambiguous risk framing increasing likelihood of talking to a doctor 
(Munambiguous=4.0 vs. Mambigous = 3.0).  There was no effect of optimism 
level on likelihood scores (β = -.64, t(29) = -1.41, p= NS). There 
was a significant interaction of condition and optimism strength (β 
= 1.25, t(29) = 2.6, p = .014), and further analysis was conducted 
at one standard deviation above and below the mean of optimism. 
Participants low on the optimism scale shown absolute risks were 
significantly more likely to talk to their doctor than were individuals 
presented with ranges (Munambiguous = 5.77, Mambiguous = 3.04; t(29) = 
-3.16, p =.004). When individuals were high on the optimism scale, 
the effect of ambiguity condition was not significant (Munambiguous = 
3.31, Mambiguous = 4.12; t(29) = .90, p = NS).  These results suggest 
ambiguous risk framing primarily discourages intentions for indi-
viduals low in optimism.  
These findings suggest that providing risk ranges as opposed 
to absolutes reduces the effectiveness of campaign appeals.  In ad-
dition, this effect appears driven by message discounting from in-
dividuals low in optimism, an already vulnerable population cohort 
(Andersson 1996).  While we hypothesize that message elaboration 
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and reduced confidence in risk ranges drives study results, additional 
research should confirm this hypothesis. 
This research builds on previous work in consumer behaviour 
determining how best to develop health campaigns, and suggests that 
policy makers should avoid presenting risks as ranges, given they 
are not as effective in triggering the desired behaviours as are risks 
presented in absolutes.  
Table 1: Empirical Results
Experiment 1
Descriptives Age Gender
18.5  
(17-23) 44% male
Manipulation 
Check 
Chi-
Square 
Value
DF p-value
2.284 1 0.131
Main DV: 
Receive Info, 1 
= yes, 2 = no 
N Mean Std. Deviation
Ambiguous Risk 31 1.71 4.6
Unambiguous 
Risk 28 1.43 5
Independent 
Samples T-Test * 
Equal variance 
not assumed 
t df p-value mean difference 95% CI
2.227 55 0.03 0.281 .028-.534
Experiment 2
Descriptives Age Gender
18.5  
(17-22) 58% male
Manipulation 
Check
Chi-
Square 
Value
DF p-value
1.23 1 0.267
Regression 
Analysis
Complete Model 
Summary R
2 F DF p-value
0.2582 3.365 29 0.032
Model Details Beta t p-value
Constant 3.4326 12.56
IV 1: Risk Frame -0.4846 -1.766 0.0879
IV 2: Optimism 
Scale -0.6421 -1.409 0.169
Interaction IV1 
x IV2 1.2462 2.6 0.0145
Spotlight Details Beta t p-value
-1 SD -1.3668 -3.165 0.0036
+1 SD 0.3977 0.902 0.374
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Whether complying with a diet, training, and drug regimens, 
completing reward programs (Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006), 
or waiting for service (Janakiraman, Meyer, and Hoch 2011), persis-
tence is important in both long- and short-term goal pursuits. 
Most previous research on persistence has examined factors 
arising after the choice is made and during the goal pursuit process 
(e.g., goal proximity and progress, goal accessibility, resource deple-
tion, etc.). In contrast, this paper focuses on a specific factor that oc-
curs at the time of choice yet still influences consumers’ persistence 
along their chosen path. In particular, we hypothesize that choices 
from rejectable choice sets (which contain a salient and viable no-
choice option) versus forced choice sets (which do not) will increase 
persistence along the chosen path.
When consumers encounter adversity along a chosen path, they 
are likely to have a variety of thoughts and feelings such as regret 
and disappointment (Zeelenberg 1999). Counterfactual thoughts 
such as “was this option the right one for me?” may cause consum-
ers to question whether they should persist or abandon their chosen 
path. We propose that when consumers reflect back on their original 
choice, the mere availability of a no-choice option in the original 
choice set will attenuate their counterfactual thinking and, conse-
quently, increase persistence. In particular, since consumers choos-
ing from rejectable choice sets must determine whether any alterna-
tive is acceptable or “good enough” to be chosen (i.e., is preferable to 
the no-choice option), choices made from rejectable choice sets have 
essentially “passed” the adequacy or acceptability test at the time 
of choice. Therefore, consumers will be less likely to have counter-
factual thoughts regarding the adequacy of their chosen path when 
they have chosen from a rejectable (vs. forced) choice set, and will 
be more likely to persist on that path. This main hypothesis and sug-
gested mechanism is tested across six studies.
Study 1 asks participants to choose a task of their liking (from 
two options) from either a rejectable or forced choice. A “loading” 
screen then appears and participants wait for their chosen task to be-
gin. Unbeknownst to the participants, there is no actual task and the 
main dependent variable is how long they are willing to wait (persist) 
for their chosen task to begin. As expected, participants in the reject-
able choice set (RC) condition waited (persist) significantly longer 
than those in the forced choice set (FC) condition (MRC = 21.27 vs. 
MFC = 16.38; Tarone-Ware χ
2 = 6.77, p < .01).
Study 2 extends these results to “active” persistence (persis-
tence in completing an actual task) in an incentive-compatible de-
sign. Further, we demonstrate that the inclusion of a no-choice op-
tion in particular, and not just any undesirable third alternative in 
general, increases persistence. Participants were assigned to one of 
three conditions: forced choice set containing 2 task-options (FC2), 
forced choice set containing 3 task-options (FC3), and rejectable 
choice set containing 2 task-options plus a no-choice option (RC). 
The task participants completed was a word-find puzzle on the topic 
of their choice. As expected, RC condition participants were found to 
persist longer (MRC = 418 seconds) than participants in both the FC2 
condition (290 seconds; F(1, 103) = 6.08, p < .02; plog_time < .052) and 
the FC3 condition (283 seconds; F(1, 103) = 7.30, p < .01; plog_time < 
.012). Thus, this study highlights the unique aspects of the no-choice 
option and its effect on persistence, while examining an active (vs. 
passive) form of persistence in an incentive-compatible design.  
Study 3 demonstrates, again in an incentive-compatible design, 
that the no-choice option must be embedded in the choice set to af-
fect persistence by replicating the previous results despite giving all 
participants the choice of opting-in (or out) prior to choosing a task. 
These results (i) reduce concerns that the reported effect is triggered 
by negative affect (or reactance) among FC participants resulting 
from perceptions of being forced to participate in the task, and (ii) 
demonstrate that simply choosing to do something over nothing can-
not explain differences in persistence found between the RC and FC 
conditions (because all participants actively chose to do something 
by opting in). 
Study 4 shows that choosing from a rejectable (vs. forced) 
choice set impacts persistence only on the chosen task, not other, 
unrelated tasks that also occur after the choice. Thus, the effect is 
task specific and choices made from rejectable choice sets do not 
increase motivation in general. This further supports our contention 
that persistence increases only when the selected option is directly 
vetted against the no-choice option.
In studies 5 and 6 we directly test the underlying mechanism. 
Specifically, we show that increased persistence due to the inclusion 
of a no-choice option is fully mediated by counterfactual thoughts 
(Study 6). Further, we show that the effect of including (or exclud-
ing) the no-choice option is dormant, and becomes “active” only 
when adversity is encountered (Study 5). In the absence of such ad-
versity, counterfactual thoughts are moot.
In summary, this paper examines how merely including a no-
choice option at the time of choice influences consumers’ persis-
tence along their chosen paths. The results of six studies demonstrate 
that the presence of a no-choice option, even if it is undesirable and 
should logically be ignored, increases consumers’ persistence when 
facing adversity along their chosen path. Thus, while previous re-
search explored how factors encountered during goal pursuit impact 
consumers’ persistence, this paper demonstrates that factors encoun-
tered earlier, at the time of choice may have a dormant, yet substan-
tial effect on post-choice persistence.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The 500 000 accident-free kilometers travelled by the Google 
Car is a dramatic example of the future place of domestic robots in 
everyday life (Rijsdijk and Hultink, 2003). Because of their ability 
to behave autonomously, to interact like human and to communi-
cate with their environment, domestic robots occupy an undefined 
space between objects and human beings. This raises unprecedented 
questions for researchers and managers alike (Rijsdijk, Hultink, and 
Diamantopoulos 2007). One specific concern is the impact of the 
anthropomorphic appearance of domestic robots on consumer adop-
tion. In one study, this research shows that anthropomorphism does 
not favor the adoption of domestic robots. 
Anthropomorphism and Consumer Behavior
Anthropomorphism, usually defined as the attribution of human 
characteristics and features to nonhuman objects (Epley, Waytz, and 
Cacioppo 2007), is an area of growing interest in consumer research 
(Kim and McGill 2011; Landwehr, McGill, and Herrmann 2011). 
Theoretically, three processes account for the influence of product 
anthropomorphism: schema congruence, analogical reasoning and 
the attribution of human mental capacity (Aggarwal and McGill 
2007). Empirical research has shown that the presence of human fa-
cial features and expression (eyes and mouth, smiling and frowning) 
in products leads to more favorable consumer attitudes and behav-
iors (Kim and McGill 2011) especially in interaction with contextual 
(framing) or individual (social power) variables. 
As to other anatomical features like the presence of limbs (head, 
neck, legs, arms, and trunk), results are less clear. Social robotics posits 
that humanoid robots (robots with limbs but without flesh-like skin) 
would be preferred to machine-like robots. At the same time, people 
declare that they do not want robots to look like human or to perform 
task performed by human beings (reading books, cooking, interacting 
with children) (Ray, Mondada, and Siegwart 2008). And experiments 
show contradictory results (Ho and MacDorman 2010; Mori, MacDor-
man, and Kageki 2012; Yee, Bailenson, and Rickertsen 2007). How-
ever, it is hard to draw conclusions from these experiments because 
of the presence of confounding effects, the limited size of samples, 
the focus on tech-oriented people in the experiments, and the unclear 
descriptions of context of use. Moreover, research has focused on the 
appreciation of the robot at the expense of adoption behavior.
The goal of this research is to study the impact of anatomical 
features as sources of anthropomorphism on adoption behavior. In 
line with dominant theory, the central hypothesis is that the presence 
of anatomical features has a positive influence on adoption behavior.
Method and Findings
263 working mothers, aged 25-55, were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions.  In each condition there was a photo of a do-
mestic robot with a brief text that presented it as a product that could 
entertain, teach and look after children. The only difference between 
conditions was the anatomical appearance of the robot that varied in 
the level of anthropomorphism (the two anchors being machine-like 
and human-like with two other robots in between).  233 participants 
completed questionnaires.
The results of the study do not confirm the hypothesis. Despite 
significant differences in humanlike appearance of the robots (F(1, 
229)=3.432, p=.018), in their perceived personality (F(1, 229)= 
3.695, p=.013) and in the anxiety they generated (F(1, 229 = 3.382, 
p=.019), anatomical anthropomorphism did not influence context 
compatibility (F(1, 229)=.146, p=.932), utilitarian attitude (F(1, 
229)=.492, p=.688), hedonic attitude (F(1, 229)=1.016, p=.387), 
ease of use (F(1, 229)=2.274, p=.081) or purchase intention (F(1, 
229)=.697, p=.555). Results were similar when computer and mobile 
phone equipment, familiarity with technology and technology pho-
bia were controlled for. 
Only when the binary variable that measures whether interview-
ee use the Internet on their smartphone was introduced as a factor, 
did results change. Significant interaction effects between anatomi-
cal anthropomorphism and the use of Internet on the smartphone 
appeared for utilitarian attitude (F(1, 225)=2.699, p=.011), context 
compatibility (F(1, 225)=2.923, p=.006) and purchase intention 
(F(1, 225)=3.581, p=.001). The mean scores for the two anchor ro-
bots (machinelike and humanlike) did not differ significantly but the 
means for the two other robots were higher when respondents said 
they used Internet on their smartphones than when they did not.  Our 
interpretation is that, as domestic robots are moving extensions of 
smartphones, people that use Internet on their smartphones are able 
to use these as a reference schema for their evaluation of the robots 
whilst people that do not have to resort to other stereotypes (machine 
and human). 
Conclusion
From this study, it seems that previous results on the impact 
of anthropomorphism cannot be extended to domestic robots and 
to anatomical features. Should this be confirmed, it raises questions 
as to the processes explaining the impact of anthropomorphism on 
consumer perceptions. It also raises questions about the strategies of 
robotic companies that invest thousand millions of dollars in devel-
oping humanoid robots, when these do not seem to be preferred by 
consumers. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Brand memory is central to brand equity (Keller 1993) (Keller 
1993) as well as consumer decision making (Hoyer and Brown 1990; 
Warlop, Ratneshwar, and van Osselaer 2005; Yoon et al. 2005). It 
is well established that memory declines with age (Kausler 1994; 
Salthouse 1991 ). But episodic memory, that retains contextual in-
formation about personally experienced events in one’s life, such as 
the contents, time, and place of the occurrences (Lachman, Lach-
man, and Butterfield 1979, 215), seems to be especially vulnerable to 
aging (Light 1991). Given that brand-based experiences with prod-
ucts—whether with the products themselves or marketing commu-
nications thereof—get stored in the episodic memory system of the 
consumer (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch Jr 1991; Kahn and Wansink 
2004), the issue of memory deficits in older consumers is particularly 
problematic for marketers targeting the elderly, a very important con-
sumer segment today. 
In this context, an important distinction needs to be made be-
tween two types of episodic memory related to brand information, i.e., 
item memory and associative memory (Clark 1992; Hockley 1991). 
Note that consumer researchers have overlooked this distinction in 
the past. Item memory pertains to memory for single units of informa-
tion, e.g., memory for a brand name or a brand logo graphic individu-
ally, whereas associative memory is memory for the co-occurrence 
of units in a prior event, e.g., memory for a specific brand name and 
a brand logo graphic together (Old and Naveh-Benjamin 2008). The 
basic units can be two items; an item and its context; two contextual 
elements; or more generally, the representation of two mental codes 
(Naveh-Benjamin 2000). Additionally, and very germane to the pres-
ent research, it has been shown that aging affects the two types of 
memory differentially such that memory deficit in older (vs. younger) 
adults are usually larger in the case of associative recognition memory 
than item recognition memory (Old and Naveh-Benjamin 2008).
The overarching objective of this paper is to study ways to re-
duce episodic memory deficits in brand memory in older consumers. 
Other researchers have investigated the role of schematic support in 
learning environments to reduce episodic memory deficits in older 
adults (Arbuckle et al. 1994; Castel 2007). Schematic support refers 
to the finding that schemas or prior knowledge within a domain can 
serve to enhance memory by supporting encoding and retrieval pro-
cesses within that domain (Craik and Bosman 1992). We study the 
effects of two types of schematic support, meaningfulness of brand 
elements and relatedness between brand elements, on item and asso-
ciative recognition memory differences between older and younger 
consumers. Meaningfulness of a brand element is the extent to which 
a specific concept is known and represented in a person’s semantic 
network (Anderson 1983; Collins and Loftus 1975). Relatedness be-
tween brand elements, on the other hand, represents an aggregate 
of the interconnections between two elements in a person’s seman-
tic network (Collins and Loftus 1975). The more properties the two 
brand elements have in common, and the more links there are be-
tween the two elements via these properties, the more closely related 
are the two elements. 
Our research seeks to make several important contributions. 
First, we introduce the key distinction between item and associative 
memory to consumer researchers and empirically demonstrate its sig-
nificance in a branding context. Second, although it has been show in 
prior studies that schematic support can boost memory performance 
in older adults, our work helps resolve some major conundrums in 
the existing literature. The most common type of schematic support 
that has been studied is related (schema consistent) versus unrelated 
(schema inconsistent) information (Castel 2007; Naveh-Benjamin 
et al. 2003). But schematic support in the form of meaningfulness 
of stimuli has not been examined before. In study 1, we hypothesize 
and show that meaningfulness of brand logo graphics helps attenuate 
item (but not associative) memory deficits in older consumers. Third, 
whether schematic support leads to larger improvement in memory 
performance in older adults (Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003), or whether 
they and their younger counterparts benefit equally from schematic 
support (Verhaeghen, Marcoen, and Goossens 1993), has been a con-
troversial issue (Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, and Ben-Shaul 2002). In 
study 2, we try and find an explanation for these discrepant findings. 
Finally, only two studies (Badham and Maylor 2011; Naveh-Benja-
min et al. 2003) so far have assessed the relative effects of schematic 
support on item and associative memory. This is the first investigation 
to make a comprehensive assessment of the effects of two important 
types of schematic support in attenuating item (vs. associative) mem-
ory deficits in elderly consumers, and that too in a branding context.
Study 1 (N = 50) used a 2 (older vs. younger consumers, be-
tween-subjects) x 2 (associative memory for brand information vs. 
item memory for brand logo graphics, within-subject) x 2 (more vs. 
less meaningful brand logo graphics; within-subject) mixed factorial 
design. The dependent variable was recognition accuracy as mea-
sured by the proportion of hits minus false alarms (Law, Hawkins, and 
Craik 1998; Morrin and Ratneshwar 2003). The stimuli were pairs of 
brand logo graphics and brand names. On the one hand, in study 1, we 
found a statistically significant three-way interaction between mean-
ingfulness of brand logo graphics, type of memory, and age group (F 
(1, 48) = 5.42, η p
 2 = 0.10, p < .03). We show that meaningfulness of 
brand elements attenuates deficits in item memory for brand elements 
but not deficits in associative memory in older (vs. younger) consum-
ers. On the other hand, in study 2 (N=69), using a similar procedure 
as study 1, we find support for a statistically significant three-way 
interaction between type of memory (item memory vs. associative 
memory), age group (elderly consumers vs. younger consumers), and 
relatedness between brand elements (unrelated vs. related) (F (1, 67) 
= 7.30, η p
 2 = 0.1, p < .01). However, relatedness between brand logo 
graphics and brand names reduces differences in associative (but not 
item) memory in older versus younger consumers. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In this article, we propose that motivation to connect with others 
is a key driver of the effect of moral identity on preference for giving 
time rather than money. This identity-based motivation (Oyserman 
2007) is expected to have its strongest effect when time is costly or 
psychologically unpleasant to give. When time is relatively costless 
to give (e.g., when time is abundant), or when giving is relatively 
pleasant, virtually anyone should be willing to give it.  However, 
when giving time is relatively scarce or unpleasant, consumers are 
likely to need an additional impetus such as moral identity to moti-
vate them to give time rather than money. Moreover, the effect of ac-
tivated moral identity on preference for giving time should be stron-
gest for those who are high in trait-based moral identity, since their 
moral self possesses a higher activation potential (Reed et al. 2009).
Hypothesis 1: Giving time makes consumers feel more con-
nected to aid recipients than giving money does, 
particularly when moral identity is activated.
We argue that it is when giving time is costly or unpleasant that 
activating moral identity will most strongly trigger a preference to 
give time vs. money. After all, when time is easy to give, most con-
sumers will likely give it. It is when time is costly or unpleasant to 
give that consumers will need additional motivation to give it – and 
moral identity can provide that motivation (see Oyserman 2007). 
Hypothesis 2: Activating moral identity will lead to a prefer-
ence for giving time vs. money primarily when 
giving time is scarce.
Hypothesis 3: Activating moral identity will lead to a prefer-
ence for giving time vs. money primarily when 
giving time is psychologically unpleasant.
Prior research has shown that consumers are more responsive 
to a situational cue that activates an identity if they hold the identity 
(LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Bayuk 2010; Reed 2004). To further confirm 
that our effects are driven by identity-based motivation (Oyserman 
2007), we test whether a situational cue activating moral identity 
interacts with individual differences in moral identity centrality to 
drive preferences to give time vs. money.
Hypothesis 4: Activating moral identity will lead to a prefer-
ence for giving time vs. money when trait-based 
moral identity is high, relative to when it is low.
Study 1 tests H1 and H2. 268 participants (104 males, 162 fe-
males, 2 preferred not to answer) were randomly assigned to a cell in 
a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Time Scarce and 
Money Abundant vs. Time Abundant and Money Scarce) between-
subjects design. They first completed a moral identity activation task 
and then an ostensibly unrelated donation task.
Results
Donation Preferences. We found a moral identity activation x 
scarcity interaction, F(1, 238) = 9.21, p<.01, Partial η2 = .04. When 
time was scarce and money was abundant, participants in the moral 
identity activated condition preferred giving time rather than money 
more so than participants in the moral identity not activated condi-
tion, F(1, 238) = 8.29, p<.01, Partial η2 = .03. However, preferences 
for giving time vs. money were similar across the moral identity ac-
tivation conditions when time was abundant and money was scarce, 
F(1, 238) = 0.88, n.s. This result confirms H2
Connection to Aid Recipients. We ran a hierarchical regression 
predicting felt connection to aid recipients, and found a main effect 
of gender, such that women felt more connected to aid recipients than 
men did, b = 0.50, t(233) = 2.65, p<.01, Partial η2 in corresponding 
ANOVA = .03. A main effect of donation preference also emerged, 
such that participants felt more connected to aid recipients as they 
expressed a stronger preference to give time rather than money, b = 
0.31, t(233) = 4.15, p<.001, Partial η2 in corresponding ANOVA = 
.13. This effect was qualified by a donation preference x moral iden-
tity activation interaction, b = 0.30, t(233) = 2.73, p<.01, Partial η2 in 
corresponding ANOVA = .03.This result confirms H1.
Study 2 tests H3. Participants were led to believe that giving 
time involved relatively neutral tasks (e.g., filing papers at a hospital) 
or relatively unpleasant ones (e.g., emptying bedpans at a hospital). 
Drawn from a university behavioral lab panel, 238 participants (88 
males, 144 females) were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (Moral 
Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Volunteering Time High 
vs. Low on Unpleasantness) between-subjects design. The study 
consisted of two ostensibly unrelated tasks: the moral identity acti-
vation task from Study 2 and a donation task. After these and other 
unrelated studies, participants were debriefed and paid $10.
Results
Main Analysis. We ran an ANOVA predicting preferences for 
giving time vs. money. The predictors included all relevant control 
variables from study 1, the moral identity activation condition, the 
unpleasantness condition, and the moral identity activation x un-
pleasantness interaction. The predicted moral identity activation x 
unpleasantness interaction emerged, F(1, 201) = 7.73, p<.01, Par-
tial η2 = .04. When volunteering time was high on unpleasantness, 
activating moral identity increased preferences for giving time vs. 
money, F(1, 201) = 6.74, p<.05, Partial η2 = .03. However, when vol-
unteering time was low on unpleasantness, activating moral identity 
had no effect on preferences for giving time vs. money, F(1, 201) = 
0.45, n.s. This result confirms H3.
Study 3 tested H4, that activating moral identity will lead to 
greater preferences for giving time vs. money for people higher in 
trait-based moral identity, relative to those lower in trait-based moral 
identity.  Ninety-two participants (41 males, 51 females) from a uni-
versity behavioral lab took part in a study with a 2 (Moral Identity 
Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Moral Identity Centrality High vs. 
Low) between-subjects design. 
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Results and Discussion
To predict preferences to give time vs. money, we ran a hierar-
chical regression. The predictors were the control variables, the main 
effects of moral identity activation and moral identity centrality, and 
the moral identity activation x moral identity centrality interaction. 
As predicted, a moral identity activation x moral identity centrality 
interaction emerged, b = 2.03, t(61) = 2.60, p<.05, Partial η2 in cor-
responding ANOVA = .10.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Sunlight is known to enhance positive affect. Increased sunlight 
in the spring and summer or on sunny days can boost optimism and 
positive affective responses, resulting in increased helping behav-
ior (Cunningham 1979), greater life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore 
1983), and stock-market upswings (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; 
Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2003). What is less widely known is that 
this positive relationship between sunshine and positive mood is not 
always supported, and sometimes is even reversed. Watson (2000) 
analyzed diary reports from students in Texas during either the fall or 
the spring and found no consistent effect of amount of sunshine on 
any of the daily mood variables. Furthermore, the assumed positive 
relationship between sunlight and positive affect is sometimes even 
reversed. For example, findings show that the peak incidence of sui-
cides occurs in late spring and summer and fewest suicides occur in 
winter months (for a review, see Kevan 1980). 
These inconsistent findings can be reconciled by recognizing 
that the influence of sunlight on people’s affective response might 
depend on the default affective reaction elicited in a specific situ-
ation. Because mildly positive feelings are the “usual” feelings for 
most people most of the time (e.g., Matlin and Stang 1979; Schwarz 
and Clore 2003), sunlight most often may intensify this mild positive 
feelings and make people feel upbeat and optimistic. On the other 
hand, when people have mild negative mood, sunlight may instead 
intensify this negative feeling and make people feel more depressed 
and pessimistic than otherwise. For depressed people, sunlight may 
further decrease their dissatisfaction with one’s life state and increase 
suicide (Kevan 1980). 
In this research, we propose that bright light intensifies people’s 
default affective reactions towards other people or external stimuli, 
which in turn, influences judgments and decision making in that situ-
ation. Our rationale is twofold. First, because the connection between 
bright light and warmth is deeply ingrained in the human psyche, 
we propose seeing bright light can make people feel warmer, even 
though the objective temperature is kept constant. Second, because 
ambient warmth is known to turn on the hot emotional system (Carl-
smith and Anderson 1979; Pennebaker et al.1996; Rotton and Frey, 
1985), we hypothesize that exposure to bright light, which increases 
feeling of warmth, may also activate people’s hot emotional system, 
evoking more extreme affective reactions in various situations. 
We conducted four experiments to test our hypotheses. In all 
of the experiments, ambient brightness was manipulated and other 
environment factors such as temperature and humidity level were 
controlled. Experiment 1 showed that bright light increases people’s 
feeling warmth, without impacting arousal level. Experiment 2 
showed that ambient brightness polarizes both positive and negative 
affective responses – under bright light participants were more likely 
to perceive aggressive actors in an ad-script as more aggressive, but 
also perceive attractive actors in an ad-campaign as more attractive 
(“hot”). These findings showed for a first time that ambient bright-
ness (controlling for warmth) amplifies affective reactions toward 
aggressiveness and sexiness that are metaphorically associated with 
the concept of “hotness,” just as ambient warmth might do. Given 
that our proposition describes a more general effect of the effect of 
brightness on emotional responses, the next experiment tested the 
influence of ambient brightness on people’s affective reactions to ob-
jects that are not metaphorically associated with “hotness”. In experi-
ment 3, we manipulated the valence of words (i.e., positive, negative, 
and neutral), and showed that ambient bright light makes respon-
dents judge positive words as more positive but also judge negative 
words as more negative. Bright light does not influence judgments 
of neutral words. 
The goal in experiment 4 was to show the impact of ambient 
brightness on consumption decisions. Based on the idea that people 
consume spicy foods because of the thrill of burning on the tongue 
(Wright, 2005), we proposed bright light should intensify this posi-
tive affective response. As a result, in bright light, people should seek 
more spicy foods because bright light would increase the positive 
affective response associated with thrill seeking. The results revealed 
that participants chose spicier sauces in a chicken wing taste test if 
they were in a bright-light room than if they were in a dimmed-light 
room. Mediation analyses showed that feeling of warmth mediated 
the influence of ambient brightness on anticipated affective reac-
tion towards eating chili, which consequently impacted participants’ 
choice of spicy levels.
In sum, cross four experiments, we found light increases peo-
ple’s perception of ambient warmth, which in turn activates their 
hot emotional system, leading to intensified affective reactions in all 
kinds of situations. Across different domains, ranging from evalua-
tion of words to perceptions of aggressiveness and sexiness, and to 
choice of food spiciness levels, we found light intensified both expe-
rienced and anticipated affective response, and consequently, influ-
enced judgment and choice in a variety of context. The findings are 
important for several reasons. First, they provide a theoretical frame-
work that can reconcile the inconsistent findings in literature regard-
ing the influence of sunshine on people’s affect, some showed that 
sunshine (ambient brightness) intensified positive affect and others 
showed that it amplified negative affect. Second, more importantly, 
they show that one format of sensory input (light) influenced a wide 
range of judgments that are not obviously or directly related to it. The 
results thus imply that different sensory inputs combine to influence 
each other. Sensation of light increases feeling of warmth, and influ-
ences judgments just as warmth does. A third substantial contribution 
is that these data show that visual input of ambient brightness can 
impact judgments and decision making by activating the hot emo-
tional system. The implications of this finding are important, because 
they are the first to imply that the visual-perception system and the 
emotional systems are integrated. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The issue of protecting consumer privacy has continued to grow 
in prominence over the past several years. Companies have grown 
increasingly sensitive to privacy concerns as the Federal Trade Com-
mission has actively pursued companies that have more flagrantly 
violated the privacy rights of citizens, such as the case with Google’s 
$22.5 million fine for tracking unaware Safari browser users online. 
Yet at the same time, most individual consumers freely share infor-
mation online that can get them into trouble, from General Petraeus’ 
reliance on Gmail to conduct his scandalous correspondence to em-
ployees fired for Facebook posts or tweets complaining about their 
employer or showcasing them in compromising circumstances. Al-
though every change in privacy settings from Facebook generates 
considerable press, the majority of Facebook users who keep their 
profiles public reveal important, personal information that can be 
used for identity fraud—such as their birthday, e-mail addresses, and 
prior school names (Carrns 2012).
Thus we are faced with an interesting paradox when it comes 
to how people treat their private information. Although most people 
agree that protecting their personal information is important and 
that it should be protected, they readily share information in public 
forums or for relatively small discounts or to simply get through a 
transactional process – the “privacy paradox” (Norberg et al. 2007). 
This research examines why people treat this resource in such an 
inconsistent fashion.
Previous research has examined this paradox from several per-
spectives. There are individual differences in propensity to disclose 
information (Jourard and Lawakow 1958, Westin 1991). There are 
also risks to sharing personal information, particularly in any digi-
tal forum, and people do not always appropriately weigh the poten-
tial risks associated with sharing personal information if they feel 
some immediate benefit to doing so (Acquisti 2004). Alter and Op-
penheimer (2009) found that simply by making fonts easier to read, 
people were more likely to disclose the personal flaws and opinions. 
Disfluency led to heightened perceptions of risk, which decreased 
rates of disclosure.
Other more recent work has illustrated that context effects have 
a very powerful influence on information disclosure. John, Acquisti, 
and Loewenstein (2009) found that the method of inquiry (direct 
versus indirect), visual appearance of a website (professional versus 
unprofessional), and priming privacy concerns can all influence the 
disclosure rates for quite personal, intrusive questions. Other work 
by the same researchers demonstrated that disclosure rates are influ-
enced by perceptions of disclosure by others and the order in which 
the questions are presented in terms of level of intrusiveness (Ac-
quisti, John, and Loewenstein 2012). One of the reasons that dis-
closure rates fall prey to such context effects is that the valuation of 
personal information is ambiguous (Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein 
2009). This research specifically examines the sources of ambiguity 
in valuing personal information that contributes to such effects.
From a transactional perspective, people have several common-
ly used sources of currency—time, money, and more recently, their 
personal information, which can be exchanged for discounts, person-
alized services, and other benefits. Previous research has illustrated 
that both money (Amir, Ariely, and Carmon 2008) and time (Leclerc, 
Schmitt, and Dubé 1995) are often ambiguously valued when trans-
lated into utility. However, time tends to be the more ambiguously 
valued of the two, which results in effects such as a lack of a sunk 
time effect, due individual challenges in accounting for time (Soman 
2001), or more positive evaluations of negative experiences when 
paying in time instead of money, due to more easy rationalization 
of time-related expenses (Okada and Hoch 2004). The difference in 
how people value these two resources also depends quite critically on 
perceived surplus, or “resource slack,” as described by Zauberman 
and Lynch (2005). Discount rates for investments of time tend to be 
higher than those of money because people believe that time will be 
more plentiful in the future, relative to money. However, generally 
speaking, people are conditioned to think of both time and money as 
scarce resources of some value due to constraints imposed by budget 
(for money) or available hours in a day (for time.)
In contrast, I contend that because personal information does 
not operate with such obvious constraints, as the same piece of infor-
mation can be disclosed multiple times to various parties, people are 
not naturally inclined to think of their information as a constrained 
resource relative to other resources like time or money. Furthermore, 
simply thinking of personal information as a resource or as valuable 
does not decrease rates of disclosure for such information. However, 
when consumers are primed to think of their personal information as 
a valuable, constrained resource, disclosure rates decrease. 
Experiments 1 and 2 examine personal information as a re-
source relative to time and money. Experiment 1 illustrates that 
while people are reluctant to share their personal information with 
strangers or exchange it for goods and services, they do not see it as 
a valuable or constrained resource relative to time or money. Experi-
ment 2 demonstrates that the discount rate for investments made with 
personal information is even higher than that of time, which is higher 
than that of money, further underscoring that personal information is 
typically not thought of as a constrained resource. Experiments 3a 
and 3b show that relative to a control condition or a condition where 
participants are primed to think of their personal information as a 
valuable resource, those that are primed to think of their personal 
information as a valuable, constrained resource are significantly less 
likely to indicate they would disclose information about undesirable 
behaviors (experiment 3a) and less likely to actually admit to having 
ever engaged in these same undesirable behaviors (experiment 3b). 
This research has important implications for the ways in which con-
sumers can be educated to think about their personal information in 
way that reduces disclosure of personal information that could have 
negative personal implications.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Recent research on the precision of provided anchors suggests 
that consumers adjust less when a provided anchor is represented 
on a fine-grained scale than on a coarse scale (Janiszewski & Uy 
2008; Zhang & Schwarz 2012).  As a result, consumers are more 
confident that a product will deliver on its promises, and are therefore 
more likely to select a product, when the promise is conveyed in fine-
grained units (Zhang & Schwarz 2012).  Zhang and Schwarz (2012) 
find that consumers prefer products whose attributes are expressed 
precisely (vs. imprecisely), and conclude that consumers have more 
confidence in outcomes when companies provide fine grained es-
timates, and that precision may therefore be beneficial to the firm. 
While Zhang and Schwarz focus on quantities of time, one estimate 
that consumers routinely receive from firms is a price estimate.  We 
examine how the precision of a price estimate affects satisfaction 
with the estimate and beliefs about future outcomes.  Further, we 
examine what happens when the actual price differs from the price 
estimate.  
Conceptually replicating the findings of Zhang and Schwarz 
(2012) and Uy and Janiszewski (2008), we find that consumers who 
receive a precise price estimate adjust less from this estimate when 
predicting a final price than do consumers who receive an imprecise 
estimate.  Additionally, we demonstrate that precise price estimates 
result in narrower ranges of believed possible outcomes.    More spe-
cifically, while the precision of the anchor does not affect the lower 
boundary of the range of possible outcomes, consumers believe that 
the highest price they may possibly pay is significantly higher when 
they receive an imprecise (rounded) price estimate.  We also demon-
strate that consumers prefer precise price estimates and that satisfac-
tion with the estimate appears to spill over onto general attitudes to-
ward the retailer, as consumer report more positive attitudes toward 
the retailer after receiving a precise price estimate.  Finally, despite 
consumer preferences for precise estimates, we provide evidence 
that providing a precise estimate can backfire.  Specifically, we find 
that when the final price exceeds the estimated price, consumers are 
more dissatisfied when they originally received a precise estimate, 
perhaps stemming from their beliefs that this outcome is less fair.  
At the price estimate stage, we replicate the findings of Zhang 
and Schwarz (forthcoming).  Specifically, precise price estimates ap-
pear to lead consumers to adjust less when settling on an anticipated 
price.  While the precision of the estimate did not affect participants’ 
estimates of the lowest conceivable price for their car repairs, par-
ticipants who received imprecise estimates believed the highest 
conceivable price to be significantly higher than participants who 
received a precise estimate.  Additionally, it appears that consum-
ers prefer more specific information when navigating an uncertain 
service interaction—participants who received a precise estimate 
were more satisfied with the estimate, and the service interaction as 
a whole, than were participants who received an imprecise estimate. 
Combined, these findings suggest that service providers and retail-
ers of variably priced goods would benefit from providing the most 
precise price estimate possible.
However, when the final price does not match a provided price 
estimate, our results suggest that the opposite may be true: service 
providers may be better served by providing imprecise price esti-
mates.  When the final price is lower than estimated, the precision of 
the original estimate does not matter—consumers are always happy 
and the final price seems fair.  However, when the final price comes 
in above the original estimate, consumers who received a precise 
price estimate believe the final price to be less fair, are less satis-
fied with the final price, and have lower overall attitudes towards the 
service provider.
Zhang and Schwarz (2012) invoke Gricean maxims to ex-
plain consumers’ pattern of adjustments from precise anchors—an 
assumption of the maxim of quantity leads to the inference that a 
precisely provided price estimate has more thought behind it (and 
should therefore be closer to the actual outcome than an imprecise 
price estimate).  In our study, the precise price estimate was lower 
than the precise price estimate ($381 vs. $400) and the two esti-
mates were provided between subjects—participants were unaware 
that others were receiving different estimates.  In practice, however, 
there are circumstances where individuals receive separate estimates 
of the same quantity, and this information may be shared.  For ex-
ample, two coworkers may compare company-provided estimates of 
upcoming performance bonuses or a married couple may compare 
two unique quotes they received for the same service.  Given con-
sumers’ preferences for precise price estimates, the question arises 
as to whether a consumer would prefer a higher (but more precise) 
estimate over a lower (but less precise estimate).  We are currently 
working to examine this question.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to reduce social-
desirability-driven distortion in consumer surveys that takes advan-
tage of the increasing availability of social networks. The approach 
is based on prior research suggesting that consumers express their 
identity through the choices they make (Belk 1988; Berger & Heath 
2007) and that this choice behavior is typically easily observable to 
their friends (Kenny & Acitelli 2001; Kurtz et al. 2008; Mikulincer 
& Nachshon 1991). We propose that friends’ knowledge about each 
others’ preferences and past behavior can be used to incentivize indi-
viduals to provide more accurate survey responses. Instead of merely 
evoking the social context, as in prior work such as that by Tice et al. 
(1995), the proposed method incorporates the social context in a pure 
coordination game (Schelling 1969). We examine this approach via a 
novel Facebook application, where respondents are rewarded if their 
characterization of their own behavior matches what others believe 
that characterization will be. 
In our proposed coordination game, a respondent and a number 
of his/her friends independently answer the same survey questions, 
but from different viewpoints. The respondent answers a question 
about him/herself (e.g., “Do you exercise regularly?”) while a friend 
answers the question from the perspective of the respondent (e.g., 
“Does ___ exercise regularly?”). The greater the correspondence be-
tween these independent responses, the greater (the probability of re-
ceiving) a monetary reward. An increase in truth-telling is predicted 
if individuals’ behavior is observable to others and particularly pro-
nounced for individuals with higher closeness to a game partner. Due 
to consumers’ self-expression tendency (Belk 1988) and by com-
municating subtle information about themselves to others (Berger 
& Heath 2007), observability of a certain behavior is predicted to 
enhance detection of the truth in the coordination game. Thus, we 
predict higher levels of truth-telling for higher levels of observability 
and higher closeness among participants.
In a first study, we examined the influence of observability and 
closeness among friends on the effectiveness of the game. We re-
cruited 196 participants from a major university for this purpose. 
Participants were asked to respond to a random set of 20 out of 40 
health-related questions on 7-point Likert scales. These questions re-
flected socially desirable behaviors but varied by the level of observ-
ability as assessed in a pretest of 207 subjects from the same popula-
tion. After answering 20 health-related items and completing a filler 
task, respondents learned the mechanics of the coordination game. 
They were asked to invite a subset of their Facebook friends by using 
our Facebook application, knowing that one of them will be asked to 
serve as the observer. In the game, a respondent answered the same 
questions again, but in the context of the coordination game. This 
within-subjects design allowed us to measure the answers of the re-
spondents to the same questions twice, first in the hypothetical con-
text, and second in the context of the coordination game. We calcu-
lated the difference between the answers to the second and first part 
as a measure of this reduction in bias. We calculated this measure at 
the question and individual level. This resulted in a dataset contain-
ing 3,920 cross-clustered observations. In line with our predictions, 
answers in the game-condition were significantly lower compared 
to the standard survey situation. Importantly, we find that both the 
observability of the question and closeness among friends have a 
positive influence on the performance of the game. As predicted, we 
found that the bias-reducing effect of the game is more pronounced 
in situations of high closeness among friends and high observability 
at the question level.
In a next study, we explicitly tested the impact of wrong beliefs 
on respondent’s answers. As the game setting provides incentives to 
match any answers of friends, it can also defer the respondent from 
telling the truth if he or she thinks the answers of the friends are ei-
ther too optimistic or pessimistic. We recruited 121 participants from 
an online consumer panel for this study. Four fifths of the participants 
were routed into a hypothetical survey situation in which they were 
randomly assigned to either the control condition, where they simply 
responded to the survey questions in regular fashion, or to one of 
three conditions where they were introduced to the social approach. 
In these three conditions we manipulated the direction of beliefs to 
either be higher (friends think I behave healthier than I really do), 
lower (friends think I behave less healthy than I really do), or equal 
to the respondent’s self-perception (friends know my true health-
related behavior). A fifth condition served as a benchmark where we 
observed participants’ actual behavior in the task of interest. As the 
task, we asked participants to make a choice between a health- and 
a fun-related video, expecting socially biased responding to result in 
an inflated choice of the health-related video. In the benchmark con-
dition, respondents were told that they would actually have to watch 
the chosen video online. As expected and in line with our hypotheses, 
we found inflated survey responses in the hypothetical survey (the 
control condition) as well as in the situation were friends hold in-
flated beliefs of a respondent. Importantly, participants playing with 
friends holding aligned beliefs matched the actual truth as assessed 
by comparison with the benchmark condition.
Overall, we found converging evidence from a series of both 
field and lab studies that suggest less biased self-reports if health-
related behavior is surveyed in the context of a social coordination 
game which makes the tacit knowledge of social networks regarding 
one’s true health-related behavior salient.
Accurate information about survey respondents’ self-reports on 
their socially desirable behavior is of major interest for physicians, 
health organizations, or governments, and gained considerable atten-
tion in recent consumer research (Campbell & Mohr 2011). It is well 
known, however, that consumers do not always answer such surveys 
truthfully because health related questions can induce socially desir-
able responding (Crowne & Marlowe 1960; Kristiansen & Harding 
1984). Evidence shows that individuals tend to over report their phys-
ical activity and under report the amount of food intake (Adams et al. 
2005), a practice that is believed to have considerably increased dur-
ing the last two decades (McFerran et al. 2010). Thus, investigating 
ways to debias survey or stated preference data has a long tradition in 
marketing research (e.g. Miller et al. 2011). In this paper, we propose 
a novel approach to reduce distortion in health-related surveys that 
takes advantage of the increasing availability of social networks. Our 
approach is based on the theory of the extended self (Belk 1988), 
which postulates that a respondent’s behavior is articulated through 
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previous choices and observable from a friend’s perspective. We use 
this knowledge of a respondent’s friends to incentivize truth-telling 
in a survey context. Specifically, we ask respondents to participate in 
a pure coordination game (Schelling 1969) where they are rewarded 
if their assessment of their own behavior matches what observers 
believe they will respond. 
In our proposed game, a respondent and the friends simultane-
ously answer the same Likert scale survey question from different 
viewpoints. The respondent answers a survey question about himself 
(e.g. “Do you exercise regularly?”) while observers answer the same 
question from the perspective of the respondent (e.g. “Does the re-
spondent XY exercise regularly?”). If both provide a similar answer, 
they increase the likelihood of receiving a payoff. Our game mirrors 
what is known as pure coordination game in the behavioral game 
theory literature (Schelling 1969). In these games, players simul-
taneously decide on their strategy/answer, whereas no interaction 
between them is allowed or possible. An equal payoff is provided 
to both players if their answers match. Players receive no payoff if 
their answers diverge. Hence, if the respondent believes that there is 
a probability higher than chance that the observer will pick the true 
answer then it can be theoretically shown, that the game will lead 
to a greater motive to tell the truth. It follows from the previous de-
scription that the game can only provide incentives for truth-telling 
if the observer knows the truth to a certain degree. Knowledge about 
the truth will be greater to the extent that the behavior recorded of 
the respondent is visible to others. According to the notion of the 
extended self and the self-expression tendency of consumers (Belk 
1988), behavior is relatively visible at least in certain domains. Indi-
viduals’ possessions, the products they buy, and their personal pref-
erences communicate subtle information about their desired self to 
others (Belk 1988; Berger & Heath 2007). These subtle signals are 
oftentimes correctly decoded from publicly consumed products and 
inferences are drawn regarding the possessors’ individual traits and 
characteristics (Berger & Heath 2007; Ferraro, Escalas, & Bettman 
2011). 
This will be particularly the case if the behavior in question is 
generally observable to others. Hence, we put forward the following 
first hypothesis: H1: The more observable a surveyed behavior is, 
the higher the external validity of answers provided in a coordination 
game setting. However, the effectiveness of the proposed coordina-
tion game is not only dependent on the degree of observability of 
a respective behavior but also on the closeness among friends, as 
close friends are more likely to observe a focal respondent’s behav-
ior as sensitive information is shared primarily among close friends 
(Kenny & Acitelli 2001). Publicly observable behavior is a neces-
sary precondition within our proposed truth-telling game to draw 
inferences about a consumers’ behavior. Based on previous research, 
physical activity and health-related behavior was shown to be gener-
ally publicly observable for others (Trost et al. 2002). With regard 
to the degree of closeness among friends, it is noteworthy that it 
has been shown recently that friends derive accurate estimates of 
a focal persons’ attitude and behavior (Kurtz et al. 2008) due to the 
fact that friendship ties are inherently constituted by self-disclosure 
among friends (Derlega et al. 1976; Mikulincer & Nachshon 1991). 
Hence, we propose: H2: The higher the degree of closeness between 
the respondent and the observer, the higher the external validity of 
answers provided in a coordination game setting.
Based on a series of these four studies, we provide novel evi-
dence that this approach makes people more likely to admit to so-
cially undesirable truths about their health behavior. In addition, we 
define three conditions under which the proposed social approach 
can improve truth-telling: (1) if the respondent’s behavior is observ-
able, (2) if the observer is represented by a close friend, and (3), 
if the focal respondent’s and observer’s beliefs about the focal re-
spondents’ behavior are aligned. Finally, we find that our proposed 
approach can also be applied to choice questions in addition to Likert 
scale questions, stressing the generalizability of the approach to dif-
ferent survey formats. A limitation of our studies is that data col-
lection in the field studies was performed over Facebook. We also 
acknowledge that the performance of the game might differ in other 
social environments and with survey questions from other subject 
areas than health-related behavior. However, due to the consistency 
and magnitude of our revealed effects, we expect results from other 
contexts to be in line with our findings. Our research particularly 
addresses a recent call for more elaborate research methods on mea-
suring consumer’s behavior in ubiquitous online environments such 
as Facebook.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer cues are everywhere. Given that situational cues 
can momentarily activate associated identities and that once salient, 
these identities can subsequently influence behavior (e.g., Oyserman 
2009), it becomes imperative to understand how a salient consumer 
identity may influence behavior and how the salience of this identity 
is managed. For this investigation, we draw on identity theory and 
on boundary theory, a recent extension of identity theory (Ashforth 
et al. 2001, Clark 2000). Specifically, we propose that individuals 
erect and maintain consumer boundaries to manage when and where 
a consumer identity is situationally cued. When individuals have 
strong consumer boundaries, they should be less responsive to situ-
ational cues. In contrast, when boundaries are weak, even a subtle 
consumer cue may heighten the salience of a consumer identity. To 
test these predictions, we (a) develop a scale of consumer boundary 
strength, (b) propose that exchange orientation is at least one impor-
tant indicator of consumer identity salience, and (c) demonstrate that 
the strength of an individual’s consumer boundaries moderates the 
effect of a consumer cue on consumer identity salience, as indicated 
by an increase in exchange orientation. 
Study 1
To develop a scale of consumer boundary strength, we began 
by conducting depth interviews. Specifically, we asked 9 participants 
to find images that express “what being a consumer means to you.” 
Based on these interviews, we developed a list of 77 potential items. 
Eventually, the list was reduced to 44 items measuring three types of 
consumer boundaries: psychological boundaries (16 items), physical 
boundaries (16 items), and monetary boundaries (12 items). 
Study 2
To reduce the items identified in study 1, 292 undergraduate stu-
dents completed our measure of consumer boundaries in exchange 
for course credit (46% female). All items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), with higher 
values indicating stronger boundaries. The 44 consumer boundary 
items were subject to a number of exploratory factor analyses using 
an oblique rotation. The final set of items revealed a three-factor so-
lution (eigenvalues > 1), with each factor mapping on to one type of 
consumer boundary. Specifically, factor I was labeled psychological 
boundaries and includes the items, “Emails from my favorite stores 
are a welcome distraction from other tasks” (r), “Most of my book-
marked websites are online stores” (r), “I keep pictures of things I 
want to buy in places where I will frequently see them” (r), and “I 
subscribe to a lot of catalogues and/or store emails” (r). Factor II was 
labeled physical boundaries and includes the items, “I keep my shop-
ping trips as short as possible,” “I only shop when there is something 
I need,” “I often go to the mall just because I like to shop” (r), and 
“I go to the mall just to window shop––even though there’s nothing 
I need” (r). A third factor, labeled monetary boundaries, includes the 
items, “I only go shopping when I have money to spend,” “I only let 
myself think about shopping when I know I can afford it,” and “My 
budget plays a big part in determining when I go shopping.” All the 
reliabilities are above the acceptable cutoff of .70, ranging from .78 
to .80.
Study 3
Study 3 evaluates the underlying structure of our measurement 
model (N = 160 undergraduate students). To assess which model 
best fit our data, we compared three models of consumer boundaries. 
Model 1 assumes all items are reflective of a single latent construct. 
Model 2 assumes three separate, uncorrelated factors. Model 3 as-
sumes three separate but correlated factors. A number of model fit 
statistics suggest model 3 is the only model that demonstrates accept-
able fit. The fit of model 3 is further supported by a direct compari-
son of the models’ chi-square statistics (model 3’s X2(41) = 55.80 vs. 
model 1’s X2(44) = 203.80 and model 2’s X2(44) = 104.77, p-values 
< .01). Thus, it appears consumer boundaries are best thought of as 
three distinct, but correlated, types of boundaries.
Study 4
Study 4 was designed to assess the nomological validity of the 
scale. To do this, we investigated correlations between consumer 
boundary strength and theoretically relevant precursors and out-
comes (e.g., materialism and compulsive buying). Our sample con-
sisted of 157 undergraduate students who participated in exchange 
for partial course credit. All correlations were in the hypothesized 
direction, thus indicating adequate nomological validity.
Study 5
Study 5 used an experimental design to test the reliability and 
predictive validity of our consumer boundary strength measure. Spe-
cifically, we find that framing the experiment as a consumer vs. citi-
zen task increased participants’ exchange orientation, as measured 
by Murstein et al’s (1987) 16-item scale, but only for participants 
with weak consumer boundaries (1.5 SD below the mean; Mconsumer = 
5.15, Mcitizen = 4.56; t(179) = 31.23, p < .01). When participants had 
strong consumer boundaries (1.5 SD above the mean), the framing 
manipulation did not influence their exchange orientation (Mconsumer = 
4.07, Mcitizen = 4.18; t(179) = -1.06, p > .20).
Conclusion
This research explores the boundaries individuals erect around 
being a consumer (study 1), develops a scale to measure individual 
variance in consumer boundary strength (study 2-4), and demon-
strates that this measure moderates the relationship between a con-
sumer cue and consumer identity salience, as indicated by a height-
ened exchange orientation (study 5). For consumer behavior, this 
research presents a framework for studying the influence of consum-
er identity salience in both consumer and non-consumer domains. As 
a field, we have long acknowledged that we are a society of consum-
ers––it is time we move beyond consumer boundaries and begin to 
explore how being a consumer affects everything else.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How do companies persuade consumers to buy their products? 
They have many ways such as advertising, sales promotion, free 
product trials, etc. However, non-profit organizations face a unique 
challenge. While their mission is also in persuading consumers to 
contribute, many times they cannot use the usual means such as ad-
vertisements and sales promotion tools available to for-profit organi-
zations (Dixon, 1997). Given that approximately two of every three 
households donate an annual average of over $2,000 to charities of 
their choice (Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007), 
the competition for charity dollars is quite stiff for a bulk of chari-
table organizations with unfortunately few or no conventional mar-
keting tools from which to avail. 
Hence, the unique challenge faced by non-profits is that they 
need to persuade people to donate without many of the tried and 
tested methods of persuasion at their disposal. Many times, the only 
method that non-profits can use to communicate their aims and per-
suade consumers to contribute is in their name. Unlike for-profit en-
tities that try to come up with memorable or catchy names, we see 
non-profits coming up with longer but more descriptive names that 
try to communicate the aims of the causes in the best possible man-
ner. For instance, “Mothers Against Drunk Driving” captures all the 
emotions of the cause and hence, the name itself acts as a critical 
(and at times the only) persuasion tool. We see mainly three types of 
names for charities—positive, negative or neutral frames.
Given that a charity’s name frame plays such an important role 
in garnering contributions, how can charities use this tool to optimize 
value? Could the nature of these names—that is, their positive or 
negative frame—influence the revenue generated by charitable or-
ganizations, and hence their survival and growth? Specific research 
questions are worth exploring. First, would a positively framed char-
ity garner greater contributions versus a negatively framed charity 
over time, and might this difference vary in the short versus the long 
run? Second, how does the positive or negative framing of the char-
ity name influence the survivability of the charity? If differences do 
exist, then what theoretical mechanisms can help explain? The aim 
of this research is to answer these questions.
Existing literature at times gives conflicting answers to the 
questions raised, especially in the long run. There is greater agree-
ment in short run with extant research suggesting a negative frame 
will be stronger than a positive frame.  Research has demonstrated 
that negative messages have greater sway than positive messages, 
all else equal (Petty, 1986; Smith and Petty, 1996). In the long run, 
however, one of two outcomes could occur. While it is possible that 
the negative continues to outweigh the positive frame over time, the 
converse is possible. Briefly, research on loss aversion (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981) the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty, 
1986), positive-negative asymmetry and negativity bias (Rozin and 
Royzman, 2001) would suggest negative retaining its persuasive 
strength in the long run too. However, from a different stream of 
research, popularly known as the Mobilization-Minimization hy-
pothesis (MMH) (Taylor, 1991), one could infer the converse with 
the negative frame appearing stronger in the short run, but soon 
minimized in favor of a long run preference for the positive (also see 
Matlin and Stang, 1978).
Applying predictions from previous theories to our research, we 
are specifically interested in examining whether a negative frame (in 
terms of the charity’s name) will perform well in the short term as 
well as the long term. That is, one prediction would suggest that the 
same pattern would hold in the short term and long term, while the 
second prediction would suggest that the pattern is likely to reverse 
in the long-term.  In order to test these opposing predictions we con-
sidered two variables in survival and revenue.  We utilized Hierar-
chical Linear Modeling to examine the pattern of revenues over time 
and survival analysis to study which types of charities were likely to 
survive in the long run. In order to find answers to these questions 
and to find out which theoretical mechanism might be at work (nega-
tivity bias versus MMH) we used as data the key financial perfor-
mance measures and firm attributes as submitted by all tax-exempt 
nonprofit organizations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) span-
ning a ten year period, gathered and compiled by The Urban Insti-
tute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). 
In this research, we find that the likelihood of survival is statisti-
cally greater for positive versus negative charities after controlling 
for key covariates. Additionally, after accounting for the possibility 
of a self-selection bias attributed to a charity’s naming, we show sta-
tistically greater revenue growth over time for positive (versus nega-
tive) charities, providing further evidence in support of a positive 
framed charity’s greater ability to sustain long-term performance. 
Thus, both examinations show a greater influence from positive ver-
sus negative frames over time.
This research presents theoretical and practical implications. 
Theoretically, our research first informs extant persuasion research 
on the influence of positive and negative framing on persuasion and 
its longevity. Second, we inform the theoretically opposing predic-
tions regarding the lasting nature of negative versus positive messag-
es made by ELM and MMH. Third, findings inform how a charity’s 
framing can influence an individual’s altruistic behavior differently 
in the short and long run. From a practical perspective, these findings 
give cue to charities—or any organization for that matter—in select-
ing a frame based on their strategic aims; that is, whether they strive 
for more immediate or long-term returns. Additionally, our research 
illustrates the importance of using longitudinal studies to understand 
the various factors that have a temporal influence.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The concept of moral identity has received considerable interest 
by consumer behavior scholars in the past decade (Winterich, Mittal, 
and Ross 2009).  This is not surprising considering the intuitively 
appealing notion that consumers may construct their identities and 
act in accordance with what they believe are typical characteristics 
of being a good and honest person (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). 
Although the identity relevance of morality is difficult to contest, 
scholars have argued that consumer movements dedicated to ethi-
cal consumption are considered too extreme to have any real effect 
on everyday consumption behavior (Devinney, Auger, and Eckhardt 
2010). However, brand community research suggests that morality 
is central even when the main purpose of the community revolves 
around a consumption object such as a brand (Luedicke, Thompson, 
and Giesler 2010). We extend research on moral identity and ethical 
consumption by exploring the role of collective moral identity in an 
online consumption community.
Specifically, in this research we draw upon social movement 
theory (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow et al. 1986), moral identity 
theory (Reed et al. 2007), and theories on social norm construction 
(Goffman 1974; Fine 2001) to explore how authentic brand users 
construct collective moral identity around the specific cause of “anti-
counterfeits”. The context of counterfeits is interesting because coun-
terfeits represent a threat to the authentic brand user’s self-identity 
through perceived brand signal poaching (Berger and Ward 2010; 
Commuri  2009), but also a broader moral identity threat as coun-
terfeits can be seen as unethical or damaging to society. In order to 
explore the implications of multiple identity threats, we specifically 
investigate the scripted social norm negotiation that occurs within 
the online community to shed light on the processes by which mem-
bers construct and maintain individual moral identity while bridging 
multiple normative frameworks. For example, we investigate what 
happens when social norms constructed within the community are 
challenged by social norms that govern behavior in other social inter-
actions, such as when an authentic brand user is faced with an oppor-
tunity to inform a friend that the gift received from a family member 
is a “fake”.  Consequently, this research furthers our understanding 
of both individual and collective moral identity and the negotiation 
that concurrently creates and facilitates legitimization of authentic 
(i.e., non-counterfeit) brand use.
We employed netnographic analysis (Kozinets 2002) to explore 
the collective and embedded nature of authentic brand users’ moral 
identity projects. The specific online community selected as a netno-
graphic site is an online blog and forum website dedicated to luxury 
branded fashion accessories, including Chanel and Louis Vuitton. 
This particular research context is interesting because branded acces-
sories are highly visible and symbolic, thereby allowing us to study 
a context in which social norms for legitimate brand use and the ap-
propriateness of brand signals are likely to be very important to the 
consumer. Specific threads related to counterfeits were downloaded, 
organized and analyzed and then compared to more general posts 
in related topic areas to ascertain themes related to both legitimate 
brand use and the community members differentiation strategies 
from those who don’t use/like their favorite brand or those who use 
counterfeits.  The threads and posts were coded and analyzed using 
NVivo 10 software.
The process by which norms are institutionalized has been la-
beled ‘framing’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 291) and the frames con-
structed within the community can become “guided doings” that ex-
ert corrective control within that social context (Goffman 1974, 22). 
We find that although the ethical in the consumption is easily distin-
guished and underscored in community scripts (i.e., buying counter-
feits is bad for society), the social normative framework used by the 
community is highly nuanced in terms of different nested identity 
threats, thereby blurring the oppositional boundaries between “us” 
and “them” and what is considered legitimate usage of the authentic 
brand. Different frames related to ethical consumption, brand au-
thenticity, and identity protection are constructed by the community 
members and serve as an overall framework for social norm con-
struction and negotiation. Hence, this framework is important be-
cause it provides the foundation for both collective and individual 
moral identity projects within the community. 
Importantly, different social normative frames serve different 
purposes in terms of mobilizing resources to the anti-counterfeit 
cause and to regulate behavior both within and outside the communi-
ty. For example, by positioning authentic brand users as “ethical con-
sumers”, the community can create scripted social norms that regu-
late interactions with outside marketing agents, such as shop owners 
and websites (e.g., eBay). Interestingly, however, the “ethical” is not 
enough to truly legitimize authentic brand use. Thus, to achieve such 
brand use legitimization, we find that community members need to 
draw upon more brand related meanings, such as the genuine hand-
craft of the authentic brand, to more effectively mobilize community 
resources and to neutralize identity threat through community bound-
ary maintenance. This is important because the community needs to 
continuously redefine and negotiate the social norms that regulate 
how the community members interact with outsiders, including fam-
ily and friends, who purchase or gift a counterfeit accessory, such as 
a handbag or a wallet.
In conclusion, this research furthers our understanding of the 
ethical consumer and collective moral identity projects by specifical-
ly exploring how consumers use oppositional meanings derived from 
an anti-counterfeit framework to legitimize their authentic brand use. 
The blurry community boundaries found in this community are like-
ly to be found in many other consumption communities, especially 
when we explicitly recognize that members are likely embedded in 
a broader socio-cultural network, governed by several normative 
frameworks. Importantly, our findings support that the overall anti-
counterfeit cause needs be qualified with more specific brand related 
identity threats for the “ethical” to resonate with the authentic brand 
consumer. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
As corn prices were nearing record highs in the summer of 2012, 
followed by the rising cost of gas, electricity, airfares, bread, coffee, 
and fresh fruits, consumers saw significant increases in their shop-
ping bills (Hough 2012). To exemplify, during several subsequent 
years, Michelin, the world’s second largest tire maker, was forced 
to raise its prices to offset the increase of the cost of raw-materials. 
In turn, prices of the truck tires of its major competitors, Bridges-
tone and Firestone, continued to grow, as well. In these examples, 
the marketing positioning strategy of the Michelin brand has been 
to endow its brand with human features in its marketing communi-
cations, whereas the Firestone brand has not been positioned with 
such humanized features. Will consumer price fairness evaluations 
regarding a price change differ dependent upon whether a brand is 
anthropomorphized vs. non-anthropomorphized? This research ad-
dresses this question.
With the emerging trends of market price increases, firms are 
becoming more concerned with consumer hostile reactions to price 
hikes, as these firms’ profitability is constrained by consumer percep-
tions of what is considered to be a fair price (Bolton and Alba 2006; 
Wu et al. 2012). Price fairness encompasses consumers’ perceptions 
of a price as right, legitimate, and just (Campbell 2007; Homburg, 
Hoyer, and Koschate 2005). Given the importance of price fairness, 
researchers have begun to address this topic. However, the majority 
of prior research on price fairness has primarily focused on factors 
that are intrinsic to the price per se. That is, researchers have exam-
ined consumers’ attributions of a firm’s motive for a price change 
(Bolton and Alba 2006; Campbell 1999; Haws and Bearden 2006), 
consumer thoughts regarding previous or competitor prices (Bolton, 
Warlop, and Alba 2003), and consumer knowledge regarding appro-
priate pricing strategies (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Yet, research 
has been especially sparse in terms of investigating the factors that 
are extrinsic to a price change. The current research fills this gap in 
the literature and demonstrate that consumer price fairness percep-
tions when there is a price change will differ dependent upon the 
brand positioning strategy (i.e., anthropomorphized vs. non-anthro-
pomorphized brand). The research examines both price increases and 
price decreases.
With this research, we attempt to provide several theoretical 
contributions. First, we demonstrate that brand anthropomorphiza-
tion has a more detrimental effect on consumer judgments of price 
fairness when a brand raises its price (Table 1). Evidence in sup-
port of this proposition comes from the theoretical argument that, 
as consumers perceive brands as mindful and capable of perform-
ing intentional actions (Kim and McGill 2011; Puzakova, Kwak, and 
Rocereto 2013), they are more likely to attribute a negative motive 
for a price increase by an anthropomorphized (vs. non-anthropo-
morphized) brand. In this regard, we establish that no differences 
in price fairness exist between anthropomorphized and non-anthro-
pomorphized brands for price decreases. Second, we demonstrate 
that the negative effect of brand humanization in instances of price 
increases is not universally negative and, instead, depends upon 
the type of cognitive processes that consumers employ to arrive at 
a causal judgment of a behavior. Recent research on self-construal 
(Ahluwalia 2008; Zhang and Mittal 2007) has opened up the possi-
bility that a consumers’ self-construal influences consumers’ reason-
ing of intentional actions. Specifically, this research has established 
that the interdependent vs. independent self-construal determines the 
extent to which a person considers an action as driven by the person 
as opposed to the context (Ng and Houston 2006; Zhang and Mittal 
2007). Third, research has investigated the extent to which an action 
is viewed as being directed to benefit others. That is, interdependents 
are motivated to keep interpersonal harmony and hold beliefs that 
any behavior should benefit others (Heine et al. 1999). These beliefs 
lead to the interpretation of the goal of any action as an attempt to 
maintain interpersonal harmony. Relying on two facts: 1) greater at-
tendance to the context as opposed to the object and 2) interpretation 
of any action’s motivation as to maintain interpersonal harmony, we 
propose that interdependents will hold more positive view of price 
increase and will see more positive motive in price increase when a 
brand is anthropomorphized (vs. non-anthropomorphized). Thus, on 
the basis of this research, we find that, as opposed to consumers with 
independent self-construal, interdependent consumers are likely to 
view price increases by an anthropomorphized brand as more fair 
compared to that of a non-anthropomorphized brand. Finally, we 
investigate the mechanism underlying consumer processes of price 
changes by humanized vs. non-humanized brands. In particular, we 
demonstrate that consumer price fairness judgments are driven by 
the inferred motives of a brand. 
Table 1: Cell Means and Standard Deviations in Study 1
Price Increase Price Decrease
 AB NAB Mdiff AB N Mdiff
Price 
Fairness 
1.90
(.83)
2.59 
(1.07) -.69*
5.62 
(1.06)
5.50 
(1.22) .12
Inferred 
Motive
2.48
(.83)
3.14 
(1.22) -.66*
5.60 
(1.15)
5.41 
(1.16) .19
Notes: AB = anthropomorphized brand; NAB = non-anthropomorphized 
brand. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
* p < .05
Overall, we conduct two studies to provide important theoretical 
and managerial contributions to the price fairness and brand anthro-
pomorphism literature. First, this research contributes to the work 
on price fairness by shedding light on consumer perceptions of price 
fairness in situations of price changes by anthropomorphized vs. 
non-anthropomorphized brands (Studies 1-2). Second, this research 
enhances the theory of anthropomorphism by investigating the role 
of self-construal on consumer judgments of anthropomorphized 
brands and its underlying processes (Study 2). Third, understand-
ing responses to price changes by consumers with interdependent 
vs. independent self-construals is not only theoretically important 
but might also open up new possibilities for marketers to use self-
construal as a customer segmentation and prioritization variable. 
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Concealing Your Consumer Stupidity: How the Fear of Appearing as an Incompetent 
Consumer Reduces Negative Word-of-Mouth
Matthew Philp, Queen’s University, Canada
Laurence Ashworth, Queen’s University, Canada
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research proposes that the decision to share negative word-
of-mouth (WOM) will involve a dilemma between the various ben-
efits of sharing negative WOM and the potential psychosocial cost of 
appearing as an incompetent consumer.  Specifically, we suggest that 
dissatisfying purchase experiences – of the kind that are generally 
assumed to inspire negative WOM – can sometimes reflect poorly 
on consumers.  For example, when a consumer purchased, in retro-
spect, an inferior product, or paid too high a price because they were 
not sufficiently careful.  Consumers may be concerned that revealing 
such information could cause them to appear as an incompetent con-
sumer in the eyes of the intended recipient.  To avoid this possibility, 
we predict that individuals will sometimes withhold or distort nega-
tive WOM.
Theoretical Development
Consumers are motivated to share negative WOM after a dissat-
isfying consumption experience to reduce the negative feelings from 
dissatisfaction (Anderson 1998).  Consumers experience a variety of 
benefits from sharing negative WOM, such as altruism, vengeance, 
anxiety reduction, and self-enhancement (De Angelis et al. 2012; 
Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; Richins 1983).    However, little research 
has examined motivations that may work against these existing mo-
tivations, and therefore reducing negative WOM. 
It is known that sharing WOM can send signals and information 
to other people about who that individual is as a person and a con-
sumer, including the prices paid, the decisions made, and the infor-
mation obtained (De Angelis et al. 2012; Dichter 1966).  In the case 
of sharing negative WOM, this may portray the self as an individual 
who is unable to get price deals, commonly makes foolish purchase 
decisions, does not possess superior product knowledge, and is an 
overall incompetent consumer.
We suggest that incompetence is an undesirable self-image that 
consumers will be motivated to avoid.  Existing work has shown that 
perceived responsibility for a price deal makes a consumer feel like 
a “smart shopper” (Schindler 1998).  Extending this principle, we 
suggest that perceived responsibility (or, more accurately, beliefs that 
the intended target might hold the consumer responsible) for a dissat-
isfying purchase experience will make consumers concerned about 
appearing as an incompetent consumer.  Under these conditions we 
expect that consumers will be less willing to share negative WOM 
out of fear of appearing incompetent.
Overview of Studies
Three studies were conducted to examine this prediction by ma-
nipulating various aspects of consumer dissatisfaction and perceived 
responsibility and examining the impact on WOM content (Study 1 
and 2) and WOM intentions (Study 3).  Consistent with prior work, 
Studies 1 and 2 found that participants were significantly more dis-
satisfied and used more negative words when sharing WOM after 
learning that the product they purchased was available at another 
store for a lower price (relative to the same or a higher price).  How-
ever, we also found that participants who felt more responsible for 
their purchase (e.g., by paying with cash instead of gift-card or when 
they had more time to make a necessary purchase versus no time) 
used significantly less negative words when sharing WOM despite 
the high levels of dissatisfaction.  We suggest this occurred because 
of an increased motivation to avoid an undesirable self-image as an 
incompetent consumer.
Study 3 sought to measure the concern of appearing as an in-
competent consumer as a mediator of this effect while extending the 
findings to a new dissatisfying context.  Consistent with prior re-
search, results of a process mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes 
2008) found evidence that learning a firm will charge for repairs for 
a manufacturer defect leads to a significant increase in dissatisfaction 
which also leads to a significant increase in the intention to share 
negative WOM.  However, this negative consumption experience 
also leads to a significant increase in the concern of appearing as an 
incompetent consumer, which then significantly decreases the inten-
tion to share negative WOM.  Although, this effect is moderated by 
warranty choice, where the concern of appearing as an incompetent 
consumer increases when the participant feels more responsible for 
opting out of the default warranty (see figure 1 and table 1).
Figure 1: Mediating Role of the Fear of Appearing  
as an Incompetent Consumer of the Willingness  
to Share Negative WOM
* p<.05 
Opt-out of 
Warranty 
Poor Response to 
Product Failure 
+ 2.4* + .23* 
+ .98* - .15* 
 
Dissatisfaction 
 
Willingness to Share 
Negative WOM 
Concern of Appearing as 
an Incompetent Consumer 
Conclusion
Overall, previous WOM research has examined various motiva-
tions underlying consumers’ desire to spread negative WOM.  How-
ever, the motivations identified work in unison, such that they are all 
expected to increase the willingness to share negative WOM.  This 
research identifies the psychosocial cost of appearing as an incompe-
tent consumer as a conflicting motive after a dissatisfying consump-
tion experience that decreases negative WOM.  The results of three 
studies further indicated that the more responsible consumers feel 
for their choices leading up to a dissatisfying consumption experi-
ence, the more they are concerned about portraying an undesirable 
self-image as an incompetent consumer.  To avoid portraying this 
self-image, participants shared less negative WOM.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Eugene (1998), “Customer Satisfaction and Word of 
Mouth,” Journal of Service Research, 1 (1), 5-17.
De Angelis, Matteo, Andrea Bonezzi, Alessandro M. Peluso, Derek 
D. Rucker, and Michele Costabile (2012), “On Braggarts 
and Gossips: A Self-Enhancement Account of Word-of-
Mouth Generation and Transmission,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 49 (August), 551-563.
Dichter, Ernest (1966), “How Word-of-Mouth Advertising Works,” 
Harvard Business Review, 44 (6), 147-160.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 577
Hennig-Thurau, Thorsten, Kevin P. Gwinner, Gianfranco Walsh, 
and Dwayne D. Gremler (2004), “eWOM Via Consumer-
Opinion Platforms: What Motivates Consumers to Articulate 
Themselves on the Internet?” Journal of Interactive 
Marketing, 18 (1), 38-52.
Preacher, Kristopher J. and Andrew F. Hayes (2008), “Asymptotic 
and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Comparing 
Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models,” Behavioral 
Research Methods, 40 (3), 879–91.
Richins, Marsha L. (1983), “Word-of-Mouth by Dissatisfied 
Consumers: A Pilot Study,” Journal of Marketing, 47 (1), 
68-78.
Schindler, Robert M. (1998), “Consequences of Perceiving Oneself 
as Responsible for Obtaining a Discount: Evidence for Smart-
Shopper Feelings,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 74 (4), 
371-392.
Table 1: Overview of Studies
Purchase 
Responsibility Dissatisfying Consumption Experience WOM Measure Means
Standard 
Deviation Interaction
Study 1
Gift-Card (Low)
Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied)
WOM Valence 
(Positive – 
Negative Words)
-0.85 1.67
F(1,145) = 
4.04, p < .05
Other Available Price: Same (Control) 1.84 1.52
Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied) 1.65 1.64
Cash (High)
Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied) 0.44 2.29
Other Available Price: Same (Control) 1.04 2.12
Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied) 2.89 2.83
Study 2
Immediate Necessity 
(Low)
Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied)
WOM Valence 
(Positive – 
Negative Words)
-0.15 1.70
F(1,133) = 
3.70, p < .05
Other Available Price: Same (Control) 1.00 0.97
Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied) 1.12 1.32
Non-Immediate 
Necessity (High)
Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied) 1.07 1.61
Other Available Price: Same (Control) 1.15 1.41
Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied) 0.82 0.98
Study 3
Default Warranty 
(Low)
Does Not Honor Warranty (Dissatisfied) Willingness to 
Share Negative 
WOM (Harrison-
Walker 2001)
6.16 0.90 F(1,103) = 
13.00, p < 
.001
Honors Warranty (Satisfied) 4.81 0.87
Opt-Out of Default 
Warranty (High)
Does Not Honor Warranty (Dissatisfied) 5.50 1.01
Honors Warranty (Satisfied) 5.43 0.87
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Healthful Food Decision-Making at the Point of Purchase: An Update on Nutrition 
Labeling
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Nutrition labeling aims to help consumers make healthful food 
decisions.  However, consumers often make habitual decisions that 
are driven by taste when shopping groceries and disregard nutrition 
information (Grunert et al. 2010).  This research investigates whether 
front-of-pack nutrition labeling, and heuristic cues presented on the 
labeling, increase attention and the healthfulness of food decisions. 
We consider actual point of purchase decisions and assess the impact 
of labeling penetration in the food categories.
Conceptual Framework
We propose that nutrition information, implemented consistent-
ly on the front of packages, receives more attention if the labels are 
present on all packages, compared with the market penetration.  Vi-
sual search theory substantiates this claim (Duncan and Humphreys 
1989): consumers are faster in recognizing objects as present with in-
creasing frequency of appearance and higher similarity in shape and 
coloring.  Consumers are also faster in classifying whether an object 
is present (vs. classifying it according to its absence; Bialkova and 
van Trijp 2010; Yamani and McCarley 2010).  The full penetration 
should thus increase the salience of nutrition labeling that is consis-
tently (vs. inconsistently) placed on packages (H1).
The visual scene in the full penetration condition should also 
allow consumers compare products more easily, without missing in-
formation or confusion.  Consumers learn about a label’s position on 
the packages and know where to expect it (Hollingworth 2007; Oli-
vers 2009; Yamani and McCarley 2010).  This consistency should fa-
cilitate the identification of foods as (un)healthful and thus improve 
decision quality (H2).
Study 1
Study 1 was conducted in a supermarket and manipulated the 
front-of-pack nutrition labeling (consistent format at a consistent po-
sition vs. real life labeling) and the labeling penetration (implement-
ing the consistent format on all products vs. according to market pen-
etrations).  Three hundred and eight products from three categories 
(sweets, 43% vs. 100% penetration; cereals, 59% vs. 100%; ready 
meals, 81% vs. 100%) were manipulated.  The labels showed calorie, 
sugar, fat, saturated fat, and salt content.  The healthfulness of the 
product choices was assessed via nutrient-based SSAg/1 scoring (the 
higher, the less healthful).
Participants (n = 260) were asked to choose three products, one 
of each category (cover story: orientation in supermarkets).  We used 
mobile eye-tracking to capture visual attention, assessed via share 
of attention (gaze durations on nutrition labeling / total packaging).
ANOVAs revealed that the consistent nutrition label increased 
share of attention from 1.00% in the inconsistent condition to 4.63% 
in the market penetration condition, and to 4.12% in the full penetra-
tion condition (F(2, 257) = 33.90, p < .001, η2 = .21).  Hypothesis 1 is 
only partly supported; the full (vs. market) penetration had no effect 
on attention change.  SSAg/1 scoring did not differ between partici-
pants (M = 19.17 vs. M = 19.12 vs. M = 19.07; F(2, 256) = 0.04, p = 
.96).  Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
The nutrition labeling formats may have been ineffective in in-
creasing the healthfulness of choices, because the stimuli did not al-
low consumers to process the labels within fractions of a second (as 
quantified by gaze durations).  Study 2 assessed how two heuristic 
cues – health marks and traffic light color-coding – may interact in 
helping consumers make healthful in-store choices.
Implementing Heuristic Cues
Health marks (binary overall healthfulness classifications) re-
duce the duration that consumers attend to the packaging (Bialkova 
and van Trijp 2010).  However, we predict that this attention shift is 
contingent on the presence (vs. absence) of traffic light colors.  Add-
ing colors attracts attention to nutrient-specific evaluations (Jones 
and Richardson 2007).  This is expected to inhibit the propensity to 
use cognitive short cuts offered by health marks (H3).  The combi-
nation of the two heuristic cues should also make consumers select 
more healthful products (H4), because health marks guide consum-
ers to a healthful evoked set and the colors automatically activate 
the meanings ‘go’ (green) and ‘stop’ (red) when assigned to more or 
less healthful nutrient levels, thereby implying automatic approach-
avoidance reactions (Koenigstorfer et al. 2013).
Study 2
A 2 (health marks present vs. absent) × 2 (traffic light colors 
present vs. absent) between-participant design was applied.  Pack-
ages of 15 snack foods were manipulated (e.g., rice cakes, SSAg/1 
= 0; fried banana chips, SSAg/1 = 18).  The procedure was similar 
to study 1; however, participants (n = 160) additionally selected one 
snack to take home.  Gaze duration and frequency (Rosbergen, Piet-
ers, and Wedel 1997) on the snacks were assessed.
Two-factorial ANOVAs were conducted to test hypothesis 3. 
The presence (vs. absence) of health marks, the presence (vs. ab-
sence) of colors, and their interaction were modeled as independent 
variables; gaze duration as the dependent variable.  The results re-
vealed longer gaze durations when colors were shown (F(1, 148) = 
3.97, p < .05, η2 = .026); health marks had no effects.  However, there 
was a significant interaction (F(1, 148) = 5.72, p = .02, η2 = .037).  As 
postulated in hypothesis 3, health marks decreased gaze duration in 
the absence of colors (t(73) = 3.48, p < .001) while it was unaffected 
when colors were present (t(75) = –0.56, p = .58).  The interaction 
was replicated for gaze frequency (same directions, F(1, 148) = 6.26, 
p = .01, η2 = .041).
Both health marks and traffic light colors did not influence the 
healthfulness of choices.  However, as predicted in hypothesis 4, 
health marks led to more healthful choices when colors were present 
(F(1, 156) = 4.44, p = .04, η2 = .028; from M = 14.54 to M = 12.16; 
t(76) = 2.11, p = .04).  This effect was not observed in the absence of 
colors (M = 12.67 vs. M = 13.82; t(80) = –0.93, p = .35).
Contributions
Our research shows that consistency in nutrition information 
increases visual attention (but not healthfulness of choices), and that 
combining two heuristic cues, traffic light colors and health marks, 
on the front of food packages helps consumers make healthful food 
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decisions at the point of purchase.  As opposed to back-of-pack la-
beling (Balasubramanian and Cole 2002), front-of-pack nutrition la-
bels that meet consumer heuristics influence food purchase behavior 
and may have positive health effects, given that consumption vol-
umes will not increase.
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Commitment to Virtuous Behaviors - How Self-Control Shapes Commitment to Near 
Versus Distant Behaviors 
Danit Ein-Gar, Tel Aviv University, Israel
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Virtuous behaviors are behaviors that people believe they ought 
to do, but might find them difficult (Ein-Gar, Goldenberg, & Sagiv, 
2013; Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). Understanding 
the effectiveness of requests to commit to virtuous behaviors is im-
portant theoretically and practically.
Past research suggests that activation of distant future mindset 
should encourage individuals to be more self-controlled, goal-driven 
in their behavior (e.g. Dhar & Kim, 2007; Fujita et al., 2006). Fur-
thermore research on choice between “should” and “want” shows 
that when the execution of the choice is in the distant future, people 
make more “should” (i.e., virtuous) choices than when execution 
of the choice is in the near future (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 
2010; Rogers & Bazerman, 2008).
This research suggests that contrary to past findings, consum-
ers may be less likely to commit to a distant- (as opposed to a near-) 
virtuous behavior. 
Temporal-construal-theory has laid the notion that distant future 
is construed more abstract while the near future is construed more 
concrete (Liberman, Sagristano & Trope 2002; Trope & Liberman, 
2003). In line with this notion, in the distant future, one’s schedule 
is construed abstractly, while in the near future, one’s schedule is 
construed more concrete.
Research on information processing suggests that abstract in-
formation makes people more optimistic regarding the outcome of 
their actions (Chan, Sengupta & Mukhopadhyay 2013). Thus, when 
individuals’ schedule is abstract, they might optimistically believe 
they will find spare time for a given action, and hence be more likely 
to commit to it. Conversely, research has shown that concrete infor-
mation provides more confidence of prediction (Camerer & Weber, 
1992). Thus, when individuals’ schedules are concrete, they may be 
more certain of finding the necessary time to carry out the action, and 
hence might be more likely to commit. 
This paper offers to reconcile these seemingly contradicting hy-
potheses by suggesting that commitment preference is dependent on 
one’s level of self-control.  
It is argued that low self-control consumers prefer committing 
to the distant future, not only because they are more likely to procras-
tinate, but also because in the future time is vague and this vagueness 
makes them feel more confident they will find the time to complete 
their commitment. High self-control consumers prefer committing to 
the near future hand, not only because they want to “check things off 
their list” but also because the near future is concrete and this gives 
them a sense of certainty that they will be able to identify the neces-
sary spare time.  
Study 1: Demonstrated the effect for commitment to pro-envi-
ronmental behavior. Student participants (n=60, MAGE=24) complet-
ed a self-control scale (DSC; α =.85; Ein-Gar et al., 2013; Ein-Gar 
& Steinhart, 2011), a filler task and then read about consumption of 
green products. Next, participants reported their willingness to hand 
out flyers encouraging consumption of green products, either the 
next semester (near-condition) or the next summer vacation (distant-
condition). As expected low self-control participants were more will-
ing to hand out flyers in the distant-future while high self-control par-
ticipants showed greater preference in the near future (F(1,57) =10.11, 
p<.02).
Study 2: Tested the effect for pro-social behavior, when self-
control is manipulated rather than measured. Adult participants 
(n=122, MAGE=28) were asked to recall an event in which they had 
overcome temptations, (high self-control condition) or had yielded to 
their temptations (low self-control condition). Next, participants read 
about a pro-bono project in which volunteers spend time with under-
privileged children. The project was expected to take place either 
next month (near-condition) or in 6 months (distant-condition). Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the number of hours they would be 
willing to volunteer. Low self-control participants volunteered more 
hours in the distant-future. High self-control participants volunteered 
more hours in the near-future (F(1,118) =14.08, p<.01). 
Study 3: Unravels the underlying effect of time availability cer-
tainty while testing commitment to a behavior with a personal bene-
fit. Adult participants (n=386, Mage=32) completed the DSC scale (α 
= .90) and were then offered to join a 10-session coaching program 
for attaining a financially goal either in two weeks (near condition) or 
four months (distant condition). Participants were asked to indicate 
their intention to commit to a 10-meeting program and to indicate 
how certain there are they would find the necessary time to uphold 
their commitment. Low-self-control participants were more willing 
to commit in the near- condition while high-self-control participants 
reported greater commitment intentions in the distant-condition 
(F(1,382) = 9.95, p < .01). Moderated mediation analyses showed that 
commitment was positively mediated by time availability certainty 
for low self-control participants (95% CI: 0.014 to 0.419) and was 
negatively mediated for high self-control participants (95% CI: 
-0.488 to -.02). 
REFERENCES
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in 
modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 325–370.
Chan, E., Sengupta, J., & Mukhopadhyay, A. (2013). The 
antecedents of anticipatory purchase: Reconciling the two 
routes to optimism. Journal of Consumer Research, 23 (1), 
90-105.
Dhar, R., & Kim, E. Y. (2007). Seeing the forest or the trees: 
Implications of construal level theory for consumer choice. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17(2), 96–100. 
Ein-Gar, D., & Steinhart, Y. (2011). The sprinter effect: When 
self-control and involvement stand in the way of sequential 
performance. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21, 240–255.
Ein-Gar, D., Goldenberg, J., & Sagiv, L. (2012). The role of 
consumer self-control in the consumption of virtue products. 
International Journal of Research Marketing, 29, 123-133.
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). 
Construal level and self-control. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 90(3), 351–367.
Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect 
of temporal distance on level of mental construal. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 38(6), 523–534.
Milkman, K. L., Rogers, T., & Bazerman, M. H. (2010). I’ll have 
the ice cream soon and the vegetables later. A study of online 
grocery purchases and order lead time. Marketing Letters, 
21(1), 17-35. 
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 581
Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Kalyanaraman, S. (1999). Mixing 
virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the 
diversification heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 12, 257-273.
Rogers, T. & Bazerman, M. H. (2008). Future lock-in: Future 
implementation increases selection of “should” choices. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
106(1), 1-20. 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. 
Psychological Review, 110(3), 403–421. 
582 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Staging the Museumspace: Overlapping Personal, Social, and Hedonic Experiences
Ada Leung, Pennsylvania State University at Berks, USA
Huimin Xu, The Sage Colleges, USA
Jessica Schocker, Pennsylvania State University at Berks, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A visit to museum is beyond receiving services from the staff 
or knowledge from browsing and reflecting on the experiences of 
interacting with the exhibits.  Instead, service encounters at the mu-
seum should be conceptualized as a theatrical experience, in which 
museum visitors pay to spend time enjoying a series of memorable 
events that the museum stages and to be engaged in an inherently 
personal way (Pine and Gilmore 2011).  So the question becomes, 
“What kinds of experiences do visitors look for and what do they 
find memorable?”  As with any cultural outing, visiting a museum 
involves the juxtaposing of personal experience with the exhibits 
(Goulding 2000; Joy and Sherry 2003), and social experience that 
often shared with friends or family members (Debenedetti 2003). 
Therefore, it becomes imperative to investigate how such seemingly 
ambivalent experiences are enjoyed simultaneously and reflected 
upon after the visit.  In this paper, we propose to examine personal, 
social and hedonic experiences of museum consumption, in particu-
lar, the experiences should also be studied in the social context of 
the companions.  The goal of the present study is to emphasize the 
overlapping nature of museum experiential consumption as well as 
the theoretical implications.  
Although museum visits can be considered as a typical service 
encounter, but the focus of this investigation, the social aspect of mu-
seum experience which includes the interactions between adults and 
children, has been different from what has been previously studied, 
and therefore lends itself to multi-method data collection, including 
six-month observation and visual image capturing of a community 
museum in the United States, 18 group exit interviews, seven ZMET 
interviews, and 32 narratives about personal and pupil field trips to 
the museum.
We present a model that depicts the overlapping nature of 
personal, social, and hedonic experiences that occur in the muse-
umspace, and, by extension, museumspace institutions.  Although 
personal experience is often conceptualized as the intrapersonal 
experiences between the cultural objects and the visitors, its effects 
and implications are often interpersonal and social in nature.  The 
very act of acquiring “new knowledge” from exposing oneself to the 
stimuli offered by museum exhibits can be considered as structur-
ing practices of the society.  Prior research has tended to frame such 
experiences as “embodied.”  However, such framing can mask im-
portant collective and hedonic aspects of museum going.  Social ex-
periences include pursuing for quality time, socializing to proper eti-
quette, and stocking up on cultural capital, have consequences in the 
strength of social relationships and one’s ranking in social standing. 
Visitors may navigate energetically or leisurely in the museumspace 
to engage themselves and their companions to pursue different types 
of experiences.  In today’s experience economy, the museumspace 
encompasses all four experience-realms, educational, entertainment, 
escapist, and esthetic (Pine and Gilmore 2011), which we suggest 
that they are largely emerge from the intersecting of both personal 
and social experiences.  Capturing aesthetic details of exhibits de-
scribes the intersection of the aesthetic based hedonic, personal, and 
social experience, in which visitors attempt to capture memorable 
events with images.  Meeting artists/curators describes the intersec-
tion of emotional based hedonic and social experience, in which visi-
tors overlap visual- and text-based experience with often emotion-
ally charged social interactions with the artists/curators.  Playing at 
staged edutainment describes the interaction of imaginative based 
hedonic and social experience, in which young visitors play to ex-
plore, learn, and be entertained with the interactive exhibits.
This research places consumer experiences at the center of con-
sumption phenomena and provides a typology of various types of 
experiences that are generated in the museumspace.  Our research is 
consonant with Joy’s (2003) contention that museum consumption 
is an embodied personal experience that includes both aesthetic and 
imaginative experience.  However, our work departs from Joy’s both 
in focus and contribution by showing how museum-based hedonic 
experiences overlap with both personal and social experiences, and 
in fact social experiences are not only the results but may be the 
driver for the enjoyment of museum-going (Debenedetti 2003).
Although our primary goal was the development of an emic un-
derstanding of visitors’ experiences of a community museum, through 
a systematic unpacking of informants’ accounts, we also discovered 
evidence of intersecting experiential consumption.  In particular, our 
informants’ tendencies towards engaging in different types of person-
al and social experiences were shaped by their level of cultural capital 
and types and the strength of social relations they are embedded in. 
Those experiences that relate to personal reflections and stocking up 
of cultural capital were evident among those with higher level of em-
bodied cultural capital.  In contrast, social interaction-based hedonic 
experiences are evident among those with school-age children in tow. 
In order to understand more fully the notion of experiential consump-
tion and its relationships with customer satisfaction and involvement, 
it is necessary to identify factors that increase the likelihood of gener-
ating memorable events for the visitors. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Despite the existence of several successful cute-looking prod-
ucts in the marketplace, such as the Volkswagen Beetle or the nu-
merous Hello Kitty accessories, it seems that marketers still prefer 
striving to create elegant-looking product designs built on aesthetic 
principles (e.g., symmetry and harmony, Kumar and Garg 2010), and 
are reluctant to incorporate cuteness into the designs of their prod-
ucts. Such reluctance may reflect an implicit assumption that cute-
looking product designs do not have any particular advantage over 
elegant-looking designs in driving product purchases.
In this research, we argue that the advantage of cute-looking de-
signs emerges when the focus of investigation is shifted from prod-
uct acquisition to retention. We posit that just as infants’ cuteness is 
conducive to sustaining their parents’ caretaking behaviors for a long 
time (Glocker et al. 2009; Morreall 1991), the advantage of cuteness 
in product design should be manifested in sustaining a close relation-
ship between a cute-looking product and its owner for a long period. 
We propose that, even when a cute-looking and an elegant-looking 
product design are perceived as equally attractive, the cute-looking 
one will induce a higher intent to retain the product.
Study 1 adopted a 2 (Product image: cute-looking versus ele-
gant-looking) X 2 (Mindset: high versus low ownership) between-
subjects design to test this hypothesis. As a stimulus, we used a T-
shirt featuring a cute-looking (versus an elegant-looking) dog image, 
and employed a customization (versus a choice) task to induce a high 
(versus a low) ownership mindset (Shu and Peck 2011). After cus-
tomizing (versus choosing) a T-shirt, participants (111undergraduate 
students, 54 females) indicated their willingness to keep the T-shirt. 
A product image X mindset interaction emerged (F (1, 107) = 3.28, 
p = .07). In the high ownership condition, participants were more 
willing to keep the cute-looking than the elegant-looking T-shirt (M 
’s = 6.22 versus 5.12; F (1, 107) = 7.60, p < .01), whereas this effect 
disappeared in the low ownership condition (p > .9). Study 1 hence 
provided initial evidence that when consumers experience a strong 
sense of psychological product ownership, a cute-looking product 
design elicits a higher intent to retain the product than does an ele-
gant-looking design. 
Study 2 adopted a (Product image: cute-looking versus elegant-
looking) X 2 (Mindset: ownership versus acquisition) between-sub-
jects design. This study used a different product category and a dif-
ferent ownership mindset manipulation to further extend the findings 
of Study 1 by showing that, compared to an elegant-looking product 
design, a cute-looking design induces only a higher intent to retain, 
but not to purchase, the product. Study 2 also aimed to provide evi-
dence for consumers’ caretaking motivation as explaining the reten-
tion advantage of cuteness. Participants (199 adults recruited online, 
89 females) evaluated either a cute-looking, panda-themed teapot or 
an elegant-looking, peacock-themed teapot. In the acquisition mind-
set condition, participants indicated their willingness to buy the tea-
pot. In the ownership mindset condition, participants completed a 
mental imagery task that simulated psychological ownership (Peck 
and Shu 2009) and then indicated their willingness to retain the tea-
pot. To test the underlying mechanism, we measured caretaking mo-
tivation with two items, “a desire to take care of/protect” the product 
(α = .93). There was a product image X mindset interaction (F (1, 
193) = 4.14, p < .05), with perceived attractiveness and anthropo-
morphism, which differed across the cuteness and elegance condi-
tions, as covariates. Extending the findings of Study 1, the results 
showed that participants were more willing to retain the cute-looking 
than the elegant-looking teapot (M ’s= 4.70 versus 4.28; F (1, 193) 
= 10.72, p < .001), whereas their purchase intentions for the two 
teapots did not differ (p > .6). A boostrap-based mediation analysis 
further confirmed that the advantage of cuteness over elegance on 
product retention was mediated by caretaking motivation (LL 95% 
CI = .01, UL 95% CI =.22).
In Study 3, we tested product category as a boundary condition 
for the retention advantage of cuteness. Due to the associations be-
tween elegant-looking designs and higher performance expectations 
(Orth, Campana, and Malkewitz 2010) and between baby-schema 
and weakness and vulnerability (Gorn, Jiang, and Gita 2008), peo-
ple might infer low performance from cute-looking designs, which 
should be particularly detrimental in product categories for which 
functional performance is the primary attribute used in product evalu-
ations (hereafter referred to as “functional” products). Therefore, we 
expect that for functional products, the advantage of cuteness over 
elegance on product retention will be reduced. Study 3 adopted a 2 
(Product image: cute-looking versus elegant-looking) X 2 (Product 
category: functional versus non-functional) between-subjects design, 
with a focus on intent to retain the product. Participants saw the im-
ages of either a cute-looking or an elegant-looking computer speaker. 
In the functional product condition, the speaker image was shown as 
is, whereas in the non-functional product condition the same speaker 
image was printed on a fridge magnet, with participants being told 
that they received the magnet as a gift from a company manufactur-
ing computer speakers. The procedure was similar to the one used in 
the ownership mindset condition of Study 2. Eighty undergraduates 
Table 1: A Summary of Empirical Results
Study Stimuli
Ownership 
Mindset 
Manipulation
Findings
Study 1 T-shirt
A 
customization 
task
--Participants were more 
willing to keep the cute-
looking T-shirt than the 
elegant-looking one only 
when they experienced 
a strong psychological 
product ownership.
Study 2 Teapots A mental imagery task
--Participants were more 
willing to retain, but not 
more willing to purchase, 
the cute-looking teapot 
than the elegant-looking 
one.
--Caretaking motivation 
mediated the effect of 
product image on product 
retention.
Study 3
Computer 
speakers, 
fridge 
magnets
A mental 
imagery task
--For functional products, 
the retention advantage 
of cuteness over elegance 
disappeared.
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(44 females) participated in the study. We found a product image X 
mindset interaction (F (1, 75) = 4.15, p < .05), with affective reaction, 
which differed across the cuteness and elegance conditions, as a co-
variate. When the product was non-functional (i.e., fridge magnets), 
we obtained the same pattern of results observed in the previous stud-
ies—specifically, participants were more willing to retain the cute-
looking rather than the elegant-looking product (M ’s= 4.50 versus 
3.21; F (1, 75) = 4.25, p <.05). In contrast, there was no difference 
in willingness to retain the product (p > .4) when the product was 
functional (i.e., speakers). The results support our hypothesis that the 
effect of cuteness on retention is reduced for functional products.
In summary, we show that although cute-looking product de-
signs enjoy no advantage over elegant-looking designs in stimulat-
ing purchase intentions, consumers are more willing to keep cute 
products when they own them. The cuteness advantage on product 
retention results from caretaking motivation and is absent in func-
tional products.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Traditional (e.g., microeconomic) views have presumed that the 
values or utilities people attach to various entities are fixed.  From 
this perspective, making a good decision requires a valid process for 
eliciting what those values are, which may be thought of as equiva-
lent to “looking up” fixed subjective utility measures in a registry. 
More recent behavioral decision research has largely displaced that 
presumption with one maintaining that valuation is a labile process. 
In particular, studies have indicated that decision makers’ value as-
sessments depend on a host of conditions that happen to be present 
at the time of elicitation (e.g., framing and the nature of the required 
decision; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1980; Hsee 1996; Slovic 
1995).  The resulting consensus has been that values are constructed 
on the spot, per existing conditions and demands.
The present research proposes that the valuation process is a 
dynamic one that extends beyond the incidental circumstances sur-
rounding a given decision situation.  The proposition we examine 
is that among the significant contributors to the values that drive 
people’s decisions are also particulars of their recollections of prior 
decisions.  Many real-life decision problems require the decision 
maker to make tradeoffs.  Thus, choosing Laptop A and therefore en-
joying its superior RAM would necessitate the pain of paying more 
than Laptop B’s lower price.  The specific hypothesis we examined 
is that recalling a prior tradeoff situation can reliably remind decision 
makers that one side of that tradeoff entailed the satisfaction of one 
value (e.g., for high processing speed), but the frustration of another 
value (e.g., for saving money).  Further, and critically, such recall is 
predicted to activate the frustrated values from their dormant states, 
thereby affecting decisions in current contexts that are irrelevant to 
the original tradeoff situations.
We investigated the dynamic nature of value and the possible 
processes underlying such value shifts across two studies. In the first 
study, 62 subjects participated online through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (cf. Goodman, Cryder and Cheema 2012).  Each subject was 
assigned randomly to one of three conditions in which the subject 
recalled and wrote about a time when s/he had: (1) a fast, but low-
quality, restaurant experience; (2) a slow, but high-quality, restaurant 
experience; or (3) any restaurant experience (i.e., control condition). 
Following this manipulation, each participant made a hypothetical 
purchase decision between two cameras.  One camera was superior 
on attribute dimensions commonly recognized as reflective of picture 
quality (megapixels and lens), and the other was superior on an at-
tribute conceptually associated with speed (shutter speed). Perceived 
camera knowledge was also measured, as having a better understand-
ing of the choice options would presumably make the tradeoff sacri-
fice more salient.   
Consistent with our hypothesis, results indicated that high-per-
ceived camera knowledge subjects in Condition 1 (fast/low-quality 
restaurant experience) were more likely than those in Condition 2 
(slow/high-quality restaurant experience) to choose the camera su-
perior on the frustrated tradeoff value dimension they recalled—
quality.  Also consistent with our prediction, high-perceived camera 
knowledge subjects in Condition 2 were more likely than those in 
Condition 1 to choose the camera superior on the value frustrated in 
the recalled tradeoff situation—speed (Table 1).  
One plausible explanation for why this value carryover occurred 
is that having a better understanding of the choice tradeoffs made the 
decision more difficult for high-perceived camera knowledge sub-
jects in Study 1.  This choice difficulty, in turn, increased choice and 
attribute tradeoff processing (see Bettman, Luce and Payne 1998, for 
Table 1: Major results from logistic regression analyses performed in Study 1 and Study 2
Study Description Statistics 
Study 1
Recall Group only model was non-significant. Adding Camera Knowledge as a 
covariate led to trending (p = .092) effect of Camera Knowledge that was moderated 
by a significant interaction between Recall Group and Camera Knowledge
Recall Group only: c2(2) = 0.32, 
p = .852; Recall Group x Camera 
Knowledge: c2(2) = 6.31, p = .043
Slow-High quality, as compared to Fast-Low quality, recall group was significantly 
more likely to choose the Fast Camera
b = 1.66, odds ratio (OR) = 5.25, z 
= 2.02, p = .044
Slow-High quality, as compared to Control, recall group was not significantly more 
likely to choose the Fast Camera
b = 1.17, OR = 3.22, z = 1.41, p = 
.160
Frustrated Value Carryover occurred for High Subjective, but not for Low Subjec-
tive, Camera Knowledge subjects
High: c2(2) = 9.16, p = .010; Low: 
c2(2) = 0.76, p = .683
Study 2
Train Choices affected by Recall Group when the Decision Task was Difficult (i.e., 
in the deep choice processing condition) c
2(2) = 6.76, p = .034
Frustrated Value Carryover from the recall occurred in the Difficult, but not in the 
Easy, choice processing condition
Difficult: c2(2) = 7.07, p = .029; 
Easy: c2(2) = 1.91, p = .384  
When the choice was more Difficult, the Slow-High quality, as compared to the 
Fast-Low quality, recall group was significantly more likely to choose the Fast Train
b = 1.19, OR = 3.19, z = 2.55, p = 
.011
When the choice was more Difficult, the Slow-High quality, as compared to the 
Control, recall group was marginally more likely to choose the Fast Train
b = 0.81, OR = 2.25, z = 1.79, p = 
.074
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a review).  To test this explanation, in a second study we predicted 
that inducing greater choice tradeoff processing through manipulat-
ing the difficulty of the decision would increase the attractiveness of 
the option with the frustrated value.  We also wanted to show that our 
effect generalizes to other contexts.  Two hundred and sixty six par-
ticipants were assigned randomly to one of three conditions in which 
the subject recalled and wrote about a time when s/he had: (1) a 
fast, but low-quality, doctor’s office experience; (2) a slow, but high-
quality, doctor’s office experience; or (3) any restaurant experience 
(i.e., control condition).  Following this manipulation, each partici-
pant made a hypothetical purchase decision between two trains trav-
eling between cities.  One train was superior on attribute dimensions 
commonly recognized as reflective of train quality (cleanliness, food 
service), and the other was superior on an attribute conceptually as-
sociated with speed (travel time). To determine if greater tradeoff 
processing is a factor underlying value carryover, we manipulated 
perceived difficulty of the train choice using a standard fluency par-
adigm (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz and Simonson 2007; Song and 
Schwarz 2008).  Participants were randomly assigned to view the 
train options in either an (1) easy to read font (i.e., Arial) or a (2) 
difficult to read font (i.e., Mistral).  
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants in the difficult-to-
read font condition, as compared to those in the easy-to-read font 
condition, were more likely to choose the option consistent with their 
frustrated value.  Specifically, those in the difficult decision condi-
tion who recalled the slow/high-quality doctor’s office experience 
were more likely than those in the easy and control conditions to 
choose the train that was superior on the frustrated tradeoff value di-
mension they recalled—speed.  Similarly, those in the fast/low-qual-
ity doctor’s office experience condition were more likely to choose 
the train superior on the value frustrated in the recalled tradeoff 
situation—quality (Table 1).  Thus, our findings suggest that greater 
tradeoff processing increased choices in favor of the frustrated value. 
Ongoing studies are investigating the mechanisms underlying this 
value shifting process, including the possible role that deprivation 
and satiation play in driving the observed carryover.  
The present findings lend credence to the fundamental idea in-
troduced in this new line of research, whereby the construction of 
value is subject to the systematic influences of prior value experi-
ences in contexts that are remote from the current decision situation, 
in both time and domain.  Specifically, in a decision situation involv-
ing difficult tradeoffs, frustrated values do not simply go away, but 
instead remain active and seek to be satisfied.  Subsequent, superfi-
cially distinct, decision situations represent opportunities to satisfy 
those frustrated values.  Current research is being directed toward the 
elaboration of further forces that affect value carryover in consumer 
contexts.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In The Experience Economy, Pine and Gilmore (1999) sug-
gest that service firms can use humor to create a competitive edge. 
A humorous approach to provision has been discussed in services 
as disparate as restaurants and accounting (Williams 2009; Michaud 
2000), and airline personnel have been explicitly encouraged to set 
up inflight gags (Woodyard 2004). Humor’s effects have been exam-
ined in advertising including that of services (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 
1998; Fugate et al. 2000; McCullough and Taylor 1993), with little 
investigation in other consumer contexts. We explore how two hu-
mor aspects—relevance (the degree to which a joke by a service pro-
vider is germane to the consumption purpose) and appropriateness 
(the acceptability or desirability of humor in a particular context), 
and their interplay—map onto service delivery. 
Relevant advertising humor generally outperforms irrelevant 
(Weinberger and Gulas 1992), but we believe in service contexts 
relevance might be assessed at two levels with different degrees of 
cognitive processing (Lovelock 1983). With few resources devoted 
to joke processing, heuristics should provide evaluation shortcuts 
(Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly 1989; Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann 
1983) and a joke may be considered relevant to a consumer’s pur-
pose if it simply shares surface feature overlap with the service (e.g., 
a joke set in a restaurant setting delivered by a waiter). However, 
when consumers devote significant effort to joke processing, evalu-
ation may occur at a deeper level (Chaiken et al. 1989; Petty et al. 
1983). Here, relevance may be judged more sophisticatedly, accord-
ing to diagnosticity of the joke’s deeper substance for current goals.  
Humor occurring in settings perceived as appropriate generally 
gives rise to more favorable reactions (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 1998; 
Fugate et al. 2000). This begs a follow-up: how service consumers 
determine humor to be (in)appropriate. Broad clues offered by ser-
vice advertising research suggest that humor may be more appro-
priate in less serious industries (bars, car washes, bowling alleys) 
than highly serious ones (tax or legal services) (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 
1998; Fugate et al. 2000; McCullough and Taylor 1993). Situational 
norms—highly accessible beliefs about how to behave in particular 
social situations or environments (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and Custers 
2003; Cialdini and Trost 1998)—aid in explaining this divergence. 
Norms may dictate that frivolous behavior is (in)appropriate in the 
(latter) former setting.  
Relevance and appropriateness have often been conceptually 
bundled in research on humor (Fugate 1998) under a general presump-
tion that (ir)relevant humor will be deemed (in)appropriate, but the 
unique contributions of each have not been well-documented. We pro-
pose that relevance and appropriateness are conceptually separable, 
with service settings offering a prime disentangling opportunity. One 
special consideration here is that humor is often a shared social experi-
ence, but exposure to advertising generally occurs in private (Gulas 
and Weinberger 2006)—an assumption pervasive in humorous ad-
vertising research methodologies. However, if a joke is experienced 
in a highly public service environment (e.g., with other patrons), the 
strong social setting may heighten the salience of appropriateness 
norms. Evidence that increasing focus on norms increases likelihood 
that they will affect thought and behavior (Cialdini, Reno, and Kall-
gren 1990; Jonas et al. 2008; Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000) leads 
us to believe that highly public humor would naturally lend itself to 
assessment of appropriateness in evaluation. At the same time, the 
strong social dimension of the setting may render a judgment of ap-
propriateness to be somewhat complicated, given the presence of both 
self and others, yielding multiple vantage points from which to assess 
the appropriateness of humor. Consideration may be given not only to 
whether the scenario is too serious for humor, but also to how others 
may respond (i.e., perspective taking; Abele and Wojciszke 2007; Da-
vis et al. 1996; Trotschel et al. 2011). Integrating one’s own humor per-
spective with others’ may be more challenging and require more effort 
than is required to consider one’s own assessment (Davis et al.1996). 
While the natural inclination in highly public humor settings may be to 
examine appropriateness, respondents may not always have the cogni-
tive resource availability to be capable of rendering these judgments. 
When mental resources are more constrained, a respondent may seek 
a less demanding means of evaluating the humor attempt (Chaiken et 
al. 1989; Petty et al. 1983). When a joke is told in a highly public ser-
vice context and a consumer has low cognitive resources available, we 
expect a joke with high relevance will produce more positive reactions 
than a joke with low relevance. 
Consistent with our theorizing, our study shows that, with high 
resources available, responses to a public joke varied with perceived 
appropriateness. In this situation, the complexity of assessing appro-
priateness from multiple perspectives could be managed. However, 
responses among those who had limited resources available (because 
of a TV distraction in the restaurant environment) depended on rele-
vance. These individuals reacted more favorably after hearing a joke 
that pertained to a restaurant than one that pertained to a fabric store 
or hearing no joke at all. Given the low levels of cognitive resources 
that were apparently devoted by these respondents, as evidenced in 
our multiple manipulation check measures, the restaurant setting 
presumably provided a simple and useful cue for evaluation. Our 
supplemental analyses of process support this interpretation. 
One important take away from our studies is that public humor 
consumption has key implications for the ways relevance and ap-
propriateness are deployed in determining reactions to humor. Thus, 
a theoretical contribution to consumer research exploring the effi-
cacy of humor is in exploring more public displays of humor than 
have been typical of marketing research on humor. In doing so, we 
add nuance to extant marketing-based humor theory. Our results sug-
gest a more sophisticated view of relevance and appropriateness and 
thereby contribute meaningfully to our understanding of humor in 
marketing settings. With respect to humorous advertisements, our 
results suggest a need to reconsider the roles of relevance and appro-
priateness when an ad is viewed in a public setting, such as during a 
World Cup or Super Bowl gathering.
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Table 1: Empirical Results*
TV No TV
Business Fun Business Fun
No Joke Fabric Rest No Joke Fabric Rest No Joke Fabric Rest No Joke Fabric Rest
Appropriateness 4.00(1.91)
2.56
(1.36)
2.57
(1.21)
3.18
(1.38)
4.38
(1.58)
5.22
(1.38)
3.69
(1.67)
2.47
(1.37)
2.69
(1.34)
3.22
(1.02)
5.00
(1.63)
4.57
(1.56)
Relevance 2.17(1.19)
2.34
(0.91)
3.53
(0.92)
2.50
(1.27)
2.56
(1.09)
3.63
(1.15)
2.56
(1.25)
2.59
(1.23)
3.38
(0.81)
2.42
(1.14)
2.69
(1.30)
3.47
(1.19)
Resources
index
2.50
(1.24)
2.53
(1.02)
2.73
(1.08)
2.91
(1.09)
2.13
(1.25)
2.53
(1.34)
4.11
(1.88)
4.76
(1.95)
4.16
(1.93)
4.03
(1.42)
3.94
(1.61)
3.73
(1.67)
Total thoughts 2.00(1.24)
2.63
(1.09)
2.80
(1.01)
3.06
(1.09)
2.19
(1.28)
2.56
(1.31)
4.11
(1.88)
4.82
(1.88)
4.25
(1.08)
4.11
(1.37)
4.00
(1.55)
3.87
(1.68)
Setting thoughts 0.08(0.29)
0.56
(0.73)
0.53
(0.52)
0.18
(0.39)
0.44
(0.51)
0.63
(0.62)
0.06
(0.24)
0.06
(0.28)
0.13
(0.34)
0.11
(0.32)
0.06
(0.25)
0.07
(0.26)
Diagnosticity
thoughts
0
(0)
0.06
(0.25)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0
(0)
0.06
(0.25)
0.06
(0.24)
0 
(0)
0.06
(0.25)
0.06
(0.24)
0.06
(0.25)
0
(0)
Interact quality 2.50(1.04)
2.92
(0.73)
3.33
(0.91)
2.47
(1.03)
2.75
(0.67)
3.69
(1.05)
3.78
(1.43)
2.51
(0.96)
2.71
(0.99)
3.28
(0.87)
4.96
(1.43)
4.84
(0.99)
Provider 
expertise
2.30
(1.09)
2.41
(0.79)
3.40
(1.02)
2.58
(1.09)
2.50
(0.67)
3.71
(0.89)
2.46
(1.08)
2.46
(0.70)
2.56
(0.95)
2.87
(1.21)
3.32
(0.78)
3.57
(0.80)
Provider
attitude
2.52
(0.91)
2.73
(0.92)
3.17
(1.12)
2.43
(1.07)
2.88
(0.79)
3.64
(0.88)
4.13
(1.11)
3.84
(0.94)
3.98
(0.96)
3.43
(1.15)
5.02
(1.15)
5.10
(0.80)
Provider
behavior
2.58
(1.04)
3.04
(0.73)
3.53
(0.76)
2.53
(1.11)
2.87
(0.86)
3.77
(0.97)
3.89
(1.35)
2.56
(0.96)
2.77
(1.03)
3.49
(0.84)
5.06
(1.28)
5.11
(0.76)
Tip 0.56(0.18)
0.61
(0.15)
0.70
(0.15)
0.54
(0.18)
0.61
(0.17)
0.73
(0.16)
0.74
(0.23)
0.56
(0.19)
0.61
(0.17)
0.67
(0.14)
0.94
(0.17)
0.91
(0.14)
*Mean (standard deviation)
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Introduction
Previous research on the social modeling of food intake has 
shown that individuals’ food consumption is strongly influenced by 
the food consumption of their eating companions, that is, individuals 
usually eat more when others eat more, and they eat less when oth-
ers eat less (e.g., Herman, Roth, & Polivy, 2003; Herman & Polivy, 
2005). In illustrating the basis for social modeling effects on food 
intake, Herman et al. (2003, p. 874) argue that “a significant concern 
for most people is to avoid eating excessively” and that “the intake 
of one’s eating companions, then, serves to establish a guideline indi-
cating how much one may eat without eating excessively”. 
A hypothesis that directly follows from this reasoning is that 
individuals should be more likely to follow social models in food in-
take when they are motivated to show socially appropriate behavior, 
follow social rules, and avoid inappropriate behavior than when they 
are less motivated to do so. Although this conclusion is reasonable, 
to our knowledge, research on this particular question has so far been 
missing.
In the present research, we address this gap and examine the 
moderating role of motivational orientations on the social modeling 
of food intake. Based on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 
1998, 2012), we assumed that individuals in a prevention focus, who 
regulate their behavior according to their responsibilities and duties 
and are driven by a fundamental desire to avoid inappropriate behav-
ior, are more likely to show social modeling effects in food intake, 
compared to individuals in a promotion focus, who tend to regulate 
their behavior according to their ideals, aspirations, and accomplish-
ments and are thus more likely to rely on their internal responses 
when determining their level of food consumption (Florack, Friese, 
& Scarabis, 2010; Pham & Avnet, 2004; 2009).
In two studies, we tested the strength of social modeling effects 
under different regulatory foci. In Study 1, a social model that was 
present consumed a high amount of food or did not consume food 
at all. In Study 2, the social model was not present; however, inci-
dental cues signaled that the model had consumed either a high or a 
low amount of food. In both studies, we expected the social model’s 
behavior to more strongly influence consumption of participants in 
a prevention focus, compared to consumption of participants in a 
promotion focus.
Study 1
The experimental study was conducted at a German and Aus-
trian University. 
We varied participants’ regulatory focus experimentally by in-
creasing the salience of ideals or hopes (promotion focus) or duties 
and responsibilities (prevention focus). Participants were then pro-
vided with palatable food (cookies) they were free to consume during 
the experiment. Moreover, each participant was paired with another 
participant, who served as a social consumption model. The assigned 
partner either received the instruction to eat freely, or not to eat at all. 
To test our hypothesis, we measured the absolute amount of cookies 
participants consumed as well as the degree of intake matching be-
tween target participants and the assigned partners.
Results show that, in line with our assumptions, participants in 
a prevention focus (but not participants in a promotion focus) aligned 
their own level of consumption with the level of consumption of their 
eating companion, regardless of whether the companion consumed 
a lot of food or no food at all. Thus, the results of Study 1 support 
our assumption that prevention-focused individuals, who are driven 
by a fundamental concern to make secure decisions and avoid inap-
propriate behavior, rely on the behavior of social model to determine 
the appropriate amount of food to consume. By contrast, promotion-
focused individuals seemed to have followed their internal responses 
to determine their own level of consumption.
Study 2
In Study 2 we took our assumption one step further by investi-
gating whether prevention-focused individuals rely on the consump-
tion behavior of a social model, even when the social model is no 
longer present, and its behavior is therefore less salient. We expected 
that, even in situations when the role model is not actually present, 
prevention-focused individuals maintain their motivation to disam-
biguate the ambiguous situation with respect to the appropriate food 
intake by relying on external cues such as visible leftovers of other 
participants’ consumption behavior.
Study 2 was conducted at a German University. We asked par-
ticipants to test and evaluate three different flavors of ice cream. 
Table 1 . Summary of Main Results (simple slope tests) for Study 1 and Study 2 . 
 Regulatory Focus Manipulation  
Promotion  Prevention  
 Consumption Condition Consumption Condition
Study 1 (N = 71)***
DV: Cookie  
Consumption (50g)
No Consumption 
Model Consumption Model  
No Consumption 
Model Consumption Model  
M SD M SD F M SD M SD F
15.39 g 14.85 g 10.44 g 12.13 g 1.71 4.17 g 5.24 g 14.06 g 10.86 g 6.81*
Study 2  (N = 40)***
DV: Ice Cream 
Consumption  (600g)
Low Consumption 
Cues
High Consumption 
Cues  
Low Consumption  
Cues
High Consumption 
Cues  
M SD M SD F M SD M SD F
116.67 g 51.20 g 158.38 g 47.50 2.19 67.60 g 81.31g 197.57 g 62.34 g 21.91**
*  p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .001
*** interaction: regulatory focus x consumption model significant at p ≤ .05
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Unlike in Study 1, participants did not observe the behavior of a 
physically present eating companion. Instead, when entering the lab, 
they saw the leftovers of an ostensible previous participant. Partici-
pants either saw three empty cups of ice cream (high-consumption 
model) or three cups of ice cream that were close to being full (low-
consumption model). We expected these subtle consumption cues 
to have a similar effect on the consumption behavior of prevention-
focused individuals as the food intake of an actually present eating 
companion. The results of Study 2 are in line with our assumptions 
and with the results of Study 1. Again, individuals in a prevention fo-
cus (but not individuals in a promotion focus) ate significantly more 
ice cream when provided with cues about a high-consumption model 
than when provided with cues about a low-consumption model.
Conclusions
The present research offers support for previous assumptions 
of Herman and colleagues (2003) that social modeling effects main-
ly occur because individuals have a fundamental concern to avoid 
eating excessively.  In two studies, we demonstrate that individu-
als who show a strategic inclination to avoid inappropriate behavior 
(individuals in a prevention focus), but not individuals who show 
a strategic inclination to approach advancement (individuals in a 
promotion focus) match their food consumption to that of a social 
model, regardless of whether the social model is actually present or 
not. Our results provide promising results that can help to increase 
the effectiveness of interventions that use social models to positively 
influence individuals’ eating behavior.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Despite the widespread use of acronyms in branding (e.g., 
IKEA, WWF), little is known in terms of how consumers perceive 
them. According to research on processing fluency, easy-to-
pronounce acronyms should render more positive evaluations of 
a brand than difficult-to-pronounce acronyms. This is because the 
ease of processing fluent information creates positive affect which 
is often misattributed to the target (Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz 
1998). In the present research, we argue that difficult-to-pronounce 
acronyms can be evaluated favorably with respect to attributes that 
are associated with social distance.
Our prediction is based on research that shows that disfluent 
stimuli are associated with physical distance and abstract construal 
(Alter and Oppenheimer 2008; Förster 2009). In a brand name 
context, we argue that the difficulty of processing a brand name 
elicits the impression that a brand is “distant” from the consumer. In 
turn, the brand is positively evaluated with respect to attributes that 
are representative of distant relations. This explanation is in keeping 
with research that suggests when people encounter information that 
is consistent with an existing mental representation, they are likely 
to “feel right” about the information, which subsequently heightens 
the evaluations of target information (e.g., Kim, Rao, and Lee 
2009; Higgins et al. 2003; Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004). 
Attributes that are associated with social closeness, on the other 
hand, are experienced as “unfit” with the distant representation of 
the brand, and therefore, are expected to be less positively evaluated 
compared to fluent brands. 
In study 1, we employed a 2 (fluency: fluent vs. disfluent) x 2 
(attribute type: close vs. far) within-subjects design. Participants were 
presented with a list of five-letter acronyms disguised as organization 
names. Intermixed in the list of acronyms were four acronyms that 
were pretested as being difficult to pronounce (e.g., CCDPC) and 
four acronyms that were pretested as being easy to pronounce (e.g., 
CATSA). Participants in the pretest indicated no prior knowledge 
of the acronyms. They were instructed to give their impressions of 
each organization on five attributes, two of which, were pretested 
as being representative of socially distant relations (i.e., competent, 
competitive) while the remaining three were pretested as being 
representative of socially close relations (i.e., approachable, warm, 
friendly). The “distant” and “close” attributes were pretested as 
being equally attractive qualities to a brand. Each attribute was 
presented as a seven-point scale in a fixed order for every acronym. 
A repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ attribute evaluations 
revealed close attributes were more positively evaluated when the 
acronym was fluent than disfluent, replicating classical findings 
in fluency research. However, attributes that were associated with 
distant relations were rated more positively when the acronym was 
disfluent than fluent.
In study 2, we adopted a 2 (fluency: fluent vs. disfluent) x 2 
(attribute type: close vs. far) mixed design with the latter factor 
as within-subjects variable. All participants were presented with a 
five-letter acronym that represented a home security company (i.e., 
A.C.A.A.F.). Participants in the disfluent condition saw the brand 
name alone, while those in the fluent condition were presented with 
a cue below the acronym that facilitated its pronunciation (i.e., 
[a-caf]). All participants were asked to give their impressions about 
the brand name on four attributes, two of which were pretested as 
being representative of socially distant relations (i.e., proficient, 
skilled) while the other two were pretested as being representative 
of socially close relations (i.e., loyal, caring). They were asked 
to evaluate the likelihood that the brand were to be reflect each 
description on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). 
After providing their attribute evaluations, participants were asked 
to indicate how attached they would become to the company if they 
were to become its customer (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). This 
measure was included to test whether disfluency (vs. fluency) created 
a sense of psychological distance which subsequently affected 
attribute evaluations of the brand. Finally, participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which they used their feelings to evaluate each of 
the attributes (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
A repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ attribute 
evaluations with fluency as a between-subjects factor revealed a 
significant interaction between attribute type and fluency. Once 
again, close attributes were more positively evaluated when the 
acronym was fluent than disfluent. Attributes that were associated 
with distant relations were rated as equally positive when the 
acronym was fluent or disfluent. A mediational analysis was 
conducted on the close attributes to confirm whether the difference in 
evaluations between the fluent and disfluent conditions was due to a 
difference in psychological distance. Disfluency negatively predicted 
the evaluations of close attributes as well as feelings of attachment 
or closeness to the home security company. When both feelings of 
psychological closeness and disfluency were included as predictors, 
the effect of disfluency on the evaluations of close attributes was 
significantly reduced, indicating that a difference in psychological 
closeness fully mediated the effect. For both the close and distant 
attributes, participants indicated that they used their feelings to 
a similar extent to evaluate the brand. This result suggests that a 
difference in processing styles (affective vs. cognitive) could not 
have explained the difference found in attribute evaluations.
Across two studies, we find that when a brand name is disfluent, 
individuals perceive the brand to be distant, which enhances the 
evaluations of matching attributes while lowering evaluations of 
mismatching attributes. Our findings have practical implications 
for brand positioning as well as theoretical implications for brand 
personality research (Aaker 1997). Whereas brand personalities such 
as competence can be promoted through disfluent communication, 
personalities such as sincerity are likely to become more salient 
through fluent communication.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The pursuit of happiness is one of the most fundamental of all 
human motives. This motive is often translated in the acquisition of 
hedonic products. Hedonic products offer fun, pleasure, cheerful-
ness and enjoyment (Chitturi, Raghunathan and Mahajan  2008). 
However, hedonic products fail to elevate happiness in the long run 
(Brickman and Campbell 1971; Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). 
The hedonic treadmill theory (Brickman and Campbell, 1971) argues 
that hedonic products do not offer a sustainable elevation of happi-
ness, despite consumers’ intentions. After purchase, consumers’ hap-
piness falls back to the baseline level. The hedonic treadmill theory 
sketches a fatalistic image: consumers pursue happiness through he-
donic consumption, but fail to do so in the long run. Our research 
shows that hedonic products are bought for purposes of immediate 
gratification. Consumers do not want to elevate their long term hap-
piness and they anticipate the hedonic fallback. 
Additionally, we want to demonstrate how utility affects length 
of ownership of hedonic versus functional products. If hedonic prod-
ucts are bought to meet short term goals, the utility derived from it 
should be in the near future. The deceleration rate of benefits should 
be steeper and this should determine the duration of ownership.
Overall, we argue that consumers buy hedonic products for pur-
poses of immediate gratification which results in a shorter period of 
ownership. However, time-perspectives may shift. Hedonic products 
demand more resources, which bolsters guiltiness (Khan, Dhar, and 
Wertenbroch 2005). Guilt is correlated with risk aversion (Mancini 
and Gangemi 2004) and risk aversion supports the acquisition of in-
surances, or extended service contracts (ESC). ESC’s extend a prod-
uct’s lifetime.  So, paradoxically despite a shorter period of owner-
ship guiltiness fosters the acquisition of an ESC which extends the 
lifetime of a product.  
Study 1 was conducted online using MTurk  (N = 119, mean 
age 35.27 years, 42% were male, US-residents). Participants had 
to indicate how long they anticipated keeping either 10 hedonic or 
10 functional products. Pretests indicated that the hedonic products 
were more hedonic (F(1,58) = 59.33, p < 0.001), and the functional 
products more functional (F(1,58) = 37.79, p < 0.001). All partici-
pants answered on a scale how fast they think people will replace the 
product (1 very late; 7 very soon) and how long people will keep the 
product before disposing it (1 very short; 7 very long). We reverse 
coded the second question and averaged with the first question (r = 
0.72, p < 0.001). The results show that utilitarian products are kept 
longer than hedonic products (F(1,12) = 18.98, p < 0.001).
In the second study we held the product constant, but manip-
ulated the motivation to buy a bike. Seventy-seven undergraduate 
students (mean age 20.56 years, 63% were male) from a European 
university completed the study. Participants were asked to imagine 
that they bought a bike to practice their beloved hobby (= hedonic) 
or as a transportation device to go to work (= functional). They rated 
the former condition as more hedonic (F(1,75) = 140.14, p < 0.001). 
Also, they expected having more fun with the bike to practice their 
hobby (F(1,75) = 13.89, p < 0.001). In both conditions they equally 
liked riding a bike (F(1,75) = 2.41, p = 0.13). Again, the participants 
anticipated keeping the functional bike longer than the hedonic bike 
(F(1,75)=10.31, p < 0.001).
To test if the deceleration rate of utility accounts for anticipated 
duration of ownership, we asked how they perceived the evolution of 
the benefits (1 very little; 7 very much) associated with the product 
over a time horizon (at the time of purchase, half year, a year, a year 
and half and two year after the purchase (fig 1). 
Figure 1: Evolution of benefits
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that participants assigned 
more utility to the functional bike (F(1,75) = 27.75, p < 0.001). Ad-
ditionally, an interaction effect shows a steeper deceleration rate 
for hedonic products (F( 1,75) = 47.46, p < 0.001). Furthermore 
we calculated the area under the curve (AUC) for each participant. 
Mediation analysis reveals a significant total effect of the hedonic 
versus functional condition on length of ownership (t(76)=3.21, p 
< 0.001). Further, when controlling for AUC the direct effect disap-
pears (t(76)=1.56, p = 0.120), and AUC turns up as a better predictor 
(t(76) = 2.51, p < 0.05). Lastly, AUC is smaller in the hedonic condi-
tion (t(76) = 5.19, p < 0.001). Therefore, we conclude that a different 
deceleration rate of utility accounts for the length of ownership for 
hedonic versus functional products.
For the third study we used the same scenario as in the second 
study. However, instead of asking about duration of ownership the 
respondents were offered an ESC which costs 15% of the purchase 
price. The ESC comprised multiple maintenance services which 
extend the product-lifetime. Eighty-seven undergraduate students 
(mean age 20.87, 47% were male) from a European university com-
pleted the study and received partial course credit. 
The hedonic bike was rated as more hedonic (F(1,76)=83.34, 
p<0.001), and participants expected have more fun with this bike 
(F(1,76)=5.48, p=0.020). Across both conditions the respondents 
equally liked riding their bike (F(1,76)=2.01, p=0.159). Finally, the 
participants reported that it would be more likely that they would buy 
an ESC for the hedonic bike (F(1,76)=3.86, p=0.050).
Our results support the idea that hedonic products are bought to 
meet short time goals. Additionally, hedonic products are kept for a 
shorter period of time because the benefits evaporate faster. These re-
sults challenge the idea that consumers buy hedonic products to ele-
vate their long term happiness. Instead, we show that hedonic products 
are bought for purposes of immediate gratification. However, hedonic 
products bolster feelings of guilt which may alter time-perspectives. 
Feelings of guilt activate risk aversion, which results in the acquisition 
of ESC’s. Paradoxically, an ESC extends the lifetime of a product.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Immeasurable in richness and overwhelming in immensity, the 
scale of New Media is of the grandest kind. To manage the deluge 
of incoming information and the trove of existing content, New Me-
dia firms rely on user generated ratings to optimize browsing and 
enhance search (Huberman, Romero, and Wu 2009). Users’ “Likes” 
and “Dislikes” for stylish clothing and entertaining videos enable 
firms such as Threadless, Amazon, and Netflix to manage their con-
tent as well as recommend products based on similarities between 
users’ history of preference ratings (Balabanovic and Shoham 1997). 
Understanding what motivates people to express their preferences 
by liking and disliking products and content online has important 
implications for New Media.
Although users have social motives of sharing their preferences 
(Back et al. 2010; Gosling, Gaddis, and Vazire 2007; Toubia and Ste-
phen 2013) and instrumental incentives of customizing their brows-
ing experience when they express their preferences online (Her-
locker et al. 1999; Herlocker, Konstan, and Riedl 2000), we propose 
that people evaluate their preferences for another reason – the feel-
ing of learning about their own preferences.  Specifically, we posit 
that people undergo a process of self-discovery when they express 
their preferences, and they derive an inherent sense of pleasure from 
this self-discovery process. As such, the more people feel they are 
learning about their preferences, the greater the pleasure they experi-
ence from liking and disliking. Moreover, relative to other judgment 
tasks not involving evaluating one’s preferences, liking and disliking 
evokes the highest enjoyment.
Using T-Shirts from an online retailer as stimuli, Study 1 mea-
sures people’s expectation of the enjoyment in evaluating their pref-
erences (liking vs. disliking) against four sets of non-preference 
related judgments about clothing, such as gender appropriateness 
(for males vs. for females), age appropriateness (for adults vs. for 
children), or price estimation (cheap vs. expensive). Against any 
combination of the non-preference related alternative tasks within 
the four sets, the task of liking and disliking is always perceived to 
be the most fun, suggesting that people are motivated to express their 
“Like” and “Dislike” online because of an inherent pleasure in as-
sessing their preferences (F(3, 75) = 8.17; F(3, 75) = 14.99; F(3, 75) 
= 10.22; F(3, 75) = 8.48, all p’s < .01).
Studies 2 and 3 manipulate the feeling of learning to test the 
proposed mechanism underlying the fun of preference evaluation. In 
a series of pairwise comparisons between a base shirt, T-Shirt X, and 
nine alternative shirts, T-Shirts A through I, respondents are induced 
either to feel they are learning more about their preferences in T-
Shirts or learning less through a framing manipulation of asymmetric 
comparisons. Specifically, asymmetric comparison is visually ma-
nipulated through a boxed frame around the target shirt and seman-
tically manipulated through the instructions. In the Focus on Base 
condition, the base shirt (T-Shirt X) serves as the target and the nine 
alternative shirts (T-Shirts A through I) act as the reference points, 
which generates a feeling of learning about T-Shirt X again and again 
for each comparison (e.g., How much do you like X vs. A? X vs. B? 
X vs. C?). Conversely, in the Focus on Alternatives condition, the 
nine alternative shirts serve as the target and the base shirt becomes 
the reference point, which creates a feeling of learning about many 
different shirts (e.g., How much do you like A vs. X? B vs. X? C vs. 
X?). Results reveal greater enjoyment when respondents feel they 
are learning about nine different shirts (Focus on Alternatives condi-
tion) than when they feel like they are learning about the base shirt 
repeatedly in the Focus on Base condition (F(1, 90) = 4.18, p = .04). 
Moreover, the manipulation check confirms that respondents feeling 
they are learning about T-Shirt X repeatedly have a higher recall rate 
(F(1, 90) = 5.74, p = .02) and are more confident in their final assess-
ment of T-Shirt X at the end of the experiment (F(1, 90) = 4.03, p = 
.05), suggesting that it is possible to learn more about the T-Shirts in 
the stimuli beyond one or two exposures.  
Using a similar design of asymmetric comparison, Study 3 rep-
licates the findings of Study 2 with a new stimulus and addresses 
a potential confound of boredom. In particular, the new stimuli re-
place T-Shirts with letters of the English alphabet, since past work 
demonstrates that people can form preferences for symbols (Zajonc, 
1968). More importantly, a second factor of a non-preference related 
task about the positioning in the alphabet (e.g. Which letter is further 
along the alphabet?) is introduced as a baseline measure to account 
for any boredom potentially caused by the asymmetric comparison 
manipulation. The 2 (Focus: Focus on Base vs. Focus on Alterna-
tives) x 2 (Task: Preference evaluation vs. Order of letters) between-
subjects experiment finds a significant two-way interaction, in which 
higher feelings of learning (Focus on Alternatives) induce more fun 
than lower feelings of learning (Focus on Base) within preference 
evaluation, but the asymmetric comparison yields no difference of 
Focus within the non-preference related control condition of posi-
tioning in the alphabet (F(1, 302) = 6.62, p = .01). Additionally, the 
process measure of the feeling of learning reveals a similar Focus x 
Task interaction (F(1, 302) = 3.60, p < .06). 
In all, people not only expect liking and disliking to be more 
enjoyable than other judgment tasks, but their source of fun origi-
nates from a feeling of learning about their preferences. By manipu-
lating the feeling of preference learning with two different stimuli, 
our results reveal that people who feel they learned more about their 
preferences have more fun than people who feel they learned less. 
The motivation behind expressing one’s likes and dislikes bears rele-
vance to New Media firms, which rely upon preference ratings as the 
basis for collaborative filtering, content management, and consumer 
customization. Although there are social and instrumental motives 
to submitting Likes and Dislikes online, people may also derive an 
inherent pleasure in evaluating their preferences due to the feeling of 
self-discovery associated with learning about their preferences. 
REFERENCES
Back, Mitja D., Juliane M. Stopfer, Simine Vazire, Sam Gaddis, 
Stefan C. Schmukle, Boris Egloff, and Samuel D. Gosling 
(2010), “Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual Personality, Not 
Self-Idealization,” Psychological Science, 21 (3), 372-74.
Balabanovic, Marko and Yoav Shoham (1997), “Fab: Content-
based, Collaborative Recommendation,” Communications of 
the ACM, 40 (3), 66-72.
Gosling, Samuel D., Sam Gaddis, and Simine Vazire (2007), 
Personality Impressions Based on Facebook Profiles, In Proc 
International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media.
596 / The Feeling of Learning and the Joy of Liking
Herlocker, Jonathan L., Joseph A Konstan, Al J. Borchers, 
and John Riedl (1999), “An Algorithmic Framework for 
Performing Collaborative Filtering,” in Proceedings of the 
22nd International Conference on Research and Development 
in Information Retrieval, Berkeley, CA: Association for 
Computer Machinery.
Herlocker, Jonathan L., Joseph A Konstan, and John Riedl (2000), 
“Explaining Collaborative Filtering Recommendations,” 
in Proceedings of the 2000 ACM Conference on Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work, Philadelphia,PA: Association 
for Computer Machinery.
Huberman, Bernardo A., Daniel M. Romero, and Fang Wu (2009), 
“Crowdsourcing, Attention and Productivity,” Journal of 
Information Science, 35 (6), 758-65.
Toubia, Olivier and Andrew T. Stephen (2013), “Intrinsic Versus 
Image-Related Motivations in Social Media: Why Do 
People Contribute Content to Twitter?” Marketing Science, 
forthcoming.
Zajonc, Robert B. (1968), “Attitudinal Effects Of Mere Exposure,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (2), 1–27.
597 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
The Moderating Role of Numeracy in the Effectiveness of Cause-Related Marketing
Janet Kleber, University of Vienna, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria
Anja Chladek, University of Vienna, Austria
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Cause-related marketing (CRM) is a well-known selling strat-
egy to improve the success of a product by including a donation to 
a charitable cause into the product price (Varadarajan, & Menon, 
1988). The effectiveness of CRM depends on several factors such 
as the type and the selling price of the product. Particularly, CRM 
is usually more effective in hedonic products than in utilitarian ones 
(Strahilevitz, 1999; Strahilevitz & Myers, 1998) and it works better 
in low-priced products (Chang, 2008). Research has also shown that 
CRM is often more successful when the amount of the charitable 
contribution is provided in absolute amounts (i.e., X Euro of the sell-
ing price) than in percentages (Chang, 2008). This effect occurs even 
though the donation amount in these different presentation formats 
is equal. 
A prerequisite to perceive the actual donation amount in each 
presentation format might be sufficient numerical ability (i.e., nu-
meracy). Individual differences in numeracy influence the compre-
hension of numerical information, including the transformation of 
frequencies, percentages and probabilities into each other (Peters et 
al., 2006; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). Accordingly, the presentation of 
numerical information either in frequencies or in percentages chang-
es the meaning of these numbers for less numerate individuals, but 
does not influence evaluations of higher numerate individuals (for 
an overview see Peters, 2012). For example, individuals with lower 
numeracy were willing to donate more if the victim is presented in 
a frequency format (i.e., 1 out of 100 vs. 1% out of 100), whereas 
higher numerate individuals are not affected by the format (Dickert, 
Kleber, Peters, & Slovic, 2011). Therefore, we expect that numeracy 
moderate the effect of presentation formats on CRM effectiveness. 
Particularly, we hypothesize that people with less numeracy are in-
fluenced by the presentation format of the donation amount, whereas 
the effectiveness of CRM is not affected by different presentation 
formats for higher numerate individuals.
In two experiments, we manipulated the presentation format 
between-subjects by showing the donation amount of the sales price 
either in absolute amounts (absolute condition: “X Euro of the selling 
price will be donated”) or in percentages (percentage condition: “X% 
of the selling price will be donated”). Numeracy was assessed with 
an objective questionnaire, which measures the understanding of fre-
quencies and percentages (Peters et al., 2007). To examine whether 
the predicted interaction between numeracy and presentation format 
depends on product type and selling price, the product type (hedonic 
vs. utilitarian) and the selling price (low vs. high) were also manipu-
lated in both experiments. 
In Experiment 1 (N = 56), we used a 2 (presentation format: 
absolute vs. percentage) x 2 (price level: low vs. high) x 2 (product 
type: hedonic vs. utilitarian) mixed-factorial design with numeracy 
as additional continuous predictor. Participants evaluated hedonic 
and utilitarian products with low and high selling prices regarding 
their willingness to purchase and their attractiveness. To test our hy-
pothesis, we conducted a repeated measures regression with prod-
uct type and price level as within-subjects factors and presentation 
format and numeracy as between-subjects factors. As dependent 
variable, we combined willingness to purchase and attractiveness 
ratings into one CRM effectiveness scale. The results support the 
predicted interaction between numeracy and the presentation format. 
Particularly, less numerate individuals evaluated CRM as more ef-
fective if the donation amount is presented in absolute amounts than 
in percentages, whereas no difference was found for higher numerate 
individuals. This interaction was independent of the product type.
Experiment 2 (N = 118) was designed to replicate our findings 
regarding the interaction between numeracy and the presentation for-
mat of the donation. In contrast to Experiment 1, we examined the 
same hedonic and utilitarian products by describing their purpose 
differently and therefore manipulate product type between-subjects. 
In addition, we considered the attitude towards helping others as a 
covariate (Koschate-Fischer, Stefan, & Hoyer, 2012). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects condi-
tions (presentation format x product type) and evaluated products of 
low and high prices. In this experiment we replicated the interaction 
of numeracy and presentation format with better evaluations of the 
absolute donation amounts for less numerate individuals and no ef-
fect for participants with higher numeracy. Neither the products’ type 
nor the selling price affected this interaction.
Both experiments consistently showed that the effect of presen-
tation formats on CRM effectiveness depends on individual differ-
ences in numerical abilities of the consumer. As hypothesized, less 
numerate individuals evaluated absolute donations as more effective 
than percentages, whereas evaluations of higher numerate individu-
als were not influenced.  Furthermore, we found that this interaction 
was independent of the product type. Accordingly, in the conception 
of CRM campaigns it should be considered that presenting donations 
in percentages requires sufficient numeracy to easily comprehend the 
absolute donation amount correctly. Therefore, presenting absolute 
donation amounts should be preferred over percentages in all types 
of products. In general, this research demonstrates that individual 
differences can result in differential evaluations of the same CRM 
campaign and should be considered in its conception.
REFERENCES
Chang, C. T. (2008). To donate or not to donate? Product 
characteristics and framing effects of cause-related marketing 
on consumer purchase behavior. Psychology & Marketing, 25, 
1089-1110. 
Dickert, S., Kleber, J., Peters, E., & Slovic, P. (2011). Numeric 
ability as a precursor to pro-social behavior: The impact 
of numeracy and presentation format on the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying donations. Judgment and Decision 
Making, 6, 638-650. 
Koschate-Fischer, N., Stefan, I. V., & Hoyer, W. D. (2012). 
Willingness to pay for cause-related marketing: The impact of 
donation amount and moderating effects. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 49, 910-927.  
Peters, E. (2012). Beyond comprehension: The role of numeracy in 
judgments and decisions. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 21, 31-35. 
Peters, E., Dieckmann, N., Dixon, A., Hibbard, J. H., & Mertz, C. 
K. (2007). Less is more in presenting quality information to 
consumers. Medical Care Research and Review, 64, 169-190. 
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, 
K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy and decision making. 
Psychological Science, 17, 407-413. 
598 / The Moderating Role of Numeracy in the Effectiveness of Cause-Related Marketing
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (2008). Numeracy, ratio bias, and 
denominator neglect in judgments of risk and probability. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 18, 89-107. 
Strahilevitz, M. (1999). The effects of product type and donation 
magnitude on willingness to pay more for a charity-linked 
brand. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 8, 215-241. 
Strahilevitz, M., & Myers, J. (1998). Donations to charity as 
purchase incentives: How well they work may depend on what 
you are trying to sell. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 
434-446. 
Varadarajan, P. R., & Menon, A. (1988). Cause-related marketing: A 
coalignment of marketing strategy and corporate philanthropy. 
Journal of Marketing, 52, 58-74. 
599 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Cognitive Motivation and Its Impact on Price Cognition
Mehdi Tanzeeb Hossain, The University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Ritesh Saini, The University of Texas at Arlington, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As defined by Cacioppo and Petty (1982), need for cognition 
(NFC) refers to individuals’ tendency of engaging in effortful think-
ing. Tenets of dual process theory invoke that low NFC individu-
als are likely to exert greater use of system 1 processing which is a 
more affect based and automatic system for information processing 
(Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). However, effortful think-
ing can enhance certain biases and individuals with high NFC are 
likely to show such biases more often than individuals with low 
NFC. For example, high NFC individuals are found to show greater 
false memories (Graham 2007) and similar to low NFC individuals, 
high NFC individuals are also found to show halo effects (Petty et 
al. 2009) and anchoring effects (Blankenship et al. 2008). In align-
ment with such research demonstrating the counter intuitive fact that 
thoughtful individuals may also make errors in judgment and deci-
sion making, in this research we demonstrate that high NFC indi-
viduals are more likely to make errors in price cognition than low 
NFC individuals. Marketers often offer products at a price that is 
just below a round number to make an impression to the consumers 
that the product is offered at a cheaper price or on sale (Schindler 
and Kirby 1997). While there is apparently no difference between 
$4.00 and $3.99, consumers perceive the latter as a lower price. The 
magnitude of such price perception is substantial enough to generate 
additional sales (Kalyanam and Shively 1998). Even though research 
has shown that it is an error emanating from incomplete process-
ing of pricing information (Thomas and Morwitz 2005), scant at-
tention has been paid to explore the impact of consumers’ tendency 
to think effortfully on their tendency of making such errors in price 
cognition. This research fills in this gap by demonstrating that indi-
viduals who exert greater degree of effortful thinking are more likely 
to make errors in price cognition relative to individuals who do not 
enjoy effortful thinking. Moreover, we found that effortful thinking 
leads to overreaction to free offers. We reasoned that high NFC in-
dividuals are more likely to be driven by maximization goals rather 
than satisficing goals (Nenkov et al. 2008; Cacioppo and Petty 1982) 
and such maximization tendency will enhance the attractiveness of 
a price point that provides a discount cue. In our context, we posit 
that the low price perception induced by JBP enhances the feasibil-
ity of goal achievement (i.e, best shopping outcome) for high NFC 
individuals and therefore, such price points are evaluated as more 
attractive by such group of individuals. As a consequence, effortful 
thinkers, often driven by the maximizing goal, are more likely to be 
deceived by JBP than effortless thinkers. Similarly, greater degree of 
effortful thinking may enhance the perception that a free offer gives 
them an opportunity of maximizing their shopping value by eliminat-
ing price constraints. 
Study 1 was conducted to test our key thesis. Respondents were 
asked to imagine that a new ice-cream store was to be opened in their 
locality which wanted to know consumers’ price perception of cer-
tain items. They were given the picture of a hot fudge sundae with its 
price mentioned either as $3.99 (nine ending condition) or as $4.00 
(zero ending condition). Respondents indicated their price percep-
tion on a seven point semantic differential scale indicating whether 
the price of the item was high. We implied a regression analysis 
where the dependent variable was the price perception and indepen-
dent variables were the price conditions, NFC and their interaction. 
The results indicated a significant interaction effect (β= .739; p<.05) 
of price conditions and NFC showing that high NFC individuals per-
ceived the price to be significantly lower in the nine ending condi-
tion (M=5.27) than in the zero ending condition (M=3.77) whereas 
the low NFC individuals didn’t show any variation of price percep-
tion across conditions (M= 4.00 vs. M=3.86). A spotlight analysis at 
one standard deviation above the mean of NFC showed a significant 
difference such that high NFC individuals perceived the price to be 
significantly lower in the nine ending condition than in the zero end-
ing condition. A similar spotlight analysis at one standard deviation 
below the mean of NFC did not show a significant difference in price 
perception across the two conditions. Moreover, a mediation analysis 
was conducted following the Zhao et al. (2010) procedure where the 
attractiveness rating of price was the mediating variable. The 95% 
bootstrap confidence interval ranges from .0313 to .8415 and we 
found evidence of a complementary mediation. 
Study 2 and 3 were conducted to replicate findings from study 
1. In these studies we had introduced a reference option along with 
the target product. The purpose was to see how the price percep-
tion of the target category (sundae) varies due to the price ending 
in presence of a reference category. A regression analysis revealed 
a significant interaction effect (β= .717; p<0.01) indicating that high 
NFC individuals showed greater degree of price ending bias (M3.99= 
2.409 vs. M4.00= .720) than the low NFC individuals (M3.99= 1.0 vs. 
M4.00= 1.1). Similar results were obtained in study 3 using a cogni-
tive efficiency measure proposed by Frederick (2005). Results indi-
cated that cognitive efficiency enhances the nine ending bias. Study 
4 was conducted to replicate the findings by situationally manipulat-
ing thoughtfulness rather than using chronic measures. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to high thoughtful and low thoughtful con-
ditions. A significant interaction effect revealed that respondents in 
the high thoughtful condition showed significantly lower price per-
ception (M= 4.52) in the nine ending condition than in the zero end-
ing condition (M = 3.34) while respondents in the low thoughtfulness 
condition did not show any difference across price conditions (M= 
4.41 vs. M =4.36) (F 1,160 = 4.688; p<.05). In study 5, we extend our 
investigation of the impact of effortful thinking on price cognition to 
the context of free promotions (Shampanier et al. 2007).  A logistic 
regression analysis indicated a significant interaction effect (β= .353; 
p<0.05) showing that individuals in the high thoughtfulness condi-
tion showed greater degree of zero price effect than individuals in the 
low thoughtfulness conditions. 
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Table 1: Summary 
Analysis Results Findings
Study 1
Regression analysis: DV= price 
perception, IV1= price condi-
tions ($3.99 vs $4.00),IV2= 
NFC
a significant interaction effect 
(β= .739; p<.05) of price con-
ditions and NFC
high NFC individuals perceived the price to be signifi-
cantly lower in the nine ending condition (M=5.27) than 
in the zero ending condition (M=3.77) whereas the low 
NFC individuals didn’t show any variation of price per-
ception across conditions (M= 4.00 vs M=3.86)
Study 2
Regression analysis: DV= dif-
ference in price perception, 
IV1= price conditions ($3.99 
vs $4.00),IV2= NFC
a significant interaction effect 
(β= .717; p<0.01) between 
price conditions an NFC
the difference in price perception was significantly high-
er in the nine ending condition (M= 2.409) than in the 
zero ending condition (M= .720) for high NFC individu-
als. For low NFC individuals no such difference was evi-
dent (M=1.0 vs M=1.01) across conditions
Study 3
Regression analysis: DV= dif-
ference in price perception, 
IV1= price conditions ($3.99 
vs $4.00),IV2= CRT
a significant interaction effect 
between price conditions and 
CRT (β= .422; p=.018)
individuals scoring high on CRT showed significantly 
greater difference in price perceptions in the nine ending 
condition (M= 1.882) relative to the zero ending condi-
tion (M= 1.01) while individuals scoring low on CRT 
didn’t show any difference in price perceptions across 
conditions (M= 1.25 vs M= 1.11). 
Study 4
ANOVA: DV= difference 
in price perception, IV1= 
price conditions ($3.99 vs 
$4.00),IV2= thoughtfulness 
conditions
a significant interaction ef-
fect between price conditions 
and thoughtfulness (F 1,160 = 
4.688; p<.05).
respondents in the high thoughtfulness condition showed 
significantly lower price perception (M= 4.52) in the 
nine ending condition than in the zero ending condition 
(M = 3.34) while respondents in the low thoughtfulness 
condition did show any difference across price condi-
tions (M= 4.41 vs M =4.36)
Study 5 Regression analysis
a significant interaction effect 
(β= .353; p<0.05) of price con-
ditions and thoughtfulness
the choice share of the low value option went up from 
42% in the cost condition to 75% in the free condition 
for the high thoughtfulness group, showing a significant 
zero price effect (β=.331; p<0.01). For the low NFC 
group the choice share of the low value option barely 
increased from 61% in the cost condition to 63% in the 
free condition (β= .023; p>.8)
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Cultures appear to differ in the degree to which they nurture 
personalized versus socialized power concepts (Torelli and Shavitt 
2010). European Americans seem more likely to conceptualize 
power as something to be used for advancing one’s personal agenda, 
and obtaining praise and admiration from others (i.e., a personalized 
power concept). In contrast, Hispanics appear more likely to foster 
a view of power as something to be used for helping and benefitting 
others (i.e., a socialized power concept). However, little is known 
about the role of social norms in carrying and reinforcing such cul-
tural patterns. We address this issue in the current research. 
Social norms are a central concept in the study of human social 
behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and the study of cultures (Tri-
andis 1995, 1996). The term norm can refer to what is commonly 
done by people in a group (i.e., descriptive norms) or to conduct that 
commonly earns approval or disapproval (i.e., injunctive norms). 
Although what is approved is typically what is done, descriptive 
and injunctive norms are conceptually and motivationally distinct 
(Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). This distinction seems particu-
larly relevant when discussing the norms applied to power-holders. 
We propose that descriptive and injunctive norms applied to power-
holders will not necessarily correspond. Because self-centered pow-
er-holders have the potential to negatively impact those around them 
by maximizing their personal gain at the expense of others’, societ-
ies that foster a personalized view of power should fear the conse-
quences of excessive power that goes unchecked. This is evident in 
the political system of checks and balances contained in the Ameri-
can Constitution—aimed at assuring fairness in the use of power by 
the different branches of government. Thus, mainstream European 
Americans, because they are seen as more strongly embodying North 
American culture (Devos and Banaji 2005), may be especially likely 
to apply injunctive norms of fairness when judging the interactions 
of power-holders with others.
As important as fairness norms are, research suggests that com-
passion can sometimes override fairness, particularly when notions 
of compassion are made salient (Batson et al. 1995). We propose that 
Hispanics who hold a socialized view of power for the benefit of 
others would be predisposed to apply injunctive norms of compas-
sion to power-holders. A power-holder who focuses on helping those 
around him or her does not represent a social threat that needs to be 
deterred. On the contrary, people generally approve of benevolent 
power-holders (Frieze and Boneva 2001). Thus, we expect that His-
panics will apply to power-holders injunctive norms of compassion 
when judging their interactions with others.
An important characteristic of social norms is that, although 
they serve an important role in guiding behavior within a society, 
they are more likely to do so when they are made salient by environ-
mental stimuli (Cialdini et al. 1990). Accordingly, cultural differenc-
es in the application of injunctive norms are more likely to emerge in 
situations that render these norms salient (Fu et al. 2007). We further 
suggest that cues that prime power should increase the salience of 
the culturally associated injunctive norms and thereby increase the 
focus on these normative considerations for judging a power-holder. 
Thus, when power is salient (versus not salient) European Americans 
should rely more on notions of fairness for evaluating power-holders’ 
actions, whereas Hispanics should focus more on notions of compas-
sion in the same context. 
Study 1 tested the basic contention that European Americans 
and Hispanics differ in the injunctive norms applied to power-hold-
ers. European American and Hispanic participants indicated the ex-
tent to which they believed that power-holders should embody three 
personal characteristics that were selected to represent fairness, and 
three personal characteristics selected to represent compassion. After 
that, they were presented with three pairs of characteristics designed 
to pit fairness against compassion (sympathetic vs. fair, ambitious 
vs. friendly, and thorough vs. good-natured), and asked to choose the 
one from each pair that they believe “it is a must” for power-holders 
to have.  Results showed that European Americans believe that pow-
er-holders should embody more fairness than compassion character-
istics, whereas Hispanics believe that power-holders should embody 
more compassion than fairness characteristics. European Americans 
(Hispanics) were also much more likely to choose characteristics of 
fairness (compassion) versus compassion (fairness) as “must haves” 
for power-holders. 
Study 2 extends the findings to a negotiation context and pro-
vides evidence that power activated culturally distinct injunctive 
norms associated with power. Participants were first presented with a 
task designed either to make notions of power salient (power condi-
tion) or not (neutral condition). Participants were presented then with 
a negotiation task in which a powerful negotiator behaved in either a 
fair or compassionate way, and then evaluated the negotiator. When 
power was made salient (vs. not), European Americans (Hispanics) 
evaluated more favorably the powerful negotiator according to cul-
tural norms of fairness (compassion). 
In Study 3 we tested the hypothesis that power salience would 
cause European Americans (Hispanics) to evaluate power-holders 
more favorably the more fair (compassionate) they are perceived 
to be. We did so by investigating people’s evaluations of power-
holders with whom they have a real-life, on-going and consequen-
tial interaction (patient-physician interaction). Results showed that, 
when power is salient (vs. not), Hispanics evaluate more favorably 
a power-holder with whom they have an on-going, real relationship 
to the extent that he/she is perceived as being more compassionate. 
This effect was absent among European Americans, who evaluated 
the power-holder non-significantly less favorably as a function of 
compassionate perceptions when power was made salient (vs. the 
baseline condition). In contrast, European Americans evaluated non-
significantly more favorably the power-holder as a function of per-
ceptions of fairness in the power salient (vs. neutral) condition. 
In sum, our research demonstrates that European Americans 
are predisposed to apply to power-holders injunctive norms of fair-
ness, whereas Hispanics are predisposed to apply injunctive norms of 
602 / Fairness or Compassion? Cultural Differences in Power Norms Affect Judgments of Power-Holders
compassion. These cultural variations in the use of injunctive norms 
were more evident in situations where power was made salient. 
These findings have important consequences for service interactions 
in which notions of power are relevant.
REFERENCES
Batson, C. Daniel, Tricia R. Klein, Lori Highberger, and Laura 
L. Shaw (1995), “Immorality from Empathy-Induced 
Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 68 (6), 1042-54.
Cialdini, Robert B., Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren 
(1990), “A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling 
the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58 (6), 1015-
26.
Devos, Thierry and Mahzarin R. Banaji (2005), “American = 
White?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88 
(3), 447-66.
Fishbein, Martin and Icek Ajzen (1975), Belief, Attitude, Intention, 
and Behavior. Reading, MA Addison-Wesley.
Frieze, Irene H. and Bonka S. Boneva (2001), “Power Motivation 
and Motivation to Help Others,” in The Use and Abuse of 
Power: Multiple Perspectives on the Causes of Corruption, 
Annette Y. Lee-Chai and John A. Bargh, Eds. NY: Psychology 
Press, 75-89.
Fu, Jeanne Ho-ying, Michael W. Morris, Sau-lai Lee, Melody Chao, 
Chi-yue Chiu, and Ying-yi Hong (2007), “Epistemic Motives 
and Cultural Conformity: Need for Closure, Culture, and 
Context as Determinants of Conflict Judgments,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 92 (2), 191-207.
Torelli, Carlos J. and Sharon Shavitt (2010), “Culture and Concepts 
of Power,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99 
(4), 703-23.
Triandis, Harry C. (1995), Individualism & Collectivism. CO: 
Westview Press.
---- (1996), “The Psychological Measurement of Cultural 
Syndromes,” American Psychologist, 51 (4), 407-15.
603 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
The Better You Do, the Worse You Feel: Selective Information Processing Approaches 
Based on Social Comparisons Moderates the Effect of Absolute Performance on 
Satisfaction
Dilney Gonçalves, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Jonathan Luffarelli, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Antonios Stamatogiannakis, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumption settings in which consumers are evaluated in 
comparison to others are ubiquitous. A prime example of such set-
tings is the postsecondary education industry with, in the USA alone, 
its 21 million annual consumers. Yet, consumer research has largely 
ignored such settings. Consequently, the antecedents of satisfaction 
when customers are evaluated relatively are not well understood. 
This research addresses this gap by examining satisfaction in con-
sumption settings in which consumers are evaluated relatively. We 
primarily (but not only) use the postsecondary industry as the testing-
ground for our theory.
In relative evaluation settings, consumers may have access to 
three pieces of information: their individual scores (individual abso-
lute evaluation), the scores’ distribution mean (average evaluation), 
and the actual relative evaluation outcome (ranking).We hypothesize 
that in these settings, superior (inferior) evaluations can lead to in-
ferior (superior) satisfaction. We theorize that different weights are 
given to the aforementioned pieces of information as a function of 
social comparison orientation.  We refer to social comparison orien-
tation as SCO.
Specifically, we argue that consumers high in SCO pay rela-
tively more attention to the average evaluation, which is a relevant 
proxy of others’ absolute evaluation. A lower (higher) average evalu-
ation signals that others are doing poorly (well), setting thus a lower 
(higher) comparison standard. In turn, a lower (higher) comparison 
standard makes high SCO consumers feel that they are more (less) 
competent in comparison to others. 
Conversely, consumers who are low in SCO would focus their 
attention relatively more closely on their own absolute evaluation. 
Since a high (low) absolute evaluation is better (worse) than a low 
(high) one, these individuals feel more (less) competent when their 
own absolute evaluation is high (low).
Jointly, we propose that a simple intervention like moving all 
the absolute scores up or down without changing rankings (actual 
outcomes), can significantly affect consumer satisfaction. Since in 
such interventions the individual and average evaluations would co-
vary, consumers high in SCO would then feel more (less) competent 
and, therefore, satisfied when their own absolute evaluation is low 
(high), while the opposite pattern should be observed for consumers 
low in SCO.
Study 1
A pilot study (not reported) revealed that employees have a ten-
dency to believe that consumers will be more (less) satisfied with 
higher (lower) evaluations. Study 1 demonstrates that such belief is 
erroneous and that consumers high in SCO are more satisfied with 
lower absolute evaluations, although they do not expect to be. Fif-
ty-four graduate students (familiar with relative evaluations) were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: high vs. low absolute 
evaluation. Importantly, relative ranking was kept constant across 
conditions. In each condition, participants evaluated the satisfaction 
of a fictitious colleague of theirs with an exam grade. Two weeks 
later, 70 graduate students drawn from the same population were 
asked to make a direct choice between the high vs. the low evalu-
ation condition. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, participants provided higher 
satisfaction ratings in the low (vs. high) absolute evaluation condi-
tion (t=6.36; p=.05). In contrast, when two weeks later participants 
made a direct choice, 77% of them preferred receiving high absolute 
evaluations (X2=20.63; p< .001). Hence, in the second part of the 
study, participants indicated that a situation in which everyone would 
obtain a higher absolute evaluation, and thus (as the first part shows) 
be less satisfied, was preferable.
Study 2
This study (n=111), tested the moderating role of SCO. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to a 2 (absolute evaluation: high 
vs. low) x 2 (relative evaluation: above vs. below the mean evalua-
tion) x 3 (context: classroom, sports competition, loyalty program) 
between-subjects design. We measured satisfaction on 7-point scales 
and SCO (Gibbons and Buunk 1999).
We found only one significant interaction; between absolute 
evaluation and SCO (B=-.60; p=.02). A spotlight analysis (Irwin and 
McClelland 2001) revealed that participants with a high SCO were 
less satisfied when absolute evaluation was high (vs. low) (B=-1.19; 
p=.037). Conversely, participants with a low SCO were more satis-
fied when absolute evaluation was high (vs. low) (B=1.23; p=.034).  
Study 3
This study (n=256), replicated our results through procedural 
priming of SCO (Mussweiler and Epstude 2009) and uncovers a 
moderated mediation between evaluation and satisfaction. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to a 2 (absolute evaluation: high vs. 
low) x 2 (social comparison: primed vs. control group) between-sub-
jects design. We measured satisfaction and perceived competence 
with 7-point scales.
Results showed that SCO significantly moderated the relation-
ship between absolute evaluation and perceived competence while 
perceived competence significantly mediated the relationship be-
tween absolute evaluation and satisfaction (Preacher et al. 2007). 
Indirect effects show that participants who were primed to be more 
socially comparative felt significantly more dissatisfied with a high 
(vs. low) absolute evaluation (95% CI [-.007, -.001])  while partici-
pants in the control condition felt significantly more satisfied with a 
high (vs. low) absolute evaluation (95% CI [.055, .33]).
Discussion
To summarize, we found that SCO moderates the relationship 
between consumer evaluation and perceived competence, while 
perceived competence mediates the relationship between consumer 
evaluation and satisfaction. We suggest that this process is the result 
of different information processing approaches triggered by individ-
ual differences in SCO.
Theoretically, our work is the first to examine satisfaction in 
consumption contexts in which consumers are evaluated relatively. It 
also contributes to the scant literature showing how higher satisfac-
tion may result from lower performances (Medvec et al. 1995; Iyen-
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gar et al. 2006). Thirdly, we add to the understanding of the selec-
tion of comparison information (Mussweiler 2003) by showing that 
information about others’ (vs. own) absolute evaluation is selected 
based on SCO.
Managerially, our results have important implications for all of 
the firms that — in one way or another — evaluate their consumers 
or their employees relatively. We demonstrated that “being as nice 
as they come” when evaluating consumers may be detrimental for 
consumer satisfaction and we expose the previously unknown, and 
potentially detrimental, impact of relative evaluation methods on 
consumer satisfaction. Interestingly, according to our results, when 
appraising individuals with a greater (lower) tendency to engage 
in social comparison, appraisers should shift absolute evaluations 
downward (upward), while keeping relative evaluations constant, in 
order to increase satisfaction.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Neoclassical economic theory considers man to be a utility 
maximizer who will choose the same alternative under any circum-
stance given it provides to him the maximum utility (Luce 1959). 
However, research has documented many instances when consum-
ers’ preferences are predictably biased by the composition of the 
set under consideration (e.g., Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982). It is 
worth noting that much of this existing behavioral research shows 
that when the set composition is changed in some manner (e.g., at-
tributes, brand information, additional options), choice is influenced. 
We propose, however, that even when the factors in the alternative set 
are kept constant, choice can still be influenced. Specifically, when 
we keep the set of alternatives exactly the same but merely change 
their spatial order, choice of alternatives can change. Consider an 
ice cream parlor that offers five ice cream cones displayed on the 
shop counter in increasing order of size from left to right (smallest 
to largest). Would consumers’ preferences change if the cones were 
arranged in the opposite order—increasing in size from the right to 
the left? Would consumers’ estimates of the amount of calories dif-
fer? Why would seeing the same set of alternatives left to right (LTR) 
versus right to left (RTL) affect choice? We borrow from literature 
in cognitive psychology that demonstrates the influence of language-
scanning habits (based on the direction of script flow of the dominant 
language) on different outcomes (e.g., Chae and Hoegg forthcoming; 
Maass and Russo 2003). 
The repeated scanning of information in the same direction 
(LTR in English) is thought to foment a habit of scanning informa-
tion in the direction of the language script and an expectation of the 
path that movement should follow, which consumers then employ in 
domains extraneous to language (Chan and Bergen 2005; Dehaene, 
Bossini, and Giraux 1993; Maass, Pagani, and Berta 2007; Tversky, 
Kugelmass, and Winter 1991). Based on this research, we first pro-
pose that reading in an LTR direction consistently biases the order in 
which consumers evaluate unfamiliar product sets: starting by evalu-
ating products on the left and then evaluating products to the right. 
We posit this biased estimation order influences how consumers es-
timate unknown set quantities, such as price and calories. Because 
the product they estimate first is likely to serve as anchor for the 
estimation of subsequent products, those estimates are likely to be bi-
ased toward the first estimate (Epley and Gilovich 2001). Therefore, 
if a set is organized in increasing order LTR (RTL), where the least 
(most) expensive product is located in the left, price estimates of the 
products to the right will be biased low (high), making the whole set 
appear lower (higher) in value. Second, we propose that spatial sets 
can vary in their level of visual flow—how well they match the direc-
tion of language—and that visual flow can influence the estimation 
process, where product sets high in visual flow encourage adjustment 
while products low in visual flow discourage it. 
Four lab and one field study support these propositions. Study 1 
tested the role of reading directionality on the estimation of process, 
specifically anchoring. Participants were shown images of three food 
items increasing LTR in caloric content (salad, chicken, burger). In 
the RTL condition, they were shown the same items but in the re-
verse order. As predicted, an LTR (vs. RTL) order, where the food 
with the lowest (highest) number of calories was located on the left, 
caused participants to anchor on a low (high) calorie estimate which 
biased subsequent estimations toward the low (high) anchor. Study 2 
tested the underlying process by temporarily reversing the direction 
in which individuals read. As predicted, temporarily changing the 
direction in which participants read moderated the bias to anchor on 
the leftmost products. Study 3 moderated the effect by facilitating or 
hindering visual flow. As it was expected, the set high (vs. low) in 
visual flow increased of adjustment away from the anchor. Study 4 
moderated the effect of reading directionality on estimation by using 
real movement (rather than implied as in study 3). As with the previ-
ous study, the set that matched (mismatched) visual flow encouraged 
(discouraged) adjustment. Study 5, a field study, tested the effect in a 
smoothie shop. As predicted, consumption was influenced by spatial 
order of the alternatives.
Through lab and field studies, this work provides evidence of 
how simply changing the spatial arrangement or visual flow of the 
alternatives changes not only the estimation processes but also con-
sumer preferences. This work adds to the literature on spatial de-
cision making, demonstrating that consumers employ an anchoring 
and adjustment process that is highly influenced by the direction in 
which they read.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As one of the negative emotions most tightly related to decision-
making, regret has proved an important topic for consumer behavior 
research (e.g., Simonson 1992, Inman and Zeelenberg 2002). People 
are strongly motivated to avoid or decrease it and the regulation strat-
egies they implement may have strong influence on their judgments, 
decisions and behaviors. This research illustrates how optimism may 
represent a defense mechanism against regret when the outcome of 
the regretful decision is still pending and uncertain.
Although most research on regret examine situations where the 
negative emotion results from a disappointing outcome, a decision 
process, independently from its outcome, can also trigger regret, 
when it is not judged as sensible and wise, i.e. justifiable (Connolly 
and Zeelenberg 2002, Pieters and Zeelenberg 2005). Pre-outcome 
regret can emerge after neglecting some topics while preparing for 
an exam or investing in highly risky financial products, even before 
knowing the academic exam questions, or the performance of the 
chosen financial products. Research has already documented strate-
gies that people may implement to mitigate their post-outcome regret 
(Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007) but much less is known about regula-
tion strategies of pre-outcome regret. We propose that, when there is 
a delay between the decision and its outcome, regretful people are 
optimistic about the outcome of the wrongful decision compared to 
non-regretful people, as a strategy to cope with self-blame. Further-
more, this regret-induced defensive optimism correlates with poten-
tially harmful behavioral intentions such as decreased willingness to 
alter and improve future similar decisions. However we show that 
severity of decision consequences is a boundary condition for defen-
sive optimism. When the consequences at stakes loom larger, pre-
outcome regret do not optimistically distort expectation any longer.
Study 1 (N=133) relies on real decisions where pre-outcome 
regret is manipulated with the responsibility for not practicing before 
taking a standardized reasoning test (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead 
2000, Ordoñez and Conolly 2000). In the high regret condition, par-
ticipants were given the choice between practicing before the actual 
test or earning one additional dollar by answering another unrelated 
questionnaire. Consistent with our pretest, the vast majority of par-
ticipants chose the 1$ unrelated questionnaire. In the no-regret condi-
tion, the experimenter gave them the unrelated questionnaire without 
any other choice. Severity of the consequences was manipulated by 
assigning the respondents to a test version that either matched (high 
severity) or mismatched (low severity) their self-stated preferred 
type of reasoning (verbal or numerical). The rational for choosing 
this manipulation was that a bad performance at a test that matches 
an individual’s preferred type of reasoning will represent a more se-
vere threat for the self than a bad performance in another domain 
less relevant for the individual’s identity. Performance forecasts were 
elicited just after the actual test, such that participants had no longer 
any control on the test outcome when giving their expectations. In 
the low severity condition, individuals who regretted not practicing 
estimated they answered more questions correctly (M = 61.52) than 
individuals in the no-regret condition (M = 50.85) (F(1,112) = 5.11, p 
= .03). However when the consequences were more severe, the esti-
mates given by regret (M = 68.47) and no regret (M = 68.92) groups 
did not differ (F(1,112) = .09, NS, interaction F(1,112)=2.74, p=.10). 
Furthermore, in the low severity condition only, regretful partici-
pants expressed less willingness to practice in the future compared 
to non-regretful ones. In line with the expectation pattern, regretful 
people actually performed better than non-regretful people when the 
test version mismatched their preferred type of reasoning (low sever-
ity), whereas the performances of the regret and no-regret groups 
did not differ when the test matched the preferred style of reasoning 
(high severity). It is possible that the regret manipulation may have 
led participants to put more efforts in the test so as to perform better 
and make up for choosing to skip practice. The optimistic forecasts 
compared to those on the non-regretful participants may thus both 
reflect the better performance and a defense mechanism. The design 
of Study 2 allows to better control for alternative explanations when 
testing regret-induced defensive optimism in a different domain with 
different manipulations of pre-outcome regret and severity.
In Study 2 (N=183), regret is manipulated by priming partici-
pants (Scrambled Sentence Task, Reb & Connolly 2009), in order to 
provide more direct evidence that optimism is a regulation strategy 
specifically triggered by regret. Priming also allows distinguishing 
between the outcome and self-blame components of regret. Previ-
ous research has shown that self-blame regret leads to more learn-
ing than outcome regret (Reb & Connolly 2009). We thus explore 
the possibility that the type of pre-outcome regret may also affect 
expectations for the decision outcome. Participants had to compose 
a financial portfolio out of a set of stocks. Severity was manipulated 
with the percentage of their savings they supposedly had invested 
in that portfolio (5% vs. 100%). In the low severity condition, both 
groups primed with self-blame regret (M = 6.90) and outcome regret 
(M = 6.65) were optimistic compared to the no-regret condition (M 
= 5.96, respectively t(167) = 2.44, p < .05 and t(167) = 1.79, p = 
.075). Individuals in both regret conditions were also more willing 
to endorse the same decision they made before compared to the con-
trol condition (both p’s<.05). In the high severity condition, people 
primed with self-blame regret were pessimistic (M = 5.57) compared 
to the no-regret (M = 6.42) and the ‘outcome regret’ conditions (M 
= 6.36, respectively t(167) = -2.01, p<.05 and t(167) = -2.28, p < 
.05). They were also less likely to recommend their portfolio choice 
compared to the other conditions.
This research illustrates how optimism can emerge as a defense 
mechanism against pre-outcome regret for decisions with relatively 
benign consequences. People experiencing pre-outcome regret are 
also less prone to question and less willing to improve their decision 
if a similar situation occurs in the future. Both the self-blame and the 
outcome components of pre-outcome regret induce optimism and it 
does not arise for more consequential decisions.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The increase in life expectancy and the challenge of aging well 
that ensues from it have given rise to the new concept of success-
ful aging (SA). SA has been the subject of many research studies 
over the last fifty years (Havighurst and Albrecht 1953; Rowe and 
Kahn 1987). Aging well has also become a key issue for marketing 
to seniors, yet this concept remains under-investigated in consumer 
research.
Given the demographic, financial, and strategic importance of 
the seniors target (Moschis 1992, 2003) and the lack of marketing re-
search on the subject, it is necessary to examine the perception of SA 
and its influence on consumption by individuals over 50 years old.
This study provides a reliable and valid measurement instrument 
for Desired Aging Well (DAW) in three dimensions: physical, psy-
chological, and social. Its influence on consumer behavior is tested in 
three markets: health, leisure, and financial services. The DAW scale 
and the overall antecedents-manifestations-consequences model are 
validated on a sample of 1,019 individuals who are representative of 
French people aged 50 to 65 years old.
The SA model, its definition, and measurement have been sub-
ject to controversy in scientific research (Depp and Jeste 2006). Our 
research, through the DAW construct, is situated within the theoreti-
cal framework of Baltes and Baltes (1990). Through the Selection, 
Optimization, and Compensation (SOC) model, the authors have de-
fined SA as an adaptive process of selective optimization and com-
pensation.
There is a lack of consensus in the literature for the evalua-
tion of SA. Some researchers (Rowe and Kahn 1987) consider that 
SA should be characterized by normative criteria defined by the re-
searchers. Others (Baltes and Baltes 1990; Baltes and Carstensen 
1996) argue that it is a matter of the individual’s subjective judgment. 
In order to clarify the divergent approaches of the SA construct, we 
propose making a conceptual distinction between SA and Aging Well, 
and argue that SA is a normative view of the quality of aging (objec-
tive approach) while Aging Well is centered on the perceived quality 
of aging by the people concerned (subjective approach).
Baltes and Carstensen (1996) believe that a normative approach 
is detrimental to a better understanding of aging because it ignores 
the individual and cultural variation among people’s objectives. On 
the contrary, according to the subjective approach, when one is inter-
ested in SA an important preliminary question would be to establish 
people’s goals.
Following Baltes and Carstensen’s (1996) position, we view 
SA as the achievement of the objectives of the person concerned. 
The subjective approach seems all the more relevant in a marketing 
research context as it can more accurately explain consumption be-
havior. It is also more adapted to marketing methodologies. 
In sum, the literature review on SA and the marketing context 
of our study led us to understand DAW as a perception for which we 
offer the following definition:
“DAW is the individual perception of the relative importance 
of the objectives to be pursued in the quest for ideal aging in 
accordance with one’s physiological, cognitive, social, and 
financial resources” (Sengès, Guiot, and Malas 2013).
A literature review on DAW antecedents led us to consider 
the following variables: subjective age tendency which is the dis-
crepancy between chronological age and subjective age  (Barak and 
Gould 1985; Moschis and Mathur 2006), age, the search for positive 
emotions, life satisfaction, and gender. The SOC model (Baltes and 
Baltes 1990) and the future time perspective theory in motivation 
(Nuttin 1980, 1984) prompted us to test the influence of DAW on 
consumer behavior. The three sectors highlighted by the literature 
were studied through the following indicators: the number of finan-
cial portfolio reallocations, the frequency of leisure activities, and 
the attitude towards health innovation. 
To define the DAW concept and to create a reliable and valid 
measurement scale, we drew on Churchill’s (1979) paradigm. Data 
collection was carried out through a quantitative online survey on a 
sample of 1,019 French people aged 50 to 65 years old. 
The model was tested by the structural equations method, which 
gave a satisfactory fit to the data: Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Ad-
justed Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
and Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) were 
close to the norms if one refers to the commonly used measurement 
indices (χ2: 433.00, significance: .000, χ2/degree of freedom: 2.547, 
GFI: .961, AGFI: .947, CFI: .958, RMSEA: .039). Causal relation-
ships were evaluated using standardized parameters.
This study reveals three important findings. The first is that the 
DAW may be captured by a multidimensional construct made up of 
three components: Physical, Psychological, and Social. It is possible 
to work either with the full DAW scale or with only one dimension. 
The physical factor constitutes two-thirds of DAW explained vari-
ance.
The second important result concerns DAW antecedents. Life 
satisfaction, the search for positive emotions, internal subjective age 
tendency, and gender (being a woman) have a significant positive 
influence on the importance given to the DAW dimensions. On the 
other hand, actual age and the external subjective age tendency have 
no impact. These findings confirm that the internal subjective age 
tendency should be distinguished from the external subjective age 
tendency. 
The third contribution of the study is that DAW appears to have 
a significant effect on consumption behavior. Indeed, the greater the 
importance attributed to physical, social, and psychological DAW, 
the greater the number of actions related to financial investments and 
the greater the interest in health innovations. Finally, the importance 
attached to psychological DAW exerts a positive influence on the 
frequency of leisure activities. 
Thus, DAW has the capacity to characterize consumer expecta-
tions in terms of aging and to predict their consumption behavior. 
Therefore, the DAW may be used as a segmentation criterion for the 
seniors market. 
Future research should consider other dimensions for grasping 
the DAW construct more fully, such as cognitive functioning (Rowe 
and Kahn 1997) and physical appearance (Bowling 2010). Further 
research on a wider sample (from 35 to 80 years old) would also en-
able an analysis of the potential variations of DAW according to age 
and their impact on consumption.
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In conclusion, the introduction of the DAW concept to market-
ing could contribute to the development of Aging Well Marketing 
and could enable practitioners to better meet the needs of senior con-
sumers who want to assume control of their aging.
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Table 1 . DAW: Validity and Reliability Results
Factor Analysis and Reliability Tests
Physical Desired 
Aging Well F1 
Psychological 
Desired Aging 
Well F2
Social Desired 
Aging Well F3
Eigenvalues 4.81 1.24 1.13
Variance explained (%) 40.09 10.30 9.38
Total variance (%) 59.78
Cronbach’s α (dimensions) .75 .78 .77
KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin): .89                Bartlett χ2: .00
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Physical Desired 
Aging Well F1 
Psychological 
Desired Aging 
Well F2
Social Desired 
Aging Well F3
Le Jöreskog’s ρ .66 .77 .77
le ρvc .49 .52 .53
Fit Indices of The Measurement Model
Indices Values Indices Values
Absolute indices GFI: .98 RMSEA: .06AGFI: .96
Incremental indices NFI: .97 CFI: .98
Indices of parsimony
χ2: 77.96 dof: 17
Level of 
significance:
.00 χ2 /dof: 4.59
Tests on the Acceptability of a Second Order Factor
F1 F2 F3
Structural coefficients 1.00 1.57 1.45
Structural standardized coefficients .78 .92 .71
Value of t test 11.88 11.62
Probability of t test .00 .00
Figure 1: Diagram of Relationships Between Variables
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers who are motivated to present themselves in a social-
ly desirable manner often choose to display images of higher status, 
wealth, and prestige through conspicuous consumption. However, 
will conspicuous consumption have its desired social benefits even 
when conspicuous products are purchased with money or wealth ac-
quired unfairly? Will consumers themselves engage in conspicuous 
consumption when they earned money without adequate effort? The 
results of four studies suggest that the social benefits of conspicuous 
consumption can be diminished when others spend money acquired 
without fair effort. However, consumers who themselves acquire 
money without adequate effort still prefer to engage in conspicuous 
consumption. These effects are moderated by individual differences 
in the value placed on social justice.
Though conspicuous consumption has many known social ben-
efits (Griskevicius et al. 2007; Nelissen and Meijers 2011; Scott, 
Mende, and Bolton 2012), these social benefits may not accrue when 
money spent on conspicuous consumption is acquired without ad-
equate effort. Justice is an important, universal social value, and peo-
ple have a desire to believe that people get what they deserve (Lerner 
2003; Haidt and Graham 2007). Thus, when consumers are aware 
that others spend conspicuously using money acquired without their 
own effort, conspicuous consumption may highlight social inequal-
ity and the other person may be perceived negatively. Furthermore, 
this effect will be more pronounced if evaluators place greater impor-
tance on social justice.
Study 1 tested this prediction by examining participants’ per-
ceptions of a classmate who engages in conspicuous consumption. 
Participants in the low (high) monetary fairness condition read that 
their classmate won a competition with a cash prize through inad-
equate effort (hard work). Then, the classmate was considering the 
purchase of a Louis Vuitton (vs. no brand) wallet using the award 
money. Participants indicated their overall impressions of the class-
mate and the value placed on social justice, using two items from 
the moral foundation scale (Graham et al. 2011). As expected, a sig-
nificant three-way interaction between monetary fairness, brand, and 
value of social justice revealed that when the brand was conspicuous, 
money acquired without fair effort led to more negative evaluations 
of the classmate, particularly when participants highly valued social 
justice. When the brand was not conspicuous, money acquired with-
out fair effort led to negative evaluations of the classmate in general, 
independently of the value placed on social justice.
In study 2, we sought to test the process underlying the effect 
demonstrated in study 1. We theorized that conspicuous consump-
tion with money earned unfairly may diminish the perceived validity 
of the prestige signal communicated via conspicuous consumption. 
Given that positive images from conspicuous consumption are based 
on perceptions of personal qualities that generate wealth or status, 
people may not evaluate others engaging in conspicuous consump-
tion positively when they do not perceive others as having higher 
prestige and status. Thus, the perceived prestige attributed to others 
should mediate the effect of monetary fairness on evaluations of oth-
ers’ conspicuous consumption.
Study 2 examined participants’ evaluations of a classmate who 
was wearing an Emporio Armani jacket. In the low (high) monetary 
fairness condition, the jacket was bought with money received from 
the parents (vs. a paycheck). Participants indicated their impressions 
of the classmate, prestige perceptions, and the value placed on social 
justice. As in Study 1, money acquired without fair effort led to nega-
tive evaluations of the classmate, particularly when people valued 
social justice. Moreover, the indirect effect via prestige perceptions 
was significant. Thus, people who value social justice perceived 
other consumers negatively because they thought that conspicuous 
consumption did not signal prestige when others earned money with-
out their own fair effort.
In studies 3 and 4, we examined the impact of monetary fairness 
on consumers’ own choice of conspicuous consumption. We predict-
ed that when consumers have acquired money without adequate ef-
fort, they are likely to feel a lack of personal ability and competence, 
and therefore become more motivated to engage in conspicuous con-
sumption to fulfill efficacy needs (e.g., power, control) through com-
pensatory consumption (Lee and Shrum 2012; Rucker and Galinsky 
2009), particularly if they do not highly value social justice. 
Study 3 manipulated monetary fairness as in study 1. Partici-
pants considered purchasing a t-shirt using their award money, and 
they indicated their preference for one of two t-shirts from Emporio 
Armani that differed in conspicuousness and their beliefs about the 
value of social justice. As expected, the interaction between mone-
tary fairness and value of social justice revealed that money acquired 
without fair effort increased preference for a more conspicuous prod-
uct when consumers placed less value on social justice, although this 
was not the case when consumers valued social justice.
Study 4 examined the reason for the different patterns of effects 
of monetary fairness on one’s own choice of conspicuous consump-
tion versus perceptions of others. Monetary fairness was manipulat-
ed by money from the parents (vs. a paycheck) as in study 2. Partici-
pants then provided their beliefs about the prestige signaling effect of 
their own (or their classmate’s) conspicuous consumption using the 
money (i.e., how much status conspicuous purchases communicate). 
Consistent with the mediation found in study 2, when people evalu-
ated their classmate’s conspicuous consumption, money acquired 
without fair effort led to lower perceptions of prestige, particularly 
when people valued social justice. In contrast, when participants 
considered their own conspicuous consumption, money acquired 
without fair effort led to higher perceptions of prestige, particularly 
when people placed less value on justice, supporting the rationale 
provided for the study 3 findings.
These results demonstrate that the value placed on social jus-
tice by consumers negatively affects consumers’ perceptions of oth-
ers when others engage in conspicuous consumption through money 
acquired without fair effort. This occurs because conspicuous con-
sumption is no longer seen as signaling prestige. However, consum-
ers who acquire money unfairly themselves prefer to engage in con-
spicuous consumption to signal their prestige, mostly when they do 
not place much value on social justice, believing that their conspicu-
ous consumption still has a prestige signaling effect on others. This 
research contributes to the literatures on conspicuous consumption 
and justice motives in consumer behavior. 
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Table 1 . Summary of Study Results
Study DV Perspective Conditional effects of monetary fairness on DV at different levels of value of social justice Brand type
1 (N=78) Positive impression of the classmate Other
Low value of justice (-1SD) .97*
Conspicuous
High value of justice (+1SD) 2.51***
Low value of justice (-1SD) 2.01***
No brand
High value of justice (+1SD) 1.70***
2 (N=158)
Positive impression of 
the classmate Other
Low value of justice (-1SD) .50*
Conspicuous
High value of justice (+1SD) 1.40***
Prestige perceptions Other
Low value of justice (-1SD) .03NS
High value of justice (+1SD) .71***
Prestige perceptions mediated the interaction effect on the DV (95% CI = .06 to .33)
3 (N=198) Choice of a conspicuous product Self
Low value of justice (-1SD) -.65**
High value of justice (+1SD) .10NS
4 (N=116)
Prestige signaling 
role of conspicuous 
consumption
Other
Low value of justice (-1SD) .20NS
High value of justice (+1SD) .65*
Self
Low value of justice (-1SD) -.71**
High value of justice (+1SD) .06NS
Note. NS = Not significant, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
613 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Consequences of Cultural Fluency
James A. Mourey, DePaul University, USA
Ben C.P. Lam, Iowa State University, USA
Daphna Oyserman, University of Michigan, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
On the 4th of July, do Americans put more food on a patriotic 
plate? Can subtle exposure to traditional wedding photos make you 
more willing to buy an unrelated consumer product? In short, can 
cultural meanings deeply rooted in memory influence consumption 
when cued?
Culture is a meaning-making framework; the characteristic way 
humans perceive their environment (Triandis, 1972). In this sense, 
culture provides a blueprint or outline for how one is to behave and 
what one can expect of others across a variety of situations. What 
is culturally appropriate seems right, while what is culturally inap-
propriate seems off or wrong (Triandis, 2007). Because all of human 
life occurs within culture, and cultural knowledge is deeply rooted 
in memory, what feels right or wrong ‘goes without saying’. While 
social scientists have long studied culture, the implications of this 
feeling of fluency, the telltale marker that culture is at work, has not 
yet been studied directly. Instead, researchers have either focused on 
describing a particular culture or on comparing and distinguishing be-
tween cultures, particularly contrasting East and West and describing 
the content and consequences of cultural ‘syndromes’ such as individ-
ualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
Rather than focusing on a specific culture or on specific dif-
ferences between cultures, we introduced the concept of “cultural 
fluency” and focus on the consequences of the feeling of fluency that 
being immersed in a culture provides. Within situations that are cul-
turally appropriate, people from that culture can feel at ease, they 
know what to expect and how the situation will unfold. These feel-
ings of ease can spill over into unrelated judgments, including, as we 
show here, consumer judgments. We build from two major tenants 
of behavioral decision research and social cognition research: first, 
that preferences are constructed in the process of making a choice 
(Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007) and second, that 
metacognitive judgment, the feelings that emerge while thinking, are 
a major source of constructed preferences (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). 
These prior studies have focused on feelings of ease or difficulty that 
come to mind in the process of choosing or judging. For example, 
they show that difficult to read print font (Song & Schwarz, 2008b) 
or being required to give many examples both cue feelings of dif-
ficulty that spill over into the judgment task. Building on this prior 
work, in five studies we provide evidence that subtle cultural cues 
influence consumption such that cues congruent with deeply-root-
ed cultural memory “feel right,” create a sense of fluency, and en-
courage more consumption while culturally-incongruent cues “feel 
wrong,” create a sense of disfluency, and discourage consumption. 
However, we also show that this experience of cultural fluency can 
influence cognitive processing style, encouraging more analytic, sys-
tematic processing when experiencing cultural disfluency and more 
gut, intuitive processing when experiencing cultural fluency. 
In studies 1a-1b we conducted field experiments in which pic-
nickers are provided with culturally fluent plates (i.e., patriotic plates 
on the 4th of July), culturally disfluent plates (Halloween plates on 
Labor Day), or control white plates.  We measured the amount of 
food these picnickers put on their plate in ounces and found that peo-
ple unknowingly put more food on their plates when randomly given 
a culturally fluent plate and less food on their plates when provided 
a culturally disfluent plate relative to one another and to the control 
white plate condition.
To replicate this effect across cultures to demonstrate the ro-
bustness of the concept of “cultural fluency,” we replicated the study 
during Chinese New Year with Hong Kong Chinese participants and 
Americans.  Chinese participants provide a red-bordered plate took 
larger serving sizes at a buffet during Chinese New Year compared 
to Hong Kong Chinese provided a black-bordered control plate and 
Americans provided either a red- or black-bordered plate, as the 
cultural script was not accessible for the American participants.  As 
predicted, the effect did not hold for the Hong Kong Chinese par-
ticipants given a red-bordered plate when it was not Chinese New 
Year, as the cultural fluency meaning of the red-border was no longer 
culturally significant.
Moving beyond the domain of holidays, the third study in-
volved participants looking at wedding photos and rating them for 
their quality.  Unbeknownst to participants they were randomly as-
signed to one of two conditions, one depicting traditional wedding 
imagery (culturally fluent) and one depicting nontraditional images 
(e.g., green dress, purple tuxedo; the culturally disfluent condition). 
Participants were then provided with a random consumer product (a 
blanket in study 3a; a shovel in study 3b) and asked about the likeli-
hood of purchasing the product.  Participants in the culturally flu-
ent condition were significantly more likely to purchase the random 
product than participants in the culturally disfluent conditions.
To explore the effects of cultural fluency beyond choice, we de-
signed a fourth study using the same wedding manipulations as in the 
prior studies but with a different dependent variable: the cognitive 
reflection task (CRT).  We predicted that participants in the culturally 
fluent condition would be more likely to make errors on the CRT, and 
that’s precisely what we found in two studies, the latter demonstrat-
ing mediation through the ease with which one could imagine his/her 
own wedding (validating our proposal that cultural fluency affects 
style of processing).
The final study combined the aforementioned manipulations 
and reasoning in a study involving Valentine’s Day that was con-
ducted in Hong Kong and the U.S.  Valentine’s Day was selected 
because it is a holiday celebrated the same day and in the same way 
in both cultures.  Participants completed the CRT on February 14 or 
February 21 in a computer screen with a pink border (culturally flu-
ent) or a black or white border (culturally disfluent).  As predicted, 
participants completing the CRT on February 14 with a pink border 
performed the worst of any group, whereas no differences emerged 
on February 21, a day on which the colors carry no cultural meaning.
In sum, across five studies we show that culture congruence 
influences consumption in a variety of contexts via subtle feelings 
of fluency/disfluency. Theoretical and managerial implications are 
discussed.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
From the widespread practice of product customization to the 
recent practice of “crowdsourcing” ideas, companies are actively 
involving consumers in the new product development process. To 
benefit from the input of consumers as well as professionals, compa-
nies could provide consumers with a professionally designed default 
product that may serve as a starting point in the idea-generation pro-
cess for new products or product improvements. Providing a default 
product has been shown to impact the consumers’ utility (Dellaert 
and Stremersch, 2005) and evaluation of self-designed products 
(Moreau and Herd, 2010), but no research has investigated the effects 
of providing a default product on consumer creativity. In this paper, 
we investigate the moderating effect of the product design goal on 
the relationship between the level of advancement of the provided 
default product and the creativity of the generated product ideas. 
Based on contemporary creative cognition research, we can en-
vision two contrasting effects of the provision of a default product in 
the consumer’s idea generation process: 1) it may enhance creativity 
when the existing features of the default product activate relevant 
domain knowledge and stimulate a more thorough exploration of the 
idea space (Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe, 2007) or 2) it may in-
hibit creativity when the default product fixates attention too much 
on the existing product features and limits the exploration of the idea 
space (Smith, Ward, and Schumacher, 1993). We hypothesize that 
the combination of the level of advancement of the default, i.e., the 
number of already incorporated features, and the product design goal 
determines whether the default product will stimulate or inhibit the 
generation of creative product ideas. 
The design goal can either be to modify or enhance the func-
tional performance of the product or its aesthetic appearance. When 
the product design goal is aesthetic, we expect that fixation effects 
will play a more dominant role. The rational here is that people gen-
erally show a preference for aesthetic congruity in product design 
(Patrick and Hagtvedt 2011). Thus, consumers are expected to gen-
erate ideas that are congruent with the aesthetic features of the de-
fault product. A more advanced default product incorporates more 
features, which increases the likelihood of fixation effects. This may 
limit the exploration of the idea space, resulting in less creative ideas.
When the design goal is functional, aesthetic considerations pre-
sumably play a less important role than improving the performance 
of the product. In this case, the positive effects of activating relevant 
domain knowledge (and the spreading of activation in the consumer’s 
memory) by means of the provision of a default product will outweigh 
any negative fixation effects. The more features the default product 
already incorporates, the more relevant knowledge structures will be 
activated in the consumer’s mind. This may lead to a more thorough 
exploration of the idea space, resulting in more creative ideas.
We conducted two experiments to investigate the interaction ef-
fect between the level of advancement of the default product and 
the design goal on the creativity of the generated ideas. Sixty-one 
business school students participated in return for course credit. The 
study design was a 2 (default product: basic vs. advanced) x 2 (de-
sign goal: functional vs. aesthetic) mixed design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a pretested picture of 
either a basic or an advanced alarm clock. In addition to an improved 
appearance, the advanced default product also incorporated three 
common wake-up functions (i.e., the most frequently mentioned 
ones in a pilot study). Each participant was then asked to complete 
two tasks: 1) to improve the alarm clock’s wake-up function and 2) to 
improve its aesthetic appearance. Three target consumers were asked 
to rate the creativity of the generated ideas on a single-item, seven-
point scale (cf. Sellier and Dahl, 2011). 
A mixed ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect be-
tween the level of advancement of the default product and the design 
goal (F (1, 59) = 12.195, p<.01). Follow-up analysis revealed that 
with a functional design goal participants generated more creative 
ideas when given an advanced default product rather than a basic 
default product. With an aesthetic design goal, we found exactly the 
opposite (see Table 1). 
The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the results of Study 
1 using a different product (a tablet computer holder) and a differ-
ent task (an idea-generation rather than a problem-solving task). The 
study design was similar to Experiment 1 except for the experimen-
tal stimuli. We also added a baseline condition in which no default 
product was given. One hundred-eleven business school students 
participated in return for course credit. As in Experiment 1, a mixed 
ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect on creativity of the 
generated ideas (F(1, 108) = 7.700, p = .001). The nature of this inter-
action effect was similar to Study 1. The means and standard devia-
tions for the experimental conditions can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1a: Summary of Study 1 Results
Creativity of results
Default 
Product
Functional 
design goal
Aesthetic 
Design Goal
Basic 5.32 (1.25) a 5.60 (1.38) a
Advanced 6.24 (1.13) 4.83 (1.44) 
N=61
a Significant difference with the advanced default product condition (α = .05)
Table 1b: Summary of Study 2 Results
Functional Design Goal
Default 
Product
Creativity of 
results
Depth of 
Exploration
Breadth of 
Exploration
None 5.80 (0.62) c 1.86 (0.72) b 2.89 (1.09) b c
Basic 5.76 (0.58) c 1.54 (0.51) a c 2.54 (0.77) a c
Advanced 6.07 (0.55) a b 1.95 (0.77) b 2.03 (0.59) a b
Aesthetic Design Goal
Default 
Product
Creativity of 
results
Depth of 
Exploration
Breadth of 
Exploration
None 4.72 (0.59) c 1.58 (0.55) b 2.33 (0.76) b c
Basic 4.61 (0.59) c 1.19 (0.46) a c 2.00 (0.71) a
Advanced 4.28 (0.77) a b 1.42 (0.60) b 1.92 (0.63) a
N=111
a Significant difference with the “no default product” condition (α = .05)
b Significant difference with the “basic default product” condition (α = .05)
c Significant difference with the “advanced default product” condition (α = .05)
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We also investigated the effects of providing a default product 
on the exploration of the idea space by asking two trained coders to 
categorizing all generated ideas. The highest number of ideas gener-
ated in a particular category was used as a measure of the depth of 
exploration, while the number of different categories in which the 
participant generated ideas was used as a measure of the breadth of 
exploration of the idea space. The results revealed that, independent 
of the design goal, the level of advancement positively impacted the 
depth, but negatively impacted the breadth of exploration. These 
variables mediated the effects of the level of advancement of the 
default product on creativity when the design goal is functional, but 
not when the design goal is aesthetic.
The two experiments show that the level of advancement of a 
provided default product influences the exploration of the idea space 
and, hence, the creativity of the ideas generated by consumers, but 
the nature of this effect depends on the design goal. Our findings 
have straightforward managerial implications for companies that 
want to achieve higher levels of creative performance by offering 
default products when soliciting ideas from consumers in the new 
product development process.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Rising obesity rates among children have led many to blame 
the fast food industry because frequenting quick-service restaurants 
has been linked to higher intakes of sodium, fat, calories, and soft 
drinks, and lower intakes of healthful nutrients like fruits and veg-
etables (Bowman et al. 2004; Paeratakul et al. 2003).  As such, some 
regulatory agencies are seeking legislation to restrict certain market-
ing practices by fast food outlets. One such regulation took effect 
recently in the state of California and requires meals targeted to chil-
dren to meet certain nutritional standards for fat, calories, sugar, and 
sodium if toy premiums or any other incentives are included with the 
food purchase (Baertlein 2010). This regulation aims to help parents 
change their attitudes, and subsequent behavior, toward unhealthy 
food products.
In conjunction with government regulations, amidst growing 
public concerns about childhood obesity, food marketers have re-
sponded with self-regulatory actions. For example, Kraft pledged to 
eliminate advertising to children, of foods that do not meet certain 
nutritional standards and Jack in the Box has eliminated toys from its 
children’s meals as of June 2011 (Morrison 2011).
While these governmental and corporate initiatives address-
ing childhood obesity may be well intended, it is unclear how and 
why consumers respond to such efforts. Childhood obesity is indeed 
epidemic in the US (CDC 2012), which raises questions about how 
best to develop theory and change behaviors, and ultimately redress 
this societal problem. The Theory of Psychological Reactance was 
extensively used to explain consumers’ unintended reactions to gov-
ernment regulations (Ringold 2002); however, in some cases, this 
and other frameworks may not explain this deviance phenomenon in 
the way that attributional processes can (Conway and Schaller 2005). 
First, Reactance Theory posits that individuals most likely deviate 
from expectations such that they can reassert their lost freedom of 
choice (Conway and Schaller 2005). Although children’s meals toys 
are banned, parents may still purchase the same food item, with-
out a free toy, or paying for the toy. That is, parents still have the 
freedom to select their food products, regardless of the nutritional 
content. Second, Reactance and Attribution Theories predict indeed 
the same outcomes (deviance); nonetheless, these two psychological 
approaches provide “different accounts of the origins of deviance” 
(Conway and Schaller 2005, 313). For instance, reactance is more 
emotionally-driven (Knowles and Linn 2004), which may imply that 
parents persist in buying potential harmful products for their chil-
dren just to rebel against this policy, a hardly acceptable perspective. 
Conversely, attribution provides a cognitive reason for deviance; this 
suggests that parents may deviate due to factors (e.g., government 
regulation) that influence their attributional judgments; hence, the 
unique explanatory value of the attribution model. Consequently, this 
study builds on Attribution Theory to provide a better understanding 
of how and why consumers respond to government regulations (GR) 
relative to corporate self-regulations (CSR). We argue that the pres-
ence of GR versus CSR triggers more unexpected attitudes, and sub-
sequent behavior, toward poor-nutritional products, because parents 
have an unexpected lower tendency to blame the food marketers for 
these products.  The mediating role of attributions of responsibility is 
particularly important here, especially when examining consumers’ 
post-consumption reactions, because these cognitive processes are 
likely to have a lasting impact on consumer behavior (Weiner 2000).
This research essentially suggests that government regulations, 
despite their good intentions, may be detrimental in changing par-
ents’ attitudes and behavior toward unhealthy food products due to 
unexpected attributions of blame for the nutritional value of their 
children’s meals. A unique view on the power of attributions of re-
sponsibility is thus provided.  Our findings further highlight that cor-
porate self-regulations could truly make a difference when it comes 
to childhood obesity. Specifically, consumers reported more negative 
attitudes and behavior toward poor-nutritional products when corpo-
rate self-restrictions on toy premiums were announced.   
The theoretical rationale for this research is Attribution Theory 
(Kelley 1973). Research has demonstrated that, in co-production 
contexts, consumers are subject to self-serving bias or have the 
tendency to blame the company when a negative product outcome 
occurs, which in turn negatively affects their satisfaction with the 
firm and its products (Bendapudi and Leone 2003). In the current 
context, parents would normally blame the food marketers for chil-
dren’s unhealthy meals, which leads to negative attitudes regarding 
these products. Nevertheless, we find that the presence of GR miti-
gates this self-serving bias. Specifically, a toy premium ban causes 
less attributions of blame to the firm, for poor-nutritional meals. As 
a result, consumers’ attitudes and subsequent behavior, toward these 
products, are enhanced. Thus, we test the impact of GR on product 
satisfaction through attributions of responsibility, stressing the medi-
ating role of attributional judgments.  
Data for testing the hypotheses were collected experimentally, 
using a sample of US parents who purchase children’s meals from 
McDonald’s. Two studies were conducted: a pilot study, in which 
some of the scales were tested and the main experiment, used to test 
the hypotheses. We used between-subjects and randomized experi-
mental design; parents were randomly assigned to one of the experi-
mental conditions -- control group, GR, and CSR --, which reduced 
the possibility of confounding effects. One hundred and eighty re-
spondents were used, with 60 participants per each condition. 
Attributions of responsibility (α = 0.73) measured the degree 
to which parents blame the company for their poor-nutritional meal 
choices. Product satisfaction (α = 0.90) scale, adapted from Huffman 
and Kahn (1998) and Fitzsimons (2000), captured parents’ overall 
satisfaction with these meal selections.  Lastly, the behavioral inten-
tions scale (α = 0.93), modified from Cronin, Brady, and Hult (2000), 
measured parents’ tendency to make similar food choices in the fu-
ture.
The multivariate analysis of variance was employed to examine 
whether GR had the hypothesized impact on attributions of responsi-
bility and product satisfaction. As predicted, attributions of responsi-
bility to the firm, in the GR condition, were lower (M = 2.98) relative 
to the control group (M = 3.68) and CSR treatment (M = 3.99); (F 
(2,179) = 6.61, p < .05). Our results further showed that participants 
in the GR condition reported a higher product satisfaction (M = 6.09) 
as opposed to those parents in the control group (M = 5.30) and CSR 
treatment (M = 5.43); (F (2, 179) = 3.26, p = < .05).  Participants’ 
gender, education, age, and income were controlled for. Gender (cod-
ed 1 for male and 0 for female) had a significant impact on consum-
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ers’ attributions of responsibility (F (1,179) = 6.43, p < .05); never-
theless, participants’ education (F (7,179) = 1.28, p > .10), age (F 
(3,179) = 0.91, p > .10), and income (F (5,179) = 0.74, p > .10) did 
not show significant effects on attributions of responsibility. Lastly, 
gender (F (1,179) = 1.57, p > .10), education (F (7,179) = 1.30, p > 
.10), age (F (3,179) = 1.65, p > .10), and income (F (5,179) = 1.57, p 
> .10) did not have significant effects on product satisfaction.
The model proposed in this study and the traditional mediation 
steps (Baron and Kenny 1986; Holmbeck 1997) were tested using 
structural equation modeling (Iacobucci 2012). This mediation test-
ing procedure is preferred, and continues to be used, by research-
ers in the marketing and social psychology fields (Iacobucci 2012; 
Klein and Dawar 2004). One hundred and twenty responses were 
considered in the mediation analyses which include the manipulated 
conditions. The path coefficients and goodness of fit indices of the 
proposed model are presented in table 1. All coefficients were sig-
nificant at p < .05 and had the hypothesized direction. We find that 
the impact of GR on product satisfaction is mediated by attributions 
of responsibility. Lastly, product satisfaction significantly predicted 
behavioral intentions (b = 0.68, p < .05) and the sign of the coeffi-
cient was in the expected direction. 
This study responds to calls from ACR/TCR champions (Mick 
2010) and the MSI (2010-2012) to conduct research on substantive 
matters, and ultimately to transform/enhance consumer well-being. 
We propose and test a conceptual framework of consumer responses 
to government regulations with regard to a major societal challenge 
such as childhood obesity. The study (1) advances an alternative 
psychological mechanism, which explains unexpected consumers’ 
attitudes and behavior; (2) proposes a mediating role of attribu-
tions of responsibility between government regulation and product 
satisfaction; (3) offers a new conceptualization of the government 
regulation construct (i.e., moderator of attributions of responsibility/
self-serving bias). 
This research shows that, in the presence of a government regu-
lation, parents take more personal responsibility, for poor-nutritional 
meals, which triggers higher satisfaction with, and subsequent en-
hanced behavioral intentions toward, these products. Nonetheless, it 
would be relevant to examine the extent to which Reactance Theory 
versus Attribution Theory explains consumer responses to different 
consumer protection regulations. Lastly, while both studies -- the 
pilot and main study -- supported the unexpected impacts of a gov-
ernment regulation, the results may not be generalizable to different 
other contexts and operationalizations of government versus corpo-
rate regulations. Future research should thereby broaden the scope of 
product category and examine whether consumers’ responses to vari-
ous regulations can be explained by their attributional judgments. 
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It’s not Just Numbers: Nutrition Information as Cultural Contaminant
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Carlos J. Torelli, University of Minnesota, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
France is worldwide known all over the world for its passion 
for cooking to such an extent that the French gastronomic meal has 
been recently declared as a world intangible heritage (UNESCO 
2010). However, despite its world renowned reputation, the French 
food model suffers from relative isolation. The hedonistic approach 
to food is far to be shared by all cultures. For example, in the United 
States, food choices are mainly driven by utilitarian concerns in which 
health holds a central place (Rozin, Remick, and Fischler 2011). 
Based on this utilitarianistic view of eating, many Western countries 
have established public health plans in order to increase health-
conscious food choices. France does not escape this process of food 
utilitarianization. By introducing the National Nutrition and Health 
Program in 2001, the French ministry of health hoped to improve 
the health of the French population. Thus, French consumers are 
encouraged to place a greater emphasis on the relationship between 
their food choices and overall health. There is reason to believe 
that this focus on the utilitarian aspects of eating may decrease the 
French cultural enthusiasm for food. For instance, the French start 
to consider food more as a basic necessity than a pleasure (Hébel 
2008). Borrowing from recent research on the social psychology of 
globalization and on the effects of cultural mixing (Morris, Mok, and 
Mor 2011; Torelli et al. 2011), we argue that these attempts to enforce 
healthy eating can be perceived by French consumers as something 
that is both foreign to their culture and symbolic of utilitarian values 
that are inconsistent with the Frenchness of food enjoyment. In this 
research, we focused on the case of nutrition information because this 
is one of the most visible and noticeable aspects of public health plans 
designed to fight obesity. Indeed, in France, most food items display 
nutrition information (Storcksdieck genannt Bonsmann et al. 2010).
Thus, because food enjoyment is a central aspect of French 
culture, providing nutrition information in food could induce feelings 
of cultural contamination and its concomitant negative reactions 
(Chiu et al. 2011; Torelli and Ahluwalia 2012; Torelli et al. 2011). As 
a result, we believe that the exposure to nutrition information when 
French identity is made salient will enhance the perception that it 
is associated with values impervious to the in-group (i.e., utilitarian 
values). The current research is based on the assumption that 
nutrition information in foods is perceived as a cultural contaminant, 
or as an attempt to add something foreign to a cultural symbol. We 
report three studies that investigate the evaluative and cognitive 
consequences among French consumers of presenting nutrition 
information in foods upon making French cultural identity salient 
(vs. not).
Study 1 examined the influence of making French identity 
salience (vs. not) on processing fluency. This prediction is consistent 
with past research, which suggests that exposure to bicultural products 
(i.e., those that are culturally incongruent or that juxtapose symbols 
of contrastive cultural traditions) increases processing difficulty 
(Torelli and Ahluwalia 2012). Identity salience was manipulated 
by asking 218 French undergraduates to list three reasons someone 
might prefer to live in France or to study at their college. Following 
the cultural identity salience manipulation, participants were asked 
to assess the nutrition labeling of either a healthy version or an 
unhealthy version of a ready-made meal. As predicted, in the French 
identity condition, participants rated nutrition information as more 
difficult to process than those in the college identity condition. A 
moderator mediation analysis indicated that feelings of processing 
difficulty mediated the relationship between cultural identity 
salience and perceived healthiness when the food item was framed 
as unhealthy but not when the food item was framed as healthy.
Study 2 proposed that French consumers will assess food 
items containing French primes as less healthy than food items 
containing neutral primes when nutrition information is provided. 
We expect that simultaneous exposure to nutrition information and 
iconic symbols makes accessible the stereotype that French food is 
unhealthy (Lee, Kim, and Vohs 2011) and, consequently, increases 
risk perceptions. 138 French adults participated in an online 
experiment. We primed cultural identity by exposing the participants 
to a food item that contained either French identity primes or neutral 
primes. Additionally, nutrition information or general information 
about how to preserve the product properly was shown to 
participants. Participants exposed to French primes reported higher 
risk perceptions in the presence of nutrition information than those 
exposed to neutral primes. Thus, cultural contamination induced by 
nutrition information exposure triggered defensive mechanisms that 
drive participants to devaluate the healthiness of culturally iconic 
food items.
Study 3 aimed to further demonstrate the negative reactions 
induced by cultural contamination by extending it to product 
evaluations. A sample of French adults (N=165) recruited from an 
online consumer panel completed the questions designed to make 
the French identity salient. In order to check that product actual 
healthiness does not moderate cultural contamination effects, two 
food items were tested (a virtue and a vice). Feelings of cultural 
contamination were induced by providing or not nutrition information 
to participants. Findings showed that belonging to the vice or 
virtue category did not influence participants’ responses to cultural 
contamination. However, a direct effect of nutrition information 
on product evaluations emerged. Further analysis revealed that 
the decrease in evaluations of products was due to a reduction of 
anticipated pleasure and perceived Frenchness.
This article examines how culturally incompatible marketplace 
cues influence cognitive and evaluative processes. More specifically, 
we have found that nutrition information, which is usually treated as a 
neutral stimulus in the marketing literature, is perceived as a cultural 
contaminant by French consumers. The reason is that nutrition 
information symbolizes a food model (utilitarianistic) antagonistic 
to the French one (hedonistic). Our results support the findings that 
apparently innocuous global standards in nutrition information is 
perceived as cultural contaminants and that these feelings of cultural 
contamination lead to meta-cognitive experience of disfluency and 
exclusionary responses (i.e., product derogation).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Humor is a psychological response characterized by the posi-
tive emotion of amusement, the appraisal that something is funny, 
and the tendency to laugh (Martin 2007; McGraw et al. 2012; Veatch 
1998). Consumers seek humor in products, activities, and relation-
ships, because humor is enjoyable and contributes to psychological 
and physical well-being (Martin 2007). Despite its benefits in con-
sumption contexts, marketing research has focused largely on humor 
in advertising (e.g., Eisend 2009; Gulas and Weinberger 2006; Wolt-
man et al. 2004). Focusing only on humor in an advertising context, 
however, may be inhibiting the development of broader theoretical 
and practical insights. Thus, we turn our attention to the important 
topic of what drives perceptions of humor in consumption contexts. 
The most popular humor theories suggest that humor occurs 
when one perceives an incongruity (Morreall 2009; Nerhardt 1970; 
Woltman Elpers et al. 2004). The literature, however, has not defined 
or operationalized incongruity consistently. Some define incongruity 
as something unexpected (i.e., surprise), whereas others define it as 
something that is different than what typically occurs (i.e., atypical-
ity) or as a contrast of concepts or ideas that do not normally go 
together (i.e., juxtaposition). Moreover, some versions of incongru-
ity theory suggest that humor occurs only when an incongruity is 
resolved, or made sense of, in some way (Suls 1972; Woltman Elpers 
et al. 2004). Although the variants of incongruity theory have led to 
useful insights in the perception of humor in jokes (e.g., Suls 1972; 
Shultz 1972) and advertisements (e.g., Alden, Hoyer, and Lee 1993; 
Woltman Elpers et al. 2004), we contend that they have difficulty 
explaining the perception of what is funny (and what is not funny) in 
many consumption experiences.
We empirically compare the different variants of incongruity 
theory (surprise, atypicality, juxtaposition, and incongruity-resolu-
tion) to an emerging theory that suggests that humor occurs when 
one simultaneously appraises something as both a violation and as 
benign (McGraw and Warren 2010, McGraw et al. 2012; Veatch 
1998). A violation is anything that threatens one’s sense of how 
things should be, including physical threats (e.g., tickling), identity 
threats (e.g., teasing), and behaviors that break cultural (e.g., inap-
propriate attire), social (e.g., flatulence), moral (e.g., bestiality), 
conversational (e.g., sarcasm), linguistic (e.g., a strange accent), or 
logic norms (e.g., absurdities). A violation is benign if it also seems 
sensible, acceptable, or okay in some way. 
There are a number of similarities between the variants of in-
congruity theory and a benign violation account. In many cases, 
benign violations are surprising and portray a resolved incongruity. 
Furthermore, benign violations are necessarily atypical and involve 
juxtaposition. There are, however, also situations in which the benign 
violation theory and incongruity theories make diverging predic-
tions. Our studies examine whether the benign violation theory better 
explains perceptions of humor across different types of consumption 
experiences than four variants of incongruity theory: surprise (study 
1), atypicality (study 2), juxtaposition (study 3), and incongruity-
resolution (study 4).
Study 1 (N=47) examines perceptions of humor in a Youtube 
video in which an amateur athlete attempts a pole vault. We crossed 
participants’ expectations with the actual outcome of the pole vault 
attempt. Consistent with the benign violation theory but not with 
incongruity theories rooted in surprise, participants who observed 
a violation (a failed attempt) found the video more humorous than 
participants who did not observe a violation (a successful attempt) 
irrespective of whether they expected the attempt to succeed or fail 
(MExpectedViolation=3.95, MUnexpectedViolation=3.06, MExpectedSuccess=2.33, MUnex-
pectedSuccess=2.26).
Study 2 examines whether the presence of a benign violation 
or an incongruity (operationalized as atypicality) better explains dif-
ferences between humorous and non-humorous sports plays. Par-
ticipants (N=101) either described a humorous sports play or one of 
three types of non-humorous plays: a routine play, a tragic play, or an 
amazing play. After describing the play, they rated whether the play 
seemed atypical (i.e., incongruous), worse than normal (i.e., a viola-
tion), and to have either a positive effect or no effect (i.e., benign). 
Incongruity was incapable of distinguishing humorous plays from 
non-humorous tragic or amazing plays. Although most humorous 
plays were atypical (87%), amazing plays (93%) and tragic plays 
(68%) were equally likely to seem atypical. In contrast, humorous 
plays were far more likely to contain benign violations (43%) than 
the routine (4%), amazing (0%), or tragic plays (9%). 
Study 3 examines whether juxtaposition in general or the spe-
cific juxtaposition of a benign violation better explains perceptions 
of humor in consumer products. Marketing students (N=86) identi-
fied a product that juxtaposed features in a useful way (juxtaposition 
without violation), juxtaposed features in a useless way (benign vio-
lation), or did not juxtapose features (no juxtaposition). Juxtaposition 
alone did not produce humor, as products that juxtaposed features in 
a useful way were not perceived to be any more humorous than prod-
ucts that did not juxtaposed features (M = 2.43 vs. 2.50). In contrast, 
products in which the juxtaposition featured a benign violation were 
more likely to seem humorous (M = 3.71). Incongruity, when defined 
as juxtaposition, may be an important ingredient in humor, but it is 
not a sufficient explanation because many products involving juxta-
position seem innovative rather than humorous.
Study 4 examines whether the presence of a benign violation or 
a resolved incongruity better explains differences between humorous 
and non-humorous everyday consumption experiences. One group 
of participants (N=29) objectively described a funny experience, a 
tragic experience, and a normal experience. Another group (N=19) 
coded either whether the experiences contained a resolved-incongru-
ity or whether they contained a benign violation. Both incongruity 
resolution theory and the benign violation theory discriminated hu-
morous experiences from normal experiences. However, incongru-
ity resolution was unable to explain differences between funny and 
tragic experiences (17% vs. 20% contained a resolved incongruity, 
respectively), whereas the benign violation theory was able to (25% 
vs. 10% contained a benign violation, respectively).
Although the benign violation theory did not perfectly explain 
humor across different consumption domains, it provided a better ex-
planation than leading humor theories based on incongruity. We hope 
our research encourages the field to continue to explore the question 
of what makes consumption experiences humorous.
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When Color Meets Health: The Impact of Package Colors on the Perception of Food 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The rising obesity epidemic (Flegal, Carroll, Kit, and Ogden 
2012) arouses consumers’ healthy eating concerns and motivates 
food manufactures to improve the nutritional content of their 
products towards a healthier direction. In a real-life grocery shopping 
situation, however, consumers often lack time or motivation to 
search and process detailed nutrition information to support their 
judgment and purchase decision (Wansink and Sobal 2007). Thus, 
visual cues, such as color, become critically influential because 
processing this type of information requires little cognitive resource. 
Although substantial research has been given to food color (e.g., 
Stillman 1993, Christensen 1985), the package color, as influential 
visual information on food decision making, is overlooked. This 
research aims to explore the effect of package color on consumer’s 
perception and behavioral intention on contained food. We expect 
that food in blue package is perceived healthier and hence associated 
with a higher purchase intention than in red package.
Furthermore, in the present research foods are categorized as 
utilitarian or hedonic products based on the major motives behind 
their consumption. The consumption of utilitarian foods is driven by 
their functions (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000), such as quest hunger 
or reduce diseases risks, whereas the desire to eat hedonic foods is 
mainly driven by the anticipated hedonic experience of eating, such 
as the palatability of foods (Benforado, Hanson, and Yosifon 2004). 
Empirical findings revealed that hedonic foods may not be intuitively 
perceived as healthy as utilitarian foods because sensory pleasure 
often are associated with sweet, salty, and fatty hedonic foods 
(Assanand, Pinel, and Lehman 1998, Wertenbroch 1998). Therefore, 
we expect that compared to utilitarian foods, the potential influence 
of package color on consumer’s perception of food healthiness 
should be less salience for hedonic foods since they have already 
been intuitively perceived as unhealthy. 
To highlight the nutritional content on packages, food producers 
often present labels on the package to make general nutrition claims. 
As concise as these labels are, they are sometimes ambiguous. For 
example, “light” is used to imply the healthiness in comparison 
with “regular” foods. When exposed to ambiguous information, 
consumers tend to search for additional information to confirm their 
expectation and reduce ambiguity (Hoch and Ha 1986), and the 
package color can serve as “additional information”. According to the 
Selective Accessibility Model (SAM) (Mussweiler 2003), contextual 
information (e.g., package color) often provides an easily accessible 
standard and interpretation frame when there is ambiguity. We expect 
that if the verbal cue is ambiguous, the package color will have an 
assimilation effect on consumers’ perception of food healthiness 
and purchase intention. Specifically, we postulate that label effect is 
stronger in the condition that package color is congruent with label 
than that of incongruent conditions. The term “congruence” in this 
research refers to whether the effects of label and package color on 
the healthiness expectation or purchase intention are consistent with 
each other.
Without the presence of ambiguous labels, Study1 (N=34) 
aimed to explore the effect of package color on healthiness perception 
and purchase intention. While looking at pictures of six food/
beverage packages (hedonic: potato chips, ice-cream, and ice-tea; 
utilitarian: cereal, yogurt, and milk), participants were asked to rate 
their perception of food healthiness (1-item) and purchase intention 
(3-item; α=0.91) to the presented products. For each product, two 
packages were designed with solid red (Hue: 0º, Saturation: 100%, 
Brightness: 100%) or blue (Hue: 240º, Saturation: 100%, Brightness: 
100%) covering 90% of package surface. 
Study2 (N=80) applied a similar protocol to test the color effect 
in a condition that ambiguous labels were presented hinting the 
nutrition value of products (color-label assimilation effect). For each 
of the products (utilitarian: yogurt and milk; hedonic: potato chips 
and ice-cream), there were four designs using red or blue (as Study1) 
as the package color and “regular” or “light” as the nutrition label. 
The participant’s perception of product healthiness and purchase 
intention was analyzed in mixed models for repeated measurement 
with within-subject factors of package color (red vs. blue), product 
category (hedonic vs. utilitarian), nutrition label (light vs. regular in 
Study2), and their interactions.
Results from the analyses on healthiness perception in both 
studies suggested that products in red packages were perceived to 
be less healthy than in blue (ps<0.001). The interaction of color by 
product category (ps<0.03) further showed that, such an effect was 
particularly significant for utilitarian (ps<0.001) but not for hedonic 
products. The color-label assimilation effect in Study2 suggested 
that the difference between regular- and light-labeled products was 
observed in congruent condition (blue-light vs. red-regular: p<0.001), 
but not in incongruent condition (blue-regular vs. red-light; p>0.9). 
In terms of purchase intention, participants in both studies 
reported higher intention to purchase blue- than red-packaged 
products (ps<0.04). Such an effect was particularly salient for 
utilitarian products (study2: p=0.02), but not for hedonic products. 
Study2 further revealed that label effect was significant (p=0.01) only 
if the color and label information were congruent (assimilation effect).
Further analyses revealed the color effect on purchase intention 
was mediated by healthiness perception. That is, the color effect on 
purchase intention was not significant after controlling the healthiness 
perception, while healthiness perception directly predicted purchase 
intention (p<0.001).
This is the first experiment of its kind designed to investigate 
the influence of package color on consumers’ perception of food 
healthiness and purchase intention. In line with a general color 
research in marketing (Labrecque and Milne 2012), the significant 
effect of color reported in both studies points out the potential 
that using package color as marketing cues in agri-food sector, 
accompanied with consistent verbal cues, can not only differentiate 
food products but also influence consumer’s perception and attitude 
toward such products. Future research may further investigate 
additional determinants, such as dieting habits and other individual 
differences, in order to better identify the enhancers of or detractors 
from the current paradigm.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
English speakers often refer to themselves via first-person nar-
rative forms, such as “I think” or “in my opinion”. One variation 
on this type of self-reference is known as illeism, where individuals 
refer to themselves using a third-person narrative form. While illeism 
is often associated with narcissism as famous individuals often use 
it to appear impartial (e.g., Bob Dole: “Let me tell you what Bob 
Dole thinks” Garner 2009), it is also used by average individuals 
in everyday conversations (e.g., Land and Kitzinger 2007) and even 
with what could be considered the opposite of narcissism—submis-
sion (e.g., DesRivieres 2010). Illeism is part of consumers’ everyday 
lives, most notably in contracts (e.g., “John promises to do X in ex-
change for Y”) and direct marketing communications (e.g., “We have 
all that John will need this fishing season”). As a result, illeism can 
be present at key moments in the life of a consumer, such as when 
signing a contract for a new house or deciding to become an organ 
donor. It is with difficult decisions such as these, that consumers of-
ten face a strong internal conflict between what they would like to do 
based on affect and impulsive behavior, and what they know is the 
best choice based on deliberate thought and their long-term goals. As 
a result, this work examines how illeism can influence decision mak-
ing under such conflicts. For example, if Jane were to decide between 
buying a new coat (impulsive choice) or making a donation (deliber-
ate choice), how would her decision be influenced if the charitable 
request, instead of being framed in a first-person narrative on the self 
(e.g., “I will donate $___”) were instead framed in an illeistic manner 
(e.g., “Jane will donate $____”)? 
Because research exploring the role of self-reference forms in 
decision making is scant, we use research on self-distancing (e.g., 
Arriaga and Rusbult 1998) along with the Metcalfe and Mischel 
(1999) hot-cool systems framework. This framework proposes that 
highly affective stimuli increase the probability of processing via a 
hot system (which is emotional and reflexive) leading to impulsive 
behavior. The cool system (which is cognitive and strategic), the seat 
of self-control, can intercede and regulate these impulses in favor of 
long-term goals (Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss 1972). Per the self-
distancing literature, recalling negative events from a self-immersed 
perspective (first-person perspective) leads individuals to over-focus 
on the concrete details of their experience, thus generating “hot nega-
tive affect” (Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel 2005). In contrast, recalling 
an event from a self-distanced perspective (e.g., the perspective of a 
fly on the wall) allows for the “cool” processing of the event, lead-
ing to experiences that are less emotional and have a lower level of 
physical reactivity (Ayduk and Kross 2010; Ayduk and Kross 2008; 
Kross and Ayduk 2008; Kross et al. 2005). Based on this research, 
we propose that while a first-person self-reference form creates a 
self-immersed perspective that is subject to the influence of affec-
tive cues, a third-person narrative on the self (i.e., illeism), similar to 
the “fly on the wall” manipulation, creates a self-distant perspective 
that reduces the influence of affective cues on decision making. As a 
result, during decision conflicts, illeism reduces the activation of the 
hot system allowing the cool system to supersede it. 
Five studies tested the role of illeism on decision conflicts. 
Study 1A and 1B demonstrated that requesting help from consum-
ers in an illeistic manner (vs. first-person narrative) increase their 
altruism by allowing them to suppress their selfish impulses. Study 2 
tested the influence of illeism on risk taking under uncertainty with 
affective cues designed to increase risk taking. As expected, partici-
pants in the illeism condition were less influenced by affect thus be-
coming significantly more risk-averse. Study 3 tested the underlying 
process on the domain of moral decision making through the use 
of ethical dilemmas, demonstrating that in highly affective dilem-
mas, illeism helps individuals make decisions that are more similar 
to those they made in the absence of those affective cues. Study 4 
tested the underlying process by manipulating cognitive resources, 
demonstrating that cognitive load reduces the ability of those in the 
illeism condition to overcome the influence of affect.
This work demonstrates that narrative perspective can reduce 
the influence of affect on decision making, thus fomenting decisions 
that are deliberate rather than impulsive. It also provides a unique 
mechanism through which consumers can limit the influence of af-
fect in their choices and a useful tool for marketing managers to help 
their customers connect with products that require careful consider-
ation. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There are two recent developments in marketing and consumer 
behavior that may initially seem separate but are related and can in-
fluence one another. First, companies and brands are increasingly 
selling products as experiences, focusing not on specific functional-
ities of the good but on how it feels physically and emotionally to use 
(LaSalle and Britton 2003; Newman 2012; Schmitt 2011). Second, 
thanks to social media and internet-enabled personal devices, con-
sumers are increasingly generating and relying on consumer-created 
product information (Bughin, Doogan, and Vetvik 2010; Cisco 2012). 
This research analyzes the interaction of these two developments in 
the marketplace. When a product is positioned as an experience, 
how does this influence the way consumers respond? We specifically 
study the use of product information from various sources including 
reviews and recommendations from other consumers and also the 
likelihood of providing product information in the form of a review. 
Framing Products as Experiences
Experiential aspects of consumption draw consumer affect 
(Holbrook and Hirschman 1982), are more seductive (Hoch 2002), 
and are better at advancing happiness (Van Boven and Gilovich 
2003). The implication is that experiences, or products framed as 
such, are more desirable than products. Increasingly, marketers are 
trying to capture some of this seduction and affect by positioning 
products as experiences. We confirmed the existence of this trend 
by comparing the use of experiential positioning in recent print ad-
vertisements (June 2012) versus twenty years prior (June 1992). As 
expected, the ads in the 2012 sample were significantly more likely 
to employ experiential framing than those in the 1992 sample, even 
when controlling for the number of experiential products advertised 
(movies, restaurants, etc.). 
Information Search and Closeness to Self
When examining a product, consumers can access information 
from a variety of sources, including the product description from the 
marketer (packaging, advertising), expert ratings, and recommen-
dations from others. Nelson (1970) suggested that, because expe-
riences are difficult to evaluate pre-consumption, when consumers 
consider an experience they will rely more on information coming 
from other consumers who have undergone the experience and less 
on information provided by the marketer. We hypothesize that this 
will also be the case for products framed as experiences. Addition-
ally, we propose that the mechanism behind this effect is based on 
the increased connection that consumers see between experiences 
and the self, compared to between products and the self (Carter and 
Gilovich 2012). Indeed, experiences are perceived by consumers as 
more self-defining and more central to the self than products (Carter 
and Gilovich 2012). We suggest that this greater connection between 
experiences and the self helps explain the differential consumer be-
havior with respect to recommendations. Because experiences are 
perceived close to the self, consumers turn to others close to the self 
for recommendations. Also, because consumers talk about what they 
identify with (Carroll and Ahuvia 2006; Yeh and Choi 2011), con-
sumers will be more likely to generate recommendations for experi-
ences than for products. 
Study 1
As an initial test of our theory we consider the relative use of 
recommendations from sources that vary on closeness to the self 
for products and experiences. Participants were presented with two 
products or two experiences which were either endorsed by a friend 
or an expert. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a significant 
interaction of product type and endorsement source (see figure 1). 
Participants reported liking the experience (product) better when it 
was endorsed by a friend (expert) (F(1, 336) = 20.98, p < 0.001; F(1, 
337) = 6.48, p < 0.05). Additionally, we replicate this pattern when 
comparing search versus experiential attributes within one product.
Figure 1: Study 1A, Preferences for Products and Experiences 
with Recommendations from Experts or Friends Across 
Experiences and Products
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*Preference is defined as the average of ratings of appeal and likelihood of 
purchase both on 7-point scale (α = .85).
The interaction between type of product and type of endorsement (F(1, 676) 
= 23.91, p< 0.001). Participants liked experiences endorsed by a friend more 
than those endorsed by an expert (ME Expert = 5.19, ME Friend = 5.72, F(1, 336) = 
20.98, p < 0.001) and liked products more when endorsed by an expert than 
when endorsed by a friend (MP Expert = 5.18, MP Friend = 4.84, F(1, 337) = 6.48, 
p < 0.05).
Interaction is significant: (F(1, 676 = 23.91, p < .001). There is a significant 
difference in type of source for experiences (Mexpert = 5.19, Mfriend = 5.72; F(1, 
338) = 21.26, p < .001), while the opposite was true for products (Mexpert = 
5.18, Mfriend = 4.84; F(1, 338) = 6.36, p < .05).
Study 2
Going forward we consider the same search good framed as 
either a product or an experience. We study how such product fram-
ing influences reliance on product information from different sources 
and we also formally test for mediation. Participants saw one of two 
advertisements for a pair of running shoes where the information 
content of the two ads was held constant but the positioning varied 
between regular product framing or experiential framing (imagery 
language, added sound, and emphasis on how it feels to use). Partici-
pants who saw the experience-framed ad ranked recommendations 
from friends as more useful than did participants who saw the prod-
uct-framed ad (F(1, 23) = 7.08, p < 0.05). Participants who saw the 
product-framed ad ranked the marketer-provided product description 
as (marginally) more useful than did participants who saw the expe-
rience-framed ad (F(1, 23) = 3.54, p < 0.10) (see figure 2). In sup-
port of our proposed mechanism, bootstrapping tests revealed that 
perceived closeness to self of the product mediated this interaction.
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Figure 2: Study 2, Rank of Information Sources for 
Experientially and Non-Experientially Framed Products 
(reverse scored)
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Interaction is significant interaction (F(1, 50) = 10.62, p < 0.01). 
Recommendations from friends was ranked higher for the experience-
framed shoes than for the product-framed shoes (ME shoes = 2.00 vs. MP 
shoes = 1.00, F(1, 23) = 7.08, p < 0.05). On the other hand, description 
of the product was ranked higher for the product-framed shoes than for 
the experience-framed shoes, although this effect was only marginally 
significant (ME shoes = 0.28 vs. MP shoes = 0.79, F(1, 23) = 3.54, p < 
0.10). Those who were exposed to the experience-framed ad ranked 
recommendations from friends significantly higher than product description 
(MDescription = 0.79 vs. MRecommendation = 1.00, F(1, 26) = 0.37, NS). While those 
who saw the product-framed ad were indifferent between the sources 
(MDescription = 0.27 vs. MRecommendation = 2.00, F(1, 22) = 40.11, p < 0.001). None 
of the other sources of information presented any significant differences.
Study 3
Study 3 considered how experiential product framing influenc-
es consumer creation of product information. Using the same stimuli 
as in study 2, participants who saw the experience-framed shoe ad 
reported a higher likelihood of writing a review than those who saw 
the product-framed shoes (F(1, 121) = 4.43, p < 0.05) (see figure 3). 
This result was mediated by perceived closeness to the self of the 
shoes. 
Figure 3: Study 3, Likelihood of Writing a Review for Search 
and Experience Frame
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Consumers who saw the experience-framed shoes reported a higher 
likelihood of writing a review than those who saw the product-framed shoes 
condition (MExperience-shoes = 5.31 vs. MProduct-shoes = 4.82, F(1, 121) = 4.43, p < 
0.05). There was no effect of experience valence on likelihood of reviewing 
(M
Satisfied
 = 4.92 vs. M
Dissatisfied 
= 5.27, F(1, 122) = 2.43, NS), nor did these two 
factors interact.
Study 4
Finally, to confirm the existence of an effect of experiential 
framing on likelihood to review with actual consumer behavior, we 
examined the relationship between product framing and the number 
of consumer reviews on Amazon.com. A coder rated the experiential 
nature of the product descriptions of the top ten products in each 
of 30 product categories on Amazon.com. Controlling for product 
category, average price, and average review rating, we find an ef-
fect of framing on number of consumer reviews. Products with more 
experiential product descriptions garnered more consumer reviews 
(F(3, 279) = 13.59, p < .001). 
Our understanding of the differences between experiential and 
non-experiential consumption has focused on the consequences, 
rather than on the decision-making process. This research offers in-
sight on an important influence on choice. In this experiential econ-
omy, these findings offer strong implications and cautions to those 
aiming to position their brand as an experience. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We explore the dynamics of consumption experience in tradi-
tional bazaars constructed as the new ‘other’ retail spaces. The ba-
zaar, once known to be the consumption space that was a signifier 
of the lower class identity (Urry 1991) and is characterized by eco-
nomic poverty (Varman and Costa 2009), is redesigned to include 
upper classes, now in the form of High Society Bazaars (HSBs) in 
Turkey, and enhance shopping experience for diverse social class-
es. We study consumption of space with a distinct difference from 
earlier studies, where the spaces consumed are often organized by 
authorities, whether municipal governments or private owners of 
spaces (Benjamin 2002; Miller 1998; Urry 1995). In the HSB, space 
is mostly designed by its inhabitants; the sellers, who are small ven-
dors independent of the authorities, and the shoppers, who influence 
how the stalls will be stocked and displayed by their motion as they 
visit the HSB. 
We aim to contribute to the literature on consumption of space 
through reflecting the transition from consumption of space (Belk et 
al. 1988; Sherry 1990a, 1990b, 1998; Urry 1995) to construction of 
space that is an active, contested and transitive process involving ne-
gotiation (Goodman et al. 2010). Most importantly, we discover the 
means used by consumers to construct and negotiate their space in 
the HSB. This focus led us discover the dynamics of identity politics 
of/within consumption spaces. Findings of the qualitative data ob-
tained as a result of focus group and in-depth interviews with bazaar 
consumers and sellers, and participant observations reveal the means 
of constructing space in the HSB, which include hybridization, li-
censing, and negotiation. 
HSB is constructed as a hybrid space, not the ‘original’ for ei-
ther the westernized or the traditional, thus a different order for both, 
but one that allows meeting and experiencing the other. Observed 
in the upper class experiences of HSB, the strange (people’s and 
sellers’ attitudes and attires) mixed in with the familiar (wares be-
ing sold, selling and buying going on), thus the hybrid, attracts the 
‘westernized’; for them the HSB is a familiarly novel, engaging, and 
entertaining environment. The HSB is primitive, untamed, and not 
fully ‘cultured’ or rationally ordered, but it is seductive for the same 
reasons. For the lower class, the presence of upper classes in the HSB 
has turned these bazaars into something bazaars were not before, a 
different ‘other’ space, a hybrid, where the other can be encountered. 
For the ‘traditional’, the encounter with the ‘other’ is both allur-
ing and a confirmation of a new status, an equality with the ‘other’ 
that used to be superior. The inclusion of the upper classes in HSBs 
is presented as a renegotiation of the image of the bazaar as an ‘ordi-
nary’ space for all, not exceptionally an experience for poor people. 
The hybrid HSB now constitutes a new order for the traditional, who 
still have the old bazaars to frequent, but especially for the modern-
ized, who still have the modern stores to shop at. The HSB becomes a 
‘leveling’ (Karababa and Ger 2010) space for consumers from differ-
ent social strata initially representing different and conflicting identi-
ties (traditional, modernized), where they can negotiate their space 
on an equal footing. Lower classes find license they did not have 
before in their relations with the upper classes in the HSB, whereas 
the upper classes accede the license of the lower class, which they 
did not before. For both elements, the sought consequence of this 
negotiation is the ability to experience the ‘other’ and ‘becoming the 
other’ in order to be included in the HSB. 
The possibility of negotiation in the ‘new’ environment as op-
posed to the regimented order of that which is set, contributes to 
the allure of experiencing the other. Constrained by the disciplinary 
and relatively non-negotiable structure of the contemporary markets, 
upper classes lose their ability to have pleasurable consumption ex-
periences, a condition that could be transformed through actually 
experiencing those they have otherized; yet it must emerge through 
mutual choice and negotiation (Hooks 2006). HSBs allow for this 
transformation to occur, and negotiation takes place at many levels. 
Seeming lack of  a script of shopping at bazaars gives way to con-
tinual bargaining between the sellers and buyers; stimulates com-
petition among shoppers to reach, explore, and acquire the sought 
products, and provides a space to experience the ‘other’ and her/his 
tastes (Belk et al. 2003).
We also draw attention to the tensions occurring at the macro 
level. We highlight the tension between bazaar sellers and the news 
media, as sellers oppose the labeling of the bazaar as a High Soci-
ety retail venue and argue that HSB is a public bazaar inhabited by 
people from all social classes. In addition, we highlight the tension 
between HSB inhabitants (sellers and consumers) and the municipal-
ity and other modern retail stores aiming to exert control over the 
uncontrollable economy and the unfair trade competition the HSBs 
create.
Consequently, HSBs have altered the discourse on social class 
and consumption and production of/within space. We observe trans-
formations in upper and lower class desires to experience each other 
and the HSB as the other consumption venue. Negotiation of the 
order(s) and navigation of one’s space in the HSB draw our atten-
tion to the concept of liminality (Sherry 1990a; Turner 1967), a state 
of in-betweenness, which gives way to cultural hybridity (Bhabha 
1994) that promotes difference without an imposed hierarchy among 
social strata. HSB serves as a physical space that is socially con-
structed to experience and construct otherness (Lefebvre 1991). 
Construction of space is characterized by a constantly transforming 
interplay (Meethan et al. 2006) between the lower classes as the local 
residents of the bazaar, the sellers, and the elite sectors of the popula-
tion visiting the bazaar. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Most people will agree that, except for products like a sunroof 
whose mere ownership can be a source of enjoyment, consumers 
must consider how often they expect to use whatever they intend to 
buy. Yet we show that consumers may fail to do so.
It is well established that consumers often construct their 
preferences on the spot (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Now, 
usually there is nothing in the product itself or in the shopping 
environment to prompt consumers to consider usage frequency. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that consumers will spontaneously consider 
usage frequency, because research in psychology has shown 
that decisions are driven mostly by information that is explicitly 
presented (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Legrenzi, Girotto, and 
Johnson-Laird 1993). Therefore, we suggest that consumers may 
neglect usage frequency when making a purchase decision. There 
is evidence that consumers can indeed neglect critical information 
when considering a purchase. For example, Frederick et al. (2009) 
reported several studies in which consumers neglected opportunity 
costs when making a purchase decision.
If, while making a purchase decision, consumers indeed neglect 
(or underweight) how often they expect to use the product they 
consider buying as we hypothesize, then interventions that bring to 
mind usage frequency shall influence their choices. Three studies 
support our hypothesis.
Study 1
In study 1 we tested whether a simple reminder that a product 
is used often influences consumers’ preferences. Participants 
(n=105) were asked to imagine that they went to a store to buy a 
new mattress and decided to read a brochure with “three points to 
consider when choosing a mattress.” We randomly assigned them to 
one of two conditions: usage-frequency or control. The brochure had 
three points. The first two points were identical to both conditions 
and did not relate to usage frequency. The third point reminded 
them of the usage frequency (“Recall that you will be sleeping on 
it virtually every day.”) in the usage-frequency condition, and was 
inconsequential (“Before making up your mind, first narrow down 
your choice to three or four options.”) in the control condition. 
Then they were asked to choose an option from among three models 
available that varied in price and overall quality. As expected, those 
who were subtly reminded that one uses a mattress every day chose 
the premium model more often than those who were not (25% vs. 
8% respectively; chi-square(1) = 5.48, p = .02). This result provides 
initial evidence that people do not spontaneously account for usage 
frequency in making product choices.
Study 2
In study 2 we replicated the results of study 1 and addressed 
an alternative explanation. MBA students (n=122) were asked to 
imagine that they went to a store to buy a digital camera and decided 
to read a small brochure called “How to choose a digital camera.” We 
randomly assigned them to one of three conditions: frequency, liking, 
or control. The brochure had two questions that were identical to 
all participants and a third question that was our manipulation. This 
third question read either “How often do you plan to take pictures 
using artistic features?” (frequency condition), or “How much do 
you like to take pictures using artistic features?” (liking condition), 
or “Are you going to take pictures mostly indoors or outdoors?” 
(control condition). We then asked participants to choose between 
two camera models that only differed in price and in the presence of 
an artistic feature allowing consumers to take pictures in black and 
white plus one other color. In a separate pretest consumers thought 
this feature would be used infrequently.
The proportions choosing the model with the artistic feature that 
was expected to be used infrequently were 31% in the frequency, 
61% in the liking, and 61% in the control conditions. The difference 
between the frequency and control conditions was statistically 
significant (chi-square(1) = 7.29, p < .01), but that between the liking 
and control conditions was not (chi-square(1) = .0001). Priming 
usage frequency had an effect as compared to the control group, but 
priming liking did not. This suggests that our intervention works only 
if people do not have the primed concept previously accessible in 
their minds. It is unlikely then that our manipulation simply caused 
people to exaggerate the importance of an attribute (note that the 
priming of liking had no effect).
Study 3
In study 3 we not only primed but also manipulated usage 
frequency to implicate it unambiguously in the pattern of choices 
observed. Participants (n=242) were assigned to one of four conditions 
in a 2 (frequency priming vs. control) x 2 (usage frequency: high 
vs. low) between-subjects design to take two purportedly unrelated 
studies. In the first study they did a scrambled sentence task. The 
scrambled sentences were either related to frequency (priming 
frequency condition) or neutral (control condition). In the second 
study we asked participants to choose between two USB flash drives 
and manipulated usage frequency by suggesting they would work 
on files directly from the device or store a backup of their files. 
The models differed only in data-transfer speed, design, and price 
such that the more expensive model looked better and was faster. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, when we primed participants with 
usage frequency, those in high-frequency condition chose the model 
more appropriate for frequent users (faster, better looking) more 
often than those in the low-frequency condition (60%  vs. 38%; chi-
square(1) = 5.67, p = .02), but not in the control condition (57% vs. 
48%, chi-square(1) = .84). Without a reminder frequency seems to 
have no influence in consumers’ preferences.
Our studies show that in the absence of a reminder people tend 
to neglect – or significantly underweight – usage frequency, which in 
turn might lead them to make suboptimal choices. Usage frequency 
neglect can make consumers buy less (studies 1 and 3) or more 
than they need (study 2). This research has important implications 
for consumer decision-making as well as consumer well-being by 
showing that consumers are neglecting an important aspect in their 
purchase decisions.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People often compare themselves with superior others 
when striving for a goal. Research has shown that upward social 
comparison motivates people to improve oneself in order to close 
the gap between themselves and the superior others (Van de Ven et 
al. 2011). Similarly, goal literature has demonstrated that comparison 
to superior others signals a lack of goal progress and hence increases 
motivation to engage in goal-congruent action (Fishbach et al. 2006). 
In this stream of research, upward comparison is usually described as 
any situation in which one is outperformed by others. This research, 
however, posits that holding the relative distance between the self and 
others constant, people are less motivated when they perceive that the 
superior others have already achieved the goal. Objectively though, 
the others’ goal attainment should have no negative consequences for 
their own goal attainment. 
We propose that a decrease in motivation when observing 
others’ goal attainment (compared to when superior others are simply 
performing better), is caused by feelings of being beaten. Consistent 
with this explanation, we predict that people are less likely to become 
demotivated if they focus more on their own progress. In addition, 
this feeling of being beaten and hence the subsequent demotivation 
should also decrease if the other person achieving the goal is 
someone close (i.e., close friends). We also examine how observing 
others’ goal attainment influences performance in a subsequent task. 
We predict that it may ironically motivate people to perform better, 
as the subsequent task provides a new opportunity to outperform 
the superior others. However, such effect should only happen when 
the subsequent task is related to the focal task, because performing 
better than the others in an unrelated task does not help to reduce the 
gap between themselves and the superior others on the considered 
dimension. 
Three experiments tested these hypotheses. Experiment 1 
used a 2 (priming: self vs. other) x 3 (other’s goal attainment: goal 
attained-low self progress vs. goal attained-high self progress vs. goal 
unattained-low self-progress) between-subjects design. Participants 
first conducted a story-writing task about themselves versus another 
student to induce self-other focus (Goukens et al. 2009). Next, 
participants imagined joining a loyalty program offered by a café. In 
the program, they could receive one stamp for each coffee purchased. 
After accumulating 10 stamps, they could enjoy a free coffee. 
Participants imagined meeting another student who joined the same 
program. In the goal unattained-low self progress condition, the other 
student supposedly had accumulated 8 stamps (no free coffee yet), 
while they only had 6 stamps. In the two goal attained conditions, the 
other student already had 10 stamps (free coffee), while they only 
had 8 stamps in the high self-progress condition and 6 stamps in the 
low self-progress condition respectively (hence the 3 goal attainment 
conditions are 8-6 vs. 10-8 vs. 10-6). After the scenario, participants 
indicated how likely they would go to that café (compared to a café 
closer on their way to campus). As expected, in the other-focus 
condition, the likelihood to visit the cafe was lower when the other 
student already attained the goal versus not, regardless of high or low 
self progress. In contrast and in line with the goal gradient research 
(Kivetz et al. 2006), those in the self-focus condition reported higher 
likelihood to visit the café when they themselves had high progress 
(8 stamps) compared to low progress (6 stamps), regardless of the 
other student’s goal attainment. 
Experiment 2 used a 3 (priming: self vs. friend vs. co-worker) x 
2 (other’s goal attainment: attained vs. unattained) design to identify 
another boundary condition for the demotivating effect of the other 
person’s goal attainment. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were 
asked to first write a story either about themselves, a friend or a co-
worker. Participants then took part in a task that purportedly tested 
their mathematical skills in two parts (Huang and Zhang 2011). If 
they reached 100 points in total, they could enter a lottery to win 
€50 coupon. After Part I, participants received feedback about their 
own and another (anonymous) participant’s performance, in which 
we manipulated the other’s goal attainment. In the goal attained 
(unattained) condition, participants were told that they earned 
80 (60) points, while the other earned 100 (80) points. After the 
feedback, participants started Part II, which included math questions 
that were unsolvable. Time spent on the task was used as an indicator 
of motivation. Results showed that in the co-worker condition, 
participants spent less time on the task when the other achieved the 
goal vs. not, thus replicating the previous findings. More importantly, 
when friend was primed, the time spent did not differ regardless of the 
other’s goal attainment. Finally, when self was primed, participants 
spent more time in the goal attained (vs. unattained) condition similar 
to Experiment 1. 
Finally, Experiment 3 examined whether the negative effect 
on motivation transferred to a subsequent task. This study used 
a 2 (other’s goal attainment: attained vs. unattained) x 2 (task 
relatedness: unrelated vs. related) between-subjects design. Similar 
to Experiment 2, participants were first asked to write a story about 
a co-worker. Next, they worked on a separate task that tested their 
verbal skills in two parts. After Part I, they again received feedback 
about their own and another (anonymous) participant’s performance. 
This study held the performance feedback constant across conditions, 
but manipulated whether the other’s performance was equal to the 
end goal or not. In both goal attainment conditions, participants 
were told that they obtained 60 points, whereas the other participant 
obtained 80 points. Only in the goal attained condition, it was added 
that 80 points is also the amount of points required to be labeled “a 
qualified expert in verbal skills”. In the goal unattained condition, 
no further information about the end goal was provided. After the 
feedback, participants filled in Part II of the verbal test. We used 
the number of solutions attempted as a measure of motivation. Next, 
participants were asked to take part in another study, a proofreading 
task. We manipulated the task relatedness by highlighting whether 
the previous verbal task and the proofreading task involved related 
or unrelated psychological processes. We examined the number 
of correct answers as an indicator of performance. Replicating the 
previous findings, the number of attempted solutions in Part II of the 
focal task was lower in the goal attained condition than in the goal 
unattained condition. In the goal attained condition, performance was 
better in the subsequent task when it was related (vs. unrelated) to the 
focal task. Conversely, participants in the goal unattained condition 
did not differ in performance regardless of the task relatedness.
Taken together, results from our studies show that not all 
upward social comparisons have the same effect on motivation. 
Holding relative distance the same, the perception of someone else 
who already achieved the goal can be demotivating, although it 
might also have positive influences on other related tasks. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The effectiveness of visual communication depends on its 
stylistic properties (e.g., camera angle, orientation of an object, and 
visual perspective) (Yang et al. 2010). In this project, we will focus 
on the actor-like vs. observer-like visual perspective. An actor-like 
perspective assumes an active participant’s perspective while an 
observer-like perspective assumes a detached onlooker’s perspective 
to audiences (Libby et al. 2009). A growing body of research has been 
conducted in social psychology and social cognition to examine the 
effect of visual perspective on memory and attribution in the context 
of social event (Libby et al. 2009). With different visual perspectives 
so frequently adopted in marketing practice through camera angle 
(Meyers-Levy & Peracchio 1996), it would be interesting to study 
the impact of visual perspective on consumers’ product evaluations 
and behavioral intentions. Specifically, to what extent are the visual 
perspectives effective in persuading audiences? And what role does 
the audience’s self-concept (ideal vs. ought) play in the process? 
This project is designed to answer these questions. Drawing upon 
research from social cognition, self-concept, and visual processing, 
we predict that when an actor (observer) visual perspective is used 
to promote a product or service, participants with an ideal (ought) 
self will have more favorable evaluations than those with an ought 
(ideal) self. These predictions are tested in two experiments. 
Findings of the project will contribute to consumer research on visual 
communication and self concept and offer implications for creating 
marketing messages. 
Research has shown that different visual perspectives make 
people access different aspects of the information, which in turn 
affect their emotions (Hung & Mukhopadhyay 2012), interpretation 
of actions (Libby & Eibach 2002), and judgment and decision making 
(Jones & Nisbett 1972). For example, Hung & Mukhopadhyay (2012) 
found that an actor (observer) perspective makes consumers focus 
more on the situation (the self in the situation), which in turn elicits 
different emotions. This suggests that an observer’s perspective 
facilitates greater attention to the self whereas an actor’s perspective 
promotes greater attention to the situation. We predict further that 
such difference in actor-observer perspective may vary depending on 
different self-concepts, ideal vs. ought (Pham & Avnet 2004). 
Specifically, consumers with an ideal self are more likely to 
adopt a first-person or actor perspective, through which they are 
looking out at their surroundings through their own eyes. An actor-
like visual perspective will enable consumers with an ideal-self to 
project themselves into a situation or scenario, and understand the 
demands and constraints of an event. In advertising, the congruency 
between the actor perspective in the ad and consumers’ ideal-self will 
result in greater persuasiveness of the ad message. Similar reasoning 
can apply to the observer perspective and consumers’ ought self. 
We predict that, when an actor (observer) perspective is used in 
ad, participants with an ideal (ought) self indicate more favorable 
attitudes toward the ad and the advertised product, and higher 
purchase intentions than do participants with an ought (ideal) self.
Two experiments were designed to test the hypotheses using 
two different products, recycling program and online classes. Both 
studies used a 2 (Self: ideal vs. ought) ×2 (Visual perspective: actor 
vs. observer) between-subjects design. The visual perspective is 
manipulated through camera angle that is used to shot the ad image. 
For example, one print ad shows an observer perspective, in which 
the ad image portrayed someone watching an online lecture on a 
tablet PC; the other print ad shows an actor perspective, in which 
the ad image was shot from the viewer’s perspective such that the 
viewer is watching the online lecture him/herself. Self-concept 
is manipulated by asking participants to list their current and past 
hopes and aspirations for the ideal-self priming condition, and duties 
and obligations for the ought-self priming condition (Pham & Avnet 
2004). Three dependent variables, ad attitudes, product attitudes, and 
behavioral intentions were measured by multiple bipolar scales. For 
Study 2, participants’ thoughts were also collected and analyzed to 
reveal the mechanism underlying the effects. 
Hypotheses were tested by submitting the three dependent 
variables to a 2x2 ANOVA, respectively. A significant 2-way 
interaction effect emerged for all the tests. Contrast analysis revealed 
further that when an actor (observer) perspective was used in either 
recycling or online class ad, participants with an ideal (ought) 
self had more favorable attitudes toward the ad and the advertised 
product, and higher purchase intentions than did participants with 
an ought (ideal) self. Study 2 results replicated Study 1 results. In 
addition, analysis of self-focused vs. situation-focused thoughts 
offered evidence for the mechanism that underlies the effects. As 
expected, when an actor (observer) visual perspective was used, 
participants with an ideal (ought) self had a greater proportion of 
situation-focused (self-focused) thoughts than those with an ought 
(ideal) self.
Our findings contribute to the literature on visual processing 
and in particular, stylistic prosperities of visual images. We have 
shown that actor or observer visual perspectives used in an ad can 
be diagnostic and affect how viewers evaluate the product. Yang et al 
(2010) also revealed how camera angles, another stylistic property, 
affect consumers’ product evaluations. Taken together, this line of 
research has suggested that the persuasive power of ads often resides 
in pictorial depictions, which convey semantically meaningful 
concepts to consumers via their stylistic properties (Messaris, 1997; 
Scott & Batra, 2003). Our research findings also have implications 
for marketing practitioners. In light of the visual perspective x self-
concept interaction effect, advertisers need to be careful when it 
comes to decide on the visual perspective. The best approach is to 
consider which self is salient at the moment when visual perspective 
is presented. If an actor (observer) perspective is used in the ad, 
an ideal (ought) self should be activated in order to maximize the 
persuasive effects.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Perhaps more than ever before, consumers are increasingly 
spending more and more of their time in consumptions that are com-
pletely free - think Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, etc. An important 
managerial prerogative is to optimize the product mix for what will 
be offered for free, and what not. In this paper, using various kinds of 
promotional and market formats, we examine the relative advantage 
of offering hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products for free. We conclude 
that it makes more sense to offer hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products 
for free. This gives a discontinuous and significant preference boost 
to the product relative to when (i) non-hedonic options are offered 
for free, or (ii) hedonic options are offered at discounted but above-
zero prices. Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007) demonstrate that, 
while deciding about free products, people don’t simply subtract 
costs from benefits but instead perceive the benefits associated with 
the free products as higher since the zero-price is used as a qualita-
tively different price point than other non-zero prices. This theoreti-
cal rationale for differential comparative frames is similar to the one 
offered by past research which has compared zero-price to other non-
zero price offers (Diamond and Sanyal 1990; Chandran and Morwitz 
2006). These researchers find that since the monetary value of free 
promotions is often not explicit, “free” promotions evoke a non-mar-
ket transactional mindset instead of a monetary, cost-benefit based 
mindset evoked by non-zero prices. This affective deconstruction of 
the zero-price effect is analogous to the affect heuristic (Finucane et 
al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002) and also to the “how do I feel about it” 
heuristic (hereafter HDIF heuristic) (Schwarz and Clore 1988). Both 
the Affect heuristic and the HDIF heuristic theories argue that inte-
gral affect (experienced feelings about the stimulus) is commonly 
and forcefully used as a source of information in evaluative judg-
ments. Instead of rationally calculating evaluations from a target’s at-
tributes, consumers often base their choices on feelings as they hold 
the target’s representation in their mind.  
Consumption of goods and services is often classified as he-
donic (product for fun and feelings) or utilitarian (products for func-
tional benefits) (Khan, Dhar, and Wertenbroch 2005). When consum-
ers evaluate (affect-poor) utilitarian products, they are more likely 
to be driven by the normative cost-benefit utility maximizing cal-
culus. But when evaluating an (affect-rich) hedonic product, such 
deliberative rationality often breaks down and gives precedence to a 
more feelings-driven attitude-formation process (Pham 1998; Adaval 
2001). Therefore, attitudes and preferences for hedonic consumption 
are more emotionally driven, whereas those for utilitarian goods and 
services are more cognitively guided (Havlena and Holbrook 1986; 
Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Mano and Oliver 1993; Shiv and Fe-
dorikhin 1999). Since the use of affective appraisals has been shown 
to be the underlying basis of the zero price effect (Shampanier et 
al. 2007), it follows that this effect will influence preferences more 
for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) consumption items and situations. This 
theorizing enables us to develop a straightforward argument for a 
cross-category difference in the influence of “free price” in boosting 
product preference. We expect this effect to be greater in the case of 
hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products. More specifically, we propose the 
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The “free price” will disproportionately 
strengthen the preference of the hedonic (vs. 
utilitarian) products.
Hypothesis 2: The positive affective reaction due to the free 
offer will be more for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) 
products.
We tested the free price bounce for hedonic consumption in 
a series of five studies. In study 1 the respondents chose among a 
hedonic option (Lindt chocolate), a utilitarian option (Libby’s fruit 
salad) and choosing nothing. The price condition was manipulated as 
between subjects. In the cost condition a certain price was mentioned 
for both the products while in the free condition both the products 
were offered for free. The main effect of the cost condition on choice 
of the hedonic option was significant (β= .752; Wald= 4.548, Exp(β)= 
.471, p=.033) supporting our hypothesis that a free-price dispropor-
tionately augments the hedonic option. 
The setting for study 2 was similar to study 1. But instead of 
comparing the hedonic preference in a hedonic-vs.-utilitarian choice 
set, we now compare conditions. We followed the Shampanier et 
al. (2007) procedure where a zero-priced hedonic product is pitted 
against a positive-priced hedonic product, and a zero-priced utili-
tarian option against a positive-priced utilitarian one. A logistic re-
gression analysis reveals a significant interaction effect of product 
types (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and price conditions (free vs. cost) (β= 
-1.154; Wald= 6.797, Exp(β)= .315, p< .01) showing that the choice 
share of the hedonic option increases significantly in the free condi-
tion while that of the utilitarian option remains similar across the cost 
conditions.
Study 3A explores the mechanism behind our findings. The 
study design was exactly similar to that of study 1 except that an 
affect measure was introduced before the DV. The Baron and Kenny 
(1986) mediation analysis indicated that affective arousal indeed 
fully mediates the zero price bounce for hedonic consumption across 
price conditions. 
Study 3B was conducted to rule out the alternative mechanism 
that anticipated guilt rather than affective arousal is driving our re-
sults. The study design was similar to study 3 except that attractive-
ness and guilt measures were included for both the hedonic and utili-
tarian products across price conditions. The baron and Kenny (1986) 
mediation analysis indicated that perceived guilt doesn’t mediate our 
main effects whereas affect was again found to fully mediate the im-
pact of price conditions on the choice share of the hedonic option.
In study 4, we kept the product same across hedonic and utili-
tarian conditions but primed individuals with either hedonic (in the 
hedonic condition) or utilitarian (in the utilitarian condition) goals 
for consumption (Botti and McGill 2011, study 2) to rule out the pos-
sibility of potential product related confounds. We used a 2 (hedonic 
vs. utilitarian) × 2(50% discount vs. free) condition between-subjects 
design. An ANOVA model revealed significant interaction effect be-
tween product-type and cost (F (1, 268) = 4.253, p< .05) supporting 
our prediction of a free price bounce for hedonic options. 
638 / The Hedonic-Shift for Freebies: How Preference for Hedonic Options is Disproportionately Enhanced when Their Price Falls to Zero
REFERENCES
Adaval, Rashmi (2001), “Sometimes It Just Feels Right: The 
Differential Weighting of Affect-Consistent and Affect-
Inconsistent Product Information,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 28 (June), 1–17. 
Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), “Moderator-
Mediator Variables Distinction in Social Psychological 
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical 
Considerations,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51(6), 1173–82.
Botti, Simona, and Ann L. McGill (2011), “The locus of choice: 
Personal causality and satisfaction with hedonic and utilitarian 
decisions”, Journal of Consumer Research, 37(April), 
1065–1078.
Chandran, Sucharita, and Vicki G. Morwitz (2006), “The Price 
of ‘Free’-Dom:  Consumer Sensitivity to Promotions with 
Negative Contextual Influences,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 33 (December), 384-392.
Diamond, William D. and Abhijit Sanyal (1990), “The Effect 
of Framing  on the Choice of Supermarket  Coupons,” in 
Advances in Consumer Research, Marvin Goldberg, Gerald 
Gorn, and Richard W. Pollay, eds. Provo, Utah: Association  
for Consumer Research, 17, 488-493.
Finucane, Melissa L., Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic and Stephen 
M. Johnson (2000), “The affect heuristic in judgments of 
risks and benefits”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
13(January), 1–17.
Havlena, William J. and Morris B. Holbrook (1986), “The Varieties 
of Consumption Experience: Comparing Two Typologies 
of Emotion in Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 13(December), 394-404.
Hirschman, Elizabeth C. and Morris B. Holbrook (1982), 
“Hedonic Consumption: Emerging Concepts, Methods, and 
Propositions,” Journal of Marketing, 46 (July), 92–101.
Table 1: Brief Description of Design, Stimuli and Mean-Results of Studies
Study Design Stimuli
Dependent Variable
Choice Share
Attractiveness/
Preference 
(7-point scales)
1
2 Conditions
Heterogeneous 
Choice sets
H(Lindt)$0vs.U( Fruit Salad)$0
H(Lindt)$2vs.U( Fruit Salad)$2
H(Lindt)$0= 0.652
H(Lindt)$2=0.422
2
2×2 Conditions
Homogeneous 
Choice sets
H(GV Cupcake)$0vs.H(LD Cupcake)$0.28
H(GV Cupcake)$1.19vs.H(LD Cupcake)$1.47
U(GV Sugar)$0vs.U(Imperial Sugar)$0.28
U(GV Sugar)$1.19vs.U(Imperial Sugar)$1.47
Condition 1
        H(GV Cupcake)$0=0.702
        H(GV Cupcake)$1.19=0.368
Condition 2
        U(GV Sugar)$0=0.769
        U(GV Sugar)$1.19=0.723
2 
(replication)
2×2 Conditions
Homogeneous 
Choice sets
H(GV Cupcake)$0vs.H(LD Cupcake)$0.28
H(GV Cupcake)$1.19vs.H(LD Cupcake)$1.47
U(GV Fruit Salad)$0vs.U(Libby’s Fruit Salad)$0.28
U(GV Fruit Salad)$1.19vs.U(Libby’s Fruit Salad)$1.47
Condition 1
        H(GV Cupcake)$0=0.574
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        U(GV Fruit Salad)$0=0.585
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4
2×2 Conditions
Separate 
Evaluation
H(Spa)free
H(Spa)50% off
U(Spa)free
U(Spa)50% off
H(Spa)free=6.27
H(Spa)50% off=5.42  
U(Spa)free=5.87
U(Spa)50% off =5.77 
GV: Great Value, LD: Little Debbie’s
H(***) denotes Hedonic option
U(***) denotes Utilitarian option
Subscript denotes associated cost
Table 2: Mediation Analysis Results
DV ← IV Mediator ← IV DV ← Mediator + IV
Study 3A (attractiveness) (β = .173  ; p=0.05) (β = 1.04  ; p<0.01) (βprice condition = .019, p>.5 ; βaffect= .148, p<.01)
Study 3B (Attractiveness) (β = .172; p =.084) (β = 937; p <.05) (βprice condition = .219, p <.05; βaffect= .073, p<.01)
Study 3B (Guilt) (β = .172; p =.084) (β = .039; p >.10) (βprice condition = 071, p > .4; βaffect= .122, p<.01)
*The betas are unstandardized coefficients
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I Run to be Fit, You Run for Fame: Context Effects Affecting Self-Positivity in Judgments 
on Consumption Motives and Emotions
Isabelle Engeler, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Priya Raghubir, New York University, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Many human judgments are comparative in nature (Mussweiler 
2003). Consumers have been shown to judge themselves more posi-
tively (or less negatively) than others: a bias called self-positivity 
(Hoorens 1995; Pahl and Eiser 2005). These effects can represent 
true biases that people have about themselves that are self-enhanc-
ing or self-presentational tendencies in socially desirable reporting 
whereby they wish to appear better to others (Paulhus 2002). 
Building on the context effects literature in survey responding 
(Schuman and Presser 1996), we examine the potentially debiasing 
effect of question order and type of comparison other on self-pre-
sentational responding. Differences in self/other-judgments depend 
on contextual factors such as question-order (Lin, Lin, and Raghu-
bir 2004) and type of other (Pahl, Eiser, and White 2009; Perloff 
and Fetzer 1986). We predict and show that self-presentational re-
sponding extends to the domain of consumption motives (why one 
undertakes an experience) and emotions (how one feels about an 
experience), and can be attenuated using contextual manipulations 
(question order, type of other) that affect the degree of perceived self/
other-similarity (Mussweiler 2003). 
We study the experience of marathon participation. In 2011, 
over half a million runners participated in 720 marathons in the US 
alone.1 In study 1 (N=957), we asked runners to indicate why they 
and average other runners run, and the emotions they feel and they 
believe other average runners feel when thinking of the upcoming 
race. We manipulated the order of self and other. Motives for run-
ning were categorized as self-esteem- or fitness-related. Emotions 
were categorized as positive or negative. All scales were multi-item. 
Means are in the table.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with target (self vs. other) and 
motives (fitness vs. esteem) as within- and the order (self/other- vs. 
other/self-order) as a between-subjects factor yielded a three-way 
interaction (F(1, 955) = 49.5, p < .001). Runners believed that oth-
ers are more likely to run for self-esteem reasons than they are, par-
ticularly when they responded about themselves first (Mself = 2.8 vs. 
Mother = 3.9) versus others first (Mself = 3.0 vs. Mother = 3.6; target x 
order: F(1, 955) = 47.7, p < .001). This was not true for fitness mo-
tives (target x order: F(1, 955) = 3.1, p > .05).
Runners also believed that others feel more negative (Mself = 1.2 
vs. Mother = 2.1, p < .001) and less positive (Mself = 4.5 vs. Mother = 4.0, 
p < .001; target x emotions: F(1, 955) = 766.0, p < .001) about the 
race than they do irrespective of order of elicitation (three-way F < 1). 
Following up on the order effect in motives, study 2 (N=789) 
measured perceived self/other-similarity and to what extent the 
runners used themselves as a reference to make judgments about 
the average marathoner. Replicating study 1 results (three-way: 
F(1, 787) = 16.8, p < .001), runners thought they ran less for es-
teem than others, particularly when questioned about themselves 
first, with no effect for fitness motives. Runners also thought they 
felt more positive and less negative than other runners (F(1, 787) = 
423.1, p < .001). 
Extending study 1, in the self/other-condition, runners perceived 
themselves as less similar to the average runner (Mself/other = -.10 vs. 
Mother/self = .21; F(1, 787) = 8.1, p < .01) and used themselves less ex-
tensively as a standard to evaluate others (Mself/other = 2.94, vs. Mother/
1  http://www.runningusa.org
self = 3.40; F(1, 787) = 13.9, p < .001) with perceived similarity me-
diating the effect of question order on self/other-differences in self-
esteem motives (BCa 95% CI [-.09, -.02]). 
To tease out whether these effects represent social desirability or 
self-positivity, in study 3 (N=1095) we manipulated self/other-sim-
ilarity between subjects (average, similar, inferior, superior others). 
If the effects are attenuated with similar others, these results would 
be consistent with a self-positivity interpretation (Perloff and Fetzer 
1986, Raghubir and Menon, 1998), and if they are attenuated with a 
superior other, it is consistent with a social desirability interpretation 
as people would like to aspire to superior others. Other-similarity 
moderated the three-way interaction (F(3, 1087) = 2.5, p = .06). Sep-
arate analysis for each type of other showed that the 3-way interac-
tion replicated for average others (F(1, 271) = 5.5, p = .02, ηp
2 = .02) 
and was of comparable magnitude for inferior others (F(1, 271) = 
5.7, p = .02, ηp
2 = .02). Importantly, it was attenuated for similar 
others (F(1, 279) = 2.0, p > .10), and exacerbated for superior others 
(F(1, 266) = 16.6, p < .001, ηp
2 = .06). This pattern suggests that the 
bias may be self-positivity rather than social desirability. For esteem 
motives, the target x order interaction was present for all targets. For 
fitness motives, the interaction was only significant for superior oth-
ers (F(1, 266) = 4.3, p = .04, ηp
2 = .02). Put differently, respondents 
indicated that all others run more for self-esteem than they do, and 
superior runners also run less for fitness.
Type of other also moderated the target x emotions interaction 
(F(3, 1087) = 50.3, p < .001). Separate analysis for each type of 
other, showed that this interaction replicated for all targets (F(1, 272)
average_others = 189.6, F(1, 280)similar_others = 133.1, F(1, 272)inferior_others = 
333.5, p < .001 for all, ηp
2s=.41, .32, and .55 respectively), but was 
of smaller magnitude for superior others (F(1, 267) = 6.5, p = .01, 
ηp
2 = .02). The interactions suggest that runners believe that they 
have less negative and more positive emotions than others. In all 
three studies we also found that the magnitude of the effect was 
greater for negative than for positive emotions.
Our findings contribute to the social-comparison and context 
effects literature by showing how contextual manipulations such as 
question-order and type of target can moderate self-presentational 
responses. The study uses the original domain of a new and emerg-
ing consumption experience field: marathon running. Future research 
should validate these effects in different consumption contexts not 
invoking ability, and further tease out the role of self-positivity ver-
sus social desirability in explaining why people believe they sign on 
for an activity for reasons different than others. 
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Table 1: Means, Relevant Interaction Effects, And Alphas Across Studies
Domain (w)
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Alpha self-/other-rating (α) .69/.68 .71/.73 .72/.71 .78/.77 .79/.78 .78/.81 .76/.76 .73/.70 .72/.78 .74/.74 .74/.73 .77/.79
Cell means 
Target (w) Order (b) Other (b)
Self Self/other average 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.8 3.9 3.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
similar  -  - 2.8  -  - 3.7  -  - 4.4  -  - 1.3
superior  -  - 2.8  -  - 3.9  -  - 4.3  -  - 1.4
inferior  -  - 2.7  -  - 3.6  -  - 4.4  -  - 1.2
Other/self average 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.6 3.4 4.5 4.4 4.4 1.2 1.3 1.3
similar  -  - 2.8  -  - 3.5  -  - 4.3  -  - 1.3
superior  -  - 3.0  -  - 3.7  -  - 4.3  -  - 1.5
inferior  -  - 3.0  -  - 3.5  -  - 4.5  -  - 1.4
Other Self/other average 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
similar  -  - 3.8  -  - 4.0  -  - 4.2  -  - 2.1
superior  -  - 4.4  -  - 3.1  -  - 4.3  -  - 1.8
inferior  -  - 3.9  -  - 3.7  -  - 3.7  -  - 2.4
Other/self average 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
similar  -  - 3.4  -  - 3.7  -  - 4.0  -  - 2.0
superior  -  - 4.1  -  - 3.3  -  - 4.4  -  - 1.8
inferior  -  - 3.6  -  - 3.4  -  - 3.7  -  - 2.7
ANOVAs (F (ηp2))
(only relevant higher order effects)
Target x M/E x Order x Other  -  - 2.5†(.01)  -  - <1 (<.01)
Target x M/E x Other 50.3*** (.12)
Target x M/E x Order (average) 16.8*** (.02) 5.5* (.02) <1 (<.01) 1.5 (<.01)
Target x M/E x Order (similar) 2.0 (.01)
Target x M/E x Order (superior) 16.6*** (.06)
Target x M/E x Order (inferior) 5.7* (.02)
Target x M/E (average) 766.0*** (.45) 423.1*** (.35) 189.6*** (.41)
Target x M/E (similar) 133.1*** (.32)
Target x M/E (superior) 6.5* (.02)
Target x M/E (inferior) 333.5*** (.55)
Target x Order (average/esteem) 47.7*** (.05) 23.6*** (.03) 9.3** (.03)
Target x Order (average/fitness) 3.1† (<.01) <1 (<.01) <1 (<.01)
Motives (M) Emotions (E) 
Esteem Motives Fitness Motives Positive Emotions Negative Emotions
49.5*** (.05)
Motives (M) Emotions (E) 
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
NOTE.—Motives were measured using four items for fitness motives (i.e., control weight, improve health, stay physically attractive, become physically 
fit) and four items for esteem motives (i.e., getting recognition, improving self-esteem, competing with others, adding life meaning) using 7-point scales 
(0=completely unimportant, 6=very important) derived from the Motivations of Marathoners Scales (Masters, Ogles, and Jolton 1993). Emotions were 
measured using five positive items (confident, joyful, optimistic, hopeful, calm) and five negative items (worried, anxious, uncomfortable, hopeless, tense) 
using a 7-point scale (0=not at all, 6=very strongly) derived from inventories on anticipatory emotions (Baumgartner, Pieters, and Bagozzi 2008; Leone, 
Perugini, and Bagozzi 2005) and prospective achievement emotions (Pekrun 2006). Items were counterbalanced.
S1, S2, S3 indicate studies 1, 2, 3; w denotes within-subjects factors; b denotes between-subjects factors.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Time for the Sad and Money for the Happy?  The Role of Social Approach on Consumer 
Willingness to Contribute Charitably
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We propose that while past research has generally suggested that 
communals (vs. agentics) help more (Utz 2004), this will depend on 
the resource being sought (i.e., time vs. money; e.g., MacDonnell and 
White 2012). Due to the social nature of volunteering, we predict and 
find that communals are more inclined to contribute time, whereas 
agentics prefer to donate money (pilot study). In addition, we predict 
and find that this effect is moderated by the affective state of the target, 
such that when the target is sad, or sadness-provoking, and there is 
therefore social esteem to be gained from making the individual feel 
better, communals are more willing than agentics to give time (stud-
ies 1 and 2). Further, we predict and find that agentics are more com-
pelled to give money – a more individual approach to helping – when 
presented with a sad target. Social approach – the desire to help from 
up close, versus from a distance – to enable feeling good about one’s 
contribution is proposed and tested as a mechanism (study 3). 
Pilot Study
This study assessed the willingness of communal (vs. agen-
tic) individuals to contribute time (vs. money) to a charitable cause. 
When time was the resource solicited, the model was significant 
(p=.005). Communal orientation (p=.01; Singelis 1994; Singelis, Tri-
andis, Bhawak and Gellfand 1995) was significantly related to vol-
unteer intentions, whereas agentic orientation was not (p=.11). When 
money was sought, the overall model predicting volunteer intentions 
was also significant (p<.001). Notably, while communal orientation 
was significantly related to donation intentions (p<.001), agentic ori-
entation was also a significant predictor (p=.015). In line with our 
predictions, while communals were in general more willing to con-
tribute either resource, agentics a.) were not inclined to contribute 
time, but b.) were more willing to contribute money. 
Study 1
Study 1 assesses the notion that affect of the target (i.e., sad vs. 
happy) will moderate the effect of helping. It was predicted that com-
munal individuals would be most inclined to contribute time to a sad 
target, whereas agentics would be least inclined to do the same. The 
data was analyzed using a 2 (orientation: agentic vs. communal) by 2 
(target affect: sad vs. happy) between subjects ANOVA on the contri-
bution intentions difference score. The main effect of affect was not 
significant (p=.48), and the main effect of self-construal was non-sig-
nificant but marginal (p = .10). Generally, communal individuals pre-
ferred to give time (M = .14), whereas agentic individuals preferred 
to give money (M = -.10). These main effects for contributing were 
qualified by a significant interaction (p = .03). While agentic and 
communal consumers did not demonstrate a preference for giving 
time (vs. money) to happy targets (Mcommunal=.11, Magentic=.03, p=.71), 
a significant difference was observed for sad targets. As predicted by 
social approach reasoning, communals intended to contribute more 
time (M=.25) to a sad target, whereas their agentic counterparts in-
tended to contribute more money (M=-.32; p=004). 
Study 2
Whereas affect was examined in terms of the affective expres-
sion of the charitable target, in study 2 we operationalized affect 
in terms of emotionality, using victim identification instead. It was 
predicted that communals would be more inclined to give time to a 
target they can identify, because this allows them to formulate ap-
proach motives. Agentics, on the other hand, were expected to prefer 
contributing money to identified victims. Data was analyzed using a 
2 (orientation: agentic vs. communal) by 2 (victim status: identified 
vs. unidentified) by 2 (resource: time vs. money; within-subjects) 
mixed-model ANOVA. While agentic (M = -.10) and communal (M 
= .14) individuals did not differ significantly in their preference for 
contributing to an identified target (p=.38) the pattern was in the pre-
dicted direction. Agentics tended toward contributing money to an 
identified victim, whereas communals tended toward contributing 
time. When the target was unidentified, however, agentics (M = .28) 
intended to contribute significantly more time, whereas communals 
(M = -.23) intended to contribute significantly more money (p = .03) 
in the predicted direction. When the target was not identified, com-
munals did not experience a social approach motive, and thus pre-
ferred to help from a distance, whereas agentics did not feel inhibited 
from a social approach and thus intended to contribute time. 
Study 3
The results of studies 1 and 2 suggest that the mechanism under-
lying the observed effects involves approach (vs. avoidance), wherein 
communals approach individuals who are sad (study 1) or identified 
(study 2) with their time, but the opposite with their money. Converse-
ly, agentic individuals approach individuals who are happy (study 1) 
or unidentified (study 2) with their time, and do the opposite with their 
money. The proposed mechanism is social approach, or the desire to 
help from up close (vs. from a distance). Data were analyzed using 
hierarchical multiple regression on volunteer intentions. Main effects 
were entered in the first step, interactions in the second step, and the 
three-way interaction in the third step. While neither the main effects 
nor the first order interactions significantly improved the model, the 
three-way interaction significantly improved model fit (p=.01). Next, 
social approach was added to the model, showing significant improve-
ment in fit (p<.001). Importantly, the three-way interaction dropped 
from significance (p = .18), suggesting that social approach signifi-
cantly mediated the path between the three-way interaction and vol-
unteer intentions. Thus, whether one prefers to help from up close (vs. 
from a distance) significantly mediated the effect of self-construal, af-
fect and victim status on volunteer intentions.
Discussion
Taken together, the results of the pilot study and studies 1 to 3 
suggest that agentic and communal consumers weight different in-
formation in determining what, when, and to whom they contribute 
charitably. In studies 1 and 2, the differing effect of contribution on 
money (vs. time) was examined, and in study 3 the mediating role 
of social approach was established for volunteer intentions. These 
findings suggest that agentics gravitate more toward assisting those 
who seem happier or less emotionally taxing, whereas communals 
gravitate to supporting those who are sad or whose plight is more 
emotionally engaging (i.e., identified targets).
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The Role of Visual Attention in Decision-Making: An Eye-Tracking Experiment
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Bettman suggested as early as 1979 that attention may be one of 
the key factors that influence choice. More recently, Janiszewski et 
al. (2013) reported that repeated allocation of attention to a product 
increases the likelihood that consumers will eventually select that 
product. But which factors determine what products successfully at-
tract consumer attention? More importantly, how do these factors in-
teract and influence one another? And, critically for marketing theory 
and practice, how exactly does the resulting attentional focus affect 
consumer choices among various, competing products?
The deployment and focus of consumer attention depend on two 
types of factors: endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous factors are 
“person factors” that are driven by consumer goals, such as taste, 
familiarity, and involvement (Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow and 
Young 2009; Pieters and Wedel 2004; 2007). Exogenous factors, on 
the other hand, are “stimulus factors”, such as color or brightness of 
packaging. These exogenous factors automatically attract consumer 
attention irrespective of one’s goals and intentions (Milosavljevic 
et al. 2012; Chandon et al. 2009; van der Lans, Pieters and Wedel 
2008). The marketing literature has identified the interplay between 
endogenous and exogenous factors, their respective and joint effects 
on attention, and the effect of attention on the decision-making pro-
cess as research topics of prime importance (Payne and Venkatraman 
2011; Russo 2011; Chandon et al. 2009; Wedel and Pieters 2008; 
Bettmann 1979; Russo 1978). Addressing these questions is the fo-
cus of the current research.
We presented hungry participants with high-resolution photos 
of store shelves filled with a total of 28 typical snack food items 
(randomly chosen from a set of 41 food items, such as Doritos, Ore-
os, Reese’s, M&Ms, etc.) and asked them to search for and choose 
the item that they want to eat. Seventeen participants (median age = 
25 years, range = 18 – 55 years; 61% male) participated in an eye-
tracking experiment but due to incomplete eye-recordings and fail-
ures to follow task instructions, the data from four participants had to 
be dropped from the analysis. Each participant made 150 choices in 
blocks of 25 based on the allowed decision-making time: 0.255 sec-
onds, 0.455 seconds, 0.655 seconds, 1.155 seconds, 3.155 seconds 
and 25 trials in the free-response condition in which participants had 
as much time as they wanted to make a choice. 
During the entire decision-making task, we record moment-to-
moment measures of attention, at a rate of 1000 times per second. We 
use the neuro-model of visual saliency to measure the exogenous-
factor strength of the images on store shelves (Koch and Itti 2012; 
WhiteMatter Labs GmbH; Itti, Koch and Niebur 1998), and liking 
ratings of 41 different snack food items, such as Doritos and Snick-
ers, to measure participants’ preferences for each item. 
Our results indicate that the visual saliency of the items that par-
ticipants chose was significantly higher than the saliency of equally 
or, sometimes, more liked but non-chosen alternatives (providing 
support for our H1). More specifically, when participants chose an 
item that was not rated as a “5=would like to eat very much”, they 
chose an item rated “4=would like to eat” with the highest saliency 
ranking (5) as measured by the neuro-model of visual saliency in 
significantly more trials than they chose items that were less visually 
salient (saliency ranking of 1-4; χ2 (4), p = 5.64 x 10
-06).
We next test three properties of visual attention that may give 
rise to this bias. During initial fixations, the items that participants 
look at have a higher visual saliency rank than preference rank (all 
p < 0.012, Wilcoxon sign-rank test; H2 supported). We next hy-
pothesize that visual saliency will continue to bias eye movements 
throughout the entire decision-making process (H3), not only dur-
ing the initial eye movements. To estimate the relative importance of 
visual saliency on refixations, we here consider two additional vari-
ables known to affect consumers’ eye movements: preferences and 
centrality (i.e., how close to the center of the shelf an item is placed). 
We found that the three-parameter model significantly outperformed 
a model based on centrality alone for all fixations (all p < 0.05, χ2 (2) 
test of difference in deviance) indicating that both preference and 
visual saliency information are required to predict whether or not an 
item will be refixated on. Visual saliency contributes to the model 
not only at the beginning of the decision-making process (H2), but 
up through fixation 7 (H3 supported). Finally, we hypothesize that 
visual saliency will influence total gaze duration, i.e., consideration, 
during decision making (H4). We found that items that have a very 
high saliency rank are fixated on longer overall than items with lower 
saliency ranks across all decision-making times (H = 64, 4 d.f., p = 
3.75x10-13, Kruskal-Wallis). 
The current study improves our theoretical understanding of the 
effects of exogenous and endogenous factors on attention, as well 
as the effects of attention on decision making. Our results show that 
every-day choices are systematically biased by exogenous visual sa-
liency so that consumers are likely to choose the alternatives that 
are visually salient among several liked alternatives. Using the eye-
tracking method and insights from vision science we further show 
how this effect on choice is generated: participants look (1) earlier, 
(2) more repeatedly, and (3) overall longer on items with higher vi-
sual saliency allowing them more opportunity to consider, and even-
tually choose, these alternatives. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In many product categories, consumers are integrally engaged 
in design of a product in order to customize it to their own needs. 
In such cases, the level of creativity displayed by a consumer may 
lead to superior outcomes. Creativity may be influenced by individ-
ual factors (some consumers more creative than others), the envi-
ronment, and even the product. In our research, we are interested in 
examining the effect of perceptual cues on creativity. For example, 
when designing clothes, how does a haptic cue (e.g., feeling the fab-
ric) influence creativity?
There is a long history regarding the importance of the sense 
of touch. Aristotle believed that touch mediates every type of sense 
perception, even vision (Siegel 1970). In the marketing literature, 
research on the role of haptics has risen in prominence, perhaps en-
couraged by the surge of online shopping. In such contexts an impor-
tant question is how to compensate for the lack of touch (Peck and 
Childers 2007). However, research on the impact of touch or haptics 
on creative consumption is an unexplored question, which we seek 
to address. 
Previous research acknowledges that in creativity, haptics plays 
an important role. Because it is effective in facilitating learning and 
memory (Lacey and Campbell 2006) as well as provides sensory ex-
perience and fun (Peck 2009). However, despite the importance of 
haptic cues for creativity, due to surge of online consumption con-
texts, haptic cues become less accessible. In this paper, we discuss 
the potential benefits and applications of haptics to foster creative 
consumption in a marketing setting.
Three laboratory experiments were conducted to shed light on 
this topic.  Experiment 1 explored the effect of haptic cues on cre-
ativity. As in previous research participants were asked to design a 
toy. We predict that presence of haptic cues will result in designs that 
are higher in appropriateness and novelty. Each participant was pro-
vided with either 14 shapes (haptic cues condition) or 14 photos of 
shapes (no haptic cues condition), with the same shapes across con-
ditions. They were asked to design a toy, anything a child (age 5-11) 
can use to play with. In the haptic cues condition, participants could 
touch and manipulate the shapes whereas, without haptic cues par-
ticipants could only see the shapes. After the design task, participants 
answered questions pertaining to covariate variables such as mood, 
knowledge, attention, and involvement. We invited two judges who 
majored in design to evaluate each toy idea on three seven-point 
scales measuring novelty and appropriateness. A MANCOVA was 
conducted. Results show that haptics had a significant influence on 
creativity. Specifically, when consumers were presented with infor-
mation with haptic cues, higher novelty was shown than consumers 
without haptic cues (Mwo/haptic = 2.50, Mw/haptic = 3.40; F(1, 73) = 4.96, 
p < .05). But the impact of haptics on appropriateness did not reach 
statistical significance (Mwo/haptic = 4.40, Mw/haptic = 4.80; F(1, 73) = 
1.40, p > .1). This finding shows that haptic cues aids consumer’s 
creativity, especially in terms of their novelty.
Experiment 2 followed a 2 (haptic cues vs. no haptic cues) by 
2 (visual cues vs. no visual cues) between-subjects factorial design 
to examine the moderating role of visual cues. In particular, can the 
presence of visual cues compensate for the absence of haptic cues? 
Participants were instructed to list creative usage of a plastic cup: In 
condition 1, (with both haptic and visual cues) participants were able 
to see and touch the cup. In condition 2, (haptic cues only) partici-
pants were able to touch the cup but not see it (it was placed inside 
a box).  In condition 3, (visual cues only) participants saw a picture 
of the cup on a computer screen. In condition 4 (neither haptic nor 
visual cues) participants read a description of the plastic cup such 
as color, weight, height, and texture on the computer screen. Subse-
quently participants wrote down as many creative uses of the cup as 
they could identify. A two-way ANOVA with haptic cues and visual 
cues as the independent variables, and the number of creative uses 
of a plastic cup as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of 
the haptic cues (F(1, 106) = 5.299, p < .05) as well as a significant 
two-way interaction (F(1, 106)  = 3.975, p < .05). Planned contrasts 
revealed that when haptic cues were not provided, the presence of 
visual cues led to more creative uses (Mwo/visual = 4.85, Mw/visual = 7.50; 
F(1, 106)  = 10.21, p < .01). When haptic cues were provided, how-
ever, the presence of visual cues didn’t influence creative uses (Mwo/
visual = 7.39, Mw/visual = 7.69; F(1, 106)  = .258, p > .1). This finding 
demonstrates the moderating effect of visual cues, such that visual 
cues can compensate for the absence of haptic cues, and shows that 
the visual and haptic cues do not produce an additive effect.
Figure 1: Study 2 Results:  
Moderating Effects of Visual Cues On Creativity
4.846
7.3007.480
7.690
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
No Haptic Cues Haptic Cues
T
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 c
re
at
iv
e 
us
ag
e 
of
 a
 p
la
st
ic
 c
up
No Visual Cues
Visual Cues
Experiment 3 investigated the moderating role of ownership, 
following a 2 (haptic cues vs. no haptic cues) by 2 (ownership vs. 
no ownership) between-subjects factorial design. When haptic cues 
are present, the sense of touch induces imaginary ownership (Peck 
& Shu 2009), and hence there would be no ownership effects. When 
haptic cues are not present, ownership provides a higher level of mo-
tivation and enhances creativity (Amabile 1996). The creativity task 
was same as in Study 1. To induce a feeling of ownership, half the 
participants were instructed to imagine that the toy company would 
give them the toy that they just designed. A MANOVA revealed a 
main effect of ownership on novelty (F(1, 94)  = 4.259, p < .05) 
and significant two-way interactions for creativity composed of nov-
elty and appropriateness (F(1, 94)  = 5.394, p < .05). In specific, the 
provision of ownership significantly changed novelty (F(1, 94)  = 
2.963, p < .10) and appropriateness (F(1, 94)  = 10.740, p < .05). 
When haptic cues were provided, the level of ownership had no ef-
fect across two creativity dimensions. However, when haptic cues 
were not provided, the effect of ownership became stronger. This 
finding demonstrates the moderating effect of ownership, such that 
ownership can compensate for the absence of haptic cues. 
648 / Yes, “Touch” Matters: The Impact of Touch on Consumer Creativity
Figure 2: Study 3 Results:  
Moderating Effects of Ownership On Novelty
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Figure 3: Study 3 Results:  
Moderating Effects of Ownership On Novelty
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Table 1: Summary of Findings
Hypotheses Results
Study I Effects of haptic cues on creativity
Positive effect
(only in Novelty)
Study II Moderating effect of  visual cues
Compensatory effect
(only in Novelty)
Study III Moderating effect of   ownership
Compensatory effect
(both in Novelty and 
Appropriateness)
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this 
paper shows interplay between sensory inputs and creativity which 
has been rarely paid attention despite active researches in other disci-
plines such as psychology and education. Second, to our knowledge, 
in consumer creativity literature, it is the first study investigating the 
importance of haptics. In addition, this paper guides how managers 
can compensate the absence of haptics in this online consumption 
dominant era.
Table 2: Study 1 Results: Effects of Information Type on 
Creativity
 F-values Sig.
Multivariate Statistics 2.45* .093
MANOVA
Univariate Statistics
Novelty 4.96** .029
Appropriateness 1.40 .241
* p <  .10, ** p <  .05
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Whether trying to get people to quit smoking, exercise more of-
ten, or simply get out to vote, public service announcements (PSAs) 
genuinely attempt to promote societal well-being.  One pervasive 
strategy is the use of “Top 10” reasons to change a certain behavior. 
For instance, the National Institute of Health (NIH) website currently 
includes a “Top 10 Reasons to Quit Smoking” PSA that lists, among 
others, the following reasons: “(1) I will reduce my chances of a 
heart attack, (2) I will reduce my chances of getting lung cancer, 
emphysema, and other lung diseases, (3) I will have better smell-
ing clothes, hair, breath, home, and car.” Because these “Top 10” 
lists are generally exhaustive, they inevitably include both strong and 
mildly-strong reasons to change behavior. In this report, we question 
whether such PSAs actually help or hurt the cause. 
This question builds on past work on the Presenter’s Paradox 
(Weaver, Garcia, and Schwarz 2012), showing that when people 
present information, they tend to use a strategy that resembles “add-
ing” (more is better) while people evaluating that same information 
tend to use a process that resembles averaging (less is more). For 
instance, while presenters thought that adding a $15 voucher for 
books to a $1,750 tuition credit would increase recipients’ percep-
tions of the generosity of a scholarship, recipients actually evaluated 
the $1,750 tuition credit + $15 books package as significantly less 
generous than the $1,750 tuition credit alone.
While there are some surface similarities between people’s eval-
uations of a “Top 10 Reasons” PSA containing strong and less strong 
arguments and their evaluations of a consumer product containing 
highly and mildly favorable product features (Weaver et al. 2012) 
or their impressions of other people based on highly and mildly fa-
vorable trait information (Anderson 1965), there are several reasons 
why these types of judgments may differ. First, past work on averag-
ing in impression formation has largely been limited to targets that 
are naturally perceived of as unified entities, like other people and 
consumer products. Here we investigate whether similar averaging-
like processes will arise in the context of persuasion with strong and 
less strong arguments. Whether adding or averaging will occur in this 
context is an open empirical question. Second, one of the most devel-
oped perspectives on the issue of strong versus weak arguments, the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model, also does not explicitly address this 
question. While the ELM has looked at how the quality versus quan-
tity of persuasive arguments affects persuasion, it has focused ex-
clusively on strong and “specious” (false or misleading) arguments 
rather than strong and mildly strong ones. While designers of PSAs 
may believe that relevant but less strong arguments (e.g., smoking 
will reduce my morning cough) may help or at least would not hurt 
in persuading people that smoking is unhealthy, it is unlikely that 
they would think that including a specious or false argument would 
have persuasive appeal. Furthermore, the psychological mechanism 
through which specious arguments may affect persuasion may not be 
easily transferable to the context of mildly strong arguments. Read-
ing a specious argument may lead to an inference that a source is 
unreliable and unintelligent, leading a perceiver to question all other 
arguments from that source. This explanation would not apply to the 
types of mildly favorable arguments that presenters may include in 
PSAs. 
Second, despite evidence of the Presenter’s Paradox, previous 
investigations used settings that were created for controlled experi-
ments to examine differences between presenters and evaluators. In 
contrast, the present analysis examines whether policy makers fall 
prey to the presenter’s paradox by testing real PSAs. Third, our work 
is fundamentally different from the “dilution effect” (Nisbett et al. 
1981), because we look at the effect of mildly versus strongly favor-
able information that is always relevant to evaluators’ judgments and 
presenters’ presentation decisions. Work on the dilution effect, how-
ever, studies the effect of additional information that is by definition 
nondiagnostic and irrelevant to the judgment at hand and of no value 
in predicting the outcome (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock et al. 1996).
We examined three “Top 10” PSAs to assess what is more per-
suasive, the combination of strong and mildly strong reasons that 
policy makers included in the original campaigns or a PSA created 
by us containing only the strongest reasons. 
Study 1 showed that people were less inclined to quit smoking 
after reading the NIH’s 10 Reasons campaign than after reading our 
truncated 2 Reasons campaign (NHLBI 2013a). Study 2 showed that 
prospective voters ascribed less importance to voting and were less 
likely to personally express an intention to vote after reading a “Top 
10 Reasons to Vote” PSA put forth by the Douglas County, Nevada, 
Election Center than after reading our “Top 3 Reasons” list that used 
only the strongest arguments. Study 3 used a “Top 10 Reasons to 
Exercise” PSA from the Medical News Today website, a widely-read 
medical news site with a monthly readership of 3-4 million, to exam-
ine whether need for cognition (NFC) moderated the effect. Results 
showed that while High NFC (mean + 1SD) participants expressed 
stronger intentions to exercise after seeing our 3 versus the origi-
nal 10 Reasons PSA, Low NFC participants (mean - 1SD) showed a 
non-significant tendency in the opposite direction.
In sum, our results show that Top 10 lists can reduce rather than 
enhance people’s likelihood to adopt healthy lifestyles or make de-
sired social decisions. For instance, each year, The National Health, 
Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) receives over $3 billion in tax 
money from the Federal Government in order to, among other, ad-
vance understanding of the development and progression of disease, 
diagnosis of disease, and disease prevention (NHLBI 2013b). While 
the designers of their Top 10 Reasons to Quit Smoking” PSA chose 
to include the less strong, but still relevant reasons, they inadver-
tently weakened the message rather than strengthened it. Marketers 
and public policy makers should be very careful designing such Top 
10 lists, because weak reasons can dilute the message.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer researchers have identified ways in which an em-
ployee’s gender influences consumers’ perceptions (e.g., consumers’ 
responses to a model or spokesperson in an ad, a salesperson, an or-
ganization’s leader) (e.g., Gilly 1988; Matta and Folkes 2005; Mohr 
and Henson 1996; Richins 1991), but no research has investigated 
consumers’ judgments when presented with a service organization’s 
gender composition. Considering that stereotypically male occupa-
tions generally have higher prestige and salaries and that women’s 
salaries within occupations generally lag men’s (Budig 2002), we 
believe that investigating male-typed occupations is an important 
starting point for research on how various gender compositions for 
a workgroup influence consumers’ perceptions of that group. For a 
male-typed occupation, does a workgroup’s gender composition in-
fluence consumers’ evaluations?  If so, do negative perceptions in-
crease proportionally with the presence of each additional woman or 
is it a step function? In this research we address these fundamental 
and previously unexplored questions. 
We conducted two laboratory experiments that systematically 
varied a workgroup’s gender composition and asked consumers 
about their impressions of the group. We find that a workgroup’s 
gender composition does indeed influence consumers’ judgments 
of the group and its output. In addition to addressing a novel issue 
with important managerial implications, our research sheds light on 
fundamental aspects of group impression formation. Our hypotheses 
propose different results from a linear or averaging model that pre-
dicts increasingly negative judgments as the proportion of women 
increases, even though an averaging combination rule is one that 
follows from well-established theory (Anderson 1981) and has been 
demonstrated in other consumer judgments (e.g., aggregation of in-
formation about product bundles, Yadav 1994). 
Drawing primarily from research on gender stereotypes (Eagly 
and Karau 2002), group impression formation (Dasgupta et al.1999; 
Ostrom and Sedikides 1992; Sherman, Castelli and Hamilton 2002) 
and information processing about individual members of a group 
(Kunda and Oleson 1997; Richards and Hewstone 2001) we make 
predictions on the effect of a group’s gender composition on consum-
ers’ judgments when the group’s gender was homogenous, included a 
solo or was slightly skewed (a slight majority in favor of one gender).
Hypothesis 1: Consumers believe a homogenously male work-
group is superior to and more agentic than a ho-
mogenously female workgroup. 
Hypothesis 2: Judgments of slightly skewed gender workgroups 
are similar to each other, regardless of whether 
they favor women or men. Consumers believe 
that a group whose majority is slightly skewed 
is no more superior and are no less agentic than 
a homogenously male group. However, a group 
whose majority is slightly skewed toward either 
women or men is superior to and is more agentic 
compared to a homogenously female group. 
Hypothesis 3: Solo workgroups are judged differently from 
each other, depending on the solo’s gender. 
Consumers believe that a predominantly female 
group with a solo male is no more superior to 
and no more agentic than a homogenously fe-
male group, but believe that a predominantly 
female group with a solo male is inferior to and 
less agentic compared to a predominantly male 
group with a solo female. Conversely, consum-
ers believe that a predominantly male group with 
a solo female is not inferior to and is not less 
agentic than a homogenously male group but is 
superior to and more agentic compared to a pre-
dominantly female group with a solo male. 
In addition, we predict a moderator of the effect of a group’s 
gender composition – the gender composition within ranks of a hier-
archical group. The output from a group that is only slightly skewed 
to favor women but that is organized hierarchically in a counterste-
reotypical manner (where the higher rank is homogenously female 
and the lower rank is homogenously male) will be judged inferior to 
other skewed groups (an anti-gynocracy effect). 
Hypothesis 2a: Consumers judge the output of a group slightly 
skewed toward males differently from a group 
slightly skewed toward females when the groups 
contain hierarchical subgroups that are homog-
enous as to gender. They judge the gynocratic 
group’s output to be worse than the androcratic 
group’s output. 
We conducted two experiments that manipulated gender diver-
sity in a male dominated occupation to test our hypotheses. In both 
studies, the particular occupation was marketing business school 
professors, with the particular workgroup being a group of market-
ing faculty at a specific university. Study 1 (N=223) manipulated the 
gender composition of the workgroup and tested hypotheses 1-3 us-
ing a 2 x 3 between subjects design.  Study 2 (N=227) revealed a 
limitation on hypothesis 2’s prediction, using a 2 x 2 between sub-
jects design. Study 2 manipulated the within-group status hierarchy 
of mixed gender groups and found that this information moderated 
the effect of group composition on judgments of the group. 
Our research shows novel findings about how a work unit’s gen-
der composition influences consumers’ judgments of the group and 
its output. Not only did the information about each individual’s gen-
der influence consumers’ beliefs about whether the unit was superior 
to competitors, gender composition also influenced inferences about 
the unit’s personality traits. 
Consumers did not aggregate group composition information in 
a piece meal fashion, as in a linear or averaging model as suggested 
by information integration theory. Instead, the aggregation process 
more closely resembled a step function. Despite the employees’ oc-
cupation being perceived as male-typed, the point at which judg-
ments differed was not when the majority began to skew in favor of 
women rather than men, but instead when the largely female group 
included a solo man. We show that a group’s gender composition 
must be very counterstereotypical for it to suffer from negative eval-
uations. Only the groups that were comprised entirely of women or 
included a solo man were judged inferior to the rest. 
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Inferences about the relative status of men and women within 
the group moderated the effects.  Just as consumers derogated all 
female groups, they also derogated groups with an all-female hierar-
chy (a gynocracy). Gender homogeneity per se did not imply inferi-
ority since all male groups (in study 1) and all male status hierarchies 
(in study 2) were not derogated.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
“An ‘elephant in the room’ is an obvious truth that’s either 
being ignored or going unaddressed.”
-Jeff Inman, ACR 2012
Lifestyle brands (LBs) address consumers’ core values through 
both their tangible and symbolic qualities.  In using them, consumers 
hope to possess and project the values and qualities that these brands 
represent (Helman and de Chernatony 1999).  Lifestyle branding 
(LBg) led to success in the United States and abroad (Danziger 2009; 
Lamb 2011; Sauer 2012; Birkner 2011; Menkes 1997).   Top con-
sumer brands are identified as LBs, including Nike (Klein 1999), 
Starbucks (Sauer 2012), and Apple (Cuneo 2003).  LBg seems ubiq-
uitous in the practitioner’s world (Geskens 2012), with a dizzying 
array of brands claiming lifestyle brand (LB) (Kiley 2005).   
This research highlights an academic-practitioner divide re-
garding LBs, namely, an almost absolute lack of discussion of LBs 
in the most highly respected academic marketing journals.  While 
LBg has been touched on in some academic articles (Helman and 
de Chernatony 1999; Fernie et al. 1997), we do not believe anyone 
has formally operationalized the concept of LBg beyond a very brief 
definition. We contribute to marketing theory and practice by identi-
fying the essential elements of LBg and providing a comprehensive 
definition of the term.
In a literature review we found a single top-tier marketing 
journal article with the words “LB” or “LBg” in the title (Chernev, 
Hamilton, and Gal 2011).  Yet the words “LBg” appear only in the 
“managerial implications” section.  The article’s focus is consumer 
self-expression through brands, and while theoretically and practi-
cally useful, LBg is left wholly unexamined. Only one article with 
the words “LB” or “LBg” was discovered in the Journal of Market-
ing Research; they do not appear at all in the Journal of Consumer 
Research. 
Top-tier marketing journals regularly decry the academic-prac-
titioner divide including Reibstein, Day and Wind (2009), Lilien 
(2011), Hunt (2002), and Stanton (2006).   Bridging the divide will 
happen only if marketing academia addresses topics of great interest 
to practitioners, including LBg.
We take a theory-in-use approach (Zaltman 1982) to under-
standing LBg, examining its practical definitions, identifying its 
essential theoretical elements, and providing a comprehensive def-
inition of the concept useful for both theoretical and practical ap-
proaches to marketing.
Some business writers have attempted to define what these 
brands actually mean. Edery (2006) argues that properly defining an 
LB is not simple, and even identifying which brands are and are not 
LBs can be controversial. LiBrandi (2012) agrees with Edery’s as-
sessment, positing that there are five core attributes central to LBs:
1) Authenticity
2) Use of “halo effect to extend beyond core  
3) Selectivity (not all things to all people)
4) Focus on sense of community, not 4P’s
5) “Work[ing] harder” than non-lifestyle brands
Defining Attributes of Lifestyle Brands: Finding the 
Theory-in-use
In the academic world, Jung and Merlin (2002-2003) are among 
the few scholars who attempt to provide a definition for an LB, stat-
ing that it “provides consumers with an emotional attachment to an 
identifiable lifestyle” (40), and arguing that LBs work “building and 
sustaining a strong, emotional and long-term bond with consum-
ers” (40). Relying on emotion as the crucial factor in defining LBs 
is overly simplistic; modern branding strategy generally emphasizes 
emotional connections through the creation of brand personalities 
(Aaker 1997), and by encouraging consumer-brand relationships 
(Fournier 1998). 
Based on widespread understanding and use of the term “LB” 
and the extant theoretical branding literature, we propose that the 
notable presence of all ten attributes below is what sets LBs apart 
from others:
1. Association: linking to other people, places, organizations, 
activities, events, issues, other brands or images (cf. Berg-
er and Heath 2007, Keller 2003, Watts and Dodds 2007)
2. Quality/excellence: superiority or excellence on key attri-
butes (cf. Bhattacharya and Sen 2003)
3. Sensory appeal: attractiveness or artistic value, or qualities 
related to the way its products look, feel, taste, smell or 
sound (cf. Simonson and Nowlis 2000)
4. Sign value: how conspicuously the brand is displayed by 
the user, and is congruent with the user’s self-identity (cf. 
Escalas and Bettman 2005, Sirgy 1982,)
5. Personification: a personality that resembles human char-
acteristics (cf. Aaker 1997)
6. Interactivity: engaging consumers, requiring or inviting 
them to exert mental or emotional energy on its behalf (cf. 
Austin et al. 2007, Bruns 2005)
7. Facilitation: the ability to help the user engage in preferred 
behaviors or attain important personal goals (cf. Fournier 
1998, Solomon 1983)
8. Internal consistency: perception of interrelated and coher-
ent associations (cf. Guidry et al. 2008)
9. Mythology: the brand embodies a story that resonates with 
deeply held social ideals (cf. Holt 2004)
10. Values: ability to communicate a set of core values that are 
important to its employees, and the consumer (cf. Harris 
and de Chernatony 2001, Sen and Bhattacharya 2001)
The first 7 of these attributes are either adapted or come directly 
from Charles Martin (1998).  Item 8 comes from Guidry, Zinkhan 
and Tam (2008). We have added the last two attributes, following 
Martin’s guidelines and basing them on the extant self-expressive 
branding literature, as key qualities of LBs.
We offer then the following definition: LBs 1) reflect and fa-
cilitate people’s ways of living, and enable key aspects of their 
consumers’ behavior, ranging from core users, who help define the 
brands’ meanings, to those for whom the lifestyle is aspirational; 2) 
utilize multifaceted marketing mixes appealing to more than a single 
aspect of their customers’ interests, feelings and needs; 3) offering 
high quality products; 4) authentically and consistently espouse a set 
of essential values that resonate deeply with their consumer base; 
and 4) consciously embrace multi-directional relationship marketing 
(Zinkhan 2002, Lacey and Morgan 2007).
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Implications for Theory and Practice
We have two major goals: firstly, to refine academics’ and prac-
titioners’ understanding of LBg by creating a functional framework 
for the concept; secondarily to support this framework with theo-
retical foundations, giving this structure explanatory and predictive 
power. 
It is time for the academy to conduct rigorous research to better 
understand this brand typology, furthering the interests of academics 
and practitioners alike.
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Getting Rid of Possessions to Get Back at People: Rejection and Consumer Disposal 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How do consumers react when they have acquired identity-
linked products in order to associate with a specific group, only to 
later be rejected from this group?  The present research seeks to 
answer this question by studying the impact of social rejection on 
product disposal behavior.  The present research builds on research 
that demonstrates that consumers will engage in strategic (Mead et 
al. 2011) and even conspicuous (Lee and Shrum 2012) consumption 
decisions following rejection, by focusing on circumstances under 
which rejection may cause the opposite reaction—product disposal. 
As such, the present investigation examines rejection as it pertains to 
disposing identity-linked possessions, and explores when and why 
consumers will dispose of and aggress against these possessions.
Social rejection is a threat to an individual’s fundamental need 
to belong (Baumeister and Leary 1995) and a volume of literature 
has examined responses to being rejected, ranging from aggression 
(e.g., DeWall et al. 2009) to more strategic coping mechanisms (e.g. 
Lee and Shrum 2012; Mead et al. 2011).  For example, Mead et al. 
(2011) found that participants who are given the opportunity to rein-
tegrate with other individuals seek to acquire products that facilitate 
reintegration, thus demonstrating a degree of social strategy.  On the 
other hand, research has also found that rejection can cause a person 
to behave in aggressive (DeWall et al. 2009), and anti-social (see: 
Catanese and Tice 2005) ways, against both the original rejecters 
(Warburton, Williams, and Cairns 2006) and against innocent third 
parties (Twenge 2005; Catanese and Tice 2005).  Interestingly, ag-
gression only occurs against innocent third parties who can be con-
nected to the rejecters in some way (i.e. all of them are “students”; 
Twenge and Campbell 2003). 
Given that possessions are an important part of the self-concept 
(Kim and Johnson 2012) and the extended self (Belk 1988), they are 
part of the self-concept that an individual develops with a group.  As 
such, when a group rejects a person, the way the person responds 
towards group identity-linked possessions should be a proxy for how 
they feel toward the group, so that the possessions become the “in-
nocent third parties” in the situation.  We thus expect that individuals 
will react toward their group-identity possessions in ways consistent 
with their reactions to the rejection situation, such as by disposing of 
these possessions if there is no potential for reintegration and thus 
no social benefits (of reconnecting) in continuing to signal the group 
identity.  Individuals should react destructively against the posses-
sions if the rejection has incited aggression, such as when social ex-
pectations are high (Wesselmann et al. 2010).  
The current research investigates these hypotheses; we ma-
nipulate both the reintegration potential (i.e. finality) of the rejec-
tion, as well as individuals’ prior expectations for acceptance from 
the group, and demonstrate that individuals react against their own 
material products when socially rejected, both through disposal and 
destruction.  We find that those who experience final rejection are 
more likely to dispose of group identity-linked possessions; how-
ever, though individuals are more likely to aggress against posses-
sions when rejected (versus not rejected), it is only when prior social 
expectations are high that differences between final and ambiguous 
rejection are unearthed. 
In our first study, we draw from Mead et al. (2011) to investigate 
strategy by manipulating whether the rejection allows for the possi-
bility to reintegrate with social others (i.e. “ambiguous” rejection) or 
whether it is stringently final (i.e. “final” rejection).  We expect and 
find that individuals are less willing to dispose of group-related pos-
sessions when they are ambiguously (M = 2.33), relative to finally (M 
= 4.50), rejected (t(55) = 3.88, p < .01), given that there is a “second 
chance” inherent in such situations and individuals may benefit from 
retaining group-identity items.  There is no difference between final 
(M = 2.4) and ambiguous (M = 1.94) groups’ aggression against the 
possession (t(55) = 1.17; p > .20). 
To further investigate aggressive reactions, our second study 
also manipulates social expectations—that is, the anticipation of 
a positive experience and outcome with a group—and examines 
whether social expectations impact the way participants treat their 
possessions.  Previous research has shown that having high social 
expectations about the outcome of an interpersonal interaction, fol-
lowed by a subsequent rejection, causes individuals to feel unsure 
about their social judgments; this leads to increased aggression post-
rejection (Wesslemann et al. 2010).  As such, we predict and find that 
individuals with high expectations are more aggressive than those 
with low expectations F(1,123) = 3.16, p = 0.078).  Specifically, in-
dividuals are more likely to ruin their group-related possession when 
they have high (vs. low) social expectations about a positive outcome 
with the group, particularly when rejection was final (Mhigh = 2.56; 
Mlow = 1.93; F(1,120) = 3.35; p = 0.07).  When rejection is ambigu-
ous, participants with both high and low expectations respond simi-
larly in their destructive intentions (F(1,123) = 0.44, p > 0.5).  This 
study demonstrates that consumers balance aggressive intentions and 
the strategic ability to curtail these aggressive desires when reinte-
gration is possible.
In order to uncover why destructive intentions occur, our third 
study provides an initial investigation of mitigating factors.  Prior 
literature suggests that post-rejection aggression may be caused by a 
lack of control over a situation, such that replenishing power may re-
move aggressive responding (e.g. Warburton et al. 2006).  However, 
other research also suggests that direct rejection (vs. incidental ignor-
ing) depletes relational needs (e.g. self-esteem or the need to belong), 
but not power needs (Lee and Shrum 2012).  Thus, manipulating 
social expectations may deplete either a sense of control—because 
we see aggressive responses—or else social and relational needs, 
because expectations related to feelings about the group.  To deter-
mine which of these needs (power or belonging) was depleted, our 
third study first looks at power needs and establishes that, contrary to 
previous research on aggression, replenishing a sense of control did 
not impact aggressive responses post-rejection F(69, 1) = 0.006, p > 
.90).  A follow-up study will contrast replenishing relational needs 
vs. efficacy needs to see which better mitigates aggressive reactions.
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Table 1 – Summary of Results
Disposal 
Type Condition
Study 1
Final Ambiguous Control
N = 20 N = 18 N = 20
Non-
aggressive 4.50 2.33 1.25
Aggressive 3.51 2.22 1.10
Study 2
Final Ambiguous
High 
Expectations
Low 
Expectations
High 
Expectations
Low 
Expectations
N = 32 N = 28 N = 31 N = 33
Non-
aggressive 3.64 3.66 2.50 2.45
Aggressive 2.56 1.93 2.10 1.86
Study 3
High power Low Power
N = 34 N = 37
Non-
aggressive 3.20 3.16
Aggressive 2.36 2.39
Note: means for each condition are reported here.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Previous research suggests that consumers react negatively to 
price disparities (Feinberg, Krishna and Zhang 2002), view policies 
that produce them as unfair (Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004) and find the 
prospect of facing them to be threatening to the self (Argo, White and 
Dahl 2006). In response, they are willing to lie about the prices they 
have paid to minimize the ego-threat of having been “taken” (Argo 
et al. 2006; Sengupta, Dahl and Gorn 2002).
Despite finding expected patterns of lying to avoid sharing ego-
threatening information, these studies also report levels of lying in-
tentions suggesting a general reluctance to lie. For example, across 
four studies in Argo et al. (2006), the mean score on the lying index 
exceeded the scale midpoint in only two of 16 experimental condi-
tions. That is, on average, participants reported being unlikely to lie. 
If these participants were being honest about their lying intentions, 
then how else might they respond to requests for information about 
unfavorable social comparisons when the truth is perceived as an 
unattractive option? 
We examine evasion (i.e. ambiguous, vague or avoidant re-
sponding) as an alternative to deception (lies) in the face of potential 
disclosures of ego-threatening consumer information. Evasive self-
presentation has been described as a non-obvious alternative to au-
thentic and deceptive self-presentation (Leary 1995), theorized as a 
probable response to concerns about presenting oneself unfavorably 
in group conversations (Wooten and Reed 2000), and found to be an 
effective response to difficult questions (Rogers and Norton 2011). 
Accordingly, we conduct four studies to: (1) assess evasion as an 
alternative to deception as a means of managing the flow of ego-
threatening information, (2) examine the psychological mechanism 
underlying the use of evasion or deception in such social predica-
ments, and (3) explore factors that differentially affect consumers’ 
intentions to evade versus deceive.
In Study 1, we expose participants to a hypothetical scenario in 
which they learn that they paid more (ego-threatening) or the same 
amount (control) as a friend who purchased an identical product. 
Participants (n=151) were asked to provide open-ended responses 
to the friend’s inquiry about the price paid by the participant. Three 
independent judges coded responses as “truthful,” “deceptive,” or 
“evasive,” where “evasive” means concealing the price paid either 
by not mentioning actual or relative price, or by being vague, equivo-
cal or ambiguous about price. Chi-square and Fisher exact tests types 
revealed evasion as a common alternative to deception among con-
sumers who are reluctant to reveal information about price dispari-
ties (Table 1 Panel A).
Study 2 seeks to replicate the findings of Study 1 using scaled 
intention measures and to explore process evidence by assessing 
embarrassment as a mediator of the effects of ego-threatening so-
cial comparisons on intentions to evade or deceive. Because it is an 
aversive state (Leary 1995; Miller 1992), embarrassment serves an 
important regulatory function that is essential for orderly social in-
teraction and social well-being (Goffman 1967). The fear of embar-
rassment motivates people to keep their behaviors within the limits 
of propriety and to withhold information that threatens their public 
self-images, even when it is not in their best interest to do so (Leary 
and Kowalski 1995). Participants (n = 227) from an online panel 
in the U.S. read one of two scenarios similar to those in Study 1, 
and then reported their intentions to evade or deceive in response to 
the friend’s price inquiry. Participants’ self-reported embarrassment 
when confronted with a price disparity was also measured. Study 2 
replicated the findings of Study 1, demonstrating evasion as an alter-
native to deception using multi-item scales rather than open-ended 
responses (Table 1 Panel B). Embarrassment was revealed to be a 
mediator of the effect for both evasion and deception (Table 1 Panel 
C). In subsequent studies, we examine moderating variables to sup-
port our evasion and deception as distinct behavioral responses.
In Study 3, we examine a condition under which deception (but 
not evasion) intentions are likely to be affected. Goffman (1963) de-
scribes discreditability as the possibility that an undisclosed discrep-
ancy between an individual’s actual and desired social identity may 
be revealed. When an individual engages in deception, they experi-
ence the fear of being caught in a lie (Keltner and Buswell 1996). 
We thus predict that discreditability may cause consumers to avoid 
deception. As evasion does not involve a discreditable assertion, dis-
creditability should not affect evasion intentions. Members of a paid 
research panel (n = 181) participated in a study in which discredit-
ability was manipulated by the presence or absence of a third party 
who knew the truth. Analysis of scaled intention measures yielded a 
significant decrease in deception intentions (but not evasion inten-
tions) given high discreditability (Table 1 Panel D).
Study 4 considers a condition under which evasion (but not de-
ception) intentions are likely to be affected. Student participants (n 
= 146) were assigned to read one of two scenarios in which their in-
teraction partner was either more or less persistent when questioning 
others. Levering findings from research on persistence in criminal in-
terrogations (Buller, Strzyzewski and Comstock 1991; Burgoon et al. 
1994), we predicted evasion (but not deception) to be affected by the 
presence of a persistent inquirer. This study also used credit scores 
rather than price as the ego-threatening consumer information for 
further support of robustness. Analysis confirmed that evasion (but 
not deception) intentions were attenuated when participants faced a 
more (vs. less) persistent interaction partner (Table 1 Panel E).
In conclusion, this research empirically supports evasion as an 
alternative tactic to deception for people motivated to conceal ego-
threatening information. Lying is not the only, or even the preferred, 
method of avoiding the disclosure of inconvenient truths. It is our 
hope that this work will stimulate further inquiries into the evasive 
maneuvers made by people on the everyday battleground of consum-
er self-presentation.
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Table 1
Panel
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B Study 2: Condition means for behavioral intentions
 Comparison condition
 Self-threat Control
Deception 2.62a 1.25c
Evasion 3.05b 1.64d
C Study 2: Mediation summary
DV Indirect 95% CI 
Path coefficients *
a b a x b c c’
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 Discreditability condition **
 Low High
Deception 3.51a 2.41b
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Spending Sadly: How Time versus Money Impacts Enhanced Valuations Under Sadness
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Under the ‘misery-is-not-miserly’ effect, consumers’ incidental 
sadness influences their motivation to value goods and services. In 
particular, feelings of sadness (relative to happiness or neutral emo-
tions) produce more positive valuations, leading to higher purchase 
intentions (Cryder et al. 2008, Lerner, Small and Loewenstein 2004). 
We contend that payment currency (time vs. money) may influence 
the degree to which sadness triggers greater valuations of targets. 
Consumers spend time, money, or both on goods and services, 
and thinking about spending with these currencies produces differ-
ences in motivation and involvement. Consumers perceive them-
selves to be more connected to targets on which they have spent time 
versus money (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). Money is depersonal-
ized; even subtle reminders of money arouse feelings of detachment 
(Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006, 2008). Thus, currency of payment 
may affect how consumers react to incidental emotions when valuing 
goods and services. 
In past work, the misery-is-not-miserly effect has obtained 
mainly when consumers are self-focused (Cryder et al. 2008). Our 
investigation focuses on situations in which consumers are self-fo-
cused during the induction of an emotional state. Specifically, we 
employ autobiographical mood induction (i.e., writing about a life 
event; Schwarz and Clore 1983) to increase self-focus along with 
activating incidental emotion. We argue that contemplating payment 
itself could mitigate the misery-is-not-miserly effect if situational 
self-focus no longer persists. Specifically, we predict that the misery-
is-not-miserly effect will be minimized when the payment under con-
sideration forges a weaker connection between the self and the target. 
We propose that thinking about spending time (vs. money) on a 
future or past purchase leads to more persistent self-focus that allows 
initial feelings of sadness to carry over into valuations. We argue that 
this moderating role of payment currency occurs because sadness 
spurs a focus on the self, and thinking about spending time (vs. mon-
ey) acquiring an offering connects the self to the target of an ensuing 
judgment, which facilitates (blocks) the persistence of self-focus into 
valuations of the target. Further, we also predict that the misery-is-
not-miserly effect can be mitigated for purchases involving spending 
time if consumers are primed to disconnect the self from the concept 
of spending time. 
In three studies, we examine the role of induced emotional state 
on valuations. In each study, half of the participants experience a sad-
ness induction. Across studies, we vary whether the other half of par-
ticipants respond to a happy or neutral mood induction to generalize 
the effect. Immediately following the mood induction, participants 
are asked to think about spending time or money on a target. 
Study 1 (N = 140) had a 2 (mood: sad or happy) X 2 (currency: 
time or money) between-subjects design. Following a mood induc-
tion, participants responded to a laptop valuation task (Mogilner and 
Aaker 2009). Participants in the time (money) condition were asked, 
“How much time (money) have you spent fixing your laptop?” A 2 
X 2 ANOVA on attitudes toward the laptop revealed a significant in-
teraction between incidental mood and payment currency (F(1,139) 
= 5.29, p = .02). In the time condition, participants’ attitudes were 
elevated after a sad versus happy mood induction, but in the money 
condition, sadness had no effect on valuations. Study 1 establishes, 
for the first time in the literature, that the effect of sadness on increas-
ing valuations of participants’ possessions is more pronounced when 
spending time (vs. money) is evoked. 
Next, we consider whether the misery-is-not-miserly effect ob-
tains in acquisition situations involving different currencies of pay-
ment. An online panel of mTurk participants (N = 161) participated 
in a 2 (mood: sad or neutral) X 2 (payment currency: time or money) 
between-subjects design. Following mood induction, participants 
judged an offer for restaurant vouchers available for $10 (money) or 
in return for 40 minutes filling out marketing surveys (time). In the 
time condition, participants’ purchase likelihood was elevated after 
a sad versus neutral mood induction (t(160) = 4.77, p = .03). In the 
money condition, ratings were not influenced by sadness (t(160) = 
1.74, p = .19). This demonstrates that incidental sadness (vs. neu-
tral mood) enhances the attractiveness of target offerings involving 
spending time significantly more than target offerings that involve 
spending money. 
In study 3, we seek to disassociate the self from the idea of 
“spending time” to attenuate the strength of the misery-is-not-mi-
serly effect. Students (N = 151) participated in a 2 (mood: sad or 
happy) X 3 (payment currency: time, time-with-disconnect-prime or 
money) between-subjects design. Following mood induction, par-
ticipants judged an offer of a 1-day gym pass for $12 (money) or 
after listening to a sales pitch (time). For the time-primed condition, 
participants also listed examples of activities unimportant to self that 
they have wasted time on. A 2 X 2 ANOVA on purchase likelihood 
revealed a significant interaction between manipulated emotion and 
payment currency (F (1,142) = 4.57, p = .03). In the time condition, 
participants’ valuations were heightened after a sad versus happy 
mood induction (t(142) = 4.12, p = .04). Sadness had no effect on 
valuations, however, in either the money condition (t(142) = 0.43, p 
= .67) or the time-prime condition (t(142) = 0.35, p =.72). This shows 
that priming participants to think about ways in which they spend 
time on things unimportant to themselves effectively diminishes the 
effect of sadness upon time as a payment currency.
Across three studies, we showed that sadness enhanced valua-
tions of targets on which spending was framed in terms of time, but 
this misery-is-not-miserly effect was less pronounced for targets on 
which spending was framed in terms of money. Moreover, study 3 
revealed that this effect was mitigated when participants were primed 
to imagine how time can be spent on things not connected to the self. 
These studies provide the first evidence that the context of a deci-
sion setting might encourage or stifle self-connection to an offering. 
Self-focus, primed by an autobiographical sadness manipulation, can 
persist if the context allows a link to be forged between the self and 
the offering. We show that offerings framed via time tend to aid that 
persistence. 
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Table 1: Summary of Findings
Study Manipulation Design Results
1
Participants’ own 
laptops: time (money) 
spent on repairs
2 (mood: sad or happy) by 2 
(time or money)
- In the time condition, attitudes toward owned laptops were elevated 
after a sad versus happy mood induction (Msad = 6.16 vs. Mhappy = 
5.65; t(139) = 4.12, p = .04). 
- In the money condition, sadness had no effect on valuations (Msad = 
5.60 vs. Mhappy = 5.99), t(139) = 1.67, p = .20). 
2
Restaurant voucher: 
Pay $10 or 40 minutes 
volunteering
2 (mood: sad or neutral) by 
2 (payment currency: time 
or money
- In the time condition, participants’ purchase likelihood was elevated 
after a sad versus neutral mood induction (M = 5.77 vs. M = 4.87; 
t(160) = 4.77, p = .03). 
- In the money condition, ratings were also directionally higher under 
sad versus neutral mood, but this effect was not significant (Msad = 
5.53 vs. Mnuetral = 4.93, t(160) = 1.74, p = .19).
3
Gym day pass: Pay 
$12 or listen to 40 
minutes sales pitch/
demonstration from 
trainer
2 (mood: sad or happy) by 
3 (payment currency: time, 
time-with-disconnect-prime 
or money)
- In the time condition, valuations of the gym pass were heightened 
after a sad vs. happy mood induction (M = 6.16 vs. M = 5.65; t(142) = 
4.12, p = .04). 
-- In the money condition, sadness had no effect on valuations (Msad = 
3.90 vs. Mhappy = 4.07, t(142) = .43, p = .67). 
- Likewise, in the time-prime condition, valuations of the gym pass 
were not influenced by manipulated mood (M = 4.32 vs. M = 4.12; 
t(142) = -.35, p = .72).
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When Logos Rise and Fall: Exploring the Metaphorical Meaning of Upward and 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Stylistic properties influence product judgments by communi-
cating symbolic meaning beyond what is explicitly stated (Doyle 
and Bottomley 2006; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1992; Peracchio 
& Meyers-Levy 2005). Indeed, psychologists have long been inter-
ested in the metaphorical meaning of concepts; however, they have 
focused largely on verbal rather than visual metaphors (e.g., Fau-
connier and Turner 1998; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). One common 
visual property is the diagonal orientation of product images, word-
marks, and logos. Given multiple uses of diagonals in our society, it 
is conceivable that diagonal orientation could communicate a variety 
of concepts that might influence product attitudes. Although there is 
evidence that diagonals symbolize dynamism (Peracchio and Mey-
ers-Levy 2005), several questions about the metaphorical meaning 
of diagonals remain. 
First, do diagonals with opposite orientations (i.e., upward- vs. 
downward-sloping) convey different meanings, such as different de-
grees of activity? Second, how much cognitive elaboration is neces-
sary for the diagonal orientation of an image to convey metaphorical 
meaning? Here, the existing literature equivocates: earlier research 
suggests that these effects arise spontaneously (Meyers-Levy and 
Peracchio 1992), while more recent research suggests that they re-
quire extensive processing (Nordhielm 2002; Peracchio and Meyers-
Levy 2005). Third, what other semantic concepts beyond activity do 
diagonals convey? Given differences in how upward and downward 
diagonals are commonly used in society (e.g., depicting success vs. 
failure, growth vs. decline, effort vs. ease), it is likely that upward 
and downward diagonals carry multiple opposing associations.
Across three studies, we employ a multimethod framework 
(cf. Rozin et al. 2012) to investigate consumers’ capacity to extract 
metaphorical meaning from upward and downward diagonal logos at 
an automatic (vs. deliberate) level. Using direct measurement profil-
ing, in study 1, 143 undergraduate students were randomly assigned 
to a condition in a 2 (diagonal: upward vs. downward) x 3 (order: 
heatmap, activity items, or rest item measured last) between-subjects 
design. Participants were shown an upward- or downward-sloping 
line and told to click on the origin of the line (heatmap measure). 
The x- and y- coordinates of the image served as the dependent vari-
ables. Supporting our hypothesis that people anchor on the left side 
of images, thereby seeing  diagonals sloping from the lower-left to 
upper-right as upward rather than downward, there was no effect of 
diagonal on the x-coordinate: both clicked on the left side of the im-
age (M = 197.85, F(1, 165) < 1, NS). Importantly, downward (vs. 
upward) diagonals had higher y-coordinate values (M = 329.77 vs. 
65.33, F(1, 165) = 1028.80, p < .001). 
Participants also rated how well the attributes dynamism, suc-
cess (success and power, r = .76), activity (active and effortful, r = 
.58) and at rest described the line on scales anchored by not at all (1) 
to very much (7). In line with our theorizing, although diagonal had 
no significant effect on dynamism (M = 4.39 vs. 3.86; F(1, 137) = 
1.36, NS), upward (vs. downward) diagonals had significantly higher 
ratings for success (M = 5.20 vs. 4.17, F(1, 137) = 6.80, p = .01) and 
activity (M = 4.84 vs. 4.00, F(1, 137) = 5.20, p < .05), and lower rat-
ings for at-rest (M = 4.13 vs. 3.25, F(1,137) = 4.23, p < .05). 
Because we explicitly instructed participants to consider these 
semantic meanings, to examine whether diagonals would sponta-
neously generate these concepts, we used a free association task in 
study 2. 150 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were ran-
domly assigned to see one of eight fictitious logos in a 2 (diagonal) 
x 4 (image type) between-subjects design. Participants then listed 
the first three words that came to mind, after which they rated each 
word and the image itself on six dimensions: bad/good, passive/ac-
tive, failure/success, weak/strong, beginning/ending, and decreasing/
increasing. Focusing on the top of mind association, upward (vs. 
downward) diagonals evoked concepts judged higher on activity (M 
= 4.71vs. 3.98, F (1, 142) = 6.20, p < .05) and strength (M = 5.12 vs. 
4.49, F (1, 142) = 5.69, p < .05). No other effects were significant (all 
ps > .10). Furthermore, based on the direct measurement of the im-
ages, ratings of upward (vs. downward) diagonals were only higher 
for growth (M = 4.92 vs. 4.26, F (7, 142) = 5.90, p < .05), success (M 
= 4.74 vs. 4.17, F (7, 142) = 4.92, p < .05), and positivity (M = 4.54 
vs. 4.12, F (7, 142) = 3.06, p < .10). Activity and strength were only 
directionally consistent with our expectations (M = 4.88 vs.  4.47, F 
(7, 142) = 2.55, p = .11 for activity; M = 4.90 vs.4.54, F (7, 142) = 
1.79, p = .18 for strength).
Because free association tasks are context-sensitive (Rozin et 
al. 2012), corroborating evidence is needed.  In study 3, 136 under-
graduates were randomly assigned to one of five Implicit Associa-
tion Tests (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). This pro-
cedure used response latencies from paired categorization tasks to 
determine the strength of the implicit association between upward 
and downward diagonals and positivity vs. negativity, strength vs. 
weakness, activity vs. inactivity, growth vs. decline, and success vs. 
failure. As predicted, for the activity IAT, mean reaction time (RT) 
was 222.01 ms faster for upward-active/downward-passive than for 
the reverse (t(23) = 4.76, p < .001). For valence, mean RT was 150.35 
ms faster for upward-good/downward-bad than for the reverse (t(30) 
= 3.42, p < .005). For potency, mean RT was 206.52 ms faster for 
upward-strong/downward-weak than for the reverse (t(28) = 4.11, 
p < .001). For success, mean RT was 349.69 ms faster for upward-
success/downward-failure than for the reverse (t(26) = 7.67, p < 
.001). Lastly, for growth, mean RT was 406.10 ms faster for upward-
increase/downward-decrease than for the reverse (t(24) = 7.12, p < 
.001).  Importantly, analyses using the D measure scoring algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003) yielded consistent results.
Taken together, our results suggest (1) diagonal direction mat-
ters because upward and downward diagonals can convey opposite 
semantic concepts, (2) diagonals can convey multiple semantic 
meanings in addition to activity, and (3) these associations can occur 
automatically.
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Table 1: Summary of Empirical Results Across Studies
Study Summary of Empirical Results
Study 1 (Direct 
Measurement)
People anchor on the left side of diagonal lines. Using a heatmap measure, diagonal orientation did not influence 
horizontal anchoring x-coordinate value of what participants identified as the line’s origin (F(1, 165) < 1, NS), but 
it did influence vertical anchoring , with those viewing upward diagonals anchoring on a lower point than those 
viewing downward diagonals (F(1, 165) = 1028.80, p < .001).
Perceptions of activity and success are stronger for upward than downward diagonals (F(1, 137) = 5.20, p < .05 
for activity; F(1, 137) = 6.80, p = .01 for success ). ‘At-rest’ perceptions are stronger for downward diagonals than 
upward diagonals (F(1,137) = 4.23, p < .05). Upward and downward diagonals do not differ in dynamism (M = 
4.39 vs. 3.86; F(1, 137) = 1.36, NS). 
Study 2 (Free 
Association Task)
Focusing on the first elicited word, upward (vs. downward) diagonals evoke concepts judged higher on activity (F 
(1, 142) = 6.20, p < .05) and strength (F (1, 142) = 5.69, p < .05). However, there were no significant main effects 
or interactions for any of the remaining four dimensions (all ps > .10). 
Averaging ratings of all three elicited words , upward (vs. downward) diagonals evoke concepts judged higher on 
activity (F (1, 142) = 5.87, p < .05) and strength (F (1, 142) = 4.73, p < .05).
Direct measurement of diagonals: Upward (vs. downward) diagonals more strongly communicate growth (F (7, 
142) = 5.90, p < .05), success (F (7, 142) = 4.92, p < .05), and positivity (F (7, 142) = 3.06, p < .10). Activity and 
strength were directionally consistent with our expectations, but not significant when directly measured (F (7, 142) 
= 2.55, p = .11 for activity; F (7, 142) = 1.79, p = .18 for strength). 
Study 3 (Implicit 
Association Test)
Mean RT was 222.01 ms faster for upward-active/downward-passive than for the reverse (t(23) = 4.76, p < .001). 
Mean RT was 150.35 ms faster for upward-good/downward-bad than for the reverse (t(30) = 3.42, p < .005). 
Mean RT was 206.52 ms faster for upward-strong/downward-weak than for the reverse (t(28) = 4.11, p < .001). 
Mean RT was 349.69 ms faster for upward-success/downward-failure than for the reverse (t(26) = 7.67, p < .001). 
Lastly, mean RT was 406.10 ms faster for upward-increase/downward-decrease than for the reverse (t(24) = 7.12, 
p < .001). Analyses based on D scores indicated the existence of the same implicit associations: upward-active/
downward-passive (D = .58, t(23) = 4.85, p < .001), upward-good/downward-bad (D = .35, t(30) = 3.70, p < .001), 
upward-strong/downward-weak (D = .44, t(28) = 4.50, p < .001), upward-success/downward-failure (D = .82, t(26) 
= 9.37, p < .001), and upward-increase/downward-decrease (D = .85, t(24) = 7.55, p < .001).
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When and Why Do Consumers Share Product Harm Information?
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often encounter product harm information in dif-
ferent forms such as product harm crises, warnings about side ef-
fects or rumors. Cancer-causing dyes and materials used by fashion 
companies, such as Levi’s, Zara and Calvin Klein, brake problems 
in Toyoto’s cars are a few but notable examples of mass-publicized 
product harm information. Product harm information might have 
detrimental effects such as hurting brand evaluations or sales (Ahlu-
walia, Burnkrant and Unnava 2000). Although it is clear that spread-
ing of such information is important, there has been limited work on 
understanding transmission of negative information about products. 
In this research, we explore when and why consumers share product 
harm information with others. 
Word-of-mouth (WOM) literature suggests that consumers are 
more likely to share information about products if they have a high 
level of interest in a product category (Sundaram, Mitra and Webster 
1998). On the contrary, recent evidence suggests that negative WOM 
is often about other brands rather than one’s main brand or often 
other people’s experiences (East, Hammond and Wright 2007; De 
Angelis et al. 2012). Further, when individuals encounter threatening 
information that has high self-relevance, they engage in biased de-
fensive processing strategies (Carvalho et al. 2008; Puntoni, Sweld-
ens and Tavasolli 2011). These findings together suggest that higher 
self-relevance of the product harm information might lead consum-
ers to share product harm information less.
Sharing is interpersonal process and is not only influenced 
by content characteristics (i.e. relevance of the information for the 
sender) but also social factors such as the relation between sender 
and receiver (Berger 2013). Most of the existing work in WOM so 
far has explored the relation between the sender and recipient (e.g., 
tie strength or similarity to the recipient). Yet, the way individuals 
see themselves in relation to others (self-construal) is not always 
due to their chronic disposition or context, but can be also shaped 
through environmental cues (Aaker and Lee 2001). Self-construal 
can influence how individuals process information and behave in 
their social interactions (Markus and Kitayama 1991). We suggest 
that self-construal should influence sharing behavior differently de-
pending on self-relevance of the product harm information, through 
three distinct processes: defensive processes, desire to reduce one’s 
own worries, and helping others. 
The following five studies show how content characteristics 
(self-relevance) and social factors (self-construal) explain product 
harm information sharing.
Study 1 tested the effect of self-relevance on sharing informa-
tion under chronic-independent self-construal. In order to manipulate 
self-relevance, participants received a newspaper article about the 
potential side effects of plastic bottles. This article focused on either 
on male or female health-issues. In the high self-relevance condi-
tions, participants received information about risk for their own gen-
der, while low self-relevance was created by providing information 
about risk for the other gender. After reading the article, a confeder-
ate engaged in a conversation with the participant. Our key depen-
dent measure was whether participants were willing to talk about the 
information with confederate. Participants were less likely to share 
health risk information, when the information was more self-relevant 
(i.e., pertained to their own gender).
In Study 2, we tested the boundary condition of self-relevance 
on sharing. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions (severity: low vs. high). Participants’ hair styling prod-
ucts usage was used as a proxy for self-relevance. Participants read 
a newspaper article discussing about the health risks of hair styling 
products, where severity was manipulated. Participants indicated 
their likelihood of sharing the information on a 7-point scale. Product 
harm information with high severity (e.g., heart problems) was less 
likely to shared when self-relevance was higher, and this effect was 
reversed for those with low severity (e.g. sleepiness). 
Study 3a and 3b examined how self-construal of individu-
als influences sharing product information with different levels of 
self-relevance. In Study 3a, we manipulated self-relevance using the 
same procedure in Study 1. Participants were provided with the op-
tion to share the article with people outside the lab, by clicking on the 
share buttons via social network sites. Supporting our predictions, 
self-construal moderated the effect of self-relevance on sharing. 
While under independent self-construal, heightened self-relevance 
decreased sharing; this effect was attenuated under interdependent 
self-construal. In Study 3b, by using a continuous self-relevance 
measure, another self-construal priming technique and scenario, we 
replicated our results. 
In Study 4, we tested underlying processes. Participants were 
asked for their permission to provide their saliva sample in the be-
havioral lab and received their (purposely prepared) saliva sample 
reports that reported duclin (fictitious) levels, which was either high 
or low. Self-construal was primed using a pronoun-circling task. Fur-
ther, participants read a newspaper article discussing health risks of 
Stevia (food additive). In order to manipulate self-relevance, Stevia 
either poses risk for people who have high or low levels of duclin. 
After reading the article, participants completed process measures 
(defensive responses, desire to reduce one’s own worries and helping 
others) and indicated likelihood of sharing the information.
Mediation analyses supported our theorizing. First, higher self-
relevance of the product harm information under independent self-
construal increases defensive processes, which decreases sharing. 
Second, higher self-relevance of the product harm information un-
der interdependent self-construal increases desire for reducing one’s 
own concerns and helping others, which both then increases shar-
ing. Study 4 showed the generalizability of our findings and provides 
deeper insights into the processes behind these effects.
This research makes several important theoretical contributions. 
First, we integrate work in word of-mouth and information process-
ing literature by showing that self-relevance of the information can 
also play an important role in sharing product harm information. 
Second, we contribute to word-of-mouth literature as less is known 
about role of context on transmission. Finally, we address the gap 
in defensive biases work by studying the role of social factors. This 
work has important implications for marketers but also for public 
policy makers protecting consumers’ welfare. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Advertisers want to create memorable ads and brands. Develop-
ing ads that stand out from the crowd of other ads – that are “atypi-
cal” – is commonly believed to be an effective strategy to accomplish 
memorability (Goodstein 1993; Smith et al. 2007). Atypical ads are 
dissimilar from other ad exemplars in the advertised category, which 
makes them stand out more. Typical ads are similar to the prototype 
of the advertised category and hence to other ads for the same type 
of product, which should make them less memorable, is the general 
idea. 
The present research contests this idea. It aims to reconcile com-
peting theories on the memory effects of atypicality by introducing 
exposure duration as a crucial moderator. In practice, attention to ads 
is usually short, ranging from a brief glance up to a few seconds at 
most (Pieters and Wedel 2004). Yet, memory effects are often tested 
after surprisingly long ad exposures of up to 30 seconds (Heckler 
and Childers 1992; Lee and Ang 2003). Therefore, the question re-
mains largely unanswered whether atypical ads are more effective 
than typical ads across the short exposure durations common in real-
life. In fact, there is reason to believe that the effects of atypicality 
are qualitatively different at different points in time during exposure, 
even during such short durations. 
Furthermore, although it is acknowledged that recall and recog-
nition represent different memory processes (Krishnan and Chakra-
varti 1999), they seem to be used more or less interchangeably in ad 
research as indicators of memory strength. This research shows that 
recall and recognition are determined by ad typicality, contingent on 
exposure duration, but in very diverse ways. 
We distinguish between typical ads and two types of atypical 
ads, namely “mystery ads” and “false front ads”. Typical ads are 
similar to the prototype of the advertised category and dissimilar 
from the prototype of other categories (a car ad that shows a car on a 
mountain road). Mystery ads are dissimilar from the prototype of the 
advertised category and dissimilar from the prototype of other cat-
egories (a car ad that displays a selection of crystal sculptures in the 
shape of wild animals, with the headline “Luxury off-road”). Finally, 
false front ads are dissimilar from the prototype of the advertised 
category and similar to the prototype of another category (a car ad 
that pictures a couple of space suits hanging to dry on a clothesline, 
with the headline “Future proof”). 
The results of two experimental studies show that typical and 
false front ads are better recalled than mystery ads after brief ex-
posures, but not after long exposures. Due to their similarity to a 
prototype and other ad exemplars, the product category in typical 
and false front ads is immediately identified upon exposure to them, 
and this ad-category association facilitates retrieval (producing inac-
curate recall for false front ads, however). 
In contrast, recognition memory is higher for mystery and false 
front ads after long exposures, but not after brief exposures. Due to 
their dissimilarity from the category prototype, atypical ads are rec-
ognized with higher specificity than typical ads, but only after expo-
sures sufficiently long to process their distinctive features. 
In sum, the findings reveal the advantage of being similar to 
other ads (“fitting in”) in recall and the advantage of being dissimilar 
from other ads (“standing out”) in recognition, and the crucial role 
that exposure duration plays in these. Our theory and findings have 
important implications for ad development and ad testing.
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Ambiguity Seeking in Payoffs as a Source of Consumer Patience
Yuanyuan Liu, ESSEC Business School, France
Timothy B. Heath, HEC Paris, France
Ayse Öncüler, ESSEC Business School, France
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers frequently face intertemporal choices where they 
must trade-off outcomes occurring at different points in time. These 
choices challenge consumers because they involve trading off small-
er-sooner payoffs with larger-later payoffs, where future payoffs tend 
to be discounted. Researchers have investigated factors that mitigate 
impatience, such as connecting people to their future selves (Her-
schfield et al. 2011), framing the decision as expediting rather than 
deferring (Malkoc and Zauberman 2006), etc.
The current study extends research on intertemporal choice by 
showing that adding ambiguity to larger-later payoffs increases the 
appeal of future options, thereby increasing patience. People gen-
erally prefer precise rather than ambiguous alternatives (Ellsberg 
1961). Since people discount both the future and ambiguity, we 
might expect them discount future ambiguous payoffs especially se-
verely. However, prior research reports instances in which congruity 
between an option’s various features improves appeal (e.g., Zhao and 
Xie 2011). Budescu and Wallsten (1995) propose a three-way tax-
onomy of the sources of imprecision that affect how individuals pro-
cess and communicate uncertainty: the definition of the target event, 
the nature of uncertainty about that event, and the representation of 
this uncertainty. People are motivated to achieve congruity between 
the three factors, where congruity often increases an option’s appeal. 
Given that the future and ambiguity are both sources of uncertainty 
about the payoff, we predict: When ambiguity is added to larger-later 
payoffs, it will match the uncertainty of the future and thus improve 
evaluation of the target option. However, when ambiguity is added to 
smaller-sooner payoffs, it will have no such effect as it is incongru-
ous with the present’s certainty.
Study 1a randomly assigned eighty graduate students to one of 
the two conditions (precise payoff vs. ambiguous payoff) where they 
chose between a smaller-sooner payoff and a larger-later one. People 
chose between 1,000€ now and 1,800€ in one year in the precise con-
dition, and between 1,000€ now and 1,700€ to 1,900€ in one year in 
the ambiguous condition. Adding ambiguity to the larger-later payoff 
increased its choice share significantly. Study 1b enlisted a choice-ti-
tration procedure and found the same effect in certainty equivalents. 
Study 2 replicates and extends Study 1 by testing an alterna-
tive hypothesis: that ambiguity has positive features which then in-
crease the appeal of future-ambiguous payoffs, such as excitement 
and hopefulness. Study 2 was designed to rule out this possibility 
by examining whether adding ambiguity to a smaller-sooner payoff 
would increase its appeal as well. One-hundred-twenty-eight US-
based participants (mTurk) were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: precise payoffs, future-ambiguous payoff, and present-
ambiguous payoff. Participants across these three conditions, respec-
tively, chose between $100 now and $140 in 90 days, between $100 
now and $130-to-$150 in 90 days, and between $90-to-$110 now and 
$140 in 90 days. Compared with the precise condition, ambiguity 
increased patience’s choice share significantly. In contrast, adding 
ambiguity to the present option reduced its choice share. Although 
this latter effect was only directional, the lack of a significant im-
provement eliminates the rival explanation. 
Study 3 tests whether people perceive a “fit” between ambiguity 
and the future by having 129 students consider two possible pay-
offs: 2,600€ and 2,400€ to 2,800€. They were then asked which of 
these two payoffs seemed to “fit” better with each of the following 
situations, or if the two payoffs fit the situation equally. In Situa-
tion 1, participants were told that “the money is to be paid today,” 
and in Situation 2, that “the money is to be paid in five years.”The 
certain payoff was coded as 1, equal as 2, and the ambiguous payoff 
as 3. Preferences were then tested relative to equality (2.0) as well 
as across the situations. Consistent with the congruity-of-uncertainty 
hypothesis, participants perceived the precise payoff to fit the cur-
rent situation better than the ambiguous payoff, and the ambiguous 
payoff was perceived to fit the future better than the precise payoff. 
Study 4 was designed to rule out an additional alternative ex-
planation that people generally hold more optimism in the future 
and thus weight the upper range’s value more. If so, then an infe-
rior ambiguous option would fail to improve the appeal of future 
payoffs. One-hundred-twenty-three US-based participants (mTurk) 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: precise payoffs, 
future-inferior-ambiguous payoff, and present-inferior-ambiguous 
payoff. Across the three conditions, respectively, participants chose 
between $600 now and $800 in 1 year, $600 now and $700-to-$800 
in 1 year, and $500-to-$600 now and $800 in 1 year. In contrast to 
the upper-range hypothesis, the larger-later payoff continued to be 
chosen more when it was ambiguous ($700-to-$800) than when it 
was certain ($800). And again ruling out the possibility that payoff 
ambiguity is positive, adding ambiguity to the smaller-sooner payoff 
($500-to-$600 now) reduced this option’s choice share relative to the 
precise-payoff condition ($600) significantly.
Four experiments thus examined the influence of ambiguous 
payoffs on consumer patience. We find that ambiguity added to a 
larger-later payoff increased its choice share, and thus resulted in 
greater patience (Study 1a & 1b), though no such effect was found 
when ambiguity was added to a smaller-sooner payoff (Study 2). We 
attribute this effect to the perceived congruity between ambiguity 
and the future (Study 3). We also rule out alternative possibilities 
such as (1) the positive effect of ambiguity, and (2) more optimism in 
the future and a focus on the payoff range’s highest value (Study 4). 
This research has significant implications for managers. For ex-
ample, shipment options with a longer delay may use a range of pric-
ing possibilities to attract consumers, and consumers may exercise 
more self control if potential future payoffs are ambiguous. Future 
research is therefore needed to better identify implications for mana-
gerial practice and consumer decision making.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Behavioral and targeted advertising promises significant gains 
for firms and reduce search costs and better meet consumer needs 
(Chen & Stallaert 2010; George & Hogendorn 2012; Yan et al. 2009). 
The adoption and effectiveness of such approaches, however, has 
been hampered by consumer privacy concerns (Acquisti & Varian 
2006; Goldfarb & Tucker 2011; Tucker 2011). To address these con-
cerns while allowing for marketing innovations, policy makers, with 
general consensus from industry, have advocated increased transpar-
ency of firm data practices and more consumer control over how their 
personal information is used and shared (FTC 2012; Santalesa 2012; 
White House 2012). However, the landscape for behavioral advertis-
ing is constantly shifting including changes in protection afforded to 
consumers and an increasingly complex set of choices for consumers 
to navigate. In this paper we argue, and provide supporting evidence, 
that this shifting landscape has the potential to limit the effectiveness 
of these policy approaches intended to address consumers’ privacy 
concerns. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of reference depen-
dence (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) on the consistency of consumer 
privacy decision making: both in terms of disclosure and choice of 
privacy settings.
In our first experiment we evaluated the impact of changing 
protections’ levels on self-disclosure behavior. We asked partici-
pants ((N=386, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk) to take 
two separate surveys on (un)ethical behavior in which they were 
presented short, simple, privacy notices communicating the protec-
tion level each survey offers. Between subjects, we manipulated 
whether protection increased, decreased, or stayed the same from 
the first to the second survey. We found that participants presented 
with decreasing protections were 14% less likely (χ2 (1) = 8.56, p < 
.01) to admit to unethical behavior relative to participants that were 
presented no change in privacy notices. Moreover, participants 
that were presented increasing privacy protections were 11% more 
likely (χ2 (1) = 4.70, p < .05) to admit to unethical behavior relative 
to participants that were presented no change in privacy notices. 
In a second experiment (N=177), we recruited students at a 
large university to take part in a new online social network that 
was (allegedly) being formed in their university (no such network 
was actually formed but students were not aware of this). Students 
were asked to first choose who would be able to see their per-
sonal profile (privacy setting) and then anwered several personal 
questions about themselves that would be used to create one’s 
personal profiles (self-disclosure). Between subjects, we manipu-
lated the position of the most and least restrictive privacy settings 
with respect to a default option in order to frame identical privacy 
choices as either relatively less or more protective. In the high 
default condition, the least restrictive choice was indeed perceived 
as less protective than it was in the low default condition and vice 
versa for the most restrictive choice. We found that the percent 
of participants who chose a privacy setting that was higher (more 
restrictive) than the default was higher in the low vs. high default 
condition (51.1% vs. 34.8%), while the percent of participants 
who chose a privacy setting that was lower (less restrictive) than 
the default was higher in the high vs. the low default condition 
(30.3% vs. 14.8%, χ2 (2) = 7.49, p < .05). We also found that, 
holding the chosen privacy setting constant, participants in the low 
default condition disclosed personal information slightly more of-
ten (66.9%), compared to participants in the high default condition 
(60.45%, F (2,171) = 3.97, p < .05). These differences suggests 
that regardless of the actual choice of privacy setting, if the same 
choices were framed (and perceived) as relatively high, partici-
pants disclosed more personal information, compared to when the 
(objectively same) privacy settings were framed as relatively low. 
In further studies we found that this effect was robust in regards to 
different combinations of privacy settings and also occurred when 
no default choice was present.
Both these studies demonstrate that privacy preferences are 
malleable and susceptible to reference dependence effects. The (ob-
jectively) same privacy levels (protections in the first study and set-
tings in the second study) were perceived differently if they were 
presented as either relatively low or relatively high. These relative 
perceptions of privacy levels also impacted people’s self-disclosure 
behavior. The implications of these results is that both notice and 
choice policies intended to address privacy concerns in the context 
of behavioral advertising may be limited in that consumers may 
continue to disclose at levels inconsistent with their stated concerns 
or expected level of privacy protection. Firms that benefit from in-
creased disclosure by consumers for purposes of behavioral advertis-
ing may find some value in presenting notices and choices as “more 
protective” to elicit higher levels of disclosure. However, if underly-
ing consumer concerns remain unaddressed, troublesome and costly 
privacy incidents may persist, leading to decreased disclosure and 
trust by consumers in the long term.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Product customization, whereby consumers self-design their 
products using a seller’s mass customization (MC) interface, has the 
potential to provide consumers with offers that closely match their 
idiosyncratic preferences and, hence, to increase their product satis-
faction, loyalty, and willingness-to-pay (Ansari & Mela 2003; Fran-
ke et al. 2010). Recent research suggests that each of the two most 
common formats of product customization – (1) the “by alternative” 
format of having consumers choose from a pre-specified set of al-
ternatives and (2) the “by attribute” format of asking consumers to 
customize every attribute and attribute level of the product – has dis-
tinct limitations from the consumer’s perspective (Huffman & Kahn 
1998; Valenzuela et al. 2009), such as increased complexity due to 
tradeoffs among attributes (Valenzuela et al. 2009; Dhar 1997) and 
the need to process a large number of attribute information in parallel 
(Dellaert & Stremersch 2005; Huffman & Kahn 1998).
Inspired by prior research on multi-stage decision processes 
suggesting that consumers typically first narrow down the set of 
considered alternatives, and subsequently examine the remaining al-
ternatives in greater depth (Beach 1993; Ge, Häubl, & Elrod 2012; 
Häubl & Trifts 2000, Bettman & Park 1980), we propose a novel 
procedure that partitions the product customization process into two 
stages, whereby consumers first select one of a few pre-specified 
products as a starting solution, and then create their final customized 
product by further refining this starting solution. Our key hypotheses 
were that, compared to standard attribute-by-attribute MC systems, 
the proposed two-stage approach would reduce the cognitive effort 
associated with product customization, promote mental simulation 
of product use, motivate the purchase of more feature-rich – and thus 
higher-priced – products, and lead to greater satisfaction with self-
designed products.
Converging evidence from a series of field and lab studies shows 
that, compared to standard (attribute-by-attribute) customization sys-
tems, the two-stage “Customization via Starting Solutions” proce-
dure reduces decision complexity, promotes the mental simulation of 
product use, leads to the purchase of more feature-rich, higher-priced 
products, and results in greater customer satisfaction.
A field study with 842 customers of a large manufacturer of 
men’s dress shirts revealed that, as predicted, consumers who used 
the two-stage MC format designed more feature-rich shirts than 
did those who used a standard attribute-by-attribute MC system, 
ultimately resulting in the choice of higher-priced products (MTwo-
Stage = €73.21, MStandard = €57.77; t(840) = 3.245, p < .01). Moreover, 
the two-stage format significantly reduced the amount of time it took 
consumers to self-design their shirt relative to the manufacturer’s 
standard MC system (BetaTwo-Stage = -4.95, t(837) = 3.25, p < .01). 
In a field experiment conducted with 159 car buyers at a major 
German automobile manufacturer’s web site, we found that custom-
ers who had been randomly assigned to a two-stage rather than a stan-
dard (i.e., attribute-by-attribute) MC interface not only configured 
significantly more feature-rich cars as reflected by higher-priced con-
figurations (MTwo-Stage = €20,765, MStandard = €18,349; t(158) = 2.071, 
p < .05), but were ultimately also substantially more satisfied with 
their self-designed vehicle (t(158) = 2.14, p < .05) as revealed by a 
follow-up survey. 
A field experiment at a ski resort in Switzerland in which 210 
travelers were randomly assigned to either a standard customization 
system or the proposed two-stage format provided additional support 
for our hypotheses. As predicted, the proposed two-stage procedure 
caused travelers to select resort packages that included a greater num-
ber of services (MTwo-Stage = 25.35, MStandard = 16.80, t(209) = 9.930, p 
< .001) and were higher priced (MTwo-Stage = CHF1,611.96, MStandard 
= CHF1,061.46, t(209) = 9.948, p < .001), ultimately resulting in 
greater satisfaction with their ski vacation (MTwo-Stage = 6.11, MStan-
dard = 5.74, t(209) = 2.122, p < .05).
Three lab experiments, all involving a web-based jewelry cus-
tomization interface, examined the psychological processes that un-
derlie these effects. In the first of these experiments, 69 participants 
were randomly assigned to either a standard MC system or the pro-
posed two-stage format. A multiple mediation model revealed that 
the positive effect of the two-stage format on consumers’ satisfaction 
with their self-design products is mediated by an increase in their 
mental simulation of product use, as well as a decrease in the per-
ceived complexity of the decision process (z = 2.628, p < .01). A 
second lab experiment with 133 participants revealed that, compared 
to a standard MC system, using a two-stage procedure caused a sig-
nificantly lower error rate in a Stroop task (MTwo-Stage = 1.23, MStandard 
= 2.30, t(132) = 2.458, p < .05), indicating greater availability of cog-
nitive resources after self-designing a product using the two-stage 
format. 
The third lab experiment was designed to examine the effect 
of merely allowing consumers to refine their initial product choice, 
without at the same time identifying a subset of the possible product 
configuration as candidate starting solutions. A total of 100 partici-
pants were randomly assigned to either a standard MC system or a 
two-stage format. In the latter condition, the set of starting solutions 
was, in fact, the entire assortment of all possible combinations of 
attribute levels that consumers could configure in the standard MC 
condition. In line with our prediction, participants in the two-stage 
condition were significantly more satisfied with their ultimate self-
designed product (MTwo-Stage=6.33, MStandard=5.92, t(100) = 2.577, p < 
.01), and this effect was mediated by an increase in mental simula-
tion of product use and a reduction in the perceived complexity of the 
self-design process (z = 2.537, p < .05). 
This paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold: First, it 
shows that the two-stage format outperforms current customization 
formats, resulting in increased consumer satisfaction with self-de-
signed products. Second, this research reveals that the proposed self-
design format stimulates consumers’ mental simulation of product 
use, which in turn results in the choice of more feature-rich products. 
Finally, it highlights the external validity and generalizability of the 
key conceptual insights by presenting converging evidence from lab 
experiments and field studies involving actual purchases in a various 
domains. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In five experiments, we show how the “fit” of an item with a set 
of similar items affects choice. We find that people have a notion of 
a set that fits together—one where all items are the same, or all items 
differ, on salient attributes. One consequence of this notion is that in 
addition to preferences over the set’s individual items, choices take 
set-fit into account. This leads to predictable shifts in preferences 
when choosing between different sets as opposed to individual items, 
sometimes even resulting in people choosing normatively inferior 
options over superior ones. 
Even though many products are manufactured and sold as 
grouped sets, virtually no research has investigated how the com-
position of such sets influences choice. Other literature, however, 
suggests that the composition of a set could have strong effects on 
preference and choice. Early research by the gestalt psychologists 
(Wertheimer, 1923) shows that people categorize and group stimuli 
rapidly and automatically, and that some sets of stimuli are grouped 
together more easily than others. Furthermore, we know from re-
search on fluency, that things that are processed more easily are liked 
better (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Therefore, it could be 
expected that sets that are easier to group, will be liked better. Simi-
lar arguments can be found in work by philosophers on aesthetics. 
For example Klintsch (2012)  argues that the lower the complexity 
of a stimulus, the more it will be liked. Even though these claims 
have not been tested empirically, cognitive psychologists (e.g., Gar-
ner, 1970) have investigated the liking of patterns and found a strong 
negative relation between the complexity and liking. Taken together, 
this suggests that sets of products that are low in complexity will 
be liked better than sets that are more complex. More specifically, 
we expected that sets in which all products are either all-similar or 
all-different on every salient attribute, would be liked better than 
sets which are not. A pre-test in which participants rated sets of geo-
metric shapes confirmed our expectations. Participants consistently 
rated sets which were all-similar or all-different on shape and color 
as much more liked than sets which were not. 
Knowing that sets are indeed liked better when they are either 
all-similar or all-different on every attribute, we proceeded to inves-
tigate how this affects choice. We first looked at this by having par-
ticipants make choices between either two individual items, or two 
logically equivalent sets. For example, we had young children in one 
conditions choose between a striped translucent marble, and a red 
opaque one. Consistent with a pre-test, we found that an overwhelm-
ing majority of the children chose the striped translucent marble. 
However, in the other condition, we added an opaque green, blue 
and yellow marble to both sets. Even though in this situation the 
only difference between the two sets is the striped translucent vs. 
the red opaque marble, we expected the children to be more likely 
to choose the set including the red opaque marble because this group 
formed a better set; all four marbles being opaque. This is what we 
found, where only 10.4% of the children chose the red marble in the 
individual-choice condition, this increased to 72.7% when choosing 
between the two sets. We did not only look at differences in choice 
proportion between individual and set-choices, but also varied the 
contents of the set in other experiments. For example, in one study 
participants always chose between sets of mugs. In each condition 
the choices were logically equivalent, the only difference between 
the two sets was always a green vs. an orange mug. Sometimes these 
mugs were embedded in all-similar sets, created by adding three 
orange mugs to both options, or three green ones. Consistent with 
our expectations, participants were more likely to choose four green 
mugs over three green ones and an orange mug. When adding three 
orange mugs, participants were more likely to choose the set consist-
ing of four orange mugs. This shows the all-similar effect. In two 
other conditions we added a pink, blue and either an orange or a 
green mug to both options. There we found the all-different effect. 
Adding a pink, blue and green mug to both options increases choice 
for the set including the orange one, but adding pink, blue and orange 
increases choice for the set including the green mug. 
The experiments reveal a strong effect of the set-fit on consum-
er-choice. Effects that cannot be explained by well-known accounts 
of non-normative influences on choice, such as attraction and com-
promise effects (Simonson, 1989), contrast or assimilation (Wanke, 
Bless, & Schwarz, 1999), or variety-seeking (Ratner, Kahn, & Kahn-
eman, 1999).
These findings hold direct practical implications. When selling 
products that are consumed in sets, making sure that the set fits well 
will make consumers more likely to choose your products. Several 
interesting questions also arise for consumer research. First of all, 
even though variety-seeking and set-fit are the result of two different 
underlying processes, it can be expected that set-fit effects increase 
variety seeking, because consumers diversifying their first choices 
for satiation reasons, may be more likely to continue choosing diver-
sified options to keep the set-fit good. Furthermore, the effect being 
a very intuitive affective response, suggests that people who choose 
according to set-fit may experience regret about their outcomes later.
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The Diversification Paradox: How Lay Investors Perceive Risk and Covariance 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
With the development of employee savings plans and privatized 
retirement savings schemes, people with scant knowledge of finance 
routinely make risky decisions with dramatic implications for their 
future wealth. Although people can drastically reduce portfolio risk 
by investing in negatively correlated assets (Markowitz 1952), em-
pirical evidence demonstrates that they fail to do so, instead invest-
ing overwhelmingly in positively correlated assets (e.g. French and 
Poterba 1991; Huberman 2001). Behavioral research suggests that 
novice investors diversify poorly because they fail to take into ac-
count the way assets covary with each other (Hedesstrom, Svedsater, 
and Garling 2006). For instance, they evaluate the riskiness of assets 
one at a time (Dorn and Huberman 2010), or they invest in all avail-
able assets in the menu evenly (Benartzi and Thaler 2001).
Building upon this literature, we examine the interplay between 
covariance information, risk perception, and financial literacy. We 
suggest that investing in positively correlated assets can actually be 
a deliberate choice made by novice investors, in a failed attempt to 
reduce risk. Indeed, negatively correlated assets may appear incon-
gruent to novice investors. In non-financial decisions, incongruence 
is usually associated with a notion of risk (Campbell and Goodstein 
2001; Meertens and Lion 2008). While retrieving this misleading 
incongruence-risk association, novice investors may end up making 
riskier financial decisions (investing in correlated assets and avoid-
ing negatively correlated assets) when trying to minimize risk, com-
pared to when they are encouraged to take risks. In other words, they 
accomplish exactly the opposite of what they intend to do. In four 
studies, we show that this erroneous strategy can be applied in se-
quential (study 1) and in simultaneous (study 2) financial allocation 
tasks, and that it is the result of a deliberate and reasoned decision-
making process (study 3). We also suggest menu design (study 2) and 
investor education (study 4) solutions to improve novice investors’ 
investment decisions.
In study 1, participants were fictitiously endowed with a fund 
and asked to choose a second fund. We manipulated investment mo-
tives: participants were either instructed to minimize the risk of their 
allocation (risk-minimizing condition), or to maximize profits by 
taking risks if necessary (risk-taking condition). They could choose 
between two funds, presented as equally risky and equally profitable. 
Based on expected performances across hypothetical economic situ-
ations, one fund was positively correlated with the endowed fund, 
and the other fund was negatively correlated. We hypothesized that 
the latter fund would appear incongruent to novice investors and be 
perceived as riskier. We measured financial literacy with a standard 
questionnaire. Not surprisingly, expert investors were more likely to 
invest in the negatively correlated fund when instructed to minimize 
risk, than when encouraged to take risks (z=3.24, p<.001). More in-
terestingly, novice investors adopted the opposite strategy; they were 
marginally more likely to invest in the positively correlated fund 
when instructed to minimize risk (z=-1.86, p=.06). Novice investors’ 
decisions were mediated by the belief that investing in the negatively 
correlated fund would add risk to their investment. 
In study 2, participants were asked to allocate $800 among eight 
funds, whose past performances were shown in a table. The funds 
were equally risky (same variance of returns) and equally profitable 
(same average return). As in study 1, we manipulated investment 
motives. We also manipulated the covariance structure of the funds. 
In one condition (unbalanced structure), a majority of funds exhibit-
ed positively correlated returns, and the remaining funds were nega-
tively correlated with the majority funds. We hypothesized that these 
minority funds would appear incongruent to novice investors and be 
perceived as riskier. In the other condition (balanced structure), there 
was no majority subset of positively correlated funds. In the unbal-
anced structure condition, novice investors allocated less money into 
the minority subset when instructed to minimize risk, compared to 
when they were encouraged to take risks, paradoxically resulting in 
a riskier allocation (z=-2.31, p=.02). Mediation analyses confirmed 
that this strategy was due to erroneous beliefs about covariance. De-
signing the menu in such a way to decrease the perceived incongru-
ence of negatively correlated assets (balanced structure condition) 
made the erroneous covariance-risk inferences ineffective, and im-
proved novice investors’ allocation. 
In study 3, we hypothesized that impairing cognitive abilities 
would hinder the accessibility of this covariance-risk inference and 
thus improve diversification. We replicated study 2’s design (unbal-
anced structure only), and half of the participants had to memorize 
fifteen words before performing the financial allocation task. Under 
cognitive load, novice investors instructed to minimize risk invested 
less in the positively correlated funds, compared to the no-load con-
dition (t(80)=1.97, p<.05), resulting in a less risky allocation. 
Study 4 was based on the idea that laymen already know and 
routinely use the correct covariance-risk inference in their everyday 
life, although they are unable to retrieve it in financial decision tasks. 
To test this idea, we used the same operationalization as in study 1 
but framed the investment decision task in such a way to help par-
ticipants retrieve by themselves the correct inference. They were ini-
tially endowed with the stock of a company that produces Umbrellas, 
and they had to decide whether to invest in a company that produces 
Raincoats or in a company that produces Sunglasses. Most partici-
pants retrieved the correct inference, and made the correct choice. 
This study may inspire financial education programs, as previous re-
search shows that explaining Markowitz’s portfolio theory to novice 
investors is largely ineffective (Hedesstrom et al. 2006).
This research documents an erroneous diversification strategy, 
which leads novice investors to take on more risk when in fact they 
intend to reduce it. Whereas previously documented diversification 
heuristics increase with cognitive load (e.g. Morrin et al. 2012), the 
strategy that we present requires investors’ full cognitive capacity, 
thus relying on deliberate and reasoned inference-making. We be-
lieve that managers and policy-makers largely ignore this diversifica-
tion paradox, and our research proposes applicable solutions (menu 
design, financial education) to mitigate its negative consequences on 
people’s long-term financial wealth. 
REFERENCES
Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler (2001), “Naive 
Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving 
Plans,” American Economic Review, 91 (1), 79-98.
Campbell, Margaret C. and Ronald C. Goodstein (2001), “The 
Moderating Effect of Perceived Risk on Consumers’ 
Evaluations of Product Incongruity: Preference for the Norm,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 28 (3), 439-49.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 675
Dorn, Daniel and Gur Huberman (2010), “Preferred Risk Habitat of 
Individual Investors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 97 (1), 
155-73.
French, Kenneth R. and James M. Poterba (1991), “Investor 
Diversification and International Equity Markets,” American 
Economic Review, 81 (2), 222-26.
Hedesstrom, Ted Martin, Henrik Svedsater, and Tommy Garling 
(2006), “Covariation Neglect among Novice Investors,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Applied, 12 (3), 155-65.
Huberman, Gur (2001), “Familiarity Breeds Investment,” Review of 
Financial Studies, 14 (3), 659-80.
Markowitz, Harry M. (1952), “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of 
Finance, 7 (1), 77-91 
Meertens, Ree M. and Rene Lion (2008), “Measuring an 
Individual’s Tendency to Take Risks: The Risk Propensity 
Scale,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38 (6), 
1506–20.
Morrin, Maureen, Jeffrey J. Inman, Susan M. Broniarczyk, Gergana 
Y. Nenkov, and Jonathan Reuter (2012), “Investing More 
Retirement : The Moderating Effect of Fund Assortment Size 
on the 1/N Heuristic “ Journal of Marketing Research.
676 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
The Effect of Color vs . Black-and-White on Information Processing
Hyojin Lee, Ohio State University, USA 
Xiaoyan Deng, Ohio State University, USA 
H. Rao Unnava, Ohio State University, USA 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The effects of using color in various forms of marketing com-
munications (e.g., television and magazine advertising, package de-
sign) have received much attention from marketing researchers. One 
area of color effects that has not received much attention is the type 
of information processing that is elicited from a viewer by color vs. 
black-and-white (bw) stimuli. We focus on this topic in this research. 
In particular, we argue that people process the central elements of 
both color and bw pictures spontaneously. However, color pictures 
draw a viewer’s attention to the peripheral elements of a picture as 
well, more so than bw pictures. We further show that the differential 
attention drawn by color to peripheral elements of a picture can af-
fect some important consumer decisions such as product categori-
zation, feature evaluation, and subsequent choice. Our findings also 
provide practical guidance for strategic use of color in marketing 
communications.
A picture generally contains the main elements of the object 
being depicted (e.g., a chair) along with contextual elements (e.g., 
the color of the chair, the floor, and any other peripheral elements). 
When exposed to a picture of an object, a viewer’s focus is first 
drawn to the global shape of the object (Arnheim 1954, 1957; No-
jima 2003). However, our vision system is designed to continuously 
change its focus as it tries to locate the next piece of important infor-
mation (Janiszewski 1998). In a bw picture, the salience and value 
of each element are relatively even, thus inhibiting specific parts of 
the picture from being distinctive. As a result, our visual attention 
tends to stay focused on the global form of the bw picture, rather than 
exploring other elements. 
In contrast, color diffuses people’s attention to the various ele-
ments of a picture because it causes each element to be salient and 
distinctive (Itti and Koch 2001; Janiszewski 1998). Consequently, 
a viewer’s attention is drawn to various components of the picture 
rather than stay relatively focused on the overall form and shape of 
the object. In a study directly examining attention shifts while read-
ing a newspaper, Bohle and Garcia (1987) found that viewers’ atten-
tion is first directed to the main part in a newspaper page, regardless 
of the presence of color. Afterwards, however, viewers’ attention in 
a color present condition moved toward the colored, less essential 
block at the bottom of the page, while it stayed on the main part in 
the color absent condition. 
To summarize, people exposed to a bw picture are expected to 
focus on the central elements of the picture while those exposed to a 
color picture are likely to focus not only on the central elements, but 
on other peripheral elements as well. These differences in attentional 
focus lead to several interesting consequences that we explore in five 
studies.  
Study 1 shows that people exposed to color pictures attend to 
the peripheral aspects of the object depicted in the picture more so 
than they do when the pictures are presented in bw. Both types of 
pictures do not differ in the attention drawn by the central aspects of 
the pictures. Studies 2 through 5 show the effects of such differential 
attention to peripheral aspects on common consumer decisions. In 
study 2, we show that people exposed to objects presented in color 
are more likely to use their perceptual features as a basis for catego-
rization than people exposed to the same objects in presented in bw. 
In Studies 3 and 4, we investigate whether color vs. bw presentation 
of products can affect consumers’ evaluations of product features as 
well as choices. If color makes people focus on unimportant fea-
tures of a product, those features should be perceived as more impor-
tant and carry more weight in the subsequent decisions (Mackenzie 
1986). Consistent with this notion, in Study 3 we find that non-criti-
cal product features were rated as significantly more important when 
the product was presented in color than in bw. Study 4 further shows 
that color increases the choice probability of a suboptimal option, 
suggesting that color can sometimes lead people to spend unneces-
sary extra costs. In Study 5, we show that the increased choice prob-
ability of a suboptimal option is mediated by the increased perceived 
importance of the otherwise unimportant product attribute.
We believe that our research generates some important theo-
retical and managerial implications. The first theoretical contribu-
tion of our research is in reconciling prior findings that have argued 
for color to be more attention-getting vs. being distractive. We show 
that color does both. It draws greater attention, but only to peripheral 
details of a picture. Insofar as the peripheral details are not neces-
sary to interpret a picture, it is true that color distracts by drawing 
attention to those details. However, such increased attention is not 
at the expense of attention to central aspects of a picture, but due 
to added attentional resources drawn from the reader. Thus, color is 
both attention-getting and distractive. Second, our work extends the 
previous research into consumer decision domain by demonstrating 
that the increased attention to unimportant product features can lead 
consumers to respond differently in tasks like product categoriza-
tion, feature evaluation, and choice. These results thus suggest that 
marketers can strategically use color to achieve different marketing 
goals. Third, our finding that color (bw) pictures are conducive to 
the processing of peripheral (central) information suggests a link to 
the construal level theory. Indeed, the way people process color (bw) 
information is akin to low- (high-) level construal as the focus is on 
the low- (high-) level features (Trope and Liberman 2010). Future 
research is in need to investigate this link. 
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Table 1:  Summary of Results
STUDY 1 
(DV=change detection score) 
Change in Central Component Change in Peripheral Component
BW Color Contrast BW Color Contrast
2.69 2.84 P = .20 2.07 2.36 p <.01
STUDY 2 
(DV=% of participants who categorized the products based on 
perceptual similarity)
BW Color Contrast
10.0% 23.1% p <.05
STUDY 3 
(DV=Importance rating)
Central features Peripheral features
BW Color Contrast BW Color Contrast
6.38 6.57 p=.44 5.16 5.99 p<.01
STUDY 4 
(DV=% of participants who chose the product with more 
peripheral features and higher price)
BW Color Contrast
26.1% 50.0% p <.05
STUDY 5
Mediator= Importance rating  
of peripheral features
DV=Purchase likelihood of 
product with more peripheral 
features and higher price
BW Color Contrast BW Color Contrast
4.44 5.25 p=.057 3.57 4.22 p=.08
Mediation analysis result: b = .45, SE = .07;  
95% confidence interval [CI] = .01 to .81
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When a Sequence of Decisions Leads to Unfavorable Outcome:  
The Conflicting Roles of Perceived Control
Maggie Y. Chu, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Lisa C. Wan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers make numerous decisions every day. These deci-
sions may form a causal sequence in which earlier decisions influ-
ence subsequent ones. For example, a decision of which restaurant to 
go to is a precondition of what to order from the restaurant’s menu. 
The decision outcome might be either delightful or a disaster. In ei-
ther case, consumers’ overall evaluation of the experience is influ-
enced not only by the outcome but also the actions that lead up to it. 
These considerations are particularly important when the outcome of 
the decision sequence is unfavorable. Extant literature suggests that 
the negative impact of an unfavorable experience can be attenuated 
when people have control over their decision to engage in them (Hui 
and Bateson 1991, Mills and Krantz 1979, Averill 1973). Thus, per-
ceived control over the decision might enhance the evaluation of the 
entire consumption experience (despite a negative outcome). At the 
same time, attribution research suggests that the more control people 
have over their behavior, the more likely they are to regret when the 
outcome is negative (Roese and Olson 1995, Simonson 1992; Wort-
man 1976). The regret that one experiences over the bad outcome 
may undermine the entire experience. In this research, we attempt 
to resolve this ambiguity. More specifically, we consider situations 
in which a negative outcome is preceded by a series of decisions and 
consumers’ control over each of these decisions varies. We postulate 
that the effect of control at each point in the sequence depends on 
the control the individual has over other decisions in the sequence. 
Previous research suggests that when a causal sequence of ac-
tions leads to an unfavorable outcome, people tend to imagine how 
the earliest behavior in the sequence could have been altered so that 
the outcome would not have occurred (Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo 
1991, Wells, Taylor, and Turtle 1987). Because earlier events have 
fewer preconditions, people can imagine how these events could be 
modified more easily than they can imagine the modification of later 
ones. Therefore, if the initial choice was made voluntarily and leads 
to a negative outcome, people are more likely to regret having made 
this choice, and this negative affect can lower their evaluation of the 
experience as a whole. On the other hand, their overall evaluation 
of the experience depends on the amount of control over not only 
this decision but also subsequent ones. Their freedom of choice over 
these latter decisions may elicit positive affect and have a positive 
effect on their overall evaluation of the experience that overrides the 
effect of their regret over their initial decision. We hypothesized that 
choice freedom that occurs at a later stage can enhance consumers’ 
evaluation of the entire experience even when the outcome is unfa-
vorable. 
Three empirical studies validated our conceptualization. Par-
ticipants in Study 1 (N=67)   imagined themselves performing a 
sequence of actions that involved two decisions: which marketing 
study to participate in and which food sample to taste. They were told 
to imagine having freedom of choice over each decision or not. In all 
cases, the decision outcome (i.e., the food sample) was unpleasant. 
Participants then answered a questionnaire using eleven-point scales 
(0 = not at all; 10 = very much) for assessing their regret over partici-
pating in the study and their evaluation of the entire experience. The 
results show that freedom of choice at an earlier stage indeed led to 
more regrets (Mstudy/choice = 5.85; Mstudy/no-choice = 4.74; F(1, 63) = 6.37, p 
< .05). However, freedom of choice at a later stage offset these nega-
tive reactions and enhanced overall evaluations (Msample/choice = 4.20; 
Msample/no-choice = 3.23; F(1, 63) = 4.99, p < .05). 
Study 2 (N=53) was a real-life replication of the scenario ex-
periment in which participants made real choices and received an ac-
tual decision outcome. The results were consistent with Study1 that 
initial choice provoked more regret (Mstudy/choice = 4.11; Mstudy/no-choice 
= 3.10; F(1, 49) = 4.11, p < .05). Nevertheless, choice occurred at a 
later stage attenuated regret (Msample/choice = 2.87; Msample/no-choice = 4.42; 
F(1, 49) = 9.64, p < .05) and enhanced overall evaluation (Msample/choice 
= 6.69; Msample/no-choice = 5.32; F(1, 49) = 5.65, p < .05). 
Conditions in which participants are not given a choice at a 
given stage of the decision sequence might seem to be equivalent 
to a single-decision situation of the sort considered in previous re-
search. The major difference between the sequential and single deci-
sion situation is that in the latter case, an alternative possibility is 
not mentioned. Study 3 (N=66) was similar to Study 2 except that 
the existence of an alternative was manipulated. That is, at the first 
(second) stage, participants were either instructed to participate in a 
study (taste a food sample) without mentioning the existence of an 
alternative or were told that an alternative existed but arbitrarily as-
signed to one of them. Across the four conditions, participants evalu-
ated the entire experience less favorably particularly when neither 
alternative study nor sample was mentioned (Mdiff = 2.08; t(63) = 
3.45, p < .01). Thus, mentioning the existence of an alternative had 
a positive influence on judgments even when participants were not 
given any opportunity to choose this alternative. In other words, not 
having a choice at a given stage in a sequential decision situation is 
not equal to entering into a single decision.
To conclude, this research provides evidence of the differen-
tial impact of perceived control in a sequential decision situation. 
It shows that the control at an early point in the sequence can elicit 
regrets over an undesirable outcome but the control over choices at 
later stages can offset the effects of these negative feelings. Our find-
ings also indicate that consumers’ evaluation of the entire experience 
would be more favorable when there is an alternative despite of its 
unavailability. Such a difference underlines the importance of the no-
tion of sequential decision making.
REFERENCES
Averill, James R. (1973), “Personal Control over Aversive Stimuli 
and its Relationship to Stress,” Psychological Bulletin, 80 (4), 
286-303.
Gilovich, Thomas and Victoria H. Medvec (1995), “The Experience 
of Regret: What, When and Why,” Psychological Review, 102 
(2), 379-95.
Girotto, Vittorio, Paolo Legrenzi, and Antonio Rizzo (1991), 
“Event Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking,” Acta 
Psychologica, 78 (December), 111-33.
Hui, Michael K. and John E.G. Bateson (1991), “Perceived Control 
and the Effects of Crowding and Consumer Choice on the 
Service Experience,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18 (2), 
174-83.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 679
Mills, Richard T. and David S. Krantz (1979), “Information, Choice 
and Reactions to Stress: A Field Experiment in a Blood Bank 
with Laboratory Analogue,” Journal of Personality of Social 
Psychology, 37 (4), 608-20.
Roese, Neal J. and James M. Olson (1995), “Outcome 
Controllability and Counterfactual Thinking,” Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 21 (6), 620-28.
Simonson, Itamar (1992), “The Influence of Anticipating Regret 
and Responsibility on Purchase Decisions,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 19 (1), 105-18.
Wells, Gary L., Brian R. Taylor, and John W. Turtle (1987), “The 
Undoing of Scenarios,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53 (3), 421-30.
Wortman, Camille B. (1976), “Causal Attribution and Personal 
Control,” in New Direction in Attribution Research, ed. John 
H. Harvey, William John Ickes, Robert F. Kidd, Hillsdale NJ: 
L. Erlbaum Associates, 23-52.
680 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
A Fluency Account of How Price Operates as a Cue to Psychological Distance
Thomas Allard, University of British-Columbia, Canada
Dale Griffin, University of British Columbia, Canada
EXTENDED ABTRACT
Building on construal level theory (CLT; Trope and Liberman, 
2003), we propose that the price of a product, like time (e.g., Liber-
man and Trope, 1998), spatial distance (e.g., Fujita, et al. 2006), 
social distance (e.g., Chandran and Menon 2004), and probability 
(e.g., Todorov et al. 2006), creates a psychological distance between 
consumers and consumption. In particular, because access to more 
expensive products is more limited than to more affordable ones, 
higher prices create a higher psychological distance between cus-
tomers and their objects of desire. We propose this price-induced 
psychological distance to be an overgeneralization of the principle 
that relatively more expensive products require to work or save for a 
longer period of time before being able to purchase them.
Based on recent findings on the interaction between price and 
construal level (Bornemann and Homburg 2011; Hansen and Wänke 
2011; Hansen, Kutzner, Wänke 2013; Yan and Sengupta 2011), we 
propose that generating a feeling of fit between the price of an object 
and the construal-level of the advertising slogans promoting it – a 
low/low or high/high match – will improves both advertisement and 
product evaluations compared to situations of non-fit. This prediction 
relies on a mechanism where situations of fit will lead consumers 
to experience greater cognitive fluency when evaluating the product 
(e.g., Lee, Keller, and Sternthal 2010, Tsai and McGill 2011). We 
further support this rationale by demonstrating that consumers with 
a low (vs. high) tendency to enjoy thinking, low need for cognition 
(NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao 1984), rely more on this fit or non-
fit between prices and construal levels of advertising slogans when 
making judgments. We present four experiments investigating this 
price-construal fit framework.
The pilot study used a 2(price: low vs. high) between X 2(con-
strual level: low vs. high) within mixed-model design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the questionnaire, 
each providing a list of the same 17 products (e.g., a haircut, a choco-
late bar, a gym membership, etc.). Half of the products on the list 
were priced at a relatively low price for their category, the other half 
were priced at a relatively high price. Prices were counterbalanced 
between questionnaires. For each product, participants were asked 
to identify the more appropriate of two descriptions, either a low or 
high construal level depiction. For example, “a $15,000 ($100,000) 
MBA program” could be identified as either “a graduate degree” 
(low construal) or as “an investment in one’s future” (high constru-
al). For each product, participants in the high price condition were 
more likely to select the high-construal level description (chi-squares 
between 4.7 and 86.9, all p’s < .03).
Study 1 used a one factor (price condition: low vs. high vs. con-
trol) between-subjects design. It demonstrates that making salient the 
concepts of high (low) prices activates a high (low) construal level 
mindset. Participants were first shown a list of twelve different items 
ranging from inexpensive ones (i.e., a pack of gum) to expensive ones 
(i.e., 60 inch HDTV), shown without a price tag. Participants were 
asked to rank order the products from 1 = “the least expensive and 
most affordable item” to 12 = “the most expensive and unaffordable 
item”. Next participants in the low (high) price condition provided 
a price estimate in dollars for the product they ranked 1st (12th) and 
described what it would be like to pay this price. Participants in the 
control condition went through a similar procedure, but instead rank-
ordered twelve animals (e.g., a panda, a mouse, etc.) in term of size. 
To measure construal level induced by the cheap or expensive 
prices, participants selected the word that best fit their frame of mind 
“right now” in a list of fourteen pairs of words representing either a 
low-construal or high-construal level (e.g., Near-Far, Sure-Unsure, 
Self-Others). We used those answers to create an index measuring 
their construal level. Participants’ had a higher construal-level mind-
set in the high price than in the control condition. Moreover, partici-
pants had a higher construal-level mindset in the control than in the 
low price condition.
Study 2 used a 2(price: low vs. high) X 2(construal: low vs. 
high) X 2(NFC: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the same ad-
vertisement for some green tea, each using the same photographic 
illustration. The tea was either priced at $2.99 per 100g (low price) 
or $32.99 per 100g (high price), and the advertising slogan was either 
“Provides caffeine boost” (low-construal) or “Makes you more pro-
ductive” (high-construal). Participants evaluated the advertisement, 
we also measured their NFC. The low-construal advertisement was 
marginally preferred in the low price (vs. high) price condition, and 
the high-construal one, was preferred in the high (vs. low) price con-
dition. Results were qualified by a three-way interaction with NFC. 
For Low-NFC consumers, results support our predicted interaction 
between price and construal levels of advertising slogans. For high-
NFC consumers, no difference were observed for low or high con-
strual level slogan between the price conditions.
Study 3 used a 2(price: low vs. high) X 2(construal: low vs. 
high) between-subjects factorial design. Participants evaluated an 
advertisement for a watch either priced at $24.99 (low price) or 
$1024.99 (high price). The advertisement contained either the low-
construal captions “100% stainless steel”, “easy to read display”, 
“100 meters water-resistant”, “automatic quartz movement”, “Manu-
facturing defect warranty”, or their high-construal equivalent “built 
to last a lifetime”, “never let you lose track of time” “an active life-
style companion”, “precision workmanship”, “worry free timekeep-
ing”. We measured perceived fit between the advertisement and the 
product, advertisement evaluation, and product evaluation. We also 
calculated how long participants took to answer the focal measures 
of this survey. Results supported our predicted interaction for fit, 
advertisement evaluation, product evaluation, and completion time 
(faster = more fluent). 
Taken together, those results support a fluency mechanism 
underlying the positive effect of the fit between product prices and 
construal levels of advertising slogans on advertisement and product 
evaluation.
REFERENCES
Bornemann, Torsten and Homburg, Christian (2011). Psychological 
distance and the dual role of price. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 38(3), 490-504.
Cacioppo, John T., Petty, Richard E., & Kao, Chuan Feng (1984). 
The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. 
Chandran, Sucharita and Geeta Menon (2004) “When a day means 
more than a year: Effect of temporal framing on judgement of 
health risk” Journal of Consumer Research, 31 (September), 
375-389.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 681
Fujita, Kentaro, Marlone D. Henderson, Juliana Eng, Yaacov 
Trope, and Nira Liberman (2006) “Spatial distance and mental 
construal of social events” Psychological Science, 17, 278-
282.
Hansen, Jochim, Kutzner Florian, and Michaela Wänke. “Money 
and Thinking: Reminders of Money Trigger Abstract Construal 
and Shape Consumer Judgments.” (Forthcoming Journal of 
Consumer Research).
Hansen, Jochim, and Wänke, Michaela. (2011). “The abstractness 
of luxury.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 789-796.
Lee, Aanela Y., Keller, Punam Anand, and Sternthal, Brian 
(2010). “Value from regulatory construal fit: The persuasive 
impact of fit between consumer goals and message 
concreteness” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(5), 735-747.
Liberman, Nira and Trope, Yaacov (1998). The role of feasibility 
and desirability considerations in near and distant future 
decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology; Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75(1), 5.
Todorov, Alexander, Amir Goren and Yaacov Trope (2006) 
“Probability as a psychological distance: Construal and 
preference” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43, 473-482.
Trope, Yaacov and Nira Liberman (2003) “Temporal Construal” 
Psychological Review, 94, 3-15.
Tsai, Claire I. and McGill, Ann L. (2011). No pain, no 
gain? How fluency and construal level affect consumer 
confidence. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(5), 807-821.
682 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Fear Not, For You Can Help! The Effect of Fear of Failure And Self-Construal on 
Charitable Giving
Lale Okyay-Ata, Koç University, Turkey
Zeynep Gürhan-Canli, Koç University, Turkey
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Extant literature offers mixed findings as to how people respond 
to having an aspect of the self threatened, reporting both social 
contact seeking (Maner et al. 2007), and avoiding behavior (Murray 
et al. 2006). We propose that whether people might want to draw 
closer to others when threatened by a specific type of threat, fear 
of failure (FF; Rhodewalt 1990), depends on self-construal (Markus 
and Kitayama 1991). 
FF is a dispositional tendency to avoid situations with possible 
negative outcomes due to the risk of feeling ashamed of failure 
(Elliot & Thrash 2004). FF has been considered as a form of self-
threat (Sherman et al. 1984), and an aversive state (Fiske and Taylor 
1991) that reduces control over one’s life (Hogg and Mullin 1999). FF 
presents a potential link to self-construal (Singelis 1994), the extent 
to which individuals define themselves as individuals or as parts of 
groups (Agrawal, Maheswaran 2005). As separate construals of the 
self may be differentially sensitive to personal control (Hamilton 
and Biehal 2005), they might also differentially react to a loss of 
personal control caused by FF. An independent self-construal will 
likely rely on own thoughts and feelings for resolving the negative 
feelings caused by FF, whereas an interdependent self-construal will 
likely rely on input from other group members. Thus, we propose 
that compared to independent self-construals, interdependent self-
construals are more likely to respond to a threat via embracing others.
As the present research pertains to the social implications of FF, a 
help-giving context using monetary donations (Batson et al. 1997) was 
selected for testing behaviors indicating embracing others. We predicted 
that compared to an independent self-construal, an interdependent 
self-construal would lead to more interest in and willingness to donate 
to a charitable cause under a high FF, because interdependent self-
construals are more likely to resolve their negative feelings in relation 
to others and in a more social manner. This differential evaluation 
is likely to be further pronounced when a loss of personal control 
is salient, because independent self-construals are likely to be more 
sensitive to a loss of personal control (Hamilton & Biehal 2005), and 
might thus less positively evaluate their social support system, leading 
to a lowered likelihood to embrace others via charitable donations. We 
define social support as perceived or actual support from community, 
social networks or close others (Lin 1986). Studies 1 and 2 test our 
main predictions and rule out some alternative accounts, and study 3 
introduces loss of personal control as the moderating and perceived 
social support as the mediating mechanism.
Online panel participants (N=179) completed study 1. 
Following the self-construal manipulation (Swaminathan et al. 
2007), participants elaborated on a time when they were very 
(somewhat) afraid of failing at something important (of not much 
consequence) in the high FF (low FF) conditions. The control 
group wrote about their breakfast. Participants’ likelihood to donate 
to a fictitious charitable cancer foundation was tested next (Liu & 
Aaker 2008). Manipulation checks confirmed that self-construal and 
FF level were successfully primed. In line with expectations, we 
observed a significant overall interaction of self-construal with fear 
of failure level (F (1,175)= 4.341, p=0.015 and (F (1,175)=4.407, 
p=0.014)), for the main dependent variables of interest in donating 
and willingness to donate, respectively. Planned contrasts further 
showed that among those in the high FF condition, interdependent 
self construals were more interested in donating and more willing to 
donate than independent self construals.
Study 2 (N=99) used a prospective FF scenario, a more 
behavioral donation measure, an existing cancer charity, and measured 
the functional motives underlying the decision to donate (VFI; Clary 
et al. 1998). The results of study 2 replicated study 1 in showing the 
moderating effect of self-construal on the relationship between FF and 
donation likelihood and the actual amount to donate, after accounting 
for personal involvement, perceptions of manipulative intent and 
the motivations to donate. Manipulation checks confirmed that self-
construal and FF level were successfully primed. A 2 (self-construal) 
x 2 (FF level) ANOVA revealed a significant overall interaction of 
self-construal with FF for the main dependent variables of willingness 
to donate, (F (1,94)= 9,45, p=0.003)) and the ($) amount to donate 
(F (1,95)= 8.38, p=0.005), respectively. There were no main effects 
apart from a partial main effect of FF on the willingness to donate (F 
(1,94)= 3.15, p=0.079). Planned contrasts showed that among those 
in the high FF condition, interdependent self-construals were more 
willing to donate and donated a higher amount of the $10 bonus than 
independent self-construals.
Study 3 tested the moderating role of perceived control on the 
relationship between self-construal and donation likelihood under a 
high FF. Online panel participants (N= 81) were randomly assigned 
to a 2 (self-construal) x 2 (perceived control) x (fear of failure: high) 
mixed design. For the perceived control manipulation, participants 
elaborated on an event that made them feel in control (high-control 
condition) versus not in control of their life (low-control condition), 
respectively. All respondents completed the high FF task, followed by 
interest and willingness to donate measures for a children’s charity. 
Manipulation checks indicated that both self-construal and perceived 
control were successfully primed.  We observed a significant overall 
interaction of self-construal with personal control on interest in 
donating (F(1,77)=3.75, p=0.056), and the willingness to donate 
(F(1,77)=7.86, p=0.006), respectively. Finally, a bootstrap analysis 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008) supported the mediating effect of 
perceived social support. When perceived social support was added 
to the analysis, it emerged as a significant predictor of willingness to 
donate (C.I.= 0.043, 0.671; p =0.0041), whereas the effect of self-
construal became non-significant.
We contribute to previous literature by reporting that FF will 
have spillover effects in an unrelated domain, introducing loss of 
personal control as a new moderator for self-construal and perceived 
social support as a new mediator of consumer willingness to donate, 
and suggesting that advertising messages for charitable giving, which 
evoke a high FF and thinking about the self in relation to others, are 
more likely to elicit favorable consumer responses. 
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Table 1: Results 
Study # Design N Dependent Measures Potential Confounds Tested
Self-Construal 
Manipulation Check
Fear of Failure 
Manipulation Check
Loss of Personal 
Control 
Manipulation Check
Study 1
(Mind =5.24, Minter = 
4.39; F (1, 179) 
=3.92, p < .05)
(MFF-hi=3.96 vs. MFF-
lo=2.88 vs. MFF-
control=2.93, F (1, 
178)= 2.98, p<0.05).
N/A
2 (self-construal: 
Independent, 
Interdependent) x 3 (fear 
of failure: high, low, 
control) between subjects 
179 Interest in donating Willingness 
to donate N/A
Interest in Donating-overall 
FF x SC interaction: (F 
(1,175)= 4.341, p=0.015
Willingness to Donate - 
overall FF x SC 
interaction: F (1,175)= 
4.407, p=0.014)
(Mind =3.10, Minter 
=5.30; F (1, 179) 
=8.41, p < .01)
Simple effects: Mind-FF_H vs 
Minter_FF_H: 4.62 vs 5.69, 
F(1,173)= 5.65, p=0.019
Simple effects: Mind-
FF_H vs Minter_FF_H: 
4.5 vs 5.66, F (1,173)= 
6.9, p=0.009
Mind-FF_L vs Minter-FF_L: 5.29 vs 
4.36, F(1,173)= 4.29, p=0.04
Mind-FF_L vs Minter-
FF_L: 5.20 vs. 4.28, F 
(1,173)=4.44, p=0.037
Study 2
(Mind =5.01, Minter = 
4.12; F (1, 98) 
=3.95, p < .01)
MFF-hi=5.00 vs. MFF-
lo=3.37; F 
(1,98)=14.2 p<0.01
N/A
2 (self-construal: 
Independent, 
Interdependent) x 2(fear 
of failure: high, low) 
between subjects 
99
Willingness to donate       
($)amount to donate
social motives, values motives, self 
enhancement motives, 
understanding motives, protective 
motives, involvement, state self-
esteem
Willingness to donate- 
overall FF x SC interaction: F 
(1,94)= 9.45, p=0.003
($) Amount to donate- 
overall FFx SC 
interaction: F (1,95)= 
8.38, p=0.005
(Mind =2.99, Minter 
=4.34; F (1, 98) 
=8.17, p < .01), 
Simple effects: (MindFF_H vs 
Mint_FF_H: 4.0 vs. 5.50, F 
(1,95)= 13.1, p=0.0)
Simple effects: 
MinterFF_H vs 
Mind_FF_H: 5.38 vs. 
2.88 F (1,95)= 8.58, 
p=0.004; MintFF_L vs. 
Mind_FF_L: 3.48 vs. 
4.42, F(1,95)=1.3, 
p=n.s.
M-Ind SC FF_H vs. FF_L: 
4.0 vs 5.42, F (1,95)=12.263, 
p=0.001; M-Int SC FF_H vs. 
FF_L: 5.50 vs. 4.68, 
F(1,95)=4.0, p=0.048
Mind FF_H vs. Mind 
FF_L: 2.88 vs. 4.442, 
F(1,95)=3.42, p=0.068; 
Mint FF_H vs. Mint 
FF_L:5.5 vs. 4.68, 
F(1,95)=5.03, p=0.03
Study 3
(Mind =6.01, Minter = 
4.39; F (1, 81) 
=3.98, p < .05)
Mlo-control= 3.09 vs. 
Mhi-control= 5.02; F(1, 
81)= 3.32, p<0.01
 2 (self-construal: 
independent, 
interdependent) x 2 
(perceived control: high, 
low) x (fear of failure: 
high) mixed design 
81
Interest in donating        
Willingness to donate      
Perceived Social Support 
(proposed mediator)
Interest in Donating- overall 
SC x Perceived Control 
interaction: (F (1,77)= 3.750, 
p=0.056) 
Willingness to Donate- 
Overall SC x Perceived 
Control Interaction: (F 
(1,77)=7.861, p=0.006)
Perceived Social 
Support- Preacher 
and Hayes (2008) 
bootstrapping 
procedure: C.I.= 
0.043, 0.671; p 
=0.0041
(Mind =3.21, Minter 
=5.92; F (1, 81) 
=4.41, p < .01)
Simple Effects: (M-ind-
Control_Lo vs M-
inter_Control_Lo: 3.79 
vs 5.06, F (1,77)= 
6.215, p=0.015)
(Mind-Control_Lo vs 
Mind_Control_High: 
3.79 vs 5.36, F (1,77)= 
9.944, p=0.002). 
Manipulation Checks Observed Effects
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Happiness from Giving: When Consumers Misforecast Their Affective Responses to 
Prosocial Behavior
Stefanie Robinson, North Carolina State University, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
William O. Bearden, University of South Carolina, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer giving has steadily declined over the last few years 
(Giving USA 2010). When consumers do give, approximately 50% 
are motivated to only give once and not give again (Nonprofit Times 
2003). In order to continue to serve those in need, charities must 
effectively request help from donors. Consumers are more likely 
to engage in helping behavior when they will receive a positive 
emotional response (Batson 1998; Piliavin et al. 1981). However, 
research has not addressed whether consumers are accurate in 
their forecasts. Affective misforecasting is the difference between 
forecasted and experienced affect (Patrick, MacInnis, and Park 
2007). There are several different biases that have been associated 
with misforecasting; however, they do not tap into the key drivers 
of prosocial behavior: the costs endured by the giver and benefit 
received by the person(s) in need (Piliavin et al. 1981). 
When consumers think about helping others, consumers are 
more likely to focus on the benefit to others. The focus of benefitting 
others is likely to induce predictions of positive affect as research 
has shown that thinking about the benefit to others produces strong 
feelings of positive affect (Salovey et al. 1991).When consumers 
experience the helping behavior, consumers are more likely to focus 
on the process to self. With prosocial behavior, consumers do not 
see the outcome produced to those in need. Therefore, they use 
their endured costs to inform the provided benefit. The cost-benefit 
inference is not taken under consideration during time of prediction. 
In the context of everyday helping behavior, the process 
generally involves low sacrifice on the part of the giver. Consumers 
value the outcome of their input more when they engage in greater 
effort (Zhang and Epley 2009). If the costs endured are low, then this 
will inform consumers that the benefit provided was low which in 
turn decreases experienced positive affect. We suggest with low cost 
helping, experienced affect will be lower than predicted affect. 
In study 1, participants were exposed to one of two helping 
conditions: prediction or behavior. In the prediction (behavior) 
condition, participants were asked to review a website that sponsors 
a donation campaign (to go on-line to the website and click on the 
link to help the charity). Results showed that consumers who thought 
about helping the cause had more positive affect than those who 
actually helped (p < .01) and perceived benefit to others mediated 
this effect (p < .01). 
Since consumers overestimate their positive affect when they 
forecast helping in low cost contexts, they are likely to be disappointed 
when their experienced affect does not match their anticipated affect 
(Oliver 1980). When consumers do not forecast their affect, they do 
not have a comparison point to use and therefore do not have an 
opportunity to be let down.  Thus, consumers’ experienced affect 
is expected to be higher when consumers do not forecast their 
emotions (vs. forecast their emotions). If consumers have a positive 
experience helping others, they may be inclined to help again in the 
future (Jenner 1982). Therefore, not forecasting (vs. forecasting) 
one’s positive affect will increase consumers’ willingness to engage 
in future helping behavior.
The purpose of this study is to test whether making predictions 
of emotional responses influences consumers’ willingness to help a 
cause again in the future. In the prediction condition, participants 
were asked to review a website that sponsors a donation campaign. In 
the no-prediction condition, participants did an unrelated task at time 
period 1. At time period 2, all participants were asked to go to the 
website and click on the link to help. These results show that making 
a prediction (versus not making a prediction) of emotional responses 
can decrease consumers’ likelihood to help again when the charity 
makes a request immediately following the helping task (p < .01).
All helping requires some costs on the part of the giver 
(Bartlett et al. 2002), for example, one’s time, money, and/or effort 
(Dovidio et al. 1991). With costly helping behavior, the help itself 
is more intense (Piliavin et al. 1981) and therefore the process of 
helping others, i.e., the cost involved to the self, is apparent both 
when thinking about and engaging in prosocial behavior. Therefore, 
consumers are less likely to misforecast their emotions as compared 
to the misforecasting with low cost helping. We suggest that high 
cost helping provides a boundary condition to the misforecasting 
effect associated with prosocial behavior. The purpose of the next 
study is to test this prediction. 
The final study is a 2 (cost: high vs. low) X 2 (help: prediction 
vs. behavior) between-subjects design. Participants are randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions. Participants exposed to a low 
(high) cost helping task, were presented with one (five) present(s) for 
children in need. Participants in the prediction condition were asked 
to think about wrapping the presents, while those in the behavior 
condition wrapped the presents.  The variables of interest were 
similar to those used in previous studies (e.g., positive affect). The 
results showed a significant interactive effect of cost and help (p < 
.05). In the low cost condition, participants had more positive affect 
when they thought about helping versus engaged in the behavior (p 
< .01). In the high cost condition, participants had similar positive 
affect in both conditions (p > .75).  
Across the studies, results provide evidence that consumers 
overestimate their positive affective responses, which is due to 
consumers’ perception of greater benefit to others when they think 
about versus engage in the behavior. Furthermore, this overestimation 
decreases consumers’ likelihood to help the charity again in the 
future. A boundary condition for this effect shows that, with costly 
helping, misforecasting diminishes.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
One of the most general approaches to studying consumer 
choice under risk is based on the assumption that consumer are ratio-
nal value maximizers (i.e., people prefer larger over smaller expected 
returns) and prefer smaller risks over larger risks (Pratt 1964). A stan-
dard assumption in this literature is that risk is negatively associated 
with the attractiveness of an option (March and Shapira 1987). One 
way via which individuals can reduce uncertainty associated with the 
expected outcome is by acquiring information that can help them to 
make more precise estimates of the product value (Aqueveque 2006; 
Conchar et al. 2004; Erdem and Swait 2004; Peterson and Merino 
2003; Taylor 1974). Based on this line of reasoning, consumers’ 
choice formulation under risk should be based on information that 
provides a clear ranking-based standard for product evaluation (e.g., 
a camera’s resolution; a vertical product attribute) rather than on in-
formation that does not affect the actual performance of the product 
(i.e., a camera’s design, a horizontal product attribute). 
We offer an alternative account of choice under risk which pre-
dicts that consumers facing trade-offs between horizontal and ver-
tical attributes shift their focus from vertical to horizontal product 
attribute information when the purchase involves higher levels of 
risk. Drawing upon research on the ambiguity effect (Ellsberg 1961; 
Heath and Tversky 1991; Klein et al. 2010), we show that consumers 
favorable perceptions of their own competence may lead consumers 
facing higher levels of risk to more positively value an attribute that 
reflects their own preference (one that they are knowledgeable and 
feel competent about) but that does not necessarily improve product 
performance than an attribute that unambiguously indicates product 
performance. We test these competing accounts of choice under risk 
in 5 experiments.
In Experiment 1, participants chose between a digital camera 
with higher brand equity (i.e., horizontal attribute) and lower resolu-
tion (i.e., vertical attribute) and a digital camera with lower brand 
equity and higher resolution. We observed greater preference for the 
choice with lower resolution and better brand in the high-risk condi-
tion (32.0%) than in the low-risk condition (10.7%; χ2 (1) = 3.64, p 
< .05). To rule out the possibility that “brand name” lowers one’s 
risk because it may be a proxy for a bundle of vertical attributes, we 
ran a second experiment (Experiment 2) where participants chose 
between a refrigerator featuring a less desirable color (i.e., horizontal 
attribute) and larger capacity (i.e., vertical attribute), and a refrigera-
tor featuring a more desirable color but smaller capacity. Participants 
were more likely to choose the refrigerator with the more desirable 
color and lower capacity in the high-risk condition (54.1%) than in 
the low-risk condition (33.3%; χ2 (1) = 3.18, p < .05). Given that 
our results depend on the assumption that consumers are facing true 
trade-offs, we ran a second version of Experiment 2 where subjects’ 
preference for the horizontal attribute was obtained prior to the risk 
manipulation. The results show that the magnitude of the effect was 
amplified as a larger proportion of participants faced a true trade-
off. To rule out an alternative explanation based on the salience of 
information available to process (i.e., consumers may attend to per-
ceptual cues featuring greater salience in face of greater risk), we 
ran a version of experiment 2 with the color and the overall capacity 
of the refrigerator presented in text form only (instead of pictures). 
Results replicated those of experiment 2, ruling out the perceptual 
salience alternative explanation. Surprisingly, these results are ob-
served despite participants’ own intuition that information about 
vertical (vs. horizontal) attributes should be more diagnostic when 
making a choice under risk (as measured in a pretest). In experi-
ment 3, we focus on providing additional process evidence for the 
predicted mechanism by showing that consumers rate themselves 
to be more knowledgeable on horizontal product attributes than on 
vertical product attributes under greater levels of risk (no-learning 
condition). However, if consumers become more knowledgeable 
about the vertical attribute (learning condition), then such increase 
in competence should produce a reversal of the direction of the ef-
fect observed in the previous experiments. For participants in the 
no-learning condition, we observed greater preference for the refrig-
erator with the more desirable color and lower capacity in the high-
risk condition (45.0%) than in the low-risk condition (20.0%; χ2 (1) = 
2.85, p < .05). In contrast, participants in the learning condition were 
less likely to choose the refrigerator with the more desirable color 
and smaller capacity in the high-risk condition (18.2%) than in the 
low-risk condition (45.0%; χ2 (1) = 3.53, p < .05). To test the effect 
of felt competence on choice, we ran an ordinal logistic regression 
on the ranking of perceived competence about the vertical attribute, 
the attribute which was the focus of the learning manipulation. This 
analysis revealed a significant interaction between the risk and learn-
ing factors (Wald χ2 (1) = 5.66, p < .01). An examination of the pre-
dicted probability of an upward increase in ranking showed that, in 
the learning condition, overall capacity had a greater probability of 
being ranked higher in the high-risk condition (49.6%) than in the 
low-risk condition (25.9%; χ2 (1) = 3.35, p < .05). In contrast, in the 
no-learning condition, overall capacity had a greater probability of 
being ranked higher in the low-risk condition (37.5%) than in the 
high-risk condition (19.7%; χ2 (1) = 2.63, p = .05). This pattern of 
perceived competence with the vertical product attribute along with 
the reversal in choice proportions across learning conditions is con-
sistent with the competence hypothesis.
Counter to marketers’ intuition and prior literature, this research 
demonstrates that product information that does not objectively af-
fect the actual performance of the product may actually become more 
important in a choice decision associated with higher levels of risk. 
This effect stems from the belief that people tend to have favorable 
perceptions of one’s competence, which is argued to become more 
preferable under risky purchase situations. It stems from our results 
that, all else equal (e.g., production costs) horizontal differentiation, 
i.e., differentiation based on consumers preferences, may be more 
effective than vertical differentiation, i.e., differentiation based on 
rank-ordered attributes, in purchases involving higher levels of risk. 
Our results are of particular importance for products and services for 
which the value proposition is based on vertical attributes that can-
not be unambiguously discerned by consumers (e.g., internet speed, 
processor capacity, etc.).
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Table 1: Chioce Proportions
Experiment 1 Experiment 2A Experiment 2B Experiment 2C Experiment 3
Choice A Choice B Choice A Choice B Choice A Choice B Choice A Choice B Choice A Choice B
No-
Learning
Low 
Risk 10.7% 89.3% 33.3% 66.7% 56.0% 44.0% 33.3% 66.7% 20.0% 80.0%
High 
Risk 32.0% 68.0% 54.1% 45.9% 73.1% 26.9% 56.7% 43.3% 45.0% 55.0%
Learning
Low 
Risk 45.0% 55.0%
High 
Risk 18.2% 81.8%
*Note: Choice A (more preferable horizontal attribute), Choice B (more preferable vertical attribute)
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Brands Status and Reverse Placebo Effects: High Status Products Inhibit Performance 
Despite Being Preferred 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Placebo treatments have been shown to influence medication 
efficacy, but recently, researchers have investigated placebo effects 
of marketing actions. For instance, pens and wines whose labels 
bear a prestigious name may be experienced as superior (Park et al 
2010; Wansik et al 2007), and higher-priced items have been shown 
to increase performance (Shiv, Carmon, Ariely 2005a, 2005b). We 
extend this literature by investigating the impact of brand status on 
performance. Despite consumers’ preferences for “better” brands, we 
demosntrate that the use of high status products may result in lower 
performance, even though people judge them as higher in quality and 
are willing to pay more for them.
Why might a higher status product result in lower performance? 
People tend to form expectancies about their own abilities after 
comparing themselves to other users, and this may have implications 
for their subsequent performance when using high status products 
(Escalas and Bettman 2005; Festinger 1954). We posit that, in the case 
of a high status brand, this leads to a higher perceived performance 
standard but greater accessibility of the differences in the performance 
expectancies of one’s self versus this reference group (Mussweiler 
2001). When these malleable performance expectancies lead to 
an unfavorable comparison to that standard, we expect to observe 
contrast effects that lead to lower performance when using higher 
status products. This perspective is consistent with past research on 
placebo effects that show that expectancies and conditioning affect 
performance (Kellogg and Barron 1975; Storms and Nisbett 1970; 
Beecher 1946). We present a process that incorporates the influence 
of status, and show how it increases perceived standards and feelings 
of intimidation. 
We report four studies comparing 2 types of products (language 
training or cognitive training), differing only in brand name status. 
We test two hypotheses: that that despite higher reported product 
quality and willingness to pay, higher status products can lead to 
lower performance, and, that participants compare themselves to 
high-performance reference others when using high-status brand 
products. These studies identify when participants will underperform 
with higher status products.
For study 1, 138 participants were asked to use a language 
training product for a fictional language. We varied the branding as 
either produced by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or 
University of Phoenix (Phoenix). A separate pre-test revealed that 
the MIT brand ranks higher for prestige, even when controlling 
for brand familiarity (M = 6.36, p< 0.00). After using the language 
training product, participants believed they were better prepared 
in the MIT condition (M=3.51, SD=0.17) relative to the Phoenix 
condition (M=2.93, SD=0.18; simple contrast, P < 0.02) and were 
more willing to pay for the product from the higher status MIT 
producer (M = $26.71, SD=4.12) than the Phoenix producer (M = 
$15.73, SD=3.91; simple contrast p < 0.06).  Nevertheless, Study 1 
participants tested worse with the MIT brand (M = 9.96, SD=0.29) 
than Phoenix (M = 10.90, SD=0.27; F(1, 134) = 5.545, p = 0.02). A 
three-path mediation analysis (Taylor, MacKinnon and Tein 2008) 
demonstrated that perceived high standards associated with the 
school mediated the relationship between the brand and self-reported 
level of intimidation, which then mediated the relationship between 
perceived high standards and performance on the test.  To exclude 
alternative interpretations, we measured differences in participants’ 
moods and exerted effort; these proved not to be significant.
Study 2 tested whether status and price interact to affect 
performance, because previous research has established that higher 
prices lead to placebo effects (Shiv et al 2005). We find that price 
does not activate social comparison in the way that brand status 
does. New participants scored lower when the product was labeled 
from a higher status producer, MIT (M = 10.67; SD = 0.49) than a 
lower status producer, Phoenix (M = 12.21, SD = 0.50; F(1, 113) = 
4.839, p = 0.03).  However, there was no difference in performance 
when the product was labeled cheaper (M = 11.13, SD = 0.55) 
versus more expensive (M = 11.75, SD = 0.44; F(1, 113) = 0.76, 
p > 0.35). Perceived high standards associated with the school 
mediated the relationship between the school and self-reported 
level of intimidation, which then mediated the relationship between 
perceived high standards and performance on the test.
A third study using a different product (cognitive training) 
explored the role of self-monitoring. High self-monitors are more 
likely to process brand information and attend to social image 
(MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991), suggesting that the social 
comparison processes elicited by brand status will be more strongly 
observed in these individuals. We find “reverse” placebo effects 
of high status brands, as participants perform worse in the MIT 
condition than the Phoenix condition and relative to an unbranded 
control (mean score = 50% vs. 56%, t(160) = -2.44, p < 0.02). 
Moreover, we find an interaction between brand and self monitoring, 
particularly when answering the most difficult questions (F(1,206) = 
4.68, p < 0.04).
A fourth study explored boundary conditions for the reverse 
placebo effect. This fourth study addresses 2 boundary issues: 1) 
clarify the role of reference groups in comparisons while holding 
branding constant, and, 2) identify when these comparisons lead to 
forward placebo effects. To that end, 135 MIT students were assigned 
to one of 3 conditions: (1) a high-performance reference group, 
(2) a low-performance reference group, or (3) a control condition. 
As in study 3, the training task again involved using a cognitive 
training product. Our results show that performance increased in the 
presence of high-performance others and decreased in the presence 
of low-performance others, relative to the control (oneway ANOVA 
F(2,131) = 3.21, p = .04). 
Together, these studies demonstrate the reverse placebo 
phenomenon: participants in the lower-status brand condition 
performed better on cognitive tasks. Participants in the higher status 
condition used an identical product yet performed worse (despite 
reporting higher willingness to pay and perceived product efficacy). 
Our findings suggest that, when individuals use high-status brands 
of this ilk, reference group comparisons are made against high-
performance others that can lower expectancies about one’s own 
performance. 
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Which Product to Retain? The Effect of Product-Related versus Person-Related Product 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Owning a product and choosing a product often go hand in hand. 
In some cases, ownership precedes choice; consumers first acquire 
redundant products, like when they receive two toasters as wed-
ding gifts, and then they choose which of these products to retain. 
In other cases, the reverse happens, where consumers first choose 
which toaster to acquire and only then obtain the product. Can the 
timing of choice, before or after ownership, affect decision making? 
The vast research on the ownership-choice interplay has examined 
the endowment effect, studying how owning versus not owning a 
product increases preference for that same product (Thaler 1980). 
However, relatively little is known on how owning rather than not 
owning multiple products affects preference among these different 
products, namely how choice among owned products, or retention, 
differs from choice among unowned products, or acquisition.
The present research suggests that, compared to consumers who 
face acquisition, those who face retention care more about product 
features that are primarily applicable to describe people (and less 
so to describe products). We refer to this class of attributes, which 
includes hedonic and pragmatic features (e.g., beautiful, resilient) as 
well as variety of brand personalities (e.g., outdoorsy), as person-
related features. By contrast, consumers facing retention may care 
less about features that are primarily applicable to describe products 
(and less so to describe people), namely product-related features. 
This range of attributes includes other hedonic and practical features 
(e.g., esthetic, portable) as well as a distinct set of brand personalities 
(e.g., fragile).
Why would consumers who face retention rather than acquisi-
tion would care more or give more decision weight to person-related 
features? Research on cognitive implications of ownership suggests 
that people associate owned (but not unowned) objects with their 
self-concept and even classify owned products as being part of in 
the category “self” (Weiss and Johar 2013). The present research 
suggests that consumers who own a product, and thus include it in 
the category “self,” may experience greater ease of processing infor-
mation about the product’s person-related features. This is because 
a category guides how people disambiguate items, for example, by 
increasing people’s ease of processing information about features 
that are more strongly associated to that category  (Barsalou 1982). 
Accordingly, when people choose among products they classify in 
the category “self,” they should process more easily person-related 
features, which are highly associated with the category “self.” Con-
sequently, because easy-to-process features carry more weight in 
choice (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991), consumers who choose among 
products they own (and thus classify in the category “self”), namely 
in retention rather than in acquisition, may give person-related fea-
tures more weight. 
Four studies demonstrated that product owners (vs. non-owners) 
more easily retrieve, afford greater weight to, and prefer products 
that are better on person-related features. In Study 1, participants 
had to find words in a word-puzzle, comprised of person-related 
and product-related features (as verified by a pretest) under time 
pressure. Consistent with the idea that people process more easily 
person-related features for owned (vs. unowned) products, when the 
puzzle theme was “words that can describe products you own” (vs. 
do not own), participants found more person-related features.
In Study 2, participants saw a series of five product categories, 
and were asked to allocate 30 points, representing decision weights, 
among four attributes: two person-related and two product-related 
features. Half of the participants did so for a choice which of two 
owned products to retain, and the other half, for a choice which of 
two unowned products to acquire. Next, to examine whether the per-
ception of an attribute as a person-related or a product-related fea-
ture drive the results, participants rated to what extent the features 
apply to people and to products. The results confirmed that partici-
pants gave greater weight to person-related (vs. product-related) for 
product retention (vs. acquisition) decisions, especially when they 
perceived the person-related features as more applicable to people 
than to products.
In Study 3, participants received a series of three choices, each 
in a different product category, and each poses a tradeoff between 
a person-related and a product-related feature. The decisions were 
either in a product retention or acquisition choices. Consistent with 
predictions, participants were more likely to retain the product that 
was higher on a person-related (e.g., intuitiveness) feature, but more 
likely to acquire the product higher on product-related feature (e.g., 
durability).
Study 4 replicated one of Study 4’s results, showing that when 
a choice between watches required the tradeoff between beauty (per-
son-related) and precision (product-related), consumers preferred 
to acquire the more precise watch, but to retain the more beautiful 
one. However, when a choice between watches required the trad-
eoff between aesthetic appeal (product-related) and dependability 
(person-related)—conceptually equivalent features with differing 
applicability to people—the pattern reversed: Participants preferred 
to retain the dependable watch and acquire the aesthetically pleasing 
one. Moreover, this pattern was only observed for people who tend 
to see owned products as part of their self-concept, as measured by 
an independent scale.
This research shows that the product-related and person-related 
features can have different effects on consumer choices, offering 
new insight into how consumers respond to products and brands. 
For example, the results suggest that marketers’ decision whether 
to encourage feelings of ownership of their products prior to pur-
chase needs to be considered alongside with the decision whether or 
not to highlight person-related features in positioning the product. 
In particular, when practices that encourage feelings of ownership, 
such as mass customization, test-drives or advertising that encourage 
consumers to imagine product use (Peck and Shu 2009), are at play, 
marketers may benefit from positioning a product along person-re-
lated features; the same may apply when marketers focus on retain-
ing existing consumers (who already owns the product). By contrast, 
when marketers do not employ conventional marketing plans that are 
aimed at evoking a feeling of ownership, and when markets focus on 
acquiring new consumers, marketers are likely to benefit from posi-
tioning their product along product-related features.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Search is an important domain in consumer behavior, and yet 
cross-cultural differences in search decisions remain a largely un-
explored topic. The present study focuses on the following research 
question: how might cultural background interact with search cost to 
affect people’s price search behavior, and why? Existing literature 
provides some relevant clue. A predominant observation in consum-
er search experiments is that people often do not search sufficiently 
relative to optimal strategies that maximize expected payoffs, and, 
in some instances, search approximately optimally. However, Zwick 
et al. (2003) found a contravening exception of over-searching be-
havior (only) in their high search cost condition. It has never been 
completely clarified how such difference from previous results could 
have occurred. But notably, Zwick et al.’s experiments were conduct-
ed with Asian (Hong Kong) subjects, while previous search experi-
ments were largely conducted with subjects from Western cultural 
backgrounds. Meanwhile, Ackerman and Tellis (2001) found in their 
field study that Chinese took more time to shop than Americans, a re-
sult that corroborates with the possibility that Easterners search more 
than Westerners in some cases. Hence cross-cultural differences may 
be a key to resolving the differences between Zwick et al. and previ-
ous findings – although any theorizing must explain why that hap-
pened only when search costs were sufficiently high.
This paper builds on the above observation by theorizing that 
Eastern subjects, with their higher sensitivity to sunk costs and higher 
susceptibility to escalation of commitment, would search more than 
optimally when search costs are high and sunk costs effects have 
high impact by implication; however, when search costs are low, we 
theorize that Easterners’ and Westerners’ search behaviors would not 
differ significantly. Previous studies have noted that Easterners tend 
to be more susceptible to sunk costs than Westerners. This is because 
(see Keil et al. 2000; also cf. Hofstede 1980) the lower individualism 
(ID) and higher power distance (PD) in Eastern societies cause East-
erners to be more reluctant than Westerners to appear weak or lose 
face by admitting errors in public, a tendency that can carry over as 
a reluctance to lose face to the decision maker’s self-image. The im-
plication is that, as sunk costs accumulate, Eastern decision makers 
would become less compromising with the level of task performance 
than Westerners. Data from two experiments support all hypotheses 
derived from our theorizing, and also provide process evidence.
Our study involved two controlled laboratory experiments. In 
a typical task, subjects sequentially obtained price quotes in tokens 
(experimental currency). If a subject decided to stop after obtaining 
the i-th price quote, she earned a payoff of 700 tokens minus the 
lowest among the i price quotes obtained. After obtaining the first 
price quote, a subject incurred a search cost every time she sought an 
additional quote. Subjects were informed that price quotes were nor-
mally distributed with a mean of 430 tokens and standard deviation 
of 50 tokens. In both experiments, the same search task was given to 
subjects from different cultural groups respectively from an Eastern 
(Thailand) and a Western (United Kingdom) society. The two societ-
ies differ in the key dimensions that, as we theorize, drive differences 
in sensitivity to sunk costs (ID and PD indices of Thailand = 20 and 
64 while those of the UK = 89 and 35, according to Hofstede Center 
2005). Experiment 1 has a 2 (Eastern vs Western) X 2 (search cost 
= 5 vs 15 tokens per search) between subject design. Experiment 2 
has a 2 (Eastern vs Western) X 2 (salient vs non-salient sunk cost) 
between subject design where search cost increased with the number 
of searches.  Upon obtaining the i-th price quote, an additional price 
quote could be obtained at a cost of 5i tokens. The salience (non-
salience) of sunk cost was manipulated by including (excluding) the 
notion of sunk cost on the decision and summary screens and in the 
experiment instructions. 
The experiments included 264 student subjects from two major 
universities in Thailand and the United Kingdom; both were top-
ranked universities in their countries with comparable academic apti-
tude levels among students with respect to country averages. Demo-
graphic data suggest similarity in economic status between groups. 
Every subject was required to perform 40 identical search tasks out 
of which three were selected at random for payment. The conversion 
rates for payment were adjusted with relevant GDP per capita to con-
trol for perceived incentives across groups. 
The experimental data exhibit significant influence of culture 
groups on search decisions. In the low search cost condition of 
Experiment 1, subject decisions did not differ significantly across 
culture groups: both culture groups under-searched relative to the 
expected payoff-maximizing optimal strategy. By contrast, in the 
high search cost condition in the same experiment, Eastern subjects 
over-searched while Western subjects searched optimally. In Experi-
ment 2, Eastern subjects over-searched as they did not seem to be 
more willing to accept higher prices as the number of searches (and 
thus search costs) increased; meanwhile, Western subjects’ decisions 
were close to optimal. 
Further analysis suggests that our results were driven by East-
erners being more sensitive to sunk costs and thus more susceptible 
to escalation of commitment than Westerners, a notion that cor-
roborates with previous literature. This difference did not create 
significant effects when search costs were low, as in the low search 
cost condition in Experiment 1. However, it caused significant over-
searching among Eastern subjects in the same experiment’s high 
search cost condition, and also when search costs increased steadily 
in Experiment 2. 
The findings that Eastern subjects could over-search in our ex-
perimental conditions present a rare, but significant, exception to 
previous experimental findings. More generally, our results exem-
plify the perils of generalizing conclusions from behavioral research 
in marketing as well as judgment and decision-making — which 
have been conducted largely in the West — across cultures. Although 
comparing the behavior of subjects from different culture groups 
with similar demographic profiles is appropriate for our research 
objectives, our argument could receive stronger support by prim-
ing culture-related inclinations through experimental manipulations 
(e.g., Hong et al. 2000), a direction which we are currently pursuing.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gratitude is generally made known through conduct; it is an 
emotion with a social aspect that is incomplete without inclusion of 
an act of acknowledgement (Ceaser 2011). This acknowledgement 
is referred to as an expression of gratitude (EoG). Researchers have 
investigated the effects of EoGs in interpersonal contexts and have 
identified a variety of pro-social behaviors affected by EoGs (e.g. 
McGovern, Ditzian, and Taylor 1975). We extend this research to 
determine whether EoGs impact consumers’ pro-organizational re-
sponses, including satisfaction with the employee, the organization, 
and loyalty intentions.
Hypothesis 1: An EoG from an organizational representative 
will increase consumer satisfaction with the 
representative and the organization, as well as 
loyalty.
According to attribution theory (Folkes 1984), consumers’ atti-
tudes and behaviors are influenced by rationally-derived causal infer-
ences. We believe that consumers respond more positively to EoGs 
upon completing such an attribution.  Consumers similarly generate 
attributions regarding the causes of low-quality service (e.g. Bitner 
1990). We anticipate that low-quality attributions will overshadow 
those associated with an expression of gratitude.
Hypothesis 2: Service quality will moderate the pro-organiza-
tional effects of an EoG such that these effects 
will be stronger following high-quality service 
than low-quality service.
Finally, we propose that the extent to which expectations are 
disconfirmed (e.g. Cardozo 1965, Churchill and Surprenant 1982, 
Oliver 1980, Oliver and DeSarbo 1988, Swan 1983, Tse and Wilton 
1988), will underlie this effect. 
Hypothesis 3: Disconfirmed expectations mediate the effects 
of an EoG on pro-organizational consumer re-
sponses.
We test these hypotheses across four studies.
Study 1: Do Expressions of Gratitude Affect Pro-
Organizational Consumer Attitudes?
Study 1 examines whether an expression of gratitude positively 
impacts consumer attitudes. A two-condition (EoG present vs. ab-
sent) experiment was conducted using a scenario paradigm outlining 
a pleasant restaurant experience. Participants were 72 undergraduate 
students. Dependent measures for all studies were satisfaction with 
the employee (SatEmp), satisfaction with the organization (SatOrg), 
and behavioral intentions (Loyalty).
ANOVA analyses showed that participants in the EoG condition 
reported significantly more positive SatEmp (measured on a 7-point 
scale) than participants in the no EoG condition (MEoG = 6.00, MNoEoG 
= 5.29; F(1,70) = 5.71, p < .05). Follow-up mediation analysis using 
bootstrapping (Preacher and Hayes 2004) revealed a significant indi-
rect effect of EoG on SatOrg mediated by SatEmp (ß = .53, 95% CI 
= {0.08, 0.96}) and a significant indirect effect of EoG on Loyalty, 
mediated by SatEmp (ß =.37, 95% CI = {0.05, 0.73}).  
Study 2: Do Expressions of Gratitude Differ from 
Expressions of Politeness?
To demonstrate that an EoG is distinct from general positive af-
fect or politeness, we ran a three-condition (Message: EoG, “have a 
nice day” (HAND), control) experiment. The EoG was manipulated 
verbally and contrasted with the phrase “Have a nice day”. Partici-
pants were 230 undergraduate students.
ANOVA analysis showed a significant main effect of message 
on SatEmp. Planned contrast analyses showed that SatEmp was sig-
nificantly greater for the EoG condition as opposed to the HAND 
condition (MEoG = 5.22, MHAND = 4.56, F(1,228) = 11.11, p < .01). 
Notably, the HAND condition was not significantly different from 
the control (F(1,228) = 2.36, p > .10). A similar pattern of results was 
observed for each of the other dependent variables.
Study 3: Do Expressions of Gratitude Affect Attitudes 
Across Levels of Service Quality?
Study 3 was a 3 (EoG vs. Explicit No EoG vs. Not Mentioned) 
x 2 (Service Quality: High vs. Low) between-subjects design. To in-
crease generalizability, a hair salon context was employed. In a slight 
change from the first two studies, we included a condition that ex-
plicitly stated that no EoG had been received. This change was made 
because participants in the absent (study 1) and control (study 2) con-
ditions had been scoring closer to ‘definitely yes’ than ‘definitely no’ 
on the “were you thanked” manipulation check. Participants were 
335 undergraduate student participants. Dependent measures were 
consistent with previous studies, though measured on a 9-point scale.
ANOVA analyses demonstrated similar effects across all three 
dependent variables. Importantly, we observed the expected interac-
tion between EoG and service quality (F(2, 329) = 9.62, p <.01). 
Planned contrast analyses revealed that this interaction was signifi-
cant between the EoG and Explicit No conditions (MEoGxHigh = 8.02, 
MEoGxLow = 2.07, MExpNoxHigh = 6.31, MExpNoxLow = 2.07; F(1,329) = 18.86, 
p < .01). A marginally significant interaction was observed between 
the EoG and Not Mentioned conditions (F(1,329) = 2.87, p < .10). 
A similar pattern of results was seen for SatOrg as well as Loyalty. 
Study 4: Through what Mechanism does an Expression 
of Gratitude Operate?
Study 4 took a 3 (EoG: Written vs Verbal vs Explicit No) x 2 
(Service quality: High vs. Low) between-subjects design and mea-
sured disconfirmed expectations. Participants were 313 adults. 
Again, we observed the hypothesized interaction effect between 
service quality and EoG (F(2, 307) = 8.74, p < .01). As in study 3, 
the two EoG conditions demonstrated a significant increase in Sa-
tEmp when service quality rose from low (MWritten = 2.51, MVerbal = 
2.15, MNoEoG = 1.74) to high (MWritten = 6.32, MVerbal = 6.70, MNoEoG = 
4.82) .  This pattern of results was similarly observed for SatOrg and 
Loyalty.
We compared the effects of an EoG versus an Explicit No EoG. 
Using bootstrapping methods (Preacher and Hayes 2004), we found 
that the indirect effect of an EoG on SatEmp through disconfirmed 
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expectations was significant when service quality was high (ß = 0.42, 
95% CI = {.23, .65}) but not low (ß = 0.09, 95% CI = {-.002, .17}). 
This supports the hypothesized model wherein service quality sig-
nificantly moderates the extent to which an EoG disconfirms expec-
tations, and disconfirmed expectations predict level of SatEmp. 
General Discussion
Across four studies, using multiple contexts and participant de-
mographics, we demonstrate that expressions of gratitude promote 
pro-organizational attitudes, supporting H1. Further, we identify an 
important boundary condition to these effects. A low service qual-
ity experience overwhelms the presence or absence of an expression 
of gratitude. Finally, we demonstrate that this effect occurs through 
an attribution process whereby the extent to which consumers’ prior 
expectations are disconfirmed drives attitude change.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The mental rigidity of ideological conservatives, known as the 
rigidity-of-the-right, is well-documented. In their thorough review, 
Jost et al. (2003, 352) conclude that “by far the most convincing 
research on left-right differences pertains to epistemic motives asso-
ciated with mental rigidity and closed-mindedness.” Consequently, 
conservatives tend not to seek out or even consider the opinions of 
others when making judgments and decisions, and are especially re-
sistant to the views of liberals.
With this research, we offer a more nuanced understanding of 
conservative ideological responses, predicting that conservatives 
may update their decisions toward the perceived norms of a common 
audience to manage their impressions with the in-group. Though per-
haps seemingly in conflict with the “rigidity of the right,” conserva-
tives emphasize the group and are more strongly motivated to adhere 
to social norms and conventions than are liberals (Jost et al. 2003). 
Conservatives and liberals have distinct moral foundations, with 
conservatives placing a greater value on binding or group-focused 
moral foundations, which include group loyalty and duty (Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Also, conservatives may be more agreeable 
than liberals. Hirsh et al. (2010) distinguish between two subtraits 
of agreeableness: compassion and politeness. While compassion re-
flects empathy and interpersonal concern and thus is associated with 
liberals, politeness is more closely linked to norm compliance and 
traditionalism and reflective of conservative beliefs (Hirsch et al. 
2010). Thus, conservatives are motivated by politeness and comply-
ing with social norms, which are likely to be salient in public situ-
ations. 
Consequently, conservatives in the public eye may be moti-
vated to conform even to in-group members subscribing to a dif-
ferent ideology, to the extent that the decision regards social norms. 
Whether this occurs, though, may depend on which social identity 
is salient at the time of a decision. At any point in time, situational 
constraints can make salient a given social identity used to represent 
the self (self-categorization theory; Turner et al. 1987). For instance, 
although students from the same university can define themselves 
in terms of liberal—conservative social identities, situational con-
straints can lead the same individuals to ignore these identities and to 
focus instead on the shared college identity for self-definition. Con-
textual activation of this common in-group identity heightens the 
need to maintain in-group cohesiveness and harmonious relations 
with other group members. Here, we expect that conservatives will 
be particularly motivated to comply with the norms and stereotypes 
of the salient in-group, even when this in-group consists of individu-
als who are believed to hold liberal views.
A charitable giving context is well-suited for this research. Peo-
ple hold stereotypes of liberals (e.g., Democrats) as generous and 
of conservatives (e.g. Republicans) as somewhat heartless toward 
the needy. The stereotype of a bleeding heart liberal is particularly 
salient among conservatives (labeled the “Limbaugh Effect”; Far-
well and Weiner 2000) and the lack of generosity by conservatives 
(vs. liberals) is particularly prevalent in the case of needy people 
judged to be responsible for their plight (Reyna et al. 2005). In this 
context, conservatives faced with charitable decisions that would be 
discussed with fellow college students holding liberal views should 
be motivated to seek approval from the audience (Torelli 2006), and 
hence factor into their decisions the more generous expectation of 
their fellow students, thus boosting their own generosity to fit with 
a liberal audience’s norms for charitable giving. When a common 
social identity (e.g., fellow college students) is not salient, though, 
the effect of a liberal audience on increasing conservatives’ generos-
ity will be attenuated. 
In three studies, we show that conservatives (liberals) who an-
ticipate accountability to individuals who hold the opposing political 
ideology exhibit greater generosity (no change) in their charitable 
decisions, compared with those who anticipate interacting with indi-
viduals holding the same political ideology or those making charita-
ble decisions in private, and that this effect is mediated by the desire 
to seek approval from the audience.
In a preliminary study, we tested whether conservatives (liber-
als) who anticipate accountability to individuals who hold the op-
posing political ideology exhibit greater generosity (no change) in 
their real donation decisions, compared to those making charitable 
decisions in private. Students who self-identified as either liberals 
or conservatives were assigned to make a charitable decision either 
under accountability to someone from the opposing political ideol-
ogy (where shared social identity was salient) or in private. ANOVA 
results show that, as expected, conservatives were more generous 
when accountable to a liberal than when in private, with no differ-
ence in generosity among liberals in the two conditions. Further, 
within the private decision condition liberals were more generous 
than conservatives, while in the public accountability condition there 
was no difference between conservatives and liberals. 
In study 1, we tested for whether conservatives (liberals) ex-
hibit greater generosity (no change) when accountable to liberals 
versus when accountable to other conservatives (liberals) or making 
decisions in private in an established paradigm (Farwell and Weiner 
2000), and also test for the mediating role of desire to seek audience 
approval (White and Peloza 2009). As expected, regression results 
revealed that participants self-defined as conservatives were more 
generous when anticipating accountability to a liberal audience than 
to a conservative audience or in the private condition. There were no 
differences in generosity among self-defined liberals in the differ-
ent conditions. Further, mediation analyses confirmed that conser-
vatives’ decisions were driven by desire to seek approval from the 
audience. In study 2, we provided further evidence of mediation and, 
importantly, also showed that the effects dissipate when a common 
identity is not salient. 
A rich literature suggests that conservatives are firmly rooted in 
their beliefs and are highly unlikely to alter their views in the face 
of public accountability, particularly to a liberal audience. We show 
that conservatives can be motivated to align their donation decisions 
with the generosity of liberals, and hence are likely to increase their 
generosity when anticipating accountability to an audience of liber-
als with whom they share a salient common identity. Implications for 
ideology and charitable giving literatures are discussed.
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Table 1:  Summary of Results
Study Main Objective Results
Preliminary 
Study
Test for whether conservatives (liberals) 
who anticipate accountability to 
individuals who hold the opposing 
political ideology will exhibit greater 
generosity (no change) in their donation 
decisions vs. those who make decisions in 
private.
• Own ideology × accountability interaction (F(1, 101) = 5.27, p < .05).
• Conservatives more generous when accountable to a liberal than when in 
private (M = $18.58 and $13.27 respectively; F(1, 101) = 4.08, p < .05), 
with no difference in generosity among liberals (M = $20.11 and $17.01 
respectively; F(1, 101) = 1.44, p > .2). 
• Liberals more generous than conservatives (F(1, 101) = 6.57, p < 
.01) within the private decision condition, with no difference between 
conservatives and liberals in the public accountability condition (F(1, 101) 
= .39, p > .5).
Study 1
Test for whether conservatives (liberals) 
exhibit greater generosity (no change) 
when accountable to liberals versus 
when accountable to other conservatives 
(liberals) or making decisions in private, 
and test for mediation.
• Political ideology X conservative dummy interaction (b = -.56, S.E. = .26, 
t(111) = 2.13, p < .05) and political ideology X private dummy interaction 
(b = -.50, S.E. = .24, t(111) = 2.06, p < .05).
• Conservatives more generous when anticipating accountability to a liberal 
vs. conservative audience (M = 3.77 and 2.75 respectively, t(111) = 1.66, 
p < .05, one-sided, or in the private condition (M = 2.56, t(112) = 2.26, p < 
.05). 
• No differences in generosity among self-defined liberals across conditions 
(Mliberal audience = 3.01, Mconservative audience = 3.80 and Mprivate = 3.37, all p > .1).
• Full mediation of desire to seek approval from the audience.
Study 2
Test for whether effects dissipate when 
common identity is not salient, and further 
test for mediation.
• Main effect of own ideology (F(1, 193) = 12.73, p < .001, η2 = .06), and 
audience ideology X salience of shared identity X own ideology interaction 
(F(1, 193) = 4.89, p < .05, η2 = .025).
• Conservatives more generous when facing liberals (vs. conservatives) 
when shared identity salient (M = 3.64 vs. 2.53, F(1, 193) = 4.51, p < .05, 
η2 = .023. However, effect dissipated when shared identity not salient, (M 
= 2.64 and 3.01, p > .4). 
• When facing liberals, conservatives more generous when shared college 
identity salient (vs. not) (M = 3.64 and 2.64, F(1, 193) = 4.16, p < .05, η2 
= .021). In contrast, liberals’ similar across conditions (MSalient Id.–Liberal Aud. = 
3.61, MSalient Id.–Conservative Aud. = 3.94, MNon-salient Id.–Liberal Aud. = 4.24, and MNon-salient 
Id.–Conservative Aud. = 3.74, all p’s > .2).    
• Full mediation of desire to seek approval from the audience.
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Social Comparison to Advertising Depictions: Exploring Advertising Practitioners’ 
Perspectives
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Social comparison, proposed nearly 60 years ago by Festinger 
(1954) is defined as an evaluative process in which an individual 
compares himself or herself on some dimension to a target of com-
parison (Kruglanski and Mayseless 1990). This theory has dem-
onstrated relevance for consumer research including explaining 
consumers’ reactions to advertising messages (e.g., Richins 1991). 
However, little work examines how advertising practitioners, as cre-
ators of such images, perceive the social comparison process and its 
outcomes among consumers. Through a mixed method qualitative 
approach, this research examines how advertising practitioners con-
ceptualize the social comparison process among consumers. 
Past studies show that individuals actively compare themselves 
and may be motivated not only by self-evaluation, but also by a sense 
of self-improvement or self-enhancement when making comparisons 
(Wood 1989). Research also addresses the consequences of social 
comparison. Much scholarly discussion in psychology centers on 
assimilation and contrast effects (e.g., Thornton and Moore 1993; 
Brewer and Weber 1994; Lockwood and Kunda 1997; Mussweiler 
2001) and details a number of moderating variables. Other scholars 
(e.g., Richins 1991) explain that individuals may shift their standards 
and/or lower their self-perceptions of performance. Research in this 
stream mostly examines comparisons to attractive or thin models by 
women and is mixed with regard to its negative effects, although 
some scholars argue these comparisons may lead to feelings of dis-
satisfaction (e.g., Hogg, Bruce and Hough 1999; Martin & Kennedy 
1993, 1994; Harper & Tiggemann 2008; Hargreaves & Tiggemann 
2002; Lavine, Sweeney and Wagner 1999).
Gulas and McKeage (2000) and Zayer and Otnes (2012) have 
taken a first step in extending the research on comparison to adver-
tising images to examinations of men and into domains other than 
physical attractiveness. Gulas and McKeage (2000) find idealized 
images of financial success have a negative effect on men’s self-eval-
uations, while Zayer and Otnes (2012) demonstrate that men exhibit 
a variety of responses to comparisons of masculinity in ads, includ-
ing feelings of vulnerability and anxiety as well as more motivational 
and aspirational outcomes.
To investigate how advertising practitioners perceive consum-
ers’ comparisons to advertising representations, the researchers used 
a qualitative approach across two waves of data collection. In the first 
round, field observations, a focus group and unstructured and semi-
structured interviews with advertising practitioners were conducted 
in a large U.S. advertising agency. Twenty participants were asked 
“grand tour” questions (McCracken 1988), and questions focused 
on their perceptions of how advertising impacts consumers, probing 
into social comparison processes. In the second round of data collec-
tion, the researchers conducted ten semi-structured depth interviews 
with advertising professionals working at various agencies across the 
U.S. in cities such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas. 
After transcription, the researchers engaged in data analysis (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998) to identify salient themes in a similar manner as 
Drumwright and Murphy’s (2004) analysis of interview data from 
advertising practitioners. 
The findings indicate informants’ concerns about consumers’ 
feelings is largely client-driven and focused on whether or not the 
target audience in particular will have a good reaction as defined by 
how it benefits the client—whether the target audience will “like it 
and want to buy it” (Erin, female). Many informants did not express 
a concern about how advertising images may impact consumers’ 
self-perceptions. Next, findings demonstrate practitioners view the 
social comparison process and its outcomes differently based on 
whether the intended audience is male or female. With few excep-
tions, informants demonstrate a belief that women are more prone 
to engage in social comparison. Several informants associate the 
tendency to compare with perceived gendered traits, such as how 
observant women are. Further, women are seen as more susceptible 
to possible negative effects of social comparison, particularly with 
regard to comparisons of beauty. 
In contrast, men are seen as largely immune from the negative 
impact of social comparison to advertising images. One informant 
suggests that men engage in social comparison internally and do not 
verbalize it, but clearly indicates women are more prone to engage 
in the process (Casey, male). Moreover, unlike women’s perceived 
vulnerability to negative effects of social comparison, the effects of 
men’s comparisons—among informants who expressed a belief that 
men do engage in the process—predominantly are seen as positive 
and aspirational. A few practitioners did express that both men and 
women engage in social comparison and that these comparisons may 
hold negative consequences for consumers; however, they were in 
the minority. 
Despite research demonstrating that both men and women ac-
tively engage in social comparison to advertising representations, 
most informants focused on women. When asked separately about 
whether they believed men and women compare themselves to mod-
els in ads, not only were their responses about women’s social com-
parison longer in duration, they were more detailed in content. How-
ever, despite research demonstrating that men also engage in social 
comparison, few respondents actively addressed these possibilities. 
Importantly, practitioners revealed that their gendered perceptions do 
influence the types of advertising messages they develop and market. 
Future research should examine the specific ways these perceptions 
impact the creative and strategic development of ads, and thus is a 
limitation of the current research.
In sum, this research is important for several reasons. By high-
lighting the contrast between what practitioners believe are differ-
ent social comparison processes between men and women and what 
research has demonstrated as a salient process for both men and 
women (and sometimes with negative outcomes), scholars may be 
able to bring a greater understanding of the process to the advertising 
community. Advertisers could incorporate this understanding into 
their decision processes. Further, advertisers should recognize the 
potential that some messages may detrimentally affect men and that 
women are not always vulnerable and detrimentally affected. Finally, 
understanding how practitioners view the social comparison process 
holds important consumer welfare implications.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often rely on limited information that is readily 
available while neglecting missing information.  Research has dem-
onstrated that insensitivity to missing information results in inap-
propriately extreme judgments and detecting omissions is surpris-
ingly difficult (Sanbonmatsu et al. 1991; 1992; 1997).  As with all 
judgment biases, it is important to have an understanding about situ-
ational differences that may differentially impact decision making. 
Although people frequently neglect omissions, a growing body of 
evidence has shown that sensitivity to omissions can be heightened 
under certain conditions (Kardes et al., 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al., 
1991, 1992, 1997, 2003).  
A variable that should be keenly important in omission detec-
tion is construal level.  Research has indicated that people construe 
situations along a continuum from abstract to concrete and that this 
impacts the decision process (Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003, 2010; 
Liberman & Trope 2008).   Construal level theory would suggest that 
omission detection may depend on the level to which a judgment is 
construed and possibly even whether the missing attribute informa-
tion is related to primary or secondary features.  Lower-level con-
struals result in more detailed or local processing while higher-level 
construals result in more holistic or global processing (Förster, 2009; 
Förster et al., 2009; Liberman & Förster, 2009).  Because omission 
detection requires effortful, analytic processing (Sanbonmatsu et al., 
1991), omission detection should be more likely in near-future evalu-
ations than in distant-future evaluations.
Although it has not been empirically tested, construal level 
theory also implies that people may be sensitive to different types of 
omissions.  People weigh primary or central features more heavily in 
distant-future evaluations and secondary or peripheral features more 
heavily in near-future evaluations (Trope & Liberman, 2000).   As a 
result, there may be greater sensitivity to missing information about 
primary features in distant-future evaluations and secondary features 
in near-future evaluations.  The omission neglect literature makes no 
such distinction regarding the level of construal or the type of miss-
ing features.  The goal of this paper is to investigate these important 
situational differences.
Study 1 tested the effects of construal level on omission detec-
tion using multiple measures of sensitivity to omissions.  Construal 
level was manipulated using temporal distance. Participants were 
asked to imagine that they were purchasing a product (cell phone) 
either “tomorrow” (near-future condition) or “in about three or four 
months” (distant-future condition) and were provided with a few 
pieces of information about the product.  Participants in the near-fu-
ture condition reported greater attention to detail than participants in 
the distant-future condition, supporting a construal level to process-
ing style relationship.  Further, participants in the near-future con-
dition reported a greater need for additional information, a greater 
likelihood that information was missing from the product descrip-
tion, and generated significantly more additional attributes than par-
ticipants in the distant-future condition.  Collectively, these results 
indicate that the level of construal has an impact on the sensitivity to 
missing information and the likelihood of omission detection.
Study 2 investigated the impact of construal level on evaluative 
extremity.  Participants were asked to imagine that they would be pur-
chasing a HDTV either “tomorrow” or “in about six months” and were 
provided with a few pieces of information about the product.  People 
in the near-future condition reported more moderate evaluations of the 
product than people in the distant-future condition, indicating that they 
detected omissions and adjusted their evaluation accordingly.
Study 3 assessed the impact of construal level on evaluative ex-
tremity while investigating any differential effects of missing primary 
and secondary features.  Participants were asked to imagine that they 
were in the market for a basic cell phone and were provided with a 
few pieces of information about the phone.  In the description, either 
a primary feature (network information) or a secondary feature (cam-
era quality) was used as the omitted attribute.  A pretest confirmed 
that these were perceived as either primary or secondary features.  A 
how vs. why goal priming (Liberman et al., 2007) manipulation was 
used in this study to generalize our results beyond the temporal ma-
nipulation.  The how vs. why goal manipulation achieved the same 
effect on omission detection as the temporal distance manipulation 
used in the previous studies.  Focusing on how (vs. why) a behavior 
is performed results in lower-level construals, greater sensitivity to 
omissions, and more moderate evaluations (F(1,63)=6.29, p<.05). 
We found no differential impact between primary and secondary 
omitted attributes.  
Study 4 investigated a potential moderator to the effect of con-
strual level on omission detection.  The Behavioral Identification 
Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) measures individual differences in 
personal agency related to differing levels of behavioral abstractness. 
Since low-level agents interpret situations in more concrete terms, 
they should be more inherently sensitive to omissions.  In contrast, 
high-level agents should have greater difficulty detecting omissions 
because they tend to focus on more abstract, high-level interpreta-
tions of behavior.  Participants were asked to imagine that they would 
be purchasing a laptop computer either “next weekend” or “in about 
six months” and were provided with a few pieces of information 
about the computer.  The results support the expected moderating 
effect of personal agency`.  Near-future evaluations were more mod-
erate than distant-future evaluations, but only for high-level agents. 
Low-level agents provide more moderate evaluations regardless of 
temporal distance, indicating that they were more inherently sensi-
tive to omissions.
This research contributes to the growing body of literature on 
omission neglect.  People are more likely to spontaneously detect 
omissions when they are making temporally near versus distant eval-
uations, when they are in a concrete versus an abstract mind-set, and 
when they are inherently more likely to interpret actions in concrete 
versus abstract terms.  Further, although prior findings suggest that 
people may have differential sensitivity to primary and secondary 
missing features at different levels of construal, we found no such 
difference.  Our findings parsimoniously indicate that people are 
more sensitive to all types of missing information when construal 
levels are low, and that this sensitivity leads to more moderate and 
appropriate judgments.
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Table 1: Studies 2 to 4
Overall Evaluation as a Function of Construal Level and 
Omission Cuing
High Construal Low Construal
Omission Omission
 Not Cued Cued Not Cued Cued
Study 2 5.91* 4.50 4.86 4.77
Study 3 4.74* 3.66 3.97 3.76
Study 4 
High-level 
Agents
5.46* 4.69 4.20 4.33
Study 4 
Low-level 
Agents
4.62 4.31 4.68 4.09
* Mean different from all the other means included on the same line.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer awareness of deception is important in order to effec-
tively cope with marketers’ strategic attempts to unfairly influence 
them.  Yet, in spite of the widespread prevalence of marketplace de-
ception, consumers are typically insensitive to situations where they 
are being manipulated. The current research attempts to answer the 
call for research in best practices for consumer education in detecting 
manipulative intent (Boush, Friestad, & Wright, 2009). Across three 
studies, each featuring a different deception tactic, we show that con-
sumer elaboration of marketer motives enhances inferred manipula-
tive intent (IMI), leading to less favorable product judgments. We 
argue that by elaborating on marketer motives using a specialized 
form of System 2 thinking, consumers will become more sensitive to 
marketplace deception.
IMI is a measure of consumer recognition that an attempt to 
persuade is inappropriate, unfair, or manipulative (Campbell, 1995). 
The assumption here is that the marketer intends to deliberately mis-
lead. Other researchers have conducted studies exploring consumer 
education regarding marketplace deception (Bolton, Bloom, & Co-
hen, 2011; Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). Unfortunately, 
in operationalizing a tactic, these studies have explicitly identified 
the behavior as unethical.  In contrast, we refrain from telling re-
spondents whether or not the use of a tactic is unethical. In our stud-
ies, respondents are merely educated about the tactic, but not about 
the ethics of its use.  Respondents in the treatment conditions are 
asked to elaborate on the marketer’s motives for using the tactic, 
thus allowing them to draw their own conclusions about marketers’ 
manipulative intent. 
In Study 1, we consider the use of conditional probabilities in 
marketing claims to convey differences (i.e., improvements, reduc-
tions).  Framing a difference in relative (vs. absolute) terms exploits 
consumer innumeracy.  It fails to provide meaningful insight into a 
claim unless baseline information is also presented. However, simply 
being educated on how relative risk frames are calculated may not 
be enough. We posit that it is only when consumers elaborate on 
marketer motives that such framing is inferred to be manipulative.  
Respondents in study 1 (N = 141 undergraduate students) were 
educated and quizzed on how to calculate a relative risk reduction. 
Next they viewed a product claim that featured a relative risk re-
duction.  Prior to seeing the claim, they were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions in which they were given:  (1) no additional 
information; (2) baseline information used to calculate the rela-
tive reduction that was not included in the product claim; or (3) the 
same information as in (2), as well as additional instruction about 
the tactic.  The latter group also elaborated on marketer motives 
for using the tactic.  All respondents then completed an index sum-
marizing product judgments (α = .87) and an IMI scale (Campbell, 
1995; Cotte, Coulter, & Moore, 2005; α = .89).  As hypothesized, 
IMI increased for those in who received additional instruction and 
elaborated on marketer motives (p < .01). In addition, IMI mediated 
the effect of additional instruction and elaboration on the product 
judgment index, with IMI being negatively related to the index.  An 
alternative hypothesis considering consumer anger toward the tactic 
Contrast 1 
Contrast 2 
Inferred Manipulative Intent 
Index 
Contrast 1:  (background information, additional instruction, and tactic elaboration) vs. (background information but no additional instruction or 
elaboration).  Contrast 2:  (background information but no additional instruction) vs. (Control). 
STUDY 1 
Anger 
Tactic Manipulation 
     0 = control 
     1 = treatment 
Inferred Manipulative 
Intent 
Index
Risky Side Effects 
STUDY 2 
Additional Information Manipulation 
     0 = control 
     1 = treatment 
Disclosure Adequacy Manipulation 
     0 = adequate disclosure 
     1 = inadequate disclosure 
Interaction 
     0 = all other conditions 
     1 = additional info + inadeq disclosure 
Inferred Manipulative  
Intent 
Index 
Note: A language contrast (0 = native English speaker, 1 = non-native English speaker) construct (not shown) was related to each  
measured construct as a covariate and was allowed to covary with exogenous predictors. 
STUDY 3 
Figure 1:  Study Models
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was not supported.  A graphical representation of the model is shown 
in Figure 1 and results are reported in Table 1.
Study 2 considers malevolent distraction, a tactic designed to 
obscure or camouflage important information featured during a com-
mercial.  The technique is especially prevalent in direct-to-consumer 
pharmaceutical advertising where background imagery is typically 
varied at the same time information about the drug’s side effects is 
being presented.  Approximately half the respondents in study 2 were 
informed about this camouflage tactic in pharmaceutical advertising 
and then asked to elaborate on why marketers employ it (treatment). 
The other half of the sample was not given this information (control). 
All participants (N = 123 MTurk workers) were initially shown a 
commercial for a drug intended to lessen the effects of depression. 
Those in the treatment condition were then taught about the tactic, 
shown how it applied in the ad, and asked to elaborate on why it is 
used.  Those in the control condition were not given this information. 
The same measures used earlier were included (IMI, α = .90; index, 
α = .92).  Consistent with the hypotheses, those in the treatment con-
dition inferred greater manipulative intent.  IMI also mediated the 
effect of the tactic manipulation, with higher levels of IMI negatively 
correlated with index scores.  The hypothesized model is shown in 
Figure 1 and results are given in Table 1.
In Study 3, the tactic of omission neglect was considered.  Spe-
cifically, a marketer’s failure to provide affirmative disclosure con-
sistent with the “clear and conspicuous” (CCS) standard required 
by the FTC was the context used in the study.  All participants (N 
= 102 MTurk workers) received information about the CCS re-
quirement, shown examples and quizzed about what they learned. 
Those assigned to the treatment condition then received additional 
information about the necessity of disclosure statements in order for 
consumers to make an informed decision.  They were also asked to 
elaborate on why marketers often fail to include adequate disclo-
sures.  Those in the control condition where told that the CCS also 
applies to other types of media and were asked to elaborate on why 
Table 1:  Summary of Results by Study
Study Effect Type Model Path β 95% CI
1
Direct Eff Contrast 1 → IMI .43** .17, .67
Contrast 2 → IMI -.12 -.43, .23
Contrast 1 → Anger .16 -.15, .47
Contrast 2 → Anger -.09 -.44, .42
IMI → Index -.49*** -.65, -.32
IMI → Anger -.03 -.16, .10
Mediated Direct Eff Contrast 1 → Index .07 -.11, .25
Contrast 2 → Index .05 -.16, .27
Covariance IMI ↔ Anger 1.14*** .85, 1.50
Mediating Eff Contrast 1 → IMI→ Index -.21** -.36, -.08
Contrast 2 → IMI → Index .06 -.11, .23
Contrast 1 → IMI→ Anger .00 -.07, .01
Contrast 2 → IMI → Anger .00 -.04, .05
2
Direct Eff Elaboration (Elab) Manipulation → IMI .59* .18, 1.06
Elab Manipulation → Risky Side Effects .03 -.41, .46
IMI → Index -.30** -.40, -.14
IMI → Risky Side Effects -.44*** -.58, -.28
Mediated Direct Eff Elab Manipulation → Index -.37 -.74, .01
Covariance IMI ↔ Risky Side Effects .43** .18, .68
Mediating Eff Elab Manipulation → IMI→ Index -.18* -.39, -.04
Elab Manipulation → Risky Side Effects → Index -.01 -.20, .17
3
Direct Eff Additional Instruction (Instr) Manip → IMI -.44 -.99, .06
Disclosure Adequacy (Adeq) Manip → IMI .31 -.21, .83
Interaction → IMI 1.00* .13, 1.80
Language Contrast → IMI -.04 -.51, .43
IMI → Index -.52*** -.70, -.35
Additional Instr Manip → Index .22 -.19, .55
Disclosure Adeq Manip → Index .29 -.15, .69
Interaction → Index -.57 -1.20, .15
Language Contrast → Index .41* .03, .70
Covariances Additional Instr Manip ↔ Disclosure Adeq Manip -.01 -.05, .04
Additional Instr Manip ↔ Interaction .12*** .09, .15
Disclosure Adequacy Manip ↔ Interaction .11*** .08, .15
Language Contrast ↔ Additional Instr Manip -.04 -.08, .01
Language Contrast ↔ Disclosure Adeq Manip .00 -.05, .04
Language Contrast ↔ Interaction -.02 -.06, .02
Mediating Eff Interaction → IMI → Index -.52* -1.05, -.11
Notes:  Hypothesized effects in bold.  IMI = inferred manipulative intent; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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research on the topic is valuable.  This factor was crossed with the 
adequacy of disclosure in a stimulus ad (adequate vs. inadequate). 
The results provided evidence of moderated mediation such that 
those in the treatment condition and who saw an inadequate disclo-
sure had higher IMI and this was negatively related to the product 
judgment index.  As before, the model is presented in Figure 1 and 
results are reported in Table 1.
In sum, we find that simply educating consumers about decep-
tive tactics may not be enough to elicit IMI, a necessary precursor to 
self-protection actions. Elaborating on marketer motives for using a 
given tactic is required for consumers to discern manipulative intent. 
It is unlikely that a consumer will engage System 2 every time they 
consider a marketing claim.  However, thinking about the marketer’s 
motives is is particularly important in those situations where con-
sumer risk is highest.  In such cases, engaging System 2 thinking is 
likely to be well worth the effort.
REFERENCES
Bolton, L. E., Bloom, P. N., & Cohen, J. B. (2011). Using Loan 
Plus Lender Literacy Information to Combat One-Sided 
Marketing of Debt Consolidation Loans. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 48, Special Issue, S51-S59.
Boush, D. M., Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (2009). Deception in the 
Marketplace:  The Psychology of Deceptive Persuasion and 
Consumer Self Protection. New York: Routledge.
Campbell, M. C. (1995). When Attention-Getting Advertising 
Tactics Elicit Consumer Inferences of Manipulative Intent: 
The Importance of Balancing Benefit and Investments. Journal 
of Consumer Psychology, 4, 225.
Cotte, J., Coulter, R. A., & Moore, M. (2005). Enhancing or 
Disrupting Guilt: The Role of Ad Credibility and Perceived 
Manipulative Intent. Journal of Business Research, 58, 361-
368.
Sagarin, B. J., Cialdini, R. B., Rice, W. E., & Serna, S. B. (2002). 
Dispelling the Illusion of Invulnerability:  The Motivations 
and Mechanisms of Resistance to Persuasion. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 526-541.
705 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
This Is Important (But Don’t Tell Me That): The Backfire Effect of Emphasizing Goal 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom and prior research suggest that when 
goals are more important, people will strive harder to reach them and 
increase self-control efforts (Trope and Fishbach 2000). However, 
might there be conditions under which emphasizing the importance 
of a goal may instead backfire, making people more likely to fail to 
reach the goal? We examine this possibility in the present research 
by examining the way in which individuals of varying levels of self-
control respond differently based on the perceived importance of a 
goal.
Prior studies indicate that consumers allocate more self-regu-
latory resources to achieving subjectively important goals (Carver, 
2004; Köpetz et al. 2011). Even when self-control resources are 
depleted, individuals have been shown to exert more self-control 
toward important goals than unimportant ones (Agrawal and Wan 
2009). Our findings support these assertions for individuals with high 
self-control who tend to experience less desire toward temptations 
that conflict with important goals and better regulate behaviors as a 
result. Conversely, emphasizing goal importance may backfire for 
individuals with chronically low self-control. We examine the key 
interaction between goal importance and self-control across three 
studies and provide initial evidence of the underlying process.
In study 1, participants completed a scenario that presented the 
opportunity to allocate money to a 401(k) retirement plan after start-
ing a new job. Participants chose to contribute up to $16,500. After 
several unrelated tasks, we measured general self-control using a 
short-form Tangney et al. (SC; 2004) scale. Then, we assessed the 
importance of one’s control over their spending on a 1 (not at all 
important) to 7 (very important) scale.
To test our hypothesis, we ran a regression using the SC in-
dex, importance ratings, and their interaction as predictors of 401(k) 
contribution. The interaction between SC and goal importance was 
significant (b = 1116.55, t = 2.69, p = .008). To better understand the 
interaction, we conducted a spotlight analysis (Aiken and West 1991) 
at 1 standard deviation above (i.e., high self-control) and below (i.e., 
low self-control) the SC mean. Those with high self-control contrib-
ute significantly more to the 401(k) plan (b = 1579.68, t = 2.63, p = 
.009) when they rate the importance of control over spending highly 
versus when importance is lower. Those low in self-control contrib-
ute less to 401(k) when controlled spending is important, but not 
significantly.
Study 2 followed a 2 (financial goal importance: high vs. low) × 
continuous self-control design. We manipulated importance of goals 
in the personal finance domain by asking participants to rank a set of 
goals from most (1) to least (5) important. “Managing one’s finances 
carefully” was included in both the low and high importance condi-
tions. The low importance condition diminished the importance of 
the finance domain by presenting it alongside items that pretested 
as highly important goals. The high importance condition grouped 
the financial goal with less important goals. Participants read a pro-
jective purchase scenario involving a self-control purchase decision 
(adapted from Dholakia et al. 2006 and Haws et al. 2012). Specifi-
cally, participants were asked to indicate the probability that they 
would purchase a jacket that would involve spending beyond one’s 
current means. Self-control was assessed using the Tangney et al. SC 
scale (2004). 
We ran an ANCOVA analysis on the likelihood to purchase the 
jacket, using the SC index, the importance condition, and the inter-
action of these two variables as predictors. The predicted interac-
tion between SC and the importance condition was significant (b = 
-10.57, t = -2.16, p = .032). A significant relationship between the SC 
× importance interaction and likelihood to purchase was found for 
those low in self-control (b = 14.12, t = 2.16, p = .033). These low 
self-control individuals were more likely to purchase the jacket when 
the finance goal was important. A spotlight on high self-control at 1 
SD above the SC mean was not significant (b = -6.2115, t = -0.948, 
NS). These findings provide further support for our hypothesis.
In study 3, we adapted the design of study 2 and tested experi-
enced desire as a potential mediator. Desire was measured by asking 
participants how much they would want to purchase the jacket if they 
were Ms. A following the purchasing scenario. We again used the 
likelihood to purchase the attractive jacket as our dependent variable 
and measured SC (Tangney et al. 2004). As in our results from study 
2, we found a significant interaction between the SC and the domain 
importance condition (b = -16.79, t = -2.87, p = .005) for the likeli-
hood of purchasing the jacket. The likelihood for people with high 
self-control to purchase the jacket drops consistently as self-control 
increases. At 1 SD above the mean for SC, high self-controllers are 
significantly less likely to purchase the jacket (b = -26.88, t = -2.93, 
p = .004).
The indirect effect of the interaction between importance × 
SC on likelihood to purchase through desire is entirely below zero 
for a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap interval (-16.19, -1.59). This in-
direct effect is driven by reduced desire among those high in self-
control when the goal is important (-24.83, -2.62). Increasing goal 
importance is mediated by desire experienced by people with high 
self-control, but the emphasis on importance of sound financial man-
agement fails to reduce desire toward temptation for those lower in 
self-control, as predicted.
Our findings advance the understanding of consumer goal-striv-
ing behavior. Trait self-control influences whether assigning high 
importance to a self-regulatory domain motivates or deters goal-
congruent choices. When a person struggles with a self-control goal, 
although it may seem intuitive to emphasize the importance of the 
goal, our research suggests that this can instead backfire for those 
low in self-control. Rather, people with low self-control may benefit 
from downplaying the importance of the goal domain. In marketing 
contexts, messages are often designed to increase the relative impor-
tance of long-term goals over short-term temptations. Since messag-
es are often targeted to those who struggle to exert self-control when 
faced with conflicts, it is critical to consider the potential backfire 
effect when highlighting goal importance.
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Table 1: Summary of Empirical Results
Panel A: Model Results (F-Values)
Dependent Variable Importance (I)
Self-control 
(SC) Gender I X SC
Study 1
401(k) Contribution 
Amount ($) 5.87* 7.29** — 7.21**
Percent of Income  
Saved (%) 3.26
+ 2.83+ — 4.32*
Study 2 Jacket Purchase  Likelihood (%) 5.23* 10.48** 5.60* 4.66**
Study 3 Jacket Purchase  Likelihood (%) 6.34* 1.71 8.30** 8.23**
Panel B: Unstandardized Betas For The Effect of Importance on  
Dependent Variables at Alternate Levels of Self-Control
Level of the Self-control Moderator (percentile)
Dependent Variable Very Low (10th)
Low 
(25th)
Moderate 
(50th)
High 
(75th)
Very High 
(90th)
Study 1
401(k) Contribution 
Amount ($) -1024.90
+ -337.79 349.32 1294.09* 1809.42**
Percent of Income  
Saved (%) -3.90 -0.79 2.33 6.62* 8.95*
Study 2 Jacket Purchase  Likelihood (%) 17.40* 11.70* 3.57 -2.93 -9.44
Study 3 Jacket Purchase  Likelihood (%) 15.34
+ 6.30 -9.21 -23.42** -33.75**
Panel C: Mediation Analysis in Study 3 — Indirect Effect of Importance (X) on  
Jacket Purchase Likelihood (Y) Through Desire (M) at Alternate Levels of Self-Control
Level of the Self-control Moderator (percentile)
Very Low 
(10th)
Low 
(25th)
Moderate 
(50th)
High 
(75th)
Very High
(90th)
Study 3
95% Bias-Corrected 
Bootstrap Confidence 
Interval
(-3.50, 
20.57)
(-5.57, 
13.22)
(-11.41, 
3.01)
(-21.73, 
-1.89)
(-31.02, 
-3.94)
Total Indirect Effect: 95% Bias-Corrected Bootstrap Confidence Interval (-16.21, -1.65)
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Too Tired to Choose It: Shifting Preference of To Do or To Have While Seeking Happiness
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Some people endeavor to attain happiness whatever they are 
doing. They might pursue happiness even while choosing a simple 
stuff. Can seeking happiness change individuals’ buying habits? 
Which products are people likely to pick while seeking happiness? 
And why?  
A recent study demonstrated that the pursuit of happiness is an 
act of self control that requires limited resources (Kim 2013). This 
generates an inquiry as to how people make choices while seeking 
happiness because making choices also requires the same resources 
(Vohs et al. 2008). The current study tested whether seeking hap-
piness would alter product preference (toward fluency preference). 
While there are numerous options, limited resources will make peo-
ple choose easier option requiring less energy. Acts demanding high 
(vs. low) level construal drain greater regulatory resources (Fujita et 
al. 2006), and construal levels indeed shift fluency effects (Alter and 
Oppenheimer 2008; Tsai and McGill 2011). Given that material (vs. 
experiential) items show more feasible and concrete (vs. abstract) at-
tributes, life experiences will be perceived as more difficult than ma-
terial possessions. Hence, we proposed that the pursuit of happiness 
would lead people to prefer materialistic (vs. experiential) items. 
Study 1 (N=546) examined the association between two traits 
(seeking happiness and materialism). Participants completed Ten-
dency to Seek Happiness (TSH) as a trait (Mauss et al. 2011), Brief 
Self Control (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004), and Material-
istic Values Scale (MVS; Richins 2004). TSH positively correlated 
with MVS (r = .41, p < .001). To directly examine the process, a me-
diation analysis was conducted. When MVS was regressed on both 
the TSH and resource depletion, the effect of TSH was reduced (β = 
.38, p < .001), whereas the effect of resource depletion remained sig-
nificant (β = .22, p < .001; Sobel z = = 3.02, p = .002). These results 
suggested that individuals who tend to seek happiness may prefer 
material possession due to resource depletion during the pursuit of 
happiness. 
Study 2 (N=56) tested whether people who tend to seek happi-
ness actually choose material (vs. experiential) items. After making 
hypothetical choices (e.g., bags vs. theater ticket and jean vs. iTunes 
card), participants reported actual desire to be happy, tiredness dur-
ing the choice task, and TSH. Participants who showed higher TSH 
reported that they actually tried to seek happiness (r = .50, p < .001), 
felt they were running out of more resources while making choices (r 
= .41, p = .002), and chose more material products (r = .29, p < .05).
Given that inducing the pursuit of happiness while making 
choices leads to resource depletion (Kim 2013), we predicted that an 
intention to be happy while making choices would also alter the mo-
mentary choice preferences. In Study 3, participants were assigned to 
either the experimental (instruction to choose items that will improve 
happiness) or the control condition (no instruction) and were asked to 
choose one (Target gift card vs. game pass, shoes vs. restaurant, and 
new electronics vs. resort). Participants in the experimental condition 
chose more material products (t(66) = -2.09, p < .05) than those in 
the control condition.
More intriguingly, people generally try to feel happy while do-
ing something (e.g., watching movie), and this impairs their subse-
quent self-control (Kim 2013). Hence, we predicted that ego deple-
tion derived from the previous acts of seeking happiness would alter 
one’s subsequent choices (i.e., carryover effect). Participants were 
assigned to either experimental (seeking happiness while watching 
movie) or control condition (being natural). More important, people 
often try to feel happier even if they are already happy or are enjoy-
ing pleasant experiences, and this also leads to ego depletion (Kim 
2013). Hence, we examined impacts of seeking happiness while 
watching pleasant movie (Mr. Bean) in Study 4b instead of the neu-
tral movie (Bridge construction) which was used in study 4a.
After conducting the film tasks, participants rated desire to be 
happy and tiredness during the film task. In study 4a, we asked par-
ticipants to choose at most two items among given items (e.g., cos-
metics, jewelry, reading books, and going to restaurant). To strength-
en our prediction, in Study 4b we additionally asked participants to 
choose at most two web-sites among given options (Amazon, Target.
com, Movieticket.com, and Expedia). 
Participants in the experimental condition reported more desires 
to be happy (Study 4a: t(151) = -3.01, p = .003; Study 4b: t(283) = 
-5.40, p < .001), greater ego depletion during the film task (Study 
4a: t(149) = -2.82, p = .005; Study 4b: t(278) = -3.27, p = .001), and 
higher materialistic preference (Study 4a: t(156) = -2.40, p < .05; 
Study 4b: t(283) = -2.47, p < .05) than those in the control condition. 
To directly examine the process, two sets of mediation analyses were 
conducted with ego depletion as the mediator. When materialistic 
preference was regressed on both seeking happiness and ego deple-
tion, the effect of seeking happiness was significantly reduced (Study 
4a: β = .13, t = 1.66, p > .05; Study 4b: β = .12, t = 1.95, p > .05), 
whereas the effect of ego depletion remained significant (Study 4a: β 
= .27, t = 3.36, p =.001; Sobel z = 2.25, p = .002; Study 4b: β = .16, 
t = 2.62, p = .009; Sobel z = 2.21, p = .03). These results show that 
individuals who seek happiness subsequently prefer material posses-
sions (vs. experiences) due to resource depletion during the pursuit 
of happiness. 
Ironically, the pursuit of happiness decreases happiness (Mauss 
et al. 2011). We attempted to explain why seeking happiness causes 
such negative consequences, by showing that ego depletion while 
seeking happiness led individuals to prefer materialistic posses-
sions. When seeking happiness impairs one’s limited resources (Kim 
2013), the pursuit of happiness may continuously cause materialis-
tic preferences. The current study sheds light on a potential vicious 
cycle involving seeking happiness, materialism, and less well-being. 
Although life experiences improve one’s happiness than do material 
possessions (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003), individuals are likely 
to pick easier one (material item) while pursuing happiness, but this 
will ultimately ruin their happiness. 
REFERENCES
Alter, Adam L, and Daniel M Oppenheimer (2008), “Effects of 
Fluency on Psychological Distance and Mental Construal (Or 
Why New York Is A Large City, But New York Is A Civilized 
Jungle),” Psychological science, 19 (2), 161–167.
Fujita, Kentaro, Yaacov Trope, Nira Liberman, and Maya Levin-
Sagi (2006), “Construal Levels and Self-Control.,” Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 90 (3), 351-367.
Kim, Aekyoung (2013), “Happiness Exhausts Me: Seeking 
Happiness Impairs Limited Resources and Self-Control,” 
Unpublished Manuscript, San Francisco State University.
708 / Too Tired to Choose It: Shifting Preference of To Do or To Have While Seeking Happiness
Mauss, Iris B., Maya Tamir, Craig L. Anderson, and Nicole 
S. Savino (2011), “Can Seeking Happiness Make People 
Unhappy? Paradoxical Effects of Valuing Happiness,” 
Emotion, 11 (4), 807-815.
Richins, Marsha L. (2004), “The Material Values Scale: 
Measurement Properties and Development of a Short Form,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 31(1), 209-19.
Tangney, June. P., Roy F. Baumeister, & Angie Luzio Boone 
(2004), “High Self-Control Predicts Good Adjustment, Less 
Pathology, Better Grades, And Interpersonal Success,” Journal 
of Personality, 72, 271-322.
Tsai, Claire I. and Ann L. McGill (2011), “No Pain, No Gain? How 
Fluency and Construal Level Affect Consumer Confidence,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, (37) 5, 807-821.
Van Boven, Leaf, and Thomas Gilovich (2003), “To Do or To 
Have? That Is the Question,” Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 85 (6), 1193-202.
Vohs, Kathleen D., Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, 
Jean M. Twenge, Noelle M. Nelson, and Dianne M. Tice 
(2008), “Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: 
A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-
Regulation, and Active Initiative,” Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 94 (5), 883-898.
709 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
The Role of Power Distance in Influencing Non-Loyalty Status Customers’ Satisfaction
Jessie J. Wang, Indiana University, USA
Ashok K. Lalwani, Indiana University, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Loyalty programs are increasingly being preferred by busi-
nesses as a tool to increase customer retention (Dreze and Nunes 
2009). We explore how power distance belief – the extent to which 
hierarchy and inequality is prevalent in society – influences non-loy-
alty-status consumers’ satisfaction with businesses that offer loyalty 
programs (Hofstede 1980, 2001).
Current conceptualizations of power distance suggest that, be-
cause they expect and observe inequalities, non-loyalty status con-
sumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts would be more 
tolerant of preferential treatment given to loyalty status consumers. 
Hence, they should be less dissatisfied when loyalty-status consum-
ers receive priority. Contrary to this hypothesis, we suggest that in 
high (vs. low) power distance contexts, people low in the social hi-
erarchy dislike being at the low end of the rung, and desire equality. 
Hence, they are more dissatisfied with businesses giving preferential 
treatment to loyalty-status consumers (H1).
Although research has not directly explored the link between 
power distance and desire for equality, some limited research points 
to the relationship. Based on a study of 116,000 respondents from 
over 50 countries, Hofstede (2001) suggested that inequality is rarely 
considered desirable and especially so in high power distance con-
texts. Similarly, Carl et al. (2004) found a negative correlation be-
tween the level of inequality in a country (which they referred to 
as power distance-in-practice) and its citizens’ desire for hierarchy 
(which they referred to as power distance-values). Accordingly, we 
propose and find that because consumers in high (vs. low) power 
distance contexts have a stronger desire for equality, the inequality of 
loyalty programs affects consumers in high (vs. low) power distance 
contexts more negatively. In brief: non-loyalty-status consumers’ de-
sire for equality mediates power distance’s effects on their satisfac-
tion with businesses that offer loyalty programs (H2).
Furthermore, we identify boundary conditions that strengthen 
our conceptualization and moderate the effects of power distance on 
non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction. First, when non-loyalty-
status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts are in-
formed that loyalty-status consumers are older, they become more 
satisfied with businesses that give preferential treatment to such el-
derly consumers. People in high (vs. low) power distance contexts 
believe that the elderly – who are considered to be less powerful 
– need to be uplifted  from their current state to attain the objective 
of equality (i.e., non-loyalty status consumers in high power distance 
contexts desire equality for the elderly, as opposed to themselves). 
Hence, we propose: when the old age of loyalty-status consumers is 
highlighted, non-status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance 
contexts are more satisfied with businesses (H3).
Second, when non-loyalty-status consumers perceive loyalty-
status consumers to be wealthier, power distance does not influence 
their satisfaction with businesses offering loyalty programs. We pro-
pose that when loyalty-status consumers’ wealth is highlighted, non-
loyalty-status consumers in high power distance contexts believe that 
they cannot match status consumers. Hence, their desire for equality 
is mitigated, and their dissatisfaction is reduced. In brief, we pro-
pose: highlighting loyalty-status consumers’ wealth attenuates high 
(vs. low) power distance non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction 
with businesses that offer loyalty programs (H4).
A multi-method approach was used to establish reliability and 
generalizability across four studies. In study 1, a regression analy-
sis revealed a significant effect of non-loyalty-status participants’ 
power distance (ß = -.36, t(55) = -2.82, p < .008) on their satisfac-
tion with businesses that give preferential treatment to loyalty-status 
consumers, supporting H1. In study 2, we again found a significant 
negative effect of power distance on non-loyalty-status consumers’ 
satisfaction (β = -.18, t(136) = -.43, p < .04). We also found that non-
loyalty-status consumers’ power distance has a significant positive 
effect on their desire for equality (β = .37, t(136) = 4.63, p < .001). 
Non-loyalty-status consumers’ desire for equality has a significant 
negative effect on their satisfaction (β = .23, t(136) = -.31, p < .007). 
When both power distance and desire for equality are included as 
the independent variables, non-loyalty-status consumers’ desire for 
equality has a significant negative effect on satisfaction and power 
distance has a non-significant effect on satisfaction. The four regres-
sion analyses together suggest that desire for equality fully mediates 
the effect of power distance on consumers’ satisfaction with the busi-
ness (Baron and Kenny 1986). 
In study 3, we highlighted (vs. not) the old age of loyalty-status 
consumers and found evidence for a reversal effect. A regression re-
vealed a significant interaction between power distance and old age 
highlighted (vs. not highlighted) (ß = .346, t(72) = 3.13, p < .004). In 
the old age not highlighted condition, non-status consumers in high 
(vs. low) power distance contexts were less satisfied with the busi-
ness (Mhigh = 3.73, Mlow = 5.28; F(1,31) = 2.32; p < 0.03); however, in 
the old-age-highlighted condition, they were more satisfied (Mhigh = 
4.94, Mlow = 3.77; F(1,41) = -2.08; p < 0.05), supporting H3.
Study 4 examined the moderating role of highlighting loyalty-
status consumers’ wealth. A regression revealed a significant interac-
tion between power distance and loyalty-status consumers’ wealth 
highlighted (vs. control) (ß = .44, t(41) = 2.73, p < .01). In the con-
trol condition, power distance was negatively associated with par-
ticipants’ satisfaction with the office supply company (r = -.46, p < 
.03); this association was non-significant in the wealth-highlighted 
condition (r = .32, p > .15). These results support H4. 
These findings support our framework and suggest that loyalty 
programs have a stronger negative effect on high (vs. low) power 
distance non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction. Further, high 
(vs. low) power distance consumers’ desire for equality mediates the 
effect. Finally, we have provided support for two moderators for the 
relationship.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A prominent narrative in contemporary consumer culture is one 
in which “category killer” brands like Amazon, Starbucks, Home 
Depot, and Wal-Mart are forcing mom and pop independent book-
stores, coffee shops, hardware stores, and retailers out of business. 
The narrative tells us that consumers are switching their loyalties 
from independently owned and operated businesses to big box retail-
ers (Hosein and Hughes 2006; Spector 2005). However, recent anec-
dotal evidence suggests this narrative misses part of the story. For ex-
ample, when Coldstone Creamery, a national chain, moved in across 
the street from independently-owned J.P. Licks ice cream in Newton, 
Massachusetts, consumers rallied around J.P. Licks and drove Cold-
stone out of town. When Starbucks moved in next door to Los Ange-
les’s Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, sales at the local café ironically went 
up. This activity suggests that consumers may be willing express 
their political will in the marketplace and protect small, independent 
brands from aggressive competition. In this article, we explore the 
effect of competitive framing, positioning brands in competition with 
one another, and show that small brands can paradoxically benefit 
from having a large competitor. Unlike prior research that focuses on 
the dyadic relationship between a consumer and a brand, we provide 
a networked understanding of how consumers assess brands not in 
isolation, but as part of a competitive system. We explore the effects 
of competition and show how changing the competitive framing of 
the marketplace positively and negatively affects consumers’ sup-
port for the brands within it. Our results show that consumers’ brand 
evaluations are not dependent only on dyadic interactions between 
a consumer and a firm, but rather are also influenced by the web of 
competitive relationships within which the brand is entangled. Our 
results highlight how brands, both big and small, can frame a com-
petitive context to increase purchase interest, real choice, and dollars 
spent in the marketplace. 
Consumers have long utilized their purchasing power to ex-
press their views and make a difference in the marketplace (Miche-
letti 2003). Consumers today are using their consumption to exer-
cise their citizenship, to express their values and to look behind the 
products they are purchasing to understand their effects on people, 
small businesses, and the environment. Across categories, consumers 
indicate that they are increasingly willing to pay more for products 
and services that support ideas that are important to them (Tan 2007). 
We define this behavior as politicized consumption, consumption that 
has a political character or meaning beyond the economic exchange, 
in which, through one’s purchasing, one can express personal views, 
opinions, values, and political positions to participate in enacting so-
cial change (Micheletti 2003; Micheletti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2006). 
Consumers experience a sense of enchantment from politicized con-
sumption (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007), indicating that po-
liticized consumption has important meaning to consumers.  
In our experiments, we examine how framing brands of differ-
ing sizes in competition politicizes the consumption situation and 
gives the purchase political meaning. Political meanings in this cat-
egory are concerned with anti-globalization, the loss of independent 
storefronts, unfair business practices, and the loss of competition 
due to category-killers. For example, one respondent said, “I bought 
lunch at a small restaurant in a small town in Minnesota to help the 
economy there rather than hit up the Wendy’s down the road,” sug-
gesting their support of a small, local business, while another respon-
dent said, “I buy Pabst Blue Ribbon because it stands against bland, 
mega corporation beers.” 
Unlike previous research that largely focuses on the dyadic rela-
tionship between a consumer and a brand (Aggarwal 2004; Fournier 
1998), or the communal effects of networked consumers (McAlexan-
der, Schouten, and Koening 2002; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), in this 
article, we explore a networked understanding of brands by observ-
ing how consumers assess and relate to brands not in isolation, but 
as part of a market competitive system. We predict that consumers’ 
evaluations of and purchase interest in brands are not dependent only 
on the dyadic interactions between a consumer and a firm, but rather, 
that they are also influenced by the web of competitive relationships 
within which the brand is entangled. Work on separate versus joint 
evaluations (Hsee et al. 1999) provides support for our theory that 
consumers’ preferences for brands may shift depending on their per-
ception of the competitive context. People justify their decision when 
products are assessed together versus when they are assessed alone, 
inserting social approval into the decision calculus (Curley, Yates, 
and Abrams 1986; Tetlock 1985), making consumers more likely 
to choose in a manner consistent with societal or peer expectations, 
than a more self-interested one.  
Our theory and empirical findings demonstrate the importance 
of considering consumers’ perceptions of the brand’s competitive 
context and competitive behavior. Brands, both big and small, can 
use the framing the game effect to motivate or mute political con-
sumption. We offer positioning advice for both small and large firms 
for either highlighting or downplaying competitive aspects of their 
industry and strategy. We illuminate how small brands can benefit 
from the real or perceived presence of a large competitor and how big 
brands can suffer when they are perceived as being too aggressive in 
competitive arenas. Our theory shows that small, independent brands 
should highlight their competitive context and encourage consumers 
to reframe consumption as a political, rather than an economic act. 
Large, corporate brands should avoid invoking competition narra-
tives, especially when they are competing against small, independent 
brands. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Branding research and practice offer two contrasting perspec-
tives on how much control managers have over brand meaning 
(Allen, Fournier, & Miller, 2008). The most established tradition 
positions the brand manager as the main responsible for selecting, 
implementing, and controlling meaning (Park, Jaworski, & Macln-
nis, 1986). The direction of causality is defined as being from the 
brand manager who crafts and communicates the brand to consumers 
who, as larger or smaller collectives (segments), receive and evalu-
ate the brand. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that the 
meaning of a brand is shared by consumers: consumers may vary 
in terms of how favorable a particular brand association is, but they 
generally agree on the associations they link to a brand name. BMW 
is “styling and driving performance,” Volvo is “safety,” and Coke is 
“Americana and refreshment” (Keller, 2003, p. 87). The ideal case is 
indeed the brand with a single meaning across segments and markets 
(Aaker, 1996, p. 104). 
This understanding of brand perception as generally consensual 
can be contrasted with a point of view that positions consumers as 
co-creators of meaning (Allen et al., 2008; Thompson, 1997). From 
this perspective, brands do not belong to managers; they are contex-
tualized in the broader fabric of consumer culture in which consum-
ers, brand managers and other agents negotiate and reinterpret brand 
meanings (Arnould & Thompson, 2005). Rather than mere receiv-
ers, consumers actively make sense of branded communications by 
selecting legitimate interpretations that facilitate their life pursuits 
(Mick & Buhl, 1992). A core assumption of this co-creative approach 
is that brands are essentially multivocal: consumers diverge signifi-
cantly in the meanings they ascribe to brands as their personal and 
social contexts vary. 
The core question that arises from contrasting these two per-
spectives is whether consumers predominantly agree or disagree on 
what a brand means to them. The present study addresses this is-
sue by (1) proposing the construct of brand consensus and concep-
tualizing brand multivocality in terms of consumer and relationship 
effects, in line with the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994); (2) 
measuring the relative strength of these effects; and (3) showing that 
these effects vary in meaningful ways according to characteristics of 
brands, consumers, and consumer-brand relationships.
The Social Relations Model defines interpersonal perception as 
a dyadic process in which meaning is derived from three indepen-
dent sources: the perceiver, the target, and the interaction between 
perceiver and target. For instance, if Mary is asked about how sincere 
her friend Jane is, her answer will be a function of Mary as perceiver 
(i.e., the extent to which she thinks that people in general are sin-
cere), Jane as target of perception (i.e., the extent to which people 
in general tend to see Jane as sincere), and the specific relationship 
Mary has with Jane (e.g., because they are friends, Jane tends to be 
more sincere with Mary than with other people). Following this con-
ceptualization, we define brand consensus as the variance in brand 
effect, which is the degree to which a brand tends to be perceived 
similarly by all consumers, and decompose brand multivocality into 
consumer and relationship effects. Consumer effect relates to the 
extent to which a consumer perceives all brands similarly, and rela-
tionship effect is the unique perception of a consumer about a given 
brand (i.e., the brand x consumer interaction). 
We report two studies with the same general procedure: par-
ticipants are asked to fill out a survey about how they perceive 
themselves, and then, after an unrelated task, they rate a series of 
10 brands on brand personality (Aaker, 1997) and Self-Brand Con-
nection (Escalas & Bettman, 2005) items. The difference between 
studies is the specific brands being rated: study 1 (n = 99) includes 
5 familiar and 5 non-familiar sports brands, and study 2 (n = 133) 
includes 5 publicly consumed and 5 privately consumed brands. The 
analytical approach was based on three-way random effects ANOVA 
(brand x consumer x measure), which allows us to separate the effect 
of the brand x consumer interaction (i.e., relationship effects) from 
measurement error. Tests of equality of variances were conducted 
to provide statistical significance tests for the hypotheses proposed.
Our findings across 20 brands in different product categories in-
dicate that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, consumers disagree more 
than agree on how they perceive brands. Both relationship variance 
and consumer variance were higher than brand variance in both stud-
ies. Specific hypotheses about the sources of brand, relationship, and 
consumer effects are also tested and show the theoretical significance 
of these effects. We conclude with implications for the brand man-
ager on how to embrace brand multivocality.
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The Freedom Bias: Empirical Evidence for a Neglected Tariff-Choice Anomaly
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Due to an increasing convergence in quality, providers of elec-
tronic services (e.g., telecommunication and internet services) are 
relatively limited in their possibilities to differentiate from each 
other. Therefore, competition in these branches is mainly influenced 
by the providers’ pricing policy in terms of tariff structures. Tradi-
tionally, the offered tariffs differ with regard to the specifications of 
monthly fixed fee, variable usage price per unit, and included month-
ly volume. However, during the last years, providers have increas-
ingly offered menus of tariff options with varying contract durations. 
As these tariffs usually provide discounts depending on the length of 
commitment, individuals – when tempting to maximize consumer 
surplus – have not only to account for their monthly usage but also 
for the expected usage period to minimize their total costs and make 
a rational tariff choice. Nevertheless, research on tariff-choice anom-
alies indicates that people often fail to correctly estimate their usage 
patterns with the result of a less than optimal choice (e.g., Kling and 
Van der Ploeg 1990; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Train, McFadden, 
and Ben-Akiva 1987). Despite the wide range of findings regarding 
existence, causes, and consequences of biased choices in favor of 
flat-rate or pay-per-use tariffs, research on possible additional tariff-
choice biases lacks. Thus, the purpose of this research is to introduce 
a novel bias in the tariff choice context, namely the freedom bias, 
which is observable if people prefer a short-term contract although 
they would be better off choosing a long-term agreement. 
Several theoretical explanations exist for why individuals might 
choose short-term contracts over long-term commitments. First, the 
prospect theory’s value function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) im-
plies that segregation of multiple gains results in a higher perceived 
value than integration, whereas multiple losses loom larger in case 
of segregation than in case of integration (Thaler 1985). Transferring 
these principles to the tariff structure context, we assume that the 
losses of a short-term contract in terms of monthly costs are charac-
terized by a higher amount per month over a shorter period, and con-
sequently follow the idea of integration, whereas the costs of a long-
term contract that are characterized by a lower amount per month 
over a longer period approach the segregation concept. As segrega-
tion of multiple losses result in higher perceived costs than integra-
tion, the choice of a short-term tariff over a long-term tariff should 
become more likely. Second, regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomes and 
Sugden 1982) assumes not only that decision makers regret a bad 
choice in hindsight, but also that the possibility of regret can be an-
ticipated in the decision making process (e.g.,  Zeelenberg 1999). As 
regret is determined by reversibility of decisions (Zeelenberg et al. 
1996), it should be less likely to occur with a short-term agreement 
as compared to long-term contracts, as customers can alter or end 
contracts sooner. Third, contract length represents switching costs in 
terms of legal barriers (Burnham, Frels, and Mahajan 2003). Previ-
ous research highlights that it is often difficult to anticipate future 
consequences (e.g., satisfaction) of present decisions (Kahneman 
and Snell 1992; March 1978). The choice of a short-term contract 
curtails these switching costs, as individuals can switch sooner with 
a short-term contract than with a long-term contract. This might be 
an additional reason for a preferable short commitment.
Two experimental studies systematically verify the existence 
of the proposed freedom bias. Specifically, experiment 1 (N = 163) 
examines the necessary condition for the proposed bias that differ-
ent contract durations provide different levels of utility by means of 
a choice-based conjoint analysis analyzing respondents’ preferences 
for mobile phone tariffs. Participants were asked to imagine that their 
current contract with their service provider had expired and, thus, 
they had to choose a new mobile phone tariff. Participants then were 
confronted with ten random choice sets. We varied the three typical 
attributes of monthly fixed fee (five levels), variable usage price per 
minute/text message (four levels), and contract duration (five levels) 
for stimuli construction. We used the multinomial logit model for the 
estimation of respondents’ tariff preferences (McFadden 1974) and 
estimated part-worth utilities of tariff characteristics at the individual 
level using a Hierarchical Bayes procedure (Moore 2004; Lenk et al. 
1996). The results of the coefficient estimation appear in table 1. This 
study’s findings indicate that the part-worth utilities of all contract 
durations significantly differ providing a first evidence of the pos-
sible existence of the freedom bias. 
Table 1: Estimated Part-Worth Utilities
Mean 
part-worth 
utilities
Differences 
in part-
worth 
utilities
Significance 
of 
differences
Attributes and attribute 
levels βi βi - βi+1 t-value
Monthly fixed fee
1. €5.00 4.65
2. €7.50 2.00 2.66 18.45***
3. €10.00 .31 1.68 14.78***
4. €12.50 - 2.59 2.90 25.98***
5. €15.00 - 4.37 1.79 22.37***
Variable usage price per 
unit
1. 5 cents 2.66
2. 10 cents 1.03 1.64 13.52***
3. 15 cents - 1.06 2.08 16,95***
4. 20 cents - 2.63 1.58 15.79***
Contract duration
1. Monthly callable 2.48
2. After 6 months 
callable 1.30 1.18 9.25***
3. After 12 months 
callable -0.08 1.38 18.40***
4. After 18 months 
callable -1.30 1.23 11.93***
5. After 24 months 
callable -2.40 1.09 16.81***
Note: ***p < .01
Building on this result, experiment 2 (N = 106) provides ad-
ditional support for the existence of the proposed bias. This survey 
was designed as a 2 (total costs of the short-term tariff) × 4 (contract 
duration of the short-term tariff) study. The study scenarios asked 
participants to imagine that they planned to spend a semester abroad 
in 18 months. Participants then were told that their current mobile 
phone contract had expired and they had to choose a new tariff. Here-
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upon, they were confronted with the choice between a short-term 
tariff (with varying contract durations ranging from monthly callable 
to after 18 months callable) and a long-term tariff (with a constant 
duration of 24 months). To keep the choice tasks as simple as pos-
sible, we used flat-rate tariffs including calling and text messaging 
which only differed regarding contract duration and monthly fixed 
fee. This study’s findings confirm that when contract durations of 
offered tariff options diverge greatly, people significantly preferred 
short-term tariffs over long-term tariffs although total costs were 
equal or even higher. However, this biased tariff choice disappears 
and even reverts if contract durations of tariff options converge.
These findings supply important implications for a more effi-
cient tariff pricing in business practices. Due to the customers’ pref-
erence for short provider commitments offering higher priced tariff 
options with short contract durations entails the promising benefit 
that profits can be realized earlier. Moreover, although these tariffs 
might reduce switching costs, the risk of customer churn is still lim-
ited. Customers often prefer reversibility of choices without exercis-
ing this option in the future (Gilbert and Ebert 2002). Hence, this 
enables providers to skim the customers’ higher willingness-to-pay 
for short-term contracts.
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Loneliness and Moral Judgment Does Loneliness Make Moral Judgment More 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that social connections are central facets of 
daily social life, and loneliness influences most people’s quality of 
life, relatively little empirical attention has been devoted to the un-
derstanding of how feeling lonely impacts people’s moral judgment. 
Some people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s 
life in order to save several other lives. Some people think whether 
or not someone suffers emotionally has nothing to do with their judg-
ments of right and wrong. What explains the differences in moral 
judgment? Will lonely people make moral judgment more permis-
sible? In consumer research, it has been shown that socially excluded 
people are more likely to sacrifice their financial well-being for the 
sake of social inclusion, and more willing to try an illegal drug (Bau-
meister et al. 2008). From an evolutionary perspective, lonely people 
feel unsafe and tend to be more defensive and sensitive to threats and 
rejection (Cacioppo et al. 2006; Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Ernst 
and Cacioppo 2000; Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010).
However, it is still unclear how loneliness influences moral 
judgment. The purpose of this study is to advance our understanding 
on loneliness and moral judgment, where we refer loneliness as the 
subjective feeling of social isolation (Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010) 
Louise C. and John T. Cacioppo, Loneliness matters: a theoretical 
and empirical review of consequences and mechanisms, Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine, Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 218-227, 40 
(2), 2010, 0883-6612. Because lonely people are more sensitive to 
threats and attacks, see the world as a more threatening place, expect 
more negative consequences from social interaction, have less trust 
in social interaction, and remember more negative events and feeling 
than non-lonely people. It becomes more interesting to test whether 
or not lonely people have the similar moral judgments as non-lonely 
people. Do lonely people see moral judgment differently than normal 
people? Do they have different dimensions of moral judgment? We 
addressed those questions in four studies, and the result showed that 
feeling lonely makes moral judgment more permissible.
We define loneliness as a complex set of feelings that occurs 
when intimate and social needs are not adequately met and that 
“drives” individuals to seek the fulfillment of these needs (Russell, 
Peplau, and Cutrona 1980). Lonely people have a lower evaluation 
of self, a lower self-esteem, a lower lack of trust in others and self, 
and they usually feel less control over success and failure; lonely 
people generally feel less happy than non-lonely people (Cacioppo 
et al. 2006; Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Ernst and Cacioppo 2000; 
Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010; Wang, Zhu, and Shiv ; Wang, Zhu, and 
Shiv 2012). Haidt’s social intuitionist approach suggests that moral 
judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (in-
tuitions)(Haidt 2001). We propose, in line with research on Cacioppo 
(2006)’s evolutionary model and Haidt (2001)’s social intuitionist 
approach, that because of increased negative emotions and defensive 
behaviors, feeling lonely decreases the severity of moral judgment. 
Specifically, feeling lonely increases the likelihood to choose a utili-
tarian choice in moral scenarios.
Hypothesis 1: Feeling lonely decreases the severity of moral 
judgment. 
Empathy is critically important for subjective well-being be-
cause it promotes the maintenance of quality relationships and pro-
social behaviors (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Batson 1991; Eisenberg 
and Miller 1990). Previous studies have suggested that empathy in 
general, and most often emotional empathy, is associated with pro-
social behavior (Batson 1991; Batson et al. 2002; Warden and Mack-
innon 2003). Poor empathy could also lead to decreases in personal 
well-being as a consequence of isolation and feelings of loneliness. 
We expect to see that the positive side of emotional empathy, em-
pathetic concern, mediates the relationship between loneliness and 
moral judgment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that feelings of lone-
liness will increase the utilitarian choices than non-lonely people. 
Furthermore, feeling lonely will also decrease moral standards by 
reducing empathic concern for others. 
Hypothesis 2: Empathetic concern mediates the effects of lone-
liness on moral judgment. Specifically, feeling 
lonely will increase the utilitarian choices than 
feeling non-lonely. Furthermore, feeling lonely 
will also decrease moral standards by reducing 
empathic concern for others.
This paper examines how consumer moral judgment making 
is influenced by the feeling of loneliness. Four studies demonstrate 
that lonely people are more likely than non-lonely people to make a 
moral utilitarian choice (study 1 and study 2)(Greene 2007; Greene 
2009; Greene et al. 2008); and lonely people rate five dimensions 
of moral foundations (harm, fairness, in-group, authority and purity) 
(Haidt 2001) less relevant to their judgment than do non-lonely peo-
ple (studies 3 and 4). Finally, we examined whether lack of empathic 
concern causes lonely people to make a different moral judgments 
than non-lonely people. Our mediation analysis shows that feeling 
lonely leads to reduced empathic concern. People with reduced em-
pathic concern are more likely to choose utilitarian choices in moral 
judgment, and they are more likely to rate the moral foundation judg-
ment as less relevant to their moral judgment than non-lonely people 
(studies 2 and 4). 
The findings are consistent with the previous consumer research 
on loneliness, suggesting that lonely people are less empathetic than 
non-lonely people are. We extend this work by demonstrating that 
lonely people make different moral judgment decisions compared to 
non-lonely people. Lonely people have a desire for connection, and 
at the same time, they are very sensitive to threats and rejections. 
Lonely people have a desire to feel connected, because a social group 
provides both psychological and physical safety (Baumeister and 
Leary 1995). Previous research demonstrated that socially excluded 
people are more likely to sacrifice their personal and financial well-
being for the sake of social inclusion. For example, socially excluded 
people reported more willing to try an illegal drug than non-excluded 
people (Mead et al. 2011). Maybe it is the desire for connection that 
leads lonely people to choose more utilitarian choices than non-lone-
ly people. 
This paper also highlights the importance of the positive emo-
tion, empathy, in influencing moral judgment. Social psychology and 
neuropsychological studies have shown the importance of emotions 
in moral behaviors. Social psychology studies have shown that psy-
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chopaths usually violate moral behaviors even when they know it is 
not right. Because of lack of emotions, psychopaths can steal from 
their friends, dismember live animals, cheat on their partners, and 
even murder their significant others to collect insurance benefits, 
without showing any trace of remorse or  shame (Cleckley 1982; 
Haidt 2001). 
Figure 1: (Submarine Scenario): Percentage of people chose 
utilitairan vs . non-utilirian choice by loneliness 
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Figure 2: Loneliness and Moral Foundations (N=206)
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Table 1: Means of Five Dimensions of  
Moral Foundations on Loneliness score
Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity
Lonely 4.29 4.22 4.09 3.63 4.05
Non-
Lonely 4.57 4.44 4.39 3.9 4.22
P-value <.0057 <.057 <.003 <.026 =0.121
Note. Lonely people versus non-lonely people on five dimen-
sions of moral foundations. It is measured by using 30 items Moral 
Foundation Questions. Each dimension has four questions, with 
lower number means not at all relevant to my moral judgment; and 
higher number means extremely relevant to my moral judgment. 
Loneliness is measured by using 20 items UCLA loneliness score, 
with lower number means non-lonely, higher number means lonely. 
Media Split of loneliness score.  The lonelier the participant, the less 
relevant they rated those moral foundations, especially for the first 
four dimensions. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Altruism can be loosely defined as “a willingness to act in the 
consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of 
ulterior motives” (Nagel 1970, p79). The opposite of altruism is 
egoism, that is, when the ultimate goal of people’s behaviors is to 
improve one’s own welfare. The egoistic motive and the altruistic 
motive have usually been pitched against each other as two compet-
ing motives, especially in the debate about whether many seemingly 
altruistic behaviors are actually driven by ulterior motives to serve 
egoistic purposes (see Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Versterlund 2008 for 
review). 
Some recent novel empirical findings suggest the relationship 
between egoistic and altruistic motives can be more complex than 
presumed, especially when the two motives are juxtaposed. Feiler, 
Tost and Grant (2012), for example, found that people donate less 
when the potential to benefit others and oneself were both empha-
sized in a donation request, than when only one potential benefit was 
emphasized. Andreoni, Rao & Trachtman (2011) found that when 
Salvation Army solicitors standing at different entrances of a shop-
ping mall explicitly asked each customer for donation, total dona-
tion increased by a large margin, but more people avoided the asking 
solicitors by entering and exiting from alternative entrances. These 
line of findings seem to suggest that altruistic and egoistic seeming 
behaviors may arise in the same setting, in different forms. 
Another recent line of research suggests an overlooked moti-
vational role of helping others. For example, simply focusing on the 
pro-social consequences of one’s creative work could increase work-
er’s creativity (Grant & Berry 2011), and the potential to help oth-
ers buffers one from emotional exhaustion caused by negative tasks 
(Grant & Sonnentag 2010). Moreover, under some circumstances, 
people become happier spending money on others than spending 
money on themselves (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton 2010). These find-
ings suggest that the comparison between motivation to help others 
and motivation to benefit oneself could be potentially more complex 
than current research demonstrates. 
In this paper, we propose an asymmetry between choices and 
motivation, such that even when people are more motivated to per-
form on a task when the incentive benefits others rather than them-
selves, they may nevertheless prefer benefits to go to themselves 
rather than to benefit others.  Specifically, if research participants 
are given the opportunity to work on a laborious task in return for 
a low payment, we predict that participants will work harder on the 
task if the payment directly goes to a charity, than if they could keep 
the payment, or than if they can choose whether to keep the payment 
or donate it to the charity. Moreover, we predict that when given a 
choice between keeping the payment and donating it to a charity, 
most participants would keep the money for themselves. 
The effects hypothesized above reflect “altruism” in behavior, 
and “egoism” in choice. We argue that these seemingly contradic-
tory effects will occur because the motivation to increase one’s own 
welfare and the motivation to improve others’ welfare are leveraged 
differently under different situations. However, a direct choice may 
highlight the difference between the two options and eliminate altru-
istic motivation. 
In Study 1 (N=168), we described a local charity to all partici-
pants who came to the lab, and informed them that they could do-
nate any amount of their earning from the lab to the charity, at any 
time, by letting the experimenter know. Then participants worked on 
a simple task: sorting out the pennies from a big bowl of about 1000 
mixed foreign coins. We randomly assigned participants into one of 
three conditions. In the self condition, we told them they could keep 
the pennies they found; in the charity condition, we told them all of 
the sorted pennies would be donated to the charity introduced earlier; 
and in the control condition, we did not give them incentives to sort 
the pennies. In all conditions, participants were told that 50 pennies 
were buried in the bowl, left over from a previous study, and that if 
no one sorted out the pennies, they would all be wasted. The results 
revealed a stark contrast between participants’ performance and their 
choices. Participants in both the self and charity conditions outper-
formed those in the control condition (F(2, 165) = 15.2, p<.001). 
Moreover, participants in the charity condition found more pennies 
than those in the self condition (MCharity= 27.5, SD= 11.4, MSelf= 21.8, 
SD =10.1; contrast analysis t = 3.037, p<.01). In contrast, only one 
participant in the self condition opted to donate the pennies to the 
charity. We replicated these results in Study 2 (N=111) with different 
stimuli (a hole-punching task). 
In study 3 (N=163), we assigned participants into four condi-
tions: charity only, self only, choice first and choice last. Participants 
could earn money based on the number of steps taken on a stepping 
machine in 5 minutes. In the charity condition, participants’ earn-
ings from the stepping task would be donated to the charity. In the 
self condition, participants could keep all their earnings and were not 
aware of the charity. In the choice conditions, participants learned 
about both options and were asked to make a choice either before or 
after the task. As in the first two studies, when they were not given 
a choice, participants worked harder for the charity project than for 
themselves (Mcharity=298, SD=72.8, Mself=251, SD= 104.4, t=2.32, 
p<.05). Participants in the charity condition also outperformed those 
in the choice conditions, regardless of their choices (M
choice-first
= 261, 
SD= 85.4, Mchoice-last=268, SD= 72.7, t=-2.26, p<.05), indicating al-
truistic behavior. However, when a choice was given between self-
interest and other’s welfare, only 20% chose to donate in the choice 
first condition, and 24.4% chose to donate in the choice last condi-
tion, indicating egoistic choices. Implications and excluded alterna-
tive explanations will be discussed. 
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What Makes a Luxury Brand: The Effect of Competence and Warmth Cues on Luxury 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Luxury, a concept once used to delineate class-oriented ex-
clusivity, appears to becoming increasingly popular and prevalent 
among today’s mass market consumers. Not only has the size of the 
global luxury market grown exponentially to approximately 1 trillion 
dollars, but consumers are joining the world of luxury consumption 
from mature and emerging markets alike (BCG report 2010). 
Given the large footprint of luxury products and services, an im-
portant challenge for marketers is to better understand the anteced-
ents of a brand being perceived to be a luxury. The current research 
explores whether and how luxury perception can be influenced by 
cues of competence and warmth. While warmth is an assessment of 
others’ intentions towards the self, competence captures others’ abil-
ity to carry out intentions towards the self (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Applying this framework to 
branding, Aaker, Garbinsky, and Vohs (2012) found that while being 
judged high on either competence or warmth contributes to purchase 
intention for a brand, being judged high on both warmth and compe-
tence gives brands an extra boost in purchase intention, which they 
termed the “golden quadrant”. However, in many situations, a brand 
might have the bandwidth to only advertise or represent itself as ei-
ther competent or warm. The present research asks how each of these 
factors independently contributes to the luxury perception for brands. 
Based on prior literature, we propose that just as competence 
cues signal ability to act on one’s actions in an interpersonal con-
text (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu 2002), the same cues could sig-
nal a brand’s ability to produce superior products and services when 
judging a brand or a product. We further suggest that competence is 
the first important marker of luxury. Therefore, we predict that rela-
tive to warmth cues, competence cues increase luxury perception of 
new brands or brands not associated with being luxurious. However, 
building on the “golden quadrant” concept, we predict that once a 
brand has established itself to be a luxury brand, because competence 
is more likely to be inherently linked to the product, as a consequence 
we suggest warmth cues may contribute more strongly to additional 
luxury perception. Four studies tested the above novel hypotheses.
Experiments 1a and 1b: The first two studies tested the effect 
that competence cues contribute to luxury perception through subtle 
variations of color or taglines on advertisements. Experiment 1a ma-
nipulated warmth and competence by either adding a warmth-related 
word (e.g. passion, sincerity) or a competence-related word (e.g. tal-
ented, intelligence) on the same mock advertisements. Experiment 
1b manipulated warmth and competence by slightly altering the 
color tone on real print advertisements from well-known brands (e.g. 
Forever 21, Swatch) to be either a warm tone or a cool tone.
In both experiments, participants saw two advertisements with 
either warmth cues or competence cues. After viewing each adver-
tisement, participants answered two items on the luxury perception 
of the advertisement on 7-point scales (“How much luxury do you 
associate with this ad?”, “How much status/prestige do you associate 
with this ad?” 1= Not at all, 7= Very much). Results show that in both 
experiments, participants rated the advertisements with competence 
cues as more luxurious compared to advertisements with warmth 
cues (ps = .01, .005 respectively). An additional control condition in 
experiment 1b demonstrates that it is competence cues that elevate 
luxury perception (p = .001) instead of warmth cues lowering luxury 
perception compared to the control condition (n.s.). 
Experiment 2: The next experiment tested the proposed inter-
action effect that once a brand reaches luxury status, warmth cues 
enhance luxury perception more than additional competence cues. A 
2 (cue: competence vs. warmth) × 2 (brand status: non-luxury vs. es-
tablished luxury) between-subject design was adopted for the current 
study. Brand status was manipulated by using real print advertise-
ments from well-known non-luxury brands (Forever21 and Swatch) 
or established luxury brands (Hugo Boss and Omega watch). Simi-
lar to Experiment 1b, warmth and competence were manipulated by 
altering the color tone on either advertisement to be warm or cool 
toned. Participants saw two advertisements in a random order and 
answered questions on luxury perception of the advertisements after 
seeing each advertisement, similar to Experiments 1a and 1b. Results 
show a significant two-way interaction (p < .001) between warmth/
competence cues and brand status. For non-luxury brands, advertise-
ments with a cool color tone are judged as more luxurious (p = .02) 
compared to the same advertisements with a warm color tone. How-
ever, for brands with an established luxury image, it is advertise-
ments with a warm color tone that are judged as more luxurious com-
pared to the same advertisements with a cool color tone (p = .08). 
Experiment 3: As Experiment 2 manipulated brand status by 
adopting real-life brands, the current study sought to replicate Ex-
periment 2 in a more controlled setting with brand status manipu-
lated through description of the brand. The current study adopted a 2 
(cue: competence vs. warmth) × 2 (brand status: non-luxury vs. es-
tablished luxury) between-subject design. To manipulate brand sta-
tus, we informed participants at the start of the experiment that they 
would either see advertisements from “various new brands that hope 
to establish a reputation as luxury brands” or “various brands that 
have established a reputation as luxury brands.” Competence and 
warmth cues were manipulated similar to Experiment 1a, in which 
either warmth or competence related words were displayed on the 
same mock advertisements as taglines. Results show a significant 
two way interaction (p = .003) in which advertisements with com-
petence cues were rated higher on luxury perception for non-luxury 
brands (p = .04) while advertisements with warmth cues were rated 
higher on luxury perception for established luxury brands (p = .03). 
Conclusion and Contributions. The findings contribute to the 
literature on warmth and competence by identifying distinct stages 
of brand development in which either competence or warmth con-
tributes to luxury perception. The current research has important 
implications for brands by suggesting that a brand should build a 
luxury image by sequentially displaying first competence cues and 
then warmth cues. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Red and blue denote warm and cold temperatures on water 
faucets, air-conditioning systems, weather maps, and thermometers, 
among other items. The co-occurrence of red/blue hues and warm/
cold temperatures in everyday experiences leads to the formation of 
learned color-temperature associations which consumers can use to 
make inferences about products (Wright 1962). However, would in-
cidental exposure to red or blue color cues influence a consumer’s 
perceptions of the temperature of a focal food/beverage? Specifical-
ly, would a consumer rate a food/beverage as having a higher (lower) 
temperature after seeing a red (blue) color cue? Moreover, what are 
the downstream behavioral outcomes that result from the integration 
of visual (i.e., color) cues into haptic (i.e., temperature) perceptions? 
Prior research shows that individuals are extremely responsive 
to subtle variations in temperature (Cheema and Patrick 2012) with 
some areas of the body, such as the fingertips and oral cavity, being 
able to detect a one degree change in temperature (Jones and Ber-
ris 2009). Given that the hands and mouth are the primary inputs 
involved in food/beverage consumption, it is not surprising that tem-
perature perceptions play an influential role in food/beverage evalua-
tions (Moskowitz, Beckley and Resurreccion 2012). In fact, for many 
foods/beverages, there is a narrow range of acceptable temperatures 
and deviation from this range can lead consumers to reject food as 
unsafe (USDA 2011) or unacceptable in taste (Cardello 1994). 
When evaluating product temperature, individuals rely on hap-
tic and visual cues. Haptic cues to temperature are obtained when 
heat transfers to or from a product to thermoreceptors in the skin, 
and thus haptic cues require physical product interaction, or at least 
proximity to the product (Klatzky, Lederman, and Reed 1987). Vi-
sual cues to temperature such as steam emitting from a bowl or frost 
on a glass can be obtained without product interaction and with less 
proximity to the product. 
In this research we focus on how incidental exposure to non-
diagnostic red or blue color cues—such as the color of the cup a bev-
erage is sampled from, influence product temperature perceptions. 
We draw on theories of intersensory integration and propose that the 
integration of visual and haptic cues in temperature perceptions is 
a function of ease of obtaining visual (vs. haptic) information. We 
propose that because visual can be obtained with a lesser degree of 
product proximity, visual color cues will be integrated into product 
temperature perceptions so that individuals exposed to a red (blue) 
visual cue will rate a product as having a higher (lower) temperature. 
We test these propositions in five studies.
In study 1 we demonstrate the basic effect of visual cues on 
temperature perceptions (i.e., the color-temperature effect) using an 
experiment with two between subjects conditions (visual cue: red vs. 
blue). We find that when asked to sample a clear, room-temperature 
beverage from a red or blue cup participants who sample from a red 
(blue) cup perceive the beverage as having a higher (lower) tem-
perature.  
In study 2 we provide evidence that the color-temperature effect 
is a function of the lower cost of obtaining visual (vs. haptic) cues 
to temperature which leads to visual cues being integrated into tem-
perature perceptions. Specifically, we manipulate the order sequence 
in which visual (vs. haptic) information is available using a 2(visual 
cue: red vs. blue) x 2(sensory cue sequence: visual-haptic vs. haptic-
visual) between subjects experiment. In this study we manipulate 
the color of the beverage and have participants view the color of 
the beverage before sampling the beverage (i.e., visual-haptics) or 
after sampling the beverage (i.e., haptics- visual). In support of our 
theorization, we find that when visual information is available before 
haptic information (i.e., visual-haptics), and hence visual cues are 
less costly to obtain than haptic cues, the color-temperature effect 
persists. However, when haptic information is available before visual 
information (i.e., haptics-visual) the effect is diminished. 
In study 3 we examine the robustness of the color-temperature 
effect to unambiguously warm or cold product temperatures. Em-
ploying a 2(visual cue: red vs. blue) x 3(beverage temperature: room 
vs. cold vs. warm) between subjects design experiment, we had par-
ticipants sample a cold, room or warm temperature beverage from a 
red or blue cup and evaluate the temperature. We find that the color-
temperature effect persists for room temperature beverages, gets di-
minished for warm beverages and gets reversed for cold beverages. 
In studies 4 and 5 we investigate the behavioral outcomes of 
the color-temperature effect. In study 4, we induce thirst and have 
participants sample a clear beverage from one of three cups (visual 
cue: red vs. blue vs. white) representing the between subjects experi-
mental conditions. We find that participants consume a larger volume 
of the beverage from red (vs. blue or white) cups.  
In study 5 we examine whether the color-temperature effect 
would influence food preparation behaviors. The results of a single 
factor between subjects experiment (visual cue: red vs. blue) show 
that participants exposed to blue (vs. red) color cues reported longer 
heating times for foods.
Collectively, the results of five studies suggest that visual cues 
are integrated into temperature perceptions leading to a color-tem-
perature effect. This color-temperature effect subsequently influenc-
es downstream behavioral outcomes such as consumption volume 
and food preparation behaviors. Process evidence seems to suggest 
that the integration of visual cues into temperature perceptions is 
driven by the fact that visual cues to temperature can be obtained 
with less product proximity than haptic cues to temperature making 
visual cues less costly
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Table 1: Summary of Empirical Results
Study Design Cell Means Key Findings
1
One factor between subjects (visual cue: 
red vs. blue)
Dependent variable: Perceived 
temperature (in °F)
Mred = 72.83 vs. Mblue = 69.30; F(1, 47) = 
5.47, p < .05
The color-temperature effect- exposure 
to red color cues leads to higher 
temperature perceptions
2
2(color cue: red vs. blue) X 2(sensory 
input sequence: visual-haptic vs. haptic-
visual) between subjects
Dependent variable: Perceived 
temperature (in °F)
Mblue_V-H = 64.64 vs. Mred_V-H = 73.52; 
F(1, 49) = 14.85, p < .01
Mblue_H-V = 70.32 vs. Mred_H-V = 72.34; 
F(1, 42) = .84, p = .362
The color-temperature effect holds when 
visual cues are available prior to haptic 
cues but gets diminished when haptic 
cues are available prior to visual cues.
3
2(cup color: red vs. blue) X 3(beverage 
temperature: neutral/room vs. cold vs. 
warm) between subjects
Dependent variable: Perceived 
temperature (in (in °F)
Mred_room = 74.10 vs. Mblue_room = 72.43; 
F(1, 43) = 3.63, p < .07
Mred_cold = 63.71 vs. Mblue_cold = 69.82; 
F(1, 39) = 5.18, p < .05
Mred_warm = 79.19 vs. Mblue_warm = 82.74; 
F(1, 38) = 1.24, p = .273
The color-temperature effect holds for 
room temperature beverages and gets 
reversed for cold beverages
4
One factor between subjects (visual cue: 
red vs. blue vs. white)
Dependent variable: consumption 
volume (in grams)
Mred = 91.04 vs. Mblue = 74.04; F(1, 51) = 
6.92, p < .05
Mred= 91.04 vs. Mwhite = 76.56; F(1, 58) = 
4.60, p <.05
When thirsty, individuals exposed to red 
(vs. blue or white) color cues consume a 
larger volume of a beverage
Perceived temperature mediates the 
effect of color cues on consumption 
volume
5
One factor between subjects (visual cue: 
red vs. blue)
Dependent variable: heating time (in 
seconds)
Mblue = 123.65 vs. Mred = 98.08; F(1, 49) 
= 3.22, p < .08
Consumers exposed to blue color 
cues heat food for a greater number of 
seconds than consumers exposed to red 
or white color cues
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Although there is a consensus in the literature that industries are 
globalizing and that consumer attitude and behaviors worldwide are 
homogenizing (Cleveland, Laroche, and Papadopoulos 2009, Steen-
kamp and Jong 2010), only limited research so far has followed the 
global consumer across national borders to examine brand prefer-
ences abroad.  This research addressed the case of consumer brand 
choice in the context of travelers to a foreign destination, in par-
ticular the case of a host nation not known for any tradition in the 
respective product category and whose local brands therefore engen-
der higher levels of perceived risk.  We focus on a variety of origin 
specific (product ethnicity), consumer specific (cosmopolitanism vs. 
ethnocentrism), as well as situational variables (word of mouth) to 
determine if and when conditions consumers prefer local or global 
brands abroad.  Importantly, this is the first research addressing these 
variables jointly. 
The first study supports prior research on consumer ethnocen-
trism (Steenkamp, Batra, and Alden 2003) and cosmopolitanism 
(Cleveland et al. 2009, Riefler, Diamantopoulos, and Siguaw 2012) 
in finding that both types of consumers largely replicate their do-
mestic choices when abroad.  Ethnocentric consumers exhibit for-
eign product derogation even when traveling to foreign destinations, 
whereas cosmopolitan consumers in the same context display more 
interest in the products local to the host nation.  
We extend these findings via the concept of product ethnicity 
(Roth and Romeo 1992, Usunier and Cestre 2007).  In line with Di-
mofte, Johansson, and Ronkainen (2008), who show that consumers’ 
preferences for global versus local brands are partly determined by 
their ethnicity, we find that travelers whose home country is compara-
tively superior in that product category (i.e., has a high product coun-
try ethnicity) behave differently depending on whether their nation’s 
category expertise or tradition resides in its local or its global brands. 
In the former case, they act in line with ethnocentric consumers and 
prefer global brands to some other nation’s local brands.  In the latter, 
they act in line with cosmopolitan consumers and give local brands 
a try.  In a sense, it could be said that the former (latter) exhibit the 
behavior of individuals with more (less) of a global consumer culture 
(Alden, Dana L., Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp, and Rajeev Batra 
(2006), “Consumer Attitudes Toward Marketplace Globalization: 
Structure, Antecedents and Consequences,” International Journal 
of Research in Marketing, 23 (3), 227-239.).  Overall, the findings 
of study 1 suggest that global travelers’ choices can be predictably 
determined by specific variables such as product ethnicity, consumer 
ethnocentrism, and cosmopolitanism.
The results of the second study demonstrate that the initial incli-
nations are malleable and that brand managers possess tactical levers 
that can influence travelers’ choices in predictable ways.  Important-
ly, we add to the mix situational variables such as word of mouth. 
We show that, among nations with a high product ethnicity, consum-
ers who come from a nation with a local beer tradition (i.e., Belgium) 
will be more reluctant to try another nation’s products when traveling 
abroad compared to consumers from a nations with a global beer tradi-
tion (i.e., the U.S.).  
Methodologically, the experimental scenarios employed for 
evaluating the hypothesized theoretical relationships ensured a con-
servative test of consumer preferences: unlike previous research, our 
studies allowed participants to assume idiosyncratic levels of brand 
globalness and local iconness, ensuring that choice was reduced to 
its most basic local-global dimension.  Furthermore, given that most 
research on consumer cosmopolitanism has been qualitative in na-
ture (e.g., Thompson and Tambyah 1999), we offer novel studies that 
contribute to the empirical validation of the construct (Cleveland et 
al. 2009, Riefler et al. 2012) in a setting that has not received much 
attention so far.  In doing so, we also extend the application of the 
recently established product ethnicity construct (Usunier and Cestre 
2007), which has been put forward as a promising construct for fu-
ture research on country-of-origin effects (Usunier 2011). 
In practical terms, the present research has clear and action-
able implications for segmentation as well as marketing purposes of 
global and local companies.  If the host nation does not have a tradi-
tion in a particular product category, foreign travelers will not be 
predisposed to choosing its local brands.  This is particularly the case 
for travelers coming from nations that do have this tradition through 
strong local brands and for whom inferior foreign brands do not even 
enter the consideration set (i.e., they engage in overt avoidance be-
havior).  However, for consumers hailing from nations with tradition 
through strong global brands or from countries of no particular tradi-
tion, the novelty of the host nation’s local brands is attractive enough 
as to create approach behavior and choice preference.  Furthermore, 
local brand managers can take comfort in the knowledge that even 
consumers from nations of high product ethnicity in the category can 
be attractive targets for their brands when traveling.  In general, these 
consumers are more open to local products, as long as there are no 
salient prompts that highlight the associated risks.  
Brand managers should note that some of the often posed argu-
ments for global brands–namely their importance for the global trav-
eler (Nijssen and Douglas 2008)–have to be revised.  Our research 
shows that consumers originating from a country with strong global 
brands (such as the U.S.) will be attracted by the novelty and variety 
local brands can provide.  At the same time, global brand managers 
can count on two segments in particular–ethnocentrists and people 
originating from a country with a strong local beer tradition.  Global 
brands stand for quality and ensure the same taste experience across 
all markets (Dimofte et al. 2008).  Minimizing risk is particularly 
important for these two segments. 
Finally, our research demonstrates how brand managers can 
shift these default choices through information cues that alter the 
risk perceptions associated with the local or global brands involved 
in choice.  Although global brands feature higher equity and their at-
tractiveness is more difficult to change, local brands can be reliably 
rendered more or less attractive via manipulated risk perceptions.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In his original conception of expected utility, Daniel Bernoulli 
(1738; 1954) proposed that individuals generally have diminishing 
marginal utility (DMU). Much in the same way that an additional 
spoonful of sugar provides a smaller additional taste sensation than 
the previous spoonful of sugar (i.e., satiation), an additional dollar 
of wealth provides a proportionally smaller additional utility than 
the previous dollar. Current conceptualizations of DMU suppose that 
consumers simply value additional dollars of wealth less. Rather, we 
suggest that consumers are simply less sensitive to greater numeric 
magnitudes.  In the current article we demonstrate that an individu-
al’s ability to “value” money, goods, and services depends critically 
upon their ability to perceive differences in the numeric magnitudes 
of the money, goods, and services.
Previous research in numerical cognition has demonstrated that 
individuals have curvilinear representations of magnitude (Dehaene 
et al., 2008; Furlong and Opfer, 2009; Siegler and Opfer, 2003; Opfer 
and Siegler, 2007; Siegler, Thompson, and Opfer, 2009; Birnbaum, 
1974; Anobile, Cicchini, and Burr, 2012; Peters et al. 2008). Al-
though an individual may know that 1,000 is 10 times as large as 100, 
their subjective representation of 1,000 is often much less than 10 
times as large as their subjective representation of 100. In the current 
article, we propose that the extent of DMU may be related to how 
individuals represent numeric magnitudes. In particular, we suggest 
that a gain of $1,000 may not be perceived as ten times as beneficial 
as a gain of $100 because the magnitude of “1,000” is not perceived 
as ten times as large as the magnitude of “100”. Across three studies, 
we tested this hypothesized relation in a riskless paradigm, a risky-
choice paradigm, and in a consumer judgment paradigm.
In all studies we assessed participants’ magnitude representa-
tions by using a task taken from Siegler and Opfer (2003). On each 
of 11 screens participants were randomly presented a number (e.g., 
268) and asked to indicate its position on a line anchored at 0 and 
1,000. This task allows us to investigate participants’ sensitivities to 
numeric magnitudes and compare these to their sensitivities to con-
textualized quantities (e.g., an amount of money).
Study-1 participants (N=76) indicated their Willingness to 
Drive (WTD) for 12 dollar values ($5, $10, $15, $20, $30, $40, $50, 
$60, $70, $80, $90, $100) presented in random order. The WTD mea-
sure asked participants to indicate the furthest distance they would be 
willing to drive (roundtrip) to receive a specified amount of money; 
as this is a common consideration for individuals (e.g., driving to 
take advantage of a sale).
We built a log-log multilevel (MLM) model predicting WTD 
with the dollar amounts; the coefficient between these two variables 
represents the exponent parameter in the value function. The ex-
ported coefficient, b = .87, t(68) = 8.64, p < .0001, was less than 1, 
indicating DMU (i.e., concave value functions). 
In support of our hypothesis, the results also indicated an inter-
action between objective dollar amounts and participants’ magnitude 
representations in WTD predictions, b = 0.09, t(68) = 2.34, p = .02, 
controlling for numeracy, gender, age, education, and income. Par-
ticipants with more linear magnitude representations exhibited more 
linear value functions (i.e., less DMU) than those with less linear 
magnitude representations. 
In study 2 (N = 99) we assessed participants’ value functions 
with a more conventional risky-choice paradigm. We used the DEEP 
program for measuring prospect theory parameters (Toubia et al., 
2012). On each of 16 trials, participants indicated their preference 
between two gambles. Results indicated a mean value function expo-
nent parameter of b = .68, t(90) = 26.02, p < .0001, indicating DMU. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants with more linear magni-
tude representations exhibited more linear value functions (i.e., less 
DMU) than those with less linear representations, b = .07, t(90) = 
2.34, p = .02. 
In the previous two studies we demonstrated that a participant’s 
ability to value prospects depends critically upon their ability to per-
ceive the magnitude of the prospect they are valuing. The goal of 
study 3 was to extend this paradigm in an attempt to account for a 
well-known phenomenon in consumer pricing perceptions – the dif-
ferential influence of relative and absolute discounts. 
Participants (N = 201) in study 3 indicated their WTD for 16 
sale prices: four discount levels (10%, 15%, 20%, 25%) at four dif-
ferent price levels ($10, $50, $150, $400). In addition, participants 
were randomly assigned to see either relative discounts (e.g., was 
$150, now 20% off) or absolute discounts (e.g., was $150, now $30 
off). We hypothesized that relative discounts inhibit consumers’ abil-
ity to represent the magnitude of the discount. Given the relationship 
between magnitude representations and valuation, we also hypoth-
esized that relative discounts would produce greater DMU for dis-
counts (i.e., more curved value functions). 
Results confirmed our predictions. First, greater relative dis-
counts were related, in one analysis, to less linear magnitude rep-
resentations, b = -1.12, t(199) = 13.72, p < .0001, and, in a second 
analysis, to less linear value functions, b = -0.10, t(199) = 3.10, p 
= .002. When the magnitude-representation scores were introduced 
into the model predicting DMU, participants with more linear magni-
tude representations exhibited more linear value functions, b = 0.14, 
t(198) = 5.23, p < .0001 and the influence of the condition variable 
became non-significant, b = 0.05, t(198) = 1.28, p = .20. Thus the 
influence of discount frame was mediated by magnitude representa-
tions, bIndirect = -0.16, CI [-0.21, -0.10].
The primary contribution of this article is the demonstration 
that the ability to represent abstract numeric magnitudes underlies 
how consumers value different prospects. That is, a consumer’s abil-
ity to “value” money, goods, and services depends critically upon 
their ability to perceive differences in the magnitudes of the money, 
goods, and services. Prior conceptualizations of DMU assumed that 
consumers value additional units less than preceding units. Our re-
search suggests that consumers are simply less sensitive to greater 
numbers of units. This interpretation has rather stark implications for 
the conceptualization of risk aversion an intertemporal choice, and 
provides several novel avenues for consumer research.
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Table 1: Summary . Multiple regression models predicting the 
shape (i .e ., exponent parameter) of participants’ value functions 
for Studies 1-3
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Estimate
(SE)
Estimate
(SE)
Estimate
(SE)
Intercept 0.874***(0.024)
0.684***
(0.017)
0.354***
(0.015)
Magnitude-
Representation Score
0.091*
(0.038)
0.068*
(0.029)
0.078*
(0.032)
Numeracy 0.019(0.015)
0.002
(0.012)
0.023*
(0.009)
Gender 0.001(0.054)
-0.045
(0.039)
-0.067
(0.032)
Age -0.001(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
Income -0.020(0.022)
-0.005
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.013)
Education -0.008(0.021)
-0.002
(0.015)
0.001
(0.013)
Relative Versus 
Absolute Discount
(Condition Variable)
-0.008
(0.046)
Whereas the MLMs described in the text (studies 1 and 3) are more 
appropriate analyses, the analyses presented in the table are more easily 
interpretable. The above reported analysis for study 1 was conducted in 
the same manner as described in study 3 (i.e., exporting a value function 
exponent parameter for each participant).
*** p < .0001
**   p < .001
*    p < .05
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The Bottom Dollar Effect: How Resource Availability Influences Perceived Value and 
Satisfaction 
Robin L. Soster, University of Arkansas, USA
Andrew D. Gershoff, University of Texas at Austin, USA
William O. Bearden, University of South Carolina, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Mental accounting research suggests that pain of payment at-
tenuates the pleasure of consumption and that consumers with de-
pleted resources think about costs differently. The present research 
finds that, when consumers spend their last available resources (i.e., 
spend to zero), the perceived value of purchases decreases and satis-
faction is attenuated. 
Introduction and Background
Recent research has shown a number of ways in which deplet-
ing resources influence consumers’ spending decisions (Brady 2009; 
Huffman and Barenstein 2005; Kamakura and Du 2012; Mishra, 
Mishra, and Nayakankuppam 2010; Stilley, Inman, and Wakefield 
2010a). For example, consumers tend to choose more prevention-
oriented products as more time passes since their last paycheck, and 
they are more likely to choose products that are scarce when they 
feel financially deprived compared to others (Mishra et al. 2012; 
Sharma and Alter 2012). Findings also suggest that consumers spend 
differently, such as spending less on non-essential products during 
times of both macroeconomic contraction (Kamakura and Du 2012) 
and personal economic contraction (Brady 2009; Huffman and Ba-
renstein 2005). Other research suggests that consumers think about 
both expenditures and opportunity costs differently, depending on 
the amount of resources at their disposal (Morewedge, Holtzman, 
and Epley 2007; Spiller 2011). Although it seems likely that these 
patterns of spending might influence consumer financial and mate-
rial well-being, researchers have yet to examine whether they have 
implications for consumers’ satisfaction with the products that they 
do end up purchasing. 
We extend the above findings relating to resource availability 
by considering how the state of consumers’ resources at the moment 
of purchase influences not only the consideration of costs, but also 
post-purchase satisfaction. We hypothesize that consumers are less 
satisfied with products and services when the purchase itself has “ze-
roed out” or exhausted a budget compared to when funds remain in a 
budget after a purchase. Specifically, we propose that, when consum-
ers incur costs that exhaust their budgets (i.e., spend their bottom 
dollar), the marginal utility of those spent resources is significantly 
greater than economically equivalent costs that merely reduce bud-
gets (i.e., non-bottom dollar spending). According to both the mental 
accounting literature (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998) and the value 
perspective of satisfaction (Johnson, Anderson, and Fornell 1995), 
these differences in the perceived cost of the resources spent should 
influence satisfaction. 
Experiments
Study 1 used adult consumers (n = 169) recruited from MTurk 
to test whether reported feelings about spending ten dollars depends 
on whether the spending comes out of a budget, and whether the 
spending does or does not deplete available resources to zero. Find-
ings reveal that consumers are more circumspect when spending 
their bottom dollar (i.e., going from $10 to $0), but only when that 
money comes from a depleting budget. 
Study 2 employed a mixed design to examine the relationship 
between budget condition and satisfaction (H1) as well as the media-
tional role of perceived value (H2). The first factor, budget condition 
(exhausting versus not) was a between-subjects factor, while the sec-
ond, consumption timing, was within-subjects, consumption timing 
(T1/T3). The context used for the study was the viewing and evalu-
ation of short movies for an online film festival. Adult participants 
from MTurk (analysis based upon n = 87) were told that they had 
been given 30 [50] credits to spend on short films costing 10 credits 
each. Satisfaction and perceptions of film value were measured after 
participants viewed the T1 and film (when no participant’s budget 
was exhausted) and T3 films (when half of the participant’s budgets 
were exhausted). The resulting 2-way interaction of budget condi-
tion and timing supported our hypothesis; bottom dollar spending 
decreases satisfaction. Additionally, value perceptions fully medi-
ated the relationship between budget condition and satisfaction at 
T3 (Hayes 2013). 
Study 3 used a scenario-based study with students (n = 201) to 
further examine the relationship between bottom dollar spending and 
satisfaction. The study was a 2 × 2 design. All participants were to 
get a ticket to an attraction. A Budget factor varied whether or not 
buying the ticket would have exhausted a budget or not.  An Acquisi-
tion factor varied whether or not participants had to use money from 
their budget to buy the ticket, or they were given the ticket as a gift. 
We predicted that, for those who had to purchase, satisfaction would 
be lower if their budget was exhausted compared to not.  For those 
who received the ticket as a gift, there would be no difference by 
budget condition. Results supported this. 
Study 4 employed a mixed design to replicate the findings from 
study 2 (H1; H2), while also testing whether the ease of obtaining re-
sources had an influence on the bottom dollar effect, impacting both 
satisfaction with and perceived value of the films (H3). MTurk (n = 
217) participants first had to complete actual work in order to earn 
credits. Participants’ perception of the ease of obtaining credits was 
measured. Participants then spent their credits at the film festival (see 
study 2). Half of the participants (exhausting budget condition) ran 
out of credits after purchasing their second film. Similar to study 2, 
both satisfaction and perception of value were measured after the 
second film was viewed.
Budget condition, perceptions of ease of obtaining resources, 
and the interaction of these factors were regressed on satisfaction 
with the second film. A significant interaction of resource availabil-
ity and ease of obtaining resources supported H3. Further analysis 
(Model 8; Hayes 2013) revealed moderated mediation. For those 
spending their bottom dollar, value perceptions mediated the rela-
tionship between ease of obtaining resources and satisfaction. This 
mediation did not arise for participants with resources remaining.
Conclusion
While prior models of satisfaction have focused on concepts 
such as product performance and expectations (Oliver 1980, 1997), 
this research applies a mental accounting perspective to examine 
how satisfaction is influenced by whether or not there are remaining 
resources in a budget used to make a purchase. We show that, when 
individuals make purchases that exhaust their budgets (versus not), 
satisfaction is lower (H1). Findings also reveal that perceived value 
mediates the relationship between budget condition and satisfaction 
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(H2), and that the perceived ease of obtaining resources also influ-
ences these relationships (H3).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Round numbers have been defined as multiples of the pow-
ers of the base (e.g., multiples of 10 in the commonly used base 
10 number system, see Dehaene and Mehler 1992) or as numbers 
whose factorial content includes 2, 5, or 10 (Sigurd 1988).  In-
tuitively, most individuals would likely agree that 5, 40, 125, or 
3740 are “rounder” numbers than 6, 41, 128, or 3739.  Individu-
als often employ such numbers “to indicate not only the quantity 
represented by the number itself, but also quantities that could be 
more precisely described by numbers close in value to the reference 
number” (Jansen and Pollmann 2001, p. 190).  Round numbers are 
more common than other numbers in communication contexts, con-
ducive to individuals’ greater liking thereof.  They are often used 
as milestones and granted special meaning even when none is ra-
tionally warranted  (e.g., rational investors prefer round numbers 
for the prices of the stocks they buy–Bradley et al. 2004, Kandel, 
Sarig, and Wohl 2001).  The fondness for round numbers is not 
indiscriminate.  It seems to largely apply to categories that involve 
metrics associated with commonplace categories or phenomena. 
For categories involving unfamiliar natural or random phenomena, 
a paradoxically opposite effect occurs whereby round numbers are 
suspiciously fluent and best avoided.  This comes from the percep-
tion that, in unfamiliar contexts that feature randomness, the oc-
currence of an event that can be precisely quantified via something 
as common as a round number is surprising and considered highly 
unlikely.  Anecdotal evidence includes the scientific expedition to 
measure Mt. Everest that came up with a perfect 29,000 ft. altitude 
but arbitrarily added another 2 feet before making it public because 
it was assumed that the perfectly round measurement would be 
disbelieved.  Research on lottery number picks has found that out 
of the six least commonly played numbers in Canada’s 6/49 Lotto 
game a full half are round numbers (Stern and Cover 1989). 
Round numbers thus are preferred when describing the magni-
tudes of known objects and situations (i.e., the principle of favorite 
quantities –see Jansen and Pollman 2001), but also shunned and dis-
trusted when paired with unfamiliar phenomena and quantities.  In 
the latter instance, we face the unusual case of enhanced levels of 
fluency and familiarity which, instead of increasing liking and creat-
ing approach, raise suspicion and produce avoidance via an illusion 
of lie effect.  
Study 1
In one set of items, 146 participants were asked which one of 
three provided numbers was the correct answer to a series of triv-
ia-type questions.  One of the three options was always a round 
number.  Out of the remaining two non-round numbers, one was 
relatively easier to process due to featuring repeated digits.  Across 
the board, the round number was the most frequently picked if the 
question referred to common decisions or events, but a non-round 
choice prevailed for unfamiliar random situations or natural events. 
The fluent non-round number was always the second most frequent 
choice.  Early in the experimental session, participants were also 
asked to provide a 4-digit number that was personally relevant to 
them.  About 50 minutes and several studies later, they were asked 
to assess the probability that a certain number of Panda bears were 
left in the wild worldwide (on an 8-point likelihood scale anchored at 
extremely unlikely and extremely likely).  This number was extracted 
by the experimental software from the initial 4-digit number ques-
tion and inconspicuously inserted in the Panda bears query.  Out of 
the 4-digit numbers participants provided, 39 were round and 107 
were not.  Data showed that participants thought it less likely for 
the number of Panda bears to be round than non-round.  Since the 
fluency of the self-generated, personally relevant number was uni-
formly high, this reinforces that the processing of round numbers is 
peculiar.  Finally, participants were offered more or less difficult to 
process stimuli as the two possible numeric answers to questions that 
dealt with random events.  In the typical case, despite a larger 16-size 
font used for the round number (vs. 12-point font for non-rounds), 
the non-round number was the preferred choice.  The illusion of lie 
effect emerged even though the round number was undistorted and 
thus more perceptually fluent.  
Study 2
The second study assessed the extent to which the illusion of 
lie emerges and has consequences in terms of consumer willingness 
to believe product claims.  We looked for marketing communica-
tions that are more likely to allow for some doubt, and infomercials 
and competitor-originated brand information (i.e., comparative ad-
vertising) were relevant contexts. Participants looked at a series 
of product claims that had purportedly been made in infomercials, 
half of which had been proven true and half false.  Participants had 
to assess the extent to which the statements were true on 7-point 
likelihood scales.  In the typical case, a statement claimed that a 
particular piece of gym equipment improves body strength in just 
28 or 25 minutes (or that mental exercise bolstered memory perfor-
mance by 60 vs. 63%).  The round-number claim was disbelieved 
significantly more, in particular by those for whom the category 
was less familiar.  When a competitor could have mentioned it in 
an advertisement, the seating capacity of a new aircraft was more 
likely to be 248 rather than 250 passengers.  
Conclusions
The illusion of lie effect refers to the unique information pro-
cessing case wherein the fluency of round numbers produces avoid-
ance if associated with random stimuli or unfamiliar claims.  Mar-
keting communications that employ numerical claims demonstrate 
the effect when consumers are unfamiliar with the product or its 
category.  Two more studies are currently pursued in order to disen-
tangle the processing mechanisms behind the illusion of lie effect. 
The discussion above suggests that either a disfluency explanation or 
a set of naïve theories that individuals hold about when [non]round 
numbers are appropriate may be at work.
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Descriptive Norm as a Moderator in Predicting Fundraising Responses from Involvement 
and Social Influence Susceptibility
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
With cuts in government funding, a lot of vital societal func-
tions from medical research to disaster relief increasingly rely on 
charitable giving from individuals. Research has looked into char-
acteristics of individuals who are more likely to give, and charac-
teristics that may boost a fundraising message’s effectiveness. Our 
research seeks to understand interactions between certain charac-
teristics of audience and fundraising messages in shaping favorable 
responses to fundraising messages. As a contribution to the market-
ing and charitable giving literature, this research represents the first 
examination of descriptive norms’ moderating effect on the relation-
ships between involvement, social influence susceptibility and fun-
draising message responses. We demonstrate that taking descriptive 
norms into consideration can boost the effectiveness of targeting in 
obtaining donor support. Another contribution of this research is that 
it extends prior work on descriptive norms by showing that highlight-
ing the prevalence of donations does not always increase fundraising 
effectiveness. Instead, fundraising campaigns may benefit more from 
portraying a lack of popularity in donating when targeting potential 
donors who are highly involved.
In the context of fundraising, high involvement would predis-
pose one to respond positively to the message. However, the strength 
of this relation would vary depending on one message characteris-
tic, i.e., whether a descriptive norm of donating being prevalent is 
stressed in a fundraising message. When a message portrays a de-
scriptive norm in donating to the related organization, it leads to a 
perception of gaining adequate financial resources. Kingma (1989) 
posits that if charitable giving is purely driven by altruism, the knowl-
edge of an increase in contributions by others with $1 would reduce 
one’s own contribution with $1. Others’ contributions are to some 
degree seen as substitutes for one’s own.  Subsequently an individual 
may deem his/her contribution as less necessary, since the soliciting 
organization’s goal is already met. This is termed a “crowding out” 
effect (Abrams and Schmitz 1984) which would dampen the more 
involved individuals’ natural tendency of responding favorably to 
fundraising. In contrast, when a message depicts an absence of norm 
in giving, an involved, caring individual would infer the severity of 
financial shortage and thus would resonate more with the solicitation. 
Perceived descriptive norm has a different moderating role for 
another audience characteristic, i.e., social influence susceptibility. 
A socially susceptible reader/viewer is on the watch for the presence 
or absence of “social proof” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) depicted 
in a message. Doing the popular thing provides benefits that include 
boosted certainty about the worthiness of a cause/organization, feel-
ing good about being socially approved, and earning a reputation 
among certain social groups. When a prevalence descriptive norm 
is portrayed in a fundraising message, the more socially susceptible 
individuals would feel more eager to jump onto the bandwagon to 
enjoy these benefits, thus they would respond more favorably to the 
message. However, when a message reveals that few people donate, 
donating is unable to provide potential donors such social benefits. 
The association between social influence susceptibility and favorable 
responses would fare weaker when an unpopularity descriptive norm 
is present, relative to when a prevalence descriptive norm is present. 
To examine these two interactions, an experiment was conduct-
ed among 166 college students. Descriptive norms in fundraising 
messages were manipulated (“many donate” vs. “few donate”). Pre-
existing involvement with the topical non-profit organization and 
social influence susceptibility (Bearden, Netemeyer and Teel 1989) 
were measured. The key outcome variable is the immediate cognitive 
and affective responses to a fundraising message. A regression that 
includes descriptive norm appeal type, involvement, susceptibility 
to social influence, and two interaction terms supports the involve-
ment x descriptive norm hypothesis (p < .016). Specifically, in the 
“few donate” condition, higher involvement predicts more favorable 
responses (r =.47, p < .001); but in the “many donate” condition, 
this positive association is statistically weaker (r = .26, p = .02). The 
susceptibility x descriptive norm interaction emerges marginally 
significant (p = .06). For the “few donate” condition, social influ-
ence susceptibility doesn’t predict favorable responses (r = .1, ns.); 
but in the “many donate” condition, greater susceptibility translates 
to more favorable responses (r = .42, p <.001). Meanwhile, greater 
involvement and greater social influence susceptibility both predict 
more favorable message responses.  
These findings bear managerial implications for what is known 
as “social norm marketing” (Berkowitz 2005). Sometimes people’s 
normative beliefs, whether rooted in reality or not, are entrenched 
and not readily changeable in the short run through advertising (Po-
lonec, Major, and Atwood 2006). Further, ethical questions arise 
when fundraisers mis-present descriptive norms in an attempt to gain 
certain advantages. In such circumstances fundraisers would be bet-
ter served if they examine and accept the reality of normative belief 
to decide who would be the most promising audience to target, e.g., 
the more involved, or the more socially impressionable? 
Although this research conceptually treats descriptive norm as 
a moderator, the results also shed light on norm’s role as a focal pre-
dictor. Its lack of main effect echoes earlier research that tested the 
causal link between norms and behaviors with mixed results. The 
current findings suggest that the choice of descriptive norm appeal in 
advertisements would largely depend on characteristics of the target 
audience. Although for-profit advertisements’ common practice is to 
highlight “popularity” descriptive norms, this strategy would not be 
effective for fundraising when target audience is very involved. Un-
intuitively, fundraising campaigns may benefit more from employ-
ing the opposite normative strategy when target audience are highly 
involved with and attached to the focal brand.   
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When 15% Off Plus 10% Off is More Than 30% Off: Multiple-Discount Promotions are 
Preferred to Larger Single-Discount Promotions
Dan R. Schley, The Ohio State University, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In a recent article by Chen and Rao (2007), the authors dem-
onstrated that consumers appear to prefer multiple-discount (MD) 
promotions over single-discount (SD) promotions. For example, 
consumers prefer 20% off plus an additional 25% off of a $100 item 
over an economically equivalent 40% off. The authors reasoned that 
consumers’ preference for MD is due to consumers erroneous pro-
cessing of multiple percentage changes. Specifically, when presented 
MD, consumers fall victim to a face value effect (i.e., inferring that 
20% off plus an additional 25% off is equal to 45% off; see also Chen 
et al. 2012, Peters et al. 2012). In the current article I extend Chen 
and Rao’s (2007) findings by proposing a separate, arguably more 
fundamental, mechanisms for the influence of MD on price percep-
tions – perceived rarity of the discount. 
In a simple pretest, I assessed the frequency of multiple (2 or 
more), single (1), or no discount (0) promotions from 358 products 
selected at random from major retailers. Results indicated that there 
were significantly fewer MD promotions (6.44%) than no-discount 
(52.66%) and SD promotions (40.90), χ2 (2) = 123.70, p < .0001. 
Therefore, it appears that within this cross-sectional investigation, 
MD promotions were objectively rarer than SD or no discount pro-
motions. 
According to Chen and Rao (2007), an MD promotion with 
20% off plus an additional 20% off should be perceived as a 40% 
discount, which should be less attractive than an MD promotion with 
25% off plus an additional 20% off and equally attractive to an SD 
promotion with 40% off. In contrast, results of study 1 indicated that 
purchase intentions in both of the MD conditions were significantly 
greater than in the SD condition, ps < .03, and did not differ from 
one another, p = .93. To test the proposed mechanisms, participants 
indicated how likely they thought the product was to go on sale for a 
lower price in the near future (i.e., rare promotions are those which 
are unlikely to be beaten by another promotion in the near future). 
Results of study 1 indicated that perceived rarity in both of the MD 
conditions was significantly greater than in the SD condition, ps < 
.02, and did not differ from one another, p = .76. Moreover, results of 
a mediation analysis revealed that the influence of MD promotions 
on purchase intentions was mediated by MD promotions being per-
ceived as rarer bIndirect = 0.36, CI [0.11, 0.72].
Study 2 replicated study 1 but involved absolute discounts (i.e., 
either $20 off or $10 off plus an additional $10 off). This design 
controlled for erroneous processing because the economic and face 
values are identical when discounts are presented as dollars off. Re-
sults again indicated that MD promotions produced greater purchase 
intentions, p = .01, and greater perceived rarity, p = .03, than SD 
promotions. Mediation results confirmed those of study 1. These re-
sults further rule out erroneous processing as an explanation for the 
observed effect.
In Study 3a I tested a boundary condition for this effect by em-
ploying one, two, or three discounts. Results indicated that purchase 
intentions and perceived rarity in both of the MD conditions were 
significantly greater than in the SD condition, ps < .03, and did not 
differ from one another, p = .93. The mediating relationship of per-
ceived rarity was replicated again. These results suggest that the ef-
fect of different numbers of MD promotions on purchase intentions 
is null (i.e., more than two discounts in a promotion does not appear 
to produce a larger effect).
In previous studies, the positive influence of MD promotions 
offset the objectively larger economic values of SD promotions. In 
study 3b, I tested whether the positive influence of MD promotions 
could offset both objectively larger economic and face values of SD 
promotions. Participants were randomly assigned to the SD (30% 
off) or the MD (15% off plus an additional 10% off) condition. Re-
sults indicated that purchase intentions and perceived rarity in the 
MD condition were significantly greater than in the SD condition, 
ps < .04, once again confirming mediation, bIndirect = 0.32, CI [0.08, 
0.66]. Thus, the influence of MD promotions appears to offset con-
trasting influences of both economic and face values.
Whereas I measured perceived rarity in previous studies, I ma-
nipulated rarity in study 4. Participants were presented 10 previous 
purchases from a store. In the MD_Rare condition 2 of the purchas-
es had MD promotions whereas 8 purchases had MD promotions 
in the MD_Frequent condition. Participants were then presented a 
novel MD promotion. Results indicated that purchase intentions and 
perceived rarity in the MD_Rare condition were higher than in the 
MD_Frequent condition, ps < .05. Mediation results confirmed that 
the manipulating the perceived rarity of MD promotions influenced 
purchase intentions by way of decreasing perceived rarity of the pro-
motion, bIndirect = 0.60, CI [0.30, 0.99].
The results of five studies confirm the initial hypothesis, that 
MD promotions are perceived as rarer, and thus, more attractive than 
SD promotions. Whereas Chen and Rao (2007) supposed that MD 
promotions were preferred by consumers because of erroneous pro-
cessing of multiple percent changes (i.e., 40% off = 20% off plus 
25% off), the results of all five studies control for this possible effect 
by requiring the face value of the MD conditions to be the same 
or less (study 3b) than the face value of the SD conditions. Future 
research should seek to differentiate the roles of erroneous process-
ing of multiple percentage changes (Chen and Rao 2007), perceived 
rarity, and mental account (Thaler 1985; 199) in MD promotions.
The current research provides a novel perspective for the influ-
ence of MD promotions. These findings may also have similar impli-
cations for domains outside of price discounts (e.g., loyalty program 
points, changes in package size, bundle composition) where per-
ceived rarity of an offer enhances its attractiveness. While the current 
research concerned participants’ immediate price perceptions, subse-
quent research should seek to investigate the effect of MD promo-
tions on future price expectations as well (DelVecchio et al. 2007).
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Table 1: Summary . Means and standard errors for  
purchase intent and perceived rarity in all studies
Likelihood of purchase
Likelihood that product 
will go on sale for lower 
in the near future (i.e., 
perceived rarity)
1 (Very Unlikely) to 7(Very Likely)
Condition Mean(SE)
Mean
(SE)
Study 1 (N = 108)
SD (40% off) 4.92(.29)
3.95
(.26)
MD (20% off + 20% off)
5.78
(.23)
3.00
(.26)
MD (20% off + 25% off)
5.75
(.26)
3.11
(.25)
Study 2 (N = 121)
SD ($20 off) 4.89(.19)
4.53
(.18)
MD ($10 off + $10 off)
5.53
(.16)
3.95
(.20)
Study 3a (N = 117)
SD (40% off) 5.46(.22)
3.74
(.25)
MD (20% off + 20% off)
5.92
(.16)
3.00
(.19)
MD (20% off + 10% off + 10% off)
6.05
(.15)
3.07
(.23)
Study 3b (N = 120)
SD (30% off) 4.91(.23)
4.85
(.22)
MD (15% off + 10% off)
5.53
(.20)
4.12
(.21)
Study 4 (N = 99)
MD_Frequent 4.33(.20)
4.31
(.17)
MD_Rare 5.04(.17)
3.19
(.18)
Thaler, Richard H. (1985), “Mental Accounting and Consumer 
Choice,” Marketing Science, 4 (3), 199–214.
——— (1999), “Mental Accounting Matters,” Journal of Behav-
ioral Decision Making, 12 (3), 183–206.
735 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
When Hungry People See Leaner Meals: Hunger Reduces Calorie Evaluations
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers may approach product choice when hungry, tired, 
aroused or distracted. Such motivational states have extensive effects 
on product judgment and choice, including increases in perceived 
attractiveness (Read et al. 1998), purchase (Mela et al. 1996), variety 
seeking (Goukens et al. 2007), and impulsive choice (van den Bergh 
et al. 2008). 
In addition to general trends towards underestimation, a vari-
ety of factors systematically bias one’s perception of food amount 
(Gleaves, Williamson, & Barker, 1993). Consumers’ calorie esti-
mates are particularly prone to various distortions. People often have 
biased estimates of calories (Chernev and Chandon 2010, Chandon 
and Wansink 2007). Such errors are often in the direction of calorie 
underestimation (Lansky and Brownell 1982, Lichtman et al. 1992, 
Livingstone and Black 2003).
In the current work, we wish to examine how a common physi-
cal state, hunger, influences calorie estimation. Counter to prior 
thinking regarding the influence of need on size estimate (Beasley 
et al. 2004, Bruner and Goodman 1947, van Koningsbruggen et al. 
2011, Veltcamp et al. 2011) we show that hunger may actually lead 
to a reduction in calorie estimates.
In our first study, 67 participants were recruited outside a large 
cafeteria in a large Northeastern University. The setting was chosen 
to maximize distribution of hunger levels, since we assumed some 
participants would approach us before lunch (hungry), and some af-
ter (sated). Participants estimated calories in four baked goods: muf-
fin, bagel, donut, and brownie. 
After estimating calories, participants were asked to report on 
their hunger level on a 9-point scale. They were also asked to report 
whether they had eaten lunch yet or not (binary). We analyzed the 
data using a repeated measures mixed model, with item type as the 
repeated factor and an unstructured covariance matrix. 
Participants estimated a lower number of calories when hungry: 
F(1,65)=7.01, p=.01. Using a median split on hunger, high hunger 
participants estimated a lower average number of calories (255.52) 
than did low hunger participants (311.94), a decrease of 18%. We 
found similar results using the binary measure of having had lunch. 
Participants who have not yet had lunch (hungry) reported a lower 
number of calories (263.87) than did those who have already had 
lunch (305.99): F(1,68)=.04. 
In our second and third studies, we manipulated hunger by ask-
ing half of our participants (N=120) to fast for five hours. In both 
studies the manipulation increased self-reported hunger (<.0001). 
Participants estimated calories in three baked goods: muffin, bagel, 
and cookie. Given high levels of noise in prior studies, we asked par-
ticipants about adeptness at calorie estimation and eliminated partici-
pants who self-reported lack of adeptness at calorie estimation (below 
bottom quartile [2] on a 9-point scale rating of “How good are you 
at estimating calories”). For other participants (N=106), there was a 
significant effect of fasting on calorie estimation: F(1,100)=6.87, p 
=.01. Average estimated calories were lower for fasting participants 
(M=252.79) than for non-fasting participants (M=305.17). 
The third study aimed to extend the generalizability of the pre-
vious studies by showing similar with grocery items containing more 
than one serving, and a correspondingly greater amount of calories. 
This would also extend the relevance of our findings from discrete 
items for immediate consumption (baked goods) to grocery settings, 
where purchases are made for potential consumption over time. Half 
of our participants (N=72) were asked to fast for five hours prior to 
the study. Participants estimated calories six grocery items (crack-
ers, cookies, chips). As before, we eliminated participants who self-
reported lack of adeptness at calorie estimation. We also eliminated 
very extreme observations - 4SDs above the mean. Among those par-
ticipants, fasting produced a significant effect on calorie evaluations: 
F(1,59)=5.4, p=.02. Given the larger heterogeneity of the sample, 
age was included as a covariate. Fasting participants evaluated the 
products as containing fewer calories (Mcal=1465.21) than did non-
fasting participants (1969.18), a reduction of over 25%.
The findings highlight the fact that at least under some circum-
stances, visceral motivations can lead people to perceive less of a 
desired product property rather than more of it. Specifically, a greater 
need for food (hunger) made people think foods provide less ener-
gy (calories). Such findings are not only of interest in themselves, 
but might also explain prior results showing hunger leads people to 
purchase more, and higher-calorie, groceries (Nisbett and Kanouse 
1969, Mela et. al 1996, Tal and Wansink 2013). 
It is possible that motivated perception effects are in fact a rar-
ity, or occur only in some cases, and our opposite effects in other 
cases. For instance, motivated perception effects may occur when a 
person needs to act to obtain a product, but not in the judgment of a 
product that’s available for use. Alternately, it may be that the level 
of consciousness of a particular goal affects whether motivated per-
ception or other effects occur. 
It may also be that motivated perception effects occur for some 
domains but not for others. For instance, physical size dimensions 
might be more easily affected by wishful seeing, while other quantity 
dimensions such as quantity and calories may not be affected. Size, 
being a more directly perceived dimension, may be biased in a direc-
tion consistent with motivated perception, while the more abstract 
dimension of calories may be affected differently, according to shift-
ing functional needs.
Our initial suspicion is that these effects constitute a case of 
functional perception. People often perceive their environment in 
terms of how it allows them to act and fulfill their needs (Gibson 
1979/1986, Schall et al. 2010, Witt et al. 2005). Rather than evalu-
ating stimuli objectively, they evaluate them in terms of how they 
fulfill current needs. Consequently, evaluations of dimension such as 
weight and calories would be distorted by current hunger. Specifical-
ly, when is hungrier and needs more food, any given quantity of food 
would appear to provide less sustenance.  This is because relative to 
one’s needs it provides less sustenance, and quantities are perceived 
not in an absolute sense, but relative to one’s needs. Consequently, 
hunger would lead to judgments of lower calories. 
The distorted food perceptions demonstrated in the current study 
may subsequently affect quantity purchased and consumed. Accord-
ingly, we might wish to help consumers debias their judgment, for 
instance by providing or stressing objective information. Consumers 
themselves may wish to be particularly careful about their judgments 
and choices under conditions that lead to biased judgment.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The classic account of escalation of commitment suggests that 
decision makers have a tendency to become locked into courses of 
action by throwing good money after bad in dealing with losing proj-
ects (Staw, 1976, 1981). Most of the research in this area has focused 
on its negative consequences, the psychological, organizational and 
project-related causes of such behaviors, and the procedures to help 
people avoid the escalation trap (Staw & Ross, 1987). Very little, if 
any, research has examined the point at which the tendency to es-
calate is triggered. The present research examines this question in 
a unique setting of consumer collections. Collection is important to 
both consumers and marketers, yet we know very little of how con-
sumer decisions about collections occur and why some collection 
programs are highly successful (e.g. Barbie dolls, baseball cards) 
whereas others fail. We propose that making a decision to collect 
(e.g. antiques, books) often originates from consumers escalating 
their commitment to something they have already had but was not 
initially intended to collect. 
Prior research has also suggested that an important explanation 
of the commitment dilemma is the decision makers’ desire to appear 
rational in their decisions (Staw, 1981). That is, by committing new 
and additional resources an individual who has suffered a setback 
could attempt to “turn the situation around” or to demonstrate the 
ultimate rationality of his or her original course of action. Relevantly, 
in the domain of collection, the point at which consumers start to 
escalate their commitment by actively acquiring more products is 
usually when maintaining the current possession level becomes dif-
ficult to justify. But at what point are individuals likely to experience 
a lack of justification with their current possessions? 
First, we propose that there are often good reasons to possess 
one item in a product series. Owning such an object, say a Starbucks 
City Mug, can satisfy consumers’ utilitarian needs. The first item in 
a collectible product series chosen by a consumer is also likely to be 
his or her favorite, thereby enhancing its value. Therefore, unless a 
decision to collect has been made, or at least entertained, consumers 
are unlikely to buy additional items of the same type. 
How then do decisions about collections occur? We propose 
that possessing a small number of collectible items could become the 
collection tipping point because it represents a disequilibrium that is 
“neither here nor there,” which is difficult to justify and thus prompt 
a change. Without an intention to form a collection, possessing a few 
items in a large collection series fails to provide the psychological 
benefits of having a collection. Even worse, whereas some collect-
ible items have utilitarian value regardless of their collection status, 
ownership of a few such items is redundant and wasteful and may also 
reflect an apparent failure as a collector. One way to resolve the con-
flict, however, is to escalate one’s commitment to start a collection. 
We conducted four studies to test these hypotheses. In study 
1, participants were endowed zero, one, or two boxes of collectible 
mints and were asked to choosing between getting another box of 
collectible mint or a different gift of equivalent value. A logistic re-
gression with condition number as independent variable and choice 
as dependent variable yielded a significant condition main effect 
(Wald χ² (2) = 4.12, ß = -.815, p < .05). Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, compared to those in the zero-mint condition, those in posses-
sion of one box of collectible mints were no more likely to choose 
another collectible mint as their additional reward (47% versus 45%, 
p = NS). In addition, we found that owners of two boxes of collect-
ible mints were significantly more likely to choose mint over the pen 
as an additional reward than owners of zero or one box of collectible 
mints (69%; Wald χ² (1) = 4.17, ß = 1.17, p < .05). 
In Study 2 participants were endowed with 0, 1, 2, or 3 collect-
ibles in a different collection domain, fridge magnets. We found that 
participants’ likelihood of starting a magnet collection differed sig-
nificantly across the four conditions (χ² (3) = 7.939, p < .05). Com-
pared to those assigned no magnet, those assigned just one were no 
more likely to choose another in the same series (32% versus 40%, p 
= NS). However, we found that those with two or three magnets were 
more likely to choose a magnet than those with zero or one (χ² (1) 
= 4.55, p < .05). The difference in the choice share between owners 
of two and three magnets, however, was not significant (58% versus 
55%, p = NS).
In Study 3 we replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in the 
collection domain of Starbucks coffee mugs.  The results of Study 3 
provided strong support for our conceptualization by demonstrating 
the mediating role of decision justification on the influence of pos-
session level on collection commitment. In addition, it shows that the 
collection tipping point effect is not affected by the total collection 
size
Study 4 showed that the effect was eliminated when owners of 
two items could easily justify their possessions, that is, when they 
perceived the two items come in a pair. We discuss the theoretical 
and managerial implications accordingly.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Most spending decisions involve conflict in one form or another. 
Even ordinary decisions like whether to dine out or eat at home can 
create conflict. Research on self-control typically studies conflicts re-
sulting from tradeoffs between product quality and price (Haws and 
Poyner 2008; Okada 2005; Wilcox et al. 2011)—situations where 
consumers contemplate purchasing attractive products that are con-
sidered indulgent, frivolous expenses (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). 
Oftentimes, however, consumers’ spending conflicts involve qual-
ity and quantity. Quantity-quality tradeoffs occur when consumers 
decide between higher-quality products in smaller numbers versus 
lower-quality products in greater numbers. For example, buying a 
single pair of designer brand shoes or spending the same amount 
of money on multiple pairs of non-designer brand shoes. Quality-
quantity tradeoffs also occur when consumers decide between high-
er-quality products in smaller volume versus lower-quality products 
in larger volume. For instance, for the same price, consumers can buy 
a small jar of premium mustard versus a larger bottle of regular mus-
tard, or a standard-sized bottle of a national brand of shampoo versus 
a jumbo-sized bottle of a generic brand. In such situations, tension 
results from the desire for better quality versus greater quantity. 
Despite their prevalence, quantity-quality conflicts remain 
largely unexplored. Moreover, although quantity considerations 
involve self-control (Wertenbroch 1998) little is known about how 
self-control affects quantity-quality tradeoffs, and it is non-intuitive 
what this effect would be. That is, because high self-control consum-
ers tradeoff quality for price, they also may prefer quantity over qual-
ity because (1) greater quantity typically reduces price on a per-unit 
basis, and (2) higher quality is typically associated with indulgent 
expenses. We propose, however, that high self-control consumers 
have an aversion to quantity, which causes them tradeoff quantity in 
favor of quality.
According to prior research, consumers believe small package 
sizes are an effective way to control consumption (Wansink and Park 
2000). The tendency to avoid larger packages is so robust that con-
sumers pay higher prices per-unit by purchasing smaller packages 
of products whose consumption they want to control (Wertenbroch 
1998). For example, regular smokers buy a single pack when they 
could save money per-unit by purchasing ten-pack cartons. This 
willingness to forgo price discounts on larger packages occurs in 
categories including potato chips, cookies, beer and ice cream. This 
research implies that consumers focused on moderating consump-
tion experience greater conflict from higher quantity, and therefore 
limit consumption quantity. In the case of high self-control consum-
ers, because they focus heavily on controlling the amount they con-
sume (Redden and Haws 2013), they should place less importance on 
quantity when facing conflicts involving quantity. Accordingly, we 
propose that when consumers face quantity-quality conflicts, higher 
levels of self-control correspond to a greater focus on controlling 
consumption. This enhanced focus on control leads high self-control 
consumers to place less importance on quantity and to select higher-
quality products in lower quantity over lower-quality products in 
greater quantity. Consequently, high self-control consumers gravi-
tate toward indulgent products, like premium quality and designer 
products, simply to avoid excessive quantity. We refer to this phe-
nomenon as quantity aversion.
Importantly, whereas most prior research has focused on con-
flicts involving indulgence, we propose that quantity aversion ex-
tends to non-indulgent product categories. This occurs because high 
self-control consumers regulate behavior across widely ranging 
situations (Tangney et al. 2004) and do so relatively automatically, 
without much conscious deliberation (Fishbach et al. 2003; Wilcox 
et al. 2009). Oftentimes, well-ingrained habits are executed not only 
in situations that require them, but also in contexts that bear strong 
resemblance to situations in which the habit was formed (Wood and 
Neal 2009). Thus, high self-control consumers may limit consump-
tion quantity as a generalized response to conflicts involving quan-
tity. Therefore, they exhibit quantity aversion even in categories that 
do not provoke concerns about over-indulgence (e.g., dishwashing 
soap). 
Five studies present conflicts involving quantity and show that 
high self-control consumers are quantity averse. Study 1 is a con-
joint study that shows that high (vs. low) self-control consumers 
place less weight on quantity in tradeoffs among quantity, quantity 
and price.  In studies 2 and 3, we reasoned that prompting high self-
control consumers to stop regulating their behavior would attenu-
ate their quantity aversion. Using a depletion manipulation, study 2 
presents a quantity-quality conflict and shows that high self-control 
consumers prefer a low quantity/high quality option (i.e., one pair of 
designer brand shoes) over a high quantity/low quality option (i.e., 
three pairs of non-designer shoes) in a no depletion condition. How-
ever, this effect is eliminated when consumers are depleted and lack 
willpower to exert self-control (Baumeister et al. 1994). Using a li-
censing manipulation, study 3 shows that quantity aversion occurs 
in a no licensing condition but is attenuated when consumers feel 
licensed to lower self-control (Khan and Dhar 2006). Study 3 also 
demonstrates that quantity aversion in a non-indulgent category (i.e., 
dishwashing soap). 
Study 4 delineates the underlying process. It shows that quan-
tity aversion does not occur in the absence of a quantity conflict, 
but facing conflict involving quantity, high self-control consumers 
focus on constraining consumption. In turn, quantity becomes less 
important and they prefer a low quantity/high quality option over a 
high quantity/low quality option (again, dishwashing soap). Finally, 
study 5 moves away from the lab and tests for quantity aversion in 
a field study. Controlling for price-per-unit-purchased, we find that 
high (vs. low) self-control consumers tend to purchase fewer items 
on a routine trip to the supermarket. 
These findings are significant because research typically con-
ceptualizes self-control failure as purchasing indulgent products and 
associates good self-control with avoiding higher-priced, hedonic 
luxuries. But we show that high self-control consumers actually 
prefer higher-priced, higher-quality options over higher-quantity op-
tions. This is surprising because greater quantity options (e.g., larger 
packages, bulk packaging) typically reduce price-per-unit, which 
should attract consumers with high self-control. Our findings are 
also novel because they suggest that encountering quantity conflict 
triggers quantity aversion (study 4), while the actual need to con-
trol consumption is less important. That is, quantity aversion occurs 
even in categories where over-indulgence is unlikely, suggesting that 
quantity aversion is an automatic response to quantity conflict. 
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Giving Time vs . Giving Money: Which is Better for Moral Cleansing?
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Time and money are both important but distinct concepts. 
Spending time allows one to feel personally connected to others 
(Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), and consider emotional meaning rath-
er than economic utility (Liu and Aaker, 2008). On the other hand, 
compared to time, money is more functional and less personally con-
nected (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009); simply the thought of money 
increases feelings of independence and reduces helping behavior 
(Vohs, Meade, and Goode, 2006).
One stream of research that has employed the concepts of time 
and money is the work on moral transgression. After committing a 
moral transgression, the transgressor is motivated to compensate in 
some way, to right their wrongs. People like to cleanse themselves 
when their moral identity is threatened, whether the cleansing be 
metaphorical or physical (Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin, 2009; Zhong 
and Liljenquist, 2006). Further, donating money and time are seen as 
substitutable methods to compensate for past bad behaviour (Sach-
deva et al, 2009; Tetlock, et al. 2002), and donating time and donat-
ing money are often interchangeable (Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz, 
1996; Bryant et al. 2003).  
Given that the psychological meaning of these two constructs is 
very distinct, compensating with time versus money should lead to 
different degrees of “cleanliness”. In other words, if people use do-
nation as a means to absolve oneself of the guilt of a past transgres-
sion, then the perceived severity of the transgression should depend 
on whether they donated time or money. Since time is associated 
with personal connection (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009) and emotional 
meaning (Liu and Aaker, 2008), it may well be the case that volun-
teering time allows the transgressor to feel closer and more self-con-
nected to the charitable cause, such that donating time, relative to 
donating money, is a more effective “cleanser”. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that money is perceived to be a tool, a means to en-
able one to attain goals (Lea and Webley, 2006; Vohs and Baumeister, 
2011). Thus, “cleansing” with money rather than time may be more 
effective because one can use money as an instrument to directly 
“pay off” the psychological debt of the immoral transgression with 
the donation. Support for this premise come from a pilot study in 
which we find that activating the concept of money rather than time 
cues exchange norms (Aggarwal and Zhang, 2006). Money-primed 
participants expressed higher levels of exchange orientation (mean-
time = 2.88, meanmoney= 3.52, F(1, 74) = 4.58, p < .04), suggesting that 
donating money may more readily cue feelings of quid pro quo, and 
thus be more effective in paying off the initial moral transgression. 
In three studies, we demonstrate that donating money and vol-
unteering time lead to different evaluations of the initial transgres-
sion. In Study 1, we show that donating money allows the transgres-
sor to feel better and less immoral about the initial transgression. 
Moral transgression was manipulated through a scenario describing 
a student cheating on an exam.  Subsequently, the participants read 
about an upcoming fundraising event held by the Leukemia Society 
for cancer research. Participants were asked to donate for the cause in 
time or in money. Results show that participants who donated money 
felt less bad about the earlier transgression than participants who vol-
unteered time (Mmoney= 3.95, Mtime = 5.48, F(1, 37) = 9.64, p < .01).
Given the greater level of exchange-orientation of money over 
time, these results suggest that donating money can directly pay off 
the “moral debt” of the initial transgression. Further, since spending 
time allows one to feel personally connected (Mogilner and Aaker, 
2009), volunteering time to a specific cause (the Leukemia Society) 
may make one feel close to it resulting in an inability to transfer 
the “moral credits” and apply them to the initial immoral behaviour 
(cheating in the exam). 
In Study 2, we examine conditions where volunteering time 
can link the moral act of compensation with the initial transgression. 
We facilitate the transfer of moral credits by making the domain of 
transgression and moral behavior the same. Participants were told to 
imagine that they had rejected a classmate from their group project 
because they felt uncomfortable with that student’s disability. Subse-
quently, they were exposed to either Transport Canada’s awareness 
campaign for environmentally sustainable transportation or access-
ible transportation for disabled people. Donation in time or money 
was sought. When the domain of the transgression and compensation 
did not match, those who donated money felt less bad about their 
transgression (Mmoney = 7.54, Mtime = 8.37, t(96) = 1.90, p = .06), 
but when the domains matched, those who volunteered time felt the 
same as those who donated money (Mmoney = 7.50, Mtime = 7.07, t(96) 
= 1.05, p = .30).
Study 3 replicates these effects using actual rather than hypo-
thetical transgressions. Participants first filled out a survey about 
their eating habits including questions about chicken and egg con-
sumption. Subsequently, they read an article about poultry farming 
practices and the inhumane conditions that chickens lived in. Next, 
they read about either an upcoming environmental event or a farm 
animals-related fundraising event, and were encouraged to donate 
time or money. Results mirrored those of Study 2. When the domains 
matched, those who volunteered time felt the same about consuming 
chickens/eggs as those who donated money (Mmoney = 3.85, Mtime = 
3.49, t(138) = .62, p = .54). When the domains did not match, those 
who donated money felt less bad about consuming chickens/eggs 
(Mmoney = 3.02, Mtime = 4.11, t(138) = 2.29, p < .05). In fact, those who 
volunteered time in a different domain felt equally bad as partici-
pants in a control group who did not compensate at all (Mtime = 4.11, 
Mcontrol = 4.34, t(138) = .64, p = .52).
These findings demonstrate that time and money are not substi-
tutes for each other for moral compensation and that compensating 
with time may be less effective in “cleansing” past transgressions. 
This work may have important implications for instances of repeat 
transgressions: if people feel cleansed subsequent to donating money, 
they may be more likely to commit similar transgressions in the fu-
ture: donating money may be better for alleviating negative feelings 
relating to the transgressions committed, but volunteering time may 
be better for restraining individuals from transgressing in the future.
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Table 1: Summary of All Results
Study 1
 Volunteering Time Donating Money
DV = Average of guilty, immoral, harmful
5.48a 3.95b
Study 2
 Volunteering Time Donating Money
DV = Average of guilty, immoral, wrong
Same Domain 7.07a 7.50a
Different Domain 8.37b 7.54a
Study 3
 Volunteering Time Donating Money
DV = Average of guilty, wrong, harmful
Same Domain 3.49a 3.85a,b
Different Domain 4.11b 3.02a
Control (no 
compensation) 4.34
 b
Note: Numbers with different superscripts are  
significantly different at p < .05
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
When do consumers prefer consistency and when will they be 
more open to change and novel choice options?  A large literature has 
investigated how aspects of the choice context and time horizon can 
affect openness to change and different options.  We propose a novel 
additional influence, determined by the self-relevance of the choice 
and how people anticipate future outcomes.  
People try to understand what leads to future outcomes, to form 
anticipations, and to change the future outcomes for the better if pos-
sible. In a world of pure certainty, the mechanism behind a causal 
process is known, and consistency is guaranteed so that predictions 
can be made based on the causal mechanism and past experiences. In 
a realistic world full of uncertainty, however, predictions are much 
harder to make. First, the causal mechanism is more complex - a sin-
gle outcome is determined by a multitude of various factors, some of 
which may even work in opposition. Second, even if a major causal 
mechanism is identified, past experiences are not specifically instru-
mental, since consistency between the past and future is indefinite. 
Earlier research on the causal reasoning behind predictions of 
uncertain events mostly focused on differences in causal mecha-
nisms (see Ahn & Kalish 2000, and Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClel-
land & Hastie, 2009 for a review). We highlight the belief in internal 
consistency (i.e. that the nature of the system relevant for the causal 
mechanism is consistent, and endorses transitivity between the past 
and the future). Following prior research, we argue that this belief 
is as importance as causal beliefs in the process of predicting future 
outcomes. If “the causal mechanism mediates between causes and 
effects” (Ahn & Kalish, 2000), then internal consistency is the link 
that connects past causal processes and future outcomes. Internal 
consistency directly depends on the active subject in the system (e.g. 
the person playing a game), upon which the mechanism belief also 
resides. Further, we propose that when optimistic or pessimistic pre-
dictions of anticipated future outcomes are formed, choices between 
maintaining or disrupting their own perceived internal consistency 
may also be affected by the anticipated outcomes.  
Consumer research has shown that choices constitute a com-
mon means of self-representation (Ariely & Levav 2000; Kim & 
Drolet 2003), with different choices reflecting different aspects of 
one’s self-concept (Stephens, Markus & Townsend, 2007). There-
fore, in this paper we look at game scenarios where people interact 
with simple objects in a short sequence and are faced with choices of 
self-relevance. We examine the role of identity continuity on predic-
tions in the pilot study and the pretest of Study 2.  Then, in Study 1 
and Study 2, we examine how the anticipation of a future outcome 
conversely affects people’s choices relevant to the continuity of self-
conception. 
First, in a simple pilot study (N=170), we used a hypothetical 
ball throwing game in which we manipulated mechanism beliefs 
(skill vs. chance), prior outcomes (success vs. failure), and the iden-
tity continuity of the subject (the same person vs. two different per-
sons). Results showed that when the same person performs, the two 
opposite mechanism beliefs lead people to opposite anticipations of 
future outcomes even based on the same prior outcomes (logistic re-
gression β=-2.48, Wald=7.30, p<.01) . But when internal consistency 
is interrupted, these predictions are suppressed (β=.693, Wald=.612, 
n.s). 
Then in Study 1 (N=203), we used a hypothetical blackjack 
game and employed a 2 (mechanism beliefs) X 2 (prior outcomes) X 
3 (future outcome present vs. absent) between-subjects design. When 
a future outcome is present, we found more participants chose a nov-
el drink that they have never had before over a drink they usually get 
in the pessimism-inducing conditions, but not so in the optimism-
inducing conditions (β=1.78, Wald=4.22, p<.05). However, when 
the future outcome is absent, no such effect was found (β =-1.51, 
Wald=2.20, n.s.) These findings suggest the differences in partici-
pants’ preference between the usual and novel choices were indeed 
associated with a consciously or unconsciously formed anticipation 
for the future outcome. 
In Study 2, we designed a real ball rolling game with monetary 
incentives, and employed a 2 (mechanism beliefs) X 2 (prior out-
comes) X 3 (self-relevance of the choice) design. We first confirmed 
in a separate pretest (N= 61) that participants formed predictions of 
the next future outcome as we predicted. Then in the main study, 
232 participants took part in both the game and a seemingly separate 
survey. First, they were asked to list three different aspects of their 
personal identity, and write a sentence describing one of the aspects. 
Then they played the game and were stopped after four rolls and 
asked to choose between elaborating on the previously chosen aspect 
of their identity (the continuity option) or writing about a new aspect 
of their identity (the discontinuity option). More participants in the 
pessimism-inducing situations chose the continuity option than those 
in the optimism-inducing situations (β=.575, Wald=4.56, p<.05). 
However, no effects were found when the choice options were ir-
relevant to one’s own self-concept, suggesting the self-relevance of 
choices was crucial in the process. Other alternative explanations 
such as reducing anxiety or mood were ruled out by content analyses. 
In sum, we find that options representing a discontinuity of self-
conception are differentially chosen, depending on the anticipated 
future outcome. When a pessimistic future outcome is anticipated, 
people prefer options reflecting discontinuity of the self-conception, 
as if to “thwart fate”, but when an optimistic future outcome is an-
ticipated, people prefer options reflecting continuity of the self-con-
ception, as if to welcome and “embrace fate”.
These findings have important implications. For example, an-
ticipated future outcomes may affect self-relevant choices such as 
their loyalty to identity-relevant brands and services. 
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Feeling Guilty About Money: How Consumers Prioritize Cleansing Tainted Money Over 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers can feel guilty about money, for instance, when they 
receive a product refund by stretching the truth or obtain a pay raise 
by exaggerating their contribution to a project. Given that consumers 
feel guilty about money, does this affect how they spend that money? 
Since feeling guilty about money signals a problem in one’s moral 
standing, it should thus encourage spending the money in ways that 
restore this threatened morality (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heather-
ton 1994; Keltner and Gross 1999; Izard 2010). But exactly how do 
people counter the threat to their moral standing exemplified by the 
guilt-tainted money? 
One possible response is to engage in moral balancing (Nisan 
1991)—people who feel guilty about money can restore their moral 
standing by participating in various kinds of pro-social activities, 
such as donating the money or volunteering time. A second possibili-
ty relies on a more generalized model of moral compensation. Rather 
than engaging in pro-social activities, the guilt may simply encour-
age people to engage in activities that improve their own welfare 
(e.g., investing in their health or education). This prediction is based 
on a perspective that views moral system to be interconnected with 
other domains of self, consequently allowing improvements in one 
domain to compensate for shortcomings in another domain (Monin 
and Jordan 2009; Steele 1988).
In contrast to these two perspectives, we propose a more spe-
cific compensation process. We argue that compensatory actions 
can be highly constrained by (1) the moral nature of guilt, and (2) 
the association between the guilt and money. First, prior research 
suggests that emotions motivate actions as a response to the emotion-
eliciting event (Frijda 1986). Thus, when guilt arises from personal 
contexts (e.g., failing to adhere to a diet goal), it will trigger actions 
that improve the self (e.g., spending on healthy food or books; Khan, 
Dhar, and Wertenbroch 2005). However, when guilt results from 
events undermining the welfare of others (e.g., cheating), it will 
motivate actions that improve others’ welfare (e.g., charitable giving; 
Haidt 2003). Second, recent findings suggest that the compensatory 
actions can be even more specific depending on whether guilt is as-
sociated with money or not. De Hooge et al. (2011) demonstrate that 
guilt motivates pro-social behaviors focused on victims, rather than 
a general pro-social orientation. Also, Levav and McGraw (2009) 
show that feelings can be attached to money and these feelings as-
sociated with money influence how consumers spend that money. 
These findings indicate that guilt can be attached to money, and this 
association between guilt and money may limit the compensatory ef-
forts to pro-social actions that involve the tainted money, just as they 
were limited to actions that involved the victims. Therefore, while 
people who feel guilty about money would spend this money pro-so-
cially, they would not engage in pro-social actions that do not involve 
the money (e.g., donating untainted money and volunteering time). 
Our predictions suggest that consumers focus on cleansing money 
rather than redeeming themselves. If they aim at moral redemption, 
they would prefer giving time over money (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 
2007). 
Study 1 examined whether guilt promotes virtuous spending in 
general or only those specific to its moral domain. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: moral guilt, non-
moral guilt, and control. All participates read a scenario in which 
they received a refund. While participants in both guilt conditions 
felt guilty about their refund, only those in the moral guilt condi-
tion felt guilty because of a transgression; those in the non-moral 
guilt condition felt guilty due to a private self-control failure. Next, 
participants indicated how likely they were to spend some of the re-
fund on various spending categories. The results confirm that unlike 
non-moral guilt, moral guilt uniquely increases pro-social spending, 
but not other forms of virtuous spending for self or close others.
Studies 2 and 3 tested whether the guilty spend money pro-so-
cially only when the guilt is associated with the money (consistent 
with a motivation to cleanse the tainted money) or also when it is 
elicited by reasons unrelated to the money (consistent with a striving 
for general moral balance). For instance, in study 3, all participants 
took part in an Implicit Association Test to measure their prejudice 
against disabled people. Whereas the control group received money 
simply for participating in the test, a second group received mon-
ey because they qualified for a follow-up study due to their strong 
prejudice against the disabled. Compared to participants in the con-
trol, those who received the money because of their alleged preju-
dice engaged in increased pro-social spending. However, people in 
a third group, who also received a negative test result but received 
money as a reward for their participation (not for the test result), 
did not show any increase in pro-social spending. The studies show 
that guilt promotes pro-social spending when it is directly associated 
with the money being spent, more so than when guilt is unrelated to 
the money.
Study 4 demonstrates that guilt associated with money increases 
preference for giving money over giving time to charities—even 
though volunteering time can be more effective at compensating for 
moral failures (Reed et al. 2007). Study 5 shows that those who lied 
for a refund uses that refund more pro-socially, but not their other 
money—even though money should be fungible. These findings 
indicate that the compensatory actions do not reflect a generalized 
drive for moral remedy, but rather a specific desire to remove the 
unpleasant guilt attached to money. 
Finally, in Study 6, we measured feelings about money either 
before or after participants’ donation decision and find a reduction 
in guilt after the donation. The result confirms the effectiveness of 
people’s attempt to cleanse their tainted money by spending it pro-
socially.
Our results show that compensatory efforts that arise from guilt 
can be strikingly specific when guilt is moral in nature and is associ-
ated with the money being spent. This specific compensation process 
indicates that people’s specific desire to cleanse tainted money is 
more powerful than their quest for general moral redemption. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This study examines long-term consumer temptation. We chose 
the context of consumers enrolled in a debt management program 
(DMP) as their history of getting into debt, and relatively constrained 
resources should result in high temptation to spend. In 2011, more 
than 3 million consumers received financial counseling and educa-
tion from a consumer credit counseling service (CCCS). The Nation-
al Foundation for Credit Counseling (NFCC) has 90 member agen-
cies and 700 offices throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico (National 
Foundation for Credit Counseling), (2013). The program only works 
if consumers are able to live within their means and pay off their 
debts. Consumers in the program work with counselors to design 
their budgets with little room for discretionary spending.
Research on temptation originates in psychology, where self-
regulation theory predicts giving into or resisting various short-term 
temptations (cf. Baumeister 2002; Tice, Baumeister et al. 2007; 
Faber & Vohs 2004; Vohs and Faber 2007). These studies usually 
measure short-term self-regulation and involve small temptations. 
Our research focuses on the lived experience of temptation while in 
a DMP. Consumers in a DMP are especially likely to face difficult 
tradeoffs between long-term goals and short-term temptations that 
have real consequences for their financial well-being.
The contributions of this study are four-fold: 1) we examine 
long-term rather than short-term temptation; 2) we find financial edu-
cation alone is not sufficient to enable DMP members to counteract 
temptation; 3) our results suggest the concept of impulse purchasing 
should be better conceptualized; and 4) we find a link between self-
discourses when tempted and success or failure in the DMP.
Detailed description of Studies and Data
In fall 2010, a local CCCS identified participants in their DMP 
(a five-year program) who have email addresses. The President of 
CCCS sent an initial email explaining the study; we provided a link 
to enroll in the study and accepted participants until the sample size 
reached 100. Participants received an email with a questionnaire link 
once each week for the next 11 weeks (total of 12 weeks of participa-
tion). Participants were compensated for their participation.
Several open-ended questions were included in the survey to 
provide insight into participants’ thinking and emotions regarding 
weekly temptations. The authors read all open-ended responses relat-
ed to temptations and goals vertically (across weeks) and developed 
thematic categories iteratively (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). Then the authors split the cases into 4 groups with 
each author reviewing cases horizontally such that each case was 
read across all weeks. Based on our analysis, we identify two general 
categories of DMP participants: program-focused and temptation-
sidetracked. 
Discussion of Results/Conclusion
DMP program-focused participants are successful at resisting 
temptation; they set specific spending goals each week, and track 
their spending as taught by their CCCS counselors. When faced 
with temptation, they remind themselves of their goals and values, 
and most importantly, exercise counteractive control (Fishbach, 
Friedman and Kruglanski 2003; Trope and Fishbach 2000; Zhang, 
Huang, and Broniarczyk 2010). Program-focused participants often 
report positive emotions after resistance in a temptation episode, 
narrating that they are “free,” “successful,” or even “victorious.” 
Temptation-sidetracked behavior may or may not have an effect on 
participants’ ability to succeed in a DMP.  Smaller temptations may 
be considered over weeks and worked into the budget, even if the 
money has to be pulled from other budget categories.  However, ex-
pensive temptations (even when resisted) or smaller temptations that 
are not considered or delayed are associated with failure in the pro-
gram. Temptation-sidetracked consumers who ultimately fail in the 
DMP program engage in avoidance (Roth and Cohen 1986) when 
tempted or alternatively, when they do resist, extreme negative emo-
tions are evident.
Our findings suggest that temptation-sidetracked behavior is a 
category conceptually different from impulsive or compulsive pur-
chasing as presently conceptualized (c.f. Beatty and Ferrell 1998; 
O’Guinn and Faber 1988; 1992; Rook and Hoch 1985; Rook 1987; 
Vohs and Faber 2007).  Impulse buying is typically defined as buy-
ing that is spontaneous and not deliberative (c.f. Beatty and Ferrell 
1998). But impulse purchasing may or may not have consequences 
for consumers. For example, participants in impulse buying studies 
have described their primary purchase emotion as “carefree” (Rook 
and Gardner 1993) and some report putting aside money to spend 
impulsively (Rook and Hoch 1985; Stilley et al. 2010). The major 
difference between the temptation-sidetracked behavior in our study 
and impulse shopping is that temptation-sidetracked behavior may 
be either spontaneous or elaborately considered over weeks. While 
they do experience “go” emotions such as “rush” and “excitement,” 
temptation-sidetracked consumers never used the word “carefree” 
or any synonym to describe their emotions when tempted. As with 
impulse shopping, temptation-sidetracked behavior may or may 
not be problematic, depending upon whether or not DMP consum-
ers work the tempting item realistically into their budget. Moreover, 
temptation-sidetracked consumers appear to enjoy the products they 
purchase rather than shopping just to shop, and thus do not fit into 
traditional conceptualization of compulsive shopping (O’Guinn and 
Faber 1988; Faber and O’Guinn 1992). 
Our research of temptation suggests that impulsive purchasing 
needs to be better conceptualized as some behavior traditionally de-
fined as impulse purchasing is fun, enjoyable, and affordable while 
other impulsive purchase behavior is problematic because of avoid-
ance or resistance of boundaries. This study contributes to the con-
sumer compliance behavior literature  (Dellande, Gilly, and Graham 
2004) by showing that failure occurs when temptations are highly 
unrealistic relative to goals and/or when responses to temptation are 
automatic, avoidant, or angry. For credit counselors and policymak-
ers, our research suggests that the tools for managing money, debt, 
and temptation should include more than learning how to budget and 
track spending. Without the ability to associate the challenge of re-
sisting temptation with financial success and goal achievement, some 
individuals cannot actuate the budget management tools they learn 
in the DMP. In addition, our research suggests that participants may 
benefit from learning to anticipate that stress, hunger, special events, 
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sales and clothing items are likely to trigger temptations that will 
require active resistance. Future research should determine if and 
how resistance to temptation in the moment can be better developed 
among DMP consumers.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
From Stone Age pottery, to Renaissance paintings and modern 
luxury watches, there is strong evidence that using objects as status 
symbols is at the core of human behavior. This phenomenon has been 
widely studied across various research disciplines. 
Given that signaling high status through products (for instance, 
through luxury products) is a prevalent behavior, we examine the 
underlying factors that make a product most suitable for status sig-
naling. In other words, we accept that a lot of consumers want to 
signal high status (socio-economic-status, SES) through the products 
they consume and we try to understand the characteristics a product 
needs to have so that it is preferred over another product as a means 
of status signaling.
In this article, we propose an answer to this question, a construct 
that we call natural scarcity. Although scarcity has been frequently 
studied as a factor that enhances the value of products we contend 
that only in situations where a product of excellence is produced by 
naturally constrained resources, such as the unique skills of a crafts-
man, or scarcely available raw materials, will enhance the value of 
product in the context of status signaling. Other means of scarcity, 
such as artificial scarcity induced by the marketer, are much less ef-
fective in the long run. Typically, luxury goods are supposed to be 
of superior performance, made by hand, from traditional brands, re-
quire craftsmanship, have exclusive designs, or are limited editions, 
etc. As we will argue, natural scarcity provides the necessary mecha-
nism to explain such instances (and all others). It explains under what 
circumstances a product’s performance matters and when products 
would signal high-status even when they are not made by hand or do 
not require craftsmanship. It is important to mention though that our 
intention is not to define when a product should be called a luxury 
product and when not, but to explain the underlying mechanism that 
makes a product a more suitable signal for high socio-economic sta-
tus and this mechanism could also apply to products that are not typi-
cally considered luxury products, such as collectibles (e.g. stamps) 
or premium products. As we will show, suitability for status signaling 
also correlates with the product’s perceived value.
It seems intuitive that having access to scarce resources signals 
status. However, research has not been very clear about how spe-
cific forms of scarcity affect product valuation. On the one hand, just 
making a bad product appear scarce does not necessarily enhance its 
status signaling value. But we also hardly ever observe limited edi-
tions from excellent cell phones, computers, or TVs. According to 
the basic microeconomics market model, when supply is low and de-
mand is high, the price (as an indicator of perceived value) goes up. 
Yet, in line with signaling theory we argue that for a signal to be an 
efficient (or to function as an honest signal, which means that a true 
high status individual is able to signal his true underlying qualities 
(i.e. having high status) with this signal) signal of high status it must 
be hard to imitate from low status individuals. For example a US$50 
watch from a supermarket would not function as a suitable signal for 
the underlying trait of high SES, because it can easily be bought by a 
low SES individual who wants to pretend signaling high SES. On the 
other hand an expensive Patek Philippe mechanical watch of which 
the company produced only five and which can only be acquired from 
members of the brand’s most selective collectors club is an efficient 
signal for high SES, because low SES individuals neither would have 
the financial resources nor the access to the collectors club to own 
one these watches. Natural scarcity provides the underlying basis 
for such honest signal, because when a highly demanded product of 
excellence also requires naturally constrained resources to produce, 
it is the best guarantee that it cannot be mimicked by imitators. For 
example, the reason why there are only few pieces from a very exclu-
sive Patek Philippe watches is not because the company artificially 
restricts production, but because such a high-level of precision can 
only be done by a small number of highly skilled watchmakers who 
could not produce more units without compromising the quality of 
the watch (because then they would have less time to spend work-
ing on one single watch). On the other hand, the design, planning, 
and construction for an iPhone also require extraordinary skills, but 
once it goes to manufacturing, producing a higher number of units 
would not affect the performance. To produce more iPhones, one just 
needs to let the assembly line work longer, whereas producing more 
Patek Philippe mechanical watches would decrease the performance 
and level of excellence of every single watch. In this context, natural 
scarcity serves as a better signal of high SES, because the person 
who owns such a product can be sure that only few people would 
own such a high quality product. We test these hypotheses with three 
experimental studies where participants rated product scenarios in 
various contexts of natural scarcity. Study 1 shows (similar to the 
argumentation above) that handmade products are only perceived 
as suitable means for status signaling if the production is naturally 
scarce. In study 2 we demonstrates how even fully machine-made 
products can be considered as high status signaler under the context 
of natural scarcity (e.g. when it requires high skills to monitor pro-
duction of every single unit). Finally study 3 extends the concept 
to décor elements and examines under what conditions a naturally 
scarce décor element can add value (and increase it’s high SES sig-
naling capacity) depending on the product’s functional performance. 
The implications of our research is that natural scarcity provides 
an important construct to explain various phenomena in the context 
of product valuation. It is probably one of the central factors to de-
termine both a product’s suitability for high SES signaling and its 
perceived value. It can furthermore account for various factors and 
variables that have been frequently been suggested as driving factors 
for product valuation. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Mass customization (MC) systems allow firms’ customers to 
create unique, self-designed products (Franke and Schreier 2008; 
Moreau and Herd 2010). Field evidence, however, indicates that 
only a minority of consumers use the full individualization potential 
of these systems by configuring products with unique options (e.g., 
configuring a red pearl car instead of a black one). This consumer 
segment is of considerable interest to firms given their potential im-
pact on product diffusion and enhanced profit margins. Therefore, 
the present research aims to better understand the nature of this im-
portant segment.
Who are the consumers who select unique product options when 
mass-customizing a product and what motivates them to do so? Ini-
tial conceptual research suggests that answers to these questions may 
reside within the narcissistic personality trait (Sedikides et al. 2007). 
In the light of recent research showing that narcissistic consumers 
have a strong preference for scarce products (Lee and Seidle 2012), 
our general premise is that some consumers who configure unique 
products may be doing so in order to be “special,” as an expression 
of their narcissistic personalities. In particular, we argue that narcis-
sistic consumers are anxious to stand out in order to appear unique, 
as well as to command attention and admiration of others, with both 
processes influencing product configuration. For narcissists, the pur-
chase and consumption of unique products is likely to serve as an 
important interpersonal strategy to project a colorful lifestyle to the 
public (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). In terms of marketing, nar-
cissistic consumers should be more likely to desire unique product 
options and thus to configure distinctive products via MC systems, 
in order to act in accordance with their narcissistic personalities. To 
date, only little research has addressed the narcissistic consumer at 
the empirical level. In response, we explored the impact of consum-
ers’ narcissistic tendencies on the uniqueness of configured products.
In a pilot study, we established that recent car buyers scoring 
high on narcissism tended to use online car configurators more often 
and chose product options that were selected by few other consum-
ers (see table 1). Further, they more frequently purchased a new (vs. 
used) car and also paid a higher price for it. Building on these real-
world findings, our experimental studies began by showing narcis-
sists as more likely to configure unique products. In study 1, par-
ticipants configured a car using a mock-up online car configurator, 
allowing us to determine the uniqueness of participants’ product con-
figurations by an objective measure (built around actual percentage 
shares of the selected product options obtained from the car manu-
facturer). We found that a consumer’s level of narcissism is a signifi-
cant positive predictor of how unique a product is configured in an 
online MC system (while controlling for demographics such as age, 
income or car expertise), with narcissists’ enhanced need for unique-
ness and feelings of superiority mediating this effect (see table 1). In 
addition, narcissistic consumers configured more expensive products 
(compared to less narcissistic ones), given that unique product op-
tions are more expensive than common ones. These results suggest 
that unique configured products help express the narcissist’s person-
ality and their tendency to self-enhance (as expressed by their sense 
of superiority). Therefore, MC systems seem to be ideal tools for 
narcissistic consumers.
In study 2, we built upon study 1’s findings by demonstrating 
that consumers react differently to feedback on their product’s degree 
of uniqueness contingent upon their narcissistic tendencies. After 
participants configured a car by means of the mock-up car configura-
tor, they were believed that their configuration was compared against 
the manufacturer’s database. Depending on the experimental con-
dition, they were then provided with “unique feedback” (“average 
feedback”), stating that no similar car (many similar cars) were con-
figured within the same year. When told that their configured product 
was unique (vs. average), the narcissist felt more pride of author-
ship and was thus less willing to modify the original configuration. 
These effects were less pronounced for the non-narcissist (see table 
1). Building on consumers’ ability to save a product configuration 
for later reference, study 3 then examined the longitudinal configura-
tion process. Therefore, consumers configured their preferred car and 
were then asked to repeat their choices four times over the course of 
a one-day workshop. While narcissistic (vs. non-narcissist) consum-
ers were more convinced of their initial product configuration, they 
changed it more often when having the opportunity to do so (see 
table 1). It appeared that the configured product had lost its unique-
ness appeal over time, which is why narcissists altered their product 
more often than non-narcissists did.
While MC systems are inherently designed to allow the indi-
vidualization of products, few consumers using MC systems take ad-
vantage of this fact and actually configure unique products. Our ex-
perimental studies indicate that narcissists, whose incidence rates are 
steadily increasing around the globe (Twenge et al. 2008), are likely 
to account for some of the heterogeneity associated with unique 
product configuration within MC systems. This consumer segment is 
of particular interest within the realm of customizing a product, giv-
en that these consumers systematically deviate from the mainstream 
in order to define their unique identity with unique products. In the 
light of initial evidence showing that narcissistic mind states can be 
primed (Sakellaropoulo and Baldwin 2007), these findings may have 
the potential to make a difference for firms offering MC systems as 
well as for researchers studying these devices.
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Table 1: Main Results of The Empirical Studies
Study (N) Main results
Pilot 
(N=107)
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a car buyer, the greater the number of surcharge options selected on a car 
(narcissism main effect: β = .23, t = 2.22, p < .05).
Study 1 
(N=213)
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more unique the product configuration (narcissism main effect: 
β = .17, t = 2.52, p < .05).
The positive relationship between narcissistic tendencies and product configuration uniqueness is mediated by need for 
uniqueness (indirect effect a1 x b1 = 2.08, 95% CI: .19, 4.73) and feelings of superiority (indirect effect a2 x b2 = 4.14, 
95% CI: .57, 8.08).
Study 2 
(N=190)
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more (less) pride of authorship  
of the configured product in the case of “unique feedback” (“average feedback”)  
(feedback x narcissism interaction: β = .05, t = 2.32, p < .05).
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the less (more) willingness to reconfigure the product in the case 
of “unique feedback” (“average feedback”)  
(feedback x narcissism interaction: β = .05, t = 2.11, p < .05).
Study 3 
(N=50)
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more likely a product configuration will be altered over several 
configuration rounds (narcissism main effect:  
β = .26, t = 2.68, p < .05).
The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the less convinced the consumer is of the product configuration 
over several configuration rounds (round x narcissism interaction:  
β = –.04, t = –2.54, p < .05).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Suppose you had the option to choose between a healthy (e.g., 
salad) and an unhealthy (e.g., chocolate cake) food item, with one 
item placed on your left visual field and the other item placed on your 
right visual field. Would the lateral (left vs. right) visual field posi-
tions of the healthy versus unhealthy items influence your choices?
Prior research has examined different factors that could influ-
ence choices between healthy versus unhealthy food items, such as 
the body type of people in the surroundings (McFerran et al. 2010), 
package cues of the products (Deng and Kahn 2009), and affective/
cognitive states (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999), among others.  Howev-
er, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has examined the effects of 
presenting healthy versus unhealthy options in different lateral visual 
fields on consumer choices. In this paper, we examine this research 
question through the help of four experiments. The results of our 
studies suggest that a healthier food option is more likely to be se-
lected when it is placed on the left (vs. right) visual field. 
Choices between healthy versus unhealthy food items involve 
tradeoffs between temptation and self-control (Dhar and Werten-
broch 2012). Our theorizing is based on the prior research in spatial 
representation of magnitude, which has found that individuals tend 
to map increases in magnitude as moving from left-to-right (Cohen 
Kadosh, Lammertyn, and Izard 2008), which is applied to any do-
main that can be described in more/less terms (Holmes and Lourenco 
2011). We extend the previous literature by studying how this left-to-
right mental representation of magnitude affects consumption deci-
sions between a healthy and an unhealthy product. Specifically, we 
expect that presenting food items in a structure consistent with the 
way consumers organize food mentally (i.e. healthy on the left and 
unhealthy on the right) will increase processing fluency and hence 
help consumers override any automatic predisposition for the un-
healthy food item. In sum, we hypothesize that there will be greater 
preference for the healthy food options when it is placed on the left 
(vs. right) of the unhealthy food item. Four experiments test our hy-
potheses. 
Study 1 examined if presentation of two food items (healthy 
vs. unhealthy) on the left versus right visual fields might influence 
choices. Consistent with our hypothesis, a greater proportion of par-
ticipants chose the healthy option when it was on the left (vs. right) 
visual field. 
Study 2 examined the behavioral outcome of consumption vol-
ume when participants are able to consume both the healthy and the 
unhealthy items, placed in the different visual fields. In addition, 
Study 2 also examined the moderating effects of priming health-
concerns on the effects driven by the left-to-right organization of 
magnitude.  The results of this study revealed that when the food 
products were arranged congruently with the left-to-right direction 
of magnitude, consumption of the healthy and unhealthy product 
when the health prime was not made accessible was comparable to 
the amount consumed when there was a health prime present. On the 
contrary, when the organization of the products was incongruent with 
the left-right orientation of magnitude, there was a tendency to drink 
more from the unhealthy item (vs. the healthy one) unless a health 
prime was present.
Study 3 examined a boundary condition for the results observed 
in Study 1. Specifically, Study 3 examined the moderating effects 
of deprivation state (in form of hunger). The results of this study 
showed that under low hunger, consistent with the findings of Study 
1, a greater proportion of participants chose the healthy option when 
it was on the left (vs. right) of the unhealthy food item. In contrast, 
and as hypothesized, these effects got attenuated when the choices 
were made under high hunger. 
Finally, Study 4 examined visual field effects on choices. The 
results of this study show that when the items are processed in a com-
patible direction to the left-to-right magnitude orientation, consum-
ers tend to prefer the healthy option to the unhealthy one. However, 
when the food items are processed from right-to-left, the results are 
attenuated. These results provide some evidence that it is the left-to-
right mental organization of food items and not sequential processing 
(i.e. seeing the healthy item first) that is driving the proposed effects.
In conclusion, the results of four experiments show that prefer-
ences for the healthy options are higher when they are placed to the 
left of an unhealthy food item. In addition, we show that placing the 
healthy item on the left leads to less consumption of the unhealthy 
item. We also identify deprivation state (in the form of hunger) as a 
boundary condition to this effect. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first research to examine how lateral visual field positions (left 
vs. right) of healthy and unhealthy items might influence choices be-
tween them. From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this re-
search provide further insights into how consumers organize healthy 
and unhealthy food items mentally and how this organization affects 
consumption choices. This is especially relevant given rising obesity 
rates worldwide.
REFERENCES
Cohen Kadosh, Roi, Jan Lammertyn, and Veronique Izard (2008), 
“Are Numbers Special? An Overview of Chronometric, 
Neuroimaging, Developmental and Comparative Studies of 
Magnitude Representation,” Progress in Neurobiology, 84 (2), 
132-47.
Deng, Xiaoyan and Barbara E Kahn (2009), “Is Your Product on 
the Right Side? The “Location Effect” on Perceived Product 
Heaviness and Package Evaluation,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 46 (6), 725-38.
Dhar, Ravi and Klaus Wertenbroch (2012), “Self-Signaling and 
the Costs and Benefits of Temptation in Consumer Choice,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 49 (1), 15-25.
Holmes, Kevin J and Stella F Lourenco (2011), “Common Spatial 
Organization of Number and Emotional Expression: A Mental 
Magnitude Line,” Brain and cognition, 77 (2), 315-23.
McFerran, Brent, Darren W Dahl, Gavan J Fitzsimons, and Andrea 
C Morales (2010), “Might an Overweight Waitress Make You 
Eat More? How the Body Type of Others Is Sufficient to Alter 
Our Food Consumption,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20 
(2), 146-51.
Shiv, Baba and Alexander Fedorikhin (1999), “Heart and Mind in 
Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer 
Decision Making,” Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (3), 
278-92.
752 
Advances in Consumer Research
Volume 41, ©2013
Matching Motivations and Incentives to Combat Tire Pressure Neglect
Mike Yeomans, University of Chicago, USA
David Herberich, University of Chicago, USA
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Energy efficiency plays an increasingly important role in policy 
because it addresses rising energy prices and the negative externali-
ties of energy consumption  from pollution. Although the develop-
ment of more advanced “green” technologies is a possible long run 
solution, the adoption of such solutions is questionable because, even 
today, many conservation efforts and technologies are routinely ne-
glected.  This is particularly perplexing to researchers because the 
immediate personal benefits alone often outweigh the observable 
costs of conservation (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Hausman & Joskow, 
1982). For example, government estimates suggest tire pressure un-
derinflation is common, at roughly 75% of the domestic personal 
vehicle fleet (USDOT, 2001), even though drivers stand to benefit 
by facing the small cost of tire inflation: properly inflated tires can 
substantially improve fuel efficiency (between 2-3%) and reduce ac-
cidents by improving stopping speed and preventing tire blow-outs 
(NHTSA, 2005).  We address this discrepancy by presenting results 
from a field experiment designed to test possible solutions.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first analysis of tire 
pressure in the social sciences.  We chose this setting because it is 
an economically significant behavior in its own right, and our unique 
experimental design allows us to compare competing theories of 
consumer behavior in a real-world, real-stakes context. We begin by 
documenting widespread “tire pressure neglect” through conducting 
spot-checks at gas stations throughout Chicago. In designing treat-
ments, we considered three theories for tire pressure neglect: 1) Lack 
of information, both about the savings from tire pressure and their 
own tire pressure level; 2) High upfront costs, exaggerated by pres-
ent bias; and 3) Inattention to the social consequences of neglect. Our 
treatments varied the incentives offered, and the framing used, to test 
between these three accounts They were also crossed in a way that 
also might induce an “overjustification effect”, which would predict 
that incentives are not as effective when they conflict with internal 
motivations (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Gneezy, Meier & Rey-
Biel 2011). 
Analyzing our results, we found that information alone had al-
most no effect on tire inflation rates, even though the average driver 
who had one or more low tires (78% of our sample) would have 
saved at least $10 over the next four months (in 2010 gas prices), 
translating to a marginal wage of over $125/hour. When small in-
centives, such as paying the $0.50 air pump fee or helping with the 
inflation, our intervention saved roughly $30/hour in short-term gas 
saving alone, and $48/hour in the single most effective treatment. 
The two incentives (free air or help) also differed depending on 
what framing was used - describing tire pressure neglect as a social 
concern increased the likelihood of tire inflation when offered help 
(32.9% of Intent To Treat) relative to when air was free (17.3%). 
However, when pressure neglect was framed as a personal concern, 
customers were more likely to inflate with free air (23.9%) than with 
help (11.6%).
From a policy perspective, this study is limited since we can 
only observe tire pressure decisions made that day – in that sense, 
we treat inflation as a one-time investment in energy efficiency over 
the medium-term, rather than as a strategy to curtail energy-intensive 
behaviour (Stern & Gardner, 1981). We believe our results apply to 
many other efficiency investments, which tend to be both more effec-
tive at reducing energy consumption, and yet under-appreciated as a 
conservation strategy, compared to curtailment (Attari et al., 2010). 
However, a comprehensive account of tire pressure neglect would 
also consider the long-term effects of intervention, where issues like 
procrastination and habit formation become more important, and tire 
inflation might more closely resemble a curtailment behavior. In par-
ticular, our results support the use of small incentives to motivate 
behaviour, even on a scale that might seem trivial compared to the 
obvious benefits of the behaviour.
The results of this study can inform many real-world efforts 
to encourage pro-social behavior. Existing promotions for energy 
conservation have mixed monetary incentives (such as cash rebates) 
with social motives (protecting the environment), where our results 
suggest that switching either to non-monetary incentives (such as 
free delivery) or monetary motives (saving on energy costs) may be 
more effective. This applies not just to energy efficiency but also to 
other pro-social domains where mixed motives are present. As a gen-
eral rule, where neglect is the dominant state of affairs, we reject the 
common dichotomy between psychological approaches that focus on 
persuasive appeals, and economic approaches that focus on incentive 
structures. Rather, we argue that getting the most out of either ap-
proach requires a careful understanding of both.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There is growing consumer interest in things that are “un-
spoiled, pristine, genuine, untouched, and traditional” (Handler 
1986, 2); and this is captured in a wide variety of market offerings 
and experiences such as retro brands (Brown, Kozinets and Sherry, 
2003), reality shows (Rose and Wood 2005), retail environments 
(Peñaloza 1998), among a host of other examples. Past studies em-
pirically demonstrate how postmodern conditions such as globaliza-
tion, deterritorialization, and hyperreality (Arnould and Price, 2000) 
motivate consumer demand for cultural authenticity. The impact of 
postmodernity is undeniably potent, yet it may easily lead scholars to 
conceptualize the desire for the “authentic” as solely a reaction to the 
loss of meaning and disenchantment.  This perception leads some to 
declare authenticity a “hoax” (Potter 2010).  More importantly, the 
obsession with postmodernism leads to overlooking the importance 
of history, thereby portraying an incomplete understanding of cul-
tural authentication (see Peñaloza 2001 and Oswald 1999 for notable 
exceptions). Ohnuki-Tierney (2005) argues that scholars’ obsession 
with postmodernism “has led some to deny histories, even in the plu-
ral, of a particular people” (Ohnuki-Tierney 2005, 181-183). Calls 
have also been made in consumer research to not only explore “cul-
tural history through the commodity form” (Arnould and Thompson 
2005, 876), but also note the importance of history as a “source of 
market value” (Peñaloza 2000, 105) and a “cultural maker of legiti-
macy and authenticity” (Brown, Kozinets, and Sherry 2003, 19).
In response to these calls, we present an empirical examination 
of cultural authentication and show how during this on-going process 
consumers creatively use history, drawing from historical events and 
cultural artifacts with historical significance. We use Pierre Nora’s 
(1989) definition of history as “how our hopelessly forgetful modern 
societies, propelled by change, organize the past.” (p. 8). We con-
ducted a multi-site ethnography of African Americans in African 
clothing to understand how consumers reflexively seek and enact 
elements of their cultural heritage as they investigate and perform 
an ethnic identity. Over a one-year time frame, we interviewed eight 
core informants a minimum of nine times each (i.e. at least three 
times each in three different consumption settings). We also observed 
informants, often spending 6-8 hours a day for several weeks with a 
single informant.
Our data show that representing resistance, journeying to the 
‘Motherland, and educating one’s own, are authenticating practices 
African American consumers engage when wearing African clothing. 
We find the process of cultural authentication involves seeking heri-
tage and enacting heritage, which are informed by consumer authen-
ticating practices. Seeking heritage finds consumers inquiring what 
is “authentic” when it comes to the cultural-roots of African-Amer-
icans and searching to define what is African-American. It is more 
than a reaction against a postmodern marketplace, which threatens 
authenticity with simulation of reality and superficial performance 
of identity (Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Beverland and Farrelly 2010; 
Leigh, Peters, and Shelton 2006; Rose and Wood 2005).  Rather, it is 
about investigating or exploring one’s heritage in the context of nev-
er having known but mostly imagined one’s historical ancestors and 
ancestral nation. When consumers seek heritage they attempt to cre-
ate a space in which to explore the (in)authenticity of African and Af-
rican American-ness and to search for a collective identity. Enacting 
heritage finds consumers legitimizing their cultural heritage through 
performance.  Unlike authoritative acts which engage cultural dis-
plays like festivals and rituals to make explicit what the membership 
of the community of participants regard as significant life moments 
(Arnould and Price 2000), our consumers enact performances where 
the expectancy-disconfirmation model of consumer satisfaction do 
not apply (Deighton 1992).  Taken together, seeking heritage and en-
acting heritage present cultural authentication as both a reflexive and 
dialectic process, something to which previous cultural authentica-
tion research did not account.  This view of cultural authentication 
supports previous work theorizing ‘integration’ or ‘incorporation’ as 
important components of cultural authentication (Arthur 1997) and 
acculturation (Peñaloza 1994), respectively; yet it also extends this 
work by revealing the process of ‘disintegration’ at work. Further, it 
captures the inherent dynamism of history and culture, where his-
tory allows the consumer to reconstruct what is no longer, to manage 
the inherent cross-fertilization of the African and American identities 
and to create a quilted understanding of their ethnic identity.
Our findings support the idea that the authentic and inauthentic 
co-exist (Grayson and Martinec 2004) and that there is often inter-
play between the two.  They also support the notion of paradox as 
an important element of authenticity (Rose and Wood 2005).  How-
ever, a number of important differences exist. First, paradoxes that 
consumers experience are not always elicited by postmodern forces 
and reactions to threats of inauthenticity inherent in postmodernism; 
instead they may arise from gaps in consumer historical knowledge 
with respect to established meanings and the desire to understand 
what is authentic and what is inauthentic.  Second, the paradoxes 
that exist are not always between differing ‘known’ texts; that is, the 
consumer may not be reconciling tensions between what they know 
(albeit subjectively) to be either real or fantastic.  While our consum-
ers do ‘imagine’ and create fantasy that are inconsistent with histori-
cal facts, they do not realize the meanings they assign are inaccu-
rate.  Therefore, unlike Cohen’s tourists (1979) or reality television 
viewers, who are able to distinguish between “people like me” and 
“storybook characters”, our consumers are often less capable of dis-
tinguishing the real and unreal parts of their culture. Third, because 
our consumers are not dealing with known texts, our work shows the 
paradoxes that confront consumers are not so much ‘negotiated’ as 
they are ‘investigated’. The findings also contribute to discourses on 
cultural authenticity by calling attention to the role and importance 
of history; and that authentication may not only reflect consumer de-
sire for truth and genuineness (Grayson and Schulman 2000; Trilling 
1972), but equally important, may reflect consumer desire to explore 
and investigate—with the consumer an active agent in this very re-
flexive and dialectic, temporal process.
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Embodied Gentleness Effect: The Influence of Hand Movements on Food Preferences
En Li, Central Queensland University, Australia
Donnel Briley, University of Sydney, Australia
Gerald Gorn, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Imagine that you have just finished some hand grip exercises, or 
you have just finished putting together a puzzle. You find some grapes 
and apples on the kitchen table. Which fruit would you choose to eat?
These scenarios depict a common consumption phenomenon 
where consumers engage in certain hand movements prior to mak-
ing seemingly unrelated food decisions. Hands are one of the most 
frequently used body parts in consumers’ daily life so it is not sur-
prising that consumer judgments and decisions can be shaped by 
hand sensations and movements (e.g., Elder and Krishna 2012; Hung 
and Labroo 2011; Krishna 2006; Krishna, Elder, and Caldara 2010; 
Krishna and Morrin 2008; Lee and Schwarz 2010; Peck and Shu 
2009; Peck and Wiggins 2006; Xu, Zwick, and Schwarz 2012). This 
paper contributes to this realm of research by examining the influ-
ence of incidental hand movements on consumer food preferences. 
Specifically, we focus on how hand movement gentleness could 
shape consumer attitudes toward food with different haptic hardness 
(Klatzky and Lederman 1992, 1993).
The embodied cognition literature suggests that perceptual-
motor patterns are an integral part of the multimodal representation 
of concepts (Barsalou 2008). Hence, the sensations a person feels at 
any given time can drive experiences offering similar sensations to 
become more accessible in the memory. Thus, making gentle hand 
movements (e.g., using a sensitive computer mouse setting) causes 
a host of “gentle touch” activities (e.g., eating food with low haptic 
hardness) to become more “top of mind.” As a consequence, these 
highly accessible activities could be preferred more than less acces-
sible activities (e.g., eating food with high haptic hardness), because 
the former is more “top of mind,” and therefore easier to simulate 
and activate. Hence the embodied cognition literature would posit 
that making gentle hand movements should lead to increased prefer-
ences toward food with low (vs. high) haptic hardness. Moreover, 
the accessibility of the “gentle touch” experiences could be increased 
through hand movements primed both temporarily and chronically 
(Higgins 1996), and this embodied gentleness effect could appear 
when the haptic cues are physically available and when they are only 
verbally communicated (Krishna and Morrin 2008). Three studies 
were conducted to test these predictions.
Study 1 examined the impact of hand movement gentleness on 
the choice between verbally communicated food options with dif-
ferent haptic hardness (sliced apples vs. grapes). Participants were 
randomly assigned to use a computer mouse with fast pointer speed 
in the high gentleness condition or slow pointer speed in the low 
gentleness condition. Both the haptic hardness difference of the food 
stimuli (p’s < .001) and the hand movement gentleness difference 
under the mouse manipulations (p < .01) were confirmed in pretests. 
Consistent with our prediction, the choice of grapes was higher in the 
high gentleness condition (73%) than in the low gentleness condition 
(55%; χ2 = 4.15, p < .05).
Study 2 extended and replicated the findings of Study 1 with a 
different dependent variable (attitude and purchase intention rather 
than consumption choice) and a different domain of food product 
(drinks rather than fruits). Participants were randomly assigned to 
four conditions, based on a 2 (hand movement gentleness: high vs. 
low) × 2 (cup hardness: soft vs. hard) between participants design. 
At first participants used high or low gentleness mouse to complete 
a few computer tasks. Then, they were asked to taste and evaluate 
spring water filled in soft or hard cups. The results indicated a sig-
nificant interaction of hand movement gentleness with cup hardness 
(F(1, 154) = 4.64, p < .05, ‟p
2 = .03). As expected, when the soft 
cup was used, contrasts revealed more positive attitudes and pur-
chase intention among participants with high (vs. low) hand move-
ment gentleness (M (high gentleness) = 4.18 vs. M (low gentleness) 
= 3.56; p < .05). When the hard cup was used (i.e., under the control 
condition), however, hand movement gentleness didn’t affect par-
ticipants’ attitudes and purchase intention toward the spring water 
(M (high gentleness) = 4.03 vs. M (low gentleness) = 4.18; p > .50).
Study 3 examined the possible boundary condition of the em-
bodied gentleness effect. Existing literature suggests that individu-
als low (vs. high) in self-monitoring are more sensitive to internal 
states (DeMarree, Wheeler and Petty 2005). Hence, low (vs. high) 
self-monitoring consumers would be more likely to make their food 
choices based on their internal states, including bodily sensations 
involved in gentle hand movements. Therefore, the embodied gen-
tleness effect should be more prevalent among low (vs. high) self-
monitoring consumers. In Study 3 participants used a normal mouse 
(under medium pointer speed) to complete a few computer tasks, 
including the Revised Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox and Wolfe 
1984). Then, they were asked to make refreshment choice between 
sliced apples and grapes and indicated how long they had been us-
ing smartphones. The results revealed a significant smartphone his-
tory × self-monitoring interaction (χ2 = 4.09, p < .05). Among low 
self-monitoring participants, smartphone history length had a posi-
tive effect on the choice of grapes (χ2 = 7.53, p < .01). However, no 
smartphone history effects emerged among high self-monitors (χ2 = 
.03, p > .85). These results suggest that using smartphones leads to 
a higher likelihood of choosing grapes in the refreshment decisions 
and this effect is apparent among low rather than high self-monitors. 
Hence, consumer activities such as using smartphones can provide 
chronic priming of gentle hand movements and give rise to the em-
bodied gentleness effect.
The current research explores whether the enactment of gentle 
hand movements affects consumer food preferences. We find that 
making gentle hand movements can lead to increased preferences 
toward food with low (vs. high) haptic hardness and that this em-
bodied gentleness effect is robust under both temporary and chronic 
hand movement priming and salient on both verbally communicated 
refreshments and spring water served in cups. Furthermore, our evi-
dence also shows that this embodiment effect is moderated by indi-
vidual differences in self-monitoring.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often make inferences by observing the behavior of 
others in the marketplace. These inferences can provide important in-
formation for our own judgments (Asch 1956; Yaniv et al 2011) and 
purchase decisions (Chan and Berger 2012; Wang et al 2012). For 
example, the market share of smartphone brands indicates the pro-
portion of consumers who choose a certain brand. What, if anything, 
does such information tell us about users’ preferences for competing 
options in the market? Most likely, the consumer who has chosen 
an iPhone perceived more value from that model than others, but by 
how much? Such inferences are likely to affect our perception of dif-
ferent brands, and may even influence our own consumption choices. 
To address this issue, our research investigates the inferences that a 
prospective consumer makes about the evaluations of prior consum-
ers, based on their choices. We show that the degree to which  previ-
ous consumers are perceived to distinguish between competing op-
tions depends on overall choice share and various contextual factors. 
In a market setting where two options (brands) compete and 
each is chosen by some consumers, a split in choice share suggests 
that the two consumer groups favored each option for different rea-
sons. Building on correspondence inference theory (Jones and Da-
vis 1965), we suggest that observers will be differentially impacted 
when an option is chosen by the majority group vs. the minority 
group. Because majority judgments tend to be perceived as a bet-
ter reflection of reality (Nemeth 1986), choice of an option by the 
majority indicates the likely presence of advantages for which there 
is widespread agreement. Therefore, we hypothesize that observers 
will generally assume the majority group to perceive greater differ-
ences between competing options than the minority group.
Choice share information also reveals the level of consensus 
among consumers. Higher-level consensus makes the likely advan-
tages of the majority choice (mentioned above) especially plausible. 
As a result, greater overall consensus should lead observers to expect 
that the majority group perceives even larger differences between 
competing options, while the minority group perceives smaller dif-
ferences.
Finally, we expect characteristics of the product itself to impact 
inferences made from choice share information. Affect-rich products 
tend to be evaluated by use of one’s feelings, while affect-poor prod-
ucts tend to be evaluated by objective criteria and, therefore, more 
sensitive to differences (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004). If observers 
believe that larger differences are necessary to distinguish evalua-
tions of two affect-rich products than two affect-poor products, then 
the same choice share information should result in greater perceived 
differences for affect-rich options. 
We examined our hypotheses with two experiments involving 
hypothetical decision scenarios. The dependent variables were infer-
ences made by participants from choice share information. Study 1 
used a mixed factorial design including five factors: choice, majority 
membership, consensus, product type, and awareness. For each of 
four decision scenarios (presented within-subjects), undergraduate 
participants (N = 151) were given choice share information for two 
competing options. Participants were asked to predict the expected 
average rating given each option by both the majority group and the 
minority group. 
Not surprisingly, analyses revealed that predicted average rat-
ings were significantly higher for the chosen option than the forgone 
option. More important, we observed a significant two-way between 
choice and majority membership, through which the perceived dif-
ference in rating between the two options was larger for the majority 
group than the minority group. In addition, we observed a significant 
choice × majority membership × consensus three-way interaction 
effect, indicating that the effect just described was stronger in the 
high-consensus condition than the low-consensus condition. Finally, 
the choice × product type two-way interaction was significant, and 
the pattern of means suggested the difference in perceived ratings 
between the two options was larger for the affect-rich product than 
the affect-poor product.
The results of study 1 provided initial evidence that inferences 
based on choice share information follow a systematic pattern. The 
goals of study 2 were to explore potential consequences of such a 
pattern while replicating the findings of study 1. Specifically, we ex-
amined whether inferences derived from choice share information 
would be consistent with actual choices based on the same informa-
tion. 
The design of study 2 was similar to study 1 with three changes. 
First, participants (N = 182) were asked to make an additional deci-
sion after each of the four original decision scenarios. These new de-
cision scenarios had their own cover story and presented a choice be-
tween two options with different average ratings. The average ratings 
were generated individually for each participant, by combining the 
choice shares for each of the four earlier scenarios with participants’ 
predicted average ratings for those scenarios. As a result, a form of 
preference reversal would be observed if a participant’s choice in 
the original decision scenario differed from that participant’s choice 
in the new decision scenario. The second change was to drop the 
awareness manipulation. Finally, we counterbalanced the order of 
product type.
Analyses of predicted average ratings revealed a pattern con-
gruent with that of study 1. Analyses of the new choice variable were 
conducted by comparing the frequency of preference reversal across 
conditions. We observed a significant effect of product type, such 
that participants were more likely to make inconsistent choices for 
affect-rich products. In addition, we observed reliable differences in 
the occurrence of preference reversal across consensus levels: choic-
es were more consistent when consensus was high rather than low.
Our research identifies several factors affecting inferences 
based on choice share information. Participants inferred that mem-
bers of the majority group perceived greater difference between com-
peting options than members of the minority group, and this effect 
was amplified under high levels of consensus. In addition, partici-
pants inferred that others’ sensitivity to perceived product differences 
was greater for products that were affect-rich than those that were 
affect-poor. These findings have important implications for research-
ers exploring social influence and interpretation of social statistics, 
and for practitioners managing products at varying positions in the 
marketplace.
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Table 1: Inferred Expected Ratings of Forgone/Chosen Options
Study Product Consensus level Minority chooser Majority chooser
Forgone option Chosen option Forgone option Chosen option
1
Music
Low 
consensus
5.14 7.33 4.80 7.51
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
High 
consensus
4.56 6.53 3.57 8.14
(0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13)
Stereo
Low 
consensus
5.46 7.27 4.68 7.50
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
High 
consensus
5.05 6.28 4.06 8.13
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11)
2
Music
Low 
consensus
5.04 7.26 4.80 7.30
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
High 
consensus
4.68 6.97 4.16 7.98
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11)
Stereo
Low 
consensus
5.42 6.66 4.85 7.14
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
High 
consensus
5.47 5.93 4.46 7.65
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers never before had the opportunity to customize such 
a wide variety of products. An increasing number of companies are 
offering web-based services that allow customers to design their 
own customized products. Allowing people to express their prefer-
ences attribute-by-attribute can benefit consumers and retailers by 
decreasing the complexity of choice, increasing product satisfaction, 
and leading to greater purchase likelihood (Huffman and Kahn 1998; 
Schreier 2006; Valenzuela, Dhar, and Zettelmeyer 2009). However, 
providing such opportunities for customization may not be uniform-
ly beneficial to all consumers. For example, consumers’ responses 
to customized offers may be affected by their degree of preference 
development as well as their insight into their own preferences (Si-
monson 2005). In this paper, we argue that the type of configuration 
format predominantly used in mass customization (MC) systems can 
lead to more local information processing, ultimately leading to de-
creased purchase intentions and diminished post-choice evaluations 
of the configured product.
This research builds on prior work demonstrating that informa-
tion processing styles can easily be triggered by and carried over to 
other tasks (Förster and Dannenberg 2010). Most MC systems are 
designed as a bottom-up process where consumers configure their 
product in multiple sequential steps by choosing feature or style 
elements attribute-by-attribute. For instance, to configure a car, a 
consumer would first select the model type, then the exterior color, 
followed by the type of rims, and so on. Focusing on a sequence 
of individual attributes rather than the complete product may trig-
ger more local processing, as consumers engage in less mental 
simulation of the whole configuration. Such sequential processing 
can increase consumer’s hopes (Mogilner, Shiv, and Iyengar 2013), 
inadvertently leading to suboptimal choice outcomes. Moreover, 
focusing on each attribute likely reduces mental simulation which 
has been shown to impact post-choice evaluations (Escalas 2004). 
In contrast, choosing from a set of ‘off the shelf’ alternatives (by-
alternative) likely increases global processing, as consumers can 
see the product in a more holistic manner and make cross-attribute 
comparisons simultaneously. This focus on the product as a whole 
better enables consumers to select a product whose attributes fit well 
together. Thus, contrary to intuition, customizing a product can make 
consumers worse off in some circumstances than simply choosing 
from available alternatives.
In two studies, we examined configuration formats (by-attribute 
vs. by-alternative customization) utilizing a simulated online car 
configurator of a European automotive manufacturer. In study 1, the 
by-attribute condition allowed participants to customized their car 
attribute-by-attribute, selecting a value (e.g., silver) for each of six 
attributes (e.g., exterior color). In the by-alternative condition, par-
ticipants chose from a set of six prespecified alternatives (i.e., com-
pletely configured cars), consisting of random selections of the same 
six attributes. Processing style was measured using the Kimchi simi-
larity task (Kimchi and Palmer 1982) where participants were shown 
a triangle made up of smaller triangles and had to indicate which 
of two other figures (e.g., a square made of triangles or a triangle 
made of squares) was more similar to this target. Results confirmed 
that consumers in the by-attribute (vs. by-alternative) configuration 
format engaged in increased local processing as measured by the 
Kimchi similarity task.
The design of study 1 allowed participants to select from nu-
merous values on each attribute, similar to the way MC systems are 
usually used by retailers and manufactures. Although higher in ex-
ternal validity, this design allowed for a greater number of possible 
combinations in the by-attribute condition than in the by-alternative 
condition. To control for the potentially confounding influence of dif-
ferent amounts of possible option combinations between conditions, 
study 2 used a reduced configuration set where the total number of 
prespecified alternatives represented all possible combinations of the 
same three attributes of the by-attribute condition (2 model types x 
3 exterior colors x 2 rims). Measures included choice satisfaction, 
pride of authorship, purchase intention, and degree of mental simula-
tion of the configured product.
Replicating study 1, the by-attribute (vs. by-alternative) con-
figuration format led participants to process in a more local manner. 
Moreover, participants in the by-attribute condition indicated lower 
choice satisfaction and pride of authorship relative to participants 
assigned to the by-alternative condition. Importantly, the by-attribute 
configuration format substantially decreased consumers’ purchase 
intentions. Mediation analyses using three serial multiple mediation 
models with processing style as first mediator and mental simulation 
as second mediator indicates that increased local processing stem-
ming from the by-attribute configuration format led to less mental 
simulation of the product, negatively affecting ultimate choice satis-
faction, pride of authorship, and purchase intention.
Together these studies demonstrate that the typical MC format 
of by-attribute customization can lead to unintended consequences 
for consumers. Contrary to prior research demonstrating positive 
effects for allowing consumers to customize products, the results 
of this research demonstrate that a by-attribute customization for-
mat was generally associated with less favorable outcomes than the 
by-alternative format and that processing style plays a central role 
within that process. As society places greater emphasis on consumer 
self-expression, the demand for and availability of individualized 
and customized products is ever increasing. Surprisingly, little re-
search has examined the effect of various MC systems on consumer 
choice outcomes. This research highlights that there is further need 
for examining the impact of configuration system formats. Future 
research should also examine whether global processing is gener-
ally favorable or whether there are conditions where increased local 
processing can be beneficial. 
In summary, the contribution of our research is twofold: We 
demonstrated that the format of configuration (by-attribute vs. by-
alternative) has an impact on individual styles of information pro-
cessing. Furthermore, we presented evidence that increased local 
processing and decreased mental simulation stemming from a by-
attribute customization format can make a difference to both con-
sumers (by decreasing their product satisfaction and pride) and firms 
(by diminishing consumers’ intentions to purchase the product).
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Table 1: Main Results of Studies 1 and 2
By-
attribute
By-
alternative
M M t
Processing styles (study 1) 1.75 2.41 1.85*
Processing styles (study 2) 1.35 2.00 1.74*
Choice satisfaction 5.40 5.82 1.72*
Pride of authorship 5.12 5.77 1.90*
Purchase intention 55 75 2.44**
Note. Whereas study 1 used an extensive configuration set, study 2 used a 
reduced configuration set. Processing styles ranged between 0 and 3 (higher 
numbers indicate a global processing style), choice satisfaction and pride of 
authorship were inquired on a 7-point Likert scale, and purchase intention 
was measured as a percentage value.
* p < .05; ** p < .01
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Faces provide insights into the traits and characters of indi-
viduals. For example, attractive individuals are often perceived (or 
stereotyped) as having more positive personality traits and success-
ful life outcomes (Eagly et al., 1991). Similarly, Ekman and Friesen 
(1974) demonstrated that individuals can perceive deceptive intent 
from facial structure and expression. Beyond face shape, symmetry 
and other structural characteristics, a more interesting component of 
impression formation is the dynamic nature of the face. The ability to 
accurately identify emotions in the face has been the subject of con-
siderable research, particularly in the area of emotional intelligence. 
Abilities to recognize and interpret facial expressions vary based on 
the individual (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).
Several scales have been created to measure individual abilities 
in the recognition of emotions; one popular scale is the Mayer, Sa-
lovey, and Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). Salovey 
and Mayer (1990) described Emotional Intelligence as “the ability to 
monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to discriminate 
among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking an 
actions.” According to the theories of Emotional Intelligence, the de-
gree to which people are good at monitoring their own emotions and 
those of others around them is likely to differ.
Existing scales rely solely on static photographs of expres-
sion, threatening ecological validity (Carroll & Russell, 1997; Tian, 
Kanade, & Cohn, 2001) and intense expressions, which may mask 
the subtle effects of dynamic displays, thereby failing to include 
the importance and authenticity of motion to facial expression and 
perception (Ambadar et al, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the use of dynamic views in face perception research assists in 
emotion recognition, producing greater levels of accuracy than static 
views (Back, Jordan and Thomas, 2009.)
The overall purpose of this research is to create an instrument 
that will include dynamic and natural stimuli to identify whether 
individuals vary in their ability to identify and interpret facial ex-
pressions and to examine the implications of these (in)abilities on 
marketplace outcomes (e.g., job performance). Five studies exam-
ine individual abilities to identify and interpret facial expressions 
through the creation and validation of an instrument to measure these 
abilities.
Study 1 includes the development of a three component instru-
ment (FEIS): static recognition of facial emotional expressions, ac-
curacy of interpreting emotional expressions in different contexts, 
and the impact of dynamic facial expressions in emotion recognition. 
Muscular movements of the face were coded by facial expression 
recognition software programmed utilizing the Facial Action Coding 
System (Ekman and Friesen 1978). A series of static photographs, 
photographs embedded in a context, and dynamic videos were pre-
sented to study participants. Results of study one indicate that par-
ticipants exhibit a range of expression identification abilities.
Quartiles of each component were computed. Belonging to the 
first quartile meant scoring below the twenty-fifth percentile of facial 
expression identification scores, the second quartile meant scoring 
between the twenty-fifth and fiftieth percentile, the third quartile 
meant scoring between the fiftieth and seventy-fifth percentile, and 
the fourth quartile meant scoring amongst the top twenty-five percent 
of all facial expression identification scores. We would expect indi-
viduals who score poorly on component one (i.e., at the 25 th percen-
tile or lower) to score poorly on each individual task. A one-way be-
tween subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of each 
task on the overall component score. There was a significant effect 
of task on the overall component score (i.e., belonging to a particular 
quartile) at the p<.01 level for happy (F(3,238)=37.107, p=.000), an-
ger (F(3,238)=49.372, p=.000), disgust (F(3,238)=49.177, p=.000), 
sad (F(3,238)=43.790, p=.000), surprise (F(3,238)=38.682, p=.000), 
fear (F(3,238)=27.297, p=.000) and neutral (F(3,238)=41.631, 
p=.000). Furthermore, the mean scores by quartile demonstrate lin-
ear graphical trends. Interpretation and dynamic scores were com-
puted separately and demonstrate similar results, all significant at the 
p<.01 level.
Study 2 tests the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
scale by comparing the FEIS with existing scales of emotional intel-
ligence, namely the MSCEIT. Pearson correlations were conducted 
to test the relationship of the proposed instrument and its components 
with an existing scale (MSCEIT) and its four branches. Results in-
dicate the first component of the FEIS (Identify) is correlated sig-
nificantly with the MSCEIT total score (r(96) = .323, p<.01). This 
low-level correlation is expected given that both the first component 
of the FEIS and the MSCEIT measure a participant’s evaluation of a 
facial expression in a photograph. The second and third components 
(Context and Video), however, are not correlated with the total emo-
tional intelligence score provided by the MSCEIT, suggesting there 
is minimal overlap between the two instruments. The overall score 
for the FEIS and the MSCEIT exhibit a low-level correlation (r(96) 
= .255, p<.05). This pattern of results indicates that the MSCEIT and 
the FEIS examine distinct constructs. 
Structural equation modeling was used to examine the char-
acteristics of the FEIS model. The model, including the three com-
ponents of the FEIS scale and the MSCEIT (with its four compo-
nents), fits well (χ² (13) = 14.364, p = .35; CFI = .987, TLI = .980, 
SRMR = .047, RMSEA = .033 [90% CI = .000, .109]. All regression 
coefficients for the model components were significant at the .05 
level. This evidence provides support for the discriminant validity of 
the FEIS and its hypothesized structure.
The FEIS demonstrated acceptable test-retest reliability with 
a significant Pearson correlation of .79 for the overall score (r(85) 
=.79, p <.01) in Study 3. 
Studies 4 and 5 examine the face and predictive validity of the 
scale. Results indicate that marketing majors perform better than ac-
counting majors on the FEIS scale (Study 4) and that individuals 
with better emotion recognition ability, i.e., those who score higher 
on the FEIS scale, perform better in negotiation tasks (Study 5).
The current paper contributes to our understanding of market-
place metacognition (Wright 2002), persuasion knowledge (Fries-
tad and Wright 1994), and our knowledge and understanding of the 
intentions of others in the marketplace. Specifically, facial expres-
sion recognition can serve as an interpretive tool when assessing the 
goals and tactics of marketers.  FEIS also contributes to the social 
and emotional intelligence literatures by focusing on facial emotion 
recognition and creating an instrument that includes real-time, dy-
namic views of the face.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In most retail contexts, managers usually have flexibility in con-
trolling the ambient light intensity. Hence, not surprisingly, stores 
and restaurants vary greatly in terms of ambient light intensity with 
some stores and restaurants being very bright (e.g. Bed, Bath and 
Beyond, Chipotle) and others being very dim (e.g. Hollister) or even 
pitch dark (e.g. The Opaque Restaurant Chain). Along these lines, 
would the ambient light intensity in a store or restaurant influence 
consumers’ choices between vice and virtue products? We focus 
mostly on choices between healthy (virtue) and unhealthy (vice) 
food items, but we also test the robustness of our findings in a non-
food budget allocation context.
Building on prior research streams, two alternative hypotheses 
can be proposed. First, research in the domain of sensory compensa-
tion would suggest that deficiency or weakness in one sensory in-
put tends to get compensated with better processing of stimuli from 
other sensory inputs (Hoover et al. 2012; Kolarik et al. 2013). Based 
on this literature stream, it can be proposed that diminished ambient 
light would lead to increased sensitivity and alertness in the non-
visual modalities. If this holds, a consumer is more likely to choose 
the virtue/healthy item when the ambient light is dim (vs. bright). In 
contrast, research in the domains of sleep behavior and disinhibition 
will predict an opposite pattern of results. Specifically, consumers 
might be more mentally alert and less sleepy in bright (vs. dim) light, 
because among other physiological changes, bright light suppresses 
melatonin, which is the primary controller of circadian (day/night) 
sleep bio-rhythms (Lowden et al. 2004). Thus, consumers would 
be less mentally alert in dimly (vs. brightly) lit environments, and 
therefore less likely to rely on cognitive effortful processing when 
choosing between virtue and vice products. Second, consumer de-
cision-making would more disinhibited in dim (vs. bright) ambient 
light since dark/dim lights give people a sense of illusory anonymity 
and encourage moral transgressions (Zhong et al. 2010). Thus, theo-
ries related to both mental alertness and disinhibition would predict 
greater preference for vices/unhealthy foods when the ambient light 
is dim (vs. bright). 
Across four studies (two conducted in the laboratory and two 
in the field), we examine the effect of ambient light on consumers’ 
choices and in the process test the two competing hypotheses dis-
cussed above. In Study 1A, a field experiment at a restaurant, we 
have restaurant diners choose between healthy (i.e. fruit cup) and 
unhealthy (i.e. cheesecake) food items in dim or bright ambient 
lighting and find a greater preference for the unhealthy food item 
in dim (vs. bright) lighting. In Study 1B we extend these findings to 
a non-food budget allocation task and have participants allocate a 
budget of windfall money to fun and necessary activities. The results 
show that participants allocate a greater proportion of the budget to 
fun items in dim (vs. bright) ambient lighting. In addition, process 
evidence suggests that participants are more mentally alert in bright 
(vs. dim) lighting. Overall, the results of Studies 1A and 1B provide 
support for the hypothesis based on theories related to ambient light 
influencing sleep behavior but do not provide support for the sensory 
compensation or disinhibition models. 
In Study 2 we investigate the underlying process driving greater 
preference for vices in dim (vs. bright) lighting in further detail by 
manipulating mental alertness through the use of a highly alerting 
(vs. neutral) ambient scent. We argue that if decreased mental alert-
ness in dim ambient lighting is driving the greater preference for un-
healthy foods then this effect should be attenuated when a highly 
alerting ambient scent is present in dim lighting. In support of our 
theorization, we find that in the presence of a highly alerting ambient 
scent the increased preference for unhealthy (vs. healthy) foods in 
dim lighting is diminished. 
While Studies 1-2 employed forced choice tasks Study 3, an-
other field study at a restaurant, involved unobtrusively recording 
diners’ food choices. We varied the ambient light intensity (dim vs. 
standard vs. bright) in the restaurant and unobtrusively recorded 
restaurant diners’ orderings from the regular restaurant menu. Con-
sistent with the findings from the previous laboratory studies, the 
results show that restaurant diners order the unhealthy menu items to 
a greater extent in dim (vs. bright or standard) lighting. 
Overall, the results of four experiments show that dim (vs. 
bright) ambient light enhances choice for vices across food and non-
food domains. This finding has strong practical relevance since man-
agers can typically control ambient light levels in most stores and 
restaurants. Thus, they might be able to manipulate ambient light 
intensity to drive preferences. 
Table 1: Summary of Empirical Findings
Study Dim Ambient Light Bright Ambient Light
1A
Field study, 
n=73
Chocolate 
Cake vs. 
Fruit Salad
Proportion Choosing Healthy
44%a
*
Proportion Choosing Healthy
70%b
*
1B
Lab study, 
n=77
Fun vs. 
Necessary 
Activities
Mean amount 
to Fun
$397.22a
Mean amount 
to Necessary
$602.78b
Mean amount 
to Fun
$281.48c
Mean amount 
to Necessary
$728.57d
2
Lab study, 
n=95
Chocolate 
Cake vs. 
Fruit Salad
Proportion Choosing Healthy Proportion Choosing Healthy
Neutral
42%a
Alerting Scent
65%b, d
*
Neutral
62%c, d
Alerting Scent
69%c, d
3
Field study, 
n= 118
Regular 
Restaurant 
Menu
Dim
Proportion 
Choosing 
Healthy
29%a*
Regular
Proportion 
Choosing 
Healthy
51%b
*
Bright
Proportion 
Choosing 
Healthy
62%b*
Proportions with different subscripts are  
significantly different at p < .10
* indicates significantly different at p <.05
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When More Than One Negative Emotion is Elicited: How Suppressing or Expressing One 
Allows the Other to Raise its Ugly Head
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
An ad from an award-winning campaign for the World Wildlife 
Fund shows penguins rummaging through trash with the tagline 
“The future is man-made.” It suggests how, in the absence of human 
stewardship, greed and overconsumption are ruining the planet. 
Advertising like this is commonplace and typically elicits different 
emotions. For example, thinking about the plight of various species 
that are disappearing may elicit sadness. However, thinking about 
the actions that lead to this decline in biodiversity may elicit anger 
too. How do attempts to regulate these different feelings affect the 
downstream effects they can have? 
Although past research on affect has emphasized the need to 
examine different emotions (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), much 
of this work does not address how exposure to stimuli that elicits 
more than one emotion (Lau-Gesk 2005; Williams & Aaker, 2002) 
has an impact on judgments of unrelated targets. For instance, 
in the example above, does sadness have an effect on subsequent 
unrelated judgments? Or are we more influenced by anger? Or, do 
both emotions exert an influence? And, under which conditions is the 
effect of each more dominant? 
Several possibilities exist. First, the emotion elicited most 
intensely might be the only one to have an impact on current and 
subsequent judgments. Second, other emotions elicited to a lesser 
degree ad might also have an effect if considered applicable to the 
judgment situation. Third, the downstream effects of the different 
feelings experienced might depend both on whether the dominant 
feelings are expressed or suppressed, and on the passage of time. 
For instance, imagine that a single stimulus (e.g., a print ad) elicits 
two different negative emotions. One of these (e.g., sadness) might 
dominate the other (e.g., anger). Suppressing the dominant emotion 
might lead to a post-suppression rebound similar to that observed in 
thought suppression research (Wegner, 1994). This rebound effect 
might temporarily overpower the weaker emotion, lessening its 
impact. Expressing the dominant emotion, on the other hand, might 
have a cathartic effect, thereby allowing other less intense emotions 
to manifest. Although the effects of catharsis are unclear, with some 
prior studies showing that the effects of emotions are accentuated 
with catharsis and others showing that they are attenuated, work by 
Watkins (2004) suggests that an experiential mode of expressing 
emotions might be adaptive whereas an evaluative mode of analyzing 
emotions might be maladaptive. Following this work, we suggest that 
expressing the dominant emotion might have cathartic effects (i.e., a 
reduction of that emotion). However, if other less dominant emotions 
are being experienced (e.g., anger), catharsis of the dominant emotion 
might allow less dominant ones to be more evident.
How might these effects change if some time passes after 
suppression or expression of the dominant emotion? If the dominant 
emotion is expressed during ad processing and catharsis takes place, 
the less intense emotion would be allowed to surface, leading to 
catharsis as well. In this case, with the passage of time we would 
likely see further reductions in both emotions. 
If the dominant emotion is suppressed, however, the passage 
of time might lead to a reversal of the initial effects observed: The 
rebound effect that initially overpowered the less intense emotion 
would likely subside after a while, allowing the less intense emotion 
to finally surface (perhaps even with renewed force!), impacting 
behavior. 
We examined this in three experiments. In experiment 1 (N = 
72), participants saw an ad that elicited sadness (more dominant) and 
anger (less dominant). Participants were either instructed to suppress 
sadness, or not given any specific instruction. A lexical decision task 
followed, to assess the relative accessibility of sadness and anger 
emotion concepts. As expected participants were faster in responding 
to sadness- than to anger-related words (F(1, 58) = 75.77, p < .001). 
However, there was also a significant interaction (F(2, 58) = 3.15, p 
= .05): The difference in reaction times to sadness vs. anger-related 
words was greater when participants were instructed to suppress 
sadness (492 vs. 576 ms) than when they were not (499 vs. 553 ms; 
t(58) = 1.99, p = .055). Thus, suppressing the dominant emotion not 
only increased its salience but also diminished the extent to which 
the less dominant emotion was accessible. 
Experiment 2 (N = 104) varied whether participants expressed 
or suppressed the dominant emotion, as well as the time at which 
emotions were measured. In the immediate conditions the dependent 
measure came right after viewing the ad. Participants in the delay 
condition were told that questions about the ad would be asked 
after a while and completed two filler tasks first. Even though all 
participants felt equally sad (all Fs < 1), levels of anger depended 
jointly on instruction and time of measurement (F(1, 99) = 5.74, p = 
.02). When instructed to express sadness, anger did not vary with time 
(M immediate = 4.73; M delay = 4.23; t(99) = .61, p = .5). However, when 
instructed to suppress sadness, time had a big effect: Participants felt 
less angry initially than after a while (M immediate = 3.88; M delay = 6.16; 
t(99) = 2.77, p = .01). Interestingly, also, instruction and time jointly 
influenced the extent to which participants blamed corporations for 
the environmental problems seen in the campaign (F(1, 100) = 5.45, p 
= .02). Immediately, expressing sadness led to blaming corporations 
more than suppressing sadness (7.23 vs. 6.15; t(100) = 1.97, p = .05). 
After a delay this pattern was reversed (though not significantly so, 
6.85 vs. 7.58, t(100) = 1.32, p = .18).
The results of Experiment 3, not discussed in detail here 
because of space constraints, converged with those of experiment 
2. They showed that the less dominant emotion was more likely to 
manifest when participants expressed the dominant emotion. As a 
consequence, actions of companies in unrelated situations were 
seen as more blameworthy when these lower-level (less dominant) 
feelings were allowed to manifest.
Our experiments showed how the suppression and expression 
of different emotions that are elicited by the same ad could impact 
evaluations in both related and unrelated situations. Our results not 
only contribute to the literature on emotion regulation, but also our 
paper is one of the first to examine how this emotion regulation 
works in a context when more than one emotion is elicited.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Television and movie characters who wear white clothes are the 
“good guys” and those who wear black ones are the “bad guys”. In 
the English language, “black-hearted” means wicked and evil, while 
the idiom “pure as driven snow” refers to moral cleanliness. People 
often associate white colours with moral concepts such as purity and 
goodness, and black colours with immoral concepts such as con-
tamination and evilness. These psychological associations between 
white, black, and morality are likely engrained into human existence. 
People more readily identify positive words in a white font than 
negative words in a black font (Meier, Robinson, and Clore 2004; 
Sherman and Clore 2009), and they perceive gray colours as lighter 
when evaluating positive words but as darker when evaluating nega-
tive ones (Meier et al. 2007). 
Drawing upon findings from priming research, we posit that 
exposure to white products increases propensity for prosocial be-
haviours while exposure to black products increases propensity for 
non-prosocial behaviours. For instance, people exposed to elderly 
concepts walk slower (Bargh et al., 1996) and people primed with 
professor stereotypes score higher on academic tests (Hansen and 
Wänke 2009). These priming effects occur because environmental 
cues activate related concepts in the self that then guide behaviour 
(Wheeler et al., 2007). 
In addition, we posit that mere colour exposure leads to consis-
tent moral behaviours, but interacting with the colours leads to com-
pensatory moral ones. The moral licensing literature has found that 
people who behave morally subsequently behave immorally (Miller 
and Effron 2010), while people who behave immorally subsequently 
behave morally (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006). We hypothesize that 
buying white products will lead to moral licensing, whereas buying 
black products will lead to moral compensation. Although a white 
sofa is not inherently more moral than a black sofa, but because 
the colours white and black imbue products with moral meaning, 
buying the product (in contrast to viewing the products) allows the 
consumer to engage with the product. Hence, buying the white sofa 
should make the individual feel as if she has behaved morally, thus 
leading to licensing; conversely, buying the black sofa should make 
the individual feel as if she has behaved immorally, thus leading to 
compensation. 
In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that exposure to white prod-
ucts cause people to “do good”, while exposure to black products 
cause them to “do bad”. Participants saw pictures of four black or 
white products. All participants indicated how much they liked each 
product. They then indicated how likely they would perform four 
prosocial and non-prosocial behaviours. Participants who saw white 
products scored higher (M = 5.07) on prosocial intentions than those 
who saw black ones (M = 3.07), t(48) = 2.52, p < .02.
In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that colour can imbue prod-
ucts with symbolic meaning beyond the inherent function or pur-
pose of the product. Participants saw either a hedonic or utilitarian 
product. They then indicated whether it was a vice or a virtue, and 
whether it was something that they want to or something that they 
should buy. As expected, the utilitarian product was more virtuous 
(M = 7.04) than the hedonic product (M = 5.80), F(1, 148) = 18.50, p 
< .001. More importantly, white products, both hedonic and utilitar-
ian, were more virtuous (M = 7.09) than black products (M = 6.35), 
F(1, 148) = 13.76, p < .001. 
The colour of the product can affect how virtuous the product 
is perceived to be. Hence, buying white products should lead to li-
censing, while buying black products should lead to compensation. 
Rating these same products, on the other hand, should lead to be-
haviours that are consistent with the moral meanings of the colours. 
Experiment 3 used a 2 (store: white vs. black) × 2 (task: rate vs. 
buy) between-subjects design. Participants entered a simulated on-
line store with either predominantly “white” or “black” products. In 
each condition, half of the participants rated the products; the others 
selected five products to purchase. Participants were entered into a 
draw for $2 and they could donate any amount of it to Greenpeace. 
In the store with white products, rating participants donated more to 
Greenpeace (M = $0.89) than buying participants (M = $0.48), t(39) 
= 2.56, p < .02. But in the store with black products, rating partici-
pants donated less (M = $0.47) than buying participants (M = $0.72), 
t(56) = 1.88, p < .07. 
Buying for oneself is a form of action that directly links to the 
self-concept to facilitate the perception of having done good or bad 
from buying white and black products. We demonstrate in Experi-
ment 4 that these buying vs. rating effects only hold when one is 
buying for the self. In a 2 (colour: white vs. black) × 3 (task: buy for 
self vs. buy for others vs. rate) between-subjects design, participants 
again entered the simulated online store. They were told to either 
rate the white (black) products, choose five to purchase for them-
selves, or choose five to purchase for a friend. They then indicated 
how likely they would perform four prosocial and non-prosocial be-
haviours. Among participants in the store with white products, those 
who bought for themselves scored lower on prosocial intentions 
(M = 2.35) than those who bought for others (M = 4.18) as well as 
those who rated the products (M = 4.35), F(2, 88) = 5.65, p < .01. 
But among participants in the store with black products, those who 
bought for themselves scored higher on prosocial intentions (M = 
4.20) than those who bought for others (M = 2.75) as well as those 
who rated the products (M = 2.31), F(2, 89) = 4.14, p < .02.
In this research, we show that when people are exposed to white 
and black colours, related moral concepts become readily accessible 
and affect their subsequent behaviours. White and black colours also 
influence how virtuous products are perceived, and since white prod-
ucts are perceived as more moral and black products are perceived 
as less moral, engaging with (i.e. buying) these products leads to 
compensatory moral behaviours while mere colour exposure leads 
to consistent moral behaviours. Any moral deed has individual and 
societal consequences, and if colour is everywhere, an understanding 
of colour exposure on morality is needed.
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Study 1
 White Products Black Products
DV = Prosocial intentions
5.07a 3.07b
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 White Product Black Product
DV = Virtuousness of product
Utilitarian Product 7.36a 6.79a
Hedonic Products 6.62a 4.98b
Study 3
White Products Black Products
DV = Donation
Buy $0.48a $0.72b
Rate $0.89b $0.47a
Study 4
White Products Black Products
DV = Prosocial intentions
Buy-self 2.35a 4.20b
Buy-other 4.18b 2.75a
Rate 4.35b 2.31a
Note: Numbers with different superscripts are  
significantly different at p < .05
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role that anticipated regret plays in 
investment decisions, particularly consumer education investment 
decisions.  Regret is an emotion that plays a powerful role in con-
sumer decision-making (Inman and Zeelenberg 2002), and is defined 
by Sugden (1985) as “the painful sensation of recognizing that ‘what 
is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’” (p. 77).  It is 
backward-looking.  Consumers sometimes learn after a decision that 
another alternative would have been optimal, which causes a sense 
of regret (Bell 1982).  Studies have found that information about 
products after purchase (Cooke, Meyvis, and Schwartz 2001) and 
information about forgone alternatives (Iman, Dyer, and Jia 1997) 
play an important role in not only regret but also post-purchase sat-
isfaction.  Consumers expect to possibly feel regret about purchase 
decisions, and thus try to reduce future regret that may come with 
different choices (Simonson 1992).  Therefore, consumers not may 
not only feel regret for a decision made in the past, but they may also 
feel anticipatory regret before the decision is actually made (Janis 
and Mann 1977).  Anticipated regret is forward-looking and is the 
focus of the present study.
We postulate that anticipated regret actually consists of two 
components, keep and drop regret, and both should be considered 
when studying consumer regret.  Anticipated keep regret is defined 
as a situation where a consumer anticipates regret for continued in-
vestment in a situation and finds out later that they should not have 
invested.  Anticipated drop regret represents a situation where a con-
sumer anticipates regret for not continuing with an investment but 
later finds out that he should have.  Both types of regret play an im-
portant role in the way consumers evaluate decisions.  While existing 
research suggests that consumers may feel regret or anticipate regret 
for multiple reasons, this is the first study that attempts to define and 
explicitly study the factors that comprise anticipated regret.
A decision-making exercise was developed to empirically test a 
variety of research hypotheses.  A total of 469 subjects participated, 
and they were asked to evaluate an investment in education under 
losses that grew larger over repeated decisions.  Participants were 
instructed that they entered a two-year graduate program to earn a 
professional degree at a well-known university.  The program costs 
over $50,000 per year (including tuition, room, board, books and 
fees), and they expected to pay over $100,000 in costs to complete 
the entire program, nearly all of it financed through student loans. 
Before entering the program they determined that they could afford 
the program if current trends continue, but that may change.  As a 
result, in order to validate their decision after each semester, the sub-
jects developed a plan that included the following minimum bench-
mark requirements for the degree.  After each semester they would 
review the projected performance measures and decide whether or 
not to continue in the program.  The majority of these measures fell 
below the minimum acceptable threshold, and they declined further 
at the second evaluation point.
We found mixed support for our research hypotheses.  As hy-
pothesized, consumers anticipate drop regret and keep regret when 
making continuing investment decisions, and (b) anticipated drop 
and keep regret help explain consumers’ decisions beyond what per-
ceptions of eventual program success and commitment to completing 
the graduation degree explain.  We also found that (a) anticipated 
drop regret causes consumers to continue with a failing investment, 
and (b) anticipated keep regret causes consumers to not continue 
with a failing investment (partial support; first decision period).  Our 
third hypothesis was partially supported: anticipated drop regret ex-
plains the decisions to continue (or not) with a failing investment 
more than anticipated keep regret for decision 1 (but not decision 
2).  Finally, our results shows that anticipated drop regret decreases 
over the course of a failing investment, and anticipated keep regret 
increases over the course of the failing investment in graduate educa-
tion.
This study finds that consumers anticipate regret in the future 
when making consumption decisions in the present.  This suggests 
that worrying about the future weighs on the minds of consumers.  It 
is argued that anticipated regret could lead to decision-making errors 
in the present.  This suggests that anticipated regret is an important 
mechanism that might affect persistence in a losing investment (i.e., 
escalation of commitment, Staw 1976).
The contributions of this study are as follows: first, we attempt 
to clearly define and measure the two subsets of anticipated regret in 
order to better understand the dynamics of anticipated regret and its 
role in escalation.  Second, we model these two types of anticipated 
regret together on the same situation in order to better understand 
their comparative explanatory power on decisions.  Lastly, we mea-
sure how these components of anticipated regret change over time.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
There are many factors that influence our enjoyment and sa-
tiation from a current experience. Among them we have, the initial 
utility we derive from it (Coombs and Avrunin 1977), the objective 
quantity that we have (Mook and Votaw 1992), the rate at which 
we consume it (Galak, Kruger and Loewenstein 2013; Nelson and 
Meyvis 2008; Nelson, Meyvis and Galak 2009), how much variety 
it contains (Rolls et al. 1984), or merely how we remember it (Rozin 
et al, 1998) or categorize it (Redden 2008). Finding ways to delay 
satiation is instrumental to our happiness (Raghunathan and Irwin 
2001) because when this phenomenon takes place, consumers stop 
enjoying their favorite stimuli as much as they did before and need 
to consume better ones in order to just maintain a desired level of 
enjoyment (Brickman and Campbell 1971). Despite its importance 
for wellbeing, just a few ways in which satiation can be reduced have 
been documented in the literature (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).
The current research looks at a new factor that can affect satia-
tion from a current experience, such as anticipating consuming va-
riety in a given domain. Frequently, in our everyday lives, we find 
ourselves in situations where our future consumption in a given cat-
egory is likely set due to decisions we have made for ourselves, or 
simply because the circumstances have attached us to a particular 
set of conditions. For example, we choose to buy vacation packages, 
time shares, or season tickets for extended periods of time, lease ve-
hicles to contracts for a set number of months or years, acquire an-
nual country club or gym memberships, or simply buy our favorite 
flavor of yogurt in bulk at the local Costco. Alternatively, there are 
situations such as moving to a particular city for work, where we may 
find ourselves committed to a specific set of entertainment or dining 
options. What both of these cases have in common is that consumers 
know what their future consumption in a specific domain will be. 
Needless to say, we encounter this type of conditions on a regular 
basis, so it would be useful to learn more about what their effect is on 
the enjoyment of a related present experience. This research has the 
objective to help answer this question.
We look at cases where consumers face a current experience in a 
given domain and are able to anticipate what their prospective future 
consumption on that category is. We propose that in such cases peo-
ple will satiate slower in the present if the prospective future episode 
contains variety. We also provide evidence that this effect is due to 
consumers’ increased savoring of the current experience - potentially 
caused by their anticipation of a different episode in the future - and 
to anticipatory thoughts related to the upcoming event (Loewenstein 
1987).
We tested this effect in a series of studies in which subjects rated 
their enjoyment of different sets of jelly beans as they repeatedly 
consumed them. Study 1 tested the core prediction as participants sa-
tiated less from the consumption of jelly beans when they were made 
believe that they could have a more varied consumption opportunity 
in the future. The setup employed for this experiment served as a 
proxy for situations where consumers are attached to a particular set 
of consumption options due to external circumstances, such as the 
options available in the city in which they live. Study 2 replicated 
the effect in a design where instead externally establishing what the 
future consumption scenario is we determined it by asking partici-
pants about their individual preferences. This setup served as a proxy 
for situations in which participant’s future consumption is entirely 
determined by their own choices. Moreover, this experiment demon-
strated the moderating role of time distance on this effect. It shows 
that the effect will be stronger in cases where the future consumption 
opportunity will take place in a few days as opposed to in several 
months. Lastly, study 3 provided evidence in favor of savoring of the 
present and thoughts about the future as the underlying mechanism, 
while showing that the effect is domain specific and does not extend 
to future, varied experiences in general. 
In conclusion, these findings contribute to our understand-
ing about the phenomenon of satiation in meaningful ways, as no 
research had looked at the effect that such important factor at the 
theoretical and practical level, such as anticipating future consump-
tion, may have on satiation from a current experience. This paper is 
consistent with the conference objective of “making a difference”, 
as we, consumer behavior researchers, must strive on doing work 
on topics that are both, theoretically and practically relevant. If we 
use our skills towards this objective, we will be able to have a bigger 
impact on consumer welfare. 
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Choosing the More Effortful Option for Illusionary Self-Control
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers must often choose between giving into temptation 
and the pursuit of a higher-order, long-range goal (Hoch and Loew-
enstein 1991; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). These dilemmas are es-
pecially common in the domain of eating behavior, where people 
must often decide whether to indulge their craving for delicious but 
fattening food (e.g., chocolate cake and ice cream) or to choose an al-
ternative (e.g., fruit salad) that is consistent with their goal of staying 
healthy. However, people often encounter situations in which only 
unhealthy options are available. For example, a dinner guest might 
feel obligated to choose between two luscious desserts that the host 
has spent considerable effort in preparing; a tourist may patronize a 
local “greasy spoon” restaurant that does not offer healthy alterna-
tives; and one might contemplate two flavors of popcorn to eat at a 
movie concession stand. 
Most research on the resolution of conflicts between immediate 
gratification and long-term goal attainment (Hoch and Loewenstein 
1991; Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999) has focused 
on the first type of choice situation described above. That is, individu-
als are confronted with a choice between a hedonically appealing but 
unhealthy option and a healthy but relatively less unappealing one. 
In these conditions, they typically choose the first option (Hoch and 
Loewenstein 1991). If the desirability of good health is called to their 
attention, however, they may choose the healthy option (Ferguson and 
Bargh 2004; Shah and Kruglanski 2003). Or, they might choose one 
option of each type thereby striking a balance between their desires to 
attain the two goals in question (Dhar and Simonson 1999).
The second type of choice situation, which we consider in the 
present article, is less straightforward. In this situation, a healthy 
alternative is not available; that is, the choice alternatives are both 
hedonically appealing and unhealthy. In this case, health-conscious 
consumers might often decide not to choose either option. If they are 
unable or unwilling to defer choice, however, how do they make a 
decision that allows them to forego the goal of good health? 
Our answer to this question was guided by implications of two 
areas of research concerning (a) the motivation to justify one’s deci-
sions (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993) and (b) the role of self-
control (Baumeister and Exline 2000; Geyer and Baumeister 2005). 
In the latter regard, people consider the exercise of self-control to 
be moral and inherently desirable, or the “master virtue” as put by 
Baumeister and Exline (2000). Consequently, they may believe that 
practicing self-control by sacrificing a degree of pleasure in a choice 
situation (e.g., foregoing the objective they consider to be most desir-
able) is virtuous, and that if they are willing to make this sacrifice, 
they deserve a reward. Therefore, we speculated that if individuals are 
confronted with two appealing but unhealthy alternatives, and if they 
can convince themselves that they are being virtuous by sacrificing 
the alternative they perceive to be more desirable, they may feel en-
titled to a reward for their virtuousness by choosing the relatively less 
desirable option. Thus, if consumers believe that obtaining one option 
requires greater effort than obtaining the other, consumers might con-
vince themselves that by resisting the temptation to select the more 
easily available option, they are being virtuous and are entitled to 
choose the more effortful one. Ironically then, consumers choose not 
to maximize their pleasure even if a health goal is violated. 
We tested our prediction in four studies. Study 1 adopted a 2 
(goal priming: health goal vs. control) × 2 (counterbalance of attrac-
tive options) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either a heath goal priming condition or a control con-
dition by evaluating magazine covers either related or unrelated to 
health goals. They were then presented descriptions of two chocolate 
truffles and were asked to indicate their preference and choice. We 
manipulated the psychological effort of evaluating the choice options 
by presenting one option in a difficult-to-read font and the other in an 
easy-to-read font, A logistic regression revealed only a main effect of 
goal priming such that when a health goal was primed participants 
were more likely to choose the less fluent chocolate (52%) than those 
in the control condition (25%) regardless of which option was made 
less attractive.
Study 2 replicated the finding of Study 1 by manipulating 
the physical effort involved in obtaining indulgent food items. We 
showed that making a health goal salient increased the likelihood 
that the participants would choose the more vice option that is more 
distant (vs. close) to them.
Study 3 showed that choosing the more effortful indulgent food 
option was specific to individuals with a high level of self-control. 
This finding suggests that sacrificing pleasure in the conditions we 
considered results from not only participants’ motivation to justify 
their indulgence, but also their ability to do so.
Study 4 adopted a 2 (goal priming: health goal vs. control) × 
2 (food category: healthy choices vs. unhealthy choices) × 2 (coun-
terbalance of attractive options) between-subject design. The results 
suggest that activating a health goal will lead to greater consumer 
preference for the more effortful option only when both options vio-
late the health goal; when choosing between two healthy options, 
people will always prefer the less effortful option, regardless of 
whether a health goal is activated.
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How Incidental Affect Alters Subsequent Judgments: Insights From Behavioral, fMRI, 
and Psychophysiology Studies
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People do not have stable, coherent and readily accessible 
preferences that can be reliably measured through self-report. 
Instead, judgments are constructed on the spot and recent, contextual 
factors exert a disproportionate influence on judgments (Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson, 1992; Slovic, 1995). These contextual 
influences include feelings that are unrelated to the judgment (such 
as moods, emotions, and expectation of receiving a reward, Schwarz 
& Clore 1983, Cohen, Pham & Andrade 2008). Why is the brain 
susceptible to these types of rewards that engender such changes 
in revealed preferences?  To address this question, we studied the 
impact of incidental affect on behavioral measures of experienced 
value (studies 1-3) and the neural representation of experienced 
value (study 2), an essential computation in the process of value-
based decision-making.
In study 1 (N=80, 41m, aged 18-29 years), we tested whether 
receiving or losing monetary rewards of different sizes altered the 
subsequent enjoyment of consuming a product (two different wines) 
in an unrelated task. We found that wines tastes significantly worse 
after losing 5 EUR as compared to winning 5 EUR (planned contrast: 
F(1,77)=5.16, p=.026) and to winning 10 EUR (planned contrast: 
F(1,77)=6.82, p=.010).
In study 2, we scanned human subjects’ brains (N=19, 6f, aged 
21-46 years) using fMRI while engaging in a task that again first 
involved the receipt of a monetary reward ($0, $50, $200) for real 
using a one-armed bandit task and subsequently the receipt of a food 
reward (two different liked wines). During the tasting task, subjects 
were instructed to evaluate how much they liked the taste of each 
wine.
Behavioral analysis showed that the incidental rewards (i.e. 
amounts won from the slot machine) significantly biased participant’s 
judgments of how much they enjoyed the wines (F(1, 18) = 7.46, 
p=.013). No effect on reaction times was found. We replicated these 
effects on behavioral measures of valuation in another follow-up 
study. In study 3 (N=160, all females, aged 18-36), we conceptually 
replicated this effect for a different type of reward (i.e. exposure to 
affective vs. neutral print ads) and also investigated whether these 
effects depend on the motivational state of the consumer (i.e. hungry 
vs. satiated state). We could replicate our findings also for such 
primary rewards (main effect: F(1,151)=6.76, p=.010) and showed 
that the effects depend on the motivational state in the high affect 
ad but not in the low affect ad  condition (planned contrast for 
motivational state in high affect group F(1,147)=5.29, p=.023).
We ran a set of different univariate fMRI analysis. First, we 
looked for brain areas correlating with the size of monetary reward 
and found that the size of incidental rewards triggered activity changes 
in different brain areas previously found to be involved in reward 
processing (i.e. vStr, dStr, amydala, insula, inferior OFC). Second, 
we investigated brain areas that correlate with the size of reported 
experienced value (EV) and found that EV was encoded in brain areas 
that also have been previously found to encode EV (i.e. vmPFC, the 
inferior lateral OFC, anterior insula). Third, we analyzed the neural 
correlates of how the judgment of the consumption experience is 
biased by the size of the incidental reward. Interestingly, we found 
that incidental rewards affect EV through a negative correlation in 
two of the EV areas mentioned above, the insula and the inferior 
lateral OFC.
Our results show that incidental rewards have an effect of 
reported OV. Interestingly, our fMRI results reveal that incidental 
affect bias taste processing such that subjects show more activity 
in brain areas in encoding EV the smaller the reward. That means 
that during tasting and before rating subjects first compensate for 
lower rewards as mood management theories would suggest. This is 
different from how more cognitive cues that are linked to the product 
such as the price of the wine (Plassmann et al. 2008) or a verbal label 
signaling quality (De Araujo et al. 2005) affect activity in brain areas 
encoding EV. Interestingly, these effects are primarily presented 
during a late tasting stage but not on early tasting stage. We are 
currently collecting SCR and Facial Affective Encoding measures to 
better understand the temporal dynamics of these effects.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The question of how prior outcomes influence risk preferences 
is central to all sequential decision settings. A wealth of evidence 
has shown that such influences are poorly described by subjective 
expected utility (SEU) theory, and that prospect theory, where out-
comes are coded as gains and losses relative to some reference point, 
offers a better framework for analyzing such behavior. However, due 
to the flexibility in how one can specify the reference point, prospect 
theory often fail to offer an unambiguous prediction concerning the 
effects of prior outcomes on behavior. For example, Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) states that, “there are … situations in which gains 
and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that 
differs from the status quo.” 
In the current study, we explored the possibility that psycho-
physiological responses to gains and losses can be used to supple-
ment the theory.  In particular, we examine risk taking, its physi-
ological correlates, and how prior outcomes influence risk attitudes. 
Indeed, there is a long tradition in prospect theory to describe the val-
ue function in terms of psychophysics principles such as diminishing 
sensitivity and reference dependence. Thaler (1999), for example, 
states that the prospect theory value function is “a representation 
of some central components of the human perceived pleasure ma-
chine”, with the reference point, diminishing sensitivity, and greater 
salience of losses relative to gains, as the three core properties of the 
value function. Recent studies in addition, have shown that this latter 
property—loss aversion—is directly reflected in the physiological 
responses (Sokol-Hessner, 2009), raising the possibility that such a 
measure can be a general strategy for understanding how the value 
function changes in sequential decisions.
Specifically, we measure participants’ skin conductance re-
sponses (SCR) to quantify bodily arousal responses, and relate such 
responses to behavior. We observe both behavioral and physiologi-
cal consequences of prior outcomes, suggesting that physiological 
responses are related to the observed behavior. By combining the 
above variables and individual level behavioral and physiologi-
cal analyses, we can explore subtle effects within subjects, and can 
speak directly to the effects of prior outcome on a given individual, 
rather than being limited to group analysis.
In Experiment 1, we investigated behaviorally using 36 sub-
jects how prior gains and losses affected participants risk attitude. 
Upon arriving at the lab, subjects were told that they were to make 
a series of gambles that unfolded in sequential order. Specifically, 
each subject played a roulette wheel task for 60 rounds. Each round 
consisted of 2 stages of roulette gambles that were resolved succes-
sively. The large number of rounds was chosen so that subsequent 
psychophysiology experiment would contain enough trials to obtain 
robust physiological response estimates. At the beginning of the ex-
periment, subjects were endowed with $18. Participants were told 
that, in each stage, they could bet any amount between $0-9, and that 
they would observe the gamble and its outcome regardless of their 
choice. To highlight the chance nature of the gamble’s outcome, we 
displayed a roulette wheel on the computer screen where red slots 
represented winning outcomes, and black squares represented win-
ning outcomes. The roulette wheel spun for 10 s and a white ball 
would then be dropped onto the wheel. The color of the slot that 
the ball stopped at the end of the 10 s determined the outcome. Par-
ticipants viewed a trial gamble before choosing whether or not to 
bet in the target gamble. We included a trial gamble to prevent any 
ambiguity about what would happen during the gambling procedure, 
so that it would be difficult for participants to later reinterpret the 
situation in a way that minimized its affective impact. Results from 
Experiment 1 showed that subjects’ risk attitude differed according 
prior outcome. Specifically, risk taking was greater following losses 
than gains, consistent with the break-even effect.  Importantly for 
subsequent physiological measurement, we found no significant time 
trend with regards to this tendency.   
In Experiment 2, we extended the previous experiment by inves-
tigating how responsibility of the choices affected subjects’ choices. 
This tests for the hypothesis that the breakeven effect is moderated 
by a need to justify or rationalize the initial decision, as has been 
suggested by previous literature.  As in Experiment 1, a total of 36 
subjects participated in the study, each completing 60 rounds. In con-
trast to Experiment 1, however, in half of the trials, the wager amount 
in Stage 1 was assigned at random by the computer and implement-
ed by the subject. In the other half of the trials, the wager amounts 
in Stage 1 were freely chosen by the subject as before. Our results 
showed that the breakeven effect was moderated by whether initial 
choices were free or assigned. Specifically, the breakeven effect was 
reduced when initial choice was assigned, consistent with the litera-
ture on escalation of commitment. 
In Experiment 3 (N=40), we incorporated psychophysiological 
recordings in our experimental paradigm in Experiment 2. SCR was 
measured using Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the crease between 
the distal and middle phalanges of the first and second digits of the 
left hand. The SCR data were amplified and recorded with a BIOPAC 
Systems skin conductance module connected to a laptop computer. 
Data were recorded at a rate of 200 samples per second. SCR analy-
sis was conducted using AcqKnowledge software (BIOPAC Systems 
Inc.). SCR (in microSiemens, µS) was measured as the trough-to-
peak amplitude difference in skin conductance of the largest re-
sponse in the window 0.5 s after stimulus onset to 4.5 s after stimu-
lus offset. Following standard preprocessing procedures, a minimal 
response criterion was set at 0.02 µS, and responses not exceeding 
this threshold were scored as “0”. SCR data were low-pass filtered 
(25Hz), smoothed (3 sample kernel), and square root transformed to 
reduce skewness. SCRs at outcome were normalized with the dol-
lar amount of the outcome to produce measurements with units of 
µS/$. Consistent with previous literature, we found that SCR during 
outcome reflected magnitude of the gains and losses. More relevant 
for our hypotheses, we found that SCR following the first outcome 
was correlated with the subsequent wagers, suggesting that the ef-
fects due to prior outcome are partially mediated by psychophysics 
of gains and losses as reflected by the physiological responses.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This paper considers how a commitment to not publishing p-
hacked results will change the lives of individual scientists and prod-
ucts of science. We call this “Life After P-Hacking.” We discuss four 
lessons.
Lesson #1
We have to really start caring about statistical power. The 
freedom to engage in p-hacking created an environment in which 
researchers were able to get many of their studies to yield statistically 
significant results despite dramatically underpowering those studies 
(or studying truly null effects). “Life after p-hacking” means that 
conducting underpowered studies will now come with significant 
costs to the individual researcher: (1) by definition, many underpow-
ered studies will yield null effects, and (2) researchers will not know 
why they did not work – whether the null effects represent a false 
hypothesis (a truly null effect) or a false-negative. This makes it dif-
ficult to learn and difficult to publish, a combination of costs that is 
unlikely to be sustainable for the typical researcher. The only way 
forward, then, is to really start caring about statistical power – to 
make sure our studies are properly powered at, say, 80%.
Of course, ideally we would conduct power analyses in order to 
properly power our studies, but power analyses require researchers 
to know what effect sizes they are studying. When effect sizes are 
unknown, researchers are unlikely to have good intuitions about the 
size of the effect they are studying, for publication bias and p-hack-
ing means that the literature dramatically overestimates the sizes of 
most effects. In order to give researchers better intuitions about effect 
size – and power – we conducted a large MTurk survey (N = 696) 
that tested a number of “obvious” two-condition between-subjects 
hypotheses (e.g., men are taller than women). Based on the (unbi-
ased) effect sizes obtained, we then computed how many participants 
a researcher would need to have in each condition in order to have 
achieve 80% power. Although some very obvious effects require the 
kinds of small samples we see in our literature – for example, you 
need “only” 15 per cell (30 total) to detect that women report own-
ing more pairs of shoes than do men – other obvious effects require 
much larger samples than we are used to. For example, to detect that 
men report weighing more than women, a researcher needs 46 par-
ticipants per tell (94 total). Given that most of the effects that we 
study are likely to be smaller than “men weigh more than women,” 
we advise researchers investigating unknown effect sizes to have at 
least 50 participants per cell. Otherwise, their studies are likely to 
be so underpowered as to prevent them from learning or publishing 
anything. (We will emphasize that this n>50 heuristic is merely a 
heuristic, and should not substitute for conducting power calcula-
tions when effect sizes are estimable).
Lesson #2
At the exploratory stage, p-hacking is advisable as it helps 
us learn from the data; but we should replicate any p-hacked re-
sult. Some researchers have misinterpreted our crusade against 
p-hacking as a suggestion that we should never p-hack, no matter 
what. This is wrong. Conducting lots of unplanned, exploratory 
analyses on our data is a fruitful way to learn from data. We will 
describe a real example of this – in which a researcher collects three 
measures and finds the predicted result for only one of the three (and 
even then, only after removing outliers). The two measures that did 
not work were obviously “bad” in retrospect, and the removal of 
outliers for the third measure is easy to justify. Thus, this is a case 
in which exploratory p-hacking may have helped identify a result 
that was not obviously there after the first, planned analysis was 
conducted. Of course, at this stage one cannot know whether the 
significant result is due to capitalizing on chance or whether it is real. 
The only way to tell is to conduct an exact replication, using only the 
measure that worked and committing in advance to the same outlier 
rule that worked. Thus, this is what “life after p-hacking” will often 
involve – p-hack during an exploratory phase but then attempt to 
directly replicate any result obtained during that phase.
Lesson #3
Fewer papers. A science that requires larger samples (for sta-
tistical power) and more direct replications of one’s own work (to 
test whether a p-hacked result is reliable or not) is a science that 
takes longer. Thus a natural, inevitable consequence of “life after 
p-hacking” is that we will write fewer papers. This means that our 
field needs to lower the threshold for what is considered an adequate 
quantity of published papers, and that published papers should be 
judged on their merits rather than as lines on one’s cv.
Lesson #4
Label your research as not p-hacked. Research that is not p-
hacked is more likely to be true and is of therefore higher quality. 
Until journals start requiring disclosure of all sample size rules, mea-
sures, and manipulations upon submission of articles, a reader and 
reviewer cannot know whether a paper is p-hacked or not. Those who 
are not p-hacking will benefit from making it know that they are not 
p-hacking. Thus, we advocate that researchers include the following 
21 words in their methods sections: “We report how we determined 
our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all mea-
sures in the study.”
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
New concepts that go against conventional assumptions are 
typically hard to “prove” using a single method.  In such cases, it is 
more effective to rely on evidence that employs a number of different 
methods/data.  That is, while changing fundamental assumptions is 
unlikely to be supported with any single study, a pattern of findings 
obtained using various approaches and domains can more persua-
sively advance the alternative view.
This approach is illustrated in the context of a basic assump-
tion underlying consumer decision making whereby attribute values 
are the carriers of utility whereas relative option positions in any 
given set are irrelevant.  Specifically, an assumption that decision 
researchers have adopted from economic theory is that consumers 
should have stable utilities for each attribute value.  Violations of this 
principle, such as that consumers prefer Option A over B but prefer 
B over A when C is added to set, were thus interpreted as evidence 
that preferences are “constructed” when decisions are made.  More 
generally, decision researchers have assumed that preferences should 
be based on the options’ absolute values (e.g., 10X magnification, 
the felt comfort of headphones), and violations of this assumption 
represent the influence of context, task, and frame on constructed 
preferences.
An alternative view being proposed is that consumers have a 
stable tendency to prefer options in particular relative positions.  The 
focus of this research is on the notion that consumers have a stable 
tendency to compromise or avoid compromising, which means that 
non/compromising choices they make are not constructed and repre-
sent stable tendencies.  In support of this view, I present evidence that 
involves several different types of evidence and different research 
methods, all of which are consistent with the alternative view of pref-
erences.  One project (Simonson and Sela 2011; Briley, Frederick, 
Sela, and Simonson, in progress) involves studies of twins and dem-
onstrates that the tendency to not/compromise is largely heritable.
A second project (Knafo, Solomon, Simonson, and Hasenfratz, 
in progress) uses a videogame that incorporates various choice prob-
lems.  A comparison of the choices made by young children and older 
children suggests that the tendency to compromise develops between 
the ages of seven and nine (and may further develop as the children 
get older).  Additional projects (Drolet et al., In progress; Sela and Si-
monson, In progress) show that certain individual differences are as-
sociated with an enhanced tendency to compromise; these individual 
differences include age, moderation, and self-monitoring.
These very different research projects support the notion that 
people have a stable tendency to compromise (or refrain from com-
promising).  Accordingly, a finding that consumers tend to select the 
middle option from sets presented to them should not be interpreted 
as evidence of “preference construction,” because stable tendencies 
are not constructed. 
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A Study of the Play Element of a Location-based Social Network: Foursquare (20 min)
Alexandra Vignolles, INSEEC Business School, France
The videography presents the social network location-based Foursquare within the perspective of users and experts. We develop the 
theory of the play element as a social function applied to Foursquare (Huizinga, 1951). Implications as well as limitations and avenues of 
research are finally introduced.
A Pen (8 min)
Anastasia Seregina, Aalto University School of Business, Finland
Norah Campbell, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Bernardo Figueiredo, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
Hannu Uotila, Rakettijengi Tuotannot Oy, Finland
What might an object-oriented philosophy look like? This video places a mundane object, a pen, at the center of meaning-making by 
plotting its mode of being as something other than anthropological or instrumental. The pen co-constitutes reality with human actors. Where 
does agency end and passive materiality begin?
Around the World of Tourist Souvenirs  (30 min)
Alain Decrop, University of Namur, Belgium
Julie Masset, University of Namur, Belgium
This videography invites you to travel inside tourist souvenirs around the world. The film shows that souvenirs often are considered as 
special possessions that help consumers remember and extend their trips in time, space and the social network. It also highlights the hiero-
phanous role of souvenirs as messengers of meanings.
Fading Stories (12 min)
Inga Jonaityte, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy
Olivija Douris, Philadelphia Art Institute, USA
Recent far-reaching transformations in the field of photography have accelerated the creation of inexpensive crowd-generated “photo 
archives,”  reducing the demand for more expensive professional and objective imagery. This film explores the irreversibly shrinking path for 
traditional photojournalism, altering production, distribution and the consumption patterns of unbiased and representative photographic truth.
Entre-deux-mondes: Shaping of Artistic Projects in a Local Music Scene (31 min)
Joonas Rokka, Rouen Business School, France
Baptiste Cléret, University of Rouen, France
Alice Sohier, University of Picardie, France
This video continues research on music from a scenes perspective. By studying local indie music producers in France, we conceptual-
ize “artistic projects” of indie music producers as a particular cultural universe that is embedded in scenes and shaped by an assemblage of 
market actors.
Citizen Consumer (29 min)
Sonya Grier, American University, USA
What does it mean to be a consumer in a context which emphasizes social goals as key to citizenship?  This film explores the evolving 
notion of citizen/consumer in Cuba at a time of shifting market dynamics and cultural change.
The Runners’ (R)evolution (24 min)
Caroline Graham Austin, Montana State University, USA
Conor Benson, Bluejack Productions, USA
Running is more popular than ever in the United States, and a vocal minority of runners have decided to eschew traditional footwear (a-
shoe, perhaps?) in favor of minimal shoes, or no shoes at all. They find the experience to be transformative for both their bodies and spirits.
Film Festival 2013
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The Indian Bazaar: Street Markets and Customer Perceptions (16 min)
Sowmya Raja, IIT Madras, India
Niranjan Kuppan, Allahabad Bank, India
‘Sandhai’, ‘Bazzar’, ‘Mandi’ – called by different names, the informal local marketplaces serve as cultural hubs of India. This movie 
documents an explorative look at various informal street markets in the Indian city of Chennai.  While giving insights into Indian customers’ 
psychology, this film also captures their perceptions of these bazaars.
Coffee Shops Yesterday, Running Groups Today - Consumption Communities as the New 
Address for Oldenburg’s Third Places (20 Min)
Giridhar Ramachandran, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
Richa Agrawal, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
Ramon Oldenburg coined the name ‘third places’ to social gathering places outside of home and work, and felt that the vanishing third 
places were a reason for the decline of community. Through participant observation and interviews this study explores the possibility of con-
sidering consumption communities as present day third places.
Yoga and Fashion (13 min)
Maria Kniazeva, Uiversity of San Diego, USA
A former banker from Singapore, a pornographer from Los Angeles, a student from Washington D.C., and a former marketer from Tokyo 
help the author explore how they marry yoga and fashion.
Consuming the Contradiction (17 min)
Joel Hietanen, Aalto University, Finland
John Schouten, Aalto University, Finland
Iiro Vaniala, Aalto University, Finland
In ‘Consuming the Contradiction’ we produce a mashup of the footage shot at the Flow music festival in Helsinki. The stories reveal 
further insights into the acts of demythologization and contradiction in what has been coined hipster consumption.
Entertained to Excess: The Contemporary Practices of Boredom (21 min)
Henri Myöhänen, Aalto University School of Economics, Finland
Joel Hietanen, Aalto University School of Economics, Finland
Perhaps it is not surprising that the concept of boredom has not received much interest in consumer research in our media saturated 
consumer culture. This videography illustrates, from a Heideggerian perspective, how boredom becomes embodied in the lives of consumer 
seeking extreme thrills. We find that a world which bombards us with distractions in the form of various types of entertainment may have its 
dark side that perpetuates the very experience of boredom we wish to desperately escape in our pleasure-obsessed age.
It’s a Girl Thing (58 min)
Shannon Silva, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Andre Silva, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Donna King, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Tiffany Albright, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Framed by the structure of a faux interactive website for tween girls, “It’s a Girl Thing” speaks with consumer critics, tween brand mar-
keters, girls, moms, and educators to explore the seemingly benign cultural universe of candy-coated, pastel-colored, hyper-commercialized 
girl culture (and the tween queen phenomenon) to reveal the complex and contradictory messages directed at today’s young girls.
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Roundtable
Consumption Addiction: A Research Agenda of the Progression from Adaptive to Maladaptive 
Categories of Consumption Behaviors
Chairs: 
Dante M. Pirouz, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Ingrid M. Martin, California State University, Long Beach, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Hieu Nguyen, California State University Long Beach, USA
Participants:
Wendy Attaya Boland, American University, USA
Merrie Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
June Cotte, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Samantha Cross, Iowa State University, USA
Stephanie Feiereisen, City University London, UK
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Ann Mirabito, Baylor, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Justine Rapp, University of San Diego, USA
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University, USA
Maura Scott, Florida State University, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Stacey Finkelstein, Baruch College, USA
Our focus of this roundtable is to develop a research agenda that explicates the process of consumption addiction, including categories 
of consumption behaviors not usually associated with addiction. We will discuss a taxonomy of consumption addictions and the influence of 
marketing cues on this process.
Roundtable Summaries
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Roundtable
Best Practices for Behavioral Lab & Subject Pool Management
Chairs: 
Christina Brown, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
Lillian Chen, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
Participants:
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France
Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Kristin Diehl, University of Southern California, USA
John Galvin, Harvard Business School, USA
Miranda R. Goode, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St Louis, USA
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
Chase Harrison, Harvard Business School, USA
Douglas Hausknecht, University of Akron, USA
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Amber Holden, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, USA
Jeff Lees, Columbia Business School, USA
Gina S. Mohr, College of Business, Colorado State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Melvin Prince, Southern Connecticut State University, USA
Dan Rice, E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana State University, USA
Patricia Rossi, Reims Management School, France
Aaron M. Sackett, University of St. Thomas, USA
Sridhar Samu, India School of Business, Hyderabad, India
Karen H. Smith, Texas State University, Texas, USA
Rebecca White, University of Chicago, USA
Alan Malter, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Cameron McClure, Columbia Business School, USA
ACR member schools face increasing expectations regarding publishing, with concomitant increases in the need for data collection. 
This session begins the process of building a community of faculty supervisors and lab managers, to facilitate exchange of best practices in 
lab and subject pool management, to improve our efficiency and effectiveness.
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Roundtable
Consumption & Heritage
Chair: 
Cele C. Otnes, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Participants:
Russell Belk, York University, Canada
Benedetta Cappellini, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
Aron Darmody, Suffolk University, USA
Beth DeFault, University of Arizona, USA
Amber Epp, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Eileen Fischer, York University, Canada
Markus Giesler, York University, Canada
Jim McAlexander, Oregon State University, USA
Hope Jensen Schau, University of Arizona, USA
Srinivas Venugopal, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Ela Veresiu, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany
Madhu Viswanathan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
This roundtable explores intersections between consumption and heritage—a construct that remains underconceptualized within our 
field. Participants will share their experiences with research endeavors that explore various forms of heritage consumption (e.g., brand, eth-
nic, intellectual, touristic), address questions related to conducting heritage-related research, and explore a research agenda around heritage.
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Roundtable
Changing the Way We Think About Consumer Financial Decision-Making: Bridging Theory, 
Practice, & Relevance in Household Financial Decision-Making
Chair:
Avni Shah, Duke University, USA
Participants:
Daniel Bartels, University of Chicago, USA
Cynthia Cryder, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Hal E. Hershfield, New York University, USA
Eric J. Johnson, Columbia University, USA
Punam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Kyu B. Kim, University of Southern California, USA
John G. Lynch, University of Colorado, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA
Scott Rick, University of Michigan, USA
Suzanne Shu, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Stephen Atlas, University of Rhode Island, USA
Stephen Spiller, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Abigail B. Sussman, University of Chicago, USA
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA
Gal Zauberman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Dilip Soman, University of Toronto, Canada
This session examines the emerging topic of consumer financial decision-making.  Researchers will discuss 1) successful ways that 
consumer behavior research has influenced financial decision-making, 2) ways to encourage researchers to study consumer behavior theory 
through the lens of household financial decision-making, and 3) directions for future research.
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Roundtable
Mechanical Turk 2 .0: Issues, Limitations, & Solutions for Collecting Data
Chair: 
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Participants:
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Daniel G. Goldstein, Microsoft Research, USA
Gabriele Paolacci, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Pamela Smith, University of California, San Diego, USA
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Selin A. Malkoc, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Cynthia Cryder, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Pamela Mueller, Princeton University, USA
Joseph P. Redden, University of Minnesota, USA
Panos Ipeirotis, New York University, USA
Donna Hoffman, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA
Thomas Novak, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Brittney Dalton, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Hilke Plassmann, INSEAD, France
Consumer research has seen a dramatic increase in the use of Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Research has recently discussed the benefits 
and reliability of MTurk data, yet important questions remain. We will discuss some of these issues and limitations faced by consumer re-
searchers, and propose possible solutions.
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Roundtable
Making a Difference in Different Ways: Unleashing the Power of Collaborative Research Teams to 
Enhance Consumer Well-being
Chairs: 
Meryl P. Gardner, University of Delaware, USA
Minita Sanghvi, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, USA
Julie L. Ozanne, Virginia Tech, USA
Participants:
Laurel Anderson, Arizona State University, USA
Alan Andreasen, Georgetown University, USA
Eric Arnould, University of Bath, UK
Stacey Baker, University of Wyoming, USA
Julia Bayuk, University of Delaware, USA
Merrie Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
Brennan Davis, Baylor University, USA
Benet DeBerry-Spence, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Alexander (Sasha) Fedorikhin, Indiana University, USA
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA
Curt Haugtvedt, Ohio State University, USA
Ronald Paul Hill, Villanova University, USA
Deborah Roedder-John, University of Minnesota, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Carol Kaufman-Scarborough, Rutgers University, USA
Punam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Junyong Kim, Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Aradhna Krishna, University of Michigan, USA
Craig Lefebvre, RTI International and University of South Florida, USA
Daniele Mathras, Arizona State University, USA
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Stephanie Oneto, University of Wyoming, USA
Connie Pechmann, UC at Irvine, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Mark Peterson, University of Wyoming, USA
Norbert Schwarz, University of Michigan, USA
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK
Clifford J. Shultz, II, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Harish Sujan, Tulane University, USA
Ekant Veer, University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Madhu Viswanathan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
This roundtable seeks to foster discussion among researchers who use different paradigms and methods to improve consumer well-
being. We seek to inspire synergies and collaboration by offering practical advice for building and maintaining effective cross-paradigm and 
trans-disciplinary research teams to explore new models for transformative and life-enhancing consumer research.
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Mediation, Contrasts, & LISREL
Dawn Iacobucci, Vanderbilt University, USA
How to really do mediation analyses, contrasts in ANOVA, and LISREL. Bring your laptop and questions. Dawn will email pre-confer-
ence instructions for downloads and be available for personal consultation.
Selected References:
How to really do mediation analyses, contrasts in ANOVA, and LISREL. Bring your laptop and questions. Dawn will email pre-confer-
ence instructions for downloads and be available for personal consultation.
Designing QUALTRICS Studies
Bryce Winkelman, Qualtrics, USA
Learn what is new in the Qualtrics platform and how it can help you conduct more effective research. Also covers future product devel-
opment roadmap and includes a Q&A session.
Selected References:
Learn what is new in the Qualtrics platform and how it can help you conduct more effective research. Also covers future product devel-
opment roadmap and includes a Q&A session.
How to Make a Good Consumer Research Video
Russell Belk, York University, Canada
Marylouise Caldwell, University of Sydney, Australia
Paul Henry, University of Sydney, Australia
Anyone who wants to make a consumer research video can do so with relatively little instruction or equipment. After whetting appetites 
with a few short examples, this workshop will provide practical suggestions for making a good video and conduct a short exercise on pre-
production filmmaking. The workshop will conclude with a discussion of how to turn video footage into a film and how to make it an effective 
film. Both total novices and experienced filmmakers should be able to learn from it.
Journal of Consumer Research New Reviewer Training
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Jim Burroughs, University of Virginia, USA
Open to all conference attendees who are new, potential, or beginning reviewers who review for or are interested in reviewing for JCR. 
The Editors and Associate Editors of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) are conducting a workshop to train new, potential, or begin-
ning reviewers and discuss the review process in general. They will explain what makes a great review, discuss the trainee program, and 
answer any questions.  Potential Participants: Søren Askegaard, University of Southern Denmark; Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta; 
Lauren Block, Baruch College/CUNY; Margaret C. Campbell, University of Colorado; Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia; 
Kristen Diehl, USC; Aimee Drolet, University of California, Los Angeles; Jennifer Edson Escalas, Vanderbilt University; Eileen Fischer, 
York University; Kent Grayson, Northwestern University; Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland; Joel Huber, Duke University; Gita V. 
Johar, Columbia University; Andrea Morales, Arizona State University; Page Moreau, University of Colorado; Brian Ratchford, University 
of Texas at Dallas; Rebecca Ratner, University of Maryland; Jaideep Sengupta, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Craig 
Thompson, University of Wisconsin; Stijn van Osselaer, Cornell University; Patti Williams, University of Pennsylvania; Stacy Wood, North 
Carolina State University; Ann McGill, Editor, University of Chicago; Laura Peracchio, Editor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Mary 
Frances Luce, Editor, Duke University
Workshop Summaries
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Journal of Consumer Research Advanced Reviewer Training
Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia, Canada
Eileen Fischer, York University, Canada
Open to all conference attendees with substantial reviewing experience who would like to refine their skills in reviewing for JCR. The 
Editors and Associate Editors of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) are conducting a workshop to train advanced reviewers (review-
ers with substantial reviewing experience) and discuss the review process in general. They will explain what makes a great review, discuss 
the trainee program, and answer any questions.  Potential Participants: Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; 
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta; Søren Askegaard, University of Southern Denmark; Lauren Block, Baruch College/CUNY; James 
Burroughs, University of Virginia; Margaret C. Campbell, University of Colorado; Kristen Diehl, USC; Aimee Drolet, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles; Jennifer Edson Escalas, Vanderbilt University; Kent Grayson, Northwestern University; Rebecca Hamilton, University of 
Maryland; Joel Huber, Duke University; Gita V. Johar, Columbia University; Andrea Morales, Arizona State University; Page Moreau, Uni-
versity of Colorado; Brian Ratchford, University of Texas at Dallas; Rebecca Ratner, University of Maryland; Jaideep Sengupta, Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology; Craig Thompson, University of Wisconsin; Stijn van Osselaer, Cornell University; Patti Williams, 
University of Pennsylvania; Stacy Wood, North Carolina State University; Ann McGill, Editor, University of Chicago; Laura Peracchio, Edi-
tor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Mary Frances Luce, Editor, Duke University
Mediation Practicum – On Using Hayes (2003) PROCESS Macro, Indirect Effects, & 
Bootstrapping
Stephen Spiller, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
A brief guide to conducting mediation analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro. Additionally included is a brief discussion of 
why there may be an indirect effect without a total effect, the benefits of bootstrapping, and interpretations of its results. Bring your laptop. 
Advance Preparation:  Go to: <a href=”http://www.afhayes.com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-and-conditional-process-analysis.
html”>http://www.afhayes.com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-and-conditional-process-analysis.html</a>.  Download two zip files 
from that page (the process macro and the sample data files).   Readings:   Spiller, Stephen A., Gavan J. Fitzsimons, John G. Lynch, Jr., and 
Gary H. McClelland (2013), ““Spotlights, Floodlights, and the Magic Number Zero: Simple Effects Tests in Moderated Regression,” Journal 
of Marketing Research 50 (2), 277-88.  Zhao, Xinshu, John G. Lynch, Jr., and Qimei Chen (2010), “Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths 
and Truths about Mediation Analysis,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (August), 197-206.
Selected References:
A brief guide to conducting mediation analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro. Additionally included is a brief discussion of 
why there may be an indirect effect without a total effect, the benefits of bootstrapping, and interpretations of its results [as discussed recently 
in Zhao, Lynch, & Chen (JCR, 2010) and in Stephen, Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland (JMR 2013).
Spiller et al. 2013
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01-A: Interferences in Competitive Sponsorship Clutter: The Influence of Congruence and 
Articulation on Attitude
Benjamin Boeuf, HEC Montreal, Canada
François A. Carrillat, HEC Montreal, Canada
Alain d'Astous, HEC Montreal, Canada
This study examines the effects of congruence on attitude in a competitive sponsorship clutter. In an incongruent sponsor-event setting, 
competitive sponsors’ presence should have a positive effect on brand and sponsorship attitude. The moderating role of activation as a strat-
egy to reduce communication interferences is also investigated.
01-B: The Role of Social Context on Attitudes Towards Product Placement in Children’s 
Films
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Nikoletta Siamagka, University of Reading, UK
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Evelyn Derera, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Francesca Evans, UK
This interpretive study explores the role of social context on attitudes towards product placement in children’s films. Our findings reveal 
that children are influenced through product placement by discussing brands placed within films, as well as being enticed to eat the products 
that are placed within movies.
01-C: The Role of Emotional Intelligence as a Moderator of the Effectiveness of 
Advertising Disclaimers on Digitally Enhanced Images
Paula Peter, San Diego State University, USA
Steven Shyne, San Diego State University, USA
Anjala Krishen, University of Nevada Las Vegas, USA
Are advertising disclaimers on digitally enhanced images effective in reducing body dissatisfaction? What is the role of Emotional 
Intelligence (EI)? With an empirical study we show EI as an important moderator of the effectiveness of advertising disclaimers on body 
dissatisfaction considering both males and females.
01-D: This Ad is Funny, But Will I Share It?
Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA
Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA
Encouraging consumers to share ads with others has become one of the important goals for advertisers. This exploratory study takes a 
psychological approach to show why one ad might be shared over another especially in the case when attitudes toward the ads are similar.
01-E: Does a Parent’s Social Economic Status Affect the Effects of Television Advertising 
Directed to Children? Findings from Field Experiments of Kindergarten Samples in South 
Korea
Seung (Seung-Chul) Yoo, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Eunji Cho, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
This research investigates the effects of a parent’s socio economic status (SES) on children’s responses to television advertising by 
comparing the children of low SES and high SES families in a kindergarten setting in terms of attitudinal and behavioral reactions to TV 
advertising.
Working Papers
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01-F: How Hand Position Impacts Cognitive Processing: Implications for Mobile 
Marketing Messages
Keith Coulter, Clark University, USA
Anne Roggeveen, Babson College, USA
Dhruv Grewal, Babson College, USA
Basing our theory on the embodied cognition literature, we demonstrate how the differential processing of information that is proximal 
versus distal to the hands can impact how an advertising message is perceived and encoded. The research has important practical significance 
for the field of mobile marketing.
01-G: Effects of Highly Attentive Services: Role of Relationship Dynamics and Norms
Maggie Wenjing Liu, Tsinghua University, China
Lijun Zhang, Peking University, China
Hean Tat Keh, University of Queensland, Australia
While special attention and little extras to consumers may create satisfying service encounters, highly attentive services can affect con-
sumer negatively. With two lab experiments, we posited and tested that consumer satisfaction and purchase intention with high attentiveness 
may vary across different relationship dynamics and norms between customers and service providers.
01-H: Responses to Comedic Violence Advertising: Norm Beliefs and Age Effects
Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA
Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA
Comedic violence ads generate humor through norm violation. Consistent with social norm theories, this study found that greater norm 
beliefs on violence in advertising positively influenced evaluation of comedic violence ads. Norm beliefs also interacted with age; norm belief 
effects on ad responses became stronger with the increase of age.
02-A: Get Rid of Your Pennies If You’re Looking for Relaxation: The Role of Money in 
Psychological Tension
Mehdi Akhgari, University of Manitoba, Canada
Hamed Aghakhani, University of Manitoba, Canada
Kelley Main, University of Manitoba, Canada
Results of two studies investigate the psychological consequences of money. The concept of money increases psychological tensions 
such as stress, anxiety, and depression for money owners. Specially, reminders of possessing low denominations of money such as coins 
increase the owner’s psychological tension.
02-B: The Warmth of Our Regrets
Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee, Colorado State University, USA
Jeff D. Rotman, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
We show that individuals experiencing action regret feel physically warmer than individuals experiencing inaction regret. Moreover, we 
find individuals self-regulate their perceived warmth by desiring cooler drinks (vs. warm) when experiencing action regret, whereas individu-
als desire warm (vs. cool) drinks when experiencing inaction regret.
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02-C: Emotional Value of Co-creation: Can Co-creation of a Service Recovery Defuse 
Customers’ Anger?
Joohyung Park, University of South Carolina, USA
Sejin Ha, University of Tennessee,  USA
This study examines 1) whether co-creation of recovery outperforms a traditional firm-driven recovery in reducing customers’ anger 
caused  by a service failure, and 2) a condition under which such effect fades away (i.e., when compensation is offered simultaneously). The 
online scenario-based experiment confirmed the assertion of this study.
02-D: The Effect of an Abstract vs . Concrete Mindset on Coping Behavior in Negative 
Emotion-Laden Trade-offs
David L. Alexander, University of St. Thomas, USA
John Sailors, University of St. Thomas, USA
We examine how assuming an abstract or concrete mindset changes the negative emotion generated by difficult trade-offs. We show 
that assuming an abstract mindset reduces perceptions of the negatively emotional stress in difficult trade-offs and explore the lower levels of 
coping behavior during choice that result.
02-E: How Embarrassment Affects Consumer Evaluation of Conspicuous Products
Xiaobing Song, Dalian University of Technology, China
Feifei Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Xiuping Li, National University of Singapore, Singapore
The current research examines how embarrassment influences conspicuous consumption. It is predicted that consumers who are feeling 
embarrassed would evaluate a branded product with the salient brand logo less favorably. The results further show that the effect would be 
more robust among consumers who have lower self-esteem.
02-F:  What About Me? Empirical Evidence of Consumer Envy and Destructive Envy 
Behavior
Inga Wobker, Zeppelin University, Germany
Isabella Maria Kopton, Zeppelin University, Germany
Peter Kenning, Zeppelin University, Germany
In everyday economic life, consumers are often treated differently. As a consequence consumer envy may result if treated worse. As 
envy is often associated with destructive behaviors for instance lower willingness-to-cooperate, surprisingly little research on consumer envy 
has been done. This study provides insight into this important issue.
02-G: Coping With Disgusting Consumption: Managing Threats From Self And Others
Kivy Weeks, University of Connecticut, USA
This research investigates disgust associated with consumption.  It proposes that disgust poses both personal and social threats that 
consumers must manage.  Using a netnographic method, eleven themes for how individuals cope with disgusting consumption on a cloth 
diapering discussion board are identified.  These themes support a dual-threat conceptualization.
02-H: Hiding the Food from your Customers: Use of Surprise in Food Presentation
Hua (Olivia) Lian, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
We examine how food presentation style (stacking food vertically vs. laying food horizontally on plates) affects consumers’ likelihood 
of ordering a dish. Results indicate that consumers are more likely to order a vertically than horizontally presented dish, and it is mediated by 
the pleasant surprise consumers anticipate from the former.
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03-A: Goal-Orientation Theory and Elderly Consumers’ Intentions to Use Mobile 
Applications for Entertainment Purposes
Annie Chen, University of Westminster, UK
Norman Peng, University of Westminster, UK
To examine Chinese elderly consumers’ intention to use mobile applications to play online games, this research adopts the goal-orienta-
tion theory and incorporates hedonic value as a moderate. The results show performance-prove goal orientation and performance-avoid goal 
orientation will affect consumers’ intention. Moreover, hedonic value will moderate these relationships.
03-B: What Prevents Older Adult from Travelling as Much as They Wish They Would and 
Thus Reap the Benefits of Travelling at Old Age?
Gaelle Moal-Ulvoas, France Business School, France
This research investigates the obstacles which prevent older adults from travelling as much as they wish they would. Four categories 
of travel barriers are identified: the lack of physical and social resources, the lack of availability, personal and physical risks and the lack of 
other resources.
03-C: How to Make Your Grandma Exercise: The Activation of Goals and the Availability 
of Plans
Jaeyeon Chung, Columbia University, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA
We show that framing the plans (vs. goals) of exercising is persuasive only for the old but not for the young due to differing cognitive 
availability in generating alternative exercise plans. When reaching out to both populations, advertisers should address both the explicit goals 
and the plans within an advertisement.
03-D: Valuing Your Group Leads to Relative Derogation of Group Offenders
Yunhui Huang, Nanjing University, China
Chinese consumers were less willing to buy a domestic brand which had (vs. not had) been merged by a foreign prestigious brand. But 
this tendency only existed among people highly identified with the nationality (Study 1) or people provided the opportunities to affirm the 
nationality (Study 2 and 3).
03-E: Relative National Identification, Oneness and Product Evaluations: A Conceptual 
Framework
Aditi Grover, Plymouth State University, USA
Phil Ramsey, University of New Hampshire, USA
Jeff Foreman, Penn State Harrisburg University, USA
Drawing on self-identity theory and Oneness, we propose a conceptual framework that highlights the role of national identification in 
product evaluation. Relative National Identification (RNI) – residual identification with one’s country-of-birth adjusted for newly acquired 
identification with country-of-residence- is examined to study differences in consumer product evaluations.
03-F: An Exploratory Study of the Role of Employee Skin Tone on Customer Evaluations
Kelly Cowart, Grand Valley State University, USA
Carolyn Massiah, University of Central Florida, USA
Kevin Lehnert, Grand Valley State University, USA
This study explores the impact of service provider skin tone and gender on consumer perceptions. Empirical findings suggest that both 
factors significantly influence consumer perceptions. The perceived ethnicity of the service provider plays a key role in consumer responses 
as well. Hispanics are evaluated less positively than other ethnic groups.
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03-G: Gender Differences in Purchase Attachment Resulting From Loneliness
Sarah Roche, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
David H. Silvera, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Not all purchases are incorporated into the extended self equally. Our findings indicate that loneliness and gender interact to predict dif-
ferential attachment to material and experiential purchases.  When they are lonely, men shift their attachment toward experiential purchases 
and women shift their attachment toward material purchases.
04-A: Consumer Incompetence and the Motivation to Avoid Consumption
Matthew Philp, Queen's University, Canada
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Laurence Ashworth, Queen's University, Canada
Exploring the impact of feeling as an incompetent consumer on the motivation to avoid consumption of desirable items, this current 
work finds that the desire to avoid consumption increases (decreases) when past incompetent (competent) purchase decisions are more ac-
cessible in memory.
04-B: Understanding Global Impact and Voluntary Simplifier Lifestyles: A Value-
Orientation Perspective of Anti-Consumption
Sadia Yaqub Khan, Cardiff University, UK
Mirella Yani-de-Soriano, Cardiff University, UK
The paper compares the value orientation of two conceptually different anti-consumption lifestyles: Voluntary Simplifier (VS) and Glob-
al Impact (GI). The results show the two groups have a positive relationship with the value of universalism, but while VS are self-directed, 
GI are not. Neither VS nor GI are associated with the value of security.
04-C: Let Me Skip the Ads! Revisiting Reactance Theory in an Advertising Context
Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Experiencing freedom to watch TV without interruptions led to reactance when the freedom was threatened. Studying reactance be-
comes important in understanding TV ad effectiveness, due to diverse media usage. However, reactance did not lead to willingness to restore 
the freedom, which suggests re-examining the psychological reactance theory.
04-D: Who Washes a Rental Car? Contamination as a Barrier to Renting
Leslie Koppenhafer, University of Oregon, USA
This research examines contamination as a barrier to renting. Participants evaluated a car rental where cleaning supplies were explicitly/
not described and evidence of prior user was present or absent. Participants viewed the company more favorably and were willing to pay more 
when the prior user was not made salient.
04-E: Making Me Feel Bad Will Make You Pay: Defensive Responses to Self-Threat Based 
Marketing Communications
Pingping Qiu, Monash University, Australia
Fang Wan, University of Manitoba, Canada
Amitava Chattopadhyay, INSEAD, Singapore
The idea that consumers seek for products to restore their self-worth when self-views are cast into doubt encourages the marketers to 
use self-threatening messages to persuade consumers to buy. However, we argue that self-threatening appeals may backfire among high self-
esteem consumers, since they are susceptible to cues signaling their self-deficiency.
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04-F: The Not So Simple Life: Naturecultures of Voluntary Simplicity
Shona Bettany, University of Westminster, UK
Ben Kerrane, University of Manchester, UK
In this paper we use Haraway’s (1991) concept of natureculture to broadly explore one aspect of anti-consumption, voluntary simplicity, 
in the context of urban stock-keeping. We explore how nature is mobilised as a shifting resource among those adopting a voluntary simplified 
lifestyle for the home production of eggs.
04-G: Negativity Bias in the Product Prevention Ad Claim
Jihye Park, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea
H. Rao Unnava, Ohio State University, USA
This research examined the negativity bias effect when consumers face with a product prevention ad claim. Data from three experiments 
show that the negative pre-existing attitude toward a brand and a product category stimulated biased information processing to the negative 
direction.
04-H: Strategies to Resist Advertising
Marieke Fransen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Claartje ter Hoeven, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
In the present research, we developed and validated a scale to measure strategies that people adopt when resisting advertising. In three 
different studies, ten strategies (e.g., counter arguing, selective exposure, and avoidance) were observed. The scale shows convergent validity 
when correlated with ad skepticism, resistance to persuasion, and reactance.
05-A: Let’s Break Up: The Action of Tearing Decreases Relationship Bonding
Chun-Ming Yang, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Zengxiang Chen, Nankai University, China
Two experiments demonstrate that the concept of relationship is embodied in the physical closeness between objects, and tearing things 
apart is analogous to the termination of relationship. The effects of tearing are tested in an interpersonal moral judgment task and a negative 
publicity context.
05-B: The Influence of the Types of Brand Crisis on Consumer's Response: the Moderating 
Role of Brand Association and Brand-Customer Relationship Strength
Jung Ok Jeon, Pukyong National University, Republic of Korea
Sunmee Baeck, Pukyong National University, Republic of Korea
Eun Mi Lee, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
This study investigates the effects of brand crisis on consumer’s response relating to consumer's brand association and brand-customer 
relationship strength as well as brand crisis types, to understand consumer's internal process of negative information on brands systematically. 
For this purpose, an integrative approach of qualitative and quantitative methods is conducted.
05-C: How Could You Do This To Me? Brand Betrayal and Its Consumer Behavior 
Implications
Arianna Uhalde, University of Southern California, USA
Deborah MacInnis, University of Southern California, USA
We outline the conceptual properties and hypothesized effects of brand betrayal, defined as a negative consumer experience resulting 
from a deceit-based brand transgression directly related to the basis for brand attachment. Two studies consider how brand betrayal influences 
consumers’ emotions, brand attachment, perceived brand authenticity, forgiveness, and desire for revenge.
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05-D: The Added Value of Contextual Motivations on the Consumer-Brand Relationship
Marina Carnevale, Fordham University, USA
Lauren Block, Baruch College, USA
Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA
Purchase decisions may be prompted by the need to self-reward (self-compensate) some positive (negative) feeling about the self caused 
by extraordinary achievement (failure).  Across two studies, we show that these different contextual motivations affect the consumer-brand 
relationship and explore an important moderator of these effects.
05-E: An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of Relationship Development in Brand 
Community
Miri Chung, University of Rhode Island, USA
Seung Kyoon Shin, University of Rhode Island, USA
Hillary Leonard, University of Rhode Island, USA
The current research investigates the determinants of consumer loyalty in the context of brand communities and proposes an empirical 
model, considering two perspectives of consumer loyalty development process: communication between consumer and company, and com-
munication among consumers. We suggest that network centrality plays an important role in determining consumer loyalty.
05-F: Collector-Brand Relationships: Consumer Engagement via Disney Pin Collecting
Alexander J. Kull, University of South Florida, USA
Barbara A. Lafferty, University of South Florida, USA
By examining Disney pin collectors, this research investigates the strategically important construct of consumer engagement. Drawing 
upon observations, a survey, and depth interviews, the paper explores whether and how collecting branded items can initiate and strengthen 
consumer-brand relationships. Preliminary results suggest categorizing collectors’ initial motivations as brand-driven, product-driven, or 
socially-driven engagement.
05-G: How You Are With Mike Tells Us How You Are With NIKE: Relationship Between 
Interpersonal Attachment Styles and Brand Attachment
Hyewon Cho, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Tiffany White, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
We argue and demonstrate that highly avoidant people, who tend to be detached in their interpersonal relationships, form stronger 
self-brand connections with exclusive brands than consumers who are low in avoidance. We also explore whether exclusive brands provide 
emotional comfort to consumers who are high versus low in avoidance.
05-H: Self-Brand Connection, Schadenfreude, and Sympathy: A Person-Centered 
Approach to Understanding Emotional Reactions to Product Failure
Sarah Roche, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Jill Sundie, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Daniel Beal, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Emotional responses to upward social comparisons involving status products, and product failure, were examined via latent profile 
analyses. Diverse emotion profiles were predicted by self-brand connection. A strong brand connection can buffer against the experience of 
hostile envy, and schadenfreude after product failure, unless consumers hold certain socially dysfunctional traits.
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06-A: The Creation and Management of Human Brands
Marilyn Giroux, Concordia University, Canada
Bianca Grohmann, Concordia University, Canada
Celebrities are often the center of marketing campaigns and companies are working hard to establish relationships between consumers 
and human brands. The goal of this research is to create a measure of the strength of human brands and relate human brands to consumers’ 
relationships to celebrities, endorsements and co-branding opportunities.
06-B: Selective Revelations: The Brand Backstory and the Creation of the Private Sphere
Vanisha Narsey, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University, USA
In-depth interviews with brand backstory creators uncover how and why brand backstories may be used in simulating the private sphere. 
The strategies and aims uncovered ultimately enchant consumers towards the inner-world of the brand, enabling them to reach the core of the 
brand backstory and experiential authenticity.
06-C: Employee Misbehavior: The Effect of Employee Typicality on Brand Evaluations
Jakob Utgard, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
Tarje Gaustad, Oslo School of Management, Norway
Despite companies’ investments in recruiting, training, and monitoring, employees sometimes misbehave in ways that hurt the brand. 
Such misbehavior can spread quickly and potentially turn into media scandals. In two studies, we find that employee misbehavior is more 
negative for the brand when the employee is seen as a typical (vs. atypical) exemplar of the company’s employees. We theorize that the behav-
ior of a typical employee is seen as a signal of other employees and the company as a whole, whereas behavior of an atypical employee is seen 
as less diagnostic of the company. Thus, wrongdoing by a typical employee is likely to promote more negative inferences about the brand.
06-D: Brand Salience for the Visually Impaired: An Exploration on Brand Reception and 
Experience for Blind and Low Vision Audiences
Janice Fung, Humber College Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning, Canada
This study examines the recognition and experience of branded products by blind and low vision audiences. The importance of under-
standing brand reception and perception through the lens of the visually impaired is intended to increase business value for organizations, 
enhance information accessibility, improve social equality and enhance quality of life.
06-E: Disproportionate Positivity and Negativity Biases of Brand Extension Information
Joseph W. Chang, Vancouver Island University, Canada
Yung-Chien Lou, National Chengchi Uniersity, Taiwan
You Lin, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan
Under high-accessibility scenarios, negativity extension biases on high-entitativity family brands were more salient. Under low-acces-
sibility situations, the negativity biases of similar extension information on both high- and low-entitativity family brands were more salient, 
whereas the negativity biases of dissimilar extension information on high-entitativity family brands were more salient.
06-F: Towards a Higher Generalizability of Brand Personality Scales
Theo Lieven, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
The generalizability of popular brand personality scales is in question. Researchers have reported problems when attempting to replicate 
existing scales. Since scale creation methods are based on the lexical approach, this study proposes a procedure to enhance generalizability 
by the collection of synonyms from the dictionary.
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06-G: “The Perfect Driving Machine”: The Effect of Familiarity and Semantic Similarity 
on Learning and Recall of Brand Slogans
Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Zongyuan Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Familiarity and semantic similarity between originally and newly learned slogans influence both learning and recall of the original slo-
gans. Moderately unfamiliar slogans benefited the most from repeated learning. Learning semantically similar new slogans facilitates recall 
of original slogans. These findings provide meaningful implications for brands planning to change their slogans.
06-H: Why We Love Brands: The Roles of Brand Personality and Brand Trust
Nguyen Pham, Arizona State University, USA
Tin Lam, Vietnam National University, Vietnam
Across two studies, we investigate how brand personality plays a meaningful role in establishing consumer trust on a brand, which in 
turn increases consumer brand loyalty. Moreover, we demonstrate that this effect is moderated by consumer motivation (i.e., self-verification 
or self-enhancement) and whether the product is publicly or privately consumed.
07-A: When Bad CSR Happens to ‘Good’ Companies: The Moderating Role of 
Identification
Bettina Lis, University of Mainz, Germany
Sabine Einwiller, University of Mainz, Germany
Consumer-company identification protects attitudes in the event of negative publicity, but not if negative information attacks the basis 
of identification. If consumers identify with a company because of CSR, attitudes and behavior deteriorate even more in the event of CSR 
misbehavior than if consumers did not identify with the firm.
07-B: Shiny Happy Chickens Tasting Good: Ethical Company Practices Affect Consumer 
Experience
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA
The ethicality of company behavior and food-production has received increasing prominence in the public eye over the past years. The 
current study shows that the ethics of production influences consumers’ product experience. We suggest that such enhanced experience may 
be a case of conceptual consumption.
07-C: Effect of CSR Attributes of Food Products on Taste Evaluation, Mediation Role of 
Naturalness
Hajar Fatemi, McGill University, Canada
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada
This study continues the research about the effect of product-related CSR on product evaluation. Focusing on food and taste percep-
tion, we suggest “naturalness” as a mechanism for the effect of CSR on taste. Effects of social and environmental CSR attributes on taste are 
observed to be different.
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07-D: I Care When I Feel Like It! The Moderating Role of Emotion Stability in Cause 
Related Marketing
Ceren Ekebas-Turedi, Old Dominion University, USA
Leona Tam, University of Wollongong, Australia
Cause related marketing (CRM) has become a popular strategy. This research investigates the impact of consumers’ emotional stability 
on the effectiveness of CRM in generating positive attitude towards the brand. Results of an experiment show that CRM influences attitudes 
only when consumers are in high (versus low) emotional stability.
07-E: But I Deserve It! The Impact of Product Positioning on Consumer Intentions 
Toward Fair Trade Products
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK
We examine the role of product positioning (luxury vs. necessity) and nationality of the product producer (same nationality vs. different) 
on consumer willingness to purchase fair trade and find that deserving of the product, but not guilt, mediates the effect on purchase intentions. 
Implications for research and practice are discussed.
07-F: The Many Shades of CSR – the Interplay of CA and CSR Associations
Xiaoye Chen, North Central College, USA
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada
This paper investigates differential impact of different CSR formats on consumer response. Two studies demonstrate that consumers 
reward companies embracing Value-creating CSR, as opposed to Philanthropic and Promotional CSR, in CSR image and corporate ability 
image. And the effects are moderated by   corporate competence.
07-G: The Destigmatizing Role of Cause Marketing (CM) Products
Sukhyun Kim, Samsung SDS, Republic of Korea
Kiwan Park, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
In this research, we investigate the destigmatizing role of cause marketing (CM) products, particularly for materialists. We demonstrate 
that compared to other forms of prosocial behaviors such as donation, materialists versus non-materialists perceive CM products as instru-
mental to destigmatizing negative accusations related to materialism when purchasing luxury products.
08-A: Role of Transactional vs. Relational Requests in Influencing Donation Intention
Mehdi Tanzeeb Hossain, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
In this research we demonstrate that transactional requests sometimes exert negative influence on peoples' intent to help while relational 
requests has a unanimous positive impact on motives leading to helping behavior. Moreover, we posit that individuals' cognitive motivation 
moderates the above impact.
08-B: Ingroup-Outgroup Asymmetry for Donations of Time versus Money
Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA
Ashwani Monga, University of South Carolina, USA
In this research, we examine ingroup-outgroup asymmetry for donations of time versus money. We find that that people are more willing 
to donate the resource that is more "me" to ingroup members versus outgroup members. Furthermore, perceptions of fit or appropriateness 
mediate this relationship.
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08-C: For Others' Benefit Only: The Impact of Individuals’ Beliefs in Karma on 
Charitable Giving
Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
We test the impact of individuals’ beliefs in karma on charitable giving.  We show that when nonprofits increase the personal relevance 
of its charitable appeals, individuals who believe in karma will respond less favorably than when the charitable appeals are more general.
08-D: Why Sometimes Recognizing Obligations Can’t Help - The Effects of Signing One’s 
Name on Donation Behaviors
Canice M.C. Kwan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
In our research, we observed that signing one’s own name, albeit in an irrelevant context, can unobtrusively activate both feelings of 
self-identity (identity effect) and a sense of responsibility (duty effect). These effects, along with other factors such as self-relevance and 
processing style, induce a self-devoted commitment to help and impact on donation behaviors.
08-E: The Importance of Different Information in Donation Requests: An Eye-Tracking 
Analysis
Janet Kleber, University of Vienna, Austria
Sophie Süssenbach, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Stephan Dickert, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria
An eye-tracking experiment examines the perception of different donation requests depending on numeracy. Results suggest that low 
numerate individuals tend to fixate more on the pictures, whereas high numerate individuals fixated more on numeric information. Donations 
were higher the longer pictures were fixated and if pictures illustrated the problem.
08-F: Is Doing Better Always Good? The Impact of Perceived Nonprofit Competence on 
Altruistic Donation Motivations
Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
Stefanie Robinson, North Carolina State University, USA
We test the impact of perceptions of increased competence of nonprofits on consumers’ motivations for charitable giving.  We show 
that when nonprofits signal increased levels of competence, altruistic individuals will respond less favorably to them as compared to when 
nonprofits were perceived as less competent.
08-G: The Effect of Color Harmony on Processing Disfluency of Pro-Social Advertisement
Nara Youn, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Chang Yeop Shin, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Myungwoo Nam, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea
We examined the effect of color harmony on the effectiveness of pro-social advertisement. The results from three studies showed that 
moderately disharmonious color combination evokes disfluency, and the path from disfluency to high construal to empathy explains the effect 
of color harmony on pro-social behavior.
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08-H: The Effect of Competitive Labeling on Charitable Donation
Zachary Mendenhall, McGill University, Canada
Ashesh Mukherjee, McGill University, Canada
To motivate donors, charities can display the amount raised by competing donor groups; an approach we call competitive labeling. In the 
present research, we argue that competitive labeling increases donations when the gap between donor groups is low, but decreases donations 
when the gap between donor groups is high.
09-A: Not Like Everyone Else: The Role of Consumer Cause-Related Identity and 
Uniqueness in Consumer Donation Intentions and Behavior
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK
Bonnie Simpson, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
Across two studies, the influence of cause-related identity and uniqueness on donation intentions and behaviors are examined. It is 
predicted that when uniqueness motives are triggered consumers will be more willing to publically (vs. privately) contribute to causes from 
which they might otherwise wish to dissociate their public identities.
09-B: Mine and Mine Only: The Influence of Gifts on Their Replacement and Subsequent 
Brand Evaluation
Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
Kiwan Park, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
Although gift giving is a common social interaction, how gifts influence gift receivers is largely underexplored. Current research demon-
strates that gift receivers project gift givers on the gift (study 1), and this influences product replacement (study 2). Furthermore, gifts reveal 
to have broader consequences on brand evaluation (study 3a & 3b).
09-C: Touch Me: Does Touching a Victim’s Photo Affect Donation Amount?
Chun-Ming Yang, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Xiaoyu Zhou, Peking University, China
Three experiments demonstrate the influences of touch element on donation amount. The results indicate that touching a victim’s photo 
lead to higher donation amount, especially for high need-for-touch individuals. Moreover, this relationship is mediated by sympathy. This 
research also shows that seeing a victim’s face is not a necessary condition.
09-D: The Role of Beneficiaries' Group Identity in Charitable Giving
Kiwan Park, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
Seojin Stacey Lee, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
We investigate what determines the differential effectiveness of self- versus other-benefit appeals in charity advertisements. We find 
that when beneficiaries are out-group (in-group) members, self-benefit (other-benefit) appeals generate greater donation intention than other-
benefit (self-benefit) appeals. We also demonstrate two distinct mediation processes to account for the proposed matching effects.
09-E: Happy Faces, Sad Faces: The Interactive Effects of Affective Displays and Donation 
Types on Charitable Giving
Fan Liu, University of Central Florida, USA
Xin He, University of Central Florida, USA
Ze Wang, University of Central Florida, USA
In this research, we find that donors tend to contribute money to a happy child rather than to a sad child whereas they tend to contribute 
time to a sad child than to a happy child. Results demonstrate that donors emphasize their own psychological wellbeing in charitable giving 
such that donors’ happiness mediates the differential effects of recipients’ affective displays on donation types.
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09-F: Regifting Redefined: The Giver’s and the Receiver’s Perspective
Burcak Ertimur, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
Caroline Lego Munoz, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
James Hutton, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
This research examines the phenomenon of regifting, giving a gift that one has received to someone else. We develop a consumer-based 
understanding of regifting, considering the multiple roles consumers may assume in such exchanges. Our findings support the notion that we 
should contextualize regifting beyond the dyadic gift exchange model.
09-G: If You Think I'm Picky, What Gift Will You Give Me?
Andong Cheng, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Margaret G. Meloy, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Three studies explore “picky” gift recipients as a distinct subset of “difficult” recipients.  “Picky” recipients, in contrast to “difficult,” 
have narrow preferences, are more decisive, and are considered snobby.  As such, gift givers select cash cards for these “picky” recipients and 
don’t differentiate between friends and acquaintances in money spent.
09-H: Temporal Reframing of Prices and Offer Attractiveness in a Cause-Related 
Marketing Context
Mazen Jaber, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
Ronald W. Niedrich, Louisiana State University, USA
Danny Weathers, Clemson University, USA
One strategy that pricing research has sought to explain is pennies-a-day, where product costs are expressed as small ongoing expenses. 
This study tests PAD effect on offer attractiveness in a CRM context. We find that PAD framing has significant impact on attractiveness at 
low donation amounts but not high amounts.
10-A:  “The Bad Guys is Tasty”: How Visual Packaging Cues and Nutrition Knowledge 
Influence Pre-School Children’s Perceptions and Selections of Snacks
Michelle Nelson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Da Zheng, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Ningzi Li, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Regina Ahn, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Chuqiao Huang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Visual package cues attract attention and influence product perceptions and selection. Unlike previous research, our interviews with 
preschool children revealed nutrition knowledge; however, they unanimously selected snacks featuring licensed characters instead of fruit or 
candy. Children’s choices revealed the influence of perceptions of fun and the familiarity of media characters.
10-B: The Role of Technology in Children’s Food Environment: Exploring Intra-Familial 
Dynamics across Cultures
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Emiko Amano, Kanto-Gakuin University, Japan
Nigel Chiweshe, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Evelyn Derera, Universityof KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
We demonstrate how family meal times and the associated rituals are evolving through the consumption of technology. Our findings 
reveal a technological generational gap as parents interpreted technology as being negative, whereas the digital natives, younger generation 
perceived technology as being a positive tool during mealtimes.
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10-C: Encouraging Reflexivity in Food Research: Producing Children's Voices
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Ziska Fields, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
This research focuses on the significance of evoking children’s self-reflexivity within consumer research.  Insights are drawn from a lon-
gitudinal interpretive study that used multiple data sources to explore children’s food consumption practices. We argue that evoking children’s 
self-reflexivity may encourage consumer researchers to address new types of research questions.
10-D: The Influence of Children in Family Decision Making: Perceptions of South African 
Parents
Mishaal Maikoo, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Debbie Vigar-Ellis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
We examine how children influence family decisions when buying snacks, toys and games.  The findings from 135 families showed that 
children use different tactics including emotional appeals, product requests, purchase justification, and bad behaviour as tools to negotiate 
within the family decision making process.
10-E: Differential Effects of Socialization Agents on Music Piracy
Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
We simultaneously examine the effects of five major socialization agents on university students’ piracy definitions and behavior. Find-
ings show that close-other agents (peers, Internet) directly impact both definitions and behavior, whereas distal-other agents (parents, music 
industry) impact piracy behavior only indirectly through definitions. These effects differ across consumer segments.
10-F: The Extended Parental Self: Gender Differences in Parental Spending on Sons vs . 
Daughters
Lambrianos Nikiforidis, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Do parents favor spending on sons or daughters? Drawing on theory and research on the extended self, we show that women spend on 
daughters and men spend on sons. Additional findings show that this effect is linked to viewing children of concordant gender as an extension 
of one’s own identity.
10-G: Self-Esteem Discrepancy and Adolescents’ Self-Connections to Peer Groups' Brands
Burak Tunca, University of Agder, Norway
Sigurd V. Troye,  Norwegian School of Economics, Norway
Prior research has shown that discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem are associated with higher self-enhancement 
needs. This study proposes that individuals with a discrepant self-esteem will have higher tendencies to develop self-connections to brands 
that are associated with their reference groups as a form self-enhancement. Findings from an adolescent sample provide empirical support 
for this postulation.
Advances in Consumer Research (Volume 41) / 801
11-A: Consumption-Related Challenges and Consumers’ Accumulation of Field-Specific 
Forms of Capital
Pierre-Yann Dolbec, York University, Canada
How do consumers accumulate field-specific social and cultural capital? By attempting to resolve consumption-related challenges, con-
sumers use three strategies which lead them to develop such forms of capital. This process ultimately brings about changes in their consump-
tion practices and deepens their involvement within the field.
11-B: Does Country Heritage Legitimize the High-end Image of Affordable Fashion 
Brands? An Analysis of the Country-of-Origin Appeals of ZARA, UNIQLO, and H&M
Wei-Fen Chen, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
We investigate the extent to which affordable fashion brands (high-end image, low-end prices) use country of origin to support their 
brand image. An analysis of brand positioning reveals that ZARA, UNIQLO, and H&M do not universally use COO but differentiate them-
selves as “affordable luxury,” “smart street style,” and “disposable fashion.”
11-C: Experiential Purchases Foster Social Connectedness
Amit Kumar, Cornell University, USA
Thomas Mann, Cornell University, USA
Thomas D. Gilovich, Cornell University, USA
We demonstrate that experiential purchases foster social connection more than material purchases. Consumers feel more connected to 
those who have made similar experiential purchases. After reflecting on experiential purchases, they also feel more connected to people in 
general, are more likely to engage in social activities, and act more prosocially.
11-D: Interpreting Financial Consumption Experiences: The Case of British-Muslims
Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Akmal Hanuk, Islamic Banking and Finance Institute, UK
Omer Rana, Cardiff University, UK
Focus group sessions were conducted to explore meanings that financial consumption experiences hold for British-Muslims. Conven-
tional and Islamic banking experiences based on personal standards and religious ideals are discussed. Participants negotiate conflicts using 
coping strategies to deal with guilt that pervade. Findings offer several points of contribution to future research.
11-E: Protections Against Agent Opportunism: Customer Assumptions and Marketplace 
Realities
Gulnur Tumbat, San Francisco State University, USA
Kent Grayson, Northwestern University, USA
Why customers participate in marketplaces where they aren't protected from opportunism by the standard agency safeguards? Using 
ethnography/interviews with clients/guides on Everest, we show that clients are willing to accept an exchange agreement that doesn’t provide 
them with the protections predicted by agency theory. We discuss implications for conventional contexts.
11-F: Mixed Messages: The Variability of Conspicuous Consumption Activity and 
Interpretations Based on Audience Familiarity
Daniel Sheehan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Sara Dommer, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
As conspicuous consumption is simply a signal to others, characteristics of the audience will likely influence the message’s reception and 
interpretation. Three studies demonstrate that people are more (less) likely to engage in conspicuous consumption in the presence of strangers 
(friends), yet a stranger’s consumption is perceived as less genuine.
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11-G: The Cyborg Self, the Tethered Life: The Meanings of Virtual Spaces and Portable 
Devices in Consumer Narratives
Tifani Wiyanto, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Edwina Luck, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Shane Mathews, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
We examine the implications of continuous access to virtual spaces through portable devices on consumer self. Portable devices are 
significant conduits to demarcate and synthesize consumers’ physical and virtual selves. Consumers’ cyborg self and life tethered to virtual 
spaces signifies a liberatory mode of being to attain self-narrative goals.
11-H: Ambiguity in Heterogeneous Consumption Communities: Confused Consumers?
Anja Simms, University of Wollongong, Australia
Ulrike Gretzel, University of Wollongong, Australia
Andrew Whelan, University of Wollongong, Australia
This research explores the role of ambiguity surrounding a consumption practice as a source of confusion for consumers. An inquiry into 
an online vegetarian community indicates different levels of comfort with ambiguity.  Members manage discomfort by adjusting the practice 
or negotiating the meaning of a particular label.
12-A: What’s Funny? A Multicultural Comparison of Humor in Advertising: Apple’s Get a 
Mac Campaign in the US and Japan
Milan Pickl Bermejo, ESCP Europe, France
Marcelo V. Nepomuceno, ESCP Europe, France
This study examines the application of humor types and presence of cultural values in humorous television advertisings broadcasted in 
the USA and Japan. We demonstrate that humorous advertising should be adapted, as adapted commercials are preferred over non-adapted 
ones. Through a content analysis we provide reasons for adapting the ads.
12-B: Power Distance Belief and Education Advertising Execution
Lingjiang Tu, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Yinlong Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Through content analysis of print education ads from U.S. and Japan and an experiment in which power distance belief (PDB) was 
primed , we found that high (vs. low) PDB leads to preference of rational (vs. emotional) education advertising appeals. We also obtained 
evidence for the underlying process.
12-C: Differential Impact of Interpersonal Engagement Orientations on Customer 
Satisfaction across Cultures through Customer Participation in Service Processes: A 
Structural Equation Modeling-Based Multi-Group Analysis
Satoshi Akutsu, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Mayomi Haga, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Yoshinori Fujikawa, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Joji Ono, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan
We examine how individual consumer’s influence and adjustment orientations affect customer satisfaction directly and indirectly via 
customer participation in service processes. Conducting a cross-cultural survey of the customers of a global educational service provider, we 
show that while adjustment positively impact on satisfaction via participation, its direct impact is negative.
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12-D: Creativity in New Product Development; When Collectivistic Values Outperform 
Individualistic Values
Jungim Mun, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Charles D. Lindsey, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Research shows that individualism is preferable to collectivism when we desire creativity as an outcome. However, empirical evidence 
shows that countries or organizations from Eastern cultures (e.g., Japan, Korea, etc.) often outperform those from Western cultures when it 
comes to new patents and other proxies of creative activity. Across two studies, we highlight a situation under which a collectivistic mind-set 
outperforms an individualistic mind-set in terms of creative output. Specifically, in a high construal scenario, ideas generated by participants 
primed with an interdependent mind-set were judged to be more creative relative to ideas by participants primed with an independent mind-
set – on both dimensions of creativity: originality and usefulness. However, no differences in creativity were found between interdependent 
and independent participants in low construal. Our nascent findings have the potential to advance knowledge of creativity and its processes, 
in general, and its effects on cross cultural performance, in specific.
12-E: You Touch it, You Buy it: Cross-cultural Differences in Consumers’ Attitudes 
Towards Local Food
Wided Batat, University of Lyon 2, France
Marie Lachance, University of Laval, Canada
Maryse Côté-Hamel, Concordia University, Canada
Why do some consumers go out of their way to buy local food, while others do not bother? Findings from semi-structured interviews 
with French and Canadian consumers suggest that non-diagnostic tactile information about food acquired even as children translates into 
persistent positive attitudes and evaluations of local food and producers
12-F: “Following Behind” Versus “Keeping up”: The Effect of Power Distance Belief and 
Superior’s Consumption on Consumer’s Preference for Status Related Products
Huachao Gao, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Yinlong Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
We propose that consumers’ preference for status-related products will be affected by power distance belief (PDB) and the presence of 
their superior’s status consumption. High (vs. low) PDB consumers prefer lower (vs. higher) status products when superior’s consumption is 
present, as they are motivated to “follow behind” (vs. “keep up”).
12-G: Shared Decisions in Emotionally Difficult Situations
Tatiana Barakshina, UIC, USA
Medical consumer decisions-making process is analyzed. A high, moderate and low gradation of “emotionally difficult decisions” is 
introduced. Findings on autonomous, shared and externally made decisions are summarized.  External decision mode is preferred for the 
highest extreme of emotional difficulty; in this work, we propose that preferences shift toward autonomous and shared decisions under mod-
erate and low emotional difficulty.
12-H: Looking for a Cultural Border Condition for the Experiential Recommendation
Ezgi Merdin, Bogazici University, Turkey
Özlem Hesapçı, Bogazici University, Turkey
With a series of studies, it is attempted to establish some border conditions of "the experiential recommendation" for happiness. Two 
main notions of the cultural self are incorporated as the independent variable and a differentiation has been made between the concepts of 
in-group vs. out-group consumption / service experience.
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13-A: The “Right” Side Can’t Be Bad! Getting on the Good Side of the Shelf
Yoon-Na Cho, Villanova University, USA
Katie Kelting, University of Arkansas, USA
From the perspective of embodied cognition, we examine the effects of a horizontal metaphor on consumer evaluations of stimuli and 
food products and find evidence to support the notion of right (left) being associated with positive (negative) valence. Findings from three 
studies are reported.
13-B: A Touch of Evil: Harmfulness Alters Sensory Characteristics
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA
Across 3 studies, we demonstrate that perceived potential harm influences sensory judgment. Participants told animals are dangerous 
rate sensory properties (beauty, softness) lower. These effects extend to actual sensory judgment of products derived from these animals, such 
that fur products derived from harmful animals feel less pleasant.
13-C: Blurring the Line: How Disfluency Begets Similarity
Michael Giblin, University of Florida, USA
Aner Sela, University of Florida, USA
In two experiments, we demonstrate that processing difficulty (i.e., disfluency) leads people to perceive different options as spatially 
closer and more similar to one another. The findings have important decision implications, as initial decision difficulty and disfluency in-
creases perceived option similarity, which in turn may further exacerbate decision difficulty.
13-D: Embodied and Primed Cleansing Effects on Consumer Indulgence
Chrissy M. Martins, Iona College, USA
Lauren Block, Baruch College, USA
Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia, Canada
This research examines how primed and embodied cleansing affects indulgence. We find that embodying a cleansing product leads to 
less guilt and more indulgence, but find the opposite when individuals are merely primed with a cleansing product or embody a neutral prod-
uct. We discuss potential explanations for these results.
13-E: “Going Against the Flow” The Metaphorical Effects of Sensorimotor Resistance
Mina Kwon, University of Illinois, USA
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
We examine how the experience of haptic resistance activates a conceptual metaphor of “going against the flow.” The implications of 
this are shown for choice situations where participants experiencing resistance go against the norm and choose options that are normatively 
not preferred.
13-F: Losing Control: When Physical Cleansing Intensifies Cheating for High Self-
Controls
Tracy Rank-Christman, Rutgers University, USA
Maureen Morrin, Temple University, USA
We show that washing one’s hands with soap and water licenses cheating behavior, and that this effect is stronger for individuals who 
exhibit chronic levels of high self-control. The results add to the growing literature on embodied cognition.
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13-G: Does Heavier Weight Mean More Power? Examining the Moderating Role of 
Dominance Trait and Semantic Congruence
Hiroaki Ishii, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
Jaewoo Park, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
Previous studies have confirmed the positive effect of weight on product evaluation, which is caused by semantic association of weight 
with importance. Our study shows another semantic link of weight, the concept of power. Additionally, we explore the interaction between 
the dominance trait, advertising picture angle, and weight.
13-H: Do Not Wash Your Hands When You Eat Junk Food: The Possibility of a Reverse 
Macbeth Effect in Consumer Behavior
Jaewoo Park, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
Hiroaki Ishii, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
This study explores whether and how the experience of physical cleansing can affect health guilt over consuming junk food. We dem-
onstrate that physical cleansing does not mitigate but aggravates perceived health guilt. Our research also shows that the effect of physical 
cleansing is moderated by consumers’ autotelic need for touch.
14-A: Mesmerized: How Digital Menu Boards Affect Food Choice
Laura Smarandescu, Iowa State University, USA
Anicia Peters, Iowa State University, USA
Brian Mennecke, Iowa State University, USA
Andrew Luse, Iowa State University, USA
The eating environment presents us with convenient, tasty, high energy density food choices. Fast food consumption is correlated with 
poor health and obesity. This research examines how rotating food images in digital menu boards influence food choices. Rotating images 
increased choice for unhealthy alternatives for vegetarians and less hungry individuals.
14-B: Exploring Consumer’s Food Choice: Utilitarian vs . Hedonic Products
Natalia Maehle, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Norway
Cele C. Otnes, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Nina Iversen, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
Leif Hem, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway
Julian Hartman, Independent Researcher, USA
Consumers have to deal with many contradictory requirements and expectations while making their food choices. To understand the 
trade-offs in their food choice situations, the current study identifies the relative importance of four main product attributes (price, taste, en-
vironmental friendliness and healthiness) for hedonic and utilitarian food products.
14-C: The Effects of Assortment Organization and Labeling on Healthy Choice: The Scoop 
from an Ice Cream Store Experiment
Ralf van der Lans, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Anirban Mukhopadhyay, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Ashley Y. H. To, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Environmental cues can have strong effects on people’s decisions. In a two-phase field experiment conducted at an ice-cream store, we 
investigate the impact of categorization and traffic light labeling on choice. Results show that organizing the assortment and labeling the 
flavors in specific ways shift consumers’ choices towards healthy options.
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14-D: It “Feels” Good for Me:  The Interaction of Naïve Theories and Processing Fluency 
in Subjective Evaluation of Healthiness
Catherine Wiggins, Cornell University, USA
Little is known about the role of processing fluency in judgments of product healthiness. This research demonstrates that the effect of 
processing fluency is dependent upon consumers’ naïve health theories, underscoring the importance of matching such theories to the level 
of processing fluency most conducive to favorable product evaluations.
14-E: Self-Licensing Effects on Food Choices
Christian Weibel, University of Bern, Switzerland
Claude Messner, University of Bern, Switzerland
Recalling an egoistic act nudges people to choose healthy over unhealthy food options. Conversely, participants preferred unhealthy 
over healthy food options when they recalled an altruistic deed. Consistent with this choice pattern participants were willing to pay more for 
healthy than for unhealthy options. This experiment extends the self-licensing literature.
14-F: Does Thinking “Outside of the Box” Make People Feel “Full”? The Influence of 
Consumer Creativity on Satiation for Unhealthy Foods
Na (Amy) Wen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Drawing on research from satiation and health psychology, we examine the therapeutic effects of consumer creativity on satiation. In 
particular, we predict that creativity can elicit a divergent mindset that may increase the heterogeneity of a consideration choice set, which 
will, in turn, accelerate the satiation rate for unhealthy foods.
14-G: How Variety in Flavors within Indulgent and Healthy Food Options Affects 
Perceived Healthiness and Preference for Promotion Types
Elke Huyghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University, Belgium
Iris Vermeir, Ghent University, Belgium
We find evidence that participants perceive variety as healthier than no variety for healthy products, while the opposite is true for indul-
gent products. Consumers also prefer a discount for an indulgent food option with variety and a bonus pack for a healthy food option with 
variety.
14-H: What You Paid Then Affects What You Eat Now: the Effect of Healthy Food Prices 
on Subsequent Food Decisions
Ying Jiang, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada
Jing Lei, University of Melbourne, Australia
In this research we examine the effect of healthy food prices on consumers’ subsequent food choices. We show that the high (vs. low)-
price of healthy food more likely leads to healthy choices in consecutive (vs. delayed) decisions for consumers who are more (vs. less) 
health-conscious.
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15-A: Consumer Emotional Intelligence and its Effects on Goal-Oriented Appeals in 
Advertising
Hongmin Ahn, West Virginia University, USA
Sang Yeal Lee, West Virginia University, USA
Yongjun Sung, Southern Methodist University, USA
This study demonstrates that consumer emotional intelligence (CEI) influences the persuasiveness of messages in ads, suggesting that 
CEI is a critical individual difference to consider in predicting consumers’ responses to advertising messages. Importantly, it suggests that the 
effect of CEI is pronounced when ad messages are prevention-focused (vs. promotion-focused).
15-B: The Impact of Attitudinal Ambivalence on Weight Loss Decisions: Consequences and 
Mitigating Factors
My Bui, Loyola Marymount University, USA
Courtney M. Droms, Butler University, USA
Georgiana Craciun, University of Pittsburgh, USA
This research examines individuals’ attitudes & intentions toward losing weight and focuses on understanding the maladaptive outcomes 
of a negative relationship between these attitudes and intentions. Results show that attitudinal ambivalence, self-efficacy, and provision of 
outcome feedback alleviated the negative effect and improved intentions to try to achieve weight loss goals.
15-C: Don’t Reward Yourself! How Celebration (Not Reward) of Accomplishment 
Increases Enjoyment and Motivation to Persevere
Aaron Snyder, Stanford University, USA
Baba Shiv, Stanford University, USA
People love to reward themselves for a job well done. However, rewards decrease enjoyment and the perception of intrinsic motivation. 
In a field experiment, we find evidence that framing an incentive as a celebration (rather than reward) increases both enjoyment and the likeli-
hood of in re-engaging in the incentivized behavior.
15-D: The Effects of Perceived Goal Progress and Assortment Size on Consumer Choice
Moon-Yong Kim, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea
When consumers buy multiple items simultaneously, this research proposes that (1) consumers’ perceived level of goal progress will 
affect their relative choice share of vices (vs. virtues); and (2) their perceived goal progress will moderate how assortment size influences 
their choice between vices and virtues.
15-E: The Bucket List: How Consumers Customize Temporal Perspective to Guide and 
Shape Their Life-Story
Jeffrey R. Carlson, University of Connecticut, USA
Anna Jansson Vredeveld, University of Connecticut, USA
This research explores how consumers use ‘bucket-lists’ to construct life plans that shape identity relevant goals. We contend that con-
sumers use experience related goals to customize their temporal perspective in order to create a coherent self-narrative that interlinks the past, 
present and future self.
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15-F: Two Fates: The Motivational and Cognitive Effect of Mortality Salience on Variety-
Seeking
Zhongqiang (Tak) Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
This research examines the cognitive and motivational effect of mortality salience in a domain of consumer behavior, namely, variety-
seeking of consumer products. One experiment provides initial evidence that cognitive priming of mortality salience increases variety-
seeking while motivational priming leads to lower tendency to choose variety.
15-G: Remember the Bad? Goal Relevance, Valence, and the Encoding of Information in 
Consumer Decisions
Michael Hair, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Samuel Bond, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Our research explores the effects of goal activation and framing on memory for positive and negative information in a consumer decision 
setting. Findings of two studies reveal that encoding performance depends jointly on the valence of information and its relevance to active 
consumption goals.
15-H: To Pursue or Not To Pursue: The Impact of Group Identification on Individual Goal 
Pursuit
Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
Kara Bentley, University of South Carolina, USA
We examine the impact of group identification on individual goal pursuit. We show that when an interdependent (vs. independent) group 
member highly identifies with its group, the vicarious goal fulfillment of the individual’s goals, resulting from the group’s successes, will 
result in disengagement from continued individual goal pursuit.
16-A: Customer Effort and the Moral Self: An Examination in a Product Customization 
Context
Prakash Das, University of Calgary, Canada
James Agarwal, University of Calgary, Canada
Little research has explored the symbolic aspects of customer effort and its relation to the moral self. In a product customization con-
text, we examine the relationship between customer effort and the moral self. It is found that effort expended influences judgments when the 
moral self is activated. The moral self increases evaluations of both companies and the individual self when greater effort (vs. less effort) is 
expended. It is suggested that effort expenditure can have symbolic implications for customers.
16-B: Sub-Ethical Choice Behavior: The Attraction Effect of Scarcity
Ashley Otto, University of Cincinnati, USA
James Kellaris, University of Cincinnati, USA
Sub-ethical choice behavior is compromising one’s values or standards, selecting the inferior ethical alternative. Sub-ethical choices are 
acceptable but not ideal, giving rise to the term sub-ethical rather than un-ethical. This research examines shelf-based scarcity and finds it 
sways consumers' choice away from their ethical ideals in a retail setting.
16-C: Anti-Brand Movement: Politico-Cultural Resistance and Ethical Commitment
Emre Ulusoy, University of Texas - Pan American, USA
Anti-brand communities are an example of social movements that go beyond the political and cultural dichotomy by playing a substan-
tive role in the creation of alternative cultural venues for consumers to voice their oppositions and construct resistant identities that extend 
into more generalized political venues for broader social change.
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16-D: Consumers’ Perceived Counterfeit Detection: A Construct with Formative 
Measurement Nature and its Relevance to Construct Validation
Jiayun (Gavin) Wu, Savannah State University, USA
Xiaoqing Wu, University of Maryland, USA
Mei-Kuang Chen, University of Arizona, USA
In the context of deliberate counterfeit consumption, we theoretically justify the proposed construct of “consumers’ Perceived Counter-
feit Detection by important others” (PCD). We emphasize PCD’s formative measurement as opposed to its reflective measurement nature; 
empirically demonstrate PCD’s existence according to our initial results; and describe its relevance to construct validation and unethical 
behavior.
16-E: Influence of Personal Control and Environmental Cue on Consumer Cheating
Chenying (Claire) Tang, Arizona State University, USA
Adriana Samper, Arizona State University, USA
Keisha M. Cutright, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Nathan D. Martin, Arizona State University, USA
We examine the effect of personal control on unethical consumer behaviors.  We find that individuals feeling low (vs. high) control are 
more likely to view unethical behaviors as acceptable (S1) and engage in cheating behaviors (S2).  This is moderated by how salient individu-
als perceive the opportunity of cheating to be.
16-F: Service Failures in Gift Orders: The Mediating Role of Guilt
Hua Chang, Drexel University, USA
Guang-Xin Xie, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA
This research examines consumers’ reactions to service failures from a psychological contract perspective. We find that consumers are 
more dissatisfied with service failures in gift orders. We demonstrate that consumers’ perception of whether a promise is made moderates the 
relationship. Consumers in the gift order condition reacted more negatively to service failures when sellers make an explicit promise. Finally, 
we show the mediating effect of feelings of guilt.
16-G: The Effect of Guilt in the Service Recovery Paradox
Yin-Hui Cheng, National Taichung University of Education,Taiwan
Shih-Chieh Chuang, National Chung Cheng University,Taiwan
Po-Dong Huang, National Chung Cheng University,Taiwan
Sui-Min Wang, National Chung Cheng University,Taiwan
Our research explores the effect of “guilt”. The results of our experiments demonstrate that if customers are compensated for service 
failures by receiving better than anticipated service, they will commonly experience feelings of “guilt.”
17-A: Eating Right, Exercising, and . . . .Reading? The Effect of Reading about Health-
Related Topics on the Internet
Ann E. McNeel, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Reading a health-related article leads consumers to feel healthier. Frequent exercisers who read a health article were more likely than 
those who read a history article to ironically choose a fashion sneaker over a fitness shoe. The research expands the notion of what constitutes 
a health-promotion behavior leading to licensing.
810 / Working Papers
17-B: Nutrition Information on Food Menu: Nutrition Involvement and Message Framing 
Effects
SoYeon Kwon, Purdue University, USA
Sejin Ha, Purdue University, USA
What is an effective calorie labeling strategy that would help consumers to make a healthy food choice? To answer this question, this 
study examined different ways of presenting calorie information of a combo meal. The extent to which it is moderated by nutrition involve-
ment is also examined.
17-C: The Role of Political Ideology in Reactions to Warning Labels
Mitchel Murdock, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
James F. Thrasher, University of South Carolina, USA
This research investigates the role of political ideology in consumer reactions to warning labels and demonstrates that when the FDA 
is associated with the warning label conservatives (but not liberals) decrease their intentions to quit smoking (Study 1) and increase their 
purchase intentions of unhealthy foods (Study 2).
17-D: “Slim” Cigarettes and Consumer Inferences about Product Harmfulness
Timothy Dewhirst, University of Guelph, Canada
Following the lead of Mick (2006) and the practice of transformative consumer research that aims to improve well-being and inform 
policy, this study provides an interpretive analysis of the tobacco industry’s consumer research to examine whether the “slims” cigarette 
product descriptor is likely to be misleading about the product’s harmfulness.
17-E: When Emotional Messages Are More Abstract: The Effects of Message Frame and 
Levels of Construal on Negative Attitudes Towards Smoking
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
This paper examines the effects of message frame and levels of construal on negative attitudes towards smoking. We show that in ab-
stract construal, emotional (vs. rational) message frame increase negative attitudes towards smoking. However, when concrete construal is 
activated, emotional and rational messages impact negative attitudes towards smoking similarly.
17-F: Natural Consumer
Maria Kniazeva, University of San Diego, USA
To explore the concept of “natural consumer” I turn to the product that represents “the very substance of the natural world” (Wilk 2006) 
- drinking water. Narratives on the labels of bottled water inform the study. The research objective is to conceptualize the natural way of liv-
ing as taught by marketers.
17-G: Do Thoughts of Money Influence Peoples’ Health Risk Perceptions?
Johannes C. Bauer, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Jochim Hansen, University of Salzburg, Austria
Vicki G. Morwitz, New York University, USA
This research contributes to the psychology of money by showing that merely thinking of money can influence peoples’ health risk 
perceptions. We provide an emotional account for why thoughts of money make people feel more optimistic about health risks and identify 
boundary conditions for the effects of money priming.
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17-H: Details to Spare: The Effects of Product Risk Disclosure on Consumer Evaluations 
of Brands and Product Manufacturers
Cassandra Davis, University of Arkansas, USA
We find that the social contract between consumers and manufacturers is impaired when manufacturers provide inadequate  product risk 
disclosure but that manufacturers receive little reward for copious risk disclosure. We also find that brand perceptions are negatively affected 
by the inclusion of product risk disclosure. Evoked fear mediates these relationships.
18-A: Consumer Experience with Augmented Reality at Brands’ Events
Ana Javornik, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Switzerland
Andreina Mandelli, SDA Bocconi, Italy
Increasingly popular marketing communication tool of augmented reality has been so far limitedly investigated. This exploratory study 
assesses the appropriateness of the variables of interactivity, telepresence and vividness for evaluating the customer experience with aug-
mented reality at brands’ events. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews with practitioners and academics are conducted.
18-B: Online Ordering for Healthier Eating: A Field Experiment
Eric VanEpps, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Julie Downs, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
George Loewenstein, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Using an original internet-based food ordering system implemented in a field setting with office workers, we experimentally test the 
conditions under which consumers can be nudged to order healthier (i.e., lower calorie) lunches by tracking the orders of individuals over 
multiple weeks.
18-C: Tastes like Freedom: Perceived Choice Improves Taste
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Across three studies, we demonstrate that consumers rate foods as tastier when given the feeling of free choice. Choice enhances expe-
rience even when it is enacted not with the tasted food itself, and when no choice at all is given but rather a false feeling of customization.
18-D: Examining Consumers’ Intentions to Purchase Luxury Goods and Counterfeits
Kuang-peng Hung, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Annie Chen, University of Westminster, UK
Norman Peng, University of Westminster, UK
This study examines the factors that influence consumers’ intention to purchase luxury goods and counterfeits. Findings confirm product 
quality, value-expressive attitudes, and social-adjustive attitudes will have significant impact on consumers’ purchase intention. Furthermore, 
status-consciousness can moderate the relationship between social-adjustive attitudes and purchase intention.
18-E: But I Don't Wanna! How Group Fun Can Increase Consumers' Motivation for the 
Un-enjoyable
Stefanie M. Tignor, Northeastern University, USA
Paul W. Fombelle, Northeastern University, USA
Nancy J. Sirianni, Northeastern University, USA
Two studies demonstrate how the co-creation of fun may be used to motivate consumers to engage in exercise, and the ways in which 
fun can impact health and well-being. We show that fun is associated with higher levels of self- and group efficacy, which in turn can increase 
intrinsic motivation.
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18-F: Jewelry and Clothing Only, Please! Happiness from Material Object Gifts Greater 
than Happiness from Experiential Gifts
Christopher Ling, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
We examine recipient (self vs. other) as moderator of the effect of chosen option on happiness, finding that consumers associate greater 
happiness with experiential versus material objects bought for themselves; however, these results reverse when receiving from others: in this 
context happiness is greater for material than experiential objects.
18-G: The Effect of Anticipated Future Consumption Amount on Food Consumption 
Experience
Hua (Olivia) Lian, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
Gerald Häubl, University of Alberta, Canada
This research examines how people’s food consumption experiences are affected by the amount of food they anticipate consuming. 
Controlling for the actual consumption amount, we found that participants enjoyed the eating experience more when they had anticipated 
consuming a smaller (vs. a larger) amount of food.
18-H: Compulsive Collecting: Conceptualization and Measurement
Monika Kukar-Kinney, University of Richmond, USA
Nancy Ridgway, University of Richmond, USA
Although there is much research on the topic of collecting, no attempt to separate collecting from compulsive collecting has been made. 
In this research, we conceptualize and develop a measure of compulsive collecting. The research offers important theoretical and empirical 
contributions as well as public policy implications.
19-A: Coping versus Enhancement Motives of Compulsive Buying and Subtyping of 
Compulsive Buyers
Sunghwan Yi, University of Guelph, Canada
Roisin O'Connor, Concordia University, Canada
We assessed the heterogeneity of compulsive buyers (CB) based on affective motives of buying: coping and enhancement motives. La-
tent profile analysis identified three clusters of CB: high coping CB, moderate coping/enhancement CB, and low coping/enhancement buyers. 
High coping CB cluster had significantly more serious CB problems than the other clusters.
19-B: Consumers’ Need for Prestige: Scale Development
Friederike Blum, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Stefan Hampel, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Hajo Hippner, University of Bayreuth, Germany
The need for prestige is deeply anchored in everyday social life. This research details the development of the “Consumers’ Need for 
Prestige” scale designed to measure individual differences in aspiring prestige. The 21-item CNFP scale consisting of the impression-orient-
ed, social-approval, and impressible dimensions demonstrate reliability, convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.
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19-C: Physical Activity and Food Consumption: The Moderating Role of Dieting Tendency
Chiu-chi Angela Chang, Central Michigan University, USA
Ying-ching Lin, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
Shu-Fang Cheng, National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan
This research examines the impact of physical activity on dieters’ and nondieters’ food consumption. The empirical findings show that 
only dieters’ food consumption and choice are significantly affected by physical activity, which is construed as an entitlement justification. 
Framing physical activity as fun (vs. work) reverses dieters’ food compensation.
19-D: Motivation Matters: Choice Confidence as a Function of Information Diagnosticity 
and NFCC
Demetra Andrews, IU Northwest, USA
Marketplace information plays a key role in generating consumer confidence. However, consumers do not respond uniformly to en-
countered information. This research demonstrates how Need for Cognitive Closure, a dispositional factor that alters information processing, 
moderates the relationship between information diagnosticity and choice confidence.
19-E: Exploring the Psychological Mechanism Behind Exclusionary Reactions to Foreign 
Companies: The Questions of Who and Why
Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Melody M. Chao, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Franki Kung, University of Waterloo, Canada
Jessica Y. Y. Kwong, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Two studies show that international conflict events lead to exclusionary reactions toward foreign companies only among consumers with 
high social essentialism. This contributes to the animosity literature by showing the social-cognitive underpinning of animosity and contrib-
utes to ongoing debate in social psychology as on whether essentialist belief influences intergroup relations.
19-F: Will Future Orientation Make People Socially Expansive?
Haejoo Han, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea
Heeyoung Yoon, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea
Kyoungmi Lee, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
Across two experiments, we find that future orientation can influence the extent to which consumers would like to expand their social 
networks. This research suggests that both individual differences in future orientation and the temporally activated future focus can make 
consumers socially expansive, and the regulatory focus moderates this effect.
19-G: The Right Shade of Green: The Effect of Sustainability Utility on Consumer Product 
Evaluations
Yoon-Na Cho, Villanova University, USA
Robin L. Soster, University of Arkansas, USA
We demonstrate the effect of perceived sustainability (dis)utility based on consumers’ category-level sustainability expectations, which 
influence consumer evaluations of brands within the category. Our findings also reveal that these effects arise independent of 1) a consumer’s 
tendency to self-enhance and 2) perceived consumer effectiveness.
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19-H: Omission Bias in the Marketplace: The Moderating Role of Experience on 
Consumer Trust Perceptions for Brands and Agents
Jungim Mun, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Michael Wiles, Arizona State University, USA
Charles D. Lindsey, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Two types of marketplace behaviors may result in harm to consumers. Commissions are harmful actions such as inaccurately reporting 
important marketplace information, whereas omissions are harmful inactions such as failing to report important marketplace information. The 
current research integrates procedural justice theory and attribution theory to predict that for harmful omissions, experienced marketplace 
actors (e.g., brands, salespersons) will suffer greater decreases in trust perceptions than inexperienced marketplace actors. In contrast, for 
harmful commissions, actor experience is predicted to have no influence on decreases in trust perceptions.
20-A: Lost and Found: the Conversion of Gains and Losses on Consumers’ Decision 
Making
Yan Meng, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
People tend to add value to rediscovered objects, which were once lost, because they convert the degree of pain when losing the objects 
to the degree of pleasure when finding the objects again. The conversion between mental accounts of gains and losses influences consumers’ 
likelihood of purchasing a product.
20-B: Luck and the Endowment Effect: A Context of Application of the “Possession-Self 
Link"
Yan Meng, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Ana Valenzuela, Baruch College, CUNY, USA/Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain
Three studies show that the possession-self link is strengthened through “good luck” associations. A strengthened link results in a prod-
uct being perceived as having a higher value, which lowers the willingness to trade the product for money and impacts the endowment effect.
20-C: New ‘Thinking’ about Optimal Consumer Decision Making
Jonathan Hasford, University of Nevada, USA
David Hardesty, University of Kentucky, USA
Blair Kidwell, Ohio State University, USA
A new theoretical perspective that reexamines how consumers should think before making decisions and the optimal outcomes that re-
sult is developed here. This research suggests that consumers should think more about routine choices, use intuition for occasional purchases, 
and use unconscious thought for major purchases.
20-D: When Why=Short Duration and How=Long Duration: The Moderating Role of Task 
Complexity
Rafay Siddiqui, University of South Carolina, USA
Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA
Ashwani Monga, University of South Carolina, USA
Research has shown that when individuals estimate the time it would take to complete a task, thinking in a ‘why’ vs. ‘how’ mindset 
leads to longer estimates. We show that when a task is complex, the reverse occurs, that is ‘how’ vs. ‘why’ thinkers perceive task duration to 
be longer.
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20-E: The Influence of Relative and Absolute Differences on Judgments
Dan R. Schley, Ohio State University, USA
Ellen Peters, Ohio State University, USA
We demonstrate that, contrary to previous research on proportion dominance, consumers appear substantially more sensitive to absolute 
differences than to relative differences. These findings were robust across manipulations and both between- and within-participant. Further-
more, the current research demonstrates that consumers have limited attention available, attending to relative or absolute differences.
20-F: Does 8 of 10 Equal 80 of 100? The Scale Magnitude Effect on Singular Option 
Evaluation
Tao Tao, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Yuhuang Zheng, Tsinghua University, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Liangyan Wang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
This research extends the scale magnitude effect from option comparisons to singular option evaluation. In three studies, we demonstrate 
that at high percentage levels, “not get” part of the score is focused; therefore large scale magnitude decreases evaluation. Further, regulatory 
focus moderates the valance of the scale magnitude effect.
20-G: The Relationship of Perceived Knowledge With Perceived Risk: An Exploratory 
Study
Jacqueline Eastman, Georgia Southern University, USA
Lindsay R. L. Larson, Georgia Southern University, USA
Tyler Meharg, Georgia Southern University, USA
This research explores the relationship between perceived risk and perceived knowledge in the financial investment domain. This will 
be accomplished through a 2 x 2 experiment comparing levels of knowledge with levels of risk to determine the impact on choice of portfolio 
in setting up a retirement investment plan.
20-H: Effect of Nicotine Consumption on Risk Taking: A Study of Gambling Behavior
Richard Yalch, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Shaun Maurer, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Maria French, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Ryan Rathbone, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Research has established a high association between cigarette smoking and risky behaviors such as reckless driving but has not demon-
strated causality via a true experiment.  Individuals intercepted immediately before or after consuming a cigarette gambled for real money. 
The results show that nicotine consumption increases risk taking.
21-A: Spokespeople in Comparative Advertising: The Role of Spokesperson Type and 
Comparison Type
Sumitra Auschaitrakul, McGill University, Canada
Ashesh Mukherjee, McGill University, Canada
Prior work suggests that using non-firm spokespeople, compared to firm spokespeople, is likely to increase the persuasiveness of adver-
tising. We hypothesize that comparison type can moderate this effect, such that non-firm spokespeople are more persuasive in case of factual 
comparisons, but this effect is attenuated in case of evaluative comparisons.
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21-B: Risk Communication Under Positive Mood: The Impact of Message Framing and 
Goal Claim on Public Safety Persuasion
Sidney Su Han, University of Guelph, Canada
Karen Gough (Finlay), University of Guelph, Canada
Lefa Teng, University of Guelph, Canada
Positive mood impacts individual’s response to risk information. Therefore, some traditional message strategies may not work well for 
public safety persuasion in positive mood. To bridge this gap, the current research examined the effects of two strategies (message framing 
and goal claim) on risk communication effectiveness under positive mood.
21-C: The Persuasion Mindset: The Effect of Persuasion on the Persuader
Chris Summers, Ohio State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Little is known about the effect of persuasion on the persuader. We argue that in striving to persuade someone else to like a target object, 
consumers adopt a “persuasion mindset,” which results in more extreme evaluations of the target object, increased confidence in evaluations, 
and an openness to persuasion by others.
21-D: Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: When Disadvantaged Brand Determination 
Improves Brand Evaluations
Ali Tezer, Concordia University, Canada
Bianca Grohmann, Concordia University, Canada
H. Onur Bodur, Concordia University, Canada
We demonstrate that brand’s passion and determination, communicated by underdog brand biography, compared to topdog brand biogra-
phy (Paharia et al. 2011), lead to higher purchase intentions when the brand is the information source. The positive effect of underdog brand 
biography disappears when the biography is learned from an independent source.
21-E: Brand Transgressions and Consumers’ Deliberate Self-Persuasion
Wonkyong Beth Lee, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Yang Ye, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
This paper explores whether consumers engage in deliberate self-persuasion when their beloved brands commit transgressions. It reveals 
when people have strong brand relationships, they use self-directed, intentional attitude change. It includes tactics to reinterpret undesired 
elements of the brands and to inhibit undesired elements of the brands out of awareness.
21-F: "Meaning Similar" Wins, "Looking Similar" Loses? The Effect of Perceptual 
Similarity and Conceptual Similarity on Consumers' Perceptions of Copycat Brand Names
Yao Qin, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Na (Amy) Wen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Lan Xu, Wuhan University, China
We investigate how Chinese consumers react to perceptually similar and conceptually similar brand names(in Chinese).Two experimen-
tal studies test the relationship between perceptual similarity and conceptual similarity on brand confusion and brand attitude. Results indicate 
that the effects were due to consumers’ attributions about the perceived sincerity in adopting copycat brand names.
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21-G: The Impact of Regulatory (Non) Fit and Task Difficulty on Consumer’s Subsequent 
Evaluations
Mariana Monfort, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Danielle Mantovani, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Paulo Prado, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Juan José Camou Viacava, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Based on the regulatory fit phenomenon, the authors investigate the impact of regulatory fit and task difficulty on consumer’s subsequent 
evaluations. Results from two experiments demonstrate that under low difficult tasks, the regulatory fit holds true, but under a difficult task 
condition, this effect no longer exists.
21-H: Mindless Resistance to Persuasion: When Low Self-Control Decreases Yielding to 
Social Influence
Loes Janssen, Radboud University, The Netherlands
Bob M. Fennis, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
The present research challenges the prevailing view that resistance to persuasion is more likely to succeed when resources for active self-
regulation are high, rather than low. Three experiments demonstrate that low self-control may actually facilitate, rather than hinder, resistance 
to persuasion when the influence context contains salient resistance-promoting heuristics.
22-A: The Power to Know What You Want: How Power Influences Preference Consistency
Bella Rozenkrants, Stanford University, USA
Daniella Kupor, Stanford University, USA
Andrea Weihrauch, Friederich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA
We hypothesize that power increases preference consistency. In three experiments, we show that power increase reliance on internal 
preferences compared to external cues, that power increases consistency between preferred product features and choices, and that power 
decreases transitivity violations. Future directions, theoretical implications, and practical implications are discussed.
22-B: How Suspicion Can Lead to Suboptimal Consumer Choices
Julie Verstraeten, Ghent University, Belgium
Tina Tessitore, Ghent University, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University, Belgium
This paper shows that suspicion affects subsequent, unrelated consumer choices. Contrary to its effect on related choices, suspicion 
renders unrelated choices suboptimal, leading suspicious consumers to choose more vices over virtues than their non-suspicious counterparts. 
Cognitive load explains these counter-intuitive findings.
22-C: The Delboeuf Illusion in Food Portion Judgments by Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
Audrey Parrish, Georgia State University, USA
Michael Beran, Georgia State University, USA
Chimpanzees preferred choosing same-sized and smaller food portions that were presented on a smaller plate over equal or larger food 
portions presented on a larger plate. These biases can be attributed to the Delboeuf Illusion which previously had only been demonstrated in 
portion estimation and consumption behavior in humans.
818 / Working Papers
22-D: Scarab Beetles among the Sheep and Goats: Some Choices are Just Meant to be 
Made
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
Cristobal Barra, University of South Carolina, USA
Adding to literatures on irrational beliefs and meaningful coincidences, we introduce synchronicity to consumer research and develop 
consumers’ belief in signs as a moderator. Importantly, we show congruence between synchronous events is unnecessary for events to become 
meaningful signs for consumers motivated to construct meaning out of the synchronous events.
22-E: Manipulate Attributions to Improve Satisfaction for Nonconscious Self-discrepant 
Behaviors
Yanghong Hu, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Nan Cui, Wuhan University, China
Lan Xu, Wuhan University, China
Individuals with interdependent self construal who are nonconsciously activated by variety-seeking goals are more satisfied with self-
discrepant variety-seeking behaviors than those consciously activated after they realize their self-discrepant behaviors. Whether an acces-
sible external attribution exists also impacts satisfaction. Perceived self determination fully mediates the relationship between attribution and 
satisfaction.
22-F: Powerful People Think Differently: Power and Reliance on Associative Knowledge in 
Consumption Contexts
Hendrik Slabbinck, Ghent University, Belgium
Mario Pandelaere, Ghent University, Belgium
We provide deeper insights into the knowledge structures on which powerful and powerless consumers rely on when making judgments 
and decisions. To do so, we make a distinction between associative (i.e. implicit) and propositional (i.e. explicit) knowledge and posit that 
powerful people rely more heavily on associative knowledge than powerless people.
22-G: Temporal Distance and Consumer Preference for Hedonic and Functional Attributes
Nai-Hwa Lien, National Taiwan University, Taiwan
Yi-Ling Chen, National Taiwan University, Taiwan
This research investigates (1) whether the preference for hedonic vs. functional product attributes change as temporal distance increases; 
(2) the moderating role of processing goal on temporal distance effect. Results of three experiments support our hypotheses and indicate the 
hedonic attribute is a high level construal and functional attribute is low-level.
22-H: The Role of Impulsiveness in Consumers’ Choice: Impulsive Behavior can be 
Economically Rational
Angelos Stamos, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Sabrina Bruyneel, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Bram De Rock, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Laurens Cherchye, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Siegfried Dewitte, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
We investigate the economic rationality of consumers acting on impulse. In two studies we manipulate impulsiveness and we assess the 
rationality of consumers’ choice. Using state-of-the art elicitation methods, we find that impulsiveness does not have an impact on economic 
rationality, though it does impact choice.
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23-A: Affect in the Selection of Reference Prices
Alexander DePaoli, Stanford University, USA
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA
Factors influencing the selection or generation of consumers' reference prices are of great theoretical and practical importance. We argue 
that positive affect makes consumers more likely to select an environmentally available cue as a reference price, whereas negative affect 
makes them more likely to generate a reference price from memory.
23-B: Not All Anchors Weigh the Same: Anchoring and Framing Effects in Pay-What-You-
Want Pricing
Catherine Armstrong Soule, University of Oregon, USA
Robert Madrigal, University of Oregon, USA
The current research explores anchoring and framing effects of external reference prices (ERPs) on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pay-
ments. Two studies demonstrate that ERPs provide normative information that has anchoring effects on voluntary payments. However, frames 
activating different types of norms can cause identical nominal information to have differential effects on payments.
23-C: A Competition among New Methods for Eliciting Probability Distributions
David Rothschild, Microsoft Research, USA
Daniel G. Goldstein, Microsoft Research, USA
Florian Teschner, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
We compare the traditional method of eliciting probability distributions from laypeople with seven graphically-oriented interfaces. The 
most complicated of the graphical interfaces take less time than the traditional method, but produce more accurate results on both the indi-
vidual and aggregate-level. Learning lowers the effort level for these complicated graphical interfaces.
23-D: What is the Best Strategy to Track the Price of Your Shopping Basket?
Tatiana Sokolova, HEC Paris, France
Marc Vanhuele, HEC Paris, France
What are the best computational strategies to track the total price of a shopping basket? Van Ittersum et al. found that people choosing 
the most accurate strategy did worse. We made the comparison in a field study and find that the most accurate and effortful strategy dominates 
simplification strategies.
23-E: The Effects of Math Anxiety on Consumers’ Perceptions of Sales Promotions
Fei L. Weisstein, University of Texas - Pan American, USA
Xi Wang, The University of Texas - Pan American, USA
This paper examines whether consumers’ levels of math anxiety influence their perceptions of various sales promotions. Our study 
shows that consumers with high math anxiety prefer simplified non-monetary promotion that involved no arithmetic calculation while con-
sumers with low math anxiety prefer discount monetary promotion.
23-F: The Effect of Price Promotion Patterns on Consumers’ Use of an Expected Price as a 
Reference Price
Atul Kulkarni, University of Missouri, USA
Kent Monroe, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign/University of Richmond, USA
Findings from two studies suggest that the use of the expected prices as a reference for price judgments (i) has a positive, non-linear 
relationship with the frequency of price promotions, and (ii) is higher when spacing between two consecutive price promotions is random, 
as compared to consistent.
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23-G: Framing and Sales Promotions: Is Gas Scarce?
Mazen Jaber, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
Kylie Goggins, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
Manufacturers routinely use sales-promotions to encourage purchases by consumers. This paper focuses on how the framing of such 
promotions affects consumers’ perceptions of offer attractiveness and purchase intentions. We compare consumer responses to instant savings 
framed as a dollar discount, a gasoline gift-card, and a monetary discount framed as non-monetary.
23-H: The Effectiveness of Groupon Promotion versus Coupon Promotion: From the 
Consumer’s Perspective
Jun Pang, Renmin University of China, China
Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, University of Alberta, Canada
Kanliang Wang, Renmin University of China, China
This research identifies the unique features of groupons and compares their promotion effectiveness with that of coupons from a mul-
tifaceted perspective. Using a field experiment, we demonstrate the relative advantages of groupon promotion and investigate the consumer 
consequences of its unique features to explain the underlying mechanisms.
24-A: Pioneering Advantage Revisited: The Moderating Roles of Form and Function in 
Consumer’s Evaluation of the Follower’s New Product
Sangwon Lee, Ball State University, USA
In this paper, the moderating roles of form and function of the new products to nullify pioneers advantage are examined. Results from 
the experimental study demonstrate that depending on the functionality level and form similarity, new product launch strategy needs to be 
different.
24-B: The Legitimation of Illicit Products through Design
Aimee Huff, Oregon State University, USA
Sarah Wilner, Wilfred Laurier University, Canada
An emergent generation of sex toys has redefined and destabilized this historically illicit product category with striking aesthetic im-
provements. We explore the process of legitimization by examining discourse about sex toys in popular media that both lead and reflect this 
transformation, and construct a semiotic square to structure our analysis.
24-C: Connecting the Dots: Using Sequential Extensions to Achieve Brand Growth
Adrian Peretz, Oslo School of Management, Norway
Lars Erling Olsen, Oslo School of Management, Norway
Brand managers often identify growth categories that lie beyond the reach of their current brands. This paper provides initial evidence 
for the viability of using intermediate brand extensions to shape parent brand associations in order to bridge the gap between an existing brand 
and an attractive, but distant extension category.
24-D: Are You One of Us? Regaining Online Credibility through Collaborative Product 
Development
Laurel Aynne Cook, University of Arkansas, USA
Ronn J. Smith, University of Arkansas, USA
The knowledge of a product’s collaborative development is explored (Study 1) and experimentally tested (Studies 2 and 3) to determine 
differences in multiple measures of trust and source credibility regarding toy companies. Using three samples of adult parents, the results have 
important implications regarding brand and product discourse between consumers.
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24-E: Exploring the Impact of Product Design Characteristics on Sales
Utku Akkoç, University of Alberta, Canada
Robert Fisher, University of Alberta, Canada
Drawing upon longitudinal data from the U.S. auto market between 1984 and 2003, we demonstrate how product aesthetics have played 
a role in customers’ preferences. Our study contributes to the limited literature on the impact of design elements on consumer behavior and 
has important implications for new product development teams.
24-F: Core versus Peripheral Innovations: The Effect of Innovation Locus on Consumer 
Adoption of New Products
Zhenfeng Ma, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Tripat Gill, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Annie (Ying) Jiang, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada
Innovation locus refers to the place in the product system – the core versus the peripheral - where innovations occur. We show that when 
an innovation is really new, situating the innovation on the peripheral (vs. core) component results in a higher adoption intention, owing to a 
risk-localization mechanism.
24-G: “Me” Likes Expert Reviews and “We” Like Consumer Reviews: Moderating of 
Product Newness
Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Narayan Janakiraman, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Zhenfeng Ma, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Ritesh Saini, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Two studies show that when product is new, customer review is more effective for the interdependents (vs. independents), whereas ex-
pert review is more effective for the independents (vs. interdependents). When product is not new, the opposite pattern occurs. This is because 
perceived efficacy of information is shifted by product newness.
24-H: Sequential Overchoice in Product Customization
Michael Dorn, University of Bern, Switzerland
Adrian Brügger, University of Bern, Switzerland
Claude Messner, University of Bern, Switzerland
The present study demonstrates how consumers can suffer from sequential overchoice. Customizing a tailor-made suit from combined-
attribute choices (e.g., deciding on color and fabric in combination) leads to less satisfaction, more information overload, and less additional 
consumption than customizing it from single-attribute choices (e.g., deciding on color, then on fabric).
25-A: Does Bitter Taste Make You Perform Better in Self-Control?
Chun-Ming Yang, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Xiaoyu Zhou, Peking University, China
In the present study, two experiments demonstrate that experiencing bitter taste may lead to better self-control performance; however, 
this effect exists only for participants with high BTP. For those with low BTP, bitterness experiences lead to decreased overall performance. 
Self-control goal mediates the relationship.
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25-B: Jujutsu For Compulsive Buyers: Arousal in Shopping Situations Can be Used to 
Strengthen Self-Control
Benjamin G. Serfas, University of Vienna, Austria
Oliver B. Büttner, University of Vienna, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria
This research examines affective processes that underlie compulsive buying and how they can be used for interventions that strengthen 
self-control. The results show that compulsive buyers experience stronger arousal in shopping situations. Implementation intentions with af-
fective arousal as critical cue helped compulsive buyers to focus their attention.
25-C: Can "Sharing the Guilt" License Indulgence?
Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
We suggest that consumers may be more likely to indulge when they share experiences with others (e.g., with friends), rather than 
indulging alone. Results of two studies show that in shared (vs. lone) consumption situations, consumers tend to feel less guilty to indulge, 
since both indulgence and guilt are shared.
25-D: Focus on Your Feelings - But the Right Ones: Insights on the Processes of Ego 
Depletion
Nina Belei, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Claudia Jasmand, Imperial College London, UK
Brian Sternthal, Northwestern University, USA
This research examines the role of feelings in stimulating versus eliminating the depletion effect. We demonstrate the differential ef-
fects of feelings signaling a need to spend less additional resources (e.g., fatigue) versus more additional resources (e.g., hunger) on depleted 
consumers’ self-regulatory behavior.
25-E: Thanks but No Thanks: the Impact of Gratitude on Consumer Self-Regulation
Marina Carnevale, Fordham University, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Rania W. Semaan, American University of Sharjah, UAE
Despite the plethora of beliefs about the beneficial effects of gratitude, very little evidence exists supporting a cause-effect relationship 
between gratitude and individuals’ well-being. In this research we aim at addressing this gap in literature by exploring how gratitude can 
directly impact individuals’ own well-being and preferences.
25-F: The Darkness Effect: The Effect of Lighting Conditions on Self-Control
Jorge Pena Marin, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
L. J. Shrum, HEC Paris, France
The current research examines whether ambient lighting (brighter vs. darker) impacts self-control. Two studies showed that participants 
who completed the study in darker conditions ate more indulgent snacks (cookies, M&Ms) than did those in lighter conditions. Potential 
underlying mechanisms for this effect are discussed.
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25-G: Helen of Troy? The Effect of Sexy Stimuli on Male’s Self-Control in Task 
Performance
Chen Rui, Tsinghua University, China
Zheng Yuhuang, Tsinghua University, China
Rui (Juliet) Zhu, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, China
Traditional proverbs and previous research suggest that sexy stimuli lower male’s self-control. This research argues and shows the op-
posite. Results of four studies showed that sexy stimuli increased male’s self-control in task performance, and this effect was mediated and 
moderated by their showing off motivation.
25-H: Working Against the Clock: Predicting Responses to Deadline Goal Failure
Yael Zemack-Rugar, Virginia Tech, USA
Canan Corus, Pace University, USA
Rebecca Rabino, Virginia Tech, USA
David Brinberg, Virginia Tech, USA
We examine consumer responses to deadline goal failure by developing and validating a new domain-specific scale (Studies 1 and 2) 
which predicts responses to real-life (academic) deadline-goal failure (Study 3). We consolidate previous contradicting findings on goal set-
ting and goal failure by using our scale as a new moderator.
26-A: “But What do I Know?” Metacognitive Processes of Those with Low Self-Esteem
Stephanie Lin, Stanford University, USA
S. Christian Wheeler, Stanford University, USA
Zakary L. Tormala, Stanford University, USA
Do people with low self-esteem (LSEs) have distinct metacognitive experiences?  A pilot study suggests that LSEs do not trust their 
thoughts. Studies show that LSEs do not depend on their thoughts as much as HSEs to form attitudes, and become less polarized in attitudes 
after thinking about them.
26-B: "Our" Past Gives "Me" a Better Future: The Influence of Collective Nostalgic 
Consumption on Future Perceptions
Canice M.C. Kwan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Alex S. L. Tsang, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
This paper has identified one important difference between personal and collective nostalgic consumption, suggesting that consumers 
perceive their future as better after engaging in collective nostalgic consumption. Our findings provided support for our proposed effect not 
resulting from common cognitive effects (e.g., spillover effect, contrast effect) per se.
26-C: Increasing Customer Compliance in Services: The Relative Importance of the Actual 
and the Ideal Self
Shuqin Wei, Southern Illinois University, USA
Tyson Ang, Southern Illinois University, USA
Many long-term services require customers to comply with the service provider’s instructions when outside of the service facility. 
We investigate how self-congruence influences compliance. We find that actual self-congruence leads to more compliance than ideal self-
congruence. We investigate the mediating role of planning and identify a moderator (units vs. numbers).
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26-D: "People" Can be Better Than “You”: The Moderating Role of Regulatory Focus on 
Self-Referencing Effect
Seungae Lee, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Soyoung Lee, University of Texas at Austin, USA
This paper examines the role of regulatory focus of messages in explaining the self-reference effect. It was hypothesized prevention-
focused messages would facilitate biased message elaboration while promotion-focused messages would facilitate unbiased message elabora-
tion. The results of study would explain contradicting results of the self-reference effect in prior literature.
26-E: "I Can't Stand My Team, but I Can't Live Without It": Ambivalence Among Highly 
Identified Sports Fans
Frank Pons, Université Laval, Canada
Marilyn Giroux, Concordia University, Canada
Mehdi Mourali, University of Calgary, Canada
André Richelieu, Université Laval, Canada
The authors conducted in-depth interviews with highly ambivalent fans that were very critical about the team they support. This study 
aims at better understanding the mechanisms that explain their behaviors. Another goal is to provide a typology of these fans using their 
rationale and motives to adopt such behaviours.
26-F: Examining the Predictors of Sports Team Attachment
Andrew Bennington, University of Minnesota, USA
Aaron M. Sackett, University of St. Thomas, USA
A better understanding of the causes and consequences of sports team attachment may have positive implications for strengthening brand 
loyalty. In this series of studies, we sought to examine the relationship between sports fanaticism and several potential factors including the 
illusion of control, nostalgia, and need for belonging.
26-G: Effects of Perceived Other’s Satisfaction and the Role of the Interdependent Self in 
Group Service Consumption
Koji Matsushita, Chuo University, Japan
Akito Nakamura, Fukushima University, Japan
Haruko Tsuchihashi, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan
Kaichi Saito, Meiji Gakuin University, Japan
This study on group service consumption suggests that Perceived Other’s Satisfaction (POS) directly influences both Customer Satis-
faction (CS) and repeat intention. The Interdependent Self-construal (IS) moderates the relationship between POS and repeat intention. We 
propose an unexplored antecedent of CS in intimate group consumption and identify a promising new area of cross-cultural service research.
26-H: Community, Identity and Sharing through Bike Paths
Hillary Leonard, University of Rhode Island, USA
Gema Vinuales, University of Rhode Island, USA
Understanding how collective consumers make sense of public goods offers the opportunity to expand our knowledge of community, 
identity, and willingness to engage in prosocial behaviors. This study aims to expand this knowledge through the examination of collective 
consumption, or the sharing of bike paths.
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27-A: Imagine Yourself in Use: Measuring the Construct of Consumption Vision
Mark Yi-Cheon Yim, Canisius College, USA
Paul Sauer, Canisius College, USA
In spite of its importance, the consumption vision construct has seen limited adoption in identification of effective marketing communi-
cations. The current study aims to clarify this construct and present a measurement tool for future researchers and practitioners.
27-B: Symmetrical Logos Can Harm Brand Equity: The Interactive Effect of Logo Design 
and Brand Personality on Brand Valuation
Jonathan Luffarelli, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Antonios Stamatogiannakis, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Haiyang Yang, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Using experimental results and large field datasets on logo perception and brand valuation, we show that symmetry in logo designs 
interacts with excitement and competence dimensions of brand personality, negatively impacting brand equity. These effects are unique to 
symmetry and not driven by other visual characteristics (e.g., complexity, contrast, fluency).
27-C: Message in a Bottle: What a Product’s Shape Tells us About the Product and 
Ourselves
Abigail Schneider, University of Colorado, USA
Page Moreau, University of Colorado, USA
Bridget Leonard, University of Colorado, USA
Product packaging plays a critical role in consumers’ purchase decisions. The present research examines how one element of packag-
ing—shape—influences consumers’ self-perceptions and enjoyment of the usage experience. Drawing on extended-self theory, we find that 
consumers react more favorably toward products with shapes that represent their ideal selves.
27-D: Increasing Spending Behavior After Exposure to Body-Type Package Shapes
Marisabel Romero, University of South Florida, USA
Adam Craig, University of South Florida, USA
The current research investigated whether exposure to product shapes that resemble thin or overweight human body-types can influence 
subsequent spending behavior. Our results show that, consistent with the stereotypical view that overweight individuals hold low levels of 
control, exposure to wide product shapes leads to a decreased accessibility of the concept of control (compared to exposure to thin product 
shapes) and subsequently leads consumers to increase their level of spending on subsequent purchase decisions. We also show that dietary 
orientation moderates this effect.
27-E: The Role of Imagination in Consumer Contamination
Jessica Gerard, University of Grenoble, France
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
The present research focuses on consumer contamination and aims to determine which form of touch is more detrimental to responses 
towards the product (actual vs. imagined touch) and to demonstrate the role of mental imagery as an underlying mechanism for our effects.
27-F: Does Non-Diagnostic Touch of Business Documents Affect the Judgment of 
Professionals and Institutions?
Cindy Caldara, University of Grenoble, France
Jessica Gerard, University of Grenoble, France
Two studies show that even when touch is non-diagnostic, it can affect consumers’ confidence on both professional persons and institu-
tional entities (grad school) through the haptic characteristics (paper thickness and/or texture) of their business cards and brochures, respec-
tively. The implications for design of emblematic professional documents are discussed.
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27-G: The More You Think You Know, The More You Want to Touch: Subjective 
Knowledge And Haptic Exploration
Joann Peck, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Victor Barger, University of Wisconsin - Whitewater, USA
Andrea Webb, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Subjective knowledge affects one's desire for pre-purchase haptic exploration. Regardless of product category, people who think they 
know a lot about a product category are more likely to want to touch a product prior to purchase than people who think they know little about 
a product category.
27-H: Exploring Boundary Conditions for Motor Fluency Effects
Virginie Maille, SKEMA Business School, France
Maureen Morrin, Temple University, USA
Prior research has demonstrated that individuals prefer haptic objects oriented toward the limb(s) dedicated to act upon them, even 
without an intention to act. We show that, when added as collateral objects in a product advertisement, such objects can also influence the 
evaluation of the advertised product, even if totally unrelated.
28-A: Entering Consumption: A Greeter at the Store Entrance Positively Influences 
Customers' Spending, Satisfaction, and Employee Perceptions
Tobias Otterbring, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden
Christine Ringler, Rutgers University, USA
Nancy J. Sirianni, Northeastern University, USA
Anders Gustafsson, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden
This research investigates how a greeter at the store entrance affects consumer behavior and attitudes. We find that customers’ employee 
perceptions, satisfaction, and approach behavior are positively influenced by a greeter, but somewhat differently between males and females. 
Findings are discussed in terms of suspiciousness, evolutionary psychology, and similarity-attraction theory.
28-B: Under-Promise and Over-Deliver: The Role of Wait Time Expectations and Wait 
Prediction Accuracy on Evaluations
Matthew Lastner, Louisiana State University, USA
Patrick Fennell, Louisiana State University, USA
Stephanie Mangus, Louisiana State University, USA
Judith Anne Garretson Folse, Louisiana State University, USA
In contrast with the negative effects found in extant literature, recent research shows positive consequences of waiting. Using the dis-
confirmation of expectations theory, our work extends the positive implications of waiting by considering wait expectations and accuracy of 
predicted wait, showing when and why longer waits yield more positive evaluations.
28-C: Consumers’ Reactions to Assortment Reductions and Shelf Categorizations
Thomas Rudolph, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Liane Nagengast, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Christina Heidemann, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
In order to support customers in their shopping processes, retailers should take into account (1) their actual assortment size and (2) the 
categorization of their shelves. We show in a field setting that both instruments simplify customers’ shopping processes. The combination of 
both instruments shows the most positive outcome.   
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28-D: Long Description Means Big Item: When Attributes of Product Presentation Are 
Misattributed to the Item Itself
Michael Giblin, University of Florida, USA
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA
Joanna Ladzinski, Cornell University, USA
Information found in product presentation can be extraneous and unrelated to the product's qualities. The length of a food's menu de-
scription, for instance, is unrelated to the size of the portion. In two studies we demonstrate that consumers misattribute characteristics of 
product presentation as characteristic of the product itself.
28-E: Inner Value Conflicts: Emotional and Behavioral Consequences in a Cross-Border 
Shopping Context
Liane Nagengast, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Thomas Rudolph, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Tim Boettger, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Although cross-border shopping has enormous impacts on many economies, it has not been investigated from a consumers’ perspective. 
We show empirically that cross-border shoppers feel inner conflicts that affect their purchase behaviors. Public policy makers can influence 
these conflicts by actively communicating the reasons for price differences in neighboring countries.
28-F: Trigger Healthy: How Samples can Create a Healthy Shopping Momentum
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA
Samples may guide consumer choice towards consistent products. Specifically, healthy/unhealthy samples in a grocery setting may 
lead to healthier/less healthy shopping baskets. We demonstrate this in a lab and field setting. These findings suggest consumers may display 
consistent shopping behavior even with product choices that are situationally determined. 
28-G: Do Not Touch Me, But Please Do: Consumer Misjudgment of Comfort With 
Initiating And Receiving Interpersonal Touch
Andrea Webb, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Joann Peck, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Anders Gustafsson, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden
This research shows that people lack self-knowledge with respect to interpersonal touch preferences. Through lab and field studies, we 
examine how one's comfort with initiating and receiving touch impacts attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Although people say they are 
uncomfortable with touch, the effects are not as negative as predicted.
28-H: Windows to the Sale: Mobile Eye-Tracking and In-Store Decision Making
Jacob Suher, University of Texas at Austin, USA
J. Wesley Hutchinson, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Herb Sorensen, Shopper Scientist LLC, USA
In a grocery field study, we use mobile eye-tracking to record shoppers’ visual attention at the point-of-purchase.  Results show that pat-
terns of attention depend upon product display characteristics and purchase duration.  A quasi-experiment shows that reducing visible SKU 
count and facilitating horizontal eye movements increases shopper efficiency.
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29-A: Wow, You're Tall! Effects of Others' Body Height on Consumers' Product 
Evaluations
Utku Akkoç, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
We present and test a framework to show whether the height of another individual can influence a consumer’s product evaluations. Our 
findings reveal that the non-interactive social presence of a conspicuously tall individual activates a height related association (status), which 
leads to evaluations consistent with this association.
29-B: Product Aesthetics Trigger Appearance Related Concerns
Christopher Ling, University of South Carolina, USA
Laurence Ashworth, Queen's University, Canada
We examine how product aesthetics influence product attitude by testing impression management concerns as a moderator, finding that 
in situations where impression management concerns are salient, the effect of product aesthetics on product attitude is enhanced.
29-C: Contaminating Retrospective Enjoyment
Scott Roeder, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Clayton Critcher, University of California, Berkeley, USA
People sometimes learn that others have had the same experience as the self. In this paper we examine how learning of others' parallel 
experiences may alter retrospective enjoyment for one's own experience. Three experiments suggest that people predict, expect and in fact 
report experiential contamination in such circumstances.
29-D: The Lucky Financial Advisor: How Luck Perceptions Influence Consumers' 
Investment Decisions
Peter Darke, York University, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
Monica Popa, Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan, Canada
We show that financial advisors' luck in areas unrelated to investment influences consumers: they invest more when learning that the 
advisor is lucky. The effect is prominent for consumers who believe in good luck, and arises regardless of advisor's expertise: consumers place 
as much stock in luck as in competence.
29-E: Tweets and Retweets for Oreo Touchdown
Vimviriya Limkangvanmongkol, The University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Oreo was the first advertiser of Superbowl XLVII who responded to the blackout opportunism by tweeting “You can still dunk in the 
dark." The tweet received more than 10,000 retweets within the first hours. This paper presents a content analysis of tweets and retweets 
by developing new coding scheme drawn from J. Josko Brakus et al’s scale of brand experience in the dimensions of sensory, affective and 
intellectual. The results explained Oreo’s successful story that the brand smartly used Twitter to interact quickly and publicly. Oreo created 
“brilliant” content tweet and sent out in “real-time” to surprise all audiences. Thus, the brand personality of Oreo was perceived as “fast reac-
tion,” “the winner,” “awesome,” and “brilliant.” In the final analysis, the author concludes that Twitter becomes a communication platform 
to leverage brand personality through brand experience.
29-F: Consumer Judgments as a Function of Social Class
Jaehoon Lee, University of Houston at Clear Lake, USA
L. J. Shrum, HEC Paris, France
Tina M. Lowrey, HEC Paris, France
Using a service context, two experiments tested the hypothesis that lower class individuals, who are more holistic thinkers, focus primar-
ily on context as a whole, whereas upper class individuals, who are more analytic thinkers, focus primarily on specific events only.
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29-G: Trust in Recommendations: Applying the Base-Rate Paradigm to Surrogation vs . 
Simulation
Hang Shen, University of California, Riverside, USA
Ye Li, University of California, Riverside, USA
Consumers increasingly depend on online reviews to inform purchase decisions; yet, Gilbert et al. (2009) find that people avoid surroga-
tion information despite its reliability for affective forecasting. We posit that the perceived diagnosticity of the surrogate’s rating determines 
how much people rely on and use surrogation.
29-H: What Motivates Consumers to Produce Online Reviews? Solidarity, Status, and the 
Soapbox Effect
Edward F. McQuarrie, Santa Clara University, USA
Shelby McIntyre, Santa Clara University, USA
Ravi Shanmugam, Santa Clara University, USA
Using three longitudinal datasets, we explore consumers’ motivation to produce online reviews, contrasting sense of belonging, com-
petition for status, and an intrinsic motivation independent of these extrinsic factors. An examination of the effect of positive feedback on 
subsequent review production provides support for the intrinsic motivation hypothesis.
30-A: The Effects of Being Envied On Word-of-Mouth
Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
Sarah E. Hill, Texas Christian University, USA
Envy is a complex emotion that influences behaviors differently depending on whether one is experiencing envy or is the target of the 
emotion. We demonstrate that being envied decreases one’s tendency to cooperate, and this decreased interest negatively influences willing-
ness to share valuable information (i.e., Word-of-Mouth).
30-B: Gamification and the Entrenchment of an Engagement Institutional Logic in the 
Emerging Institutional Field of Social Media
Andrew Smith, York University, Canada
Pierre-Yann Dolbec, York University, Canada
We contribute to the literature on institutional dynamics by highlighting how a gamified website encourages the entrenchment of an 
institutional logic in a new institutional field by instigating an arrangement of practices; diffusing values, rules, and models for successful 
practices; and offering rewards for complying with the emerging logic.
30-C: I’ll Have What She’s Sharing: The Effect of Social Media on Experience 
Consumption
Stefanie Baert, Ghent University, Belgium
Mario Pandelaere, Ghent University, Belgium
Consumers increasingly purchase experiences relative to material goods. We argue that this phenomenon is possibly due to social media 
and demonstrate that priming respondents with social media increases the evaluation of experiences. The use of social media and attitude 
towards social media sharing moderates the effect.
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30-D: The Public Heart: The Effect of Broadcasting on Emotional Intensity and Well-
Being
Virginia Weber, University of Alberta, Canada
Sarah G. Moore, University of Alberta, Canada
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
The current research examines how sharing positive emotions about brands online impacts the subsequent intensity of those emotions. 
Specifically, we demonstrate that sharing a brand-related emotion broadly on Facebook lowers the intensity of that emotion. Follow-up stud-
ies will manipulate broad versus narrow sharing in other online contexts.
30-E: Identity Management through Humor Expressions in an Online Gaming Community
Prakash Das, University of Calgary, Canada
Little is known about how consumer activities that draw upon modernistic notions of “consumer work” and “collective consumer cre-
ativity” foster community building. We present an interpretive study of an online gaming community and identify “humor expression” as 
consumer work that enhances community creativity through identity-based processes. Findings contest assumptions that community identity 
is mainly claimed by those possessing core community skills. In contested spaces, marginalized members attain recognition through humor-
based creative identity work. Humor is a motive force that is creatively wielded by community members and assists in community building.
30-F: Shaking it Up My Way: Amateur Appropriation of Popular Media
Pia A. Albinsson, Appalachian State University, USA
B. Yasanthi Perera, New Mexico State University, USA
Sarita Ray Chaudhury, Humboldt State University, USA
This study examines consumers’ appropriation of popular media through the creation of user-generated content (UGC). We study UGC 
of Gangnam Style and Harlem Shake, including video and comment reactions, to explore sociocultural implications of this phenomenon. This 
is accompanied by a typology of UGC purposes, and their message transmission approaches.
30-G: Using Social Software to Evoke Social Reflexivity: The Case of Instagram Photo 
Sharing Application
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
This study contributes to an understanding of how social networking websites are encouraging consumers’ reflexive practices. We draw 
insights from a case study of Instagram, a photo sharing application, and  argue that consumer researchers can use this website to evoke 
informant self-reflexivity, and accumulate richer and more in depth data.
30-H: Self-Esteem and Identification with One’s Social Media Groups: Two Opposite Paths 
to Online Social Outcomes
Yuanrui Li, University of California, Riverside, USA
Thomas Novak, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Donna Hoffman, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Most literature investigating the relationship between social media usage and online social outcomes has focused on self-esteem, a 
personal identity construct. Much less research has examined the collective aspects of self-esteem. In this study, we find that self-esteem and 
collective self-esteem affect online social outcomes in independent and opposite ways.
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31-A: The Influence of Brand Propinquity on Complaining Behavior via Social Media
Hongmin Ahn, West Virginia University, USA
Nicholas Bowman, West Virginia University, USA
This study explores the dynamic interplay among several facets of psychological closeness on consumer complaining behavior via social 
media. Our data suggest that increased brand propinquity results in increased engagement when discussion perceived brand mishaps. Results 
also indicate that media familiarity jointly affects consumer intention to engage in complaining behavior.
31-B: When Brands Get Personal in Online Chatters: The Effects of Self-Disclosure and 
Anthropomorphism on Consumer-brand Relationship
Li Huang, University of South Carolina, USA
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
This research investigates the brand’s personal disclosure on Twitter and its consequences on consumer-brand relationship. We provide 
a new framework predicting what to disclose, how to disclose, and to whom the brand should disclose. Shifting the psychological closeness, 
self-disclosure on Twitter can either help or impair the relationships.
31-C: Using Social Media Networks in Russia to (Re)construct Collective Memories and 
Build Brand Identity
Graham Roberts, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France
Philippe Odou, Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne, France
Gaël Bonnin, Reims Management School, France
Holt (2004) shows the different ways in which brands draw on cultural imagery, myths, and history to create identity. Our paper seeks to 
look at how brands in post-socialist Russia use social media networks, both to construct collective memories and to exploit these memories 
in order to build brand identity.
31-D: Social Networking Sites: Building Brand Knowledge and Brand Equity
Noelia Sanchez-Casado, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Eva Tomaseti-Solano, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Juan-Gabriel Cegarra-Navarro, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Social Networking Sites, as new communication tools, allow firms to provide benefits to consumers who establish a relationship with 
them. As a consequence of this relationship, consumers could develop knowledge and equity about the brand. Therefore, this study analyzes 
the effects of these benefits on brand knowledge and brand equity.
31-E: The Effect of Interpersonal Influences on Social Networking Site’s Users
Noelia Sanchez-Casado, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Eva Tomaseti-Solano, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Juan-Gabriel Cegarra-Navarro, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Social Networking Sites (SNS) have become an important tool for firm-consumer communication. In this study we analyze how firms 
create brand knowledge and brand equity in their consumers, through the Interpersonal Influences that SNS’s users experience. The results of 
this study help firms to manage their brand pages at SNS.
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31-F: Consumers’ Endorsements for Companies and Causes: The Role of Symbolism and 
Visibility
Stefan F. Bernritter, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Edith G. Smit, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
In the present study, we examined factors that might affect consumers’ decision to endorse an organization. In particular, we investigated 
to what extent brand symbolism and visibility of an endorsement affected consumers’ intention to endorse. Moreover, we explored whether 
these effects differed for companies (for profit) and causes (non profit).
31-G: “I Know It’s Your Fault, But I Blame the Matchmaker More:” Changes in 
Consumer Trust Toward Social Commerce Companies Due to Dissatisfying Purchases in a 
Two-sided Market
Yaeeun Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea
Myeong-cheol Park, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea
We examined whether the perceived main sources of service failure cause changes in consumer trust toward social commerce compa-
nies. When a business is two-sided, consumers attribute service failure experiences with merchants to the intermediary, the “social commerce 
company”. This was verified for all severity levels of service failure.
31-H: The Relationship between Brand Personality and Crisis Strategies for 
Organizational Reputation
Jiyoon Karen Han, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Dong Hoo Kim, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Yoon-Hi Sung, University of Texas at Austin, USA
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of brand personality in crisis communication. This research explores the major company 
crisis of 2010, 2011 and 2012, by comparing sincere and exciting brand personality companies with their crisis strategies.
32-A: Society or the Environment? How Tangibility Affects Consumer Perceptions of Firm 
Sustainability Practices
Sara Bahnson, University of Oregon, USA
Lan Jiang, University of Oregon, USA
Jun Ye, Xiamen University, China
Nagesh Murthy, University of Oregon, USA
This research examines the relative importance of environmental and social sustainability practices on consumer evaluations. Using both 
field and experimental data, we show that environmental practices generate greater impacts for goods firms, while social practices are more 
influential for services firms. The role of tangibility is identified as the mechanism.
32-B: Green Confessions: The Moderating Influence of Religiosity on Pro-Environmental 
Compensatory Consumption
Daniele Mathras, Arizona State University, USA
Naomi Mandel, Arizona State University, USA
Adam B. Cohen, Arizona State University, USA
‘Green guilt’ may arise after reflecting about one’s transgressions toward the environment, thus motivating restorative consumption 
behaviors. In two studies, we find that private green confessions may boost initial compensatory behaviors but both public and private confes-
sions reduce green compensatory consumption across multiple tasks, especially for intrinsically religious individuals.
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32-C: Pro-Environmental Motivation and Intent in an Emerging Market Context
Nadine Sonnenberg, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Alet C. Erasmus, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Empirical evidence regarding pro-environmental motivation and intent almost exclusively addresses conditions in First-world scenarios. 
This study examines the role of motivational factors in emerging consumers’ environmentally significant intent and highlight the relevance of 
awareness of environmental issues, moral norms, guilt, subjective norms, attitudes and perceived behavioral control.
32-D: Consuming to Support the Free Market: The Effects of Economic System-
Justification on Consumer Preferences
Matthew Maxwell-Smith, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
June Cotte, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Allison Johnson, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Political system-justification tendencies have affected consumption behaviors, although the influence of economic system-justification 
has not been investigated systematically. Three studies showed that economic system-justification predicted consumption habits that support 
companies and industries which feature prominently within the current economic system, even if such behaviors undermined people’s own 
health interests.
32-E: Are Values Always Abstract? How Construal Level and Identities Influence the Use 
of Values on Green Consumption
Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
Construal level theory predicts that values will lead to behavior when consumers are in abstract construals. Five studies extend these 
findings by showing that values can also lead to expected behaviors under concrete construals. Specifically, findings demonstrate that in 
concrete (vs. abstract) construals, values work for close (vs. distant) identities.
32-F: Going Green for Self vs . Others: Gender and Identity Salience Effects on Green 
Consumption
Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Patricia Rossi, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
This paper examines the effects of gender and identities on green consumption. Previous research shows that women are greener than 
men. However, we extend these findings by showing that social (vs. personal) identity changes the impact of gender on green consumption. 
This effect is mediated by self-transcendence values.
32-G: Consuming Green, Living Green: Boundary Conditions of the Licensing Effect
Marijn H. C. Meijers, ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Marret K. Noordewier, Leiden University, The Netherlands
Edith G. Smit, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Sustainable consumption at t=0 may license people to behave unsustainably at t=1. We show that this effect is mitigated by one’s sustain-
able identity. We also find that self-licenses can be traded in only once and do not persist in subsequent situations (t=2).
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32-H: Princesses, Castles, Enchanted Forests and Dragons – Exploring (Eco) Destination 
Wedding Consumption
Denise Conroy, The University of Auckland, New Zealand
Rachel Wolfgramm, The University of Auckland, New Zealand
Sian Coleman, The University of Auckland, New Zealand
We explore consumers’ commitment to holding a destination wedding, and whether sustainability concerns motivate this decision in 
any way.  Our intention is to develop theory that expands our understanding of how perceived meanings of destination weddings are formed 
within consumer culture, and the role identity plays in transformative consumer behaviour.
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ERRATUM
On Page 1096 of Volume 40 of Advances in Consumer Research, the correct Roundtable Chairs for the session “Market System Dy-
namics: The Value of and the Open Questions Associated with Studying Markets in Consumer Culture Theory” are Anton Siebert, Witten/
Herdecke University, Germany and Markus Giesler /York University, Canada.
ACR apologizes for the error.
